

Working Paper Series in European Studies
Volume 1, Number 3

Dimensions and Alignments in European Union Politics: Cognitive Constraints and Partisan Responses

DR. SIMON HIX

DEPARTMENT OF GOVERNMENT

LONDON SCHOOL OF ECONOMICS AND POLITICAL SCIENCE

Houghton Street
London, WC2A 2AE
United Kingdom
(s.hix@lse.ac.uk)

EDITORIAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE:

GILLES BOUSQUET

KEITH COHEN

COLLEEN DUNLAVY

ANDREAS KAZAMIAS

LEON LINDBERG

ELAINE MARKS

ANNE MINER

ROBERT OSTERGREN

MARK POLLACK

GREGORY SHAFFER

MARC SILBERMAN

JONATHAN ZEITLIN

Copyright © 1998

All rights reserved.

No part of this paper may be reproduced in any form without permission of the author.

European Studies Program, International Institute,
University of Wisconsin--Madison
Madison, Wisconsin
<http://polyglot.lss.wisc.edu/eur/>

Dimensions and Alignments in European Union Politics: Cognitive Constraints and Partisan Responses

Simon Hix

Department of Government, London School of Economics and
Political Science, London, United Kingdom

Abstract

As the European Union (EU) has evolved, the study agenda has shifted from ‘European integration’ to ‘EU politics’. Missing from this new agenda, however, is an understanding of the ‘cognitive constraints’ on actors, and how actors respond: i.e. the shape of the EU ‘political space’ and the location of social groups and competition between actors within this space. The article develops a theoretical framework for understanding the shape of the EU political space (the interaction between an Integration-Independence and a Left-Right dimension and the location of class and sectoral groups within this map), and tests this framework on the policy positions of the Socialist, Christian Democrat and Liberal party leaders between 1976 and 1994 (using the techniques of the ECPR Party Manifestos Group Project). The research finds that the two dimensions were salient across the whole period, explains why the party families converged on pro-European positions by the 1990s, and discovers the emergence of a triangular ‘core’ of EU politics.

1. Introduction: From ‘European Integration’ to ‘EU Politics’

The European Community, now European Union (EU), has mainly been studied as a case of political and/or economic ‘integration’. Given this dependent variable, the task for scholars (predominantly from the field of International Relations) has been to explain how this process worked. For example, why was integration launched in the 1950s (Haas, 1958; Lindberg, 1963)? Why did it breakdown in the 1960s (Hoffman, 1966; Schmitter, 1971; Haas, 1976)? Why was it relaunched in the 1980s (Sandholtz & Zysman, 1989; Moravcsik, 1991; Garrett, 1992)? Why was the Maastricht Treaty and the project of Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) adopted (Lange, 1993; Moravcsik, 1993; Scharpf, 1996)? And, why has power been increasingly delegated to the European Commission (Majone, 1991; Pollack, 1997) and the European Court of Justice (Burley & Mattli, 1993; Garrett, 1995)?

However, ‘integration’ is no-longer the only dependent variable that matters in the study of the EU. As a result of integration, the EU is now more a ‘political system’ than an international organisation. The EU has a *trias politica*: with executive, legislative and judicial functions. The amount of resources that are directly redistributed through the exercise of these functions may be marginal compared to the domestic level in Europe. However, through the convergence criteria for EMU, the rules for the Single Market and EU social policy, the regulatory and (indirect) redistributive impact of EU decision-making is enormous (cf. Leibfried & Pierson, 1995; Majone, 1996). Moreover, through EU environment policy, equal opportunities legislation, the provisions on EU citizenship, culture and media policies and the emerging policies against racism and xenophobia, the EU has an increasing impact on the allocation of values and norms in Europe. In Weber’s classic definition, the EU may not be a ‘state’. European integration has been slow in the two traditional areas of state authority: external and internal security. Nevertheless, in the adoption of socio-economic policies, it is difficult to deny that the EU produces an ‘authoritative allocation of values’ (Easton, 1956), determines ‘who gets what, when and how’ (Lasswell, 1936) or undertakes ‘redistributive, regulatory and stabilisation’ functions (Musgrave, 1959).

In this sense, politics in the EU ‘is not inherently different to the practice of government in any democratic system’ (Hix, 1994: 1)¹. For example, a bi-product of the graduation from ‘integration’ to ‘politics’ is the growing concern with the (lack of) democratic accountability and legitimacy of the EU. The so-called ‘permissive consensus’ (Lindberg & Scheingold, 1970), that persisted while the question of integration dominated the European agenda, has given way to a new ‘legitimacy crisis’ (in the wake of the

ratification of the Maastricht Treaty) as the European agenda has turned to the ‘political’ questions that are the traditional concerns of institutions, political parties and voters in the domestic arena. If we are to understand why this has occurred, what is likely to happen as a result of this development, and (perhaps more importantly) how to resolve this problem, the social science community has a responsibility to venture beyond the narrow study of the ‘integration’ of Europe and begin to analyse the ‘politics’ of the EU (cf. Hix, 1996b, 1998).

This is not a new argument. Since the end of the 1980s, a growing body of literature has developed on three main aspects of EU politics. First, interest group organisation and representation in the EU has been studied using theories from comparative politics, such as pluralism, corporatism and the structure-of-political-opportunities (Streek & Schmitter, 1991; Greenwood et.al., 1992; Marks, 1993; Marks & McAdam, 1996). Second, EU legislative and executive-legislative processes have been studied using concepts and tools (e.g. rational choice) from the comparative study of institutions and decision-making (Scharpf, 1988; Sbragia, 1992; Tsebelis, 1994; Crombez, 1996). Third, the study of EU policy-making is now dominated by the concerns of more general comparative public policy scholars, such as the EU ‘policy style’ and the nature of the EU ‘policy community’ (Wallace & Wallace, 1996; Richardson, 1996; Majone, 1996; cf. Risse-Kappen, 1996). Broadly speaking, these bodies of literature address the three classic variables of the political system: interest representation (inputs); decision-making (the black box); and policy-decisions (outputs) - what Keman (1993) calls the politics-polity-policy triad.

However, a fundamentally important set of variables is absent from this ‘new’ research on EU politics: the normative, cognitive and ideological constraints on the political process - or, put another way, the ‘shape of the EU political space’. Even with an

instrumental view of ideology, the shape of the EU political space (the dimensions of political conflict and the positions and alignments of actors within this space) constitutes a significant cognitive constraint on all political interaction. In the study of politics in most political systems this is often taken for granted. For example, much research on party behaviour assumes that voters are aligned along a Left-Right dimension, and that their positions on this spectrum are determined (exogenously) by structural (e.g. class) or value (e.g. post-material) divisions in society (e.g. Downs, 1956). In the study of EU politics, however, it is still common to use the assumption of the integration scholars, that the only dimension of EU politics is between actors wanting ‘more integration’ and actors wanting ‘less’ (Garrett, 1992; Lange, 1993; Tsebelis, 1994; Sbragia, 1996). Nevertheless, on issues like the democratic accountability of the system and socio-economic questions, actors cease to be aligned on this ‘Integration-Independence dimension’ and are forced to also take up positions on the more classic dimension of politics: the Left-Right.

Consequently, to contribute to the emerging study of EU politics, the cognitive structure of the EU political space needs to be understood in more depth. This article hence seeks to make a small step towards this goal: by developing a theoretical framework for analysing the EU political space (Section 2); and testing this framework on the policy positions of the Socialist, Christian Democrat, Liberal and Green party families between 1976 and 1994 (Section 3). Finally, the article draws together some tentative conclusions and suggests some avenues for further research in this area (Section 4).

2. The Shape of the EU Political Space: A Theoretical Framework

In the ontology of the new-institutional approach in political science, the shape of the cognitive/ideological environment (the dimensionality of the political space, and the ideological location of the actors within this space) is as much a constraint on political action as institutional ‘rules of the game’ (cf. Thelen & Stienmo, 1992; Hall & Taylor, 1996).² The cognitive structure of the political space and the ideological identikits of the actors’ within this space solve important problems of uncertainty, credibility, imperfect and incomplete information (esp. Budge, 1994). For example, by reducing the number of ‘viable’ locations in the political space, the cognitive structure helps resolve intransitivity problems (cf. Laver & Shepsle, 1990). Similarly, by summarising actors’ positions on a variety of political issues, and by linking previous and future commitments, the shape of the political space reduces the transaction-costs of political communication and interaction (North, 1990b; Hinich & Munger, 1993).

Nevertheless, as with institutions, there is a two-way interaction between cognitive constraints and actors’ behaviour (Shepsle, 1986, 1989). On the one hand, constraints imposed (exogenously) on political action by the cognitive shape of the political space lead to ‘structure-induced equilibria’. For example, if the location of actors in the policy space is unimportant, any actors can ally to form a ‘minimum-winning-coalition’ (Riker, 1962). However, when the spatial location of actors is important, the number of ‘feasible’ coalitions is restricted to only those that are between actors that are next to each other (‘connected’) in the policy space (Axelrod, 1970). On the other hand, the ability of political actors to alter the structure of the constraints produces ‘equilibrium structures’. For example, an individual actor can alter his/her ideological location in the political space. Moreover, actors can shape the dimensionality of the political space by refusing to

differentiate themselves (i.e. compete) on one or more dimension, or by adding a new dimension of competition (Riker, 1986).

Hence, for an understanding of the interaction between the shape of the political space in the EU and the behaviour of political actors, we need to ascertain several things. First, what is the dimensionality of the EU political space? Second, what is the location of social interests within this space? We focus on class and sectoral interests. Third, what is the (starting) position of key actors in this space? We focus on the European party families. And, on the basis of this, how can we expect actors (i.e. parties) to behave within this space: in response to the structure of the constraints?

Dimensions of Politics: Integration-Independence and Left-Right Cleavages

Most theories of political behaviour assume that the dimensionality of the political space is exogenously determined by social or value divisions ('cleavages'). As Rae and Taylor explain:

Cleavages are the criteria which divide the members of a community or subcommunity into groups, and the relevant cleavages are those which divide members into groups with important political differences at specific times and places (Rae & Taylor, 1970: 1).

In Lipset and Rokkan's (1967) famous cleavage-model, 'critical junctures' in the development of political systems create dichotomies of interests. For example, the democratic revolution created a conflict between church and state (a religious cleavage) and the industrial revolution produced a conflict between capital and labour (a class cleavage) (*ibid.* 13-23).

From this perspective, there are two main dimensions of EU politics: an *Integration-Independence* dimension and a *Left-Right* dimension. The first of these is the dimension

used in many theories of EU integration and decision-making: where actors are positioned on a continuum from 'more' to 'less' integration. Using the Lipset-Rokkan framework, however, this dimension derives from the critical juncture of European integration. In all systems, the process of political integration creates a (centre-periphery) division between groups whose identity and interests are threatened by integration and those whose identity and interests are protected (Rokkan, 1973). In the case of the EU, these groups are 'nations', who define their identities by a common territory, historical myths, mass culture, legal rights and duties, and economy (Smith, 1991: 14). Consequently, this 'national/territorial cleavage' is manifest at the EU level if any of these features of national identity are threatened and/or if some nations are perceived to benefit (through gaining resources, for example) at the expense of others.

The second dimension is the dominant Left-Right continuum that exists at the domestic level in Europe, and becomes manifest at the European level as the EU shifts from 'integration' to 'politics'. The Left-Right dimension is really a summary of two 'value dimensions' (cf. Flanagan, 1987; Dunleavy & O'Leary, 1987: 8; Finer, 1987). The first of these derives from the democratic revolution, and refers to how far there should be 'intervention in individual *social and political* relations for a collective good'. The issues on this 'libertarian-authoritarian' dimension are the normative aspects of democracy: such as freedom of association, opinion, speech and decision versus restrictive, hierarchical, and traditional practices. This was the main source of conflict in the 19th century in Europe, and has returned to prominence since the 1960s with the rise of post-material issues and the increased salience of 'new politics issues' such as ecology, nuclear disarmament, feminism, and minority rights.³ The second emerged as a result of the industrial revolution, and refers

to how far there should be ‘intervention in individual *economic* relations for a collective good’. The main issues on this ‘intervention-free market’ dimension are: redistribution, employment, public ownership, and welfare versus *laissez-faire* practices (cf. Lijphart, 1981; Inglehart & Huber, 1995).

These two ‘socio-economic’ dimensions are usually subsumed in a single Left-Right conflict for several reasons. On a functional level, the Left-Right is a remarkable invention, in that it enables politics to be simplified into either a dichotomy or a single continuum. Moreover, despite the so-called ‘end of ideology’ thesis, Left and Right still represent powerful ideological standpoints: where Left implies equality (‘intervention’ to promote equitable outcomes in the market, but ‘liberty’ to promote social and political equality before the law); and Right implies inequality (allowing the inequalities inherent in the ‘free market’ and the privileges protected by an ‘authoritarian’ state) (Lukes, 1992; Scruton, 1992; Bobbio, 1996 [1995]).⁴ This does not prevent intermediate positions, i.e. intervention-authoritarian and free market-libertarian, but does explain why these positions are less common than the oft-observed ‘Left-Libertarian’ and ‘Right-Authoritarian’ stances (Kitschelt, 1994, 1995).

Putting these arguments together, Figure 1 sets out the ideal-typical policy positions in the three-dimensional EU political space (cf. Marks & Hooghe, 1997). For example, in the 1990s, the conflict on the economic dimension of EU politics is between regulated and neoliberal (or deregulated) capitalism. However, the national/territorial dimension cuts across both of these positions: e.g. regulated capitalism at the European level constrains (and even undermines) the national Welfare State. Similarly, on the socio-political dimension, in the 1990s the conflict is between the centrality of majoritarian institutions (such as

parliaments), supported by legally protected rights and freedoms, and the growing power of the executive, through autonomous agencies, secrecy of government and police and legal powers. Again, the national/territorial dimension cuts across these positions: e.g. the emergence of democratic institutions at the European level would end national parliamentary sovereignty.

Fig. 1. *Ideal-Typical Policy Positions in the European Union Political Space*


<i>Economic Dimension</i>			<i>Socio-Political Dimension</i>	
Intervention	Free Market		Libertarian	Authoritarian
European Regulated Capitalism	European Neoliberal Capitalism	Integration <i>National/ Territorial Dimension</i>	European Federal Democracy	European Autonomous Executive
National Welfare-State Capitalism	National Neoliberal Capitalism		National Parliamentary Sovereignty	National Executive Domination
		Independence		

Location of Social Interests: Class⁵

Turning to the location of social interests within this space, class structure in advanced industrial society is more complex than the classical Marxian or Weberian notions: both of which see a fundamental dichotomy between the proletariat and the bourgeoisie.⁶ Since the Second World War, production-styles have changed. The separation of management from capital ownership, the expansion of the service industry, and the growth of public sector employment, has produced a ‘new middle class’ (a salariat) as the largest sector of the work force (Dahrendorf, 1959; Giddens, 1973: 177-97; Dunleavy, 1979). Moreover, different production, consumption and educational life-experiences have produced cross-cutting loyalties and interests.⁷ These social changes have thus led to a concomitant ‘dealignment’ of class interests and political loyalties (Dalton, 1988; Franklin, 1992).

Nevertheless, there is evidence that class remains a powerful determinant of political interest and ideological orientation (Lane, 1965; Inglehart & Klingemann, 1976; Korpi, 1983; Kitschelt, 1993). A key factor in these new class patterns is whether income is from profits or wages, a person is employed or manages other peoples’ labour, work is manual or skilled, and employment is in the public or private sector (Wright & Cho, 1992: 170-4; Dunleavy & Husbands, 1985: 121-6). Deductive reasoning from these assumptions produces a pattern of class interests in the socio-economic space as shown in Figure 2 (cf. Kitschelt, 1993: 306), that appears to be confirmed in empirical research (e.g. Heath et.al., 1993).

Fig. 2. *Deductive Location of Class Interests in the Socio-Economic Political Space*



The oval shape of the distribution indicates that there is some degree of correlation between attitudes on the two socio-economic dimensions. This allows the two dimensions to be ‘squeezed’ into a single Left-Right (Sartori, 1976: 342). Moreover, this Left-Right axis crosses the intervention-free market dimension on the ‘free market’ side of the centre, but cuts the libertarian-authoritarian dimension towards the ‘libertarian’ side. This hence explains Europe-wide support since the mid-1970s for policies that reduce public intervention in individual economic and social relations, regardless of whether Socialist or Conservative parties have been in government.


Turning to the other dimension of EU politics, one way of locating groups on the question of EU integration is to look at whether an industrial sector is internationally or domestically competitive. With the regulation of the Single Market exclusively at the European level, and the possibility of financial and monetary policy co-ordination via the

EU, the level of economic integration can determine how sectors compete on the domestic, European and world markets (Gourevitch, 1989; Frieden, 1991). This produces six locations on an Integration-Independence continuum (from least to most integrationist): non-tradable *public sectors*, who need national economic autonomy to preserve the size of the welfare state (Huber & Stephens, 1992); (mostly small business) *domestic producers*, who compete with third-country imports in the domestic market, favour market integration but only with European-level import restrictions or substantial transfers of economic resources to maintain their competitiveness (Axt, 1992); (mostly manufacturing) *global producers*, who compete in the world market more than in the European market, and hence need stable exchange rates but oppose harmonised labour standards; *financial services*, who compete in the world and European markets, favour market integration and deregulation, but oppose European-level regulation or restrictions against third-country competition; *multinational European producers* ('Euro-Champions'), who compete in the European market against third-country imports, and support 'positive' market integration at the EU level (Thiel, 1989; Holman, 1992; Green Cowles, 1995); and, the *agricultural sector*, which strongly supports market integration and benefits most from transectoral financial transfers in the EU (via the Common Agricultural Policy).

Combining class interests with sectoral interests consequently produces a deductive location of social groups in the two-dimensional EU political space as in Figure 3. This framework provides a cursory explanation of attitudes towards the EU. For example, the Danish 'No' vote in the first referendum on the Maastricht Treaty was because of the anti-integration location of the public sector employees in Denmark; who constitute the largest single social group in the Danish system (Suine, 1993). Moreover, in the core EU states -

Germany, the Benelux, and France (and Austria) - large sections of the industrial workforce are employed in European-wide competitive industry (the Euro-Champions), whereas in Britain there is a conflict of interests between financial services/global producers and the public sector. And, in the periphery states - Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Italy - where most people are employed in production for the domestic market, the European project is popular so long as significant territorial redistribution can be secured through EU structural programmes. Moreover, evidence from the Eurobarometer surveys suggests a connection between sectoral employment and attitudes towards European integration (cf. Dalton & Eichenberg, 1991; Eichenberg & Dalton, 1993; Gabel & Palmer, 1995; Whitten et.al., 1996). However, for this deductive map of social group location in the EU political space to be as accurate and robust as the map of social group location in the socio-economic space (in Figure 2), more empirical research is required.

Fig. 3. *Deductive Location of Social Groups in the European Union Political Space*



Nevertheless, this location of interests in the EU political space illustrates that the political market in EU politics is fragmented. Intra-class alliances may hold together on Left-Right issues on the EU agenda (such as the level of social regulation of the single market), but will collapse on Integration-Independence issues (such as the degree of fiscal integration and transnational economic transfers). Conversely, intra-sector alliances may hold on Integration-Independence issues but collapse on Left-Right issues. This may be more complex than the political map in most domestic arenas in Europe. However, it is similar to the type of politics that exists in many territorial or ethnically divided societies - such as the United States or Switzerland - where system-wide class alliances are undermined by competing territorial interests.

Furthermore, this map also suggests that intra-class/inter-sectoral alliances are more likely on the Left or Right at the Integration rather than Independence end of the national/territorial cleavage. For example, a Left/Integration stance would appeal to a large section of labour and significant sections of the salariat in the Euro-champions, financial services and global producers. Similarly, a Right/Integration stance would appeal to large sections of owners and the salariat in all industries. A Left/Independence stance, in contrast, would only appeal to certain public sector interests, and a Right/ Independence stance would only appeal to the petty-bourgeoisie.


Impact on Actors: Political Parties

The question, therefore, is how this shape of the EU political space constrains actors' behaviour and how actors subsequently react to these constraints. One of these groups of actors, and the main intermediary organisations between social divisions and the democratic process, are political parties. As articulators of social divisions and proponents of specific 'world views' (*familles spirituelles*), parties are constrained by the structure of the ideological space and the location of interests (i.e. voters) within this space (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967). However, with considerable financial, media and political resources, parties are highly adaptive organisations (Sartori, 1968). They are hence ideal subjects for investigating the interaction between cognitive constraints and conscious behaviour in EU politics.

When taking up positions in the EU political space, parties are constrained by the fact that their ideological identikit has been defined within the two-dimensional structure of the Left-Right, and not within the two- or three-dimensional space of EU politics (Lijphart, 1981; Beyme, 1985: 159-253; Budge et. al., 1987; Bartolini & Mair, 1990). Moreover,

because of the structure of interests on the Integration-Independence dimension, any attempt to compete on this dimension would produce divisions within party families (between parties with different national interests) rather than between party families.

Fig. 4. *The Party Families in the European Union Political Space*



Source: Hix & Lord (1997).

Notes. The mean position of each party family is shown by an X.

The ellipses represent the ranges of the member parties of each party family.

This problem is illustrated in Figure 4 - where the Left-Right position and spread of the party families were calculated from 'expert judgements' of the location of each member party (Huber & Inglehart, 1995),⁸ and the positions of parties on the Integration-Independence dimension were calculated as the percentage difference between the number of supporters who 'think the EU is a good thing' those who 'think the EU is a bad thing'.⁹ The mean positions of the party families (shown by the X's), suggests that all the major

parties are moderately pro-European, whereas the Radical Left, Extreme Right and the Anti-Europeans are all pro-national independence.

However, and more importantly for this analysis, the spread of the main party families (shown by the shape of the ellipses) is smaller on the Left-Right dimension than on the Integration-Independence dimension. This hence confirms the expectation that the main party families define themselves, and the differences between themselves and other families, by positions on the socio-economic dimension. For example, organised labour is the traditional constituency of Socialist parties. But, because labour groups are deeply divided on the Integration-Independence dimension (as Figure 3 shows), Socialist parties are also divided on this dimension (as Figure 4 shows).

In contrast, the Regionalists and Anti-Europeans (shown by the shaded areas) are more cohesive on Integration-Independence issues than on Left-Right questions: the former supporting and the latter opposing the weakening of the nation-state, but both maintaining these positions regardless of the implications for economic and social policies. Nevertheless, because the political market is too fragmented at the Independence end of Independence-Integration dimension (as shown in Figure 3), a single cross-Left-Right Anti-European alliance is unsustainable. This hence explains why the Danish anti-European movement split into Left and Right blocs in 1994 and why the other anti-European movements have tended to be either strongly Left-wing (e.g. Scandinavia) or Right-wing (e.g. France and Britain) rather than cross-class based.

Hypotheses and Operationalisation

From this theoretical framework we can draw several propositions about the interaction between the shape of the EU political space and party behaviour: the first two

relating to the structure of the constraints, and the second two relating to how parties can be expected to react.

- *There are two dominant dimensions in the EU political space: an Integration-Independence dimension on pro- and anti-European issues; and a Left-Right dimension, on ‘libertarian-authoritarian’ or ‘intervention-free market’ issues.*
- *Within this space, the location of class and sectoral interests limits the options for party differentiation on the Integration-Independence dimension.* Traditional party alignments to classes rather than sectors prevents parties from defining a narrow position on the Integration-Independence dimension.
- *As a result, parties can be expected to compete only on the Left-Right dimension.* To prevent internal conflicts (within the party families) parties will minimise differences on Integration-Independence issues and differentiate themselves on Left-Right issues on the EU agenda.
- *Moreover, in so doing, the main parties can be expected to become more Integrationist.* Broad (class and sectoral alliances) are only viable on the Left or Right at the Integrationist end of the Integration-Independence dimension. Anti-integration policy stances will have only limited class and sectoral appeal.

These propositions can be tested using several techniques from the study of party competition in the domestic arena in Europe. The Manifesto Research Group of the European Consortium for Political Research has developed a content-analysis method, to map the dimensionality of party systems and the changing location of parties within systems (Budge et.al., 1987b; Laver & Budge, 1992b; Klingemann et.al., 1994). This method has not previously been applied to party positions at the European level, but it can easily be

adapted to fit our purpose. The first step is to develop a coding-frame, of the type of issues on each of the dimensions of politics: this is set out in Table 1.¹⁰ The second step is to code the party policy statements, by counting the number of sentences (or quasi-sentences) in one of the issue categories in the coding frame. The ‘final score’ for each category is expressed as a percentage of the total number of sentences contained in each document.¹¹

We looked at every major policy statement adopted by the (national and EP) party leaders of the Socialist, Christian Democratic, Liberal and Green European party federations between 1976 and 1994: the Party of European Socialists (PES), which was founded in 1974 as the Confederation of Socialist Parties of the European Community (CSP); the European People’s Party-Christian Democrats (EPP), which was founded in 1976; the European Liberal, Democratic and Reform Party (ELDR), which was founded in 1976 as the Federation of European Liberal and Democratic Parties (ELD); and the European Federation of Green Parties (EFGP), which was founded in 1984 as the European Co-ordination of Green Parties (ECGP).¹² The total number of documents analysed was ninety-one: twenty-nine from the Socialists, twenty-nine from the Christian Democrats, twenty-eight from the Liberals, and five from the Greens (see Appendix A).

Table 1. *Issues and Dimensions in European Union Politics*

First Side of Dimension	Second Side of Dimension
<i>Intervention-Free Market Dimension</i>	
FREE MARKET	INTERVENTION

101	Open market/enterprise/incentives (401, 402)	102	Planned economy/employment (404, 412, 413)
103	Economic efficiency & productivity (410, 414)	104	Social protection/regulation (403, 409)
105	Government efficiency (303)	106	Corporatism (405)
107	Free international trade/GATT (407)	108	Trade protectionism (406)
109	Social services/education: negative (505, 507)	110	Social services/education: positive (504, 506)
111	Labour groups: negative (702)	112	Labour groups: positive (701)
113	Internal Market/Project 1992	114	Social Charter/Chapter: positive
115	EC/EU competition policy	116	Social 'convergence criteria'
117	Economic 'convergence criteria'	118	International Development Aid

Libertarian-Authoritarian Dimension

LIBERTARIAN		AUTHORITARIAN	
201	Freedom and human rights (201)	202	Traditional morality (603)
203	Democracy (202)	204	Defence of traditional way of life (601)
205	Environmental protection (501)	206	Constitutionalism (203)
207	Open government (304)	208	Government effectiveness and authority (305)
209	Women and minority groups (705, 706)	210	Law and order (605)
211	Peace/Disarmament (105, 106)	212	Militarism (104)
213	European Union citizenship	214	European effort/social harmony (606)
215	TREVI and Schengen: negative	216	Common Immigration Policy

Integration-Independence Dimension

INTEGRATION		INDEPENDENCE	
301	Integration/Supranationalism (109)	302	Independence/Intergovernmentalism (110)
303	Subsidiarity/Federalism/'Europe of Regions'	304	Subsidiarity/Sovereignty/'Europe of Nations'
305	EPC/Common Foreign and Security Policy	306	Enlargement/Widening
307	EMU/Single Currency/ECB: positive	308	EMU/Single Currency/ECB: negative
309	Increased powers of European Parliament	310	Involvement of National Parliaments
311	Powers/accountability of Commission	312	Powers/role of Council of Ministers
313	Increased 'majority voting'	314	Preservation of 'unanimity voting'
315	Economic & Social Cohesion	316	Social Charter/Cohesion: negative
317	'Two-speed' Europe/'opt-outs': negative	318	'Two-speed' Europe/'opt-outs': positive

Although these statements do not possess the same meaning as election manifestos in the domestic arena, they are accurate indicators of the positions of these political actors. These documents were signed by national party leaders (i.e. not simply by faceless European-level party officials) - at the party leaders' summits of the party federations.

Moreover, all these documents were released to the press, who are free to point out any inconsistencies between these statements and the official party policies in the domestic arena. As a result, these documents are carefully drafted by representatives from each national party, to ensure consistency with national positions. Finally, although the documents may be read by a limited number of people, they are used by party leaders as ‘policy markers’ when drafting policies on EU issues in the domestic arena. For example, in 1990 the National Executive of the British Labour Party adopted word-for-word the fourteen-point statement on EMU that had been agreed at a PES Party Leaders’ Conference as the official policy of the party (Hix & Lord, 1997: 72-3).

From the final scores on each category, two types of variables were calculated:

1. The *number of dimensions of the EU political space*. The ‘saliency’ of each dimension was measured by calculating the percentage of each document dedicated to all the issue categories on that dimension.
2. The *location of the parties on the dimensions*. First, the frequency counts for the categories on each ‘side’ of the dimensions were added together. Second, the final location on each dimension was computed by taking the total percentage of each document devoted to the categories on the second side minus the percentage devoted to the categories on the first side. Third, the position of a policy document on a compound Left-Right dimension was calculated from the policy positions on the two socio-economic policy dimensions (see Appendix B).

This is the first time that ever major European party policy document has been analysed simultaneously. Moreover, this is the first time that the method of the Manifesto Research Group project has been extended to look at party competition at the European

level. Finally, and more significantly for the purposes of this article, an analysis of the changing shape of party competition on EU issues is an important step towards a more thorough understanding of how EU politics works.

3. Empirical Results: Dimensions and Partisan Alignments in EU Politics

The results have been summarised into two topics: the dimensionality of the EU political space - the saliency of the dimensions; and the changing location of the parties in this space - on socio-economic (Left-Right) issues, on the Integration-Independence dimension, and in the two-dimensional EU political space.

Saliency of the Dimensions of EU Politics

The results of the analysis of the party leaders' statements consequently suggest that all three issue dimensions were present in EU politics across the whole period.¹³ Between 1974 and 1994, an average of 28% of the contents of the European party documents was dedicated to each policy dimension. The two socio-economic dimensions (intervention-free market, and libertarian-authoritarian issues) were slightly less salient than the Integration-Independence dimension. However, the difference between the average saliency of the Integration-Independence dimension and the socio-economic dimensions was only about 10%; and the two socio-economic policy dimensions together constituted almost 60% of the policy statements.

Table 2. *Saliency of the Dimensions of European Union Politics*

DIMENSION:	<i>Intervention- Free Market</i>		<i>Libertarian- Authoritarian</i>		<i>Integration- Independence</i>	
PARTY:	1976-80	1990-94	1976-80	1990-94	1976-80	1990-94

Socialists	48.9%	36.6%	30.6%	22.1%	20.6%	41.3%
Liberals	31.7%	21.8%	40.8%	29.4%	27.6%	48.7%
Christian Democrats	29.5%	14.3%	42.7%	32.4%	27.8%	53.3%
Greens	-	18.4%	-	50.4%	-	31.3%
All Party Families	35.2%	24.4%	38.9%	29.7%	25.9%	45.9%

Nevertheless, as Table 2 shows, the saliency of the dimensions changed between the first and last four-year periods. At the systemic level, whereas in 1976-80 the two socio-economic dimensions were considerably more salient than the Integration-Independence dimension, in 1990-94 the situation was reversed. Moreover, between these two periods there was a change in the relative saliency of the two socio-economic dimensions. In both periods, libertarian-authoritarian issues were more salient than intervention-free market issues, but the gap between the two socio-economic dimensions increased.


At the party-specific level, the status of integration-independence issues fundamentally changed for the three main party families. Moreover, there was a marked similarity in the degree of increased saliency of this dimension for these parties: a 19.2% increase for the Socialists, 19.3% for the Liberals, and 20.9% for the Christian Democrats. This change hence highlights the difference between the policy concerns of the main party families and the new Green party family. Between 1990 and 1994, the Greens were the only party family that did not place greatest emphasis on the question of more or less integration of the EU system. Nevertheless, the overall change in the relative saliency of the two socio-economic dimensions is explained almost exclusively by the emergence of the Greens. The growth in the saliency of the libertarian-authoritarian *vis-à-vis* the intervention-free market dimension was due to the huge difference of emphasis given to the dimensions by the Greens in the 1990-1994 period.

In sum: all three dimensions of politics were clearly present. This does not mean, however, that they were all ‘manifest’: i.e. that actors took different positions (competed) on the dimensions. Moreover, there was a large increase in the saliency of the Integration-Independence dimension: from about a quarter of party leaders’ statements to nearly a half. According to the theory - that parties will only compete on Left-Right issues - this presents a significant constraint on party behaviour in the European arena.

Partisan Alignments in the Socio-Economic (Left-Right) Space

As Figure 5 shows, however, on socio-economic issues in EU politics, the four party families occupied four distinct clusters in the socio-economic space of EU, with only a single overlap across the whole period (between the Christian Democrats and Liberals). The Christian Democrats were the central party in the EU political system: with a moderate position on both economic (intervention-free market) and socio-political (libertarian-authoritarian) issues. The Greens and the Socialists were differentiated from the Christian Democrats on both socio-economic dimensions (with the Greens slightly more moderate on economic issues); the Liberals were differentiated from the Christian Democrats mainly on socio-political issues and not on economic issues; and the Greens were differentiated from the Socialists mainly on socio-political issues (N.B. if the Conservatives could have been included, they would presumably have been to the lower-right of Christian Democrats). This empirical finding is very close to the picture one would expect from the location of class interests, as shown in Figure 2: with the Socialists appealing to skilled and unskilled labour and the public sector salariat; the Greens to the public sector salariat; the Liberals to the private sector salariat and employers/owners; and the Christian Democrats to the petty-bourgeoisie and owners/ employers.

Fig. 5. Location of the Party Families in the Two-Dimensional Socioeconomic Space




Furthermore, the slope of the Left-Right in Figure 5 (calculated as the line of best correlation between all the positions) is almost identical to deductive models of party competition, as shown in Figure 2. And, the shallowness of the slope confirms the intuitive and deductive arguments that although the Left-Right incorporates socio-political issues it is primarily related to economic issues.

However, as Figure 6 shows, the distinctiveness of the party families on a compound EU Left-Right was less clear (calculated by mapping the party locations perpendicularly onto the Left-Right). The Liberals were marginally more Right-wing than the Christian Democrats. However, the trajectories of the two families crossed fourteen times between 1976 and 1996. This confusion probably stems from the fact that in some national systems

Liberal parties are to the Left of the Christian Democrats (e.g. Austria, Germany, Ireland and Italy) whereas in others they are to the Right of them (e.g. Belgium, Luxembourg, The Netherlands). This hence undermines attempts to establish a unique image (N.B. the Liberal Group in the EP sits to the Left of the EPP Group, but until 1994 it sat to the Right). Similarly, the Greens were to the Left of the Socialists (which is where they sit in the EP), but their trajectories crossed twice in only five years. Nevertheless, there was a clear distinction between the Right-bloc of Christian Democrats and Liberals and the Left-bloc of the Socialists and Greens: which again accords with many theories of domestic party competition (e.g. Bartolini & Mair, 1990).

Fig. 6. *Location of the Party Families on the Left-Right Dimension*



Moreover, Figure 6 illustrates the intuitive belief that there has been a general shift ‘rightwards’ in European politics. At the end of the 1970s, the Socialists, Christian Democrats and Liberals advocated Left of centre policies: such as Keynesian economic management. By the end of the 1980s, however, the Christian Democrats and Liberals were firmly Right of centre and the Socialists were more centrist: e.g. following the abandonment of Keynesianism in the wake of the energy crises. In the early 1990s, though, the Socialists and Christian Democrats moved back towards the Left: with the Socialist and Christian Democratic leaders advocating EU intervention to curb unemployment (e.g. European People’s Party, 1992; Party of European Socialists, 1993). Interestingly, the incorporation of Conservative Parties - such as the Greek New Democracy and Spanish Party Popular - into the EPP did not prevent Christian Democratic leaders adopting more interventionist positions. However, without the British, Danish and French Conservative leaders meeting


with EPP leaders (they sit in the EPP Group in the EP but are not members of the EPP party federation), the Spanish and Greek parties were probably marginalised. Moreover, the Liberal leaders were less affected by this last trend, advocating more deregulation of the Single Market as a solution to unemployment (e.g. European Liberal, Democratic and Reform Party, 1994).

In sum, the policy location of the party families on EU socio-economic issues resembled their ideological locations in the domestic arena. Consequently, the changes in their policies at the EU level - e.g. the drift rightwards in the 1980s - is best explained by their response to domestic political factors rather than to the structure of cognitive constraints at the European level. For example, the EU socio-economic policies of the Liberals and Christian Democrats were no more differentiated in the early 1990s than they were in the late 1970s.

Partisan Alignments on the Integration-Independence Dimension

However, as hypothesised, by the early 1990s the Christian Democrats, Liberals and Socialists had all converged on a pro-integration position, as Figure 7 shows. Through the whole period, there was little difference between the Christian Democrats and Liberals: as was predicted in Figure 4, above. However, the Socialists moved from a moderately anti-integration position at the end of the 1970s to a position very close to the other party families around the time of the 1989 European elections. The Liberals and Christian Democrats then moved more sharply pro-integrationist before both returning to a position close to the Socialists during the 1994 European elections.


Fig. 7. *Location of the Party Families on the Integration-Independence Dimension*



At the beginning of the 1990s, the Christian Democratic leaders advocated a complete transition of the European Community into a ‘Federal Union’ (e.g. European People’s Party, 1990). In the wake of the public opposition to the Maastricht Treaty, however, by the end of 1993 Christian Democratic policy had returned to a more moderate position (e.g. European People’s Party, 1993). Similarly, by 1994, the Liberal leaders still supported European integration, but attached several important criteria to further institutional development: such as a ‘democratisation’ of the structures, an ‘increased role for the national parliaments’ and ‘more efficient government’ (e.g. Federation of European Liberal, Democratic and Reform Parties, 1993). The Greens, on the other hand, emerged as the only clearly anti-integrationist force with a party organisation (the European Federation of Green Parties) at the European level. For example, in the ratification of the Maastricht

Treaty, the Green parties voted against the Treaty in the EP and in every national parliament (Corbett, 1993: 85-6).

Fig. 8. *Location of the European Election Manifestos on the Integration-Independence Dimension*



This convergence of the main parties on the same position on the Integration-Independence dimension is even more strikingly illustrated in an analysis of the European Election Manifestos. As Figure 8 shows, in the 1979 European elections, the anti-integration Socialists were clearly differentiated from the pro-integration Liberals and Christian Democrats. In 1984 and 1989, however, the Socialists were close to the Liberals, in a moderately pro-integration position, but still differentiated from the avidly ‘federalist’ Christian Democratic manifestos. In the 1989 election, this convergence left ample room for the Greens to mobilise against the main party families. The breakthrough of the Greens

in the 1989 elections has been called a ‘Green tide’ rather than a ‘protest’ (Curtice, 1989). However, the findings here suggest that it can also be explained by the existence of an opportunity-gap in the political space that had been created by the convergence of the three main party families on a pro-integration position.

This evidence hence confirms that to cope with the persistent salience of the Integration-Independence dimension, the three main party families chose a strategy of deliberately not trying to compete on these issues. In other words, the response to the constraints of the EU political space was to seek to remove Integration-Independence issues from inter-party competition. The evidence also confirms that the only viable option for this strategy to succeed was for all the party families to adopt pro- rather than anti-European stances. This risked leaving a gap in the political map, but which could only be filled by a movement appealing to a narrow electorate: i.e. the Greens and their support from public sector employees.

Furthermore, and more significantly for the democratic process of the EU, by minimising inter-party family differences and limiting divisions between member parties, this strategy invited a new division in EU politics: between the ‘cartel of elites’ of all the major parties and their rank-and-file members. A cartel-of-elites is where: ‘Each interest seeks security and protection for the position it has already acquired, and together they rob political conflict of its dynamics’ (Dahrendorf, 1967: 278). As European public opinion began to turn against the Maastricht Treaty, there was thus ‘a deliberate joint effort by elites to stabilise the system’ (Lijphart, 1969: 212). This is classic elite behaviour in pillarised political systems, particularly in the period of ‘system-building’ (esp. Daalder, 1973: 18-21). However, this created conflicts (particularly for Socialists) between the leadership cadres


who are pro-integration and the rank-and-file members (who in Socialist parties tend to be public sector employees) who are increasingly hostile. As a result, whereas political parties may be able to articulate the socio-economic divisions in EU politics, they are unable to articulate the national/territorial divisions in EU politics (cf. Hix, 1995).

Partisan Alignments in the Left-Right / Integration-Independence Space and the ‘Core’ of EU Politics

When the two dimensions of EU politics are put together, a more holistic picture is revealed. As Figure 9 confirms, there was a rightward shift on socio-economic issues by the three main party families, between their average positions in 1976-80 and in 1990-94, with the Greens emerging to the Left of the Socialists. And, there was a pro-Integration shift along the Integration-Independence dimension of the three main party families, with the Greens emerging on the Independence side of the Socialists.

Moreover, comparing Figure 9 to Figure 3 explains why this strategy was viable. A (Centre)Left/Integration stance by the Socialists would alienate public sector labour and salariat, but would enable the Socialists to hold on to most private sector workers and compete for large sections of the private sector salariat. Similarly, a Right/Integration stance for the Liberals and Christian Democrats may alienate the petty-bourgeoisie but enable them to secure the support of large sections of the salariat and owners in global and domestic production, financial services and agriculture. This leaves two potential gaps in the electoral market. However, these gaps provide only limited opportunity - for example, for the Greens to secure some support from the public sector salariat - and little possibility for cross-class alliances.


Fig. 9. *Shifting Positions of the Party Families in European Union Politics*



Finally, the result of the interaction between constraints and responses by the three main European party families was the emergence of a new ‘core’ in EU politics. This core has two elements: organisational - the number and strength of the political stances; and ideological - the content and relationship between these stances.¹⁴ First, the member parties of the Socialist, Liberal and Christian Democrat party families together won slightly more than 60% of the votes in national and EP elections throughout the EU between 1989 and 1994: 30% for the Socialists, 11% for the Liberals and 19% for the Christian Democrats (including the Greek and Spanish Conservatives) (Hix & Lord, 1997: 38). Moreover, these three families constitute the three main party organisations at the European level - the PES, EPP and ELDR party federations and EP Groups - and exist across all member states. In contrast, the Conservatives (excluding the Greek and Spanish parties) secured about 17% of

the vote, but are not organised in a European party federation and do not exist in every member state.

Fig. 10. *The ‘Core’ of EU Politics: The Issues for the Three Main Party Families*



Second, the ideologies of the party families are the different issues emphasised by the three sets of party leaders. This is not to say that ‘ideology’ is an inherent phenomenon of politics, simply that the existence of *‘familles spirituelles’* requires the establishment and maintenance of a coherent package of policy ideas that are shared by the member parties

of the family, and only by those parties. The changing content of these stances is shown in Figure 10. The issue of 'integration/supranationalism' was top for the Christian Democrats and Liberals, whereas it was second for the Socialists. However, the crucial difference between the ideologies was on socio-economic issues. The Christian Democrats and Liberals were differentiated by libertarian-authoritarian questions: with the Christian Democrats emphasising 'morality' issues and the Liberals emphasising 'democracy' issues. And, the Right (Christian Democrats/Liberals) and Left (Socialists) are differentiated by intervention-free market questions: with the Socialists advocating 'planned economy/employment' and 'social protection/regulation' and the other two emphasising 'free enterprise' and the 'internal market'. As a result, the core of EU politics is a 'triangular party system': where alliances can be formed between two, or all of, the three political families; and where the other party families (e.g. the Conservatives and the Greens) are marginalised on organisational and ideological grounds (cf. Hix, 1993).

4. Conclusions: Cognitive Constraints, Partisan Responses and Further Research

The structure of political opportunities for actors is as much determined by the shape of the strategic environment as by the institutional rules of the game. Hence, the cognitive shape of the political space in the EU (the dimensionality of the space and the location of interests within this space) constrains how actors behave. However, actors are not simply passive recipients of cognitive constraints. As with institutional constraints, given the right political resources, actors can alter the shape of cognitive constraints to further their own ends.

The deductive framework and empirical findings in this research consequently suggest that the EU political space is essentially two-dimensional: an Integration-Independence dimension, arising from the different identities and interests of national and territorial groups; and a (summary) Left-Right dimension, arising from the different interests of (transnational) socio-economic groups (i.e. classes). Furthermore, the location of social groups within this cognitive map makes it very difficult for stable trans-national and trans-class alliances to emerge at the European level.

In response, between 1976 and 1994, the three main party families - the Socialists, Liberals and Christian Democrats - gradually converged on moderately pro-Integration positions. This strategy minimised the potential for conflict within the social bases of each of the party families. And, it enabled a new 'core' of EU politics to emerge: based on the ideological identikit of these three families, and a triangular differentiation and set of alliances on socio-economic issues. This strategy allowed the Greens to establish a place in the EU party system - in the gap left by the Socialists' rightward and pro-European movement. However, because of the location of social groups, and the organisational and ideological structure of the EU core, neither the Greens nor the Conservatives were able to appeal to a trans-class base (by differentiating themselves from the other party families on the Integration-Independence dimension) or a trans-national base (by differentiating themselves on the Left-Right dimension).

Furthermore, this framework sheds some light on several aspects of EU politics. For example, whereas the most sophisticated theories of EU integration (such as Liberal-Intergovernmentalism) can explain the movement from market integration to 'flanking policies' (e.g. social and regional policies), they are unable to explain several

normative/ideological issues: such as why the European Parliament has gained more power.¹⁵ However, this research suggests that increasing the powers of the EP is an important issue for the three ideologies in the core of EU politics. In other words, this issue is part of the mainstream of EU politics that is difficult for the main party families to abandon, because of the need for internal collective identification and intra-party differentiation.

Moreover, this framework explains why the British Conservatives are so isolated in EU politics. The Conservative party is not only outside the EU core on the Integration-Independence dimension, on issues of EU institutional design. The Conservatives are also beyond the EU core on the Left-Right dimension, on socio-economic issues. This hence suggests that a British Labour government may indeed be able to participate more directly in EU politics - as a key member of the Socialist party family. In hindsight, the Conservative position may have been different had they been able to become a mainstream member of the Christian Democrats.

And, this framework explains why the end of the permissive consensus about EU integration is so difficult to overcome. The three main party families have a strong incentive not to compete on Integration-Independence issues. But, as long as the main party families form a pro-Integration cartel, there will be an incentive for anti-European forces to mobilise. However, the location of interests in the EU political space undermines any broad anti-European movement from emerging to threaten the stability of the core.

Nonetheless, this is still a preliminary foray into the ideological and cognitive structure of EU politics. More research is needed if the impact of the cognitive structure on EU politics is to be further understood. For example, the deductive theory of the location of

social interests in the EU space needs to be tested in empirical research. And, the interaction between the cognitive constraints and actors' responses needs to be tested on other actors: such as public and private interest groups, EU bureaucrats, national and European parliamentarians, and national governments. Above all, however, only by integrating this type of analysis into the existing work on EU decision-making and policy-making, within the new comparative politics/comparative public policy approach to the EU, can we develop a more sophisticated understanding of EU *politics*, to match our already highly-developed understanding of European *integration*.

Endnotes

¹ For a contrary view see Hurrell & Menon (1996).

² North (1990a), for example, distinguishes between 'formal institutions', such as constitutions and decision-making rules, and 'informal institutions', such as ideology, norms, and cognitive beliefs.

³ Whereas Inglehart (1977) argues that these are 'post-material' issues, Seliger (1976) maintains that they derive from a deeper 'pre-material' dimension of politics.

⁴ For the view that the Left-Right is no-longer significant see Bell (1988) Giddens (1994). Contrarily, on the persistence of the Left-Right as the dominant dimension of political identification and competition see Inglehart & Klingeman (1976), Castles & Mair (1984), Budge & Robertson (1987), Huber (1989), Bartolini & Mair (1990), Listhaug et.al. (1990), Laver & Budge (1992a), Laver & Hunt (1992) and Huber & Inglehart (1995).

⁵ For the sake of space, we focus on class interests. However, for a complete picture, the impact of nationality on the location of groups and interests would also need to be taken into account, and how class and national locations shape competition between other actors (such as interest groups, non-governmental organisations and EU bureaucrats).

⁶ In classical Marxism class is determined by the relationship to the means of production, whereas in Weberian terms class is interpreted as 'status group' - which depends on consumption patterns and the relationship to political power and authority.

⁷ This 'plurality of life-spheres' has been emphasised by such diverse approaches as contemporary systems theory (Luhmann), critical theories of advanced capitalism (Habermas), institutional economics (Hirschman), cultural analysis (Bell), and post-structuralism (Foucault).

⁸ In this analysis, the members of the party families were defined as follows:

SOCIALISTS - Sozialistische Partei Österreichs (Austria), Socialistische Partij (Belgium), Parti Socialiste (Belgium), Socialdemokratiet (Denmark), Socialdemokraattinen Poulue (Finland), Parti Socialiste (France), Sozialdemokratische Partei Deutschlands (Germany), Panhellenio Socialistiko Kinema (Greece), Labour Party (Ireland), Partito Democratico della Sinistra (Italy), Partito Socialista Italiano (Italy), Partito Socialista Democratico Italiano (Italy), Parti Ouvrier Socialiste Luxembourgeois (Luxembourg), Partij van de Arbied (The Netherlands), Partido Socialista (Portugal), Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (Spain), Socialdemokratiska Arbetarparti (Sweden), Labour Party (United Kingdom), Social Democratic and Labour Party (United Kingdom);

CHRISTIAN DEMOCRATS - Österreichische Volkspartei (Austria), Christelijke Volkspartij (Belgium), Parti Social-Chrétien (Belgium), Kristeligt Folkeparti (Denmark), Suomen Kristillinen Liitto (Finland), Centre des Démocrates-Sociaux (France), Christlich Demokratische Union (Germany), Christlich Soziale Union

(Germany), Fine Gael (Ireland), Partito Popolare Italiano (Italy), Centro Cristiano Democratico (Italy), Parti Chrétien Social (Luxembourg), Christen Democratisch Appèl (The Netherlands), Partido do Centro Democrático e Social (Portugal), Kristdemokratiska Samhällspartiet (Sweden);

CONSERVATIVES - Det Konservative Folkeparti (Denmark), Kansallinen Kokoomus (Finland), Rassemblement Pour la République (France), Parti Républicain (France), New Demokratia (Greece), Polotiki Anixi (Greece), Forza Italia (Italy), Partido Popular (Spain), Moderata Samlingspartiet (Sweden), Conservative Party (United Kingdom);

LIBERALS - Liberales Forum (Austria), Vlaamse Liberalen en Democraten (Belgium), Parti Réformateur Libéral (Belgium), Venstre: Danmarks Liberale Parti (Denmark), Det Radikale Venstre (Denmark), Centrum-Democraterne (Denmark), Keskustapouluue (Finland), Soumen Maaseudun Puolue (Finland), Liberaalinen Kansanpouluue (Finland), Parti Radical (France), Mouvement des Radicaux de Gauche (France), Freie Demokratische Partei (Germany), Hellenic Liberal Party (Greece), Fianna Fáil (Ireland), Progressive Democrats (Ireland), Partito Repubblicano Italiano (Italy), Radicale (Italy), Federazione dei Liberali Italiani (Italy), Demokratesch Parti (Luxembourg), Volkspartij voor Vrijheid en Democratie (The Netherlands), Democraten '66 (The Netherlands), Partido Social Democrata (Portugal), Foro (Spain), Folkpartiet Liberalerna (Sweden), Centerpartiet (Sweden), Social and Liberal Democrats (United Kingdom), Alliance Party of Northern Ireland (United Kingdom).

GREENS - Die Grüne Alternativen (Austria), Anders Gaan Leven (Belgium - Flemish), Écolo (Belgium - French speaking), De Grønne (Denmark), Vihreä-De Gröna (Finland), Les Verts (France), Génération Écologie (France), Die Grünen (Germany), Ecologistes Alternatives (Greece), Camhaontás Glas (Ireland), Federazione dei Verdi (Italy), Déi Greng Alternative/Glei (Luxembourg), Groen Links (The Netherlands), De Groenen (The Netherlands), Os Verdes (Portugal), Los Verdes (Spain), Mijjöpartiet de Gröna (Sweden), Green Party (United Kingdom).

RADICAL LEFT - Socialistisk Folkeparti (Denmark), Venstresocialisterne (Denmark), Vasemmistöliitti (Finland), Parti Communiste Française (France), Lutte Ouvrière (France), Partei Demokratisch-Sozialistische (Germany), Synaspismo tis Aristeras (Greece), Kommounistiko Komma Hellados (Greece), Democratic Left (Ireland), Rifondazione Comunista (Italy), Nouvelle Gauche (Luxembourg), Socialistische Partij (The Netherlands), Partido Comunista Portugues (Portugal), Izquierda Unida (Spain), Vänsterpartiet (Sweden), Worker's Party (United Kingdom);

EXTREME RIGHT - Freiheitliche Partei (Austria), Vlaams Blok (Belgium), Front National (Belgium), Front National (France), Republikaner (Germany), Ethniki Politiki Enosis (Greece), Alleanze Nazionali (Italy), Centrum Democraten (The Netherlands), Ny Demokrati (Spain);

REGIONALISTS - Volksunie (Belgium), Front Démocratique des Francophones (Belgium), Svenska Folkpartiet (Finland), Unione de u Populu Corse (France), Lega Nord (Italy), Südtiroler Volkspartei (Italy), Partido Andalucista (Spain), Partido Nacionalista Vasco (Spain), Eusko Alkartasuna (Spain), Herri Batasuna (Spain), Unió Democràtica de Catalunya (Spain), Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya (Spain), Esquerra Republicana de Catalunya (Spain), Democratic Unionist Party (United Kingdom), Official Unionist Party (United Kingdom), Sinn Féin (United Kingdom), Scottish National Party (United Kingdom), Plaid Cymru (United Kingdom);

ANTI-EUROPEANS - Folkebevaegelsen Med EF (Denmark), Junibeveagelsen (Denmark), Majorité Pour l'Autre Europe (France), Staatkundig Gereformeerde Partij/Gereformeerd Politiek Verband/Reformatorisch Politieke Federatie (The Netherlands).

⁹ The data on the positions of the parties on the Integration-Sovereignty dimension are taken from Eurobarometer No. 37, 1992.

¹⁰ Thirty-six of the categories used in the Manifesto Project constitute the majority of this coding frame (the corresponding Manifestos Project codes are in parentheses).

¹¹ The raw final scores from the coding are available on request from the author.

¹² I concentrate on the party federations rather than the Party Groups in the European Parliament because these are the organisations that link the behaviour of party actors in all institutions in the EU and between the domestic and European levels. Also, the CSP became the PES in November 1992, the ECGP became the EFGP in June 1993, and the ELDR-Party was founded out of the Federation of European Liberal, Democratic

and Reform Parties in December 1993. On the development of the European party federations see Hix (1996a).

¹³ It is worth pointing out that the figures in the table do *not* relate to the *position* of the parties in these dimensions, simply the amount of content of each policy document dedicated to each set of issues. In other words, a party can devote 100% of a document to intervention-free market issues, but would be right in the centre on this dimension if the first half (50%) of the document supports interventionist policies while the second half (50%) advocates free market policies.

¹⁴ Hence, this use of the term is similar to Smith's (1990) two-part definition of the 'core' of the party system as the main political parties and the structure of alliances between these parties, and to the use of the term in game theoretic literature on party competition to define the pareto-set of viable policy coalitions (cf. Budge & Laver, 1992).

¹⁵ For example, Moravcsik (1995) admits that whereas his 'Liberal-Intergovernmentalist' approach (Moravcsik, 1993) can explain why Economic and Monetary Union was adopted in the Maastricht Treaty (because Germany had the least to lose from non-adoption) it cannot explain why the co-decision procedure was introduced, which gave the European Parliament more power in the EU legislative process.