DIPLOMACY BECOMES THEM:

MEDIATING KNOWLEDGE IN

SPACES OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION

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Thesis submitted to the University of Ottawa
in partial Fulfilment of the requirements for the
Doctorate in Philosophy Political Science

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ABSTRACT

This dissertation explores informal means of convening various foreign policy professionals in conflict resolution discussions, taking two quite different case studies: the Pugwash Conferences, a long-standing transnational non-governmental organization; and the Ottawa Dialogue, a more recent suite of projects. Although conventionally viewed through the rubric of 'Track Two', this thesis instead tackles the subject of unofficial diplomacy through a conceptual framework derived from critical and sociological work in International Relations theory. By taking a practice-based approach, the research reveals that what is actually done in the spaces of unofficial diplomacy not only has a diplomatic purpose at root but in fact can be seen to reproduce a diplomatic logic in how certain tasks are performed. The dissertation shows the intrinsic liminality of these informal, unofficial activities to the corridors of power and policymaking and, in this way, helps elaborate how the emergent landscape of diplomacy is impacted by various actors and changing practices.

To understand why such processes appear around international conflict, the thesis calls attention to investigating how they are used by those who participate. The approach brings into focus the constitution of professional social networks that emerge in spaces left out of limelight, where various experts contest, debate, and refract policy knowledge. Through the eyes of these non-traditional actors, the thesis problematizes diplomacy as a solely state-based authority, insisting that we must look to the close imbrication of government representatives in putatively non-state activities to understand their contribution to global governance. Developed through an immersion and engagement of ten years with the very people who do the work, this project brings together several theoretical and methodological perspectives to make sense of a complex data-set and bridge a number of disciplinary gaps.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

The greatest debt of gratitude goes to my two supervisors, Jacquie and Peter, who supported me throughout the long journey with inspiration and wisdom at every turn. To Peter for getting me to Ottawa in the first place, and not only guiding me through the track two literature but providing me with the opportunity to work on the Ottawa Dialogue. To Jacquie for her infinite patience, encouraging conversations, and creative insight for transforming my ideas into a dissertation.

I wouldn't have started the PhD without Sandy bringing me in to the Pugwash fold over a decade ago and helping me to study it as well as do it – I learned so much from working with you, and Pugwash isn't the same without you. To the rest of the Pugwash family, particularly Paolo, Claudia, Mimma, and Roberta, it has been awesome working with you all. I am of course indebted to all the participants of both Pugwash and Ottawa Dialogue who generously took the time to speak with me and share their experiences and insight.

Great thanks to all my Canadian friends made along the way for the good times and jollying me along. To Kelly, Xav (and Boris), and Al in particular, I couldn't have done it without getting to know you guys – it's been an amazing adventure! To Nicole for putting up with me at the office and during the long trips to Bangkok and elsewhere, every conversation with you has always been rewarding. To my friends in Europe, thanks for variously hosting me and providing distraction when it was most needed – sorry I could only beat Jules' record. Great thanks to Tom and Piera for giving me the space of Evershaw to write up for almost a year, even if I didn't quite manage to finish it there it was a super generous thing to do.

Lastly, to all my family, particularly Loulou, Giles, and Coco who helped me in the final stages: thanks for putting up with me during the difficult times! I hope you now understand what I've been doing for so long, enjoy reading it. This dissertation is most dedicated to my wonderful parents, who have lovingly supported my erratic choices throughout my life.

CONTENTS

CHAPTER 1. DIPLOMACY BECOMES THEM

As the Israeli ambassador leaned over the dinner table, he politely asked a fellow diner to pass the water jug. "This water?" replied the Iranian diplomat, "Are you sure? It is heavy water." After laughter around the table, conversation resumed amongst the group. The joke was typically diplomatic, a light but provocative jibe from the Iranian regarding the international concern over its heavy water production facility in Arak.[1] At this time, in 2008, the international community and Iran were at an impasse in official diplomatic activity, with Iran unwilling to back down on its nuclear energy programme, the US and European states gradually ramping up sanctions, and Israel protesting that any Iranian nuclear weapon programme would constitute an existential threat.

More striking was the interaction between Iranian and Israeli officials, who cannot openly be seen to meet. This dinner took place in a private room of a London hotel as part of a meeting held over two days under the auspices of the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs (Pugwash), a transnational non-governmental organization. Also involved were more than 35 other individuals from governments or diplomatic services, academia and non-governmental institutes, drawn from many countries across the Middle East, Europe, and North America. These participants were there under Pugwash rules – that is, in their 'private capacity' rather than representing any state or official position – and had been invited to proffer their expertise on Iran's nuclear programme and the prospect of ridding the Middle East of weapons of mass destruction. This kind of meeting is the standard for Pugwash; it is also a modus operandi seen amongst several other organizations that conduct *unofficial* diplomacy, an unusual space for the mediation of conflict-afflicted international relationships.

[1] Heavy water (deuterium oxide) production is not considered an essential component of a civil nuclear energy programme but Iran had nonetheless pushed ahead, bringing suspicion and condemnation from many countries.

Some years later a group of retired officials unwind together in a hotel room. They are in Bangkok for a meeting of the Ottawa Dialogue, a suite of projects convening Indians and Pakistanis to focus on security in South Asia. As the whisky is poured they sit recounting stories from their time in the diplomatic service or militaries of their countries. Having spent their careers opposing each other's policies, and at least part of that day debating India-Pakistan relations, now they may listen to one another freed from the inhibitions of office. Again, these individuals are present in their private capacity to bring their experience and knowledge to bear on improving the precipitous, potentially nuclear, relationship of those states they use to serve. Behind the relaxed civility, however, is the tacit recognition that each will return home and speak to or brief various colleagues, including those still in senior positions in government, of what they have learned. As with the other case, this is a well understood practice that takes place surrounding processes of unofficial diplomacy.

These short vignettes come from the two case studies featured in this research and are emblematic of the world of unofficial diplomacy. The central claim of the thesis is that, because unofficial diplomacy seeks to be relevant and have influence, the position of inbetweenness it carves out both enables a range of strategic interactions that revolve around knowledge transfer, yet perversely often reproduces and refracts the very set of political narratives that conflict resolution seeks to overcome. By bringing to light the underlying diplomatic purpose of this work through the people who practice it, the thesis illustrates the conundrum of how unofficial diplomacy at once seeks original conflict resolution ideas yet is constrained by a range of more practical effects stemming from the need to engage the states involved. By using the term 'unofficial diplomacy' to describe this work I seek to draw attention to the keen relationship that such processes of conflict resolution have with the workings of diplomacy and

problematize the activity from the inside-out. The label unofficial diplomacy captures how these nominally 'non-state' processes interact with the formal landscape of diplomacy and thereby challenges the notion that diplomacy is something that only states may do.

As such, other examples of this kind of work have variously sprung up around international conflicts. In a sense, the more entrenched the conflict, the greater the number of efforts at resolving it: cases between the US and USSR during the Cold War were plentiful; several informal dialogues are going on at any one time involving Israelis and Palestinians; and many other conflicts – in Africa, the Korean Peninsula, in the Caucuses, in the Middle East – have similarly attracted the energies of outsiders to informally mediate or facilitate dialogue between groups. Of course, unofficial diplomacy has its critics, insofar as it often may appear as interference by amateurs; moreover, there is limited proof of direct, causative impact of this work on official attempts at conflict resolution. Indeed, often derided by those on the outside as 'cheap talk,' a key problematique is the very relationship of these processes to the workings of official, governmental activity to manage or resolve conflicts.

This thesis sets out to interrogate this crucial dynamic and uncover the expanding networks of professionals who participate in unofficial diplomacy across the globe. From International Relations (IR) scholarship, we know that non-governmental, transnational actors have been targeting and influencing state policy for quite some time (Haas 1992; Keck and Sikkink 1998). This dissertation elaborates how diplomats and diplomatic practice are adapting to the plethora of non-state actors who appear as key agents in the pursuit of political outcomes. Moreover, it supports the position that these developing arrangements represent a shift from a traditional 'club' towards a more network model of diplomacy (Heine 2013; Cooper, Hocking, and Maley 2008a). At the same time, this research challenges the notion that power and authority are being

surrendered by the state to these actors, showing how they are implicated in the reconfiguration of political and social relationships at the global level (Sending and Neumann 2006; Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann 2015). To varying degrees, different states are able to latch on to and harness these emergent means of political organization through the imbrication of their representatives in the networks. In this way, the engagement of states hints at the significance of these processes; it leaves, however, unofficial diplomacy often uncomfortably caught between seeking change to the status quo and needing the state to have any chance of impact. With this in mind, the central question guiding the research is: Why does unofficial diplomacy happen in the way it does?

Posed in this way, the thesis seeks to make sense of how unofficial diplomacy takes place in practice. By practice, I mean to draw attention to what is done, by whom, and what this might mean for the range of actors who are implicated. One of the central reasons given for why such groups are convened is to 'problem-solve' some of the issues in conflict between two (or more) states, to discuss and debate the emergence of problems and seek acceptable solutions.[2] From this basic proposition, I use insights brought in from sociological approaches to IR to conceptualize the activity as a convening space: it bridges holes in the interactions and interfaces of professional communities who are siloed because of political estrangement and historical mistrust. This visualization provokes a series of questions and avenues of research that provide a highly original contribution to studies of these informal processes.

I focus on two related puzzles that emerge from the process of interaction: first, what does informal mediation look like and what are the practical factors that affect how different policy

[2] Kelman (2008) places the 'problem-solving workshop' at the centre of practice, something with which Fisher (2005), and Jones (2015) agree. Chapter 2 discusses this further.

knowledges come into collision in such meetings?[3] Second, following these intense (and at times heated) discussions, how does the 'mediated knowledge' emerge from these spaces to affect policy discourse elsewhere?[4] A key dimension I thus draw attention to is the role of knowledge. This research does not assume the presence of unofficial diplomacy as the kind of net-positive contribution to governance that other IR research has identified but rather seeks to problematize the very ways in which the exchange and transmission of policy-relevant knowledge takes place.[5] I join other research that focuses on the importance of how and which knowledge comes to be valued and who are the experts that wield it: thus, the story of how policy is not just created but is contested "lies in the strange alchemy of expertise and struggle through which our world is made and remade" (Kennedy 2016, 2).[6] The empirical evidence builds on such recent scholarship to highlight that we must focus on the constitution of policy knowledge in and through practice.

The dissertation argues that how knowledge is produced in these spaces is a contentious process subject to political and social logics that often reproduce existing structures and hierarchies. In

[3] Informal mediation, as discussed below, loosely describes the practice, whereas unofficial diplomacy is more associated with the phenomenon. I use the two terms somewhat interchangeably throughout for variation.

[4] The term 'mediated knowledge' simply seeks to denote that knowledge is made and remade through interactions within the confines of such informal processes. It is thus *mediated* in the sense that it has been subject to discussion, debate, and refraction with the 'other' side to the conflict, as well as the other professionals present. This understanding will be built upon throughout the dissertation. However, it is not to be confused or conflated with how Hjarvard (2013) and others have used mediated knowledge to more narrowly denote the role of the media and global communications in affecting knowledge production. It does side with them in highlighting "important ontological consequences, potentially 'bridging the distance between actors in both a physical sense and a social psychological sense', while at the same time, in other cases, aggravating the sense of distance and estrangement" (Pamment 2014, 260).

[5] Early work in IR on international cooperation made the case that various institutions – as mediating links between states – could reduce uncertainty through the provision of more information (cf. Keohane 1984, 1988). This type of belief in the power of information has been carried through some later work: normative calls for governments to pursue coordinated arrangements and best practices (Slaughter 2004) and others who seek to illustrate that states rely upon increasingly legal and formal means of dispute resolution (Keohane, Moravcsik, and Slaughter 2000) tend to underestimate the importance attached by states to more imprecise, fuzzy, and indeterminate means of carrying out international relations, particularly when it involves complex and entrenched historical issues of conflict.

[6] See also Seabrooke and Henriksen (2017) and Sending (2015), among others. Chapter 3 will expand on this discussion further.

similar ways to how Iver Neumann (2007) saw that diplomats 'never produce anything new' I suggest that the 'autonomy dilemma' of carving out space close to the corridors of power constrains the originality of conflict resolution ideas.[7] To substantiate this, the novel contribution of *Diplomacy Becomes Them* is to describe three key dimensions of knowledge-making that are seldom brought to the fore in existing scholarship. Together, they produce a complex picture in which diplomacy and diplomatic practice rise to the surface.

Firstly, I argue that informal mediation is less about building trust, as many scholars assume, and more about the suspension of *mis*trust. Indeed, this suspension is often part of the 'polite fiction' that the practice of diplomacy encourages. Secondly, I show that unofficial diplomacy is able to harness the often-ambiguous social connectedness of its participants in order to claim a position of 'inbetweenness' – neither official nor fully unofficial – which imbues it with productive power as space liminal to the state. Yet while this element carries a latent potential for impact, I argue that the proximity simultaneously ensures that the diplomatic boat is not rocked too hard in what is produced. Thirdly, the resolution of conflict is not the only thing at stake in these processes: embedded in these processes is a realm of opportunity for political games to be played and we see the refraction and replaying of political narratives and diplomatic disputes that expose the underlying social and political dynamics among those involved.

Overall, the thesis seeks to empirically demonstrate the complexity of processes that take place out of the limelight yet nonetheless speak to the high politics of international relations. It is in this way that I show that our understanding of diplomacy must come to reflect the wide and

[7] Herman Kraft proposed the autonomy dilemma to capture the specifics of Track Two in Southeast Asia, ultimately concluding that, "the need to maintain good relations with state institutions and officials hampers its potential for critical contributions to dialogue processes" (2000, 353).

diverse range of actors who take part – diplomacy, in a sense, is *becoming* more nuanced because of them. At the same time, these actors are participating in such a way that rather than simplistically label them as non-state we ought to recognize that what they are doing in practice *becomes* the epithet of diplomacy. The dissertation provides a number of interventions on key themes and concepts in studies of both diplomacy and global governance, thereby contributing to the emerging conversation between the two subdisciplines. The theoretical contributions will similarly add to scholarship on practice-based readings of global politics. Hopefully, the dissertation will also provoke dialogue across a wider chasm, that of IR and the traditional disciplinary home for informal mediation, Track Two.

The remaining sections of this introductory chapter will provide a deeper sense of the subject, the empirical material and theoretical choices, and the overall logic of the dissertation. I begin by situating the research in relation to existing literatures in order to describe the key concepts that will be used throughout the remaining chapters, and to highlight the particular contributions to knowledge that this research brings. In doing so, I break down the central research question into four distinct sub-questions that frame my overall approach. I then more firmly introduce the case studies, outlining that despite some significant differences they together deepen our understanding of unofficial diplomacy. Subsequently I discuss my research methods and theoretical underpinning to show how they help me to understand the research questions. Finally, I provide outlines of the remaining chapters.

1.1 Situating the research: Processes of unofficial diplomacy

What kinds of processes are we talking about? What do I mean by the activity of *unofficial* diplomacy in situations of conflict? This section will more fully introduce the stuff of unofficial diplomacy and present the concepts important to the narrative of the subsequent chapters. A

key move is to unpack the central research question – why does unofficial diplomacy happen in the way it does? – and thereby provide an order to the theoretical chapters (2 and 3) and the empirical chapters (4, 5, and 6). I firstly justify why I have chosen to take the perspective of IR to this research material – reconceptualizing *where* it happens is crucial to understanding why unofficial diplomacy takes place. I secondly reconnect the processes with their diplomatic purpose, that of mediating estrangement. This encourages us to ask, *why* does it happen at all? What are the key underlying factors that an informal mediation responds to? I then, thirdly, ask *who* does it? What types of people do we see and what can this tell us about why the activity is significant? Finally, we can then ask, *how* does it take place? What practices are involved in mediating conflict and why are they important to understanding the phenomenon? Overall, these questions provide the basis for a significantly different contribution to this type of empirical material than is found in existing literatures.

1.1.1 Mediating conflict

The use of a third party to act as a mediator between conflicting parties has been a long-standing practice and in an international context there is evidence of this approach going back thousands of years (Ahtisaari and Rintakoski 2013). In the modern world we see that, for example, the US, Sweden, and Norway have each taken such a role in the Israel-Palestine conflict (Eriksson 2015) or equally high profile individuals appointed by the UN to negotiate between warring factions, often with the material backing of the international community.[8] Here, as the nature of war and violence has changed in the past century away from direct state-to-state engagement, conflict situations are more often fractured and the international community has moved away

[8] Martti Ahtisaari is the most prominent example: a Finnish politician who has worked in conflict situations in Namibia, Kosovo, and the Aceh province of Indonesia. He has since founded an organization to "prevent and resolve violent conflicts through informal dialogue and mediation"; see http://cmi.fi/.

from the 'grand bargain' style of states diplomatically negotiating a peace.[9] Mediation in such circumstances is a quite well-understood phenomenon and efforts have merited a good deal of research from scholars. A key distinction to emphasize is between a 'traditional mediator', often a powerful international player able to exert leverage (I. W. Zartman and Touval 1985), and, the subject of this research, an 'informal mediator' that facilitates dialogue rather than imposes solutions (Kelman 2002).[10]

One of the central issues that this project confronted was that there already were a good number of scholars studying informal mediation, albeit with a surprising lack of a common terminology. The following have all been applied to studying and organizing unofficial processes in which groups of individuals from either side of a conflict are brought together: 'controlled communication' (Burton 1969), 'track two diplomacy' (Davidson and Montville 1981), 'unofficial diplomacy' (Volkan, Julius, and Montville 1990), 'pre- and circum-negotiation' (Saunders 1996), 'multi-track diplomacy' (Diamond and McDonald 1996), 'interactive conflict resolution' (R. J. Fisher 1997), 'interactive problem-solving' (Kelman 1997) and 'sustained dialogue' (Saunders 2012). In general, they are run following very similar logics, each of them gently nuanced from the other to emphasize one aspect or another in order to provide some differentiation, and each often specific in both time and place.

This body of research has frequently drawn on socio-psychological principles that also underpin interventions in other types of conflict (e.g. marriage, labour disputes, etc.). In a dialogic relationship with these more isolated practices, one can identify a subfield to conflict

[9] See Kriesberg,(2009), Zartman and Touval (2007), and Deutsch (1990) among others. Empirical work has detailed much unofficial or quasi-official activity after civil wars or in periods where turbulent, or even violent, secessionist movements have taken hold (cf. Druckman and Stern 2000; Bartoli 2003). Despite featuring prominently in the literature such examples are not the core focus of this research.

[10] Where I use mediation throughout this dissertation it is to simply reflect the sense of being a connecting link between two or more parties rather than the notion of 'traditional mediation.'

resolution studies to which this dissertation speaks.[11] This discipline has many important insights (discussed in Chapter 2) but the overwhelming orientation of this literature is to view the processes from the perspective of the organizer because they are written by the 'scholar-practitioner.'[12] In this way, much of the literature is focused on the practical elements involved in organizing the activity: of promoting change within individual participants, of planning for transferring that change to the inter-group level, and on evaluating the impact of the work.

I contend that this affects the strength of claims scholars have made. Methodologically, it is often hamstrung from asking penetrating questions of its participants by a desire to maintain future cooperation – this means we rarely get a sense of why they participate at all. Similarly, in reading this literature we get glimpses of what happens in the meeting space but, often to protect the integrity of the processes, studies tend to prioritize 'positive' dynamics that contribute to conflict resolution. Scholars have also shied away from engaging diplomats and policymakers in reflection that problematizes the role of the state and its representatives in this kind of activity.[13] While these shortcomings are understandable given the various issues of sensitivity in running these processes, they also present an opportunity to approach such cases from a different perspective and a different set of conceptual tools.

As the next chapter picks up, the dominance asserted in IR by Realist perspectives portrayed conflict resolution as soft, focusing research instead on issues of security and the state.[14]

[11] For overviews (each using different labels), see Fisher (1997), Davies and Kaufman (2003) and Jones (2015, chaps 1&2). As I explain below, I follow the label of 'Track Two' for this subfield.

[12] The classic term 'scholar-practitioner' is taken from the corpus of Herbert C. Kelman's work – it denotes the informal mediator/facilitator of the processes who also goes on to produce the scholarly research (cf. 2008, 41).

[13] Two exceptions are Chataway (1998) presenting American perspectives and Çuhadar (2007) similarly presenting Turkish perspectives.

[14] See, for example, Van Evera (2001), Levy (1998), and Posen (1993) as examples of the Realist approach that marginalized both conflict resolution and diplomacy as alternatives to war.

Although Constructivist scholars have since sought to identify ideational factors that reduce conflict through creating norms or promoting shared identities, little attention has been given to mediation and conflict resolution.[15] As a first step, this dissertation reconceptualizes the activities of informal mediation through charting it as an advancing trend of non-governmental influence in what were traditionally conceived of as matters of state; equally, it is concerned with the reciprocal move by governments to become more involved in matters of the non-state. One contribution I seek to make is thus to contextualize the processes as part of wider changes in how policy and governance are made. This leads to thinking away from foreign and security policy being carried out solely in the physical space of a ministry or governmental department and problematizes the role of the state and its representatives in these processes. Rather, I propose that we instead think in terms of *spaces* created by the interactions of participants seeking various modes of influence to frame policy issues. Where Chapter 3 more specifically sketches this space and Chapter 5 reveals its implications, reimagining the *where* of unofficial diplomacy in relation to boundaries of who does what at the international level helps us grasp why it can be important to political outcomes.

1.1.2 Diplomatic encounters

The next step is to enquire *why* instances of unofficial diplomacy spring up in the first place. Conflicts between states still occur with some frequency but these are not always, or even usually, violent in nature. Beyond simple examples of trade disputes, these conflicts take the shape of 'wars-of-words,' are often distinguished by profound disagreement, and manifest as a reluctance to engage with one another. In deeper-seated examples, such conflict is

[15] There has been some cross-over using IR to study international conflict resolution, but such efforts are few and far between. See Acharya (2004, 2011), Ball (2006), Capie (2010), Higgott (1994), and Job (2003), who have each attempted to problematize the notion of ideas and norms diffusing through the work of regional instances of unofficial diplomacy, but these are confined to the particularities of the Southeast Asian experience.

exacerbated by historical relations of fear, suspicion, and *mistrust* that inhibit engagement amongst political elites and equally populations at large. The two cases involved in this research are quite typical of the latter end of the spectrum and commonly exhibit problems of *estrangement* – political communities in conflict that acutely suffer from not knowing the mind of their adversaries because of a sustained lack of engagement.[16] Where such disagreements occur there may appear a raft of unofficial, transnational processes that take place in the background and feed into government and non-governmental thinking all the while.

A preliminary response to the *why* question is therefore to accentuate that this activity is diplomatic in purpose. This insight, which I unpack throughout the remaining chapters, partially explains why I have chosen the label unofficial diplomacy. One issue I want to draw attention to at this point is that *un*official diplomacy looks to be genetically dependent upon an *official* diplomacy; it would presuppose something formally recognized as a diplomatic system from which it takes its cues because, at the very least, semantically, unofficial logically follows the establishment of an official. Along with other scholars, I suggest this is an unnecessary dichotomy that reproduces the practice of diplomacy as a solely state-based practice.[17] Where Track Two scholars have tended to distance themselves from diplomacy in their analyses,[18] my use of unofficial diplomacy throughout this dissertation is an imperfect proposition: at this juncture, it serves well to demarcate what is commonly called diplomacy (the official mediation

[16] It is also no coincidence that both cases largely revolve around issues of nuclear weapons. There is perhaps no greater symbolic representation of estrangement than 'the bomb', weapons designed to indiscriminately obliterate another country and its population which have perversely been put into service to preserve peace. James Der Derian makes a brief reference to nuclear weapons as "the ultimate expression and instrument of alienation" (1987a, 96) but I feel that, as a tool for managing the uncertainty of the anarchical world of Realist security thinking, they are strikingly apposite to estrangement. For a more literary take on this theme see the introduction and short stories in Martin Amis' *Einstein's Monsters* (1987).

[17] The key text is Der Derian (1987b); Chapter 3 picks up this discussion again.

[18] See, for example, in Peter Jones' seminal survey *Track Two Diplomacy: In Theory and in Practice*, in which he moves his definition "away from the word 'diplomacy'" (2015, 24) and uses 'Track Two' instead. The move is well taken, insofar as he (as others) seek to reduce confusion and perceptions of interference in state matters, but I suggest it avoids addressing a central purpose of the work, the *why*.

between states) from types of informal mediation, while seeking to problematize the very practice of diplomacy and its relationship with these processes that centrally seek to resolve conflict between estranged polities.[19] In such a way, while unofficial diplomacy serves heuristically to distinguish the activity from the conduct of official relations between states, this is not an uncomplicated proposition. My case studies demonstrate an enmeshment that is not entirely accidental, and this speaks to a key theme: the evolving context of diplomacy in world politics.

Rather than seeing diplomacy as a tool of international relations, I treat it as a social institution.[20] This has two implications for my research: firstly, it helps identify diplomacy not as a tool of foreign policy but as a site in which social relations are forged and maintained. As a mediation of estrangement, diplomacy becomes akin to a third party, as it provides the medium – the rules, the norms, the expected behaviours; in sum: the practices – through which parties engage one another.[21] Indeed, as a culmination of these practices, diplomacy as an institution provides "a modicum of trust" in how relations between polities can be undertaken (Jönsson and Hall 2005, 29). An important contribution this research makes is to interrogate the implicit trust-building potential within the practice of diplomacy and ask why scant attention is paid to how *mistrust* affects professional interactions at a global level.[22]

[19] The point, in fact, is to acknowledge and use as a starting point the very ambiguity and flexibility of the term diplomacy: it is deliberately broad as it characterizes the wide variety of activities that take place on the unofficial side of international relations yet involving, either directly or by proxy, official actors alike. In noting the 'unofficial side of international relations' it is worth clarifying here that I do not consider all unofficial diplomacy to be about conflict resolution. Unofficial diplomacy is a mode that can equally pertain to the fields of trade, law, humanitarian issues, etc. that are part of the management of international relationships.

[20] In this way I align more with the English School and some post-positivists against (IR) Rationalist views on the nature of diplomacy. A key text in this regard is Jönsson and Hall (2005).

[21] In relation to this research, it serves to nuance the way in which 'mediation' is used in the Track Two literature: "mediation is best thought of as a mode of negotiation in which a third party helps the parties find a solution that they cannot find by themselves" (I. W. Zartman and Touval 2007, 437–38).

[22] Nicholas J. Wheeler (e.g. 2018) is one of few scholars developing the importance of trust in IR, although my focus on adding mistrust differentiates my approach from his in some respect. This will be unpacked further in Chapter 3 before being operationalized in my enquiry into the background of the mistrustful relationships in my cases (Chapter 4).

Secondly, many works of diplomatic studies point to some key tasks that the professional diplomat undertakes: at the risk of over-simplification, these can be listed as representation, information-gathering, communication, and negotiation.[23] The first three of these functions are of keen interest within this research because of the ways in which they relate to practices apparent in unofficial diplomacy. Viewed in a different light, contributions to the field of Track Two variously show how individuals are gathered together in order that they communicate, produce and exchange knowledge, and gather information. I would also suggest that such scholars are hesitant to profess that these participants, in essence, are *re-presenting* something which cannot be present in that room at that time. The later empirical chapters thus show how, in going about their professional activities, participants of unofficial diplomacy – crucially including non-state actors – perform similar tasks to those of the professional diplomat. This is not to claim them as diplomats; rather, through the lens of what the people involved actually do, my enquiry into what happens and why contributes to work investigating the diplomatization of professional practices (Neumann 2012; Jönsson and Hall 2005).

1.1.3 Transnational social connectedness

This latter point signifies that of crucial importance to the specificity of unofficial diplomacy is an interrogation of *who* actually takes part and in what capacity. As will be discussed in greater depth in Chapter 3, the diplomatic landscape is greatly complicated by the presence and participation of a wide range of actors who are not formally recognized as 'diplomats' but complicate what it means to do diplomacy.[24] Moreover, from almost three decades of global

[23] I do not attempt to synthesize the various shades of opinion on this point but the parameters of this selection are laid out in reference to the following scholars: Bull (1977, 170); Der Derian (1987a, 94); Hocking (1996, 472); Jönsson and Hall (2005, 5); and Cooper (2013, 44).

[24] *The Oxford Handbook on Modern Diplomacy* for example, recognises that "Diplomacy today takes place among multiple sites of authority, power, and influence: mainly states, but also including religious

governance research, we know that a great (and increasing) number of non-state professionals are engaged on the international stage, contributing to the formation of policy in myriad ways through ever-denser relations.[25] In my reading, the *where* of unofficial diplomacy conceives of the spaces in which informal mediation happens as being very much a part of the extensively *networked* character of what might be called a professional knowledge economy. In contrast to much Track Two literature, I emphasize that what we see, in effect, are expanding circuits of dialogue surrounding individual conflicts – these involve many of the same participants and increasingly become connected to other circuits of dialogue on other conflicts because of significant overlaps in what is considered relevant policy knowledge.

As will be illustrated in Chapter 5, those people I describe as participants to unofficial diplomacy are various 'foreign policy professionals' with the *expertise* and knowledge of the issues at hand. Expertise has come to be identified as the key resource of non-state actors in influencing policy: building on a growing body of evidence in global governance, I look to question stable hierarchies of expertise and think instead of a more relational understanding of why people come to be called experts (Sending 2015; Kuus 2014). In addition to a cast of think tank experts, academics, and retired policymakers, we also see individuals working in government and foreign services who participate, often in their 'private capacity.' By viewing them all as professionals in their own right, I level the playing field for expertise in international affairs and contest a dividing line separating public and private claims to authority.[26]

organizations, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), multinational corporations, and even individuals, whether they be celebrities, philanthropists, or terrorists" (Cooper, Heine, and Thakur 2013, 1–2).

[25] Foundational texts in this regard are Rosenau and Czempiel (1992) and McGrew and Held (2002). Chapter 3 will expand on this discussion.

[26] For a similar problematization, see Best and Gheciu (2014a). This point is expanded below and in Chapter 3.

Moreover, a key contribution of my research is to similarly illustrate what are often *ambiguous* connections to diplomacy and government bureaucracies, enabled through the networked character of the participants. A detail left latent in other accounts of this work in fact helps to illustrate how unofficial diplomacy carves out *liminal* space in order to influence the traditional policymaking of states. By developing a relational conceptualization of the activity through those who perform it, my research speaks to the various IR scholars using sociological and practice theory to uncover similar patterns of transnational professional networking.

1.1.4 The stakes of participation

And so what? In a basic sense, the purpose of unofficial diplomacy may not seem radically different from earlier IR research on the impact of non-state actors on the state. At first blush, we understand that individuals are convened to contribute to improving a situation of conflict. That these networks exist and try to leverage the policy expertise of the participants is of course key to trying to make their influence felt. But unlike traditional non-governmental organizations, epistemic communities, or transnational advocacy networks that have been described elsewhere, unofficial diplomacy does not contain a particularly coherent set of identities, purposes, or practices. This is absolutely critical to unpacking its significance and delineating the novelty of my empirical and theoretical contributions. Indeed, as Chapter 3 goes on to conceptualize, we should instead think of it as convening space, operating at the boundaries of various professional fields and particularly liminal to governments. To understand what attracts participants to become embedded in these networks through the work, we need not just see who they are, but must look to *how* the processes play out in practice – this in turn tells us a great deal about why unofficial diplomacy happens.

The final piece of the puzzle is to think in terms of *authority*, and hence power, at the international level. Scholarly work on this topic in IR has again come mainly under the rubric of global governance, looking at how the 'sovereign' power of the state is impacted by the range of actors claiming other sources of authority to determine political outcomes (Rosenau 1992; Walters 2004). While Chapter 3 addresses this literature in greater detail to spell out the particular purchase of authority as a concept, I draw attention here to the ways in which recent scholarship conceives of the relational nature of authority claims.[27] My contribution rests on elaborating the process through which individuals claim and contest authority – as Chapter 6 illustrates, it is not simply expertise that forms the basis for such a claim but importantly experience, political access, and social connections all contribute to a matrix of resources brought to bear on this struggle for recognition.

As such, a central dynamic that emerges in this study is how the interactions that take place within the spaces of unofficial diplomacy help to mediate between these different individuals and result in mediated knowledges. The twin dynamic of this process is to draw out what the spaces actually enable, inhibit, and contain in terms of interactions. Beyond thinking through what kinds of people participate, we must also consider the practical factors identified – mistrust, estrangement, ambiguity – which all greatly complicate a narrative of straightforward problem-solving workshops. Cumulatively, the where, the why, the who, and the how all help me respond to the specificity of why unofficial diplomacy is a phenomenon in world politics.

[27] See in particular Avant, Finnemore, and Sell (2010a), and Sending (2015).

1.2 A personal background to the case studies

Given the set of research questions identified in the preceding pages, it is appropriate to provide greater detail on how I set about answering them. To set the stage for my research design I firstly elaborate on the case studies: the detail provided helps illustrate that my simultaneous positions as a researcher and professional in the field led me toward seeking out alternative methods and frameworks to elaborate what I saw were understudied aspects of the activities I was a part of. One important qualification to make clear is that I do not provide an exhaustive description of the case studies: the structure of this dissertation reflects the interpretivist orientation of the research and the details become apparent by telling the story of unofficial diplomacy through the cases and their participants.

The point of departure for this project was an initial involvement with what has turned out to be one of the case studies, Pugwash. Through attending a couple of meetings in 2008-9 while working at London University I was introduced to what became one my project supervisors and challenged to think about what was going from an academic perspective early on. I began to assist Pugwash with organizing meetings as well as participate as a 'rapporteur' responsible for producing meeting reports.[28] From this 'feet in the water' approach my curiosity was piqued as to what was going on and why. Upon embarking on the PhD, I was further employed as a research assistant for what became the second case study, the Ottawa Dialogue, a more recent project run by my co-supervisor, Peter Jones, separate from Pugwash. I was thus granted 'insider' status to two different examples of the work, able to observe, study, and participate as part of each organizing team. Lastly, in getting to grips with the different literatures through my PhD studies, the fact that these types of case studies are virtually unknown within IR struck me as surprising and provided a central motivation to 'tell their story.'

[28] A role that has continued, with an expanded remit, to this day.

In terms of the cases themselves I have had to be selective within the differing remits of each organization. Pugwash has worked for sixty years on unofficial attempts to rid the world of nuclear and other weapons of mass destruction. As a Nobel Prize-winning transnational organization, they operate in many parts of the world, in a variety of ways, and have involved countless hundreds of professionals and students; rather than capture the entire portfolio of their work, I have chosen to focus on one 'case' that I believe is characteristic of their work. That being said, the specifics of how they operate with respect to facilitating interactions between people from Iran, Israel, and the US contains overlap with their work more generally – on the Middle East and preserving the global nuclear non-proliferation regime – and it is in some sense difficult to parse out the activities on just this aspect alone. Nonetheless, the empirics obtained were explicitly and specifically on how participants viewed Pugwash efforts relating to the Iran nuclear confrontation that lasted between 2003-2014.[29]

With respect to the Ottawa Dialogue (OD), I was invited to work with the project coordinator and project manager to assist in the organization of the meetings. At that time, the number of different projects within the suite of India-Pakistan dialogues was expanding from three to five. I selected just two of the five streams of activity for my research, partly because in these two there was a lot of overlap in who participated, and I was permitted to attend all meetings of both; similarly, the cases revolved around nuclear weapons and military aspects of the relationship, thus providing a measure of comparability between this and Pugwash's work. An interesting point to note is that Pugwash for many years had a South Asia project that brought together Indians and Pakistanis for discussions on their nuclear relations. That work has wound down for the most part and the Ottawa Dialogue has become more prominent. Similarly, the

[29] I provide a detailed account of the meetings and methods used for both cases studies below.

Ottawa Dialogue now also does work on the Middle East, at times explicitly involving Americans and Iranians in dialogue. Such points, and the fact that there is a good degree of overlap in the participants chosen for each, stimulated some of the key ideas relating to the networked character of this activity at a transnational and global level.

At the same time, it is worth stressing that there are significant differences between the two operations, not just in scope and size but in purpose and modes of working. Institutionally, they are quite different: founded in 1957, Pugwash has a longer history and more familiar reputation in international affairs, whereas the Ottawa Dialogue (OD) is not yet a decade old; Pugwash and the OD often select different kinds of participants, with Pugwash engaging serving officials in many meetings where the OD does not; and they are run to different organizational logics, for example with the OD having virtually no public outputs or press releases whereas Pugwash provides public reports of most meetings and courts journalists to some degree. Similarly, the intervention style of the main facilitators is quite different, linked to an underlying difference of Pugwash being more similar to a movement: Pugwash has been built around a central goal of a nuclear weapons free world and, in this sense, advocacy pervades its work. Nonetheless, toward this goal, it engages in conflict resolution processes and, since the Cold War days of bringing together Americans and Soviets, it has centrally been preoccupied with the process of mediating estrangement.

Both cases can be seen to use the ‘problem-solving workshop’ format to instigate contact between individuals from countries in conflict. In the OD, this is performed as close to the ‘classic’ tried-and-tested models emerging from academic study and practice as possible, insofar as groups of influentials – retired senior political and military officials – from India and

Pakistan were convened in a neutral country by an academic facilitator.[30] Pugwash operates slightly differently at times: in part (as I go on to illustrate in later chapters) because of the challenge of convening Israelis and Iranians in each other's countries – but equally because of the historical legacy of Pugwash comprising and linking many national groups – this model lends itself to something approaching 'shuttle diplomacy' which will be picked up later on.

A key point to emphasize is that the project grew as an empirical puzzle to explain rather than a response to a theoretical question or identifying a gap in the literature. On reflection, in some sense the 'selection' of case studies for this research is a misnomer, and it must be appreciated that the serendipitous access to each should not be misconstrued as a deliberate effort to represent the broad universe of unofficial diplomacy. Nonetheless, both cases display strong correlations with the variety of practice found in the field of international conflict resolution, in terms of the central mode of engagement, the dynamics among participants, and range of objectives. At the same time, the cases display sufficient variation – in terms of organizational capacity and resources, the region and participants, and methodology of achieving different objectives – that, rather than leading toward issues of selection bias, they in fact strengthen the claims and provide a solid foundation for further theoretical development, something much needed in the field of Track Two.

The point is that through the fieldwork and recursive engagement with the literatures, I came to understand that these case studies are *emblematic* of the type of activities, people, and underlying logics of unofficial diplomacy. Learning through case studies has been identified as critical in the production of context-dependent knowledge and generating deep, rich accounts of social phenomena that permit generalization (Flyvbjerg 2006). My immersion in

[30] Chapter 2 will elaborate on the study and practice linkage.

the case studies has not only enabled the mutual knowledge of how the people use these spaces but equally encouraged my development of a theoretical framework to contextualize what I found in the field.

To substantiate my claim that we are seeing changing practices in diplomacy, the two case studies in unofficial diplomacy bear different relationships to diplomacy and the central institutions of government. In particular, through investigating some of the central claims of the Track Two literature (in Chapter 2) and reframing them through the insights provided in IR, I highlight dynamics that I believe would be recognized and acknowledged by practitioners of conflict resolution but have not been dwelled upon. Together, the cases amount to valuable insights through comparing and contrasting and overall enable me to better respond to why the activity happens in the way it does and why this is important to understanding diplomacy in a wider sense.

The reader must understand that in the following chapters not every example provided holds true in both case studies or to the same degree. Indeed, this is part of the fascinating story of unofficial diplomacy, in which no two case studies are alike because of cultural, temporal, political, and social factors that are embedded in the dynamics of communities in conflict. This fact in itself provides part of the rationale for pursuing a different kind of approach than I have seen used elsewhere in the Track Two literature. The clear problem of comparability among cases points to employing a different kind of methodology that would bring to light many of the interesting facets and dynamics that I have witnessed during my immersion but have not seen brought out in much scholarly research. The following section outlines how I approached the key task of making sense of the project.

1.3 Research design

In getting to grips with the Track Two literature, there was a clear tension apparent as to those individuals who can be an 'insider' to these processes while attempting to produce scholarly work that does not necessarily compromise their ability to continue such work. As already noted, case studies are written by the scholar-practitioner and both ethically and practically it is complicated for the 'facilitator' to methodically interview their own participants to garner their impressions; thus, they rather tend to focus on larger questions of how things are being organized or on trying to assess the contributions a dialogue or set thereof make to a conflict. I have argued that this has somewhat precluded a more reflexive treatment of the endeavours that can critically consider the views and roles of the participants. This makes perfect sense and should not be viewed as a criticism, merely a limitation. Similarly reflecting the issue of access, other PhDs I have encountered have often relied upon secondary sources, basic leaflet or website information, or interviews reflecting on past activities (e.g. Kiel 2014).

I quickly ruled out quantitative approaches to unofficial diplomacy which implied unsatisfying methods to the questions I wished to ask. Rather, from being immersed in it, I wanted "to understand what a thing 'is' by learning what it does, how particular people use it, in particular contexts" (Schwartz-Shea and Yanow 2012, 23). Furthermore, in having witnessed several meetings before designing the project, I wanted to take an approach that would capture the inherent messiness of the enterprise and acknowledge that there are substantial differences in the ways in which it is practiced within the universe of this work. In a sense, such considerations informed my choice from very early on to pursue a form of interpretivist research that was auto-ethnographic in orientation; such an insider-ness should be seen as a strength of the approach and has had an integral role in the data and analysis (C. A. Davies 2008, 86–93).

From the beginning of this project, I have been acutely aware of the challenges posed by my role in studying a phenomenon of which I was to ostensibly be a part. This had clear advantages in terms of data collection: the access granted me by the organizers of the two case studies enabled immersed participant observation – in one sense this has been "deep hanging out" (Gusterson 2008, 99) for ten years, although meetings themselves were often months apart in time and often not in the participants' natural habitats.[31] Participants of each were, on the whole, positively inclined to be interviewed for the research. The flipside was that not only may participants have been aware of me at meetings and may have changed their behaviour to a degree that was hard to determine,[32] but equally there are certain sensitivities in accounting for what takes place. I had (and have) not only professional responsibilities to attend to but also have developed personal relationships with many of the research participants. This affected the types of questions that I felt I could ask: for example, particularly when it came to the issue of trust/mistrust, I had to reign in the scholarly ambition of uncovering trusting orientations in order to balance out my relationship with the research participants and the group dynamics within the organized endeavour. I move on below to outline the methods used for data collection, discussing some of the methodological and practical challenges presented by my cases. I then discuss the theoretical underpinnings of my approach to the topic, unpacking what it means to speak in terms of 'practices' and relate this to why it offers a useful set of tools to analyse unofficial diplomacy.

[31] Such considerations are generally consistent with the issues and problems of access in studying elites (Marcus 1983; Hertz and Imber 1995).

[32] The so-called 'Hawthorne' effect (Berg 2004, 155–58).

1.3.1 Data collection

The data in the following chapters was obtained via qualitative methods of in-depth, semi-structured interviews, as well as embedded participant observation from my work as a research assistant/projects consultant on the two case studies. Generally, I have provided cited quotations taken from interviews with participants in the respective projects and all are anonymous.[33] Additionally, there are some recollections of interactions and meetings that have come from participant observation at i) five meetings of the Ottawa Dialogue between 2012-2014; and ii) six Pugwash meetings and consultations in Israel and the US during 2012-15. The interviews for the Ottawa Dialogue took place first: over two meetings in November 2014 and April 2015 I interviewed fourteen participants, seven from India and seven from Pakistan. This constitutes the majority of participants of the two dialogues. For Pugwash I was able to interview just five people in person; however, I supplemented this with three further interviews on Skype, WhatsApp and via email. Overall, of the sample interviewed four were Israeli, two were Iranian, one was American and one Norwegian.

Importantly, there is much background knowledge gleaned from participation, conversation, and immersion in Pugwash since 2008 and the Ottawa Dialogue since 2012 that informs the analysis throughout. By way of example, the vignette that opened this chapter is a scene from the first meeting I attended in June 2008; although I was not in mind to take notes at that point with respect to a PhD, it was an episode that struck me then, as now, as crucially significant for understanding the interactions possible in such work. Furthermore, the continual involvement in meetings and the organization of the work allowed me to better triangulate

[33] I early on decided to maintain anonymity for each interviewee, even when they expressly said they were happy to be named, in order to privilege those who had any discomfort at being named in this research. Further, I have chosen to keep anonymous codes rather than general descriptors (which are provided at times in-text) to equally ensure that quotes are not easily attributable.

responses from interviews and produce a much 'thicker' account than simply interviews alone. For example, where I cite some reports from Pugwash meetings, I often was not only present during those discussions but actually wrote that report myself. Similarly, having been tasked to rebuild the Pugwash website, I have access to reports and participant lists of meetings stretching back into the 1990s, many of which are not currently listed on the Pugwash website. These have been cited where relevant with the meeting number but not quoted – they are not secret or restricted and may well be uploaded in the future.

The nature of this kind of work provided several challenges to the fieldwork, particularly as has been mentioned, in obtaining a wide sample of interviews. Firstly, from the outset it was clear that I would be unable to travel to India or Pakistan to interview serving officials, and during fieldwork Israeli officials declined to be interviewed. This had an obvious bearing on the research design, which I tailored to providing understanding from the participants of these two dialogues rather than individuals on the outside. This might be seen to affect the strength of claims that I make in respect of how governments view the dialogues; nonetheless, the advantage of a practice-based approach is the recursive engagement between what is observed in practice and the representation of what those practices constitute.

Secondly, with respect to the Pugwash case, speaking with any kind of Iranian, whether government, former government, or from civil society, is fraught with ethical complications that are more acute than for the other nationalities in this research. There is a serious risk for many such people that speaking out about meeting Americans or Israelis may cause personal difficulties within Iran. Where I was able to get interview access with current and former officials I was also cautious to allow my interpretation of their words as being to a 'diplomatic script' (Pouliot 2013, 49).

Thirdly, because a diplomatic and official resolution to the Iran nuclear confrontation was becoming apparent firstly through the Joint Plan of Action signed in November 2013 and subsequently the structured negotiations culminating in the July 2015 Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, the Pugwash meeting schedule dropped off during my peak time of fieldwork. Thus, opportunities to participate at meetings and moreover conduct my interviews as planned in the margins of those meetings proved scarce. I therefore tried to rely upon Skype and email questionnaires, knowing that again for Iranians in particular this was a less than satisfactory solution. Ultimately, my immersion in the work of both organizations proved a key source of data and impressions gleaned during this time had helped structure the dissertation.

Each of the interviews conducted followed a general script in which I began by ascertaining how the participants had come to be involved in this work and then deeper toward how they understand what it is that they are engaged in, taking in a variety of concepts from the literature.[34] The semi-structured staging allowed for a free-flowing conversation in which I could take advantage of emerging themes and ideas led by the participants' own experiences and understandings, rather than relying on a rigidly pre-determined set of questions and concepts. Thus, rather than treating the interview material as 'fact', I could ask participants to reflect upon what had been taking place in the meetings and thereby triangulate between 'sanitized' interview responses and what took place as practice (or performance) during the meeting spaces. The process of uncovering where interviewees speak *from* rather than what they speak *about* is a key part of understanding the tacit know-how that directs their practical knowledge (Pouliot 2013, 51).

[34] The general list of interview questions is included as appendix 1.

Of course, the interview questions had been developed not only from my pre-existing immersion in both the case studies but equally through participant observation already conducted during fieldwork. I had been able to collect a comprehensive set of thematic questions that matched up with key areas of inquiry in the track 2 literature, while also focusing on what I had identified as under-explored areas that were critical to my theoretical orientation. In general, the range of answers is reflected in certain ways throughout the following chapters while there was also fairly strong correlation on some of the key concepts. Nonetheless, some surprising evidence emerged from the interviews which changed the course of the research and presentation of material. For example, in asking participants about the trust-building objective of informal dialogue it became apparent that mistrust was a more prevalent feature of relations, and this informed the conceptual framework I have developed. Similarly, enquiry into the range of other dialogues in which my research participants may take part compelled my analysis of circuits and networks of unofficial diplomacy. Altogether, these methods provided a robust and coherent means to understand the world of unofficial diplomacy and how the participants go about their lives within it.

1.3.2 A practice-based methodology

Methodologically, a first condition was to come up with a coherent framework that avoided the pitfalls of causality – the 'deliverables' and 'measurability' with which funding agencies of the work are obsessed (and that colleagues and I have struggled with in past years). Indeed, informed through the work of producing funding reports, as well as by the debates in the literature on these points, I do not claim nor even try to prove causal influence on the outcomes of such conflictive situations. There is too little evidence and isolating cause and effect in these

processes is a tremendous, if not insurmountable, challenge (d'Estree et al. 2001).[35] Secondly, in wanting to investigate why unofficial diplomacy happens in the way it does, it is natural to look at where it happens, who does it, and how they understand it. I needed to identify a set of tools that would allow me to see what was happening in these spaces rather than viewing them from the outside. My approach has been to attempt to contextualise the individual case studies in terms of what other processes are happening at the global and transnational levels to better appreciate the 'why' – this also meant paying greater attention to the diplomacy in the various labels of the work. In doing so, I have drawn on research from diplomatic studies, global governance, and from sociological work on the modern knowledge economy to produce an account that focuses on the actors involved.

I therefore sought to elaborate on them using recent conversations from IR on the past(s) and future of diplomacy (Jönsson and Hall 2005; Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann 2011). Unlike Iver Neumann's (2012) fantastic anthropological contribution to understanding diplomacy, however, this is not a study of diplomats *per se* but rather a study of processes that constitute something 'diplomatic': reflecting the concerns on studying causality above, I do not make claims that people who do unofficial diplomacy should be viewed as diplomats. They are different kinds of actors: professionals of all kinds who engage in this work, and their 'world' that I want to present is more tentative, less stable, and furthermore less suggestive of an overall culture than we see in diplomacy. Nonetheless, following Neumann's lead, I propose to think in terms of a 'practice-based approach' that would shed light on what I was seeing. Where archival or content analysis would represent a more historical approach to unofficial

[35] Although evaluation and assessment studies proceed in Track Two, I believe there is an improbability of accurately measuring individual-level change – as thinking or behaviour – (Rouhana 2000, 1995) and too many external variables involved in accurately measuring policy influence and structural (institutional) change (Capie 2010).

diplomacy,[36] a focus on practices helps capture the relevance of the present – often through the congealed presence of the past – and furthermore encourages investigation of the situated, even mundane, aspects that cannot be captured by thinking of outputs alone. A conversation with a colleague reinforced this position, when she lamented an academic conference that was solely focused on poring through the agendas and reports of the past sixty years of Pugwash meetings: "they would miss everything that is important about this kind of work."[37]

Practices have become very much in vogue in IR and yet "there is no such thing as the theory of practice but a variety of theories focused on practices" (Adler and Pouliot 2011a, 4). As such, the label 'practice-based approach' is explicitly broad and does not wed me to a specific theorist or 'school' of thought. In essence, looking for practices means looking at "arrays of activity" (Schatzki 2001, 2): patterns of speech and bodily action that are socially meaningful because of the background knowledge that they reveal. They can provide a distinct way to understand agential action without discarding structuring effects – indeed, this approach usefully mediates between structure and agency in a way that helps capture how dispositions are shaped and organized. In being performed, more or less competently (Adler and Pouliot 2011b, 4), they also reflect shared expectations of behaviour, or norms and conventions. Practices can be both discursive and non-discursive and have been conceived as a "broad category" that "always bring together the *ideal* and the *material*" (J. Best and Gheciu 2014b, 26–27; also see Schatzki, Knorr-Cetina, and Savigny 2001). Such a notion encourages us to understand that what happens in world politics is prefigured by, or constituted upon, a set of intersubjective understandings of how certain things should be done (Bigo 2011, 228).

[36] See the contributions to the special issue of the *Journal of Cold War Studies*, vol.20 no.1, Winter 2018.
[37] PW6.NOV16

In the following chapters, I do not try to repeatedly couch discussion through the specific language of practice but rather use how certain scholars have thought of and mobilized practice theory to shed light on certain fascinating aspects of this work that are otherwise hard to capture. As such, while I do fall back heavily on Pierre Bourdieu (1986, 1990), in particular for his ground-breaking insights on *field* and *capital*, I have pursued a more 'free interpretation' of his work rather than employing a wholesale re-application of a Bourdieusian theoretical framework. The logic of taking this approach was to be complementary to the nature of the empirical material: what I was seeing and understanding required a range of concepts that could capture the fluidity of the actors involved as they moved between different fields. For example, while there are certainly structuring effects that are captured in my narrative, certain (more structural) Bourdieusian concepts like *doxa* did not easily translate to the absence of a singular intersubjectively constituted field of unofficial diplomacy. At the same time, this approach has a range of benefits for intervening precisely on debates in IR on using Bourdieu. Guided by the empirical evidence, my conceptualization of productive spaces *between* fields is a fresh contribution to such scholarship on 'field theory' (Vauchez 2011). It not only shows that we can think in terms of field and capital as they apply to the professionals who populate my research without having to use all of Bourdieu's theory, but usefully holds potential for discussions of how liminality and ambiguity as constitutive features of transnational relations are implicated in the (re-)production of power.

Furthermore, there is such a range of practice-based work beyond strict Bourdieusian analyses that can be used to capture the fluidity of international politics. The work of Gil Eyal (2002, 2013b) and Thomas Medvetz (2012b) was helpful for nuancing the conversation with Bourdieu and consequently using such ideas to think in terms of *spaces*. Vincent Pouliot (2010a, 2011) in particular has also added greatly to Bourdieu's notion of *habitus* and, along with Iver

Neumann (2012), has similarly drawn attention to the reproduction of practice and power in diplomatic settings. The volume put together by Jacqueline Best and Alexandra Gheciu (2014a) stimulated a focus on how we come to define practices in terms of who is doing what and at what level – many actors pursue goals that complicate both governance and diplomacy in interesting ways and this speaks to how "practices play an important role in *reinforcing* and/or *transforming* social relations" (J. Best and Gheciu 2014b, 28). Finally, as Anne Swidler (2001) among others has noted, inquiring into the appearance of a phenomenon like unofficial diplomacy as a bundle of potentially meaningful practices in world politics means understanding that there are simultaneously other practices that underpin, shape, and generate the activity – some, in fact, anchor and provide order to the others, again speaking to the power and dominance of certain ways of doing things at the international level.

Ultimately, we see that such things as unofficial diplomacy "cannot acquire their patterned existence and be skillfully enacted without learned and 'congealed' knowledge and discourses that give meaning to material and institutional resources and social technologies" (Adler and Pouliot 2011a, 3). The point of the inquiry is thus to unpack how it is that unofficial diplomacy has come about in the way it has: the use of practice theory and concepts by those who operationalize it offers a novel and productive way to uncover what knowledges, discourses, and resources, are used by those involved in my research. In this way, it can bring to light how unofficial diplomacy is implicated in a broader, global, context and make vital connections to how diplomacy itself is changing.

1.4 Logic of the dissertation and outline of the remaining chapters

On the one hand, processes of international conflict resolution are far from underexplored and yet, my contention is that the Track Two literature has not really expressed clear answers to

why it happens at all, who is involved, and how it takes place. On the other hand, research in IR has barely touched upon such processes, despite the preponderance of suitable theoretical and conceptual tools available.[38] This is precisely what my project intends to do: drawing on critical approaches in International Relations, the dissertation is geared toward understanding unofficial diplomacy not in terms of the more traditional analytical frames of ideas, norms, interests, or identities, but instead, in terms of what people do. The practice-based approach helps to explain that the activities we see in these spaces are not wildly different from one another, nor from some elements of how diplomacy is done.

A preliminary challenge concerns presentation: rather than front-end a lot of information on the two case studies, I have chosen to unfold it as a narrative which helps to iteratively bring to light the various dimensions of what goes on under the banner of the Ottawa Dialogue and Pugwash. The reader thus may find it frustrating not to know from the beginning which Iranians for example, have taken part in which meetings of Pugwash; but in order to tell the stories of what these processes look like in an intellectually dynamic way I instead present a logic of gradual illumination. The first part of this dissertation comprises two chapters that elaborate *what* kinds of activities we can consider to be part of unofficial diplomacy, and furthermore *where* they might be said to take place. These chapters are theoretical in orientation, ultimately developing a sociological and relational picture that allows us to see the activity in a wider context. With this foundational reassessment completed, the second part of the dissertation contains three empirical chapters that elucidate *why* we might see unofficial diplomacy at all, *who* takes part in the wider activities, and finally, *how* it practically happens. These guiding research questions structure the dissertation, account for and reveal what the 'stuff' of

[38] The obstacle of access notwithstanding.

unofficial diplomacy is all about, and amount to responding to why we see this unusual way of addressing international conflict.

If there is to be an identifiable field of Track Two, how was it constituted? Chapter 2 provides an overview of the theory and practice of processes of unofficial diplomacy by looking at the variety of ways it has been documented. I trace both the practical engagement of individuals in policy-influencing circles and the academic growth of a discipline pertaining to international conflict resolution. Through identifying some key tenets of the work that differentiates it from other knowledge-based activities such as academia, I show how there has been a steady 'professionalization' that has produced circuits of experts and knowledge flows. Above all, the chapter makes the case that existing work in Track Two has a number of in-built assumptions that have resulted in some penetrating questions not being asked and has overall not sought a more systemic inquiry into why the activity takes place.

To fully explore how we might fruitfully conceptualize the research material, Chapter 3 looks to IR for alternative disciplinary perspectives and conversations. I firstly reinforce the important step of decoupling the practice of diplomacy from the study of official relations between states. Assessing the diplomacy literature allows me to take one step back and reflect on what it means to do diplomacy – the resultant broadening of the ontological supposition of diplomatic practice encourages us to see different kinds of space for the mediation of estrangement. I then bring insights from the literature on global governance to understand why authority, professional networks, and knowledge are important parts of the story. In doing so, I contribute to an emerging dialogue between studies of diplomacy and global governance (Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann 2015).

Having reviewed these two important sets of literature, a final section of the chapter then sets about illustrating a framework that captures the inherent messiness of the world of unofficial diplomacy. I introduce some 'thinking tools' from the work of Pierre Bourdieu that help to capture the dynamism and sociality of the activity. In particular, highlighting recognition as a crucial social drive shows that, in addition to seeking ideas to resolve conflict, there is equally a process amongst participants as to who knows well about international affairs. Then, presaging the following chapter, I also introduce the study of trust as a concept that highlights the importance of looking for "practical knowledge which serves as background to actors' actions" (Ruzicka and Keating 2015, 20). In sum, the chapter amounts to proposing a sociological and relational approach to understanding how the actors involved in unofficial diplomacy come to be networked to one another, seek to communicate and refract different knowledges to various constituencies, and, above all, struggle to mediate one another's' knowledge in these spaces.

The subsequent chapters add the empirical details that illuminate a set of actors who do not always claim to be acting on behalf of the state but who, through their practices – what they say and do, and where – greatly complicate our understanding of what it means to do diplomacy. In Chapter 4 we briefly step away from the present to grasp the sources of conflict in the two case studies. To understand why unofficial diplomacy might appear in the first place encourages us to look in the background: by looking at, firstly, pervasive mistrust between the states in general and, secondly, an overwhelming sense of estrangement between their populations, I establish a baseline for each of the conflicts that both characterizes the interactions of my research participants and highlights the trust-building incentive of unofficial diplomacy. Here, we see that structural holes have persistently thwarted communication and knowledge exchange that exacerbate mistrust. The chapter speaks in interesting and innovative

ways to the classic 'security dilemma' proposition in IR: I highlight a more structural account of international conflict and the ways mistrust is generalized between states, but I also complement this through an agent-focused reading of the consequences that become apparent through a focus on estrangement. I illustrate participants' apprehension in becoming involved in such endeavours, sharing a table with 'the enemy,' and how they relayed to me that a key purpose for them is to better understand the mind of the other. The analysis reveals a more compelling logic as to why it is a *diplomatic* form of interaction that is needed between these sets of states. Overall, the central argument of this chapter is that conflict resolution is often, in fact, less about *building* trust than many scholars assume and more about the suspension of *mistrust*. Indeed, this suspension is enabled by the 'polite fiction' inherent in the diplomatic purpose and practice of unofficial diplomacy.

Chapter 5 then sets out to explore what types of actors are involved and how we make sense of the transnational knowledge networks that develop. I describe the elite cast of foreign policy professionals in each case study, and show how, in addition to participating in unofficial diplomacy, their primary, day-to-day job engages them in analysing, shaping, or crafting foreign policy issues in their domestic strategic community. In addition to connecting estranged policy communities, I show that instances of unofficial diplomacy act as a convening space between the various fields of customarily understood professions, with the participants acting as connective tissue between diplomacy, academia, science, and media journalism. Then, challenging one axiom of the Track Two literature, I problematize what it means to be influential through a discussion of how the participants variously use the results of the processes. The activity of 'transfer' certainly implicates many governmental and diplomatic actors, but a major part of this work, *as the participants perform it*, concerns circulating and percolating the knowledge outcomes through the various domestic and transnational networks.

The empirics demonstrate that social connectedness becomes an important resource: in one sense, it helps unofficial diplomacy to place itself *liminal* to the workings of official diplomacy and policymaking through the engagement of officials; at the same, this enables (and is enabled by) a certain *ambiguity* in claims to influence which behaves as a productive and generative element to the logic of unofficial diplomacy. In a state of 'inbetweenness' – neither official nor fully unofficial – the activity assumes an air of productive power based on the sociality of who is involved.

Chapter 6 then places the reader more firmly inside the processes: although the purpose of the problem-solving discussions is to analyse and propose solutions to conflict and estrangement, investigating how unofficial diplomacy takes place reveals what else may be at stake. There is a great deal of uncertainty among participants, concerning not only the relative influence of the others involved but equally over who knows the most about the conflict and international affairs more generally. Here, two key forms of knowledge claim become apparent: a credentialed type of expertise seen as 'objective,' and experiential knowledge derived from 'knowhow.' Drawing on Bourdieu's notion of *capital*, I describe how all kinds of participants position themselves to interact and compete to be seen as 'knowing well,' revealing the underlying social and political dynamics that are an unspoken part of knowledge transfer and mediation. Moreover, in contrast to Track Two literature, this perspective allows me to focus on other tacit parts of the processes: I draw attention to a greater competitive logic at work amongst the participants than previous research suggests, as well as different motivations behind contact and socialization. I show how different actor-types use the space to firstly 'feel out' who may be worth knowing, and secondly to assert their own political narratives and attempt to marginalize inconvenient knowledge. These seemingly opposed 'knowledge games' involve the manipulation of the space of unofficial diplomacy and, as such, unofficial

diplomacy can often become one more venue in which the diplomatic disputes of global politics are played out.

Finally, the concluding Chapter 7 synthesizes and summarizes the findings and analysis of the previous chapters. Through a focus on what is being done, I reflect on the interplay of what should be the dominant actors in the domain of conflict resolution, states, with a set of challengers who vie for an authoritative voice in providing problem-solving. This research thus seeks to join critical work on how knowledge is mobilized, constituted, and ultimately contested in practice through the emergence of transnational networks. Such an investigation takes us away from viewing contemporary governance as a narrative of non-state actors impinging upon the state; rather, examples of the failure to properly mediate estrangement have created alternative spaces that not only challenge but reconstitute how diplomacy is being conducted. And yet, in the face of uncertainty, characterized by estranged relations and exacerbated by the ambiguity of nuclear weapons, we must also look at how the state is both complicit and encouraging of this slow evolution. Ultimately, these processes of international conflict resolution in fact come to resemble the very practices of diplomacy. Diplomacy, for its part, thus seems to be both welcoming change while at the same time ensuring that these changes reproduce the very logic of diplomacy.

CHAPTER 2. DIPLOMACY IN PLACE(S) OF CONFLICT

This chapter will forge a connection between processes of international conflict resolution as they have been studied hitherto and my conceptual contribution of looking at them as unofficial diplomacy. In particular, through a critical review of the literature associated with Track Two,[1] this chapter sets out to address two related issues. Primarily, it opens a discussion about what counts as unofficial diplomacy, showing the development of a craft of informal mediation that helps illustrate what it looks like and where it happens. Secondarily, the chapter aims to bridge what has become an unnecessary divide between Track Two and International Relations (IR) – it provides an impetus to 're-diplomatize' informal mediation, to emphasize the diplomatic purpose of this work. The added value of this chapter is thus to firmly ground the practice of unofficial diplomacy in a disciplinary tradition; at the same time, I point to the shortcomings in the reach of the claims in this literature because of an isolationist stance that rarely locates case studies in a global context.

In the first section I suggest that understanding the genesis of unofficial diplomacy is to account for a confluence of ideational and material factors that constitute the emergence of practices recognizable as informal mediation. That is, it is not just a case of individuals, in whatever capacity, producing ideas and policy proposals for resolving conflict. Equally present is a set of material conditions, not least funding and institutional engagement, that produce a homologizing account of how individuals are increasingly networked together through a professionalization of Track Two. In the course of charting this emergence, I also show that such activities have been taking place for some time and in a variety of ways. I highlight two

[1] My use of the term 'Track Two' is not uncontroversial, as I explore throughout this chapter. It was only coined in the 1980s and as I show, many scholars doing such work prefer to use their own terminology. Nonetheless, I find it a useful and broad enough term, as well as being readily understood, that I choose to use it to denote the discipline that has emerged describing informal processes of international conflict resolution (see Jones 2015, chap. 1).

examples which precede the body of literature that now identifies as Track Two, providing some historical inflection to the basis of unofficial diplomacy. It is important to note that I do not claim to present a full-scope treatment or genealogy of the activity. Rather, in starting with reviewing how such practices have been performed at other times, under other conditions, we can infer a good deal of how the *space* of unofficial diplomacy has been constituted. As other practice-based approaches have observed, these kinds of spaces do "not logically exist prior to the practices themselves" (Paterson 2014, 156), thus we should investigate what it is that has made the activity possible. This helps build a solid foundation for the next chapter to more fully elaborate *where* unofficial diplomacy happens.

I then move into an account of how processes of Track Two are designed and implemented in contemporary practice. I highlight several basic concepts relating to what the processes look like, including the facilitator, transfer, and participants. Again, a caveat is that, in a discipline beset with definitional and methodological differences, I am not sifting through to identify the most appropriate or proffer my own 'better' understanding. The point of the dissertation, as such, is to look for unofficial diplomacy *through practice* and thereby provide a more empirical sense of the activity – the remaining chapters pick up and introduce several further concepts from the Track Two literature along the way. Through an exposition of the main currents of Track Two studies, I set the stage for a different approach to conceptualizing how we might see the field of activity. A final section then moves on to reiterate that the gap in the existing literatures between Track Two and IR was not inevitable and indeed is not insurmountable. In thinking through how the activity of unofficial diplomacy relates to wider processes in diplomacy and international relations, I hint that a more fruitful framework can be developed that benefits both disciplines.

2.1 Conditions of possibility for unofficial diplomacy

Put very simply, humans have always, and continue to, come into conflict with one another, whether as individuals or as larger groups. Conflict, in its basic sense, describes "an incompatibility of positions", although it has often become conflated with violent disputes (Bercovitch, Kremenyuk, and Zartman 2009a, 3). Several decades of research have elaborated various conditions under which conflict occurs, can be studied (both experimentally and in situ), and most importantly might be resolved.[2] The terms 'conflict resolution' and 'international conflict resolution' thus lie underneath much of the work as it has taken place and so here I seek to bear down on where informal mediation and unofficial diplomacy fit in this picture.[3]

Many studies of the field of conflict resolution point to a long history of practice going back centuries or even millennia, focusing largely on documentary evidence of negotiations or mediations between classical civilizations (Ahtisaari and Rintakoski 2013). Later research has been particularly indebted to this past and equally to the international dimension (Kriesberg 2009; Pruitt and Kressel 1985), but there is also a wide array of non-international practices that have contributed to the field, such as labour dispute mediation or divorce settlement. One issue that thus arises is that there is no concrete point of inception for conflict resolution; indeed, the term can be understood to refer to every kind of conflict at any level. To reduce the scope in this study, I, as others in the field have also done (Kriesberg 2009), emphasize conflict

[2] Some key texts include Deutsch (1949, 1990), Schelling (1960), Fisher (1972), Burton and Sandole (1986), Burton and Dukes (1990), Druckman and Stern (2000), Wallensteen (2007), Bercovitch, Kremenyuk, and Zartman (2009b), and Babbitt (2009).

[3] Indeed, adding to the number of terms, there are equally efforts to distinguish between work that aims at conflict *management,* conflict *resolution*, and conflict *transformation*, which each nuance the purpose and practices of what goes on but centrally rely on different 'casts' of participants as I show below.

occurring at an international level and look at a set of practices and a way of doing things that has emerged over time in this respect.[4]

Can it make sense to speak of the intellectual basis of something that has arisen organically over many hundreds of years and through the intuition of many different groups? In order to elaborate how unofficial diplomacy has come about, I propose to explore how this activity has appeared in a certain *space* and in relation to the emergence of the academic study and practice of international conflict resolution. Different scholars have, at different times, tried to trace these origins, turning to examples of individuals unofficially used by governments or even free-lance individuals negotiating with governments.[5] Rather than trying to specify an historical narrative in this way, I believe it makes more sense to speak of the emergence of a space in which unofficial diplomacy now takes place.

In keeping with the sociological commitment of this thesis, I lean on Thomas Medvetz's (2012b) work, in which he seeks to locate the emergence of 'think tank' as a category. Such an approach encourages a "focus on the formation of network ties that permitted certain organizations to distinguish themselves from more established institutions," and highlights that it is a "process by which these organizations became oriented to one another in their judgments and practices" (Medvetz 2012a, 116). Firstly, I discuss some of the ideational factors that must have been present and coalescing for it to make sense to speak of Track Two as a sphere of activity happening outside of the official diplomacy of states; and secondly, I look at the

[4] Many scholars refer to intractable or protracted conflict in this sense, and look to the identity-based nature of conflict revolving around issues of ethnicity, religion, or race (see Azar 1990). This deep-seated nature of conflict, with its historical impact on individuals and communities alike, is explored through the lens of mistrust in Chapter 4 in a way that adds to this literature.

[5] For example, Jones (2015, 9–10) points to the example of a Dr Logan, who attempted to conduct diplomacy with France on behalf of the US but with no accreditation or authority, and thereby precipitated the Logan Act of 1799 which explicitly forbids private individuals from "correspondence or intercourse with any foreign government."

material factors that created a structuring effect to this development and provided a growing institutional basis for the activity. The key argument is that Track Two can now be seen in a more professionalized form than the earlier 'experiments' initiated before the discipline crystallized.

2.1.1 The ideational basis of unofficial diplomacy

A starting point for understanding contemporary Track Two is to think in terms of groups and individuals convening to discuss matters of international affairs, particularly where it concerns war. There are examples beginning from the 1870s of 'peace societies' and later a "humming transnational civil society" that participated at the intergovernmental Hague Peace Conferences of 1899 and 1907 (G. Best 1999). Subsequently, in the early twentieth century, American philanthropists began to establish what are now the largest think tanks on foreign policy and global peace and security, ones that are still operational and emblematic of the work today. For the most part, these were Western developments: American and European conversations amongst an elite of nominally private citizens who could represent something other than the sovereign interest in international affairs. These took place in public policy hubs such as the Carnegie Endowment (US, founded 1910) and Chatham House (UK, founded 1920), and represent a burgeoning civil society interest in international affairs.

Furthermore, academic interest grew, culminating in the foundation of the *Journal of Conflict Resolution* in 1957 and subsequent research groups and a proliferation of other journals. One can add to this the intergovernmental organizations (e.g. the UN and NATO) that stimulated a global interest and approach to conflict and the subsequent establishment of a growing number of Peace Research Institutes in Europe (PRIO in Norway, 1959, and SIPRI in Sweden, 1966) that were explicitly focused on conflict and war. In many ways these signal the beginning of

the intellectual environ from which the practice of informal mediation grew and further transnational groups sprung (Kriesberg 2009, 18–20).

These examples illustrate the background, precursors to the development of the academic study of Track Two and other forms of informal mediation, and they are also the seeds of the actual practice of unofficial diplomacy. In a sense, it is not just the thinking about public policy on international affairs that these institutions represent; there is an engagement of actors other than state representatives in the actual 'problem-solving' – the acting upon one or more issues that at the official level of interaction have become stuck, their resolution prevented by a range of political or technical barriers – and the connections that were created in doing so. Such examples as Carnegie and Chatham House were geared to "promote the exchange of information, knowledge and thought on international affairs" and from very early on featured people of the stature of Keynes and Gandhi, as well as lesser known elites.[6] Taking this kind of political dimension and involving certain influential figures helps to distinguish it from entirely non-official processes such as academic meetings. To help illustrate this point, there are two examples that to some extent predate much of the academic research that constitutes Track Two.

The Pugwash Conferences and the Dartmouth Conferences were conducted on the intuition of their instigators, rather than according to a tried and tested formula and as such represent the pioneers of the field of international conflict resolution (Evangelista 1999; Burton and Dukes 1990, 140). The history of Pugwash begins at the urging of some of the world's leading public intellectuals (including Albert Einstein and Bertrand Russell) to hold a conference to avert the

[6] See https://www.chathamhouse.org/about/history [accessed 23 May 2018]

risk of thermonuclear war in the late 1950s.[7] Interestingly, in discussing the forum and format of such a meeting there was initial disagreement: should the meeting be a large public conference? Lord Russell was rather "convinced that a very small number of very eminent men can do much more" (Russell 2001, 489) and thus was born the Pugwash model: a meeting that prioritized 'eminent' participants in a small number. Crucially, however, as the principal organizer Joseph Rotblat noted, the meetings were "never intended to be a purely academic exercise, solely for the purpose of acquiring knowledge" – most of the participants had some form of communication with or access to policymakers, often as government advisors precisely because of their eminent status (Rotblat 2001b, 46).

The first meeting in 1957 focused on the control of nuclear weapons, the uses of atomic energy, and the responsibility of scientists, but against the backdrop of the Cold War and its polarizing East vs. West, capitalist vs. communist discourse. Indeed, part of the point of the first Pugwash conference was to enable dialogue between members of estranged communities: on the one hand, US and European scientists, and on the other hand, Russian and Chinese scientists. There were virtually no other forums for this kind of interaction, and at the official level, diplomacy (on nuclear weapons but also more generally) was not productive. The conference was considered a modest success and the fact that many of the participants returned for subsequent meetings would indicate that they found the experience useful. A key facet of this and future meetings is not simply the opportunity to understand the opinions of others with whom they would not ordinarily meet, but equally the fact that they could pass these impressions and information to officials within government upon their return. Given the lack of diplomatic engagement, it was perhaps also at the behest of governments that such interactions were encouraged to continue.

[7] See https://pugwash.org/1955/07/09/london-launch-of-the-russell-einstein-manifesto/ [accessed 23 May 2018]

The Dartmouth Conferences were similar in nature: instigated by a private citizen, Norman Cousins, the meetings provided for 'citizens dialogue' between the US and Soviet Russia.[8] Like Pugwash, the 'citizens' label masks the fact that Cousins had explicitly sought the approval of President Eisenhower to initiate this, because "the nuclear superpowers should not rely totally on intergovernmental relations: they needed a backup communication channel" (Saunders 2012, 11–12).[9] Although initially the Dartmouth meetings were on a larger scale in terms of participants than at Pugwash, by the 1970s they also began to use smaller workshops with a reduced number from each side. As testament to the utility of such meetings, Yevgeny Primakov, a long-time participant who went on to become Foreign Minister then Prime Minister of Russia in the late 1990s, wrote that

> "formal contacts do not exclude the necessity of non-official exchange of opinions in particular between those people who have the capability to report their impression and conclusions after such exchanges to the highest state officials." (quoted in Gottemoeller 2004, 181).

Mirrored in my case study of India-Pakistan relations, the appearance of continuing formal diplomacy between the USA and Soviet Union masked the fact that it was largely unproductive, and that different kinds of diplomatic engagement were sought out to supplement this deficit.

Primakov is just one example of the number of participants who at one time or another, or sometimes simultaneously, participated at both Pugwash and Dartmouth. Here we see the beginnings of the networked character of this work: many participants then (as now) participated in multiple forums that address similar or the same issues, forming an international

[8] James Voorhees (2002) has written a comprehensive account of the Dartmouth Conferences.

[9] Cousins subsequently acted as an unofficial emissary between President Kennedy and USSR Premier Khrushchev, helping shape negotiations which culminated in the first nuclear arms treaty (Pietrobon 2016).

pool of participants that encounter one another in meetings across the globe. In a way, this is not coincidence: admittedly, the circuit of potential participants was not huge during that period of the Cold War; but what it reflects is a desire from each side to have contact with the other, to discuss, debate, and potentially come away with an enhanced understanding of their thinking at a time where such opportunity was not widespread by any means (see Suri 2002, 76; A. Kraft, Nehring, and Sachse 2018). Similarly, Primakov was one of a good number that went on to have a distinguished career in government. There seems to have been either a knack by the organizers of selecting participants with bright prospects to hopefully translate the work of the unofficial diplomacy into policy, or the reverse, that the process of engaging in unofficial diplomacy led them to become more suitable for office.[10] Either way, there is a good correlation in both cases and it equally hints at the intertwining of individuals in this work and government. These two early examples show that from the earliest emergence of the practice of international conflict resolution was a need to mediate between communities estranged from one another's thinking. The methods of working that they demonstrate suitably characterise the ideational 'conditions of possibility' for the emergence of unofficial diplomacy; however, alone these factors do not provide the full picture.

2.1.2 The process of institutionalization

Just as the Pugwash and Dartmouth conferences were moving into their second decade of operations, the first academic interventions on international conflict resolution began. In most accounts of the field, John Burton is recognised as the first academic to organize workshops, beginning in 1965, that explicitly addressed "conflict based on human needs rather than on the state's interests alone" (Saunders 2012, 12; see Kriesberg 2009, 21). It is interesting to note that he was a former diplomat who eschewed the prevailing Realism of the day in International

[10] Kelman (1995, 21) discusses the interplay of these two factors.

Relations in favour of moving "toward a new 'pluralist' paradigm – *the world society perspective* – which emphasized the values and relationships of multiple actors in the global system" (R. J. Fisher 1997, 21). Writing later, Burton observed that,

> "Western political thought has been based on certain unquestioned generic, and perhaps genetic, assumptions about the human species. Psychologists, sociologists, anthropologists, lawyers, international relations students – all have been operating within a power-based, coercive, authoritative or controlling paradigm. This assumes that the problems of government, of social control, of conformity, of the social good, and of law and order, are problems that stem from the nature of the human species, the nature of the individual." (Burton and Sandole 1986, 334)

Mirroring the so-called 'third debate' of IR (Wæver 1996), Burton identified that a "paradigm shift" was occurring within the social sciences and within the practice of conflict resolution (not just internationally but in all kinds of conflict), spurred by the changing international environment in which all kinds of minority rights were being recognised, post-colonial independence movements successful, and the establishment of principles of civic equality were questioning the absolute authority of the state vis-à-vis individuals and groups. Ultimately, he believed that, "There was no option but to alter settlement processes, turning them into analytical problem-solving processes, so that the problem could be defined accurately, and solutions deduced that would meet the needs of the parties concerned" (Burton and Sandole 1986, 337). This reflection was put into practice by Burton and refined or adapted by the many who have followed.[11]

Importantly, from the 1970s onward, these intellectual developments found an increasingly supportive environment: as the ideas promulgated by leading academics took hold in practice,

[11] Most notably Kelman (1977; 1995), Azar (1981; 1990), Volkan (1985), and Fisher (1997), all of whom came from a social psychology background.

seeing applications in a wide range of alternative dispute resolution mechanisms in civil rights movements in the US in particular, a growing number of scholars produced more articles and books than ever before. As a consequence, university departments gradually became more receptive to the 'radical' ideas of conflict resolution; furthermore, "government agencies, and the corporate and nongovernmental world" became more engaged, culminating in a "remarkable field-building strategy, providing long-term grants in support of CR [conflict resolution] theory, practice, and infrastructure" by a number of large US Foundations during the 1980s (Kriesberg 2009, 22). It was also in this period that the term "Track Two Diplomacy" was coined for the first time: in his assertion that " an understanding of the way history, society, culture, and psychology interact can be made a systematic part of the foreign policy process," Joseph Montville – a serving diplomat – proposed that a "second diplomatic track can therefore make its contribution as a supplement to the understandable shortcomings of official relations, especially in times of tension" (Davidson and Montville 1981, 154–55).[12] This recognition that such processes may have a bearing on formal diplomacy helped to support the explosion of activities in the post-Cold War period.

As these material factors coalesced around the purpose of conflict resolution, the end of the Cold War brought multiple opportunities to put into further practice the research and theory developed in previous decades. Where much research had been conducted on conflict between Israel and Palestine (S. P. Cohen et al. 1977; Kelman 1978) or Northern Ireland and Britain (Doob and Foltz 1973), the increasingly fragmented civil and intra-state conflicts that erupted after the cessation of the super-power rivalry provided grounds for new 'experimentation' in places such as Tajikistan or Nagorno Karabakh (Saunders 2012; J. Zartman 2008). Intra-state

[12] In the same vein, the pioneering work of Volkan, Julius and Montville (1990) to outline a 'psychodynamic' approach to conflict that also picks up these elements is recognised above all by Fisher (1997, chap. 5). My contribution to this literature rests on focusing on mistrust, as discussed in Chapter 4.

and inter-ethnic conflicts have captivated scholarship since, but even though the occurrence of international, inter-state war has been declining (Human Security Centre 2005), there remain some major state-to-state rivalries that persist and are being addressed through this model of engagement. Indeed, examples abound of continuing work on Israel-Palestine and even Northern Ireland in a post-agreement (implementation) phase, while there has been a growth of activities addressing India and Pakistan's rivalry, for example.

Interestingly, in recent decades, Track Two has come to resemble something of a cottage industry for scholars looking to put into practice the vast body of research that has accumulated. Indeed, some scholars are able to seamlessly move from region to region, conflict to conflict, applying 'generic' methods or practices to different cultural locales.[13] There are thus multiple endeavours running at the same time or over periods of time on just one specific conflict. As it is, then, there is equally a large amount of overlap in terms of individual participants who attend different workshops. The space of unofficial diplomacy has thus expanded, spurred by institutional support, greater funding, and an intellectual climate that views the various connections forged as a special contribution to resolving conflict. In tandem with the growth in number of think tanks, quasi-governmental institutes, and multi-disciplinary university departments, there are many more professionals thinking about and doing international affairs generally, and international conflict resolution specifically, than ever before.

The central argument that this section has proposed is that we have moved on from the earlier efforts of citizens such as Rotblat and Cousins to influence official policy through informal dialogues to a much more professionalized environment in which individuals circulate from

[13] There is some debate on the appropriateness of applying a generic theory; see Avruch and Black (1987) and Jones (2015, 74–75).

dialogue to dialogue, bringing their knowledge and expertise to bear on different problems of conflict. The next section turns to the body of literature that has accumulated from case studies and surveys of the field of international conflict resolution, in order to provide some further parameters to how processes of unofficial diplomacy can be run. The point of this review is not to provide an exhaustive survey of the field but rather to distil some of the key principles that give shape to the type of unofficial diplomacy exhibited in the two case studies in this dissertation.

2.2 Contemporary international conflict resolution

Chapter 1 highlighted the surprising lack of a common terminology and the variety of labels under which broadly similar work is carried out.[14] Although most of these examples are focused on either international or intra-state conflict, I do not claim that all of them are necessarily what we should call unofficial diplomacy (authors of Track Two are similarly wary of bundling everything under their rubric). The point is, however, that they must be recognised as fundamentally sharing some central features (R. J. Fisher 1972, 67) and among the examples many have a diplomatic purpose that is evident. This section will provide a survey of the key currents of contemporary research and practice in the Track Two discipline which allows us to home in on the important factors in the case studies that follow.[15]

[14] Some scholars have also sought to classify different 'streams' within the field – e.g. "human relations" perspectives driven by social psychologists, in contrast to approaches that emphasizes the complementarity of unofficial work to official diplomacy (Çuhadar 2004) – but I am not convinced it is a useful exercise.

[15] The following subsections are not intended to be an exhaustive of the variety of concepts, approaches, and nuances that can be found in the literature. Three comprehensive contributions in the field that stand out as resources in this respect are Fisher (1997), Davies and Kaufman (2003) and Jones (2015).

2.2.1 Contact, the Third Party, and change

At the most basic level, processes of Track Two are about bringing people together from across a dividing line of an international or inter-ethnic conflict to problem-solve how the conflictive atmosphere can be ameliorated.[16] In order to make such an intervention, the processes are facilitated: that is, much the same as with other forms of mediation (e.g. of marriage or labour), a third party, usually viewed as neutral by both sides, is present to arrange and guide the interaction.[17] Most often these are the 'scholar-practitioners' who go on to write up the case studies, experiences, lessons learned, and contribute to the theory building and developing literature on conflict resolution. While it can vary by what type and how many are involved, this method of facilitation has become well established and constitutes a lynchpin of practice in the field (Pruitt and Kressel 1985).

A key principle for consideration by the third party before initiating work is that,

> "social psychologists have maintained that contact, or its deliberate interruption, has a significant impact on the relationships between groups in conflict… Contact, or its absence, may also influence perceptions such as threats, trust and hostility." (Bercovitch and Chalfin 2011, 12–13)

The 'contact hypothesis' is thus a cornerstone of this work, elaborated from studies on intergroup dynamics and prejudice (Allport 1958; Pettigrew and Tropp 2008). In essence, it states that contact and communication between rival groups, sustained over time, can create positive changes in the attitudes of individuals and groups toward the other.[18] There is a crucial

[16] This differentiates the activity from actual negotiation (at an official level). The relationship between any official process and unofficial efforts, as well as the sequencing of these, has been discussed at length elsewhere (Kriesberg 1996; R. J. Fisher 2006) – suffice to note that it has often led to unofficial processes being labelled as either a "pre-negotiation" (I. W. Zartman 1989) or a "circum-negotiation" (Saunders 1996), in which unofficial processes run in parallel. Jones also points to examples where the idea is more explicitly "to develop alternatives to official negotiation" (Jones 2015, 8).

[17] The role of this facilitator has been comprehensively addressed by Jones (2015, chap. 4).

[18] There is a huge literature covering 60 years on this notion, taking in various conditions such as differences of power relations (majority and minority groups) or institutional and legal support. In particular, the challenge of

caveat here, in that contact alone is not predicted to improve a conflictive situation but rather some conditions and careful management of how the contact takes place must be taken into account. There are cases where this was not competently undertaken and as a consequence the individuals left the meetings with a worsened sense of the other, thereby negatively impacting the conflict.[19]

The fundamental assumption and logic behind initiating such a meeting (or series) is that enabling face-to-face encounters between certain individuals from each side, carried out under optimal conditions, would likely help in the dissection of what the conflict is about and what can be done to better the situation moving forward. This is then the focus of the 'problem-solving workshop' that is the central mode of interaction in such endeavours (Kelman 2008). Typically, the contact is structured as meeting for a specified length of time, usually held in a location that is considered neutral; generally, the intention is to form a process, rather than being one-off meetings. There are many variations for how to conduct the work (cf. Jones 2015, chap. 5) and these largely have relied upon experimentation over decades by a number of scholars.[20] More recently, a literature on 'theories of change' has investigated and tested hypotheses on why and how individuals change through such processes, and what change can be sought from their society at large (Shapiro 2006; Fitzduff and Church 2004). Rather than dwell on this more organizational and evaluative approach, this narrative will rather steer toward unpacking another key distinctive feature of unofficial diplomacy, one that marks it out as something different from just intellectual work.

generalizing the experiences of contact beyond those involved up to the group or society level (cf. Pettigrew 1998) is an important aspect picked up on below in the context of transfer.

[19] Jones (2015, 90–91) discusses the notorious case of the facilitator Leonard Doob's work in Northern Ireland.

[20] Of course, in forming a process the facilitator should plan carefully for what kind of process this will be and what objectives it will have. Such planning will rely heavily on what 'theory of change' lies behind the intervention, which focuses the mind of the facilitator on "What sorts of changes help bring about the resolution or transformation of conflicts?" (Shapiro 2006). This is picked up below and again in Chapter 4.

2.2.2 Transfer

A great deal of the literature has focused on understanding how any results from the dialogue move from the level of the individuals in the room to the social groups involved in the conflict. The underlying assumption is that "relationships built from these initial contacts between the parties in conflict are expected to generate interpersonal cooperation between individuals, and translate into more productive diplomacy between the groups involved" (Bercovitch and Chalfin 2011, 13). This translation is something hoped to occur more or less naturally over time: in the shorter term, at least, individuals are able to gain a better sense of how individuals on the other side to a conflict think, what their perceptions are, and what their narratives about certain events are; in the longer term, iterative interactions are predicted to build up a sense of trust between individuals and the idea is that not only will 'new' information be passed back by participants into their respective communities but that actual changes in perceptions and behaviour may be stimulated.[21]

As a concept, transfer has thus been defined as "how effects (e.g. attitudinal changes, new realizations) and outcomes (e.g. frameworks for negotiation) are moved from the unofficial interventions to the official domain of decision and policy making" (R. J. Fisher 2005, 3). This position reflects the underlying assumption in much early work that the respective central governments implicated in the conflict should be the intended targets of transfer from an unofficial intervention, such that they can better understand the thinking from the other side of the conflict and can plan to use this in the development of official policy. To a varying degree, however, this represents only one possibility among the intended activities and recent

[21] Jones (2015, 55) notes that in many third party interventions, any 'theory' of achieving such change is largely 'internalized' by practitioners, and "based on philosophically driven views of how and why conflicts come about rather than on objective research; they rely on "gut" feelings of how to resolve conflicts."

scholarship has opened up a much wider debate on the scope of transfer.[22] The following figure is taken from the work of Ronald J. Fisher in describing the possible lines of transfer that may occur in a typical process of Track Two.



Figure 1: A schematic model of possible transfer effects from Interactive Conflict Resolution (R. J. Fisher 1997, 202)

This model captures well the different possibilities for how 'effects' and 'outcomes' may circulate after a particular problem-solving workshop and process. The different constituencies identified, and the lines and overlap, are key to grasping the potential of unofficial diplomacy:

[22] Ronald J. Fisher (2005) has been central in developing the theoretical basis of transfer and others in the field have similarly developed more complex models of transfer, most notably Çuhadar (2004, 2009; 2012).

Fisher showed how, in specific instances, participants are able to conduct transfer in a variety of ways, that include briefings and memos for officials ('direct' transfer) as well as opinion pieces or appearances in public media ('indirect' transfer). Chapter 5 will pick up on his important contributions in outlining transfer in my two case studies.

Within Track Two, building on constructivist research on 'how ideas spread', there are two important contributions that nuance the picture of transfer yet further. Both Amitav Acharya (2004) and Dalia Kaye have expanded upon this model to incorporate the notion of 'filtering,' whereby support for ideas are moved "beyond a select number of policy elites to the larger societal level, through the media, parliament, NGOs, education systems, and citizen interest groups" (Kaye 2007, 23). These types of indirect transfer highlight the multiple domestic, as well as international, audiences to which the transfer can take place, reinforcing that ideas and outcomes move through the different circuits of dialogue with the people they comprise. Writing on the impact of regional dialogues (those involving more than two conflicting parties rather than a bilateral effort), Kaye argues that the processes are

> "primarily about long-term socialization and the generation of new ideas, not immediate policy change. Such dialogues are a conditioning process in which regionals are exposed to new concepts, adapt them to their own contexts, and shape policy debates over time" (2007, 3).[23]

One of the key findings in my own research supports this notion and suggests it might be equally relevant in bilateral conflictive relationships: as Chapter 5 will show, the dialogues are primarily conceived of by those participating as being about the percolation of thinking away

[23] There is a caveat here: both Kaye and Acharya are focused on regional dialogues that explicitly seek to effect broader regional dynamics (in the Middle East and South Asia, and South East Asia, respectively). As such, there is not necessarily a focus on a bilateral conflict, but I would nonetheless put forward that in each case there are significant problems of estrangement that have been preventing functional diplomacy at the regional level. Moreover, I believe that their findings on different constituencies as targets for transfer highlight very well the notion of circulation and circuits of dialogues that I propose and find in my own work, and that this avenue of research on 'lateral' transfer should be expanded in Track Two.

from the problem-solving workshops and down into the respective societies. Government officials were understood as not always receptive to ideas that challenge the status quo and thus were frequently not sought out by participants as targets of transfer. Instead, participants might use the media to challenge existing narratives about the conflict or they would participate in the various conferences, debates, roundtable meetings, etc. that gather together members of that country's 'strategic community.' Nevertheless, the Track Two literature has had to focus on developing theory and practice in particular of the evaluation and assessment of the results of these endeavours, in part to satisfy critics and funders alike (Rouhana 1995). A key point that I want to bring forth is that, accepting that transfer is a crucial aspect of the work, looking at *who* is involved in these workshops and thus will be performing transfer is of utmost importance to understanding the logic of the work.

2.2.3 Participants and influence

Given the considerations of both contact and transfer, the third party of such a process must plan carefully for who the people in the room will be. Of course, they should be selected on the basis of what the process is trying to achieve, and this is where a good portion of difference in the practice – and hence the labels attached – comes from. More fundamentally for this dissertation, and an issue for the literature to consider, is that this process of selection is rarely discussed in an open manner and remains critically under-explored. In general, participants are most often simply assumed to be 'influentials' within a particular community:

> "The participants were members (or soon-to-be-members) of the political elite: political actors, such as parliamentarians and leaders or activists of political parties or political movements; political influentials, such as journalists, editors, directors of think tanks, politically involved academicians, and former diplomats or military officers; and pre-influentials, such as advanced graduate students who seemed headed for politically important careers." (Kelman 2008, 31)

This snapshot of a summary of meetings organized on the Israel-Palestine conflict in fact demonstrates more broadly who might be involved in any instance of Track Two. As many other scholars do, it highlights the variety of personalities and professions that can be engaged in the work. But within the literature, as it stands, this is as complicated as the picture gets. In particular, there have been few attempts to understand the activity in relation to what the different types of participants bring to the table from their professional backgrounds and social contacts – these are all implicitly assumed to make them influential – as supposed to what the facilitators intend for the project. My argument here is that the unchallenged assumption of *influence* constitutes a major point of weakness in understanding both why individuals participate and, more intrinsically, why the activity of unofficial diplomacy works in the way it does.

Where scholars have sought to understand processes by virtue of who is involved, they are generally established only in relation to a monolithic conception of government and an uncomplicated perception of where power and authority may reside. Starting from Montville's proposition, 'Track One' denotes official diplomacy and 'Track Two' describes non-official processes. This has then been carried on through with the logic of 'multi-track' diplomacy, in which participants are organized by what kind of professional sphere they come from: e.g., government, business, religious, activist, professional conflict resolution, amongst others, corresponding to a total of nine tracks by which one can identify a process as 'track three,' 'track four,' and so on (cf. Diamond and McDonald 1996). Although the multi-track model was deliberately employed to describe a comprehensive approach to peace-building in a post-conflict situation – the argument was that without engaging on all of the nine tracks, a lasting peace is significantly less likely – in practice it has become a referential tool that imposes a

label based on what kinds of people are participating.[24] A further nuance was added to describe policymakers themselves acting in their 'private' capacities, given the label 'Track 1.5' (Nan, Druckman, and Horr 2009).

The result, I argue, is that the interventions of international conflict resolution are always conceived in relation to government (that is, 'Track One') and it produces typological representations of the work that lead away from interrogating any changes in the international system that challenge sovereign power as the repository of conflict resolution. The below schematic thus illustrates where Track Two scholars tend to identify the different streams of work to be located.



Figure 2: Categories of conflict resolution and their typical participants; adapted from Jones (2015, 123)[25]

[24] There is also a correlation here between conceptions of conflict 'management,' located closer to track one because it involves those as close to power as possible, conflict 'resolution' as moving away until one reaches conflict 'transformation' at the right end of the figure 2. This latter notion, whose main proponent is Lederach (2015, 1995), is that deep-seated socio-political problems need to be addressed on a broad societal scale that views peace as an ongoing process rather than a 'quick fix' implied by management or resolution techniques.

[25] The figure omits a number of 'categories' that are included in the original which are not discussed here because they largely overlap with those included. I have also transposed the labels relating to conflict 'management,' 'resolution,' and 'transformation' according to which people would be implicated.

As noted above, 'Track Two' has become a popular and vernacular label for unofficial processes of international conflict resolution (Jones 2015, 10). However, given the associations above, and moreover, as I go on to show in Chapter 5, the fact that participants of my case study processes had varied understandings of what the different 'Tracks' refer to, I choose not to use the label. To be clear, I am not arguing that the concepts of multi-track or Track Two are useless nor that all activities in this range should be labelled as unofficial diplomacy. Rather, I believe that the rubric of unofficial diplomacy allows for a greater flexibility and nuance in the study of the processes involved in my case studies. Again, the next chapter builds on this to encourage the reader to look at these kinds of processes as something diplomatic and different from the emphases in the existing Track Two literature.

The purpose of this section was to introduce some basic parameters for how we can identify instances of unofficial diplomacy, and in particular how they relate to conflict resolution. I have shown that academics have been applying social psychology principles and drawing on a rich literature to develop a set of theoretical and practical tools to guide the interactions of conflicting parties. This has been largely founded on the notion that, under the right conditions, contact between the two sides may help reduce suspicion, hostility, and mistrust, and promote information exchange and the transfer of changed attitudes, all in mind to constructive diplomacy in the future. In the final section below, I want to further argue that while this body of literature can indeed be quite illuminating for the individual case study, it has tended to be quite isolationist: the consequences are that it thereby lacks purchase in providing answers to why individuals choose to participate and how these processes fit with what else happens globally.

2.3 Reintegrating Track Two with the purpose of diplomacy

Both official and unofficial processes of conflict resolution

> "have developed separately, as have the corresponding academic specialties of diplomacy and international conflict resolution… In more recent years, the practices have, at least to some extent, converged. Official and unofficial practitioners often work together on the same conflict" (Nan, Druckman, and Horr 2009, 65–66).

This neatly summarizes one of the incentives for my approach to the topic: although the practices of official and unofficial diplomacy might be said to have converged, the analyses have not; with this in mind, this chapter puts forward a first step in doing so.

2.3.1 Separate disciplinary lives

A discipline of Conflict Resolution has developed rather eclectically, drawing on a wide range of research in social psychology, sociology, political science, economics, and law (Babbitt and Hampson 2011, 46). What has arisen is a wide corpus of both theory-driven and practice-informed studies concerning situations of conflict – be it at the level of labour disputes, community projects, or between societies and states. Although conflict resolution has at times been defined quite explicitly, Track Two serves as an umbrella term: it encompasses both an explicit use of informal mediation as the key mode of engagement, while also admitting a wide range of actions relating to "prevention, management, resolution, and transformation" of conflict (Bercovitch, Kremenyuk, and Zartman 2009a, 10).

Important to note, this implies a variety of approaches that do not necessarily seek to *resolve* the conflict. Rather, there is a recognition that while conflict may manifest as a contentious or even violent dispute, the underlying factors (or incompatibility of positions) may remain. In some cases, the activity supports official diplomacy whereas in others it is directly an alternative; most often it is somewhere between these poles. Muddying the water yet further is

that also present in these interventions are elements of mediation (Pruitt and Kressel 1985; I. W. Zartman and Touval 2007; Bercovitch 1994) and negotiation (R. Fisher, Ury, and Patton 2008, 1987; Ury 2013) that contribute to a sense of abundance in terminology and concepts, and consequently, no agreed-upon singular approach (Mitchell 2002; Botes 2003). This spectre hangs over many contributions to the field and I am aware that my approach in one sense contributes further to this 'disarray' (Rouhana 2000, 1995).

At the international level, conflict has been taken up as research topic within the purview of International Relations but was studied with specific ontological and epistemological assumptions that are different to those used in Track Two. In the IR discipline's earliest days, during the inter-war years, the 'idealist' platform led scholars to study conflict as war, an inter-state phenomenon. The means of resolving conflict/war or seeking its future avoidance became inextricably tied into the state system of diplomacy: "If the outbreak of hostilities implies the breakdown of diplomacy, the end of fighting and the final outcome of a war require diplomatic efforts" (Jönsson and Aggestam 2009, 35). Subsequently, however, the disciplinary force of Realism during the Cold War, with its focus on deterrence, coercion, security, and so on – in short, "the then dominant view of conflict as a competitive struggle" (Deutsch 1990, 243) – essentially marginalized approaches which couched the study of international conflict in cooperative or peaceful terms, which had been 'discredited' by the outbreak of the second world war.

Those scholars who chose to study conflict *resolution* were "seen as 'soft' theoretically, focusing more on praxis rather than contributing to innovation and advancement of our general understanding of conflict processes" (Babbitt and Hampson 2011, 46). Although IR later drew upon the insights of early pioneers in the study of conflict, such as Deutsch (1949, 1958) and

Schelling (1960), to look at issues of bargaining and negotiation at the international level, the divide had already been institutionalized to a great extent:

> "IR scholars perceive a bias among CR scholars and practitioners toward peaceful methods of dispute settlement and resolution, one that deliberately and self-consciously eschews the use of force and violence" (Babbitt and Hampson 2011, 46).

Indeed, most scholars of conflict resolution advocate "means other than violence to settle both interstate and intrastate disputes, and to transform the relationships of disputing parties such that resort to violence is less likely in the future" (Babbitt 2009, 540). And yet, the evident complementarity between the purposes of diplomacy and that of conflict resolution was side-lined in this battle between Realism in IR and other social sciences.

2.3.2 An impetus for diplomacy

This dividing line has since ossified: in how conflict is addressed, in how processes of its resolution are talked about, and what concepts have been brought to bear on them (as well as ultimately who ends up reading them), there is very little cross-fertilization between IR and Track Two. It is something commented upon by Track Two scholars, at times agonizing the divide between 'theory' and 'practice' (Jones 2015, chap. 2; Rouhana 1995, 257). One implication of this is that IR embarked on its own ways and methods of studying conflict at the international level, in large part beginning with assumptions about the state and sovereignty that then 'naturally' inform the scope of diplomacy.

A second implication is that Track Two has developed without a critical relationship to IR, and more specifically, to diplomacy and diplomatic studies. Where linkages are made, it is in terms of when states or their representatives formally mediate conflict (Ahtisaari and Rintakoski 2013). As we have seen, international conflict resolution that uses informal mediation refers primarily to "third-party assistance to two or more disputing parties who are trying to reach

agreement" (Pruitt and Kressel 1985, 1); this of course does not preclude the involvement of states, but in fact a good part of case studies and research carried out under Track Two has focused on non-state interventions in international conflict. What is missing in many accounts, I argue, is a greater emphasis of *why* certain actors – governmental and non-governmental alike – might become involved as participants in the processes.

Contained within Track Two is a certain appealing logic which intuitively leads one to assume that governmental responses are the most effective and ultimately the deciding factor in resolving conflict – the typology reinforces this fetishizing of the state. So-called 'private' or non-state endeavours are therefore in some sense 'lesser', mere contributions. Furthermore, they are potentially contestable in terms of their legitimacy to pursue the work, as publics (populations-at-large) and governments do not look kindly on 'meddlers' attempting replicate their official diplomatic channels (Jones 2015, 10). However, this is the crux of my research topic and a central reason for pursuing a key argument of this chapter: I use the term *unofficial diplomacy* to carefully differentiate the nature of the 'private' conflict resolution activities carried out from those pursued under a state-based logic, and yet forcefully appeal to the sense that they are all-the-while diplomatic in nature. Part of the reason, to be elaborated through the remaining chapters, is intimately linked to what it means to do something which is diplomatic, and how this relates to the tension between a modern preoccupation with publicity, transparency, and openness, on the one hand, and privacy, secrecy, and a closed circle of relevant actors, on the other hand. Indeed, I go on to show that this tension is played out to a large extent over the what kinds of interactions take place, how knowledge is produced in these spaces, and the role of governments in ever-more complex global processes – all issues which have not been forcefully taken up within Track Two.

This chapter has concluded with an elucidation of the linkages between conflict and its resolution, war and diplomacy – the argument has been that, when viewed at the international level of analysis, the two sets of terms are not fundamentally different but have taken on separate disciplinary lives. In then demonstrating the many ways in which conflict resolution can be studied, I have hinted that apparent in these means is a diplomatic purpose, one that is often obscured because of the divorce that international conflict resolution and diplomacy have suffered. There is no good reason why such a divide remains, and indeed both disciplines can be enriched through a deeper dialogue. I go on to strengthen this argument in the next chapter by looking at the grounds for how unofficial diplomacy can be studied within an IR framework, drawing on a variety of concepts and theoretical insights that Track Two has barely engaged with.

CHAPTER 3. CONCEPTUALIZING UNOFFICIAL DIPLOMACY

Chapter 2 elaborated the craft of unofficial diplomacy, addressing how these processes of international conflict resolution have come to take place in a space outside of the official diplomacy of states, and how the academic field of Track Two has expanded to cover a wealth of approaches. So why study unofficial diplomacy differently? I suggest that scholarly work of Track Two has not yet connected what the processes look like with the variety of concepts and theoretical approaches that are increasingly employed in International Relations (IR); similarly, IR as a discipline has barely investigated these types of processes. This is not to merely suggest that I have chosen to do something novel for the sake of it; rather, the specifics of my engagement with the case studies permits an alternative approach, which furthermore takes advantage of innovative concepts to reveal different dynamics within unofficial diplomacy. This brings a set of new understandings as to why it happens in the way it does. Equally, the research will provide IR scholarship with a new set of empirical and theoretical contributions that bolster our grasp of transnational political relations.

To develop an alternative framework, this chapter first turns to two sets of literature that can help make sense of unofficial diplomacy from the outside. Because this dissertation is also intended as a disciplinary mediation between Track Two and International Relations, the discussions of this chapter go some way back in drawing out the significance of each concept as they have developed in the literature. Through firstly exploring diplomatic studies, I present diplomacy as a social institution for the *mediation of estrangement*, meaning we can understand it not as a tool of foreign policy but as sets of practices performed by agents. Moreover, the evolution in how many more actors and processes are being considered as contributing to diplomacy helps ground the diplomatic narrative throughout this dissertation. I subsequently review the literature under the rubric of global governance, which adds novel perspectives on

networks as emerging forms of political and social organization, as well as how they impact our understanding of *expertise* in global politics. A key insight here is to understand *authority* as a key site of struggle for *recognition* and power amongst various professional actors. Strangely, diplomacy and global governance have had little conversation and, in a sense, have been focused on rather different priorities.[1] While they are both important conversations for understanding the nature of unofficial diplomacy, neither alone can fully account for the particular form of enmeshment, imbrication, and mediation we see in the case studies of this research.

A third section therefore builds on the insights from these literatures to propose a sociological approach to more clearly conceptualize unofficial diplomacy. Having highlighted the importance of seeing authority in a *relational* way, which both speaks to the networked character of the empirics and equally emphasizes that there is a process of recognition involved, I go on to describe that we must look for a *space* in which mediation takes place. I thus add to Track Two accounts an emphasis on unofficial diplomacy as responses to problems of estranged relations, insofar as they appear as bridging activities for structural holes in transnational knowledge flows to promote understanding between members of siloed professional communities. This relies on bringing in some insights from the work of Pierre Bourdieu to understand that informal mediation is about convening professionals from different *fields*, who each bring various resources (*capital*) to bear on the processes. Rather than a simplistic conception of an influential individual, this implies that we can actually better account for what the professionals bring with them in terms of different resources (e.g.

[1] Where diplomacy has tended to reflect hierarchy, stability, order, and tradition, global governance has rather celebrated the novel analytical lenses of transnationality, fragmentation, and plurality (Cooper, Hocking, and Maley 2008b). This is of course changing, and I am part of this emerging conversation; see Sending, Pouliot and Neumann (2011, 2015).

expertise, experience, access) that ostensibly aid the problem-solving potential. Finally, I show how trust is implicated within the forging and maintenance of the professional networks and describe how adding mistrust to the account provides a useful foil for the dynamics of estrangement. Overall, this framework focuses attention on the various motivations for participants as they vie to be recognized as 'knowing well' about international affairs. It thereby adds a further layer to Track Two descriptions by more explicitly drawing out the underlying strategic and competitive behaviours present in interactions.

A fourth section argues that when we take these considerations and in fact make them part of the analysis, we come to appreciate a different set of dynamics in how it takes place, which in turn opens our eyes to why it happens. The value-added of the relational, sociological approach is to enable reflections on the social and political dynamics at work underneath informal mediation. This is not to say that they are the only dynamics present but rather to point to aspects of the work that are not highlighted in much Track Two work. The primary objective of this chapter is thus to present *where* unofficial diplomacy takes place, which encourages us to look for alternative explanations and dynamics to its practice. Secondarily, through doing so, I identify and describe a conceptual and theoretical framework that buttresses the subsequent chapters.

3.1 From diplomatic studies to diplomatic practice

The tradition of diplomatic studies has a rich history: stretching back from de Callières in 1716 through to the many manuals and memoirs of the twentieth century, one subset of writing has largely been by diplomats in a predominately prescriptive form that tells us what diplomacy is

and how it ought to be.[2] Here, the thrust was to elaborate on the art of diplomacy and the diplomat, providing anecdotal and idealised accounts of the role of ambassadors or, less frequently, statesmen.[3] In this vein, typical handbooks continue to solidify a mythologised reputation of diplomacy as being solely "the conduct of official relations between the governments of independent states" (Satow 2009, lix). Such histories and memoirs take for granted and, through repetition, reinforce the notion of a state system in which diplomats are the sole and legitimate persons responsible for carrying out foreign policy tasks.[4]

Within IR, for many decades diplomacy had been largely downplayed as a feature of a system in which the primary analytical actors are states and very little critical scholarship explored it as anything other than a tool of states, or the vehicle of state relationships and communication. The following subsections draw out how this has changed and why we can now come to view diplomatic studies as a vibrant set of conversations about international relations. I show firstly that untying diplomacy from the state reveals a host of practices that are diplomatic in purpose. If it is about the *mediation of estrangement*, the challenge for researchers is to look into the specificity of the form of interaction. This understanding provides the basis for re-examining who may be said to be involved in diplomacy: scholars have identified many 'new' actors, but we need to further problematize the landscape in which diplomacy takes place. I finally return to practices in the most recent set of contributions to diplomatic studies that provide a distinct granularity to what is happening to diplomats as they act on and in the world.

[2] The foundational texts in this regard are de Callières (2000 [1716]); *Satow's diplomatic practice* (2009 [1917]); Nicolson (1962); Watson (1982); and Berridge (2015 [1995]).

[3] See, for example, Meyer (2005), Jackson (1981), and Kissinger (2012).

[4] Iver Neumann (2012, 1) makes these points which also feature heavily in other contemporary reviews of the genesis of diplomatic studies.

3.1.1 An international institution

Scholars, broadly in the English School but also wedded to post-modern approaches, have since unpacked not just what diplomacy does, but why and how it exists from a theoretical standpoint – here, diplomacy becomes a central and constitutive practice of world society.[5] We see that diplomacy has trans-historically been concerned with relations between groups of people or polities and as such pre-dates the formation of the state (Der Derian 1987b; Jönsson and Hall 2005). At the heart of this thesis is the notion that,

> "rather than seeing diplomacy as an institution of the modern state system, both the practice and context should be seen as responses to a common problem of living separately and wanting to do so, while having to conduct relations with others." (Sharp 1999, 51)

As Chapter 1 made clear, the standout contribution in this vein has been James der Derian's 'genealogical approach to Western estrangement,' in which he challenges the traditionalists by arguing for an understanding of diplomacy as a "*mediation between estranged peoples*" (Der Derian 1987b, 4). As such, diplomacy should not understood as an activity tied irrevocably to the modern state system, but is a "perennial international institution" (Jönsson and Hall 2005, 3). In broadening the ontology of diplomacy in this way, Der Derian notes that "in the most general sense, the form this mediation takes, as estranged relations change, constitutes a theoretical and historical base for the study of diplomacy" (1987a, 93).

In essence, as Der Derian asserts, we should pay attention to the *form* that the mediation takes, rather than any preconceived definitions that derive from the status quo – we must "'make strange'… our habitual ways of seeing diplomacy" (1987a, 95). It is thus that he, and others

[5] Important contributions come from, among others, Fawn and Larkins (1996), Der Derian (1996), Neumann (2002), and Sharp (2003). Iver Neumann (2001) provides a great survey of diplomacy and the English School.

that have followed in such a tradition, destabilise the assumption of a diplomacy based upon and representative of the state system and thereby enable a critical re-think of the boundaries of what constitutes diplomatic activity.[6] This transformational interpretation informs the way in which diplomacy is used throughout this dissertation, with a broadened scale of who may be involved, how it might take place, and what it is to do diplomacy: "In other words, the practice of diplomacy is integrated with other social practices and takes place in the same political or sociopolitical space" (Jönsson and Hall 2005, 22). These reflections help us to capture diplomacy as something more dynamic than a state-based tool for managing international relations – indeed, following this line, we may ask who can be said to do diplomacy?

3.1.2 'New' actors in diplomacy

Another subset of diplomatic studies has followed this critical bent, building on Hedley Bull's early observation that "entities other than states have standing as actors in world politics, and that they are engaged in diplomacy vis-à-vis states and one another" (1977, 164). Since the 1990s in particular, they have begun to account for the swathe of non-governmental actors who seem to have a role to play in the conduct of diplomacy – in the post-Cold War world, there was concern as to whether we were to have 'diplomacy without the diplomats' (Kennan 1997).[7] More empirically-based, yet equally theory-guided, scholars sought to track how NGOs, corporations, and other private actors who were coming to the fore were challenging analyses of diplomacy as a practice of states. Their central claim was that

> "using the national interest as the dominant analytical framework is not just overly simplistic for comprehending and explaining an increasingly complex set and pattern of diplomatic interactions. It is also misleading, if not false." (Cooper, Heine, and Thakur 2013, 21).

[6] In particular, see Constantinou (1996, 2006); Jönsson and Hall (2005); and the contributions in Constantinou and Der Derian (2010b).

[7] Also see the debate on the 'end' of diplomacy between Sharp (1997), Cooper (1997), and Hocking (1997).

Recognition of the greatly complicated landscape in global politics also spurred a proliferation of terms for apparently 'new' forms of diplomacy emerging: "catalytic diplomacy" (Hocking 1996), "polylateralism" (Wiseman 1999), the "global heteropolarity" (Constantinou and Der Derian 2010), and even "celebrity diplomacy" (Cooper 2008) are all examples of how scholars in the diplomatic studies tradition have attempted to account for the range of actors that are not states (Langhorne 2005). However, one potent critique of this literature is that it has been too ready to simply prefix diplomacy with a term to denote the group or type being studied; while recognizing the number of new actors and the complication this brings, such a move was seen as not necessarily theoretically advancing our understanding of how diplomacy and diplomatic activity is changing (Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann 2011, 531).[8]

A more foundational critique is that this literature did not take full advantage of the parallel literature developing in IR that brought in concepts such as transnational advocacy networks and epistemic communities (ibid., 533). Although perhaps overstated, it makes the point that, theoretically, the diplomatic studies literature had tended to remain in a more rationalist vein. This has been evolving and there are now deeper explorations of how different actors are changing the analytical playing field; some of these demonstrate

> "a growing symbiosis between a variety of state and non-state actors wherein diplomatic interactions can become a virtual seamless web of activity and in which the professional diplomat becomes a facilitator in the development of arena and actor linkages" (Hocking 1996, 452).

[8] I am equally aware that my use of unofficial diplomacy does not distinguish me from this crowd, but the justification provided in the introduction made clear the label is part of the problematization of the activity.

Such approaches have produced some interesting insights that complicate the nature of representation, particularly in relation to what kinds of authority these new actors might wield; however, much like some contributions to the global governance literature discussed below, it has often been in the sense of a zero-sum game, where authority or sovereignty are viewed as being ceded from the state to the non-state, with little appreciation of the complex movements back and forth, and acknowledging a more deliberate and involved role of the state (Sending and Neumann 2006). A key puzzle emerging from this is not just to identify that new actors are becoming engaged but to specify how it is they are challenging and changing diplomacy. As Neumann (2008, 24) demands, "where is the literature on the diplomacy of state-NGO relations?... These responses make up a growing part of diplomacy, and should therefore be examined".

3.1.3 The changing diplomatic landscape

Overall, if we broadly accept the assertion in the diplomatic studies literature that indeed non-state actors are not just partaking in diplomatic processes, but through their interactions with both policymakers and diplomats they are affecting kinds of change we can measure, then we can understand that the context in which diplomacy takes place is evolving. In tandem, the range of non-diplomatic actors implicated indicates a gradual shift in "the process of representation, understood as the reciprocal recognition of an actor as a legitimate party with the power to influence both the flow of affairs and the functioning of a given system" (Langhorne 2005, 333). Non-state actors engaging in diplomacy can represent something other than the interests of sovereign states; for some, these are the interests of communities organized around deterritorialized principles or issues, who have found a unified voice in a more globalized and interconnected world. Indeed, we should recognize that, historically, "the territorialisation of diplomatic relations was largely achieved at the price of silencing the

diversity of voices and practices that constituted a wider understanding of diplomacy as the experience of encountering and dealing with others" (Cornago 2010, 89). As the age of globalization has ushered in a rise of universal or trans-cultural issues, such as climate change or nuclear weapons, individuals and groups are becoming politically connected regardless of state boundaries. This literature, at its boldest, asserts that perhaps we are somewhat breaking free from the old diplomatic system and that these global communications constitute forms of 'new' diplomacy.[9]

While not wishing to push the thesis that an old order is crumbling due to globalization, there is certainly an emerging emphasis on a more dynamic and less hierarchical diplomatic order (Heine 2008). This provides an impetus to critically re-think the concept of representation and its implications for diplomacy and who holds authority.[10] The literature is increasingly illustrating how sets of actors, often self-organized and connected through networks, either virtually or at times physically, are having a profound effect upon the functioning of diplomacy (Langhorne 2005, 339). One response as to why what was once the closed and state-centric club of diplomacy has allowed these encroachments is that "expertise, which is in fast-increasing demand in contemporary diplomacy, is shifting the principle of representation away from territoriality toward virtual forms of authority grounded in symbolic systems" (Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann 2011, 537). For example, one can think of the many NGOs with official accreditation to the United Nations through ECOSOC[11] who are thereby able to attend certain sessions of UN deliberations and mix openly with diplomats. As I have done throughout the research period in the hallways and meeting rooms of New York, Geneva, and Vienna, non-

[9] In this vein, see Riordan (2003) and Davenport (2002).

[10] And beyond this even, for sovereignty (Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann 2011).

[11] For example, the Pugwash Conferences on Science and World Affairs has had 'special consultative status' with ECOSOC since 1991, and currently more than 4,500 NGOs are listed with similar status. See http://undocs.org/E/2015/INF/5 [16 August 2016, accessed 2 May 2017]

state actors mingle and attempt to influence policy through their representations to state representatives. States and their diplomats have largely accepted and embraced this change in the status quo, and they work freely and often closely in such new sets of relations. Furthermore, governmental organizations (e.g. foreign ministries) are not just consulting with non-state actors but also employing them for a variety of purposes,[12] thereby adding to the blur and challenging a fixed dividing line between public service and private interest (Neumann 2008, 22).

3.1.4 Diplomacy as practice

A focus on representation and expertise encapsulates the latest subset of the literature on diplomacy, but one that is largely driven by IR scholars. In particular, this has come through the so-called 'practice turn' and is thus predicated to some extent on using the example of diplomacy as a vehicle for theory.[13] Diplomacy, and diplomats in particular, are a ripe group for studying, insofar as what they do on a daily basis is in some sense incongruous with the outcomes that are more frequently discussed in structuralist accounts of international politics. A key motivation of such scholars is that by investigating the practical elements of what diplomats *do*, they can show that the "everyday performance of international politics is not a mere epiphenomenon of deeper structural forces; it is also a generative force in and of itself" (Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014, 891). Even if they might view the process of diplomacy as either implicated in the reproduction of power relations, something with which the earlier

[12] For example, from my own experiences I have witnessed and met certain nominally 'private' actors (academics who are also Pugwash members) that have served on the delegations of the UK and Germany to the UN Non-Proliferation Treaty Review Conferences. Also, specific to the US case, one former Chair of the Pugwash Council served under President Obama as Assistant to the President for Science and Technology, Director of the White House Office of Science and Technology Policy, and Co-Chair of the President's Council of Advisors on Science and Technology.

[13] Key contributions are Neumann (2002, 2012), Pouliot (2007, 2008, 2011), Adler-Nissen (2016), Cornut (2015) and Pouliot and Cornut (2015).

diplomatic scholars might agree, or as the production of 'nothing new' (Neumann 2007), it has come to be a burgeoning part of the literature. Although, as noted, there is long-standing recognition that state diplomacy works through all sorts of channels and the critique of diplomatic studies for being state-centred persists, a lot of this practice-based literature has nonetheless veered toward studying official diplomats. Whether Norwegians (Neumann 2012) or NATO (Pouliot 2010a; Adler-Nissen and Pouliot 2014), there has been a continued fascination with what is done at the official level and what this may tell us about diplomacy. Using practices to chart the various ways in which non-state actors have become integrated and more than participatory in global politics is still an emerging theme.[14]

In summing up what has been written on diplomacy, I want to be clear on why it is necessary to draw on further scholarly research. Firstly, premised on the mediation of estrangement, understanding diplomacy as an institution made up of a collection of social practices allows us to think beyond the state. It paves the way for addressing how the parlour-room of diplomacy has opened its doors to a wide range of private, non-governmental actors, and to consider these as serious players in the policymaking arena. Secondly, however, the state is not in terminal decline: it must be remembered that,

> "the role of government agencies can still be expressed in terms of the traditional functions of representation, communication and negotiation, but in each case it is legitimate to ask *with whom these activities are being conducted, how, and to what end*" (Hocking 1996, 472, my emphasis).

Although these questions were posed two decades ago, there remains much work to be done. The relationship of governments and their diplomatic agents to other types of actors is a nascent theme within diplomatic studies to which I will contribute (Cooper, Hocking, and Maley 2008a).

[14] See the range of contributions to the special issue of *Cooperation and Conflict*, 50(3), September 2015.

An exclusive focus on diplomacy and diplomatic studies can only take us so far in exploring the case study material of this research. I propose that considering diplomats as professionals whose practices can be studied is an important step to understanding their interest in unofficial diplomacy. Furthermore, treating diplomacy as an increasingly networked activity holds promise to understand their interactions with experts on the outside of government. In order to fully explore these notions, it is necessary to turn to parallel developments in IR: global governance scholars have tried to make sense of the patterns of activity 'beyond' or 'below' the state that will ultimately help us better conceptualize how unofficial diplomacy takes place.

3.2 Transnational global governance processes

As Chapter 2 explored, unofficial diplomacy is premised on the interactions of nominally non-state, yet influential, actors with the nodes and sites of official authority and sovereign power. A key tenet of the work of unofficial diplomacy is precisely this recursive engagement, but the diplomacy literature has not fully caught up in elaborating upon situations in which state organizations are not the key referent. As such, I want to widen the lens by looking at how other approaches have attempted to account for similar kinds of interactions, where the starting point is the activities and influence of non-state actors.

The literature addressing non-state actors in global politics has a relatively short history in the discipline of International Relations, and scholarship didn't really blossom until the period after the end of the Cold War.[15] One early direction was the neoliberal institutionalist attempt to assert the relative importance and influence of institutions as mediating state power, but in a

[15] Early efforts were through the lens of interdependence (Keohane and Nye 1977) and the debates on the effectiveness of international regimes (Krasner 1983).

more rationalist framework.[16] Such approaches generally focused on how states instrumentalize international institutions and organizations, and through a functionalist logic explained their apparent effectiveness. While interesting in the incorporation of some non-state actors, these works generally retained ontological assumptions about the world that reify the primacy of the state, allowing for little of interest to be said about the mediating influence of these other actors and, moreover, the actual process of governing contrasted with government.

Beyond these efforts, this section will therefore focus on approaches and concepts that have complicated the picture of states being the sole repositories of power and influence on the global stage, which are generally grouped under the rubric of 'global governance.' I look first at how scholars have sought to understand the impact of non-state actors through the prism of *influence*. I show that this has been the central route for those few who have analysed Track Two but that it has limitations. I thus move on to discuss how thinking through *authority* provides purchase on how influence is constituted and how recent scholarship has further nuanced this concept by mobilizing it in a relational sense. This sets the groundwork for further discussions on how research on *networks*, particularly in terms of *professionals*, and *knowledge* helps us to grasp that reconceptualizing the *where* of unofficial diplomacy allows a deeper set of questions on why it takes place in the way it does.

3.2.1 Global policy influence

The term global governance incorporates a multifaceted research agenda but is generally attuned to explaining the process wherein patterns of international political interaction include actors other than the state, and furthermore have seemingly re-cast the role of the state

[16] Examples include Keohane and Martin (1995), Moravcsik (1993, 1997), March and Olsen (1998), and Koremenos, Lipson, and Snidal (2001).

(Rosenau 1995). At its most basic, "the central empirical claim in studies of global governance is that nonstate actors have emerged as powerful actors in world politics, thus challenging the power and authority of sovereign states" (Sending and Neumann 2006, 654). Globalization was identified as one of the key drivers and scholars sought to explain what was happening to international order as a vast array of corporations, non-governmental organizations, and politically-oriented groups had multi-scalar influence upon decision-making, as well as how new forms of authority and agency were implicated (McGrew and Held 2002). The key analytical change from earlier rationalist work is that scholars began to think in terms of governance as 'systems of rule' rather than simply government (Rosenau and Czempiel 1992) – such a perspective "urges us to focus on political processes rather than institutional structures when analyzing public policy-making" (Torfing 2012, 100). It was also the case that this opened up investigation of the "steps both before and after the explicit making and enforcing of rules that are crucial to political outcomes" (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010b, 14) and that these ought to be theorized and investigated in their own right.

One such route came through the 'ideational turn' whereby norms, principles, and social context were viewed as important constitutive factors of both interest and identity.[17] Importantly, such work more generally provided an articulation of the 'transnational' as an emergent category:

> "whilst 'international' is usually taken to refer to relations between states and 'global' to refer to a distinct level of territorialization (i.e. across the whole world), 'transnational' can encompass a variety of different types of actors and different sorts of connections across varying numbers of national boundaries." (Morgan 2006, 141)

[17] In particular, social constructivist efforts to chart the influence of non-state actors as measurably having an effect on state and multilateral decision-making, rather than being merely present in world politics. See Adler (1997) and Finnemore and Sikkink (2001).

Transnationality marks the beginning of a more concrete sense of a set of activities or relations that transcend national boundaries, and moreover, explicitly involves actors other than the state in transactions that may equally involve the state (Bulkeley et al. 2014, 5; Risse-Kappen 1995). At the same time, it also gives a sense of boundlessness, operating across multiple levels either above, below or next to the state (Scholte 2008).[18]

This deterritorializing move allowed the activities of transnational advocacy networks and NGOs, among others, to be viewed through the prism of ideas, norm-construction, or moral suasion. Such approaches centred on investigating the impact of a variety of actors working in concert across borders to affect preferences, interests, and identities. The cumulative research agenda was very much focused on elaborating *influence* vis-à-vis the state by providing evidence of policy change outcomes, or more modestly on 'agenda-setting' and other kinds of influence on early parts of the policy cycle.[19] Influence is an important although somewhat nebulous part of the fabric of unofficial diplomacy and thus, notably, the few crossover pieces from Track Two particularly looked at 'norm entrepreneurs,' a fashionable term in the constructivist research programme.

Several scholars have thus explained how unofficial processes seek to foster regional security cooperation in the longer-term, leaning on a causal mechanism of ideas influencing identities.[20] Similarly, there is scholarship that has woven explanations of normative influence into this kind of framework, positing a learning process of customary behaviour that leads to enhanced

[18] For example, 'transnational civil society' became an important and influential player on the global political scene as a de-localized expression of humanitarian solidarity and interest; see Price (2003), Florini (2012), and Hochstetler (2013).

[19] Contributions on these themes include Finnemore and Sikkink (1998), Keck and Sikkink (1998), Evangelista (1999), and Johnston (2001).

[20] The key contributions are Higgot (1994), Harris (1994), Kraft (2000), Job (2003), and Ball, Milner, and Taylor (2006) .

cooperation (Acharya 2004). One important contribution in this corpus identified the "autonomy dilemma" in the context of ASEAN countries, pondering the 'blurring' in 'Track Two' between official and unofficial processes (H. J. S. Kraft 2000, 353). This notion will be of critical importance later in this dissertation as it neatly articulates the uneasy space that these processes inhabit; however, it also presupposes an absolute distinction between an official world and a set of unofficial actors thus leaving unexplored the possible role of the state in these processes.

In general, this subfield of Track Two literature has only really focused on the South-East Asia region and no greater generalizable trends have been sought. Indeed, while the exploration of influence is a useful addition to the literature, the focus upon actual change in government policy are hard, if not impossible to quantify and qualify as attributable to unofficial processes (Capie 2010). The assumption that isolating causal mechanisms of policy influence is possible serves as a fundamental obstacle to pursuing such an agenda. Moreover, scholarship in IR has had its say, highlighting a liberal normative bent to this work through an assumption that civil society actors constituted a 'third sector', as distinct from (and often against) the state and market. An further point is that this literature rarely considered how NGOs or similar actors are more nuanced or ambiguous in their work, and in fact often work closely with governments thereby reinforcing the status quo (Stavrianakis 2012, 225).

3.2.2 Shifting spheres of authority

Other scholars instead began to examine the capacity for influence more specifically by reference to the concept of *authority*: how actors are able to position themselves through

drawing on distinctive and differentiated resources.[21] At its core, such approaches took "the image of authority flowing from a fixed, institutional centre [as] outmoded" (Walters 2004, 27). Instead, focus was placed on new configurations of governance, or "spheres of authority" (Rosenau 1992), that were seen to be a more relevant way to explain global politics. This scholarship recognized that such spheres involved complex and variegated arrays of public and private actors, many of whom were presumed to rely upon something other than sovereign authority, that is, simply being 'official' or of the state. A central assertion was that constellations of transnational actors could invoke various categories of authority – moral, institutional, delegated, and expert, amongst others – to press their claims for credible and transformational influence upon the state or international organizations.[22] In thinking through the implications of governing as a process, this research demonstrated that "the locus of authoritative problem solving does not rest with governments and their international organizations alone" (Pattberg 2005, 590).

The focus on sources of authority has been a rather productive element in global governance scholarship. Here, there has been a convergence with what was noted in some of the diplomatic studies literature: recognizing that they no longer possess a monopoly over certain resources states have often sought to work with non-governmental actors to make up for this shortfall. In this vein, one prominent scholar has observed, "If there is one topic that is consistently brought to the fore in discussions of nonstate actors' sources of authority, it is that of expertise" (Sending 2015, 14). *Expertise* has come to be understood as a socially constructed category: a

[21] Early efforts include Cutler et al. (1999), Cutler (2003), Hall and Biersteker (2002), and Dingwerth and Pattberg (2006).

[22] Empirical cases include where business or legal firms became serious players in enacting international economic policy because of specific expertise (Pattberg 2005; Djelic and Sahlin-Andersson 2006) or universal principles helped establish moral authority in the banning of landmines or asserting human rights (Anderson 2000; Hopgood 2006). In general, (transnational) civil society was seen to be not merely influential but increasingly authoritative in terms of "normative forces, rooted in modern conceptions of justice, science, and rational planning" (Beer, Bartley, and Roberts 2012, 326).

claim by an individual or group of professionals to jurisdiction over specific types of knowledge, following which they should hence be recognized as *experts* (Eyal 2013a).[23] Experts (and expertise) have been valorised as depoliticized knowledge, particularly where it concerns inputting information to political decision-making processes (Holst 2014). However, as I go on to explore below and in Chapter 6, scholarship has moved on from discussion of who has expertise to focus on questions of how individuals, groups or communities come to claim they have expertise and what this implies for claims to authority.

In general, the research proposing that expert, moral, or other types of authority may lie outside of the state created a perception in the literature that authority was shifting away from the state to various non-state actors (Strange 1996). Importantly then, a response was to point to the harnessing *by the state* of private actors and civil society groups. It was noted that any movement of authority should not be viewed as zero-sum but must be theorized and understood as "an expression of a changing logic or rationality of government (defined as a type of power) by which civil society is redefined from a passive object of government to be acted upon and into an entity that is both an object and a subject of government" (Sending and Neumann 2006, 652).

This reconfiguration heralds a crucial juncture in global governance studies – by transcending an oppositional sense of a state/non-state divide, one can see all kinds of useful and productive processes that contribute to governing. In particular, this move permits a complication of actor-type, not just by a superficial characterisation of *who they are* but enables a critical rethink based on *what they do*. Furthermore, one can then look more deeply into how they are able to

[23] Gil Eyal draws a useful distinction here between "on the one hand, the *actors* [experts] who make claims to jurisdiction over a task by 'professing' their disinterest, skill, and credibility and, on the other hand, the sheer *capacity* [expertise] to accomplish this task better and faster" (2013a, 869) that will be unpacked in Chapter 6.

do so, which takes us back to looking at authority but in a subtly different way: rather than assuming authority as something akin to a character-type, and thus analytically monolithic to an extent, there is scope for appreciating the work that goes into establishing and preserving authority.

One way of doing so is framed in a recent approach that embarks from a novel starting point: "it is not the type of actor but the *character of relationships*, both among governors and between governor and governed, that is key to understanding global politics" (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010b, 3). This provides a more dynamic conception of authority and one that then largely revolves around *recognition* – that is, "a framework that shifts the focus from actors' attributes to their positions relative to others and the resources they bring to bear in the competition to be recognized as authoritative" (Sending 2015, 13). This is an important step because it emphasizes the social embeddedness of authority, accounting for the fluctuations and patterns of not just what ideas or policies are relevant at a given time but focusing on how they become relevant and through whom.

This approach underlines that in global politics there is a "constant search for recognition" (Sending 2015, 20), and recent scholarship has moved toward looking at the conditions under which authority is asserted, recognized, and maintained. The emerging research thus breaks down authority in terms of how networks or groups categorize and discriminate between individuals as authoritative. An example of this is that, to a varying degree, because authority is conceived of as relational, it would require "a basis in trust rather than calculation of immediate benefit" (Cutler 2002, 27).[24] Overall, a key motivation for this kind of approach is that,

[24] The relationship of trust to what can be termed "social capital" will be explored below.

> "while studies of global governance excel in charting the diffusion and disaggregation of authority from the state to non-state actors, they fail when it comes to explain the power at work in the actual practices through which governance takes place" (Neumann and Sending 2010, 112).

The rise of sociologically-driven narratives that focus on practices thus responds to this problematique.

3.2.3 Professional knowledge networks

A focus on relationships also helps clarify what it might mean to speak of governance: it is "not simply the result of structural constraints; it is also the result of generative agents. It can be transformational and innovative rather than simply prohibitive" (Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010b, 9). Rather than thinking of it as government by another name, it shows that governance can rest crucially upon the social relations amongst political or professional communities and the productive elements that arise from the complex configurations that such interactions hold. This takes the discipline further away from explanations based on institutions and organizations to recognizing the impact of informal or loose transnational connections and transactions (Morgan 2006). This perspective points to the concept of *networks* as crucial in the evolving reconfiguration of social and political organization at a global level.

The idea of networks has led to less of a focus on large bureaucracies and instead a mapping of activities within a specific issue-domain that includes a variety of actors and stakeholders who are engaged. But rather than viewing them as distinct, separate, or oppositional, a network perspective emphasizes the multi-layered nature of governance as a process:

> "One way governance emerges is from strategic interactions and partnerships of national and international bureaucracies with non-state actors in the market place and civil society. In these interfaces, the creators and distributors of policy knowledge… become central players in decision-making." (Stone 2013a, 1)

The notion of interfaces helps reduce the tension between state and non-state, rather proposing an imbrication of actors that acknowledges the reality of how, and which, actors are performing tasks and, in particular, contributing knowledge to the policy-making process.

Indeed, *knowledge* and its role in transnational governance processes has come to be a rich vein of this literature.[25] One of the earliest strands of work that looked at how actors were connected transnationally around the issue of knowledge conceived of 'epistemic communities,' groups of experts which collected and mobilized to advocate or influence policy decisions through their collective knowledge claims (Haas 1992; Adler 1992; Cross 2013). However, this conception has been criticized "for not being concerned with the content of knowledge, just the fact that the experts share it, as well as exaggerating the extent of consensus among those involved" (Seabrooke 2014, 55). Indeed, for my case studies, it is not simply that such consensus is often lacking but that this approach would marginalize the very process I wish to understand: how expertise comes to be recognised and various knowledges contested. As one colleague frequently points out, "Pugwash is not meant to be a feel-good exercise. From the very first meeting, by design we promote dialogue across divides. If there is not some disagreement, differing perspectives, or tension at the Pugwash table, then we have not done our job."[26] As such, we can see that "the question of whether and how expert groups may shape policy is therefore subordinate to the question of the type and contents of knowledge that prevail as authoritative in shaping debates about what should be governed, how, and why" (Sending 2015, 8).

[25] In contrast to the earlier IR research that prioritized information, scholars such as Agnew (2007), Stone (2013a), Eyal (2013a), Seabrooke and Tsingou (2014, 2015), and Kuus (2014) have looked at the social construction of how information is deemed as knowledge.

[26] Email exchange with Pugwash member, 5 April 2016

This focus on how authority is socially constituted encourages investigation as to how different kinds of *professionals* wield knowledge and hence mobilize to assert their claims as having jurisdiction on an issue.[27] Governance networks have been shown to comprise of a range of actors – from both non-state organizations as well as government or international organizations – who interact through a professional interest in seeking to define, police, and govern the relevant bodies of knowledge (Paterson 2014). There have thus been contributions that undermine a binary state/non-state thinking and recast global governance as sets of practices performed by certain actors regardless of where they are nominally located. Rather than pointing to a perforated boundary between, for example, transnational civil society and state organizations,

> "these boundaries – and the communities of practice that they contain – are constantly constructed, reconstructed and sometimes challenged through the transformative practices of particular networks of actors – networks that often defy the conventional divides between public and private" (J. Best and Gheciu 2014b, 22).

Challenging traditional thinking in this way permits analysis of how power works through many types of political actor (Graz 2006). It provides the basis of a research design that takes us beyond observations that state and non-state work together and instead shifts the focus on to how practices may transform, or more simply reinforce, existing understandings of what is to be governed and who may do it.

Similarly, it highlights the potential for actors to strategically manipulate such boundaries to their own professional advantage. I contend that many of the participants in unofficial diplomacy rely upon a constitutively *ambiguous* sense of authority through what they do and how they present themselves which may (deliberately) complicate the basis of a claim to

[27] Much work on professionals in IR has followed the seminal contribution of Andrew Abbott (1988) – recent scholarship includes Muzio et al. (2011), Faulconbridge and Muzio (2012), Stone (2013b), Seabrooke (2014), and Seabrooke and Henriksen (2017).

representation. As we shall see in Chapter 5, the ambiguity that surrounds various individuals, because of either putative connection to government or in what capacity they are participating, is itself a critically productive and constitutive mechanism inherent in unofficial diplomacy. The point, often, is precisely to create a sense of ambiguity such that many participants, even from the same community, are unsure of who is connected to whom in government and what levels of influence and authority are being mobilized.

3.2.4 The ad hoc nature of contemporary global governance

This section has outlined some of the key developments in global governance that can help supplement what diplomatic studies has brought to the table thus far. The concepts of influence, authority, networks and knowledge are all important tools to challenge narratives that the state (and its diplomatic organs) are the sole authors of policymaking, thereby seeing how transnational processes that explicitly involve non-state actors are implicated in the web of political outcomes on the international scene. Furthermore, such perspectives reveal that core functions of the state are being performed by actors not nominally of the state and that this delicately complicates our understanding of how global governance works in practice. In summary, the challenge set by recent contributions to the literature is to look empirically for, firstly, the social spaces in which transnational network interfaces occur (Seabrooke 2014, 55), and secondly, the variety of professionals who can claim authority to influence policy (Stone 2013a, 32).

We have come to an understanding of governance as something different from, but not in opposition to, government. This has opened the complex question of what specifically counts as governance and who can do it (Bulkeley et al. 2014). One generalized answer may be to admit that it can often be everywhere and effected by almost anyone, but it is not clear whether

more straightforward knowledge exchange is indeed a form of governance. Indeed, the tension between being seen to govern 'publicly' – for example, NGOs transparently lobbying on an issue – and the often 'private' nature of diplomacy is one that is challenging to resolve. As I will illustrate, unofficial diplomacy sits somewhat uncomfortably between these two conceptions – but as I go on to show, this positioning is very much deliberate. Nonetheless, a central takeaway from the literature is that "what is new about the involvement of private actors in transnational governance issues is not so much the extent and intensity of their influence as how some of them have managed to develop a new relationship with the polity" (Graz and Nölke 2008, 126). Networks of professionals have clearly become imbricated in many facets of policymaking and thus the empirical task is to explore and further theorize such developments.

Overall, approaches within a global governance framework have recently admitted to something of a fragmentation: in the absence of an overarching government or 'governor', we witness increasingly ad hoc and issue-specific reactions to problems of governance, new initiatives that incorporate a wider range of informal processes and multiple personalities from both public and private spheres (Acharya 2016; Held and Young 2013). Such messy and unordered responses are also evident in my case studies: instances in which some actors seek influence in situations where there is a perceived failure of governance and state diplomacy, such that networks of professionals focus on inputs to policymaking and agenda-setting that are not being performed competently at the official international level. Yet, the empirical detail of the following chapters shows how it is not simply an example of one set of actors working with an institutional or 'official' branch of government; rather, the puzzle concerns how multiple actors work with and against multiple branches of different governments and international organizations. These are thus opportunities to explore how some instances of

transnational governance are enacted, as influence and authority are implicated in the conduct of various diplomatic activities.

The challenge I have left myself for the following section is to build upon the disciplinary developments of IR and outline a framework which captures the specificity of unofficial diplomacy. It implies sketching a sociological picture of *where* the activity takes place to shape a more detailed account of the craft of unofficial diplomacy. This is prompted by the reflection that "what actors do and who they are is to be determined through analyzing the particular social space in which they are situated, how they are related to other actors, and what resources they have" (Sending 2015, 18). It will set the stage for the subsequent chapters to look at the social and political content of what happens, which we can understand as contributing to both diplomacy and governance.

3.3 A sociological approach to unofficial diplomacy

Research in both diplomacy and global governance have produced fascinating insights into the evolving character of international relations, particularly where it concerns the growing enmeshment of state and non-state actors together in evermore dense social configurations that have political bearing. It is this very social character that I wish to unpack further in order that we might more fully appreciate the possibilities of power that unofficial diplomacy has. Chapter 2 demonstrated that existing work in the field of Track Two has not complicated the stories of *who* becomes involved as participants. This, I argue, obscures what their social relations might mean for translating policy influence (via transfer) and leaves unspoken a vital element of the connectedness that is going on at a transnational level.

I firstly thus focus on a key issue which is not really considered by those dealing with professional networks, largely because for their studies the appearance of networks confirms that cooperation is taking place on an issue or within a specific professional jurisdiction. Looking to the prevailing political context of conflictive relations illustrates a certain (and varying) element of *estrangement*. This is the character whereby regular contact and communication amongst populations and elites at large has been reduced because of political confrontation and accompanying constraints – it is often also the case, as I show in the next chapter, that official diplomacy has suffered in productivity in tandem. Where interaction and understanding has been reduced as a consequence, I thus propose to think of unofficial diplomacy, in a basic and functional sense, as a bridging activity for holes in the interfaces of siloed professional communities. This neatly returns us to a diplomatic reading of the activity in lieu of formal diplomacy.

Secondly, I offer up a mapping of the activity by homing in on the *space* in which it takes place and where one can better appreciate the structure of relations between those participating. This sociological conceptualisation is inspired by the work of Gil Eyal (2002, 2013b) and Thomas Medvetz (2012b, 2012). Equally, as they do, it draws on conceptual elements from the practice theory of Pierre Bourdieu (1995, 1990, 1984). Most strongly, I suggest that unofficial diplomacy happens *between fields* – this is to say, through performing a bridging role the activity becomes a site of multiple mediations among professional fields and estranged communities.

Thirdly, having located unofficial diplomacy from the outside, I go on to illustrate that we can understand the different types of actors to be in competition with one another for *capital* (Bourdieu 1989, 1986, 1985). The value-added of this approach is to foreground knowledge

and focus on those who wield it: social relations enables us to see beyond actors as simply altruistic and tease out some of the more strategic elements that are in play for them as professionals.[28] To be clear, though, this does not imply a Bourdieusian analysis; rather, it is a sociological approach that draws insights from a range of practice-oriented work taking place under the banner of IR.

The fourth subsection delivers a complication to any account as one of functional problem-solving and mediation. It is not only that estrangement has a great bearing on the practical interfaces among actors, but we must account for how *mistrust* of an 'other' becomes entrenched at even an individual level. Although this dimension is, of course, noted in the Track Two literature, I provide a guide to study how mistrust clouds the objective of trust-building in interesting ways.

In order to provide a visualization of this complex proposal, below is a graphic that illustrates some key conceptual dynamics at play in my framework. In contrast to figure 2 (above, p.56), I emphasize the notion of *topology* rather than typology as a way to grasp the significance of the activity. This sketch clearly builds on Fisher's picture of transfer (figure 1, p.52) but tries to provide a number of nuances: first, the three arrows denote specific tensions between the two parties, namely unproductive official diplomatic relations, estranged relations at the strategic level, and entrenched mistrust at a more popular, generalized level, which manifest as 'structural holes'; second, the strategic communities of each country (which include the

[28] Of course, participants and practitioners alike recognize that altruism is not the only motivator. We know that there is deep mistrust, hostility, and fear behind the conflicts in question and this is addressed in the Track Two literature. Nonetheless, descriptions such as, "[Track two diplomacy] is always open minded, often altruistic, and in Kelman's words, strategically optimistic" (Davidson and Montville 1981, 155) create the impression of an idealistic discipline, which is not the case. My perspective is of the conviction that the Track Two literature does not pick up on the other motivations sufficiently to relay the nuanced picture that practitioners have, and I seek to address this by focusing on strategic and self-interested behaviours that are present.

different professional fields layered in the graphic by those involved) become more central to the relations, with interfaces and connections in domestic policy space; third, the repository of trust (the facilitator of unofficial diplomacy, discussed below) comes to be a key, but not the only, node in a more networked model of relations; fourth, the space of unofficial diplomacy appears tangential and overlapping (in pale green) with the many different constituencies engaged and implicated in the work, including the circulatory interfaces with the global process of knowledge transfer at each pole. This final part of the puzzle illustrates that while the facilitating 'third party' is a central player, the work of unofficial diplomacy is amorphous, expansive even within domestic policy space, and vitally, a socialized space which enables interfaces, knowledge mediation, and the practices that the subsequent chapters illustrate.



Figure 3: A topological sketch of the activity of unofficial diplomacy

3.3.1 The character of estrangement

As Leonard Seabrooke has noted, "transnationality suggests a 'social space' in which professionals have multi-layered interactions between transnational, national, and local activity" (Seabrooke 2014, 55). An important point to note, and one that is left unelaborated in the Track Two literature, is the way in which individual actors who participate in unofficial diplomacy are embedded in their own domestic policy-influencing communities. Indeed, for most professionals involved, they have a clear site of activity rooted in their national context – many participants in this research labelled it their 'strategic community,' the domestic field of foreign policy and international affairs thinking. Given the stress placed on this locale by my research participants, the figure above places this strategic community at the centre of each country, close to the government (and indeed overlapping through some key individuals) and composed of the various fields shown proximate. Thus, in explaining the professional networks involved, focus should not be so much that they exist, but how they are composed of both local/national and transnational interfaces and what these potential tensions might tell us about unofficial diplomacy.

This calls for thinking in terms of connectedness: with a higher potential for professional and social relationships, "people connected across groups are more familiar with alternative ways of thinking and behaving, which gives them more options to select from and synthesize" (Burt 2004, 349; see also Stone 2013a). However, an important aspect of my research is that there is a high degree of political *estrangement* between the countries in conflict. In both case studies in this research, as Chapter 4 goes on to illustrate in detail, formal political rivalry has also impacted relations between the strategic communities and, in the absence of regularized, normalized relations at the official level, the transnational networks look and behave somewhat differently to the standard examples in the literature.

Seabrooke has suggested that transnational professional environments are particularly prone to "missing relationships between nodes in a network, unmade possible ties, which inhibit flows of information" as they happen in what are generally "thinly socialized spaces" (Seabrooke 2014, 51). Mirroring the ways in which intergroup conflict manifests, Ronald Burt has further asserted that, "behavior, opinion, and information, broadly conceived, are more homogeneous within than between groups. People focus on activities inside their own group, which creates holes in the information flow between groups, or more simply, structural holes" (Burt 2004, 353). The character of estrangement thus affects not only the possibilities for interface but equally the quality of knowledge exchanged among groups because of these impediments to flow. The 'structural holes' implied by Burt and Seabrooke (represented by the arrows pushing the two countries apart) become a foundational feature of unofficial diplomacy: although functionalist in this sense, Chapter 4 spells out how it provides a basic rationale for why various professionals feel the need to participate.

3.3.2 A socialized space between fields

In general, participants to unofficial diplomacy share an interest in knowledge, often specifically issue-based and related to the conflict in question but also including overlap more generally about international affairs (e.g. an 'expertise' on global security, nuclear weapons policy, and India-Pakistan relations). I have also hinted that different sets of professionals may become connected through networks, but that political estrangement seems to impact upon the coherence of this contact. The fragmentary and often ad hoc nature of such relationships points to thinking more deeply about how the connections are enabled and why they may be valued. A key point is that while each participant is embedded in their own domestic strategic

community, the primary field of their day-to-day activity, they also become engaged in these transnational interfaces.

One possibility of conceptualizing these relations, as many contributions to IR choose to do, is to propose a form of transnational field that unites these individuals (e.g. Madsen 2016; Adler-Nissen 2011; Leander 2011). *Field* is a useful way of conceptualizing not just that individuals co-exist with one another and in a certain way with institutions and other entities, but that overall such arrangements can be grasped as a coherent "bundle of relations" (Eyal 2013b). The Bourdieusian sense of field defines a relatively bounded social space in which a set of actors both compete for and help determine what resources are viewed as valuable within that same space. Looking for social space rather than accepting given labels and hierarchies encourages us to "go beyond the alternative of realism and nominalism" (Bourdieu 1989, 17) and consider how "power (forms of domination and types of legitimacy) is defined and operates" (Vauchez 2011, 340). This implies challenging the typological scale of Track Two to reconceive of unofficial diplomacy through the interactions of those who participate.

However, Bourdieu proposed this method for the domestic level and it is well-noted that analysis becomes conceptually problematic when it is transposed to a different context. As Anna Leander has observed,

> "at the trans-/inter-national level the question of how fields interact and where the boundaries should be drawn becomes impossible to circumvent. The number and variety of fields actors may belong to is considerable. Moreover, the homology between fields cannot be assumed to be unproblematic. The question of how fields are linked to each other, dominated by each other, and perhaps dissolved by each other is acutely posed" (Leander 2008, 21).

For my research this latter question is indeed 'acutely posed.' My case studies exemplify the interactions between members of a number of different fields as they come together in

altogether different configurations. For example, although several participants in either case study are retired officials, they have come from the fields of government or military during their careers, and now participate in their 'afterlives' in the fields of academia and think tanks, to varying degrees; when one adds academics, scientists, NGO representatives, and observing officials to the mix, we have a confusing confluence of field properties, all of which have their own logic, rules, and varying privileging of what resources are at stake. Proposing a transnational field would assume that it is recognized by those inhabiting it: that is to say, whatever field we posit in these cases – of global non-proliferation expertise, of international affairs and policy influence – would be defined by the structure of relations within it, as well as by struggle over the various forms of capital within it. This has an appealing logic, but it doesn't quite appear to capture the distinctiveness and the fluidity of what takes place within unofficial diplomacy.

In addition to the different fields illustrated in figure 3, I want to stress again the importance of estrangement and mistrust to my narrative and overall seek to emphasize the heterology of field distinctions at the international level. I propose instead that unofficial diplomacy takes place *between* fields.[29] Taking Bourdieu's injunction that a field is a (relatively) bounded social sphere, it is not clear that we can say unofficial diplomacy constitutes a field of its own – with a commonly understood set of 'rules of the game' – but rather operates in a more transversal manner. Here, I lean on the work of Thomas Medvetz, who locates the activities of think tanks as occupying a "liminal structural position by gathering and juggling various forms of capital acquired from different arenas" (2012b, 46). I assert that unofficial diplomacy finds itself in a

[29] The notion is from Gil Eyal (2013b), who makes the case very well for analysing socialized and productive spaces that locate themselves quite strategically between fields. This allows a much more fruitful treatment of the potency of unofficial diplomacy. I have tried to illustrate this quality through the suffused green oval in figure 3 that spreads as space into each country as well as existing between the fields that comprise each strategic community.

not dissimilar space: while not disputing the validity of Medvetz's work, nor contradicting his findings, within this research it appears that think tanks have come to constitute a relatively robust social sphere of their own, with a particular logic when placed in relation to other fields of knowledge production in international affairs, particularly unofficial diplomacy.

In thinking between fields, I am privileging an image not of strict and impermeable boundaries between the different fields, but rather one that sees "a zone of essential connections and transactions between them" (Eyal 2013b, 162). In this way, boundaries become important as socialized spaces in their own right and assume a certain kind of influence and power because of a tendency to be adaptable and malleable. As Chapter 5 goes on to demonstrate, in convening actors from many different fields, unofficial diplomacy behaves as a kind of connective tissue that is flexible, depending on the what the circumstances require, and manipulable, depending on the strategies of various actors. Moreover, it enables the activity of unofficial diplomacy to take place *liminal* to the workings of official diplomacy and policymaking: this quality of liminality is crucial to the functioning of unofficial diplomacy. It describes the way in which the processes have a tendency – precisely because of who is involved and thus who else is implicated in the work through social connectedness – to occupy a space simultaneously 'unofficial' and yet all the same ambiguously official, and thereby to claim a latent influence and thus productive power. Nonetheless, this location conversely has important practical consequences that become apparent in Chapter 6.

3.3.3 Capital, recognition, competition

A particular field has its own kind of logic and the actors within are conceived of in relation to one another, through often competitive interactions (Bourdieu 1990, 67; 1984, 114). Different kinds of what Bourdieu called *capital* come to structure the positions within that field: "The

kinds of capital, like the aces in a game of cards, are powers that define the chances of profit in a given field" (Bourdieu 1985, 724). There are five identifiable species in Bourdieu's own work – social, cultural, economic, political, and symbolic – and these serve to denote what is identified as valuable in a given field, thereby bestowing power to those actors possessing a certain volume.[30] So, by way of example, in the academic field one might find that cultural capital is more important than social capital, while in the diplomatic field the reverse might be said to be true: diplomacy is about knowing people, preferably those in authority;[31] while this is certainly important in academia, a more potent and profitable form of capital would be of the cultural type, knowledge that creates publications and demonstrates academic credibility.

Practically, this perspective provides the opportunity to understand on what basis different kinds of participants are involved: for some, claims to expertise on international affairs are based on their positions within universities or think tanks and they gain credibility from the publications and research work performed; diplomats more clearly have a sense of political capital insofar as they are in positions of authority, close to policymaking; for others, however, experience is a key resource and they can leverage the knowledge gleaned from their previous careers. The central puzzle, however, becomes where various participants are able to stake claims based upon more intangible, ambiguous expressions of capital. While recognition of authority has been shown to be a key trend in the literature, the Bourdieusian streak of my approach also highlights how *mis*recognition operates to elevate and promote certain claims.

[30] Bourdieu concentrates on social, cultural, economic and – as an expression of these fused together through recognition – symbolic types of capital (1986, 1989, 1990). He also touches upon political capital (Bourdieu 1981) but it is through interpretation by Kauppi (2003) in particular that this species of capital is raised here. The analytical purchase of *capital* is built up most explicitly in Chapters 5 and 6.

[31] Political capital is perhaps valorised further still. Others have written specifically of 'diplomatic capital' (e.g. Mérand 2010) but I don't see a convincing differentiation of this from a combination of political and social capitals.

This move and those many who make it are crucial to the workings of unofficial diplomacy and, as I show in Chapter 6, it enhances their claims to 'know well.'[32]

The second way in which I assert the importance of looking for space between fields is a more methodological choice that relies on thinking through capital. I re-emphasize the significance of domestic fields of activity and highlight the sociological question of *recognition* that participants seek. I assert that a crucial part of what is at stake for participants is being seen to have authoritative knowledge on the specific issues at hand, as well as being seen to know about international affairs more generally. This process of recognition takes place not just in the spaces of unofficial diplomacy but primarily in each actor's own domestic strategic community (which I take to constitute a weak field of expertise on foreign policy and security issues)[33] from which they receive a social authorization to speak on international affairs. Again, this stands in contrast to those who might propose to identify a transnational field of expertise (e.g. of non-proliferation or international affairs) to which such participants may belong. I would argue that such a proposition is undercut because, firstly, participants were not always aware that they would belong to such a field; secondly, it was not clear empirically that they recognize a set of defined 'rules of the game' that buttress which capitals are of what value in this putative field; and, not least, that as they move in the networks of unofficial diplomacy,

[32] As Chapter 6 unpacks, 'knowing well' is a phrase borrowed from Seabrooke (2014) to denote a sense in which different types of capital are recognized together – the symbolic capital of strategic communities.

[33] As will be elaborated in Chapter 5, such domestic fields contain not just the participants of unofficial diplomacy but also a range of other actors. Following Lisa Stampnitzky's work on terrorism expertise, I would argue that fields of expertise are naturally "weak and permeable": her example shows that "terrorism experts have never consolidated control over the production of either experts or knowledge… there is no agreement among terrorism experts about what constitutes useful knowledge" (2013, 12–13). I believe that this argument similarly reflects the inherent political dynamics behind claims to expertise even in a domestic setting, which is considerably *more* delimited than a transnational field.

encountering others, they may struggle to fully comprehend the distinctive dimensions of other 'foreign' fields.[34]

Moreover, I suggest that unofficial diplomacy provides an actor with the opportunity to enhance prestige within their domestic field of activity and expertise, precisely because it allows for claims that an individual has engaged the 'enemy' in discussion – such an occasion provides them with a different dimension of *mediated* knowledge than those who have not done so.[35] As Chapter 6 goes on to elaborate, this standpoint emphasizes different dynamics to those described in the Track Two literature. Importantly, it brings into focus the imperative to understand the practical implications of the interactions as actors come together in these liminal spaces. The final subsection here turns to highlight one conceptual development that is something of an outlier in IR research but provides a fundamental dimension of the distinctively practical logic of these spaces.

3.3.4 The limitations of trusting behaviour

Intuitively, scholars of Track Two posit that the interactions of contact can promote trust-building amongst individuals.[36] More generally, trust provides a useful analytical lens to investigate professional relationships and networks, particularly where it is central to developing social capital (Seabrooke 2014, 57). Indeed, the central way in which trust has been used in the Track Two literature concerns the 'repository' of trust: in Herbert C. Kelman's

[34] These arguments were developed from reflections on my empirical material after having initially proposed a transversal 'field of expertise of international affairs.' I am indebted to a discussion with Gregoire Mallard for helping to clarify these points.

[35] As Eyal (2013b, 178) notes, boundary space is advantageous because "it affords those in adjacent fields an opportunity to raid it, rapidly amassing profits, and rapidly retreat into their original fields, where these profits may be reconverted into currency that will improve one's formerly marginal position within it."

[36] In most treatments of conflict resolution processes, trust is identified as either absent (or extremely low) and thus in need of building; or that mistrust is a defining characteristic of relations and trust-building is the response.

words, the third party that facilitates contact enables the parties in conflict "to proceed with the assurance that their confidentiality will be respected and their interests protected even though – by definition – they cannot trust each other" (Kelman 2002, 177).[37] For my framework, I thus reframe this role in terms of a central node in the emergent networks of unofficial diplomacy which facilitates interaction amongst the estranged professionals. That is to say, as individuals or groups, the third party acts as a social glue between parties who mistrust one another, because this third party has been able to develop a prior rapport with each of the individuals involved built on a modicum of trust.[38] As Peter Jones succinctly phrases it, this trusting relationship "is the coin of the realm in creating the space whereby the mediator is allowed to build a relationship between himself and the parties, and ultimately between the parties themselves" (2015, 101) – as such, the graphic on p.90 places this repository of trust very much in the centre of the space of unofficial diplomacy.

Yet, although unofficial diplomacy is viewed as a problem-solving site for estranged communities, trust and mistrust are largely underdeveloped components of accounts of international conflict resolution (Kydd 2006).[39] Indeed, most contributions do not actually specify what trust is, nor do they provide a deep sense of what its presence or absence does to the process of dialogue.[40] At a basic level, trust is viewed as a disposition: an expression of an

[37] In this sense, the third party plays an analogous role to diplomacy as an institution, as discussed above.

[38] This point is predicated on such trusting relationships developing to some degree, or equally, as later chapters show, that individual actors have a different motivation to participate.

[39] Notwithstanding the key contributions by Roy Lewicki, who notes that "few authors are sufficiently detailed and descriptive of those actions required to actually" built trust in conflict resolution processes (2014, 126). Research on trust has been conducted in a wide variety of disciplines: In political theory and sociology by Gambetta (1988), Hardin (1993, 2002), and Giddens (1991), among others; and in organizational theory by Kramer (2001) in particular. Equally, psychology, economics, and anthropology have all contributed to theory-building. Chapter 4 looks at how trust has been used in International Relations.

[40] To be sure, the social psychological side of the literature unpacks how social identity theory creates in-group/out-group dynamics (see Tajfel and Turner 1986), as well as the interplay of prejudice and bias among social groups (see Çuhadar and Dayton 2011 for a good summary of these themes), but not with an explicit framing of trust or mistrust.

attitude toward another person or group that indicates "a willingness to act on the basis of, the words, actions, and decisions of another" (McAllister, 1995, p. 25, quoted in Lewicki and Tomlinson 2014, 106).[41] Important to acknowledge is that trust reflects the social condition of uncertainty as to others' intentions; in this sense,

> "Trust involves a degree of cognitive familiarity with the object of trust that is *somewhere between total knowledge and total ignorance*. That is, if one were omniscient, action could be taken with complete certainty, leaving no need, or even possibility, for trust to develop. On the other hand, in the case of absolute ignorance, there can be no reason to trust. When faced by the totally unknown, we can gamble but we cannot trust." (Lewis and Weigert 1985, 970, my emphasis)

A key point is that the *disposition* to trust or mistrust is embedded in a deeper social and political context which must be accounted for. Moreover, as the next chapter goes on to spell out more clearly, I want to stress that we should analytically treat trust as a kind of coping mechanism that allows individuals to act despite uncertainty. Indeed, trust and mistrust are predicated on the dynamism between knowing and not knowing, because to trust or mistrust is an emotional belief (Mercer 2010). It is in this sense that we should view trust as an 'inarticulate feeling' that comes from a practical sense of being in the world, a background to action (Pouliot 2008, 278–79) – the quality of estrangement thus impacts an individual's disposition to trust or mistrust by reducing the degree of cognitive familiarity (Lewis and Weigert 1985).

In order to set up the next chapter and to problematize the practical implications, it is important to firstly distinguish between the two terms: trust is inherently practical, is interpersonal, and

[41] The focus of this section is on *interpersona*l trust, which I take to be of more relevance and applicability than a focus on *trustworthiness* as a representation of trust; on this distinction, see Wheeler (2018).

is a feeling derived through knowledge accrued in interaction (Wheeler 2018, chap. 2);[42] mistrust can indeed come from a practical sense of interaction but can crucially also operate as a pre-contact disposition because it is highly affective and more susceptible to social group pressures of bias and prejudice.[43] This also helps to explain that both trust and mistrust can co-exist in an individual, "because they are related to different experiences with the other or knowledge of the other in varied contexts" (Lewicki and Tomlinson 2014, 112) – this can be reflected in a disposition of, for example, an Indian to mistrust Pakistanis in general and nonetheless trust a specific Pakistani in a particular context or to a certain extent.

As such, the main point developed here is to emphasize (along with the Track Two literature) that there is a practical requirement to engage in some form of interaction in order that latent mistrust be in any way dispelled and to then have any possibility of developing trusting relationships between individuals. This opens an opportunity to study both the micro-dynamics of how trust might be built,[44] but, crucially, how *mistrust* can affect such a process and what this tells us about the political and social context present in processes of unofficial diplomacy. The following section points to how this as well as other latent features of the work play a role in the social and political dynamics apparent in the process of informal mediation.

[42] To have an absolute 'generalized' trust (Rathbun 2011), a *pre*disposition to trust, is akin to having blind faith (or total ignorance) and is thus not trust at all but a gamble – a point made by the eminent sociologist Georg Simmel over a century ago (1906, 450).

[43] There are some authors who attribute a disposition to trust to collectivities (e.g. Kydd 2005; Larson 1997). I emphasize, along with Wheeler (2013), that trust belongs at an individual level but significantly add that mistrust can indeed operate at an aggregated level (e.g. the state).

[44] Despite largely following his ideas through Chapter 4, Torsten Michel sees trust-building as a problematic notion (2013, 873).

3.4 Unofficial diplomacy through practice

The two theoretical chapters of this dissertation have lain the foundations for conceptualizing *where* unofficial diplomacy takes place and provided a deeper sense of *what* it looks like as informal mediation. In this chapter, through discussing the literatures on diplomacy and global governance, I have developed an alternative theoretical understanding of what is happening with respect to international conflict resolution. Crucially, a first step has been to re-emphasize the diplomatic dimension: through showing how diplomatic studies has accepted a broadening ontology, we can take the mediation of estrangement as the basis for theorizing diplomacy and concentrate on the form this takes in unofficial processes. Second, this chapter has explored research on how actors other than the state have reconfigured how we understand and theorize order at the global level. We have seen that governance is not simply restrictive, based only on injunctions and rules; rather, it can also be productive and facilitative, relying upon all kinds of actors in complex movements that admits multiple locations of power and authority. Knowledge-based authority and those who claim and contest it emerges as a key site of struggle in global politics.

Thirdly, these reviews have encouraged a framework and suggested a logic that has some profound implications, not just for the Track Two literature but IR more broadly. I have added to traditional accounts of international conflict resolution a renewed emphasis on the diplomatic purpose of this work: that interventions of informal mediation take place is well understood but I have implied that we should partially see them as responses to problems of estranged relations, insofar as they appear as bridging activities for structural holes in transnational knowledge flows to promote understanding. I further have suggested that we must look at who is involved in order that we see it as engaging actors from multiple professional fields, rather than a simplistic conception of an influential individual. This implies that we can

actually better account for what the professionals bring with them in terms of different resources (e.g. expertise, experience, access) that ostensibly aid the problem-solving potential.

When we take these considerations and in fact make them part of the analysis, we come to appreciate a different set of dynamics in *how* it takes place, which in turn opens our eyes to *why it happens*. The value-added of the relational, sociological approach to the subject matter is to draw out what the spaces actually enable, inhibit, and contain in terms of practical interactions. The thrust of the following chapters argues against a reading of international relations that would tell us that expertise and knowledge of international affairs promises remedies for problems of conflict and estrangement because the more we can know about a given situation – including the historical animosity, the current policy blockages, possible technical fixes – the greater our potential for creating solutions. Through the empirical detail of my case studies, I show that such a functionalist logic becomes obscured by practical considerations, not least social and political dynamics derived from *who* takes part and *how* the process unfolds. A practice-based reading of unofficial diplomacy thus helps reveal that for the actors involved there are other stakes than the resolution of conflict.

I show that the various members of the strategic communities in these cases recognise that their own knowledge claims in their domestic communities can be enhanced by interactions in these sites of unofficial diplomacy with members of the 'opposing' strategic communities that they do not ordinarily have the opportunity to mingle with. In one sense, professionals who engage in unofficial diplomacy can claim to obtain what I term 'mediated knowledge': differentiated from what is ordinarily available in their own strategic community, this is rather produced from the multi-faceted mediation of both estranged political entities and different professional pools

of knowledge. This they can use to their advantage, taking it back to debates in their domestic strategic community with an enhanced claim to knowing well.

At the same time, the critical point of enquiry is to show how this knowledge is produced *in practice*. By focusing on the participants as professionals in their own right, I open up an investigation that brings to light how the struggle for authority is affected variously and particularly by the dimensions of mistrust, ambiguity, and liminality. The underlying social and political dynamics reveal that unofficial diplomacy does not sit easily as a simplistic site of problem-solving in international conflict but in fact reflects wider concerns. Indeed, one of the surprising things that the following chapters draw out is that those elements of unofficial diplomacy that have been left tacit in existing scholarship in fact speak up in interesting and complex ways.

Where deep estrangement has reduced cognitive familiarity among estranged communities, mistrust takes precedence before trust-building can begin – I show how diplomatic practice in this way provides a useful means to address this. Similarly, despite seeking out what I call liminal space close to governments, when explored, the nebulous quality of ambiguity often pushes these processes closer and closer to reproducing a diplomatic logic. This can manifest in the (re-)performance of those political narratives at the very heart of the conflict, which complicates our understanding of these processes as conflict *resolution*. In this way, I show that ultimately unofficial diplomacy is implicated in the global dynamics of who claims authority and power and is very much embedded in a diplomatic reading of the world. Having elaborated the theoretical orientation of this research, the following three chapters mobilize the concepts and framework laid out and introduce the empirical material that will substantiate my theoretical claims.

CHAPTER 4. MISTRUST, ESTRANGEMENT, AND TRUST-BUILDING

If we are to understand why unofficial diplomacy happens in the way it does, an important reference point is the conflict in question and what this can tell us about why unofficial diplomacy happens at all. As Chapter 2 briefly outlined, conflict at any level refers to an incompatibility of positions between two or more actors. In many cases internationally conflict does not prevent states from cooperating on a range of issues and this has been aptly demonstrated in much early research within International Relations (Axelrod 1984). Moreover, some states have created such meaningful relations among themselves that the notion of any conflict between them seriously escalating, let alone turning violent, is unthinkable (Adler and Barnett 1998). However, in a minority of cases, sets of states are virtually devoid of interactions and intractable conflict remains the defining feature of their relations. This chapter shows that conflict is not inextricably linked to an anarchic international system but is a product of 'sticky' historical relations of mistrust, fear, and suspicion. These emotional properties operate at a generalized level, that is generative of conflict, as well as simultaneously and mutually reinforcing individual, particularized, views of those others who have come to be an enemy.

Asking why unofficial diplomacy happens at all encourages a focus on the background to conflict, as well as the ways people seek to overcome it. I do not try to comprehensively explain the roots of each conflict; rather, I elaborate on two key factors which are closely correlated to the 'why' of unofficial diplomacy that help explain the persistence of such rivalries. By looking at, firstly, pervasive mistrust between the states in general and, secondly, an overwhelming sense of estrangement between their populations, I establish a baseline for each of the conflicts that characterizes the interactions of my research participants. As I show, the language of trust/mistrust is rarely used in complicated way in contemporary IR and so this chapter seeks to refocus what they can bring to studies of conflict and cooperation. In contrast to other

research which has looked at how trust can be built between adversaries at the highest levels of leadership,[1] I reframe a central tenet of unofficial diplomacy: that although work in the background to promote trust-building diplomatically can also begin with lower levels of elite professionals, we must equally look to how mistrust structures such encounters. Equally, research in Track Two has not fully operationalized mistrust and trust-building and so this chapter provides a proposed route for a deeper understanding of a key dynamic within these spaces. Indeed, the central platform of this chapter is therefore to focus less on a general emphasis of the track 2 literature toward trust-building but rather to dig deeper into the 'why' of unofficial diplomacy as revolving around countering mistrust through contact. As such, I do not claim that trust has been built in meaningful ways across both case-studies, although I show, some participants do assert that they have become able to trust certain individuals from the 'other' side.

The first section below asserts that mistrust is not merely epiphenomenal to conflict but is a structuring principle that perpetuates a rivalry. Recalling the previous chapter's emphasis on accounting for the context of (mis)trusting dispositions, I frame the discussion through lightly historicizing both sets of relations: despite the differences in the backgrounds to the two case studies, I show that *mistrust* has been a central driver of conflict in both. This sets up the second section, in which I illustrate that the research participants reveal a profound *estrangement* of relations – in each case, people on both sides to the conflict fail to understand or know the mind of the other. With these emotional drivers shaping the biases and prejudices of populations at

[1] Wheeler (2018) looks at a particular moment in India-Pakistan relations following their nuclear weapons tests (also see Wheeler 2010), as well as the rapprochement between the US and Iran in the Obama years (also see Head 2012). Others have looked at the classic case of Reagan and Gorbachev's nuclear summitry and interpersonal chemistry (Larson 1997; Kydd 2005).

large, rivals suffer from a lack of cognitive familiarity of the other which reinforces the existing conflict.[2]

Overall, these two sections illustrate that deep mistrust still prevails between, firstly, India and Pakistan, and, secondly, Iran and the 'West' (in particular, here, Israel and the US), and that this has been exacerbated and reinforced by estrangement. A key insight is to look at how structural holes have persistently thwarted communication and knowledge exchange. The ramifications bleed down to an interpersonal level, affecting diplomatic and personal interactions of all kinds. Together, the two sections speak in interesting and innovative ways to the classic 'security dilemma' proposition in IR: I firstly highlight a more structural account of international conflict and the ways in which mistrust is generalized between states but subsequently complement this through an agent-focused reading of the consequences that become apparent through a focus on estrangement. The result is a more compelling logic as to why forms of diplomacy are needed between these sets of states.

Having described the failures to cooperate formally, the third section goes on to make the case that the 'why' of unofficial diplomacy is partially rooted in providing alternate, informal spaces for mediation of these states' estrangement. Where official diplomacy, as the institutional repository of trust, is perceived as not performing its role, other forms seem to appear. I highlight two important elements to this story: firstly, mistrust remains a powerful and latent structuring disposition, as individuals unaccustomed to one another must interact; and

[2] Colaresi and Thompson (2002, 263–64) discuss the nuances between using the term 'rivals' and the language of 'protracted conflict'; in principle, they assert that, "Compared to non-rivals, rivals have more reason, whether accurately or not, to mistrust the intentions of their adversaries. They have had time to develop images of their adversaries as threatening opponents with persistent aims to thwart their own objectives." Their emphasis on using the history of conflict over related issues between states is the basis for my approach here.

secondly, that the interactions are a requisite for any trust-building to happen because cognitive familiarity must be developed.

In turning to the research participants, this chapter begins to substantiate the theoretical claims of the previous chapter as to where and why the activity takes place and provides a crucial platform for the work of subsequent chapters. My key insight is that because trust operates between knowledge of an 'other' and the vulnerability that comes from admitting the unknowability of that other (Lewis and Weigert 1985, 970), diplomacy, in its wider (theoretical) sense is a central feature of conflict resolution. On the one hand, trust is not simplistically an outcome of interaction but can be a facilitating mechanism, allowing individuals to mediate between their own knowledge and ignorance of the other. On the other hand, although I suggest that diplomatic engagement of many kinds is essential for trust-building, I caution that in itself it is not a sufficient factor to build trust (Wheeler 2013). Overall, the central argument of this chapter is that conflict resolution is, in fact, less about *building* trust than many scholars assume and more about the suspension of *mistrust*. Indeed, this suspension is enabled by the 'polite fiction' inherent in the diplomatic purpose and practice of unofficial diplomacy.

4.1 Conflict and mistrust between states

In this section, I sketch the contours of the conflicts that surround my two case studies through a framing of the deep mistrust which characterizes their relations. Drawing briefly on how mistrust has been generally used in IR, I show the histories of rivalry in the case studies as they have developed in the modern era. Naturally, there are great differences between the two cases that do not lend themselves to a straightforward comparison; at the same time, there are many other factors that help explain why the two cases diverge and why they have not fruitfully

interacted. In each case, there are rare examples of cooperation that have taken place, but these have not been sufficient for either interpersonal trust to develop between leaders, nor for the pervasive mistrust that operates more generally to be dispelled. This points to the need to look more deeply at how mistrust operates and persists.

4.1.1 Mistrust in international politics

Echoing the discussion in Chapter 2, early scholars of IR were convinced that conflict and war were inevitable features of state relations. For classical Realists, this was rooted in a pessimism about human nature and its proclivity toward conflict (Morgenthau 1950). Neo-Realists instead looked to the so-called 'third image' (Waltz 1959), the situation of anarchy at the international level which caused inexorable insecurity (Snyder 1984; Waltz 1988; Walt 1990). Such pessimism led to the view that there was "little room for trust among states because a state may be unable to recover if its trust is betrayed" and hence states are forced by the system in which they are a part to compete with one another (Mearsheimer 1990, 12). Moreover, for most Realists, "This assumption is often accompanied by the belief that states must mistrust each other" (Ruzicka and Keating 2015, 10).

The 'security dilemma' is a concept that neatly captures this quandary,[3] and, to some extent, it incorporates both the classical preoccupation with man's impulses and the later focus on the system itself. The earliest proponent put it thus:

> "Wherever ... anarchic society has existed ... there has arisen what may be called the 'security dilemma' of men, or groups, or their leaders. Groups or individuals living in such a constellation must be, and usually are, concerned about their security from being attacked, subjected, dominated, or annihilated… Since none can ever feel entirely

[3] Much rationalist work used the Prisoner's Dilemma and other game theory models to explain cooperation despite anarchy, but this dispensed entirely with a need for trust (Axelrod 1984).

> secure in such a world of competing units, power competition ensues, and the vicious circle of security and power accumulation is on." (Herz 1950, 157; quoted in Wheeler 2008, 494)

A crucial aspect of state relations that the security dilemma brings to the fore is the material factor of the "inherent ambiguity of weapons" in this anarchic society, combined with a profound psychological dynamic, "the inability of the decision-makers in one state ever to get fully into the minds of their counterparts in other states, and so to understand their motives and intentions with confidence" (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 4).[4] This principle inspired much of Realist scholarship in IR, as well as policymaking to this day. It places uncertainty, fear, and mistrust of others as drivers of a spiralling security competition, thereby limiting cooperation in time and scope, with the ultimate conclusion that "world politics is, *par excellence*, the realm of the *lack* of trust" (Rengger 1997, 469–70). In this sense, there are intense structural constraints that ought to be factored in to explanations of both mistrust and the formation of trust and trusting relationships.

Interestingly, as with the early Liberal work in IR, more recent rationalist work on trust has highlighted that provision of information through cooperation is a key means to alleviate mistrust (Kydd 2005).[5] However, such a mechanistic understanding has been critiqued for draining "the psychology from trust by turning it into a consequence of incentives… [which] eliminates both the need for trust and the opportunity to trust" (Mercer 2005, 95). Relatedly, other scholars have re-emphasized the crucial role of interpretation of information as a more

[4] There is, of course, a literature on how nuclear weapons in particular are both fundamentally ambiguous and moreover change the security calculations within the anarchic international system. See Jervis (1989), Solingen (1994), Sagan (1997), and Brown et al. (2010).

[5] Trust has not been a largely explored area of mainstream IR but a number of different schools of thought can be identified: Kydd (2005) represents a hard rationalist conception of trust that reduces it to a strategic bet on others' behaviour; Larson (1997) introduces a psychological perspective that underlines the importance of interpreting behaviour and beliefs; Rathbun (2009, 2011, 2012) and Hoffmann (2002, 2006) provide more nuanced accounts of how trusting dispositions are developed.

human aspect of trusting behaviour,[6] that filtering expectations naturally comes through the biases, preconceptions, and in-group/out-group dynamics that structure a person's belief system (Larson 1997, 717). Rather than reducing interactions or relationships to a calculation, a focus on beliefs and belief systems addresses what it means to trust or mistrust at the international level in a more complex way,[7] and a group of scholars therefore argue that trust and mistrust are not exclusively rational processes but are influenced by an emotional context – a mixture of thinking and feeling (Lewis and Weigert 1985; Head 2012).[8]

On a more practical note, trust and mistrust are labels that numerous world leaders use to convey the challenges and frustrations of international politics. In the cases featured in this dissertation, this can be exemplified in the way in which various Iranian diplomats have framed the negotiations on their nuclear programme.[9] In 2005, as chief negotiator on the nuclear issue, the now Iranian President Hassan Rouhani framed the problem as one of trust;[10] his Foreign Minister, Javad Zarif, has since reflected that the signing of the nuclear deal in 2015 was "never based on trust – it was based on mutual mistrust";[11] but as this deal was threatened by US President Trump in 2017, Rouhani warned that "The exiting of the United States from such an agreement would carry a high cost, meaning that subsequent to such an action by the United

[6] This was not a new insight, of course: in the 1950s, Herz and Butterfield had noted the problem of self-images and decision-makers' inability to recognize their situation of 'Hobbesian fear' in early work on the security dilemma (Wheeler 2008, 494–95). Moreover, Jervis had also observed that "how a statesman interprets the other's past behavior and how he projects it into the future is influenced by his understanding of the security dilemma and his ability to place himself in the other's shoes" (1976, 181).

[7] Following Lewicki, I agree that mistrust is not merely the absence of trust, on a spectrum as it were, but rather denotes an equally active disposition toward "fear of the other, a tendency to attribute sinister intentions to the other, and a desire to protect oneself from the effects of another's conduct" (2014, 110).

[8] Wheeler (2018, 8) refers to this as "a mix of calculation and bonding."

[9] The Nuclear Threat Initiative offer a comprehensive overview of the Iranian nuclear program, including a key timeline on the crisis since 2003; see http://www.nti.org/learn/countries/iran/nuclear/.

[10] "'[T]he foundation of this matter is trust. We don't trust Europe, and Europe doesn't trust us" (quoted in Head 2012, 45).

[11] HE Javad Zarif, interview on "Face the Nation" 15 October 2017, (Zarif 2017) https://www.youtube.com/watch?time_continue=41&v=vfXEyHVZMGw

States of America, no one will trust America again."[12] These examples highlight how the condition of uncertainty remains a constant with respect to others' intentions, and that even after cooperation, mistrust is not easily dispelled between rivals.

Others writing on trust have pointed to the example of Reagan and Gorbachev to emphasize the "centrality of human agency as a critical variable in shaping whether security dilemmas result in a mistrustful spiral of deteriorating relations, or a virtuous circle of cooperation" (Booth and Wheeler 2008, 7). My approach in the next two subsections is to re-emphasize some of the structural factors that sustain *mis*trust, before developing a more agential account what this looks like in practice later in the chapter. I am encouraged by a similar effort by Deborah Larson to identify instances where "adversaries could have reached arms control or other cooperative agreements if they did not mistrust each other, and that, with different policies, they could have overcome the other's suspicions" (1997, 703). In distinction, I am not looking for specific 'missed opportunities' as Larson does; rather, I am seeking to establish that actors in the two case studies are caught in a downward spiral of mistrust and fear, and that the social and political context that actors inhabit contributes to the sustaining of mistrust – this is the point of departure for the third section.

A brief caveat to the research: it is important to note that it is not particularly enlightening to simply ask participants whether they (mis)trust someone or anyone from a rival country.[13] As an example, in thinking through how trust is employed even colloquially, it is rare that I directly say to someone 'I trust you' – rather, I *act* upon such trust in a way that pre-consciously

[12] "'No One Will Trust' U.S. if Trump Ends Nuclear Deal, Iran's President Says", NBC Storyline, 19 September 2017, available at https://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/iran-nuclear-talks/no-one-will-trust-u-s-if-trump-ends-nuclear-n802611

[13] The practical implications of this point were discussed in the first chapter, section 1.3.

acknowledges that trust is present (Michel 2013, 880). Indeed, on those occasions where 'I trust you' is uttered out loud, I would suggest it is often as a reassurance where trust is actually not implicitly held and thus the explicit utterance performs the admission of vulnerability which we are concerned not to see harmed. Therefore, in establishing the structural conditions on which the individual relationships are based, I must infer a general and pervasive level of *mis*trust that has seeped down to affect individual dispositions toward the other. As a foundation for this assertion, I discuss below some of the key events in each set of relations in the case studies.

4.1.2 India-Pakistan: cultural affinities, strategic misunderstandings

In one sense, the relationship of India and Pakistan was founded on mistrust: even before the 1947 partition, one can trace a rivalry back along politico-religious lines to the tensions that simmered between Hindu and Muslim populations during the period of British imperial control (Wolpert 2004; S. P. Cohen 2013a). Violence and bloodshed resulted from the competing visions of statehood put forward by the Indian National Congress Party, representing the majority Hindu population but seeking a secular and religiously pluralistic new state, and the Muslim League Party, uneasy at the thought of being a smaller constituency in a Hindu-dominated state. To understand the years of conflict and, consequently, the parameters of diplomatic engagement between the two countries that emerged, one needs to see that the conflict "is simultaneously over territory, national identity, and power position in the region" (Paul 2005, 8).

The events of independence themselves were traumatic for many parts of India and Pakistan. The collective and cultural memory of partition is prominent in the minds of both Indians and Pakistanis, shaping their national identities to a large extent, and the events of the following

seventy years have shaped in people's minds the future possibilities for these countries. As India has grown economically and militarily, Pakistan has sought the support of external actors, notably from India's great rival China, as well as the US, in maintaining as deterrent an ability to inflict significant damage to its rival. The further division of Pakistan after the 1971 war with India, as Bangladesh was created from East Pakistan, only increased fear and suspicion in Pakistan that India was out to destroy it as a state – this sentiment persists today in many forums (S. P. Cohen 2013a, 82). By the 1908s, nuclear weapons were suspected to be developed by both countries, leading to new dimensions and ready escalations in the already tense bilateral relationship (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen 2007, 23–28). Finally, confirmation of this fact through the nuclear weapons tests of 1998 seriously escalated tension in the region, culminating in the most recent war between the two in Kargil in 1999.[14]

Both sides' manipulation of separatist movements and insurgents on the other side greatly complicates the picture of a straightforward geopolitical inter-state rivalry. In particular, the most hotly disputed territory since partition, Jammu and Kashmir, has become the main venue for a proxy war, where Pakistan "can promote cross-border militancy and terrorism there, and thanks to its growing nuclear capabilities, prevent India from expanding the conflict into Pakistan" (Chari, Cheema, and Cohen 2007, 213). Although a 1972 ceasefire agreement established the 'Line of Control,' it has not permanently resolved the border issue and has not prevented skirmishes and violence; in spite of a further bilateral agreement on a ceasefire in November 2003,[15] regular infractions and exchanges of fire still occur, with India accusing Pakistan of allowing 'foreign terrorists' to cross.[16] There had been a thawing in relations

[14] Wheeler (2010, 2018, chap. 7) has investigated this particular moment and the subsequent efforts by the leaders of each country to transform their relations (and those of the states) in terms of trust.

[15] This agreement has a wide scope, also including the International Boundary as well as the LOC.

[16] Ceasefire violation figures are disputed for the most part, with both sides accusing one another of 'starting' a violation that then escalates. In research conducted for the Ottawa Dialogue, it was necessary to rely upon Wikipedia statistics and then triangulate news sources to establish a relatively 'neutral' figure. Recently a

following the ceasefire imposition and renewed hope with the initiation of the 'Composite Dialogue' between the two countries; however, the Mumbai terror attack of 26 November 2008 by ten Pakistani terrorists derailed any progress made and there has been only a token resumption of talks since.[17]

This provides the briefest snapshot to what has happened in the 70 years since independence. Bilaterally, the two countries' efforts to cooperate have been sporadic at best: "their inability to resolve disputes is widely acknowledged to be a tragic failure, and the prospects for full normalization are not bright" (S. P. Cohen 2013a, 147). Simply put, the track record of forging agreements is poor and even the track record of diplomatic engagement on security issues is weak: the Indus Water Treaty (1960) and The India-Pakistan Non-Attack Agreement on nuclear facilities (1988) stand out as the only major political agreements to have been implemented and followed in almost 70 years.[18] Their mutual history and inability to cooperate is reflective of profound mistrust in each other's' intentions. It plays a significant role in the Ottawa Dialogue projects: accusations of cross-border terrorism are a recurrent theme; the issue of Jammu and Kashmir permeates much of India-Pakistan discussion; and the destabilizing effects of the nuclearization of the subcontinent are not mutually understood. Overwhelmingly, there is a climate of mistrust between the two countries and their political leaders that has not only prevented meaningful progress but has contributed to repeated strategic misunderstandings.

comprehensive website measuring such statistics has been launched by a member of both the Ottawa Dialogue and Pugwash: http://indopakconflictmonitor.org/

[17] Although Prime Minister Modi visited his counterpart Nawaz Sharif in December 2015, there has been little progress overall and both still speak of the climate of mistrust between the countries.

[18] One could also add the Simla Agreement (1972) and the Lahore Declaration (1999) to this list, although they are interpreted differently, their applicability is disputed, and both are rather more aspirational than concrete; indeed, the Lahore Declaration was swiftly followed by the Kargil crisis which pushed relations to a new low.

4.1.3 Iran-US-Israel: cooperation, revolution, suspicion

Any account of relations between these three countries must clearly recognize that direct relations between two, Israel and the US, have been relatively stable since the creation of Israel in 1948.[19] On the whole, and particularly since the 1970s, the US has lent ever-greater political, military, and economic support to the state of Israel. Moreover, starting as a key player in the wider Middle East strategy of successive Presidential Administrations and as a bulwark against Soviet Communist imperialism in the region, since 9/11 the Jewish State, as the beacon of democracy in the Middle East region, has become an unquestioningly crucial partner in the 'war on terror' (Mearsheimer and Walt 2006). As such, this subsection rather takes up a narrative of Iran's relations with the other two countries, and how in turn they have addressed Iran and its ambitions within the region. It is from this dynamic that we see the mutual fear and mistrust that has developed and characterizes interactions.

It is quite telling that modern accounts of US-Iran relations often begin at different points in time. Indeed, as one prominent scholar has written,

> "To understand the current predicament, therefore, one must understand the evolution of the relationship… the two parties possess different recollections, suffer from collective amnesia (when the facts are inconvenient), and propose alternate interpretations of their shared experiences." (Ansari 2006, 4)

Many American authors reflect a widespread belief that the beginning of difficulties between the two began around the time of the 1979 revolution in Iran and the subsequent occupation of the US embassy in Tehran by zealous students (e.g. Crist 2013). Such a narrative quite often views the fundamental difference as one of ideology: the radical 'Islamisation' of a previously

[19] Although the US was quick to provide recognition of the new state of Israel in May 1948 its support to the country was equivocal through the subsequent 20 years of cold war politics. Beginning with the Administrations of Kennedy and Johnson, however, a more reliable and trusting relationship developed (see Bass 2003, chap. 1). This has not been without significant variations, as demonstrated through the Obama and Netanyahu years.

amicable state heralded the breakdown of relations, the development of suspicion and fear, accompanied by a number of distinct policy disputes.[20] However, pick up a version written by an Iranian and it begins much earlier: the main point of rupture, at least for many Iranian scholars, begins around the time of the 1953 coup against their democratically elected Prime Minister Mossadegh (Mousavian and Shahidsaless 2014, 16). This event and the ensuing subversion of Iranian democracy by the re-installation of the Shah as sovereign is, for Iranians, what characterizes their conflictive relationship with the US, and the West more generally. These two different historical framings point to one current source of mistrust: Iranians generally, and the official representatives particularly, still hold this difference of narratives to be an issue of fundamental dishonesty on the part of the West.

As it was, during the period of the Shah's reign (1953-1979) relations were stable enough with both the US and Israel: diplomacy was conducted regularly, intelligence cooperation took place, and even "Israeli tourists flocked to Iran – the only Middle Eastern country where Israelis were welcome at the time" (Parsi 2008, 13). Ostensibly in return for oil access, the Shah was supported economically and militarily by the US; furthermore, the creation of an intelligence service, trained by counterparts the US Central Intelligence Agency and Israeli Mossad, was instrumental in his suppression of political dissent and maintenance of control within Iran. The cooperation with Israel in particular, however, was "deeply offensive to the religious establishment in Iran" and well before the Islamic revolution Ayatollah Khomeini preached against the 'Little Satan' in part because of "the long-established policy of the United States to give Israel unquestioning and unconditional support" (Mousavian and Shahidsaless 2014, 248–

[20] See Barzegar (2010, 86) on this point.

49). These are generally viewed as critical factors, in addition to worsening economic basics, which led to the 1979 Islamic Revolution.[21]

Following the Revolution, anti-Israel rhetoric became policy. Despite the break in formal diplomatic ties and the anti-Zionist position taken by Iran's clerics, there is a surprising amount of evidence that the Islamic Republic and Israel continued to cooperate throughout the 1980s. In particular, following the attack upon Iran by Saddam Hussein's Iraq that begun an eight year war, it was Israel that helped to supply Iran with a great deal of military hardware, even providing materials produced in and sanctioned by the US (Alavi 1988, 5). In stark contrast to the current political climate, a longstanding Pugwash member in Israel, David Menashri, has noted that, "Throughout the 1980s, no one in Israel said anything about an Iranian threat – the word wasn't even uttered" (quoted in Parsi 2008, 104). The US, however, while muddying the waters in what became part of the Iran-Contra scandal, took the side of Saddam, even turning a blind eye to the use of chemical weapons against Iranians – this episode is still cited to this day in Pugwash meetings as a gross abuse by the US and West against its commitments under various international treaties and has become a key point in the narrative of mistrust.

The 1990s represent a time of rapid isolation for Iran, identified as a supporter of terrorism and a risk to global security by the US and Israel in particular. Iran had solicited technical and financial support from Pakistan, China, and Russia to expand its nuclear energy programme; however, contrary to its obligations under the 1968 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT), Iran had been building certain facilities at undisclosed locations that, as a result, had not been inspected. This gave rise to deep suspicion of their declared policy that nuclear weapons were

[21] The factors precipitating revolution in the case of Iran have been studied by Milani (2008), focusing on the Islamic particularity of this revolution, and Menashri (1990), among others.

'un-Islamic'. The controversy and fear surrounding Iran's nuclear programme – specifically whether it had embarked upon a route leading to weaponization of the nuclear technology – absorbed a huge amount of intellectual and policy focus following the revelation of cheating in 2002 (Chubin 2010, chap. 4,5; Samore et al. 2015).

In general, relations between Iran and the West – principally the US and Israel in this analysis – have moved from cooperation (under hegemonic conditions) to profound mistrust and conflict. This is somewhat different to the foundational element of mistrust between India and Pakistan but, nonetheless, for both cases there is conflict that largely has prevented meaningful cooperation and is characterized by a pervasive mistrust. One answer to why the mistrust prevails would seem to lie in security dilemma dynamics: issues of perception and misperception between states, where uncertainty is high and predictability in the others' intentions is low.

In the next section, I argue that, in fact, we can much better appreciate the effects and nuance of the security dilemma if we also look to the *estrangement* of relations as they are embodied by individuals. The conflicts in question and the high levels of mistrust have meant that the people on each side – including those representatives who symbolize the state – have not had much meaningful opportunity to interact. One result, explored in the final section, is that they have not developed the empathy or security dilemma 'sensibility' with which to more fully know the other side. Overall, complementing the structural impact of pervasive mistrust with a focus on the more agential effects of estrangement produces a more compelling logic as to why forms of diplomacy are needed between these sets of states.

4.2 The role of estrangement in prolonging conflict

Emerging work in IR has pointed to the underlying role of emotions in shaping the formation of preferences and interests of actors (Lebow 2005; Mercer 2005). Pertinently for this research, Naomi Head has more recently argued that "if political conflicts are underpinned by emotional dimensions then an inability to understand others' feelings is likely to be a dynamic which contributes toward perpetuating mistrust and conflict" (2012, 37). This is a critical juncture for distinguishing how conflict itself is not simplistically derived from systemic pressures but rather is sustained by an emotional context – principally fear and mistrust – which not only influences the decisions of policymakers (Crawford 2000) but is premised on a lack of understanding between rivals.

On this basis, I argue that we should pay more attention to how the perceptions and beliefs of those involved in the conflict (and of course, involved in unofficial diplomacy itself) are shaped and how these dispositions guide their actions. The following sections flesh out the assertion that we must look to how estrangement – predominately expressed as lack of understanding and empathy derived from an absence of the habit of cooperation – exacerbates mistrust. Indeed, in developing the interplay between pervasive mistrust and estrangement, I set up the argument for the last section of this chapter to explore how different forms of diplomacy are essential for the work of dispelling mistrust, and hold the ultimate potential to building trust at an interpersonal level through the lens of unofficial diplomacy.

4.2.1 The structuring disposition of fear and prejudice

During the course of my research, it was fascinating that many of the participants to the cases of unofficial diplomacy either explicitly highlighted or implicitly described a real lack of

understanding of the other side to the conflict. To take just one example, a former Indian Foreign Service official observed that,

> "Culturally and socially we know the Pakistanis, we have no problems; we relate to them. But when we come to policies, issues, *we don't know how their mind works, they probably don't know how our mind works*. The challenge is actually – this is odd – people who are actually so similar should have a dissimilar thinking."[22]

This same interlocutor, who had also served as Foreign Minister, later on told me that, despite the many years of interacting via diplomatic channels with Pakistani officials, "throughout my official career I never came to know Pakistan or understand the Pakistanis."[23] In this case, even regularized diplomatic activity had not been able to produce an ability to know or understand the other. In my other case study, as I go on to show, Iran has not even had the luxury of diplomatic interaction with Israel or the US in any meaningful way for over 30 years. For both cases, I argue that this character of not knowing the other side reveals the deep estrangement between the states and their communities, symptomatic and mutually reinforcing of being locked in a mistrustful rivalry.

In his work on trust and mistrust, Brian Rathbun has noted that "rivalries are marked by particularized fear that arises from the history of conflict. This kind of fear is moralistic in that participants have made a judgment about inherent traits of the other side" (2009, 368). Recalling what was discussed in Chapters 2 and 3, this point brings together the notion of how bias and prejudice operate at an intergroup level and reinforces the sense that mistrust can emerge from such structuring forces to behave as a predisposition.[24] Moreover, fear of this kind deeply affects the ways in which new information about the other is processed: "When faced

[22] APR15.BKK7

[23] APR15.BKK7

[24] In particular, the work of Azar (1990; 1986; 1981) on deep-seated identity issues in conflict is important.

with evidence that violates well-established beliefs, we discount its validity, code ambiguous data so that it fits our beliefs, or recall belief-consistent information" (Larson 1997, 725).[25] Fear and mistrust should be seen as key factors of why political leaders don't come to the negotiating table and why rivalries sustain themselves more generally amongst populations.

An important point to note (as the next chapter goes on to depict) is that many of the individuals in unofficial diplomacy have had their beliefs shaped through careers working in some official capacity – government, diplomacy, military, or more loosely connected as scientific advisors, for example. They thus work, or have worked, within a frame of representing their countries' interests and a professional obligation to assert national narratives. We can reasonably expect that they will have some attachment to the sources and directions of their rivalries or conflicts, perhaps more than the average citizen given their role as representatives – this is what Herman Kraft's (2000) previously discussed idea on the 'autonomy dilemma' captures. However, one key distinction that my work seeks to stress is that, beyond officials, most of the participants come from countries in a rivalrous conflict and are thus, to differing extents, locked into this dynamic. Indeed, the widespread climate of fear and mistrust of the other in their domestic fields of activity is generative of further suspicion and mistrust regarding future interactions – the locking into spirals in such conflicts has been a long-studied principle[26] – and so I am able to add a further layer to the concept of the autonomy dilemma.

In a sense, this is the kind of structure-agency interplay that Bourdieu subsumes in his notion of *habitus*, that which provides a guiding 'grammar' for the practices of agents (Bourdieu 1990,

[25] Such observations are reflected consistently through the Track Two (and broader conflict resolution) literature; in particular, see Colaresi and Thompson (2002).

[26] Charles Osgood's (1962) work on "Graduated Reciprocation in Tension Reduction" represents an early attempt to theorize breaking free from 'spirals of fear'. His work has been used to investigate how 'spirals of trust' or 'virtuous circles of cooperation' can be promoted; see Hoffman (2006) and Booth and Wheeler (2008).

53; Bigo 2011). It is also apparent in the 'role identity' development that is implicated in the move between individual and social-structural phenomena noted in the constructivist literature.[27] In my research, the lack of formal interaction (in the case of Iran) or meaningful diplomacy (in the case of India-Pakistan) adds a conservative pessimism to the prospects for reversing deep-seated mistrust. To move toward understanding how unofficial diplomacy seeks to address this problem, below I provide ample evidence of the estrangement that characterizes the relationships in question. In general, we must pay attention to the ways in which caricatures of particularized and pervasive untrustworthiness (e.g. Indian views of Pakistan; or Iranian views on Americans) create the 'role identity' that affects the range of possibilities for cooperation, even at an individual level.

It is in this vein that I will then go on to make the case for the importance of different forms of diplomatic interaction in creating the possibility that individuals can transcend such narratives and make breakthroughs of interpersonal trusting behaviour. The following two sections build a baseline of estrangement by describing the widespread misunderstandings that condition relations and ultimately exacerbate the existing security dilemma. The narratives roughly follow on from where the previous section left off, at the beginnings of each of the two case study projects. This contextualization is important not just for the subsequent discussion of how trust and mistrust are implicated in participants' beliefs, but more concretely for the following chapters in which we see the practical effects of both mistrust and trust.

[27] Alexander Wendt argued that trust is a central mechanism for the "fundamental problem of collective identity formation," and that this is predicated upon interaction (1999, 358; quoted in Rathbun 2009, 355).

4.2.2 The prolonged estrangement of India and Pakistan

Beyond the historical context, the failure to create a stable and proactive relationship has also been a function of the strategic interactions between the two countries and their perceptions, and subsequent management, of crises. In general, both countries believe that

> "the logical policy prescription is to maximize their deterrent capabilities and avoid showing any sign of weakness or lack of resolve… it has been the dominant frame through which Indian and Pakistani decision-makers have viewed each other's actions" (Wheeler 2010, 322).

The periodic crises and strategic miscalculations have fed into and reinforced the sense that the countries' elites do not understand one another – misunderstanding and misperception were admitted by my interlocutors as being rife. The point is that the inter-state relationship is weak and both sides seemingly base policy on a wilful ignorance of the other side's perceptions at the expense of mutual gain. A key problem, as expressed nearly unanimously by participants, is summarized by one Indian interlocutor thus:

> "The governments… hardly meet: they hardly meet at the nuclear level, they hardly meet at the military-military level… the governments are non-serious about engaging each other. The governments don't even consider the nuclear dialogue to be a specific kind of dialogue which should *not* be interrupted, even if the other kinds of dialogues are interrupted… The government of India, for example, would say that by not talking to Pakistan on nuclear issues we are teaching them a lesson."[28]

While this example speaks of the past few years of non-engagement, in the past decades in which my interlocutors were active in office, there were virtually no agreements, very little substantive discussions, and periodically there have been crises, whether borne of militant activities, terror attacks, un-notified military exercises, media reports of imminent plans for attacking nuclear facilities – the list goes on – that have compromised and often ended

[28] NOV14.BKK1

discussion or communication. As stated by a long-standing foreign service officer and former Foreign Minister of Pakistan,

> "except for February 1999 – I had negotiated on Pakistan's behalf the Lahore Declaration and the MOU – actually, nothing much has happened on these issues bilaterally… I didn't solicit any interest of the Indians to speak to us on these issues."[29]

There is something perverse about suspending talks *because* of a crisis, when diplomacy is needed most, but this is actually more common than one might assume.[30]

Generally speaking, the situation is that there have been, and continue to be, no consistent efforts between the two countries at the official level to engage in a diplomatic dialogue which can address the array of security issues bedevilling the relationship. As one Pakistani participant who has served at the official level on India-Pakistan relations for most of the previous decade-and-a-half put it, "today's environment, where virtually we have come to a full stop in Pakistan-India, there is no glimmer of hope even […] things are not going right on track one."[31] Here, one must clearly distinguish between substantive discussion and what we might call 'formulaic' diplomacy: "of course, the High Commissioners of the two countries and the officials, the Foreign Ministries, they keep on communicating, that's not an issue."[32] It was emphasized repeatedly that, in their former roles as officials, my interlocutors rarely interacted beyond cordial and unproductive diplomatic communication – there was no issue-oriented discussion that allowed them to understand one another.

The core issue is that, as expressed by a former Indian Foreign Minister,

[29] APR15.BKK9 (MOU refers to the Memorandum of Understanding accompanying the Declaration)

[30] The history of the US and the Islamic Republic of Iran is a case in point, as I go on to show. Equally, the Soviet Union suspended diplomatic relations with Israel between 1953-1991, and many smaller states have regularly suspended relations for a variety of internal or regional considerations (Gitelson 1974).

[31] APR15.BKK9

[32] APR15.BKK9

> "If you are an Indian diplomat you deal with Pakistan a lot, it occupies a lot of your mind. But actually, in the process, you don't understand Pakistan and don't even come to know the Pakistanis. In a sense, you take a formal position and you defend that position."[33]

The India-Pakistan strategic relationship is officially played out within the High Commissions in the respective countries, the Foreign Ministries, and the interactions of the political leaders at various bilateral and multilateral forums. In the Ottawa Dialogue there are often sessions in which participants go through the recent historical record to better understand motivations and perceptions relating to particular decisions. It is clear, not just from my observations of these interactions but also by the fact that they are needed at all, that the two sides have been misinterpreting the various developments for many years, when many of the participants were actually in office. Equally importantly, the various departments of defence and foreign policy, as well as the domestic policy communities, are all implicated in the range of misunderstandings generated, as both sides build up or consolidate their conventional and nuclear forces. On the military front, the hierarchies are perhaps most acutely estranged, starkly illustrated by one Indian participant recalling the first Military-to-Military meeting of the OD: "I still remember a remark made: the [Pakistani] general said that, 'I had never seen a live Indian military man.'"[34]

One of the more perverse results of their shared history and cultural affinity is that it has seemingly permitted a complacency that "both at the popular level and the strategic elite level there is a position that you don't really need to just talk to the Pakistan side on any of these issues because we both understand each other perfectly well."[35] Both officially and in the

[33] APR15.BKK7
[34] APR15.BKK8
[35] NOV14.BKK1

population at large there is an assumption that each country 'knows' the other; yet my impression was that this clearly was not the case, and moreover that this has done nothing to reduce the climate of mutual fear and suspicion.

All of my interlocutors candidly expressed a serious deficit of knowledge concerning how people in the other country *think* and how the governments *understand* one another – the consequence of this is regular strategic or tactical miscalculation. To take another example,

> "There is hardly any clarity [about the Line of Control], even among the participants in the Ottawa Dialogue right now – that is the *crème de la crème* we are talking about, as far as a military-to-military dialogue is concerned… So, if that kind of absence of definition of what the ceasefire means exists in this kind of a group, then you can imagine what must be the situation on the ground, what must be the situation in political circles, and among the media circles – the media has absolutely no clue about anything for that matter, I'll gladly add that."[36]

All of this amounts to a serious, debilitating even, sense of estrangement between the two countries, as credible knowledge about what is happening in each country is lacking and is further distorted by unhelpful and vitriolic media in each country (Cohen 2013: 24-5).

Most significantly for this research is that the elites of the strategic communities in Delhi and Islamabad do not understand one another's thinking and, crucially, do not have many opportunities to interact and communicate sufficiently well to correct this. As identified by another participant,

> "the problem with the India-Pakistan issue is that not enough people who are in the strategic community travel to each other's country and because [of this…] their basic

[36] NOV14.BKK1 Indeed, the media was frequently fingered by interlocutors on both sides as irresponsible and contributing to perpetuating the climate of mistrust and fear.

> understanding of the mood, the psyche, what are the drivers of their behaviour – those issues are not very well understood."[37]

Ultimately, there remains to this day a particularly tense security environment between the two rivals, resulting from their mutually entwined histories founded on mistrust. I have documented in this subsection how the persistent misunderstandings, misperceptions, and lack of meaningful communications between Indians and Pakistanis as expressed to me by former government and military officials of the two countries has reinforced or exacerbated this situation. The underlying environment in which each of the individuals participating in the Ottawa Dialogue have come to frame their understanding of the other is one of reciprocal hostility, rivalry, and mistrust which has not been dispelled because of the lack of opportunity for engagement between members of the two sides.

4.2.3 Iran's estrangement from the West

In the almost forty years since the Islamic Revolution, neither the US nor Israel have had embassies in Tehran and neither country hosts an Iranian embassy on their soil.[38] While there have existed mechanisms for some limited representation,[39] they have no diplomatic or consular relations, and Iran continues to practice non-recognition of Israel as a state. In general, the tenor and practice of official diplomatic engagement has been aggressive, accusative, and poorly lacking in results,[40] exacerbated by strong public rhetoric at different times from leaders

[37] APR14.BKK8

[38] On 23 February 1979, the Israeli embassy in Tehran was closed and handed over to the Palestinian Liberation Organization. The seizing of the US embassy on 4 November 1979 heralded the end of diplomatic ties: following its occupation for 444 days, the US has not reopened its embassy and Iran has not since had an embassy in Washington, D.C.

[39] For example, an Iranian 'interests section' in the Pakistan embassy in Washington, D.C., and a US 'interests section' in the Swiss embassy in Tehran. The Iran Mission to the United Nations in New York has also served as a useful location for quiet interactions with Americans at various times.

[40] The 2015 nuclear deal notwithstanding.

of each country. As John Limbert, one of the hostages at the US Embassy during the revolution and a regular Pugwash participant, has written with respect of the US, "Since relations were formally broken in 1980, there has been an almost complete lack of official, bilateral contact. That estrangement has deprived Americans of face-to-face negotiating experience" with Iranians (Limbert 2008, 3).

Political estrangement has also led to a breakdown of interactions on a wider scale and for many years it has been challenging for ordinary Americans to travel to Iran.[41] As a result, there has been an asymmetrical estrangement in some respects: "Although the Islamic Revolution and the subsequent turmoil brought hundreds of thousands of Iranians to the United States, there are fewer and fewer people inside Iran who have had any direct contact with America and Americans" (Limbert 2008). Many Americans have had contact and interactions with Iranian diaspora in their country, but this is of a different order to interacting with Iranian officials or those who remained in Iran after the Revolution.[42]

Against the backdrop of official and legal barriers to engagement, a rift has opened up in the perceptions of each country and its citizens, and moreover how each think of the other's actions and behaviour. This is most acutely expressed in the process of dealing with the Iranian nuclear issue but is by no means exclusive to it – the nuclear file merely represents the most concerted attempt at contact since 1979. At the official level, the so-called P5+1 (or EU3+3) countries, consisting of Russia, China, the UK, France and Germany, and the US, were nominally in

[41] Although challenging at different times, it has been far easier for Iranians to study, teach, and visit the US than vice-versa. Israeli and Iranian citizens are forbidden from traveling to each other's countries given the recognition issue, and even meeting in a neutral venue is not encouraged by governments.

[42] It is important not to overstate the sense of estrangement: there have been and continue to be relatively broad cultural and social ties, mainly promoted by Iranians living or visiting the US, and in a sense many Americans have a deep understanding of post-revolution Iran. Nonetheless, the quality of estrangement that I point to have profound and widespread effects, particularly for the political class.

charge of negotiating with Iran. For many American officials, this was the first real engagement with Iranians in a generation.[43] A telling factor of estrangement is that "Iran and the United States have refrained from going beyond the nuclear issue and none of their other impending problems have been seriously addressed" (Soltaninejad 2015, 469). In one sense, this reflects an American (and Israeli) preoccupation of solving the nuclear issue above all else, even during the Obama years; in another sense, it undermined what could be seen as an attempt by Iran to reach out to the US in order to address the state of their overall relationship – the Americans missed the opportunity to engage because their estrangement from Iran prevented them from understanding such an opportunity was even present.[44]

With the emergence of the Iran nuclear issue in 2003, it took until July 2015 for an official agreement to finally be reached which reined in Iranian nuclear activity.[45] During that time (the key phase of the Pugwash case-study), there was a whole host of official and unofficial activity alike, drawing in academic and non-governmental experts to debate the largely technical details of the nuclear technology that Iran had been developing, as well as (inevitably) reflecting on the political dimensions. This debate was largely polarized between those urging a more forceful line based on Iran's failure to properly report its nuclear activities (seen as nuclear 'cheating'), and those advocating a diplomatic solution which would recognizes Iran's international rights as well as obligations.[46] In relation to this debate, it is important to note that

[43] With the exception of one set of bilateral meetings held in Baghdad held over two months in July 2007 (Limbert 2008) on the future of Iraq, there had only been formulaic multilateral diplomacy under UN and other international organization auspices.

[44] Jones (2014, 353) points to a similar argument made, although not in the terms of estrangement, that takes in a number of issues of domestic politics in each country.

[45] IAEA inspectors began their work in December 2002 after secret sites were revealed by satellite imagery after claims by a non-governmental resistance group; cf. Report by the Director General "Implementation of the NPT Safeguard Agreement in the Islamic Republic of Iran," *International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA): GOV/2003/40* (6 June 2003); available at https://www.iaea.org/sites/default/files/gov2003-40.pdf

[46] Of course, this simplifies the extremes of opinion on this matter and omits the varying shades of opinion in between, particularly regarding Iran's right to enrich uranium. The issue of enrichment was simultaneously placed in the context of a more international debate on the future of the nuclear non-proliferation regime that drew in experts and officials from many states around the globe. There is a vast literature from a variety of

Pugwash oriented its activities to promoting a diplomatic solution and, in doing so, focused its activities on promoting dialogue between Iranians, Americans, and Israelis. As the next chapter goes on to illustrate, those involved also participated in the great number of other such dialogues and policy events that were taking place globally.[47]

On the one side, the hard-line approach of increasing sanctions and punitive responses was necessary to underscore that a nuclear-armed Iran was unacceptable. In part, this was fuelled by fear and mistrust of Iranian behaviour and intentions: one Israeli Pugwash participant reflected that the official negotiations reflected "how Iran is abusing this process in order to get what it wants."[48] The language of abuse here quite interestingly reveals not only the underlying mistrust but an unwillingness to empathize with the Iranian position.[49] As a result, many Pugwash participants felt that a military confrontation had been very close during this time: "There was a real danger that bombs could be dropped on Iran, and that Iran wouldn't react in a way that would be just to say 'oops, sorry [we cheated].'"[50]

On the other side, one European participant noted that "the question of what intentions we impute to others' actions cannot be measured objectively" (Pugwash 2012c, 6). In Pugwash meetings on the topic, in Israel in particular, there had been a repetitive debate as to how policy in Iran is shaped and who within the political scene is involved. A former Russian diplomat summed up this attitude of speculation within Israeli policy circles by comparison to the so-

angles, including from American and European policy institutes and think tanks, as well as more academically inclined scholarship under IR and Area Studies.

[47] See Jones (2014) for an overview of the many different forms the activity took in this time.

[48] JUN15.PW1

[49] Or more explicitly, an unwillingness based on an emotional response to a nuclear-armed Iran; see next page. One might ask why empathy is necessary when Iran has demonstrated its malevolent intentions toward Israel over the years and focus instead on a strategic realism or pragmatism over emotion.

[50] DEC16.PW6

called 'Kremlinologists' of the Cold War era (Pugwash 2011, 5). It was clear to him, and to many others including the Israelis, that there was a large deficit of understanding when it came to knowing the Iranian mind. Reciprocally, it was also the case that "few Iranian counterparts are likely to have much understanding of the United States" (Limbert 2008, 3). Fundamentally, the stark difference in attitudes also comes down to the context in which they interpreted the available information:

> "The Israelis believed that the Iranians might acquire nuclear weapons in two years and the Americans expected it to take five to ten years. Both groups relied on the same knowledge base and frequently consulted each other. The difference was over analysis and assessment, not information… The Israelis and the Americans felt the threat of a nuclear-armed Iran differently and these different feelings were part of their assessments." (Mercer 2010, 19)

This point helps to illustrate that analysis and assessment, even in the 'rational' and 'objective' hands of intelligence communities but equally in the broader strategic communities implicated in this research, is carried out with an emotional context (Mercer 2005). The ruptures in relations between Iran and the US and Israel have exacerbated underlying conditions of uncertainty: with many of those individuals in political and bureaucratic positions of authority out of the habit of cooperation or even formulaic diplomacy, mistrust and fear have been sustained. For many participants to the Pugwash meetings, the logic of breaking this habit was clear: "if you don't talk, you're always going to sit with your own threat perceptions, your own ideas of what's going on and there's less possibility of changing things and coming to some kind of understanding that might allow a different reality."[51] The 'nuclearization' of relations in the last 20 years represents a microcosm of the entrenched perceptions within each country of enmity, rivalry, and ultimately untrustworthiness of the other side.

[51] JUN15.PW1

Overall, the previous two sections have outlined how intense inter-state rivalries have fuelled the conditions of mistrust between not just states and their representatives but equally at a deeper, more widespread level. The fear and suspicion that characterize relations in a generalized way have been exacerbated by the lacuna in diplomatic and social relations, and the rifts have become entrenched. It is important to highlight the variety of issues in the histories of the case studies as these are the factors that have created persistent narratives of how rivals view one another and thus shape their vision of future possibilities. The Iranian nuclear issue is the defining moment in recent history, but it should be seen as a reflection of the deeper strategic concerns of Israel and the US because they do not know the Iranian mind (and vice-versa). For India and Pakistan, the nuclearization of the subcontinent has added an urgency to addressing their troubled strategic relationship, where the rivalry and mistrust is as old as the states themselves and perpetuated by a lack of mutual understanding.

The final section therefore turns to the role of unofficial diplomacy in these situations. I assert that interaction is primarily key to the possibilities of dispelling mistrust and subsequently, as much of the track two literature is focused upon, there arises potential to build trust. Although this has been studied to some extent, I focus not on the leaders but on a broader political elite implicated in the process of unofficial diplomacy. These influential opinion-shapers are not always decision-makers as such but arguably have a wider role in their respective state institutions and societies which may permit a reduction in generalized mistrust. My approach in one sense responds to Nick Wheeler's conundrum on the relationship of individuals (state leaders for him) to collective state behaviour in building a 'culture of trust' (2018, 20), although I do so primarily through the reciprocal lens of mistrust. Moreover, this route is not just analogous but is complementary to the research goals of those working in Track Two, seeking

the individual-level transfer effects of their projects to the wider societies in which they are embedded.[52]

4.3 Diplomacy, the habit of interaction, and possibilities of trust-building

Given the context provided for each case study thus far, it should be readily apparent as to why unofficial diplomacy happens at all. In the case of India and Pakistan, there has been some functional or formulaic official diplomacy taking place, yet some of those responsible for this over the past decades have revealed that they still do not understand the other side, and this has prolonged the sense of conflict. In my other case study, there has been virtually no formal diplomacy between Iran and either the US or Israel in almost 40 years. The absence of meaningful contact in both cases has reduced the cognitive familiarity between sides, resulting in a certain ignorance (wilful or not) as to how the other side thinks, acts, and behaves. In such situations, where diplomacy is perceived to have failed, third parties have been willing to provide a mediatory function – both by inserting themselves between the parties in conflict and thereby performing the role of a repository of trust – as limited means to address certain aspects of each conflict.[53]

This final section will illustrate the role of interaction as a means to bridging the structural hole in knowledge and communication between estranged sets of relations. We see that the emergent networks created within unofficial diplomacy constitute something of a 'soft' institution in lieu of – but also liminal to – the stalled workings of official diplomacy. On the one hand, institutions in general do not negate the need for trust: there is still a possibility of betrayal and

[52] As Chapter 2 highlighted, important contributions are by Fisher (1997, 2005), Kelman (1995, 2008), Çuhadar and Dayton (2012), and Jones (2015, chap. 6).

[53] I do not seek to elaborate the reasons why third-parties engage in this kind of work. There are many reasons, some of them of keen interest to my orientation because of a more strategic nature than altruism, but in general this is covered elsewhere in the literature; see Jones (2015, chap. 4).

so individuals must believe that reciprocity will be forthcoming despite the existential condition of uncertainty.[54] On the other hand, the habit of cooperation pursued through any kind of institution holds the potential to reduce mistrust through dialogue that I wish to highlight, while also hinting at the ultimate potential toward trust-building at an individual level. What follows is an investigation into the particularity of unofficial diplomacy; that is, beyond the functionality of simply mediating estrangement, beginning to unpack why it happens *in the way it does*.

It implies looking at firstly the latent undercurrents of mistrust that affect the ways in which individuals approach meeting the 'enemy'; and then, secondly, the oft-cited "potential for interpersonal trust to contribute to developing a wider 'culture of trust' between states" (Wheeler 2018, 20) that is also part of the Track Two transfer research.[55] It is in this sense that I draw attention to diplomatic interaction in practice as a fundamental logic of these spaces: in enabling contact it firstly permits the development of "security dilemma sensibility" (Booth and Wheeler 2008) to reduce mistrust; and secondly, it also permits the establishment of a practical sense of who in these spaces can be considered to be credible (explored in the following chapter) and thus encourage even limited trust-building between agents. The discussion also signals one current for the following chapter: the mediatory role that trusting behaviour holds is a crucial enabling mechanism in developing the networks that sustain the effort of wider trust-building.

[54] In part, the rules, norms, procedures, and expectations generated by the institutional setting reinforce this belief (cf. Krasner 1983). There are discussions of the unwritten 'rules' of unofficial diplomacy and these will be unpacked in the remaining chapters.

[55] Although there may appear to be a 'levels of analysis' issue, as emphasized in Chapter 3, I am taking trust to be an individual disposition and operational at an interpersonal level. How these individuals then act on their trust is an empirical question (cf. Michel 2013).

4.3.1 Addressing mistrust through contact

As Torsten Michel has noted, trust-building efforts are not about changing the range of options available to actors or "that incentives are created which transform the so far irrational option into a rational one" (2013, 873). Rather, this is about acknowledging that many actors caught in downward spirals of mutual mistrust rarely are able to take up "an amazing opportunity to understand the person that we have so-far called the enemy."[56] Many of my interlocutors described the meetings of unofficial diplomacy as opportunities, often 'unique' in their personal experience – this, however, led to the problem that, for most of them, they were "unsure how it would be, and what kind of environment will exist and how you are required to act and react. What should your approach be?"[57] I begin by looking at how actors in these spaces first approached such opportunities; in both case studies, the beginning of the project pre-dated my involvement but, nevertheless, in asking research participants their impressions of the earliest meetings and interactions, I was struck by the consistent presence of types of suspicion, fear, and mistrust that were expressed.

For the most part, participants articulated a hesitancy about initial contact. Some were in fact a lot more animated in describing their reservations: in advance of his first ever meeting (which happened to be of Pugwash rather than the OD), one Indian "thought this would be a complete firestorm, I mean it was going to be war in Kathmandu!"[58] Many others used similar language – "expecting fireworks"[59] – with the understanding that not only were they fraternizing with the enemy but that they were stepping into the unknown. Often, it was also the case that they observed such tentativeness in their counterparts, through the language they used or by

[56] APR15.BKK12
[57] NOV14.BKK3
[58] NOV14.BKK1
[59] NOV14.BKK2

reference to bodily conduct. Similarly, from my observations of those individuals new to such processes, there was a palpable hesitancy and trepidation upon entering the meeting room, and even feeling comfortable at social times – many required some kind of 'bedding down' time to acquaint themselves with the environment. Reflecting on his first meeting, one very senior participant from Pakistan remembered his group's entry:

> "I walked into this restaurant and we'd just come in [from Pakistan]. The Indian group was sitting in one corner, and we all went to the far end, to the other corner, and did not look at each other, and were not introduced to each other… you are wanting to meet, but you are not wanting to meet, and therefore how do you react? It's a new situation."[60]

This situation of course goes for both case studies:[61] reflecting on his early involvement in Pugwash meetings in Israel, one participant felt "it was almost very 'politbureau-esque' – you could see people were very formal, both in terms of body language and presentation. You could tell that for everyone in the room this was something a bit new."[62]

The newness of such interactions naturally reflects the lack of habit of interaction and cooperation in these rival relations. Equally present were residues of the intense emotional responses of particularized fear and mistrust coming from the mutual histories of conflict. It is perhaps all the more so for those who had served as diplomats and ministers, because their previous interactions had coloured the shape of what was to come: "You know, when you hold an official meeting, you sit across a table and you are an armed force ready with guns to fire at the other side, and similarly they are."[63] This is not the language of trust; rather, fear, suspicion, and mistrust all inform these people's sense of what kind of contact they were to expect. For

[60] NOV14.BKK3

[61] There were only rare opportunities for Israelis and Iranians to meet at Pugwash meetings. During the research period there were no specific encounters that I was able to witness and provide commentary on, in part because they often take place out of view entirely because of the sensitivities involved.

[62] JUN15.PW2

[63] NOV14.BKK4

some participants, the interactions within unofficial diplomacy remained at a lower threshold of cooperation; asked if he saw the purpose of the meetings as trust-building, one Indian military official felt that, "trust is a very strong word. I prefer predictability."[64] Indeed, the dissipation of enemy images, after a lifetime of acting upon them, is no straightforward task – for many, the general level of mistrust continues to characterize the problem-solving workshops and interaction.

Such a limited focus on predictability in the other, otherwise expressed as developing confidence, reflects at least the notion that such interactions are a "key enabling condition (necessary if not sufficient)" for changing the mind-sets of individuals within the adversarial context (Wheeler 2013, 481). For one thing, as noted in the Track Two literature, contact enables the reframing of existing narratives and beliefs. In this way, it also introduces the possibility of security dilemma *sensibility*, which Booth and Wheeler (2008, 7) identify as a possible move for actors to understand not only the role that fear and mistrust play in their attitudes toward others but, crucially, the role that one's own actions play in provoking the other's fear. From the perspective of my research participants, this translates to a process where,

> you try and recap some of the old things that have happened, so you are then able to revisit them from a totally new perspective. And maybe make and alter your conclusions, with regard to the other side or the actions you took yourself. And the manner in which you may have miscalculated sometimes the others' intentions, when you could have, perhaps, if you had had more direct interaction with the other one, you would have had maybe a different set of ways of dealing with them.[65]

[64] NOV14.BKK5

[65] NOV14.BKK3

This is the classic move of 'putting oneself into the other fellow's place' that John Herz and Herbert Butterfield's early work on the security dilemma identified (Wheeler 2008) – it is a manner of sensitizing one another to the feelings of fear and mistrust, something of a first step for the process of contact. In a way, it is a precursor to the possibility of trusting behaviour amongst adversaries (Wheeler 2009, 437) – dispelling mistrust is a necessary, but not sufficient, step on the way to creating a 'tipping point' in the interpersonal interactions of individuals locked in a rivalry toward trust-building.

For other participants, however, the process more quickly "throws up opportunities for gaining a better insight and understanding into how the other side's mind works. It helps to dissipate suspicions; I think it contributes to building a certain degree of trust and confidence."[66] In thinking through how the atmosphere changed over the course of several meetings in Israel over several years, one Pugwash participant reflected that in

> "some of the initial, early conversations, the context was 'do we bomb [Iran], do we not bomb?' [That moved on] to arguing very specific things about the [nuclear] deal and its aftermath. The whole dialogue shifted."[67]

Similarly, within the few years of OD meetings, "In this small group, you've seen the dissipation of hostilities between us, from our very idea that, 'oh you can't say this' and 'who are you to tell us this,' to say, 'OK, can we reframe this better for a forward movement?'"[68] I suggest that these clips show the incremental potential that these processes hold to dispel mistrust, even in limited terms: individuals can at least tentatively put in suspension the overall climate of mistrust and, as a consequence, their actions and behaviour can be oriented toward some interpersonal cooperation with the other. In its most basic form, this is diplomatic: the

[66] APR15.BKK11
[67] NOV16.PW6
[68] APR15.BKK12

acceptance of personal vulnerability[69] in order to communicate and interact as humans despite difference (estrangement). Participants understand, to varying degrees, that they will not fully know that other, but nonetheless, admitting this and acting to bridge that unknowability is an essential part of the logic of unofficial diplomacy. To explore this notion further, the final subsection turns to look at how diplomacy and dialogue are essential components of unofficial diplomacy.

4.3.2 Empathetic dialogue and the tipping point of trust

In general, what takes place through contact and interaction in these spaces is not a greater proclivity toward cooperative behaviour based on provision of information or interest-based bargaining of any kind. To be sure, the initiation of both may produce some profound 'new' knowledge; but as Naomi Head has noted, "if the way in which new evidence is processed takes place through the interpretive lens of particular theories, beliefs, or normative expectations, then the outcome is likely to be somewhat different than that posited by rationalists" (2012, 38). The orientation of this research is thus to look at how such knowledge is practically produced. It takes place through the prism of emotional responses to the other and mistrust and trust play mediating roles in such a process.

I want to emphasize here that this unfolds over time with the emergence of a network of professionals. Many authors of Track Two observe that one-off meetings of unofficial diplomacy are unlikely to produce change in an individual, let alone in the policy positions of the implicated states (Saunders 2012). I would stress that this is partially because the way in which change is produced is fundamentally through a practical sense in *judgment* of others,

[69] In the most early examples of diplomacy, there emerged a principle of the "inviolability of messengers" that enabled the interactions to happen (cf. Jönsson and Hall 2005, 58 ff.). Of course, this principle of reciprocity has evolved beyond just physical safety but for some (Israelis and Iranians) it is perhaps still in their minds.

related to the value they place on the knowledge and trustworthiness of counterparts. To some degree, this requires participants to learn to believe despite uncertainty: it is not a strict choice but rather, over time, they may put the generalized mistrust of the other in suspension and accept their position of vulnerability when they engage in dialogue.[70] Equally, in order to move forward with limited trusting behaviour, it is likely that participants will have to develop empathy to some extent (Head 2012).

Here, I admit a quite clear distinction in the two case studies. As expressed by one Indian military man, "There is a distrust, enemy syndrome, and yet there is a degree of empathy and regard for each other… It's not, 'he's a guy who's an enemy'; it's 'he's a guy who's part of us, our lost cousin.'"[71] The cultural affinity and close historical entwining of India and Pakistan perhaps make empathy more readily achievable, at least on a superficial level, than between Iran and the US or Israel. Nevertheless, the point is that empathy, like trust, is a process not a singular emotion (Head 2012, 40; Morrell 2010). In this way, it is about transformation: we can think in terms of a tipping point where enemy images recede or disappear, to slowly be replaced by understanding, derived from empathetic engagement in dialogue. Again, this necessarily revolves around an individual openness to accept vulnerability, to different extents, and, moreover, a belief in the process of unofficial diplomacy.[72] In fact, this latter consideration comes to play a quite central role in participants' engagement: for example, one Israeli asserted that, "I'm a believer in dialogue, I'm a believer in track two dialogue, I think it's important... I will always come, and try to make my voice known, listen to other people and see whether we

[70] I liken this process to the "transcultural island effect" that Jones (2015, 132–34) discusses, accepting his criticism that participants may become "removed from the conflict reality to such a degree that the discussions no longer represent anything useful or real."

[71] APR15.BKK8

[72] Equally, this speaks to Brian Rathbun's (2009, 2012) work on the individual-type dispositions to trust.

can come to constructive conversations."[73] This quote opens up two final points which will conclude this chapter.

Firstly, there are certainly many people who participate in unofficial dialogues because they come to believe in the process itself. Whether one bundles this under an assumption of altruism or (as I do) seeks to problematize the motivations of participants, it points to the significance of the notion of a repository of trust that is the social lubrication for an emergent network. The facilitator (or third-party) plays a crucial *social* role in establishing the conditions for dialogue and diplomatic interaction. But this is not straightforward: the same Israeli interlocutor (as above) felt that "with regard to Pugwash in Israel it hasn't always been easy…";[74] having been in those rooms, I witnessed first-hand the tense interactions that were in part attributable to the Pugwash Secretary-General taking a role that relayed, or represented, Iranian political positions, thereby destabilizing his own ability to be seen as trustworthy.[75] Nonetheless, a key point is that the individuals in Israel returned again and again and there have been clear indications of respect and unarticulated trust in the institutional setting of the dialogue. Similarly, one Iranian expressed that "I am and was of the view that Pugwash is an internationally recognized, decent NGO, which could facilitate the forum."[76] There was also a high degree of common belief in the Ottawa Dialogue among participants, many referencing it as standing out against the other types of unofficial dialogue in South Asia.

[73] JUN15.PW1

[74] JUN15.PW1

[75] In one sense this also reflects the controversial position (to many Israelis) that Pugwash took in regard to advocating a diplomatic solution to the Iran nuclear crisis. I return to the notion of role-switching as representation in Chapter 7.

[76] DEC16.PW7

Secondly, the organic creation of a network of diverse professionals is enabled by this repository of trust role. The next chapter goes on to explore this in greater detail, but suffice to note here that we must also pay attention to the fact that the agents involved are also nested within social structures that can influence state policy (Wheeler 2013, 480). Although Wheeler and others have been focused on leaders, I show how a complementary focus on the wider diplomatic context could also provide us with useful evidence of how a culture of trust may be built. This is not always obvious, even to the participants of unofficial diplomacy; one Indian expressed his cynicism that,

> "building trust is a function of the establishment who has to currently deal with these issues. Between us there is a huge amount of trust that has been built, yes. On a personal level… But does that help track one? I wouldn't say so."[77]

In the final analysis, contact between adversaries can only be a stepping stone toward managing enemy relationships at the international level. Taking the case of unofficial elite dialogues, engagement implicitly takes up the diplomatic purpose of mediating estrangement. While this is essential for trust-building it is not a sufficient factor to build trust (Wheeler 2013, 481) nor to resolve conflict. Instead, careful reflection must be given toward the paradigmatic problem of levels of analysis and the tension between building trust and the dissipation of its shadow, mistrust. Trust has been shown to operate most acutely at the individual and inter-personal level and I believe that this is most appropriate way that trust is used. But building trust doesn't happen quickly or uniformly between individuals and more research is needed to study how this ultimately can affect collective behaviour and actions. But the key take-away in this chapter has been to reciprocally show that these processes of unofficial diplomacy are often less about building trust than about an initial suspension of mistrust between rivals or enemies. The

[77] APR15.BKK8

generalized character of mistrust must therefore feature prominently in analysis: this research has illustrated that certain individuals are able to practically cope with enemy contact by learning to suspend mistrust, something which the diplomatic grounding to this work can encourage. While this fascinating 'ritual' approach does not assume that trust can be built, it points future research toward making this key distinction and looking for the consequences.

As Chapter 6 will show, part of the point of interacting with people from the other side is to gain a sense of who is a useful interlocutor, in order to then refract their thinking back to other constituencies – this rests upon operationalizing a 'polite fiction' of diplomatic interaction. However, crucially, there is also a shadow to such a process: diplomacy, dialogue, and empathy have mutual relationships with the possibility of deception (Head 2012, 40). One Indian participant, reflecting on his experience in trying to convince a former colleague in Delhi of the utility of participating, realized, "He's not asking me a question; he's actually asking me, 'are those guys trustworthy?'"[78] This captures the quintessential nature of what happens within unofficial diplomacy. The participants place themselves in a situation of vulnerability by entering into discussions with the other, whose minds they will never fully know, and in this suspended state between knowledge and ignorance, they are also then to put their own reputations at stake by subsequently convincing fellow nationals that they have found 'enemy' interlocutors. This represents the tacit, un-articulable nature of trust. It also hints at the importance of individual credibility to the process and the embeddedness of the individual participants in their own social contexts, something that similarly relies on trusting behaviour. As such, the following chapter will go on to explore in greater detail that it very much matters *who* is involved in unofficial diplomacy and what their professional and social context can tell us about what takes place in these spaces.

[78] APR15.BKK12

CHAPTER 5. FOREIGN POLICY PROFESSIONALS AND LIMINAL SPACES

The previous chapter showed how unofficial diplomacy appears as a response to problems of estrangement and mistrust between political communities. In situations of conflict, we see efforts to facilitate contact, communication, and interaction between individuals in the absence of substantive diplomacy. A crucial set of questions that therefore arise are, who are these individuals? Why these individuals? And what might this activity enable them to do? This chapter is interested in how we make sense of the transnational knowledge networks that develop from the work of unofficial diplomacy and I do so through interrogating the social character of those who participate. The primary impetus for this approach is that existing work in the field of Track Two does not particularly interrogate the dimensions of who becomes involved and why. As Chapters 1 and 2 touched upon, scholars have noted that participants ought to be 'politically influential' in some way but, in fact, there has not been sustained enquiry in to what this looks like.[1] There may often be altruistic motivations by the actors involved, but I suggest that ignoring or marginalizing their professional context actually reduces our explanatory power as to why they might participate, what they are capable of or intend to do with the information and impressions gleaned from interactions (the activity of transfer), and moreover, what this means for understanding the overall logic of why unofficial diplomacy happens.

I propose that to more clearly grasp the nature of unofficial diplomacy we ought simply to better understand how the participants use it. Here, the use of several concepts from IR helps to illustrate that where mistrust and estrangement have been high the activity provides spaces

[1] See both Kelman (2008) and Jones (2015, 169). I acknowledge that there are certain methodological and ethical issues that complicate revealing participants' identities, particularly as contributions are written by the scholar-practitioner. Nevertheless, there seems a lack of creative engagement in addressing this challenge.

of interface between different kinds of professionals, thus connecting the often-siloed strategic communities of those participants. In doing so, instances of unofficial diplomacy latch on to, and aid the emergence of, transnational knowledge networks. Appreciating that those who take part in unofficial diplomacy are embedded in domestic fields of knowledge production, as well as participate in other networked forms of global knowledge transfer, we should look to how the networks are composed and what this implies for the governance potential of unofficial diplomacy. Of interest to IR scholars will be how the networks themselves are often less homogenous than we might expect a professional network to be: unofficial diplomacy convenes different types of professionals, often across a line of conflict, and there are a number of important and practical consequences to this role.

As Chapter 3 elaborated, the participants can be cast in terms of foreign policy professionals and so the first section here begins by explaining what types of people take part in the discussions of unofficial diplomacy. Most generally, they are individuals who are engaged in international affairs, variously analysing, shaping, or crafting foreign policy issues; more specifically, those who take part in these case studies work on and think about either the Iran nuclear issue or India-Pakistan relations. As I go on to illustrate, they come from a variety of professions but are united by an interest in addressing the uncertainty of knowledge of the other (their adversary) in their domestic context. While they may be academics, think tank experts, retired or serving officials, in each case many acknowledge that "apart from the altruistic motive, the noble purpose, there's also an element of what can be learned" through contact and interaction.[2]

[2] NOV14.BKK6

A second section adds flesh to the bone of political influence, providing evidence for how *transfer* is conducted and understood by those performing it. Chapter 2 demonstrated that transfer has been considered a crucial aspect of this kind of work, without which it loses its political relevance and differentiation from other kinds of work (e.g. academia). I analyse how the engagement of officials should forge important nodes in the networks of unofficial diplomacy and demonstrate how connections to government are sought and operate. Equally, however, I show that participants are modest in their efforts to target officialdom and that, in fact, a major part of this work, *as they do it*, lies in transfer to the wider political sphere, both at the domestic level and a more global circulation of knowledge. The result of this interrogation is that we can better understand the role that social relations, and social capital as a key resource, play in these spaces. For one thing, conceiving of professional networks helps us to pinpoint the purchase of "lateral transfer" (Çuhadar 2009, 643), an underexplored notion in Track Two that describes how different instances of unofficial diplomacy come to share knowledge as participants dynamically circulate through different initiatives.

More significantly, investigating the 'who' helps to grasp two fundamental features of unofficial diplomacy. We can see how, as a convening space, it takes place between the fields of customarily understood professions, with the participants as connective tissue between diplomacy, academia, science, and media journalism, as well connecting estranged policy communities. In this way, I draw attention to the inherent *ambiguity* present in the social connections of those who engage in this work. Many participants mobilize it as a crucial social resource, allowing them not to be easily captured by straightforward identities but rather premised on their capacity to manipulate their social relations in order to circulate knowledge of international affairs in and through official/unofficial nodes. Crucially, I show that in this way the activity positions itself *liminal* to the work of official diplomacy and policymaking:

those who participate understand unofficial diplomacy to be never wholly characterised as non-governmental but not readily taken as official either. Such a reading complicates the functionalist notion of this work and, in a state of 'inbetweenness' – neither official nor fully unofficial – the activity assumes an air of productive power based on the sociality of who is involved. This ultimately implies that, because of who we see implicated in the work, we must also interrogate the social production of the knowledge that is being sought out.

5.1 Participants of unofficial diplomacy

One of the most significant points to stress which is left unexplored in the Track Two literature is the extent to which individual actors who participate in unofficial diplomacy are embedded in their own domestic policy-influencing communities. They don't come from nowhere to participate in a dialogue and nor do they do unofficial diplomacy as a full-time job. Surprisingly, perhaps, participants are generally not remunerated for their participation, other than covering the costs of travel and accommodation where necessary.[3] So, one can reasonably ask, what is at stake for them? For these participants, their domestic context is usually the primary site of activity: it is this *strategic community* (as many interlocutors called it) from which they draw social recognition and authorization to be considered influential.[4] Of course, this point is tacitly accepted by scholars of these processes and forms the basis for participants' selection: "they must have standing in their respective communities" and "are often leading

[3] There have been instances in my case studies where participants have been requested to produce a research or discussion paper and have been recompensed for their time – but these are rare exceptions, including in the wider Track Two literature.

[4] The phrase strategic community is not really found in such terms in the literature, but I use it precisely because participants of both case studies used it unprompted in interviews. It carries similar connotations to the idea of professional 'ecologies' found in some studies of professional knowledge networks (Seabrooke 2014; Abbott 2005; Seabrooke and Tsingou 2015; Stone 2013b) and in many ways delineates a domestic 'field' of knowledge production in foreign policy or international affairs. Throughout this chapter, I used interchangeably the notions of 'strategic community' or 'foreign policy field.'

figures within their societies" (Jones 2015, 169 and 127). However, a deeper sense of what this means has not, to my knowledge, been taken up in analysis of Track Two processes.

5.1.1 Foreign policy professionals

As Chapter 2 described, unofficial diplomacy has undergone something of a 'professionalization' in recent decades. Longer-term projects that involve socialization and contact between conflicting and estranged communities are spurred on in part by greater institutional support and a larger funding base that organizers can draw upon. This is particularly the case where pervasive mistrust still characterizes protracted conflicts and thereby vastly increases the political costs of a secretly negotiated resolution at the official level. One result has been the rise of a cottage industry, often accompanied by accusations of "'Track Tourism' rather than 'Track Two'" when one sees the same people flown to exotic locations to spend time in lavish hotels (Jones 2015, 126–28). Those who participate recognize that there has emerged a circuit of dialogues, with both localized and specific efforts (e.g. on India-Pakistan nuclear relations) as well as broader discussions (e.g. on global nuclear non-proliferation) that engage a number of the same participants over time.

The two case studies in this dissertation are reflective of this trend. Nearly all of my research participants identified several similar endeavours in which they participated, either in the past or concurrently, which overlap to varying degrees in subject matter. In both cases, each participant is part of a class that can broadly be described as drawn from elites – the "leading political strata" to use Hedley Bull's classic phrase (1977, 175). These elites are intellectual, political, and opinion-shaping figures who are immersed in the foreign policy field of their national communities. To expand more concretely, a very useful description from the work of

Merje Kuus on European policy expert-networks largely corresponds to the types of personalities that are found in this research:

> "These elites include elected and appointed officials, academics, journalists, and pundits who are socially licensed to speak on international affairs. Located within the government apparatus (including institutes of international affairs) as well as universities and think-tanks, these intellectuals of statecraft explain international politics to domestic audiences and translate (figuratively and sometimes literally) national debates to foreign audiences." (2014, 35)

Furthermore, one also needs to consider that, in addition to explaining and translating in their domestic or international contexts, these foreign policy professionals partake in and shape those debates to varying degrees. The above list is not greatly different from that of Herbert Kelman provided earlier,[5] but crucially the emphasis here is more on what influence looks like.

It is also the case that a good number of participants have retired from formal political or diplomatic professions but are nonetheless seeking to leverage their experience, expertise, and connections. The possible reach of such individuals is a variable factor: it has a high valency in the India-Pakistan context, where the think-tank tradition is not as strongly established and academics not highly valued; but equally, across the US, Israel and (less-so) Iran, examples abound of 'former' officials taking part in such dialogues. Less celebrated and renowned than the examples of Bill Clinton or Nelson Mandela that Andrew Cooper (2015) cites in his study of "diplomatic afterlives", these ex-bureaucrats fill the ranks of foreign policy experts on the circuit, often also holding affiliations to think tanks and universities, and are crucial resources in the work of unofficial diplomacy.[6]

[5] Kelman (2008, 31), cited in Chapter 2, page 54-5.

[6] Of course, while the likes of Clinton or Mandela have great cachet, their high profile would often then be at odds with the general understanding of the way unofficial diplomacy most often seeks to be under the radar.

The following two subsections proceed to drill down from a typological level of abstraction provided in many scholarly works on the topic, to more clearly provide the contours of the networks that draw together these different professionals. I begin with Pugwash and describe how, through their style of work, they have accumulated over time a very broad network of influentials on the topic of the Iran nuclear issue. Despite a less structured approach, the quite organic process is related to the strength of the brand of Pugwash which repeatedly draws individuals back to the table. I then outline the Ottawa Dialogue (OD), beginning with the types of people involved that reflect a more deliberate and streamlined approach to forging a network.[7] Each endeavour looks and behaves differently because of the types of people involved and consequently the networks thus have different topologies and social distances from the state.

5.1.2 Pugwash and the Iran nuclear issue

Between 2003-2015, there were 26 Pugwash workshops, roundtables, or consultations directly on the Iran nuclear issue; a further 13 meetings broadly focused on the Middle East where it was raised in discussions; and other meetings that have not been publicly acknowledged, as well as the numerous briefings and smaller meetings that have taken place under the radar. The larger meetings often involved between 15 and 40 participants and, with new faces consistently brought in over time, it is likely that upward of 150 individuals participated in the period in question.[8]

[7] A challenge in presenting a balanced picture of each is that while Pugwash more openly publishes participant lists of meetings, the OD has taken a cautious approach that means I can only provide general descriptors of the participants.

[8] This represents my estimate of the total numbers. To present a picture of the nascent network, I draw on the full range of meetings in this section; the sample of meetings explicitly attended as part of the research period is smaller, just six meetings and consultations between 2012-15. A key resource is the database of meetings and participants up until 2007 (https://pugwash.org/activities-since-1957/), as well as participant lists of some meetings in subsequent years. All meetings are denoted below with their official number in the format #xxx.

At a basic level, the possibility of pursuing the Iran nuclear issue came from connections to Iranian academics and policymakers forged throughout the 1990s and longer-standing engagement with American and Israeli officials and non-officials. Notably, the Pugwash work on chemical and biological weapons involved members of many national delegations to Geneva where the meetings took place; this, combined with the more general programme of work on the Middle East, allowed for contacts to be made with key players in the Iranian, Israeli, and American political systems before the nuclear issue came to the fore in early 2003. Throughout its history, Pugwash has consistently sought the engagement of either advisors close to senior government or the officials themselves.[9]

At the time of a Pugwash meeting in Tehran (#288 in 2003), among those present included: Hassan Rouhani, then director of the quasi-governmental Center for Strategic Research, formerly the chief nuclear negotiator for Iran, and since 2013 the President of Iran; Hashemi Rafsanjani, then Chair of the powerful Expediency Council and former President (1989-97); and Ali Larijani, at that time Secretary of the Supreme National Security Council and as such the chief nuclear negotiator for Iran, now the Speaker of Parliament. At later meetings were Javad Zarif, former Iranian Ambassador to the UN (at Pugwash meeting #296-2) and since 2013 the Foreign Minister of Iran (attending Pugwash meeting #403 in 2013) and Ali Akbar Salehi, a Vice-President and head of the Atomic Energy Organization of Iran (Pugwash meeting #440 in 2015). These individuals were not just in senior official positions at the time of engagement by Pugwash but were or became ‘big fish’ in professionally ecological terms, influential in foreign policy thinking in Tehran.

[9] See Rotblat (1962, 2001a), Evangelista (1999, chaps 3&4), and Kraft, Nehring, and Sachse (2018, 6)

These types of participant were generally only sporadically involved. Nonetheless, engaging such senior participants at some point puts the Pugwash work on their radar, and reciprocally signals to other audiences (US and Israel) the level of reach that Pugwash has. There were also a number of Iranians who have been involved more extensively and have been the focal points of continual contact between Pugwash and Tehran. Such people are the key nodes of the Pugwash network: these include, for example, Saideh Lotfian, a Professor at Tehran University and since 2009 the Chair of the Pugwash Council; Borzogmehr Ziaran, a diplomat stationed in a number of European capitals and since 2013 a member of the Pugwash Council; and Ali Asghar Soltanieh, a nuclear scientist working as a diplomat, firstly in Geneva on chem-bio issues in the 1990s and subsequently given the nuclear portfolio as Ambassador to the IAEA in Vienna between 2006-13. While they may not necessarily be the big hitters in the domestic strategic community, they have contributed crucial linkage roles, providing connection points for the Pugwash network into the Iranian political system.

Importantly, two meetings held in Iran in 2003 and 2006 included a number of Americans who were granted visas to travel to Tehran: Rose Gottemoeller, then at the non-governmental Carnegie Endowment but subsequently an Under-Secretary of State under the Obama Administration (and now Deputy-Secretary General of NATO); Jon Wolfsthal, at that time in a think tank but had previously, and would again subsequently, work in US government departments; Tom Cochran, a senior scientist who has worked with a number of Administrations; Michael Levi, at the time working for Council on Foreign Relations and would go on to serve the Obama Administration; and Bill Miller, one of few American diplomats to have served in Iran. Many of these participants attended further meetings during the subsequent years.

Again, they are not at the highest level of policymaking, although many would go on to exert influence in official positions. As Chapter 2 touched upon, a key knack of the Pugwash modus operandi is identifying and engaging those who may go on to develop serious influence in their particular country. There is a certain amount of circulation among individuals in both the American and Iranian political systems, where appointed officials leave office through the revolving door to academia or think tanks while 'the other party' (left or right) is in power. The Pugwash network in this sense is deliberately designed to harness both expertise, in the form of scientific and political knowledge, as well as the crucial linkages (present and future) to policymaking that can be used for transfer.

The third set of players to highlight come from a meeting series began in mid-2007 in Israel. A caveat is that this was partly "an opportunity for the folks who participate on the Israeli side to express their points of view on issues relating to the Iran nuclear programme and the progression of issues relating to the [official] negotiations"[10] rather than a direct model of contact between rivals, because there was no possibility of bringing Iranian nationals to Israel. To get around this limitation, in subsequent meetings Pugwash brought a number of US and European experts to these discussions in Israel, as well as academics of Iranian heritage. At different points, key Israeli participants included: Jeremy Issacharoff, former Ambassador to the US and Ministry of Foreign Affairs official who at the time of writing serves as the Deputy Director General of the MFA; Efraim Halevy, a former director of the Mossad intelligence agency; Shlomo Brom, a retired Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) General and member of the National Security Council; and Nachman Shai and Avishay Braverman, both serving Labor members of the Knesset (Parliament). As explained to me, the Israeli strategic community of foreign policy professionals focused on the Iran issue is quite limited: "Israel is a very small

[10] JUN15.PW2

state with a very tight cohesion and you're never five or six degrees separated from decision-makers."[11] Even when retired, individuals (particularly men) with a "background as some kind of security establishment prominent figure" will be listened to and taken seriously.[12]

Beyond the individuals highlighted above for their relevance as emblematically influential, there have been a whole host of academic, think tank, and scientific participants, as well as lower-level diplomatic and political representatives from the key states. Pugwash meetings in Washington, D.C., New York, London, Paris, Tel Aviv, Moscow, and many other places all attracted a varying cast and the Pugwash network in this sense is large and diverse. In the US and many European countries, the strategic communities are considerable in size and resources, particularly when it comes to the Iran issue. The larger circuit of unofficial diplomacy on the Iran nuclear issue expanded between 2003-15, with an increasing number of events, conferences, and other activities held in cities across the world by many different organizations. As the issue became politically salient, many 'new' experts were also created: e.g. political scientists who learned some of the intricacies of the nuclear fuel cycle; or nuclear scientists, who could apply their specialized knowledge to such a political issue.

Overall, the Iran nuclear issue involves a smaller subset of a wider network of experts dealing more generally with nuclear non-proliferation, nuclear strategy, and foreign policy. From this larger group, a great number of people were involved in the Pugwash meetings, sometimes as a one-off attendee or sometimes more regularly. Pugwash thus provided an interface among many of these professionals. Importantly, the network of those attending was not static but reflected the changing engagement of states and experts with the process. The movement of

[11] JUN15.PW2
[12] JUN15.PW1

some individuals in and out of government or changing diplomatic postings during the period to be replaced by new diplomatic representatives expands but complicates the network massively. This is also reflected in the dynamism of who was considered expert on this issue and more widely respected as a foreign policy professional. Moreover, this preliminary sketch of the Pugwash network has emphasized the extent to which the people involved *move*: they are professionals in their own right, many of whom change jobs, change roles, and increase (or decrease) their own influence.

Lastly, the most central node in this network is of course Pugwash, largely embodied in the person of the Secretary-General, Paolo Cotta-Ramusino, but also as an organization of prestige. Between these two representations of the facilitator (as person and as institution) there is a varying amount of trust placed in him by participants – this trust fluctuated at times in sync with the raised tensions and mistrust, particularly for Israelis who viewed the issue in existential terms.[13] Equally, the Secretary-General is the social glue that connects the various individuals across time and space. He travels a great deal in each of these countries, visiting Iranian, Israeli, and American officials on a regular basis to brief them on the Pugwash work. As such, while the individuals may not necessarily come into contact with the others, the way in which Pugwash works means that their views and their reputations form part of how Pugwash gathers information, communicates, and refracts the discussions and ideas globally.

5.1.3 Fostering India-Pakistan dialogue

The Ottawa Dialogue (OD) formally began with a meeting held in April 2009. The creation of what became a set of dialogues between Indians and Pakistanis was aided by contacts that the

[13] As noted in the previous chapter, it was also the case that as an advocate for a specific policy position (that of a diplomatic resolution) his role as facilitator is different to that of Peter Jones in the subsequent subsection.

facilitator, Peter Jones, accumulated through work in the region – this included Pugwash and a dialogue organized with another Canadian University since 2003.[14] Given the timing of the initiative, soon after the 2008 Mumbai terrorist attacks, it was a bold attempt to inject some life into unofficial dialogue at a time when the Indian government was strongly resistant to contact with Pakistan. As the previous chapter set out, relations at the diplomatic-political level have been tumultuous and as a consequence there was deemed little point in attempting to convene serving officials from either side.[15]

There were two distinct issues under discussion in the Ottawa Dialogue that my research project took up: the nuclear strategies of the two countries (the Nuclear Dialogue) and military confrontations on the Line of Control (the Military-to-Military Dialogue). Both issues are symptomatic of the wider relationship between the two countries. Although two separate dialogues or 'streams' of the OD, they in fact included a high proportion of cross-over in participants. In terms of selection criteria for who takes part, although some familiarity of the specific topics was needed to sustain the discussion, it was not considered the base requirement: "I have found that personality and general experience matter more than expertise, though both are needed within the group" (Jones 2015, 125). The OD thus focused on recruiting a group of participants who had had long careers in government or military but were now "freed of the inhibitions of office."[16] The advantages, as understood by one such senior participant, are worth relaying at length:

> "For us, the composition of the group is such that it is mostly people who have handled India-Pakistan relations in senior positions. They know exactly what the governments

[14] The facilitating team from the University of Ottawa also includes the Project Manager Nicole Waintraub, who runs a number of the meetings, but it is the reputation and experience of Prof Jones – as a former Canadian diplomat with extensive experience in unofficial diplomacy – that is largely the face and symbol of the OD.

[15] Other efforts have at times done so, notably Pugwash in its work on Kashmir dating back to 2002, as well as another prominent example of India-Pakistan unofficial diplomacy, the Chaophraya Dialogue, which is contemporaneous with the OD and has many of the same participants (see http://www.chaophrayadialogue.net/)

[16] NOV14.BKK6

> are thinking. They know also where the leeway can be found, if they are so inclined to do it. And there you can then suggest certain things where, or at least discuss them where, will it find traction or not. Because the other side knows what their official position is, but at the same time also knows how much can the process be pushed in a new direction, or be a little innovative."[17]

Each meeting, of which there were usually two per year, took on average five or six participants from each country to a neutral location.[18] A key logic of choosing participants was that each would be asked to return for future meetings, forming a small core group on each side. Unlike Pugwash, there is no public record of meetings nor of participants lists; occasionally, press releases have been issued that do list those present,[19] but generally there has been a principle of confidentiality and anonymity. Within the pool of participants were three former Foreign Secretaries or Ministers, three former Defence Secretaries or Ministers, two former General- or Vice-Chiefs of Army Staff, three individuals who had served as their country's Ambassador to the other country, and one former chairman of a national Atomic Energy Commission. Other participants had either served in one of the three branches of their respective country's military hierarchy at Brigadier rank or above, in their country's foreign service, and just two who worked in either academia or think tanks. One of the group actually rotated back into official service during the research period to become Pakistan's ambassador to the US.

Again, the clear emphasis in recruitment was on elites: these are individuals who were described to me as "the crème de la crème"[20] because of where they served; and who, because of seniority, "have access to the officials. Most of the officials now in senior positions have

[17] NOV14.BKK2

[18] Influenced by the Pugwash model, the Nuclear Dialogue had initially included a group of scientists to ground the discussion with impartial expertise. However, during the research period this model broke down, in part due to lack of actual output and funding considerations.

[19] See https://socialsciences.uottawa.ca/dialogue/projects/nuclear-dialogue (accessed 2 May 2018).

[20] NOV14.BKK1

worked as your juniors, have served under you, so they have a certain regard for you."[21] Each participant emphasized their core attribute of experience from long service; moreover, they also generally alluded to an ongoing connection to the corridors of power, stressing the "continual link that is established"[22] between past and present officials. Interestingly, where some interlocutors downplayed a direct authorization from government for the conduct of this unofficial diplomacy, saying "there is no official mandate, nor an official acceptance of the group",[23] other participants made clear that

> "We are all here with the consent of our governments, they are amenable to what we are going to say. When we go back, they ask us in detail, 'What did you see? What were the other side [saying]?'"[24]

It should be noted that, in contrast to the open sense that most Pakistanis provided of their relations to government, there seemed a reluctance by many on the Indian side to acknowledge that their government was aware or supportive of the activity; however, one participant revealed that "this [dialogue] is given a very formal status; the mere fact that we are doing all of this [is] for a reason."[25] It was quite apparent that on both sides the individuals were maintaining an ongoing dialogue with some officials with whom they could reach – of course, this is entirely the point of the activity.

The connections and the status of the retired participants are the most relevant quality of the network in South Asia, differentiating itself from the more mixed professional topography found among Pugwash participant lists. The specific situation of India-Pakistan relations and the design of the dialogue ultimately produced a more uniform and horizontal kind of network,

[21] NOV14.BKK2
[22] NOV14.BKK3
[23] APR15.BKK8
[24] APR15.BKK14
[25] APR15.BKK12

in which there is a much stronger relative equivalence in hierarchy amongst participants, despite the nominal difference in ranks and titles. In contrast to Pugwash's emphasis on a wider network of experts, the emphasis here was on a small core of participants and a relatively stable frequency of participation. In one sense, this was not just intentional but is also forced by the relatively limited extent of the strategic communities in both Delhi and Islamabad.

Although nearly all of the participants had retired from their official professions, they (with the exception of one very recently retired Foreign Secretary) sought out engagement in the field of foreign policy through work with think tanks, academia, and in some cases media or punditry work in their domestic environ. As one participant observed, "there are not too many experts in Delhi or in Islamabad on nuclear issues. You have a bunch of people, say 20 or 30 people, talking among themselves in a very incestuous manner."[26] Although perhaps overstated, this point highlights that the professional environment of foreign policy thinking in both Delhi and Islamabad is restricted in who they can call upon as an expert in these matters.

Finally, it is worth reflecting again on the role of the facilitator in forging and maintaining the network. In contrast to the Pugwash model, the central mode of contact is very much aligned with the tradition of problem-solving workshops discussed in Chapter 2, bringing together both Indians and Pakistanis for dialogue. The facilitating team thus plays a fundamental role in ensuring the conditions and environment are neutral and that they are not perceived as a biased mediator. Each individual recruited for this process puts their credibility on the line (particularly for Indians) and in doing so, places a modicum of trust in the facilitator (and by extension, the process). Interestingly, this function is also buttressed through regular visits by

[26] NOV14.BKK1

the facilitator for consultations with the 'teams' of participants separately, as well as with government officials where possible, in both India and Pakistan.

5.1.4 Elites and dynamic networking

The previous subsections have depicted a 'cast list' of professionals in the two case studies. The different domestic sites of foreign policy influence that exist were frequently described to me in terms of strategic communities by many of the participants: sited (almost universally) in the capital city, it is in this environ that public opinion is shaped, expressed, contested, and ultimately oriented, to various degrees, toward the corridors of power. The foreign policy professionals in this research actively engage in the milieu where such debates take place. Even those who have nominally retired continue to practice international affairs, participating in think tank events and public lectures (as speakers, chairs, board members of hosting institutions, or audience members) and, for some, use the national media to express their views through appearances as pundits or writing op-eds. These are individuals who, to varying degrees, go about their 'day job' of collecting and transmitting information on the issues, even when retired.

One wider point of Track Two research is to emphasize the significance of strategies of knowledge transfer through which these foreign policy professionals conduct themselves in the wider policymaking sphere. As noted above, this aspect is what sets the activity of unofficial diplomacy apart (e.g. from academia). However, my contribution here is to point out that the people who populate the spaces of unofficial diplomacy are an understudied part of the work done, far more important than previous work suggests. My framework puts the focus in terms of strategic professional behaviour. As a way into looking at the activity, focusing on the participants and their connectedness provides us with quite a different perspective than merely

accepting them as influential – it stresses the dynamism of transnational networks, rather than seeing static participant lists. Moving from the location of domestic professional fields up to the transnational networks of unofficial diplomacy, I emphasize the potential for "professional intercourse and mutual imbrications that arise from social relations" (Stone 2013b, 243). Even where the Ottawa Dialogue picks relatively fixed groups of participants, we should account for how they move outside of the workshops and meeting spaces.[27] One of the key facets of this work is the deliberate engagement of officials and it is the connectedness of the elites who are best placed to perform such work in their own time and on their terms.

This is, of course, not a unique property of unofficial diplomacy; Jean-Christophe Graz, for example, has documented "a much wider international process of elite familiarisation and fraternisation, mutual education and, broadly speaking, networking" present at the global level (2003, 324, quoting Gill 1990). Understanding and charting the role of elite sociality as a component of transnationality is being taken up in studies of global governance (e.g. Djelic and Quack 2010), but less so by diplomatic studies. For my research, the more interesting feature that arises is the imbrication of government officials in the activity and processes.[28] At times, as has been shown in the Pugwash meetings, they are present in the rooms to understand the debates and interact with non-governmental participants; this can have its own intrigue and logic, as Chapter 6 will explore in greater detail. However, a large part of this activity – in these case studies and more widely – takes place without the express participation of officials. The following section delves into how the participants in these dialogues seek to communicate the information they have gathered beyond the meeting spaces because of what their social connections enable.

[27] As just one example, I meet a number of them at Pugwash meetings.

[28] There are parallel contributions on climate change and global governance in Bulkeley et al. (2014).

5.2 Knowledge transfer and mediation

It is worth briefly recapping that Track Two generally views outcomes (tangibles) and effects (in terms of impressions and perceptions) as both being products for transfer, which can then be disseminated *directly* (privately into governmental channels) or *indirectly* (influencing discourse and narratives in more public environs which might then affect policy).[29] Broadly speaking, participants of unofficial diplomacy also think in terms of these distinctions. Although it is somewhat artificial, it heuristically represents how participants can have an impact beyond the meeting room, with the oft-stated but vague goal to ultimately "influence events in some way" (Jones 2015, 136). Given that the orientation of the work is toward conflict resolution (even if a certain dialogue may explicitly eschew this goal for more modest contributions), in the Track Two literature and in practice there has been a certain fetishizing of the direct transfer of some kind of 'agreement' document. This holds in both case studies here, as participants regularly referenced such possible breakthrough moments.[30]

Furthermore, many participants were also candid that of crucial importance for the dialogue is the engagement of officials: "you need the access to the policymakers in order to have a difference."[31] This was repeatedly couched in terms of having a real-world impact and of not being just an academic exercise: "If it doesn't lead to anything constructive, something that will improve the situation, I don't think there is any point."[32] Nevertheless, at the same time, a

[29] This is a simplification of the wider points on transfer made in Chapter 2; see Fisher (2005, 3) and Jones (2015, chap. 6). It is worth noting in particular that 'indirect' transfer is not always defined as above but more often reflects how 'close' or 'further away' participants are from decision makers (Çuhadar 2009). As will become clear, this notion can fruitfully be challenged.

[30] Even where the facilitator of such processes is less preoccupied with doing so, it is anecdotally most often a concern of the participants; see Çuhadar (2009).

[31] JUN15.PW1

[32] APR15.BKK7

majority of participants were quite clear that they in fact use unofficial diplomacy for their own purposes, often to have wider effects beyond governmental channels. This is again something tacitly understood by practitioners, but not probed: this interesting paradox is unpacked in what follows as I demonstrate how understanding transfer as practices of information-gathering and communication helps us see why unofficial diplomacy happens in the way it does.

The following two subsections look at transfer through the agency of those involved, in order to provide a more nuanced account of how specific modes are sought and function. Between both case studies, the organizers nominally prioritize different mechanisms, as evidenced by who they select to come. The next subsection looks at how specific products are heralded as important and also how direct briefings are conducted by participants. Subsequently I look at types of indirect transfer that occur, showing that this wider percolation of impressions, perceptions, and information in fact is often of real significance for participants.

5.2.1 Talking to power: Direct influence

In South Asia, for many participants, inviting serving officials (whether or not they would come) "would defeat the purpose" for this kind of a dialogue because officials were widely thought to be too rigid: as one senior Pakistani put it, "What is the purpose of a dialogue if you cannot get out of your policy constraints?"[33] For the officials, of course, there may also be an element of professional and personal risk involved, but as we shall see, it is also perhaps that the governments of India and Pakistan view and use the unofficial dialogues in a different way than other governments have. For participants to Pugwash, any risk was less pronounced and the opportunity to discuss things "in an unofficial way" was a novel one given the historic

[33] NOV14.BKK2

restraints on diplomatic interactions between Iran and the US: "there was no limitation of contacts because those were not considered as official contacts."[34]

As such, the South Asian participants tend to rely on a different strategy, performing direct briefings for officials following meetings. A key tension that the vast majority of my interlocutors pointed out is that,

> "the present people in office are so preoccupied with their current situations that […] they'll of course hear us, meet these people who have been seniors while they were in service, and be very polite and courteous, but to what extent will they take the documents seriously?"[35]

The receptivity of serving officials to their former colleagues 'dropping in' with suggestions of what might be improved or changed in policy terms was not always positive. Some participants sympathetically referred to the same situations when they themselves were serving officials:

> "When I was working there, that is how I felt – I have access to information, I have missions in the countries in which they function, I get their reports, I am getting intelligence reports. What more can someone from outside do, with no access to my sources?"[36]

Indeed, many discussions within the meetings have relayed that the participants feel the tension keenly; there was a pervasive sensitivity that current officials will view them as "having gone soft" and individuals repeatedly reminded one another, "we are just track two, what can we do?"[37]

[34] NOV16.PW8
[35] APR15.BKK11
[36] APR15.BKK7
[37] Observations from meeting in Copenhagen, June 2013.

Nonetheless, their standing as former military and government officials permits these people to enter the bureaucracies to relay the meeting results. The following excerpt encapsulates the experiences and reach of numerous participants:

> "You see, we're the kind of, being part of the community, the strategic community, we have an access. We just simply can send a mail to the deputy-NSA [National Security Advisor] or the NSA to say we just came back from there [a meeting] and are available for a briefing. Or we go to the Army Chief and go tell him, 'look, we just came back here' – we're senior and he's a youngster so he says, 'OK, Sir, come and visit and let us know.'"[38]

In general, it happens that many meetings do not produce a specific outcome or result, such as an agreed document or paper.[39] Nevertheless, officials and bureaucracies are notified that such a meeting took place: even though they may be retired, "if you are not able to say things of substance then just pen a little memo and feed it into the system."[40] This type of action is typical of the way in which such systems as Foreign Ministries work and indeed those participants who had served as officials have clearly internalized this way of working. Moreover, these participants know how things work inside the bureaucracy, and that means knowing who to talk to:

> "There is no point in meeting the Prime Minister, he's too busy with matters of State. But one makes sure one can always plug it in to what's called Joint Secretaries in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in India, in Pakistan we call them Directors-General. Those are the nitty-gritty functional people who really matter."[41]

Despite nominally participating in their personal capacity, the serving officials who attend Pugwash meetings are equally trained to perform their "reporting" to provide their

[38] APR15.BKK8

[39] Pugwash meetings frequently produce a "rapporteur's report" (which I have regularly written) but this is not a consensus document, merely a reflection of the discussions held with some policy recommendations.

[40] NOV14.BKK6

[41] NOV14.BKK2

bureaucracies with "good ideas of positions on things."[42] This perspective is also reflected in Cynthia Chataway's interviews with serving US officials, who generally found these types of meetings to be useful: "The main role of Track II is to gather information and analyze it" (1998, 278). Other diplomats told me that they "always reflected the main elements of the discussions to decision makers, where I was pleased noticing they were taking into consideration some views [that] were not in the lines of theirs."[43] In Pugwash meetings, frequently the local embassies of relevant states have at various points engaged in these meetings too, sending junior diplomats to observe. At times, more senior representation is sent, as when Russian Deputy Foreign Minister Sergei Ryabkov flew from Moscow to Tel Aviv for one such meeting (#383), conveying a clear and deliberate signal of Russian concern with how the Israelis were debating the Iran nuclear file (Pugwash 2012b).[44]

Beyond this notion of reporting, most individuals from the South Asian group will participate in some form of interaction with the officials back home. Amongst my interlocutors, the form varied. On the one hand, "in many cases, it has to be done in social settings, I find that's better. I meet people occasionally, and you say, 'look a conversation is on a particular issue and you can convey some of these ideas.'"[45] Other participants referenced their informal conversations while in the capital city, where they meet up with former colleagues and take the opportunity to reflect what they have been doing. These kinds of conversations and social connections typify how transfer on the whole is understood to work in practice. It happens serendipitously, unevenly, asymmetrically, and even haphazardly at times. Moreover, it is predicated on the

[42] JUN15.PW3

[43] DEC16.PW7

[44] Often, as in this case, officials will combine the opportunity to participate in a Pugwash meeting with their other official duties (or vice-versa), such as meeting their counterparts in that country.

[45] APR15.BKK11

social and other types of capital that individuals can leverage in their domestic fields of activity, as the next chapter goes on to explore.

On the other hand, participants from both India and Pakistan conveyed that quite often the transfer takes the shape of a briefing, although it was often stressed that this was a 'non-formal,' 'informal,' or 'non-official' conversation, most often between one-time colleagues. One former military official from India provided an ideal-type scenario of how this would proceed upon returning to Delhi: "We will present it as a group. Mr X [the senior Indian OD participant] is the leader, he will […] go and explain it to the MEA [Ministry of External Affairs] and to the MoD [Ministry of Defence]." As he elaborated, the Ministry of External Affairs "has the final word" and makes a recommendation to the Ministry of Defence. From there it is sent to the Chief of Army Staff to determine whether it is "doable" from a military perspective. If so, the MoD might consider it "relevant to upgrade it and put it across to a higher body, whether it's part of a Cabinet Secretariat or the Parliamentarians." Beyond this, the next stage was to "give it wider yet confidential publicity."[46]

This example was a fascinatingly detailed and precise account of the various mechanisms and routes that the transfer took. In comparing it to the 'schematic model of transfer effects' (presented as figure 2) in Chapter 2, one can see that such a model correctly identifies the constituencies implicated in transfer but doesn't adequately account for the seminal role of the participants in being the key interface and route to the bureaucracies, and at the same time, as we shall see below, the 'public-political constituencies' (or strategic communities) implied by "wider yet confidential publicity". Equally interestingly was that the senior Indian participant mentioned in the quote above, who others had also fingered as taking the lead upon their return,

[46] APR15.BKK12

was entirely reticent on this process. This perhaps reflects the abashed newness of the activity, the sensitivity that Indians in particular have in participating, and the slow cultural shift of receptivity in this regard – indeed, that former foreign secretary asserted he didn't remember any example of this work being brought to him whilst serving.

In contrast, the Pugwash model has been built up over 50 years of experience and not only has a name or brand recognition, but more forcefully has a network of 'champions' for its work. A good example of direct transfer comes from a series of secret meetings during 2008 to draft a 'model framework' for the official negotiations.[47] This kind of activity is considered a rare occurrence in the literature on these processes: generally, "officials prefer to come up with written agreements themselves and are skeptical of documents or draft agreements which are 'negotiated' between nonofficials" (Jones 2015, 146). Four meetings were held in The Hague and Geneva (#334, #339, #341, and #345) that engaged representatives of the Iranian political system together with well-placed American foreign policy experts. As one participant has publicly noted, these were "neither an official meeting nor an official negotiation. But the high-level representation from both sides signified that this was not an ordinary academic or track-two diplomacy session" (Parsi 2012, 31). Pugwash was in constant consultation with officials across the board (including all members of the P5+1), acting as a quasi-diplomatic 'go-between' to develop a document that attempted to satisfy all parties. This was done partially in the meetings between Americans and Iranians, as well as through the shuttle diplomacy of the Secretary-General, both in person and via phone and email correspondence, in the years that followed.

[47] "Main Points of a Possible Agreed Framework between the I.R. of Iran, the People's Republic of China, France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom and the United States on some immediate steps aimed at building mutual confidence about the Iranian nuclear program." See https://pugwashconferences.files.wordpress.com/2013/02/20130604_iran-model-framework-updated.pdf [accessed 2 May 2018].

The document remained 'secret' until June 2012, when it was publicly released (Pugwash 2012a, 31). Ultimately, the official parties (Iran and the P5+1) did come to an interim agreement on the nuclear programme soon thereafter (in November 2013) but there is no definitive evaluation for what part Pugwash played in this:

> "at a certain point it becomes diffuse, you can't attribute… a lot of the people were involved in similar initiatives so it's hard to say what exactly came from what exact source – that is true throughout Pugwash history."[48]

Frustrating as it is to the Pugwash leadership and their funders alike (as well as the many others conducting this work in similar conditions), it is very hard to definitively claim responsibility for such an outcome, other than to point at the similarities in language between the final agreement and that proposed through Pugwash channels.[49] Nonetheless, knowing which individuals are in those meetings provides a sense of how close to the official policymaking scene the space of these Pugwash meetings had been in this case.

The examples provided are intended to demonstrate one of the central tenets of unofficial diplomacy: it is fundamentally premised on the access and influence of some participants to the sovereign centre of political power and authority, without which it would just be an academic exercise in knowledge exchange. In the case of the Ottawa Dialogue, the decision had been to convene a group in which nearly all participants hold such access and influence. The 'continual link' of respect for seniority is the crucial transfer mechanism in these cases, but there remains the question of receptivity. Within Pugwash, the presence of officials and the strategy of engaging them in their personal capacity facilitates the transfer of knowledge in a more direct, but no less nuanced way, as I go on to show. In both cases, when we look at the

[48] NOV16.PW6

[49] The same problem was recognized in Kelman's contributions to the Oslo Process (1995).

participants – their social and political resources – we can see that this crucially renders the space of unofficial diplomacy *liminal* to the corridors of power. Individual participants, as well as the organizers, implicitly rely upon the matrix of access that is enabled by a network of professionals, with the result that each seek to claim for themselves an influence on the policy discussions within their strategic communities. I go on to explore below how this necessarily takes advantage of a certain ambiguity present.

5.2.2 Indirect policy influence and percolation

An inherent problem recognised within the Track Two literature is that, short of the few examples when direct transfer of a policy position or idea can be concretely traced, the outputs from these dialogues tend to be amorphous. Many participants elaborated that transfer occurs often "in the hope that when the political climate becomes more propitious those [ideas] would serve as a guide or as a catalyst for track one."[50] Given this apparent obstacle, there was a good deal of pessimism amongst participants (particularly from the Americans, Israelis and Indians – the structurally powerful sides) regarding the effectiveness of direct transfer. It is often cited that products of direct transfer may contribute to the overall policy process in ways which are generally not discernible, let alone articulable, and may most often be awaiting 'structural opportunities' (Capie 2010) or 'policy windows' (Kingdon 1995) to have an effect.[51]

Although the purpose of involving officials in these processes is designed to generate such windows of opportunity, it is seldom quick nor determinatively causative. I want to suggest

[50] NOV14.BKK6

[51] There is some debate within Track Two against this pessimistic view that one must wait for the 'ripe' moment where unofficial diplomacy can capitalize, because it is believed that the dialogues and processes themselves contribute to creating that very moment; see Zartman (2000), Greig (2001), and Pruitt (2005). The latter notion of 'readiness' is one that complements the focus of this subsection on how ideas percolate and filter through the circuits of dialogue and down into the strategic communities.

that in fact such explanations marginalize the constraints imposed by mistrust and estrangement on the reception of information. When these factors are considered, we can understand that a principal role of participants lies in taking knowledge gleaned at such meetings and slowly introducing it into their own strategic communities. While meetings of unofficial diplomacy happen only every so often, there is a constant process of feeding the information and impressions gathered at such meetings into the humdrum of policy discussions in the various countries. This takes place through multiple routes and levels, stimulating discussion within the domestic strategic communities who help bring policy ideas into a more general public debate, as well as the other venues and meetings of unofficial diplomacy to which these individuals may participate. This type of percolation appeared to be the more pertinent result of the dialogues *as the participants view it*.

The first part of this chapter outlined the process of elite fraternization that takes place in domestic settings, as well as transnationally. Many participants described that they perform multiple roles or simultaneously hold a number of different positions, as visiting or guest lecturers at universities, as affiliates to think tanks, and are often invited to speak at or serve on the boards of institutions. This is how they are engaged in the more 'day-to-day' practice of international affairs in their domestic fields; it also provides further networks or circuits that the participants can tap into. In these case studies, it is generally the situation that, not only do the governments and military hierarchies need to be informed of the ideas and proposals that emanate from unofficial diplomacy, but that there needs to be some process of preparation before such initiatives are released to a wider audience.[52] To exemplify how this process comes about, I turn to a specific episode in the Ottawa Dialogue that, despite taking place before I

[52] Cynthia Chataway's interviewees similarly highlighted this aspect of 'trial-ballooning ideas' (1998, 274).

joined the project, was still talked about regularly in meetings and raised in angst during my interviews.

As with the quietly guarded work done in Pugwash on the Iran agreed framework mentioned above, there was a similar exercise undertaken by participants regarding demilitarizing the Siachen Glacier, a 'strategic asset' high up in the Himalayas between India and Pakistan. Participants of the OD had patiently 'negotiated' amongst each other on a mutually acceptable proposal;[53] however, this particular attempt rather blew up when it was prematurely released into the public domain and was seized upon: "The poor Indian generals got such a kick up their arse… from media, [from] serving military who said, 'What the hell are you thinking?'"[54] There was a great deal of controversy amongst Indian military and strategic community elites that so-called 'track two' were selling out a strategic asset of the country to the enemy. Interestingly, this is despite the fact that I was told "it did not create any ruffles within the [Indian] official community… primarily because of the fact that we go and brief them."[55]

In Pakistan, a different tack had been taken. The result was that "there was no controversy, no agitation. Why? Because there was preparation we had done, we talked at the official level, we talked at the media level, and people accepted the fact."[56] While this example can persuasively be explained away by referencing Indian reluctance to any accommodation with their neighbours (in spite of the apparent governmental equivocation), I want to stress how the

[53] Of course, as was stressed in interviews, they negotiated not with a formal authorization but with the knowledge of having dealt with the issue in their previous guises as officials and thus 'agreed by consensus.' See the press release at https://socialsciences.uottawa.ca/dialogue/sites/socialsciences.uottawa.ca.dialogue/files/lahorepressrelease_withattachment__0.pdf [accessed 2 May 2018]

[54] NOV14.BKK2

[55] APR15.BKK8. Indeed, the extent of involvement (and even direction) of the Indian government in this particular episode has been the subject of some of the more judicious reviews in Indian internet forums; see http://www.indiandefencereview.com/news/siachen-unmasked/ [accessed 2 May 2018]

[56] NOV14.BKK3

Pakistani participants had taken on an active role in paving the way for the ideas and proposals to be accepted at various levels and not just the governmental one. Organizationally, this comes down to catering for both 'insider' and 'outsider' strategies when it comes to such sensitive policy discussions – inside in terms of the elites engaged and their official contacts but also recognizing that outside in the wider political and strategic domains such proposals may need buy-in (Fitzduff and Church 2004).

The larger point is that it was clear from my interlocutors that they saw a reinforcing relationship between what takes place in the space of unofficial diplomacy and the ongoing sets of domestic policy discussions that take place: many spoke to how the strategic community in each country

> "absorbs a lot through these meetings and then is able to refract these ideas and articulate them within the community itself. So, it helps to fashion views and provide perspectives which would not be there if such dialogues weren't there. So they fill a gap."[57]

In the South Asian context, as well as in Iran, the relationship of interaction and conversation between government and civil society on policy issues is arguably less established than in the US or Europe – the domestic environment of think tanks, universities, and public debate thus look and behave differently. Although India ranked fourth by number of think tanks globally in 2017, with around 280 established institutions, a senior Indian interlocutor felt that "in India, the think tank culture is still at its inception stage, it will take many years for it to develop. I think India's strategic culture is almost at the nascent stage."[58] By contrast, Pakistan had then just 20 think tanks, Iran 59, and Israel 58, whereas the USA some 1835 (see McGann 2017). In this context, as suggested in the previous chapter, the activity of unofficial diplomacy can

[57] APR15.BKK11
[58] NOV14.BKK5

be seen to functionally make up a shortfall of a kind that seeks to counter the pervasive mistrust. As elaborated by a former Defence Secretary,

> "We are there to sort of soften up the whole thing, give them [governments] space to move around. And as you are aware, there are certain countries, particularly United States, who prior to doing something they expose the think tanks with the idea and tell them to float it in the market, so to say. They gauge the response of the public, the intellectuals, the concerned people, even the target audience. So, when they are officially pursuing that policy or an action, they are forewarned to cater for the likely response that they already tested – as we say, test the waters."[59]

To reiterate, the many people I have spoken to and observed at meetings of Pugwash and of the Ottawa Dialogue are all active not just in other instances of unofficial diplomacy but also in their own domestic circuits that debate and discuss the issues. One need only scan through the speaker and participant lists at meetings of the Chaophraya Dialogue[60] to see many Indians and Pakistanis who have participated in the Ottawa Dialogue, and even Pugwash's work in South Asia. Similarly, looking at past events on Iran hosted by, for example, the Carnegie Endowment (in Washington, D.C.[61]) or the Institute for National Security Studies (in Tel Aviv[62]) there are many familiar faces from Pugwash meetings. The transfer from Pugwash meetings, for example, can be direct – indeed, that is what the leadership plans for, as shown by who they invite – but the overarching *effect* of the activities on the Iran nuclear issue was also much wider, as the individuals seamlessly move through the roster of events on the circuit. The same goes, to a lesser extent because of the nascent circuit in South Asia, for the OD.

[59] APR15.BKK14
[60] http://www.chaophrayadialogue.net/ (accessed 2 May 2018)
[61] http://carnegieendowment.org/regions/123 (accessed 2 May 2018)
[62] http://www.inss.org.il/index.aspx?id=4420 (accessed 2 May 2018)

To be sure, there are a number of similar endeavours (sustained meeting series and conferences) that took place elsewhere and thus the contributions of just one effort in terms of transfer are complex and indeterminate. The point is that the many people who attend these meetings have been, and continue to be, active elsewhere – in conducting research and disseminating the results publicly, in the media, or to government – as part of the strategic communities that work on the issue. As such, all these separate efforts

> "together become some kind of, albeit messy, but one process, even if they don't necessarily link to each other or talk to each other or coordinate with each other. It's like you have all of these conversations going on and at different points and in different ways, without you being able to engineer them or necessarily know they're happening, you will have messages that are transferred."[63]

Throughout the work of unofficial diplomacy there are continual connections to many policy networks, not just bilateral or regional work, but also global forums in which the information is put to broader discussion. Whether it is officials or non-officials participating, they will nonetheless conduct various forms of transfer and it is often in the basic direction of influencing the strategic communities of each country: "Some meetings have been incredibly productive. Forget about the dialogue, just amongst how people in Israel think… the group in Israel heard things and then went out and talked to people."[64]

Having taken a perspective that places the people at the centre of the explanation, this appears as a key research finding: while not negating any altruistic motivations to participate, my interlocutors revealed a self-interested logic to their participation. This, of course, is not startling to scholarship but it is a point not addressed in Track Two and its consequences for the logic of unofficial diplomacy are thus not drawn out. Many came to learn for themselves:

[63] JUN15.PW1
[64] JUN15.PW2

learn how the other side thinks, learn how the other side craft their narratives, and learn who is on the other side. Crucially, and in distinction to the 'reporting' format of official diplomacy, the information gathered at such meetings is of particular use to individual participants in bolstering their own credibility within their domestic fields of activity, in terms of who they can claim to know and what they can claim to know.

Ultimately, although there remains a certain fetishizing of governments as the ultimate transfer point, these unofficial dialogues do not exist in a policy vacuum. Influencing public policy discourse and narratives is a key product of unofficial diplomacy precisely because these individuals that participate are embedded in their own professional strategic communities. As individuals, they operate in a wider climate of mistrust toward the other (or the enemy, as some referenced) and thus they cannot easily, readily, or naively repeat what they have heard in the discussions of unofficial diplomacy. My interlocutors implicitly understood the need to 'refract' conversations and 'soften up' audiences – it implies that impressions and knowledge must to some degree be repackaged for domestic audiences, at the risk of a 'kick up the arse' or worse, discrediting of their own reputation.

5.3 The productive ambiguity of liminal spaces

The two aspects of transfer presented in the previous section are mutually reinforcing. "It's a process of osmosis,"[65] as one senior Indian put it. Politically relevant social connections of participants enable the crucial activity of more direct influence to take place, as has also been suggested and documented in the Track Two literature. Even where government officials are not present, "ideas travel. Influence is a hard thing to measure… [but] those ideas may then

[65] APR15.BKK7

percolate up to official channels."[66] Critically, I want to reinforce my contention that the activity of unofficial diplomacy does not simply hold to a functionalist logic of making up a shortfall in knowledge circulation between respective government or even which percolates through strategic communities.

Although meetings themselves are problem-focused and discussion often revolves around what proposals and solutions would be acceptable to respective governments, there is a distinct lack of clarity in what happens next. To be sure, there was a sense that a central benefit which participants derive is that they can better inform multiple audiences, not just governments, of the 'new' knowledge they have acquired. The impressions and perceptions of such information – what I term the mediated knowledge – are gathered, filtered, and relayed from the activity of unofficial diplomacy to target multiple fields. Where the next chapter investigates the important social production of this knowledge – the very process that becomes key to a deeper understanding of why unofficial diplomacy happens – this chapter has sought to illuminate who is involved and implicated in this work, and why this matters to the story.

Through documenting the various types of people who become professionally involved in the work of unofficial diplomacy, I have shown these are not spaces that solely engage officials, nor do they only engage academics and policy experts. Within each of the examples there is a wide variety of participants actually engaged and equally implicated through transfer. Indeed, the overall professionalization of the 'Track Two world' speaks to the highly networked character of contemporary global relations. This elite sociality has been demonstrated within studies of global governance and increasingly within studies of diplomacy, as we see a greater enmeshment of officials with policy experts and other opinion-shapers in the day-to-day

[66] JUN15.PW2

execution of their professional tasks. As I proposed in Chapter 3, the space of unofficial diplomacy can be viewed as a convening space between these professional fields, and the empirics of this chapter have borne out this contention. Many of the agents involved in unofficial diplomacy have complex relationships with officialdom: they may often be characterized as much by their loose social ties to officials, as by being officials with loose social ties to the work of unofficial diplomacy itself. Yet a key point is that these are the very individuals who are responsible for transfer. Facilitators may trust that they will do so accurately, even in an altruistic manner, but as the next chapter goes on to show, equal importance must be attached to the content of that knowledge and the context in which it is produced.

A key insight that emerges from the details of this chapter is that a crucial mechanism that allows transfer to take place is a fundamental *ambiguity* inherent in the process. One of the more fascinating reflections from my research is that, in general, there was little agreement, no common understanding or point of reference, amongst the very people who are practicing this unofficial diplomacy as to what it is. Reflecting the Track Two literature's preoccupation with the so-called 'tracks' of diplomacy, many participants echoed a feeling that "almost every meeting I can say has an element of track 1.5 or track 2, and every meeting has an element of track 2 or 3, depending on how you define it."[67] This definition was a function of the composition of each group, and is reflected also in a number of contributions to the literature which acknowledge the difficulty of pinpointing precise parameters to the activity. My research, however, celebrates this messiness rather than laments it. The differing perceptions are precisely enabled by a type of opacity with respect to social connectedness, for example

[67] JUN15.PW2

with participating officials in their 'personal capacity' or some retired officials as clearly influential.

My argument is that this uncertainty in itself should be viewed as productive, even foundational, to how the activity is able to take place. Unofficial diplomacy is able to occupy a space at the boundaries of traditionally defined professional activities because of who is involved; participants consequently understand it as "a balancing act…[because] it tries not to go too far away, nor to stick too close to the government line."[68] The importance of the persistent ambiguities attached to the sociality of different participants can also be illustrated in how many sides perceive the other side's connections to government: a majority of Pakistani participants were quite convinced that the Indian side came very much prepared for OD meetings: "my impression is that they get a proper briefing from their Foreign Office and then they also coordinate among themselves who is going to say what and so on."[69] Reciprocally, and revealing the prevailing generalized mistrust, there was a feeling from Indians that, of the Pakistanis involved, some still were in positions of authority rather than just influence:

> "[Participant Y] still has fair hold in the government. I feel all of them must be good guys, it's right to believe that. And all of them have a lot more say *directly* to their military than we can. Because they are actually the first line of their country, foreign policy is military."[70]

This ambiguous character of each side's contacts and each individual's social network extends to the other case study: although there is a notion that at the Pugwash table everyone "sits there as equals; they take off their hats, everyone is there as individuals not as representatives of anything," the same interlocutor immediately noted that, "To be honest that's more true in

[68] NOV14.BKK1
[69] NOV14.BKK2
[70] APR15.BKK12

some meetings than others."[71] The polite fiction that a diplomat can participate in a personal capacity is well understood by all present. It can equally be extended to inviting a former official, because the residues of having served, often at the highest levels, mean that "some people just forget they are retired, some people are so glued to the official thinking."[72]

This lack of clarity is a constitutive feature of unofficial diplomacy: the approach in this analysis has therefore been to bring to light the logic of ambiguity through the connectedness of different parts of the networks formed through unofficial diplomacy. As one Indian participant viewed it, these dialogues are "official/unofficial, in the sense it is officially sanctioned but it is unofficial, so it's got a double meaning in it."[73] This double meaning, or "twofold truth" as Bourdieu would call it (see Eyal 2013b, 159), also extends to allowing it to be both altruistic in one sense and strategic in another. Unofficial diplomacy appears, and is understood in practice by the participants, as being neither wholly one thing nor the other: it is neither just an academic exercise nor purely diplomacy; and at the same, it is neither official nor wholly unofficial. In this way, the ambiguity is critically productive not just for those who take part but equally those who are implicated, often at arm's length, by the activity, and thus forms a fundamental part of the logic of why it happens in such a form, using such people.

This implies that we should see that this liminal policy space enables the practice of information gathering to proceed as a strategic asset for those professionals in the network. This chapter has demonstrated that unofficial diplomacy should be characterized as a realm of social possibility for addressing uncertainty (J. Best 2008, 359), that implicitly relies upon loosely defined ties between individuals and institutions of the state. The next chapter thus turns to

[71] NOV16.PW6
[72] NOV14.BKK2
[73] NOV14.BKK5 [in speaking, he said official slash unofficial]

look at how this space "can be occupied, claimed, and performed by actors" (Rumelili 2012, 502). Because of their location at the boundary of multiple and overlapping fields of knowledge production and circulation, the spaces of unofficial diplomacy are both "flexible and manipulable" (Eyal 2002: 657), as the participants themselves are able to juxtapose the official/unofficial nuance and leverage personal connections. The strength of the endeavour is that through the participants, the dialogues and their products are placed liminal to the state, using a sense of personal authority to make claims for how and where they are transferring the results of the unofficial dialogue.

CHAPTER 6. POLITICAL EXPERTISE, IGNORANCE, AND AUTHORITY

The previous chapter delved into who becomes involved in unofficial diplomacy in the two case studies, showing that the foreign policy professionals are considered influential through a matrix of ambiguous political access and knowledge of the issues at hand. This chapter seeks to probe the latter dimension; beyond the transfer products and personalities involved, investigating the actual process of unofficial diplomacy can also reveal what else may be at stake. I thus ask two questions: *how* does it take place? And what can these practices tell us about why it happens in the way it does? The chapter is premised on an understanding that in these situations of high uncertainty and with processes that are fundamentally ambiguous, there are ongoing social and political dynamics to any knowledge transfer which underpin how knowledge is mediated amongst the groups (Stone 2013a).

We should again look to how the participants use unofficial diplomacy, but rather than focusing on social connectedness and what this permits, this chapter steps inside what happens in the meeting spaces to illustrate two distinct, but not exclusive, rationalities at play: one is the drive to establish oneself as possessing authoritative knowledge on the issues at hand; the other is to learn who is credible in the room and thus recognize them as 'knowing well.' In doing so, I demonstrate that assertions of political expertise and contests over narratives are as much a part of the processes as efforts toward socialization of participants. Such a finding does not contradict existing work in Track Two; instead, a focus on these kinds of interactions emphasizes a greater level of individual strategic behaviour as well as more collective actions than are generally recognized in the literature.

The analysis shows that these dialogues enable different kinds of knowledge games to be pursued by different kinds of professionals. It again underscores the central role of the

participants in this work, particularly their role in interpreting knowledge of the other, and suggests that, under conditions of mistrust and uncertainty, the politics of knowledge production are of vital importance. Again, the evidence challenges a perspective that the provision of information reduces uncertainty by reaffirming that these spaces are not simply locations for knowledge transfer but ones where such knowledge is contested, marginalized, or ignored through political discourse and competition. In this sense, the liminal location of unofficial diplomacy should not be viewed as a problem but rather as a realm of possibility: where Track Two emphasizes the co-production of knowledge toward conflict resolution, I stress that rivals also seek to dominate the spaces through competition over the political narratives that have come to shape their international relations.

A first section shows how professionals construct the puzzle of estrangement as in need of their expertise, particularly as it is embodied in experience. It captures the *social* dimensions of how the process of mediation unfolds in the spaces of unofficial diplomacy. Two key forms of knowledge claim become apparent: a credentialed type of expertise seen as 'objective,' and experiential knowledge derived from 'knowhow.' While both of these resources are mobilized as authoritative, there is a certain fluidity to how claims are recognized in relation to those of officials. Drawing on Bourdieu's notion of *capital*, I thus describe how all kinds of participants interact and compete to be seen as 'knowing well.' I propose that this can better illustrate how knowledge claims are treated in unofficial diplomacy in a way that flattens the putative barrier between what it means to be an official and what it means to be non-state.

A second section builds on these insights to outline some *political* practices that are not usually the subject of empirical work in Track Two: to be sure, the objectives of such processes encourage participants to mutually produce new insights on the conflict in question, but I draw

attention to a greater competitive logic at work amongst the participants than previous research suggests, as well as different motivations behind contact and socialization. The material delves into how different actor-types use the space to firstly 'feel out' who may be worth knowing, and secondly to assert their own political narratives and attempt to marginalize inconvenient knowledge. These seemingly opposed 'knowledge games' involve the manipulation of the space of unofficial diplomacy through the same medium of (re)presenting authoritative knowledge between estranged communities.

Overall, the substance of this chapter complicates the account of how policy-relevant knowledge in these spaces is produced by highlighting the multi-faceted nature of mediation. The third section reflects on the balancing act between the poles of government and non-government, but one in which there is a clear sense of competition over who is attempting to dominate the liminal space and how they engage authority to go about it. The key argument of this chapter is that embedded in the process of informal mediation is a realm of opportunity to contest what and whose knowledge is of greatest value and, as such, unofficial diplomacy can often become one more venue in which the diplomatic disputes of global politics are played out.

6.1 Recognizing authority in international affairs

The enmeshment of officials and non-officials presents a challenge to unpicking what is at stake in the work of unofficial diplomacy. Scholars of these processes have generally reified a divide between acting in an official capacity, as a diplomatic representative or foreign ministry employee, and individuals who are 'outside' of the state. As has been shown, one result is the perceived qualitative difference in so-called 'tracks' of diplomacy. But as the previous chapter demonstrated, this does not adequately reflect the different levels of social connection that can

enable other forms of influence. In this section, I furthermore assert that if we look in terms of *authority*, there are other social boundaries created around what it means to be recognized as knowledgeable or 'expert' that do not reproduce a strict divide between officials and non-officials. The following sections unpack the linkages between expertise, experience, and authority to craft a nuanced account of how we can better appreciate a social ordering logic that transcends a dichotomous conception of the state and non-state actors who participate.

Generally speaking, the literature on expertise has identified two overarching sources for how an expert can be adjudged.[1] On the one hand, one might possess credentials or "certified training" (Seabrooke 2014, 51) that bestow recognition of expertise. The first subsection shows how this maps on to Pugwash engaging "some of the world's leading scientists,"[2] proven not just in their academic achievement and publications record, but equally as recognized experts at prominent universities. On the other hand, *experience* is recognized as a key factor in 'good judgment' and the "knowhow" to get things done (Eyal 2013a, 869). A second subsection focuses on what has become a crucial resource within the spaces of unofficial diplomacy, exemplified by the Ottawa Dialogue's overwhelming emphasis on retired career professionals. The final subsection provides a synthesizing route to understanding how a more encompassing sense of authority might be established.

6.1.1 Expertise as a source of authority

As Chapter 3 highlighted, scholarship has moved toward unpacking not just that some people are viewed as experts but rather to focus on how they become experts and can claim authority. Within unofficial diplomacy, many participants understand the technical resolution of the

[1] See in particular Collins and Evans (2007, 53ff.).
[2] NOV16.PW6

conflict to lie in the hands of governments, seeing them as the more powerful actors on the international scene and the final arbiters of action. The government officials involved thus hold a degree of authority as they are perceived to have proximate influence on policymaking – they can be said to be 'in authority', that is to hold a position whereby one can direct the action of others. Nonetheless, many participants (including officials) "truly believe that non-officials are part of this debate,"[3] particularly because, where "the governments are not the repository of all wisdom,"[4] these non-officials can bring something else to the table. They might be said to be 'an authority,' viewed in the literature on non-state actors as having the capacity to act based on claims of professional competency stemming principally from either expertise, moral influence, or a form of political legitimacy.[5]

The early epistemic communities literature, for example, persuasively argued that groups are able to harness authority through the control of scientific knowledge (Haas 1992) – in this vein, Matthew Evangelista's (1999) seminal study of Pugwash demonstrated the role that scientific experts played in influencing superpower policy during the Cold War. As its founder has written, Pugwash has always relied upon "using rational analysis and objective inquiry to discuss problems that were, to a large extent, political in nature" (Rotblat 2001a, 53). This tradition, combined with the technical basis to the Iran nuclear issue – focused largely on scientific assessments of Iran's nuclear energy program – led to an expectation amongst some participants that these Pugwash meetings would follow suit: "The particularity of Pugwash, namely the historical initiation by scientists, gives the indication that participants should follow the scientist approach to find a solution."[6] Indeed, a core facet of expertise within the Pugwash

[3] JUN15.PW1 and see the many comments in Chataway (1998).

[4] NOV14.BKK1

[5] The classic distinction between being 'in authority and 'an authority' comes from Friedman (1990) but see also Raz (1990). That this separation is perceived by the participants will be revisited below.

[6] DEC16.PW7

community was seen to be the 'objectivity' of this scientific approach, which implied a sense of political neutrality. As one Iranian participant observed of the secretive 2008 meetings, of great value were "those who were impartial and objective experts… we had X [a scientist], an American, he was an expert in uranium enrichment by centrifuge and he was great in his objective approach."[7] In this case, even his American-ness was trumped by his recognized expertise in the field of nuclear science.

More generally, objective expertise (particularly in the natural sciences) has been tied to the distinction of credentialing or professional qualifications – advanced degrees from universities and memberships to professional bodies. Pugwash has had an historic tendency to recruit and populate meetings with scientists of prestige: from Leo Szilard, Bernard Feld and Eugene Rabinowitch,[8] to Dick Garwin and John Holdren.[9] In practice, present-day deference to such credentials can be seen played out in one of the already very tense Pugwash meetings in Israel: a row broke out over lunch (carried on from disputes within the meeting room itself) between an American and an Israeli, both of whom were of Iranian heritage, over who better understood what was happening within Iran. Speaking to the American subsequently, he derided the Israeli participant for 'not knowing what he was talking about' – he compared this individual to another Israeli in the room, saying that even though he does not agree with his opinions, 'at least he has a PhD so knows what he's talking about.'[10]

[7] DEC16.PW8

[8] Early Pugwashites involved in the Manhattan project that developed the world's first nuclear weapon.

[9] Holdren is the former Assistant to the US President for Science and Technology, and Garwin, an eminent physicist, is "the most influential scientist you've never heard of" (Shurkin 2017).

[10] Personal notes, 15 November 2014, Pugwash meeting #415 in Herzliya, Israel

Although there was a belief that expertise is objective, derived from a scientific understanding of the technical issues, participants also articulated the possibility that political bias of the nuclear issue may affect discussions. As one Israeli tellingly reflected,

> "I view myself as an expert and not a political animal. Others will see me – I'm not blind to this – they think that I am political, they think I represent what [Israeli Prime Minister] Netanyahu says, for example. Which is total rubbish. If on technical issues, he says things that are the same as I say, or I say things that are the same as he does, those are the technical issues. And he happens to be right about a lot of them, in purely nuclear terms."[11]

Interestingly, however, neither Benjamin Netanyahu nor this participant were trained as a scientist,[12] and thus even 'on the technical issues' it should be reasonable to cast doubt on the neutrality of their expert opinion. Yet this position on expertise was widespread. Of course, as Chapter 4 made clear, the pervasive climate of mistrust has bled down amongst participants of all kinds. The emotions of fear and suspicion help to support a general tension among many participants that certain individuals were deliberately politicizing what should be technical and scientific issues.

Of course, it is acknowledged that "you don't have to have the 'kumbaya' moment at the end where everyone stands up and pats each other on the back"[13] but more than once people left the meetings early because of profound and emotive arguments that appeared more related to interpretation and assessment of the same information.[14] Frequently, within the Israeli group, participants expressed that "sometimes there's a sense that the outside participants are chosen

[11] JUN15.PW1

[12] "I'm not a nuclear physicist and not an expert that comes from there – I'm an international relations specialist", JUN15.PW1.

[13] NOV16.PW6

[14] See the point made in Chapter 4, section 4.2.3, in reference to Mercer's (2010) work on emotional beliefs.

more for their political orientation than for their expertise."[15] Many Pugwash meetings in Tel Aviv during the research period had featured heated arguments over the more fundamental issue of Iran's intentions toward Israel and the region. Equally, however, amongst Iranian participants in other meetings, it was felt that "the speakers opposing Iran's stand were not nuclear scientist[s], they were politicians [who] cared very little about the scientific explanations by me on technical aspects."[16]

Overall, such disagreements reveal the forms of "boundary work" which have been highlighted in the literature on expertise and knowledge production: where policymakers or scientists contest one another's narratives, "the soft underbelly of uncertainty is exposed to make data appear less than authoritative" (Balmer 2012, 74). Indeed, the point is that the spaces of unofficial diplomacy present an opportunity for actors to assert their expertise and thereby attempt to establish authority; but as each assertion may be made, there can be a flipside. As Summerson Carr has argued:

> "realizing one's self as an expert can hinge on casting other people as less aware, knowing, or knowledgeable. Indeed, expertise emerges in the hoary intersection of claims about types of people, and the relative knowledge they contain and control, and claims about differentially knowable types of things." (2010, 22–23)

In some Pugwash meetings, there was often such a fundamental difference in perspective that erecting this boundary between what counts as either science or policy led to questions being raised over individuals' credibility. On separate occasions, as part of the attempt to bring more 'authentically' Iranian voices into the Tel Aviv discussions, Pugwash had invited two (non-scientific) professionals of Iranian heritage from the Washington-based National Iranian

[15] JUN15.PW1
[16] DEC16.PW7

American Council. In both instances, their position that the US should engage in diplomacy with Iran was at odds with the general sentiment among Israelis and contributed to a worsening rift. Neither participant was invited back at the behest of the Israeli Pugwash group, who dismissed them as "a lobbying firm for the Iranian government."[17] On the other hand, in describing an American participant – a non-PhD 'scientist' at a non-governmental policy institution – one Israeli interlocutor suggested that he is

> "the most authoritative expert on this. He is in the technical details, he follows it like a hawk, he's writing papers on this all the time, he's just focused on the nuclear issues. I find him not to be biased in one way or the other. But, again, because very often – what can you do – he comes up with critical reports that challenge, let's say, the negotiations that are going on, so suddenly he's political."[18]

Through these examples, I have sought to illuminate how the veiled ideological elements of expertise come in to view where mistrust plays a strong role in conditioning the receptivity of individuals to other narratives. This subsection has worked toward the argument that "wars over expertise are political and social credibility contests: that inside technical argumentation are political and social dynamics" (Kuus 2014, 40). Expertise thus has something of a destabilized quality; where individuals must rely on social judgment as a determinative factor (Sending 2015; Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010a), there must be a great deal of political work that goes into recognizing certain people as an expert. This is particularly acute in the tense, conflictive discussions of unofficial diplomacy. The judgment derives not just from the spaces of unofficial diplomacy but also from the individuals' professional field(s) where they draw the credibility to become involved in the first place. Ultimately, these examples demonstrate that coming to be called an expert is increasingly understood as a social judgment about who

[17] JUN15.PW4
[18] JUN15.PW1

to agree with or believe, rather than a scientific judgment about what ought to be believed (Collins and Evans 2007, 47–48; Carr 2010, 17).

6.1.2 Experience as a marker of political expertise

As noted above, experience has been viewed as a distinct marker of its own vis-à-vis credentialed expertise. Within the setting of the Ottawa Dialogue, there was light derision by the retired officials regarding academic knowledge. One senior Indian participant expressed this, with a wry grin, in that "we are not looking at theories and validating them; we are looking at real situations."[19] The emphasis which many participants placed on the conditions of 'reality' was striking, juxtaposing the more practical needs of unofficial diplomacy as they saw it from the theoretically-inclined academy. With a different twist, in the eyes of military personnel, "no amount of classroom activity can bring that expertise" – the academic has "never been on a front, he's never been in a trench or he's never held a rifle or a gun."[20] Interestingly, this perspective chimes with developments in the literature, that "expertise is now seen more and more as something practical – something based in what you can do rather than what you can calculate or learn" (Collins and Evans 2007, 23).

Expertise *qua* experience was not just being "old fogies doing this circuit"[21] but, as the previous chapter made clear, retired participants (in South Asia particularly) were selected based on the positions they had held in office. Their professional careers meant that "they have the knowledge of things, they have the experience, [because] these were positions of responsibility."[22] In this way, knowledge by doing (or having done) was clearly differentiated

[19] NOV14.BKK7
[20] APR15.BKK14
[21] APR15.BKK9
[22] APR15.BKK11

from knowledge by learning. Reaffirmed by many of my research participants, across both cases, and indeed reflected in the composition of many of the groups, practical experience from a distinguished professional career has come to trump claims of objectivity derived from formal training and qualifications.[23]

As one senior participant phrased it, this implies that authority in the setting of unofficial diplomacy "flows from the fact that you are recognized as someone who has the experience to be able to talk knowledgeably."[24] Such experiential knowledge of international affairs as a basis of authority has been emphasized in other settings, in particular by asserting knowledge claims as a particular 'insight' into other national or cultural traditions.[25] However, in the peculiar environment of unofficial diplomacy, such special claims to insight have already been shown to be precisely what is missing because of the profound estrangement. Rather, in this line of work, it is, in fact, because knowledge about the other side's perspectives and policies is needed that experience can really matter in a slightly different sense.

Experience counts (most explicitly in the Ottawa Dialogue) not just for being able to make knowledge claims and assert arguments, but that equally the participants can authoritatively *interpret* knowledge from the other side and subsequently refract and articulate that within their domestic context. This assessment has been made, often tacitly, by their peers within government and the strategic communities. Generally, it derives from their performance over time in the public realm on relevant policy issues:

> "I think the safe thing, and this is what I tell the new guys that come in, that consider everyone to be credible unless you see otherwise. You should think that all of them

[23] See Henriksen and Seabrooke (2016, 723) for a similar argument.
[24] NOV14.BKK.6
[25] Both Kuus (2014) and Pouliot (2010a) look at how Eastern Europeans understand the Russian mind.

> represent views that are as close to the larger thinking, not just the official thinking but the larger thinking of that country, the thinking that actually frames policy. They are part of that environment within which decisions are being taken, so consider them as responsible, credible individuals."[26]

I would suggest that, above all, this reflects a recognition that it is experience as a kind of *political* expertise that is of value in these spaces, the 'knowhow' of how things work within government, rather than the more technical expertise that we saw in the previous subsection. To be sure, in Pugwash, the technical aspects of the issues are important; but it is also the case that "the scientists will tell you that the science is quite well-known and boring… nuclear physics is not such a big unknown anymore."[27] As the previous chapter showed, it is more often about understanding the positions of government and identifying the 'leeway' to move forward on an issue.

In the South Asian situation in particular, experienced participants have thus strategically positioned themselves as distinctively qualified to undertake this work, because of "their inherent credibility which they have acquired over their years of service."[28] Nonetheless, as the orientation of this research has underlined, these are not static qualities. It is not simply the case that by sheer fact of experience, nor even the stock of knowledge one has, someone will be judged as an authority (Medvetz 2012b, 90). The point is to emphasize that there is a dynamic and iterative aspect to the work by which each actor must maintain their reputation over time. In the same way that expertise is socially endowed, *recognition* re-emerges as the crucial mechanism – as (often tacit) collective judgment on an actor's suitability to participate – that confers authority upon its subject and should be viewed as a constant site of struggle

[26] NOV14.BKK3
[27] NOV16.PW6
[28] APR15.BKK11

amongst these foreign policy professionals (Sending 2015, 20; Abrahamsen and Williams 2011, 118).

The previous subsections have outlined two central aspects to claims of authoritative knowledge within the spaces of unofficial diplomacy. On the one hand, expertise as scientific and objective understanding is held up as the technical basis for discussion at the Pugwash table, but has been shown to be subject to disruption by political bias. On the other hand, for the South Asian participants in particular, "experience polishes expertise"[29] because of the embodied knowledge of having been in authority and having the knowhow of political decision-making. The following section will sketch a sociological synthesis of recognition of the different sources of authority in these spaces, with the assertion that a relational understanding of authority not only better establishes what is at stake during the process of unofficial diplomacy but productively puts in tension the perceived boundary between state and non-state actors.

6.2 A pecking order to knowledge claims

Taken together, these two different conceptions at play in establishing authority have traction with Bourdieu's notions of capital and recognition. As elaborated in Chapters 3 and 5, unofficial diplomacy takes place between established domestic fields such as politics, academia, think tanks, and media. Moreover, it emerges as transnational liminal space, providing connections and transactions between disparate actors. In these spaces, as the above discussion makes clear, participants are engaged not only in synthesising understandings of the conflict in question through dialogue but are simultaneously in competition with one another

[29] APR15.BKK14

over the value of their knowledge on the foreign policy issues at hand – indeed, given the suspicion, mistrust, and at times hostility, it is a quite critical dynamic to understanding the logic of this activity. One question becomes how we can structure a relational sense of how they view this competition, in a way that acknowledges their interactions in these spaces, yet all the while affirms their spatial separation (the 'otherness' of their siloed domestic strategic communities). In part because there is no overall 'credentialing' body that bestows recognition upon actors as authoritative in international affairs, it is challenging to demarcate any kind of transnational field in this sense.[30]

Instead, I propose that we should look to how participants mobilize the resources they have: here, the types of *capital* that structure social and political relations in a domestic field come to the fore within these transnational networks. Such a line of investigation helps us to understand what is at stake for participants, again enhancing our overall grasp of why unofficial diplomacy happens in the way it does. Above all, "it is the dynamics of recognition (and misrecognition) – so central to Bourdieu's account of the what he calls the 'production of belief' and the sociology of symbolic domination" that come to play a large role in understanding authority (Sending 2015, 23). The next subsections will discuss how knowledge comes to be of value; and yet, to illuminate who emerges as authoritative is not the end of the story. The last section will shed light on how this authority might then be put to use in determining knowledge practices within the spaces of unofficial diplomacy.

[30] This is a point made by Lisa Stampnitzky (2013, chap. 1) in respect of terrorism expertise, which I think also applies rather well to international affairs: "one of the key 'classificatory struggles' under contention is that of whether the production of objective knowledge about terrorism is possible at all."

6.2.1 Competition among capitals

This chapter has so far touched upon the *cultural* capital of knowledge production that is presented "in the form of educational qualifications" or "in the form of cultural goods" such as books, articles, etc. (Bourdieu 1986, 17). In both of these senses it translates to expertise, as presented most clearly by the participants to the Pugwash meetings. Nevertheless, in the ways it was marginalized as politicized knowledge or dismissed as not being practical, the power of cultural capital as authority in international affairs was keenly disputed by participants. I would suggest that in part this is because the cultural capital of scientific knowledge does not align seamlessly with claims to authority in international affairs, even if misrecognized as legitimate competency. To be sure, cultural capital as expertise is recognized amongst many of the participants – and may form the basis for their participation – but as a symbolic representation of authority it appears not to be a dominating factor at the level of the transnational network.

The empirics of much of Chapter 5 amounted to describing the *social* capital at work in unofficial diplomacy, in terms of the access and influence held by various participants. As one Pugwash participant put it,

> "It's who's connected to whom. If you know that there's somebody in the room who is somehow able to convey what's happened in that room very high up the food chain in whatever country, that's where some of the natural deference goes to."[31]

Yet also at work within these settings was the sense of ambiguity amongst participants; *mis*recognition of accumulated social capital comes to play a pivotal role. An important point to stress is the latency and indistinctness within such networked connections, as "the aggregate of the actual or potential resources which are linked to possession of a durable network of more

[31] NOV16.PW1

or less institutionalized relationships of mutual acquaintance and recognition" (Bourdieu 1986, 21). In many ways, social capital is predisposed to work in this elusive way, because it depends not just on the connections of one individual but equally on the capital (all types of capital) possessed by those very connections (ibid.). Moreover, the key point is the heterology between different domestic fields – in many ways exacerbated by estrangement, participants struggle to grasp the social distinctions specific to a national culture. While persistent ambiguity might appear to diminish the potency of social capital as an ordering principal, the previous chapter also showed the productive elements in this misrecognition as it generates part of the logic of these spaces. People have access, others claim access, and overall this led to a sense of indeterminacy in the extent of the network – yet perversely, perhaps, this uncertainty helps lubricate the social dynamics within the process as individuals assume a good or high degree of influence. As such, familiar in the performance of many of the actors in unofficial diplomacy, social capital is an arguably powerful resource amongst those in unofficial diplomacy.

Although he does not dwell on it, there is reference to *political* capital within Bourdieu's oeuvre (1981). In interpreting this concept, Niilo Kauppi has discussed two means of acquiring such capital: an individual may be recognized for their charismatic qualities, usually a leading political figure;[32] and, more pertinently for my research, a person "receives from the institution a limited and provisional transfer of collective capital composed of recognition and fidelity" (2003, 780). This latter notion of *delegated* political capital is particularly useful to my story, on two counts. Firstly, the delegation act again speaks to the ambiguity at the heart of retired senior officials. In a sense, such individuals represent embodied political capital, having been

[32] Friedman also discusses the Weberian notion of "charismatic authority" in much the same way, as someone whose "views or utterances are entitled to be believed" (cf. 1990, 57 and 70)

employed by the state and having had their *habitus* – the "mental and corporeal schemata of perception, appreciation, and action" (cf. Wacquant 1992, 16) – shaped in that field. Their experience allows the reward of a transfer of collective capital (which also includes an amount of social and cultural capital) based on the notion of fidelity to the state through their careers.

Secondly, political capital poses an interesting way into reconceiving the way in which state representatives participate on a more even playing field with other individuals, certainly than other work in Track Two suggests.[33] I would argue that, on the face of it, the delegation act can confer authority *mis*recognized as legitimacy to speak on international affairs. State officials, where they participate, are still engaged in a struggle to assert knowledge claims vis-à-vis other state, as well as non-state, participants. In many ways, as I show below, this is to put across the official position of their state, to represent a certain political narrative. Recognition of authority still relies to some extent upon their performance – for example, where officials simply read standard lines from a prepared script, with no attempt at spontaneous or creative engagement in the discussion, that authority tends to come down.

My key argument for this section is to suggest that the reification of the state as ultimate arbiter of conflict resolution merely reflects the historical domination that it has exerted over the realm of foreign policy specifically, and international affairs more generally, because "symbolic relations of power tend to reproduce and to reinforce the power relations that constitute the structure of social space" (Bourdieu 1989, 21; and cf. Kauppi 2003, 781; Sending 2015, 7). To be sure, I am not arguing that non-state actors are in practice more powerful than they realize;

[33] This is not to criticize Track Two, but it hasn't sought to complicate the story of how officials are involved and implicated. There is a body of IR literature on 'delegated authority' and the 'principal-agent' dynamic (cf. Avant, Finnemore, and Sell 2010a, n. 9) but within Track Two any disaggregation of political authority is left unexplored, other than to point out that officials participate in their personal capacity.

rather, I am pointing to the ways in which I have observed that the vestiges of sovereign domination reside in the habitus of those retired officials, as well as, maybe to a lesser extent, the non-governmental participants. As a structuring disposition, the habitus reinforces a "'sense of one's place' but also a 'sense of the place of others'" (Bourdieu 1989, 19) – in this way, action in international affairs has generally been viewed as the prerogative of officials and their practices come to reflect this conviction. The *illusio*[34] of unofficial diplomacy instantiates a belief even in those non-governmental 'activists' that they must play the game in the way that states dictate in order to remain playing the game – to feed at the high table, as it were – yet in this very act of misrecognition they reproduce the diplomatic order that renders them subjects.[35] All the same, I argue that political capital should be viewed not as the definitive (or legitimate) expression of authority but as one more species of capital that individuals compete for (albeit on a skewed playing field). The reason that this distinction is important is that it not only challenges the dichotomy in the authority possibilities of different participants, but that it also then behaves as one more resource, powerful to be sure, in the field.

6.2.2 The symbolic sense of 'knowing well'

In line with Bourdieu, it is important to note that above all, there is *symbolic* capital that operates within fields; this is "commonly called prestige, reputation, renown, etc., which is *the form in which the different forms of capital are perceived and recognized as legitimate*" (Bourdieu 1985, 724, my italics). Each domestic field of course places different values on the different forms of capital (hence the role of misrecognition in the assumptions of 'outsiders' in that field). Rather than investigating each field separately, I want to suggest that the notion of

[34] *Illusio* is the "belief in the game that produces the game" (Bourdieu 1984, 86). In many ways my argument has parallels with the work of Roberta Mulas (2016), using Gramsci's theory of civil society to show how civil society tacitly (but not uncritically) reproduces the order latent within state discourses on nuclear disarmament.

[35] In a sense, they render symbolic violence unto themselves.

symbolic capital can be mapped on to how the participants of unofficial diplomacy relationally recognize one another despite their differences. With (mis)recognition as a key social mechanism, participants not only valorise political influence, expert knowledge, or experience as singular, but ultimately look to identify someone as *knowing well* as an expression of these fused together.[36] This is subtly different from the social capital expression of being "well known, [and] worthy of being known" (Bourdieu 1986, 23) because it intentionally incorporates the various other traits to produce a sense in which the person does not just know the right people but equally has their knowledge claims recognized as being worth knowing – it provides a dynamic way of describing how participants mobilize and compete over knowledge claims. Knowing well implies a symbolic representation of what is at stake in the spaces of unofficial diplomacy.

Following the discussion in 7.2.1 above, empirically, symbolic capital in unofficial diplomacy tends to be attached to state officials, because political capital is recognized as crucially important; but not all officials will receive it in the same amounts. By way of example, an official from the delegation of Ireland, New Zealand, or South Africa who may participate at a Pugwash meeting will have a certain cachet among those interested in nuclear weapons politics because their country has consistently taken a principled stand on the issues. This, however, does not translate to the same amount of political capital that the representatives of, say the US or Iran will have, because they are quite simply the bigger players in the field of nuclear politics at this moment. Their representatives will consequently not only derive greater political capital

[36] The phrase 'knowing well' was not used by my research participants but is rather taken from Leonard Seabrooke (2014) – although he does not use it in a Bourdieusian sense or analysis, it provides an appealing vocabulary for describing the dynamics found in my research and merging his research on professional networks with mine. He writes that 'arbitrage' – with its emphasis on transnational knowledge sharing is closely correlated to the notion of convening fields in my work – "is based on relationships in which a professional is identified as 'knowing well' rather than simply having a stock of information" (2014, 51).

but will equally tend to have larger social capital as being 'worthy of being known,' which ultimately translates to larger symbolic power.

This conceptual work allows me to set up discussion in the following section of how such a sense of authority permits actors to manipulate the spaces of unofficial diplomacy – the ways in which the social interactions in meetings are used to determine whether certain knowledges are deemed of value. Firstly, participants form assessments that what others say comes from a place of 'knowing well'; this sensing process, partially based in trusting behaviour, is in itself inherently practical. Secondly, however, actors of all kind are nevertheless in competition to establish relative authority on international affairs and thereby influence the policy options and agenda-building of the states involved. They can therefore mobilize different strategies of deeming knowledge worthy of not knowing, depending on the resources they hold.

6.3 Two types of knowledge game

Interestingly, participants often viewed the meeting room and formal sessions as 'public' space. This is despite the fact that participants attend in their private capacity and are covered by the so-called 'Chatham House rule' which permits the sharing of information from the meetings but with no attribution of who said it. This perception has two consequences for the claims to knowledge which I will draw out in the next two subsections. Firstly, participants seek to create their own 'private' spaces within the unofficial dialogues, as a means of engaging others and feeling out the worth of their knowledge. I show below how the practical arrangements of the meetings facilitate opportunities for participants to individually and collectively authorize judgments of *who knows well*. I then set out how many participants seek to cast various bodies of knowledge as *not worth knowing*. I show the different ways in which participants –

governments and their representatives in particular – have used the spaces as 'public' in order to deploy practices of ignorance to control the political narrative of past and current events.

6.3.1 Judging who knows well

In general, the principal activity in conducting the contact amongst participants is a relatively formal meeting space.[37] This meeting and its structured sessions often take place over two-three days; it will have an attendant set of objectives, as well as a set of implicit and explicit rules of conduct (see Jones 2015, chap. 5). Most often, there is a logic that by holding a meeting in a hotel in a foreign city, participants become a kind of captive audience – as well as the meeting sessions, breakfast, lunch, and dinners all take place in the same space, thereby affording them opportunities to mix informally. The importance of 'breaking bread' has been documented in the literature (Jones 2015, 126–28) and many scholars have stressed how social time is a means of "facilitating the generation of affective ties" between individuals not used to spending time with one another (Çuhadar and Dayton 2011, 286). These scholars' central point is that, although some officials and audiences sceptically view the dialogues as 'wining and dining' trips because of these features, it is an integral part of the process without which psychological resistance to opposing perspectives might be harder to overcome.

I want to highlight that there may also be more individualized strategic behaviours present in social time evident from my two case studies that revolve around knowledge claims. Earlier chapters presented how participants often treat the dialogues as venues for information-gathering, feeling the 'pulse' within the other country, and getting to know and understand people from the other side. Indeed, Chapter 4 showed there was a strong feeling that the activity is about developing a better *sense* of the other side. I use the word sense purposively here: none

[37] Often referred to as the 'problem-solving workshop' brought up in Chapter 2 (Kelman 2002).

of the participants expressed the hope that they might 'discover the facts' or 'find the truth' about such and such an issue, nor 'bargain' or 'negotiate' an agreement with the other side. All of them expressed themselves very much in a way that shows they were feeling their way around, learning at least as much about the other participants as about the issues.

Here then, I assert that social time comes to play a crucial role in providing *private* spaces for participants. During coffee breaks or after the extended meals that take place, one often sees pairings or smaller groups of individuals wander down empty hotel corridors or sit together in lobbies or gardens. Officials are able to use such spaces to seek out an interlocutor of interest from another state – numerous times I have witnessed that a quiet corner of the bar or restaurant provides the chance to communicate, perhaps clarifying certain points of official policy or equally unofficially getting a different rationale for policies. Other participants may also follow up on discussion from the meeting or other kinds of exchanges. Many of my research participants spoke of these opportunities, seeking out regular interlocutors from the other side for such private conversations. A former Defence Minister provided me with a deep sense of what this offers up:

> "More importantly, when you talk to the same person off the record – off the table, in the side-lines, over lunch and dinners, casual chats – that's where you start getting the real sense of what the others are thinking. Those are probably the most useful parts of this dialogue, where you sit and try to understand one another."[38]

The social aspect of these dialogues "has a lasting impression on your mind, has a lasting impression on your persona, as it were."[39] Importantly though, my key argument here about the sociality of these spaces goes beyond this, suggesting that it is not just the case that participants

[38] NOV14.BKK3
[39] NOV14.BKK1

can break down psychological barriers and recap historical narratives to develop "security dilemma sensibility", but that these interactions simultaneously provide a means to assess and judge the other participants' credibility and knowledge claims. As the same former Defence Minister phrased it,

> "over a period of exchanges, one gathers the sense of it. I think people can sometimes mask their feelings and sometimes mask their real thoughts, but very quickly you can understand what lies behind what they are saying and what is the *true worth* of that individuals' utterings."[40]

Beyond verbal expressions, this sense may also be understood corporally: "The body language is the best indicator of anything, the way you formulate your words, the scowl on the face, the swagger and so on and so forth, it always tells you, you can make an assessment."[41] In order to get to the point where frank communication occurs in the margins of dialogues, participants will often have to have had a series of interactions in which they can develop confidence that what is being said comes from a place of knowing well – that is, that the utterances and self-presentation of an individual reflect a cumulative sense of the various capitals at stake in the field. Indeed, the mode of these interactions corresponds to Vincent Pouliot's suggestion that trust

> "is the perfect example of an inarticulate feeling derived from practical sense. Based on personal and collective history (*habitus*) and faced with a particular social context (*field*), security practitioners 'feel' (*practical sense*) that they could believe despite uncertainty" (2010b, 278).

Moreover, this does not always remain as an individual endeavour but becomes part of a more collective practice, in which both sides draw upon individual feelings to aggregate a

[40] NOV14.BKK3
[41] NOV14.BKK2

legitimizing judgment on the other side, ultimately toward building a generalized sense of trustworthiness. This comprises both the private interactions and conversations, as well as a contextual sense derived from seeing that individual perform in the 'public' setting of the meeting. As one participant reflected,

> "you can detect tensions within the team and you can always find out from the team itself how credible that individual is […] If you're sitting and watching everyone around the table, somebody says something, and you'll find somebody's facial expression, things like those, that give away that here's an individual who, what he said isn't going down well."[42]

Overall, the various spaces, both public and private, afford the participants opportunities to assert and contest various claims to authoritative knowledge. Through the meeting space and particularly the informal opportunities to gauge one another, participants come to feel, to sense, to trust, whether someone is not just worth knowing, but knows well.

In these ways, knowledge comes to play a central part in how actors may feel particularized trust toward other individuals. This comes back to my earlier point, that many participants are also provided with a social authorization to participate. It is not always the case that such social authorization is anything other than tacitly granted, and indeed it is rarely beyond contestation by others within a particular domestic strategic community. But in general, the authority stakes that such participants carry and struggle for can buttress claims that the knowledge they may carry away from the meetings to transfer elsewhere can be considered to have been *mediated*. The key point is that knowledge of personalities fundamentally effects how the mediation of knowledge can take place, emphasizing that knowing whose knowledge is worth knowing is a fundamental part of trust-building. The next subsection sets out to complicate this proposition by looking at a shadow knowledge game: through revealing "the political and social practices

[42] NOV14.BKK3

embedded in the effort to suppress or to kindle endless new forms of ambiguity and ignorance" (McGoey 2012b, 3), it emphasizes how certain actors cast certain knowledges as *not worth knowing*.

6.3.2 What not to know

Given that this chapter has focused on the central importance of knowledge to the story of unofficial diplomacy, it is only right to draw attention to what can be considered its 'twin' – the notion of non-knowledge.[43] Recent scholarship has begun to unpack the ways in which ignorance is not simply an absence of knowledge but is itself a social construction, relating to a set of practices to either deny or obscure things which may be considered inconvenient (McGoey 2015, 2012b; Balmer 2012; Gross 2010). Although a majority of such research has focused on scientific case studies,[44] as an approach it helps draw attention to how various knowledge claims may also rely upon what is (deliberately) not communicated or represented. Within meetings of unofficial diplomacy, the topics under discussion often pertain not only to the high politics of international relations but moreover to relatively sensitive matters of (nuclear) national security, as well as diplomatic and even intelligence work. Therefore, looking at how actors are reusing, reshaping, or repackaging the same styles of knowledge claims for precisely the opposite effect – to suppress knowledge rather than reveal it – demonstrates an interesting set of strategic games that are politically deployed by various participants.

[43] There are a range of concepts that have all been proposed under a taxonomy of non-knowledge: among others, uncertainty, ignorance, secrecy, incompleteness, omission, bias, error, inaccuracy, irrelevance, and distortion (cf. Smithson 1989). Drawing on a recent focus to the issue within sociology and international relations, I stick with the use of 'ignorance' as a means of pointing to more *strategic* "mobilization of the unknowns in a situation in order to command resources, deny liability in the aftermath of disaster, and to assert expert control in the face of both foreseeable [and] unpredictable outcomes" (McGoey 2012a, 555).

[44] For example, practices of cultivating public ignorance of the science behind smoking, as well as climate science and pharmaceuticals, have been looked at by, among many others, Fernández Pinto (2017).

There are a number of possible avenues for studying how such practices may be used within unofficial diplomacy. In general, of course, there are clear methodological challenges to analysing what is deliberately intended to remain unknown (Rappert and Balmer 2015, 333), particularly in the private conversations among participants. Therefore, acknowledging my own non-knowledge (for example, vis-à-vis the intelligence community's penetration of these spaces[45]), I choose to focus on just two 'public' aspects that will bring out how ignorance has been deployed by a variety of participants. I show how public diplomacy as a practice can be seen to obfuscate, suppress, and deny rival narratives; and consequently, how practices of *tabooing* can rein in dissension amongst groups of participants, reinforcing a type of team dynamic against narratives deemed to be against the national interest. These examples indicate that uses of non-knowledge are intimately tied up in political claims to knowing, and particularly to knowing well in the sense presented earlier.

Within the spaces of unofficial diplomacy, there is an evident desire amongst many participants for more information, knowledge that can help them understand the situation at hand. The prevailing uncertainty can be said to create a demand for more certainty – however, on the one hand, with more 'new' knowledge comes more uncertainty and ignorance (Gross 2010, 1) because of the spectre of deception that accompanies diplomacy (Head 2012, 40); and on the other hand, it also perversely permits opportunities for manipulation of the social realities that the participants are discussing. The point is that participants from each 'side' will assert their national narrative and, although not couched in quite these terms, this is tacitly assumed by

[45] One could investigate the "countermoves and counter-countermoves whereby individuals and groups seek to influence each other's thinking" as a means of winning an intelligence battle in such contexts (Rappert and Balmer 2015, 329) but this would be a larger sociological project in itself (cf. Goffman 1970). That some or even many participants to unofficial diplomacy are linked to intelligence communities is not controversial and merely adds to the prevailing ambiguity present.

participants in both case studies. For example, with Pugwash in particular, because officials are often present, "There's a little bit of a dance that everybody understands is going to happen in this kind of thing. Even if it's an unofficial dialogue, that's just the nature of it."[46] But equally within the Ottawa Dialogue, the retired officials will often revert to historical point-settling and blame-games, with the result that the first session "is more wound-up. It's not relaxed at all. It's about stating your positions."[47]

Section 6.1.1 (above) illustrated the ways in which certain claims to expertise within Pugwash meetings were marginalized by others competing to have their knowledge recognized as more authoritative. In such examples, there was a generalized belief in the value of cultural capital (objectivity), albeit tempered by the reality that such expert knowledge could be yoked to political narratives. In discussing a presentation by an American of Iranian heritage (X), one Israeli was adamant that,

> "you need to know the facts, you need to know the history, you need to know the story, what's happened, what's relevant, what's not relevant. Here it might be even more important, just because a lot of the facts are not well known and if you haven't studied this in depth you can easily [make a] mistake… I think that X does know the facts, but he sold the story he wanted to sell."[48]

I want to suggest that this latter admission does not simply represent a disagreement in what was believed (to be true or not) about the issues under discussion, but rather that it reflects acknowledgement that contained in any presentation or discussion are some smaller practices of public diplomacy and national 'myth-making' symptomatic of estranged relations. A wider point I wish to illustrate is that public diplomacy is not the preserve of states but in fact can

[46] NOV16.PW6

[47] NOV14.BKK1 This refers to the opening discussions at meetings that go over the (recent) historical interactions, raised in Chapter 4, section 4.2.2.

[48] JUN15.PW1

incorporate the wide range of strategic or political communications engaged in by actors seeking to advance their interests – where such interests align with national positions in spite of them not necessarily being strictly official representatives, it does not necessarily have to be subsumed under another label, such as transnational advocacy (Gregory 2008).

As we have seen throughout, the historical lack of engagement fostered a relative absence of direct and authoritative information between sides. In Pugwash meetings, this led to scenarios for some Americans or Israelis in which knowledge of Iranian intentions was substituted by a belief derived from narratives that they told themselves (and others) about Iranian intentions – a classic "inherent bad faith model" (Wheeler 2013, 486). That is to say, phrases such as 'Iran has hegemonic ambitions to control the Middle East' or 'Iran seeks to destroy Israel' filled in as background knowledge to thereby direct discussion to what might logically follow from Iran's current course of action. Moreover, this happened not just in Pugwash meetings but was also a feature of Netanyahu's rhetoric throughout this time period: there were concerted attempts to frame the technicalities of the Iranian nuclear issue as subordinate to these perceived overarching goals of the Iranian regime, in order that certain policy measures – such as military action – would then seem both natural and desirable (Pugwash 2012b). This exemplifies one way in which the political production of ignorance can be viewed as a "social achievement" (Rayner 2012, 108), insofar as it is a deliberate, wilful exercise for others to not know certain things.[49] By selecting what knowledge to portray, it strategically manages the policy uncertainty through a direct framing of a perceived risk in need of response (Dedieu,

[49] This is perhaps best embodied by the extraordinary PowerPoint presentation made by Prime Minister Netanyahu on 30 April 2018 on "Iran's secret atomic archive," in which he selectively mobilized already-published materials on the Iranian nuclear file, presenting them as an unseen trove of stolen material prefaced by a slide in large type font reading, "Iran lied." See https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=_qBt4tSCALA (accessed 3 May 2018).

Jouzel, and Prete 2015) – indeed, the constant focus on an Iranian nuclear weapons programme deflects from the unacknowledged and 'opaque' Israeli stockpile.[50]

Another type of public diplomacy practice premised on ignorance can be highlighted through the reciprocal attempts by some Iranian participants to prevaricate disclosure on certain critical issues of concern with their national nuclear energy program.[51] One way in which this happened was the exercise of diplomatic skill: simply not directly answering the question asked of them but rather moving the conversation on through distraction and disguise, a kind of "sustained opacity" (Mallard forthcoming; Rappert and Balmer 2015, 329). In this way, focus was taken from an absence of information in need of explanation to often long-winded descriptions, for example of legal technicalities, that amount to over-provision of irrelevant information. Some Iranian participants were quite candid that that Pugwash meetings could be used to assert their national narrative: as one former Iranian diplomat declared to me,

> "I always attached great importance to 'Public Diplomacy.' People of the world have the right to know, listening directly to the source. The Pugwash meetings served that purpose to some extent."[52]

If one also considers the level of engagement of very senior Iranian participants (as presented in the previous chapter) at the Pugwash conferences, it becomes clearer that the public space of Pugwash meetings was repeatedly used as opportunities for the government of Iran, as well as the many other countries who send delegations, to reinforce their own national narrative on international affairs and the more specific issue of concern in that particular meeting.[53] Given

[50] The classic treatment of Israel's policy of nuclear opacity is by Avner Cohen (1998, 2010).

[51] In particular, the lack of clarification within the official IAEA records on 'possible military dimensions' and complete research and development (R&D) advancements, as well as a decade of evading full disclosure on other historical elements (see Pugwash 2014, 2015).

[52] DEC16.PW7

[53] While not within the research period, I can draw on another example to reinforce this point: the government of Kazakhstan sponsored the 62nd Pugwash Conference, held in its capital Astana, and during the proceedings

the media coverage at Pugwash conferences, the meetings thus "could play an important role in shaping the public opinion"[54] toward a preferred narrative. In this specific case, as the history of Iran's nuclear programme continues to be picked at for evidence of possible military dimensions, there is a clearly discernible need – by all parties involved – "to maintain consistent stories across successive periods, to avoid the loss of honor that comes with the admission of public lies" (Mallard forthcoming).

A final set of practices to bring to light is how "knowledge alibis" might be deployed in these spaces. A number of studies have shown that in high profile cases, one way of marginalizing or countering certain knowledge is "by mobilizing the ignorance of higher-placed experts" (McGoey 2012a, 563–64). Such research (e.g. on tobacco) has shown that the recruitment of distinguished scientists or experts with knowledge contradictory to any emergent consensus can create higher levels of uncertainty, which then muddies the water of a policy process reliant on certainty (Fernández Pinto 2017, 55–56). Looking at unofficial diplomacy, a corollary to proposing that certain actors are recognized as knowing well is that their opinions then naturally come to hold more weight in these same social spaces (Bourdieu 1989, 21).[55] These are individuals who, on each side of estranged relations, carry such symbolic authority at a specific point in time that "there isn't a different opinion: if they make a point that's the last word on the topic."[56] Such people can be instrumental in foreclosing discussion on a topic,

repeatedly try to influence the outcome document released by the Pugwash Council. Officials from both the Foreign Ministry and Senate were insistent (to me personally, as well as to colleagues) that we mention by name President Nazarbayev and thereby instantiate a kind of legitimacy that comes from being recognized by a transnational NGO.

[54] DEC16.PW8

[55] Linking this point with the earlier discussion in 6.1.1, Joseph Nye (2002, 67) has suggested that in the battle of public diplomacy in this age of abundant information, "political struggles occur over the creation and destruction of credibility" and it thus reputations themselves which become important sources of power.

[56] NOV14.BKK1.

particularly where it strays into sensitive territory that can be branded as *taboo* (J. Roberts 2015, 362).

In certain Pugwash meetings, there were times where discussion was deemed to go beyond the pale in exploring topics or scenarios: again, most often when discussing the veracity of whether the Iranian regime intended to destroy Israel. In such cases, there was a closing of ranks to a degree, a general 'team' dynamic that kicks in because those "who threaten to shatter the collective denial of unsettling problems are treated as disloyal, as whistleblowers" (McGoey 2012a, 566). Of course, in this tensely conflictive situation, 'whistleblowing' doesn't quite convey the emotional content of the discussions. Reflecting on this kind of occurrence, an Israeli academic relayed that,

> "I think Israelis are somewhat concerned oftentimes that criticising their government in a closed forum or a public forum will often be twisted and used against the state in a way that the person who made the criticism didn't want it to be… maybe if they push back on a respected authority that their voice will be marginalized as a result. Influence can work both ways, right."[57]

In the relatively high stakes of the issues at hand (as well as maintaining a reputation of expertise or authority in a national strategic community), one must be seen to also be a team player rather than a traitor.

This dynamic also goes for the case of the Ottawa Dialogue, where "if you know that most of the members of your delegation disagrees with you, then you tend to get closer to their views without fully compromising your views. It happens because you don't want to be the odd man out."[58] Such group dynamics are well documented in the literature (cf. R. J. Fisher 1990) but

[57] JUN15.PW2
[58] NOV14.BKK1

my research has sought to highlight other ways in which they can come about. One such way is from the embodied or sedimented perceptions of individual participants' roles, "a certain inhibition which continues to operate, a carry-over from days in office."[59] At the same time, the sociality of the strategic communities in which these professionals work means that,

> "you've got to go back and survive, right. It doesn't operate at a very open level, it operates at a very different level, if you know what I mean. It's about people making their opinions about you, and stuff like that. It functions at a very subterranean, indirect level."[60]

Most generally, tabooing requires the intervention of a particularly authoritative figure but equally the social context of each of these professionals' participation has a forceful effect. Within India, for example, the under-developed environment of civil society space dictates that "we have not come to that level of strategic culture where speaking out against the line is respected – respected by your own group."[61] I would argue that this same dynamic operates, under the radar as it were, in the other national contexts implicated in this research.

The previous two subsections have elaborated a number of the strategic dimensions of the political context of unofficial diplomacy, which relate to how authority and knowledge can be put to use. It has shown two parallel drives that are often present: the desire by many participants to identify through 'feeling out' who else in the room has knowledge worth knowing; and the ways in which different actors compete to portray certain knowledge as either worth knowing or strategically marginalizing it as not worth knowing. In such ways, both knowledge and non-knowledge are put to use in similar ways to meet the needs of participants and, at times, to fulfil certain political goals and requirements.

[59] NOV14.BKK6
[60] NOV14.BKK1
[61] NOV14.BKK5

6.4 Knowledge as power: the openness and closure of knowledge networks

This chapter has illustrated some of the ways in which the meetings of my case studies take place, showing that the social and political dynamics underpinning the practices challenge a straightforward notion of these being spaces in which knowledge is just transferred. The 'how' question has been shown to revolve centrally around the different resources of the participants involved. The empirical material presented two key rationalities for analysis: on the one hand, many participants seek to assert themselves as having authoritative knowledge on the issues; on the other hand, participants therefore also use these spaces to seek out who else they can consider as knowing well. As other research in IR is increasingly focused on, my contention is that the various sources of authority that participants draw upon – expertise, experience, connectedness, institutional delegation, all designated as capital – are not static properties but are constituted and reconstituted through a process that plays out amongst relevant parties (Sending 2015; Kennedy 2016). Moreover, individual performance is not restricted to the confines of one meeting but impacts on a wider scale through the various networks and permeates domestic fields.

The products of these twin rationalities have also been demonstrated in how knowledge is practically perceived and mobilized in the spaces of unofficial diplomacy. Drawing attention to the underlying politics of knowledge production, the previous section showed the strategic games that are deployed in a way that participants socially construct how, and which, knowledge is deemed of value in the field. Through a traditional deference to the state and sovereignty and equally the keen opportunity of influence afforded by its liminal position, governments and their representatives hold an overarching power in this activity. Employing the approach of Bourdieu, in particular, has allowed the analysis to home in on how the actors

involved reproduce the dominant social relations through discourse and practice. Indeed, in many ways, those actors who 'toe the line' and do not challenge too heavily the existing order tend to enjoy a more privileged position relationally (Mérand 2010). However, the point has also been to illustrate that there are still layers of competition and contestation which take place in practice which obscure some kind of straightforward transmission of information between parties.

The goal of transfer in these spaces is thus a multifaceted and complex proposition not simply met through the facilitated dialogue between recognized authorities on the issues. Such characteristics are rarely, if ever, brought forth in the Track Two literature, certainly not in the explicit terms of a competitive logic.[62] I would suggest that many practitioners of unofficial diplomacy nonetheless recognize the occurrence of these drives in the work, leaving it as an unspoken assumption of complexity – the way in which these things work. Moreover, these tacit, inherently practical, processes are important to bring out because they speak to the individual and collective dimensions of the broader (diplomatic) context in which unofficial diplomacy takes place.

In many ways, this has been a different (theoretical) route to supplement the Track Two research that looks at 'theories of change' (Shapiro 2006) and to provide some evidence that any focus on the individual level must recognize the social context in which the interactions – and the inter-group conflict more generally – take place (R. J. Fisher 1990; Condor and Brown 1988). The knowledge brought by participants is considered an important contribution in

[62] Naturally, the role of the facilitator/practitioner/mediator is to reduce the extent to which such practices impact upon the process of dialogue, and the literature reflects a preoccupation with overcoming or mitigating them (cf. Jones 2015, chap. 4). Nonetheless, I again argue that, in doing so, the presence of these interesting dynamics has been obscured and we are left with less explanatory power for why unofficial diplomacy happens.

making the processes possible, hence the kinds of personalities that have been showcased in this research. This chapter has highlighted that interpretation of this knowledge is a most crucial aspect (J. Best 2008) and that this equally depends on who is involved. In many cases, participants are selected because they are recognized in their strategic communities for the accumulation of the various capitals at stake. They are thus trusted that, in the process of the mediation, they will both assert the general knowledge of their own strategic community – they "represent views that are as close to the larger thinking…that actually frames policy"[63] – as well as being able to authoritatively interpret and mediate the knowledge coming from the other side. Fundamentally, this process of social authorization helps to explain why participants do not deviate too much from their national narratives nor even their governmental policy, in a way sanctioning them as representative of this broader view.

The mediation therefore happens, on the one hand, at the level of the individual, requiring them to place in suspension their core beliefs about the ways in which the world is constituted and allow vulnerability about what is knowable. On the other hand, this chapter has shown how social dynamics significantly impact the ways in which such individuals understand and practice the activity. On both fronts, we find ourselves in a space of 'uncomfortable knowledge,' where uncertainty is hardly alleviated by ambiguities and the deliberate mobilization of types of ignorance (Rayner 2012; J. Best 2012). As such, the notion of socialization can be complicated in a way that takes it beyond a psychological process where elites become more receptive to one another's ideas (Kaye 2007, 106). It is, indeed, often about developing a cadre of professionals who are familiar with the processes of meeting the other (Kelman 1995, 21; Burgess and Burgess 2011); but unofficial diplomacy is a site of *multiple*

[63] NOV14.BKK3, quoted above

mediation: between estranged polities, among different kinds of professionals, and including various narratives to be navigated.

Similarly, acknowledging and extrapolating from the often-partisan content of certain discourses within meetings can reveal that participants also, at times, use the spaces for purposes beyond socialization and transfer. The condition of estrangement and uncertainty amongst different political communities can demand opportunities to (re-)assert national narratives of why a conflict continues, most acutely for government officials or their close representatives in the exercise of public diplomacy. Participants from all kinds of professions use such spaces in order to obfuscate competing realities: the practices of denial and tabooing shown above are not unique to government but can be reinforced by group-level dynamics. What we see therefore is that the space of unofficial diplomacy is one which various actors seek to compete over and occupy.

Where participants struggle to understand it as either one thing or another, the quality of liminality that the previous chapter illustrated helps us to understand the space as one of possibility. This chapter has gone on to argue that the various practices of knowledge-making deployed by participants must also be layered into this explanation. The foil of ambiguity inherent in the processes permits governments – whether directly involved or merely implicated through transfer – to maintain a position of plausible deniability (Chataway 1998, 273). While privately encouraging certain actors to participate they can publicly decry or refute the relevance of its products.

Nonetheless, the power of unofficial diplomacy comes from providing the access to both the other side as well as various forms of professional knowledge, and the latent possibility that

officials may appropriate ideas and knowledge gleaned from these meetings. Non-governmental participants are also able to use the flexibility of these processes, chiefly to maintain ambiguous claims to policy influence and thereby enhance their own sense of authority through access to the officials. As noted by Gil Eyal, "the capacity of intellectuals to wield knowledge as power no doubt depends to some degree on their capacity to restrict access to it" (2002, 654–55). This 'closure' of expert knowledge captures how participants interpret and subsequently present it to other audiences in order to manipulate their own relevance. Ultimately, for all kinds of participants to unofficial diplomacy, the liminality, ambiguity, and the possibility of private communication allows them to wield specialized knowledge of the other and of the issues of international affairs.

CHAPTER 7. THROUGH THE EYES OF UNOFFICIAL DIPLOMACY

> "at the end of the day it *is* diplomacy… What is diplomacy? You're buying bananas at a shop and trying to haggle the price, that is diplomacy, simple diplomacy… if you walk away without bananas then diplomacy has failed."[1]

This thesis set out to interrogate why unofficial diplomacy happens in the way it does, a research question premised on uncovering and illustrating a wide set of practices that capture the distinctive but fuzzy character of what takes place in these spaces. The research demonstrates the complex dimensions of how trust and mistrust affect interactions, how ambiguous and indeterminate social networks enable an influential location for the activities, and how various strategic dynamics impact the practical process of knowledge mediation. Over the course of the dissertation these various factors have amounted to substantiating my central claim that how knowledge is produced in these spaces is a contentious process subject to political and social logics that often reproduce existing structures and hierarchies.

From the outset, this research was presented with an awkward problem: the scholar-practitioners of Track Two have tended to eschew International Relations theory as being abstract and disconnected from the real-world situations they study; at the same time, International Relations scholars have been more or less in the dark about processes of unofficial diplomacy. Marrying the two has thus been a tall order; this research has not sought to combine two modes of analysis that are different in their various assumptions but rather to put them (back) into conversation. The central challenge I set myself was to incrementally build up a picture of why it happens in the way that it does that not only brings to light these discussions among groups of people from countries in conflict but to do so in a way that was, on the one

[1] APR15.BKK14

hand, genuinely useful to those other researchers who study the same realities, and on the other hand, of genuine interest to a community of scholars relatively unaware of what takes place in these shadowed spaces.

The result, I believe, is of real relevance given that, as one scholar has recently noted, the activity "seems to be a fixture of the international scene that shows no sign of going away" (Jones 2015, 165). Indeed, the proliferation of instances of international conflict resolution in recent years demands that we understand it in a fresh and dynamic way. Because of the novelty of the data and the need to bring several theoretical and methodological perspectives together in order to make sense of it, I have highlighted and probed a series of disciplinary gaps. Introducing the fascinating and puzzling practices of unofficial diplomacy to IR scholarship has generated some key insights and sought new conversations: in one sense, the dissertation can be seen as a mediation between Track Two and IR; in a different vein, it also revolves around dialogue between research in global governance and diplomacy. The cumulative effect has been multiple interventions in different fields, which this conclusion will attempt to capture. I begin with spelling out the methodological implications of the work for Track Two and the theoretical contributions for others working in IR using a practice lens. I then summarize the key arguments that have been carried through the preceding chapters, detailing my contributions to knowledge as well as identifying future areas of research, before moving on to some more general reflections on how looking through the eyes of this activity helps us see changes to diplomacy more broadly.

7.1 Synopsis of theoretical contributions

7.1.1 A theoretical impetus for Track Two

Most generally, the approach of this research has been to underline that analyses of processes of international conflict resolution have not sought to use theory in a way that provides a foundation to what is happening and why. Track Two literature that looks at the kinds of cases found in this dissertation is chiefly concerned with accounting for them in terms of process and outcome. There has been discussion of theory-building, often accompanied by a concern to be taken more seriously by IR scholars and diplomats alike. But a key point is that these have mostly been written from the perspective of those organizing and facilitating the contact between adversaries, rivals, conflicting parties, in the search for what works, what doesn't work, how might the discipline improve its practices. While this is understandable as far as it goes, it has tended to ignore or downplay key dynamics that take place, and my assertion is that investigation into these – and particularly the people who are the main constituents of the work – produces a great deal more insight into why we see the phenomenon of unofficial diplomacy appearing.

Diplomacy Becomes Them has therefore attempted a story of constitution: it has been keenly interested in the contextual elements of *how* it all works and *who* is involved, in order to provide a grander set of ideas for *why* it happens in the way that it does. Despite signposts for a more fruitful research agenda, there are also clear limitations to what I have done. I openly acknowledge that studying processes of unofficial diplomacy is a huge challenge, particularly when attempting to synthesize multiple examples and draw lessons for the discipline. The

empirical evidence collected comes from two quite specific cases;[2] if one were to compare these to the 'universe' of what takes place under the umbrella of Track Two, one may feel that the differing dynamics brought to light are not readily apparent in other cases. I have tried to weigh the necessity of delimiting my case studies as examples of elite-based dialogue against the need to extrapolate some broader trends. Rather than only selecting one or two very similar cases to confirm some kind of validity of results,[3] I believe that a sociological approach identifies homologies of professional life which provide a measure of contextualization to what is, at root, human activity. The fact that the two empirical cases featured here are quite different from one another and yet still hold a solid measure of comparability hopefully goes some way to validating this perspective. One injunction stemming from the preceding pages is that the messiness of this universe can be a starting point of both theorizing and analysing processes of international conflict resolution.

The broader engagement of Track Two with IR, particularly diplomacy, is a crucial contribution: it points to declaring that unofficial diplomacy cannot, in fact, be fully understood without recourse to its underlying diplomatic purpose. By extension, this challenges those who drop the 'diplomacy' from their work to critically assess why they do the work they do, and what it means in relation to what else happens at a global level. This may surprise, even disappoint, some scholars but this finding is reaffirmed across the two case studies, since many of those actors implicated in the work sense that their participation not only contributes to official diplomacy but is in itself a form of diplomacy.[4] The value added of bringing IR

[2] The data collection process has also been a fairly rare example of someone embedded in such processes switching to also become a researcher in a way that, to my knowledge, has not impacted those who participate (and hopefully will not impact my own future participation).

[3] Accepting, of course, my point that I did not so much select the cases as have them presented as an opportunity to conduct this research.

[4] There are many quotes similar to the one that opens this chapter I could draw upon from my own research, but I would also point to the numerous excerpts cited in Chataway (1998) that similarly confirm this impression.

scholarship to these case studies was to make use of a range of concepts that clearly bring out the diplomatic purpose in light of its networked, governance-like nature, as well as reciprocally showing productive practices of governing as being part and parcel of modern diplomacy. As I will explore below, this intertwining of governance and diplomacy is being unpacked by other scholars in exciting new ways.

At the same time, I have also shown the great overlap in the concerns of those in Track Two with how I pursued my case studies. The great body of scholarship on these processes identifies a variety of concepts that I speak to and engage through my research: contact, transfer, influence, socialization, percolation, and the autonomy dilemma among others. By choosing to take a different theoretical direction to the same types of empirical material, I have sought to probe, highlight, and disentangle a number of interesting avenues that I saw as underdeveloped aspects of the literature. The hope is that my approach, and the sociological inquiry into the practices of informal mediation, can stimulate a new conversation for those seeking to document what happens when different kinds of people from across a conflict line are brought into dialogue.

7.1.2 Practices in international politics

As the introductory chapter elaborated, I was fortuitously able to participate in and study two similar types of activity, not just from the outside but through immersion: getting to know not just how things are organized and run but getting to know and observe the people who do the work. This carried the challenge of how to capture dynamics which are situated and localized as I observe them but simultaneously carry a wider meaning because of who is doing them. The tacit knowledge I had that each actor is possibly, likely to be, connected to the corridors of power produces a quite strange, unreal, quality to what I saw taking place. Moreover, in

comparing the two case studies and understanding the participation of government officials and diplomats in the networks, it is clear that, in their minds, these spaces are not really about a separation between state and non-state. The actors in this research are all professionals, often simultaneously national and transnational in what tasks they do day-to-day, and so the cumulative effect of their actions speaks to an evolving socio-political order that is global in character. As such, making sense of the empirics demanded an approach that could engage these complexities.

The theoretical engagement and framework developed acts as a small contribution to the lively conversations taking place on the application of practice-based approaches to international relations. The point made in Chapter 1 – that there are many ways to read practices in world politics – holds true for how this research oriented itself. I have variously identified patterns of activity pursued by the actors in this research as a way into describing how they bring order to their world,[5] because alternative theoretical positions had real limitations in explaining the dynamics that were present. For example, to capture the historical dimension to each case – how entrenched mistrust and more recent estrangement affect present interactions – looking at practice (particularly through Bourdieu) tells us that such factors and emotional beliefs constituted within a community are in a sense 'deposited' in individuals (Wacquant 1992, 16). As we saw in Chapter 4, this interesting structure-agency interplay informs their very way of being and provides the 'grammar' and disposition for what action ought to be taken when confronted with an enemy.

[5] Adler and Pouliot (2011b, 4) and Best and Gheciu similarly view practices as "knowledge-constituted, meaningful patterns of socially recognized activity that structure experience and that enable agents to reproduce or transform their world" (2014b, 26–27).

This research has, most centrally, delivered novel empirical material for the growing number of scholars looking to read practices in diplomacy and diplomatic activities. It has also, quite importantly, done so not through looking at diplomats themselves: where some scholars have sought to illustrate changing practices of diplomacy through official processes, I have approached the topic from a different angle. I believe that this not only responds to a gap in this literature but in fact helps to bolster many of the claims made – not least, that if "diplomacy is about mediation between the inside and outside of distinct polities, and the character and relationship between these polities change… it would be surprising if diplomatic practice were to remain unchanged" (Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann 2011, 542).

From the outside, the notion of unofficial diplomacy as a site of dialogue between communities in conflict could be seen as an attempt at transforming the shared understandings of those involved and thereby challenging the status quo set of practices that perpetuate rivalry, as much Track Two work heralds. Yet the empirical material has illustrated how participants to unofficial diplomacy are, in and through practice, constrained in their desire for change. Whether borne of a need to maintain credibility or simply to re-enact the conflict in the confines of the meeting, the previous chapter revealed most starkly that political and social dynamics are refracted in the meeting space and that implicit in the process is the very reproduction of the power of the state through the very people – whether nominally 'non-state' or not – who partake in unofficial diplomacy.

7.2 Synopsis of key arguments

Beyond the wider theoretical contributions, each empirical chapter advanced a key argument that speaks to the larger preoccupation of this dissertation: investigating how knowledge is produced in these spaces tells us more about why unofficial diplomacy is a significant

phenomenon in world politics. Importantly, this research has not advanced a position that these processes affect outcomes in a significant or measurable way. To be sure, Chapter 4 did show that some participants admitted a reduction in mistrust and suspicion upon sustained contact; but this must be measured against the continued deployment of 'political games' seen in Chapter 6. Reciprocally, in one case study most clearly, there was a reduction in these games being played which would perhaps indicate that security dilemma sensibility and potentially empathy were being developed in the group. More research could be conducted into enquiring of participants a more systematic understanding of whether this is the case and whether trust is being developed on an interpersonal level. However, one of the fascinating tensions that hovers in this work is the time-boundedness of many endeavours.

Within Pugwash, one insider viewed its work as "kind of like a pop-up restaurant… to come together out of expediency at a moment to handle a grave threat that all agree is a threat. You hope to leave the world a little safer."[6] The Iran nuclear issue has lingered on the international agenda since 2003, and even at the time of writing can be said to be ongoing. Yet the height of Pugwash activity and influence was short-lived, partly by design: the focus was not on building trust but on acting as a node for knowledge exchange. Key influencers and champions in positions of authority come and go relatively quickly – as governments and administrations shift, so do the strategies of those involved. Similarly, with the Ottawa Dialogue, time has been spent creating a group of retired officials among whom some limited trust has been built, perhaps even approaching something like a community of practice[7] – however, as recognized by many, the longer they are retired, the less their influence becomes, and the more they

[6] NOV15.PW6

[7] A key text in this regard is Adler (2008), who defines the communities of practice as "likeminded groups of practitioners who are informally as well as contextually bound by a shared interest in learning and applying a common practice." See also Pouliot (2008). The dynamic, fluid, and emergent forms of networked cooperation in this research may in themselves contribute a novel understanding of appraising communities of practice as more transient and ad hoc but tolerating a wider sense of 'likemindedness' than seen elsewhere in this literature.

fraternize with the enemy, the less they are regarded as credible in their strategic community. These tensions cannot resolve themselves simply and are an accepted hazard of the work that challenge a fascination with outcomes over process. Therefore, to understand why it is important is not so much to look for its impact as to look at how it happens: to investigate the form the mediation of estrangement takes is also to see the power involved and understand what may be changing within diplomacy more broadly (Der Derian 1987a, 92).

Firstly, these processes are, in fact, less about *building* trust and more about the suspension of *mistrust* between people on either side of a conflict line. Indeed, this suspension is implicit in the diplomatic purpose and practice of unofficial diplomacy. Asking why unofficial diplomacy happens at all, Chapter 4 showed that the pervasive mistrust which operates through individuals at a generalized level has to be placed in suspension in order that trust might be built at an interpersonal level between people who consider the other to be an enemy. This diplomatic 'fiction' practically helps those involved to mediate between their own knowledge and ignorance of the people they have called an enemy. Coming to know the mind of the other in spite of estrangement provides a crucial information-gathering resource for participants which is not taking place to the same degree at an official level.

Trust is thus not merely an outcome but can also be a facilitating dimension of the work; analysts should not just look to see if trust has been achieved but look to the ways in which trust can enable conflict resolution itself. Track Two scholars can also operationalize trust-building such that it doesn't appear simply as an uncomplicated aspiration of the activity but becomes an active component of the research, importantly including a focus on mistrust. Identifying the micro-practices of where a tipping point for trusting behaviour can begin may encourage others to follow suit and more deeply engage with the literature on trust in the other

social sciences, particularly the emerging work in International Relations. Here, Nick Wheeler and others have done much to raise the profile of trust as an avenue of research. With its emphasis on trust as an inarticulate practical sense that informs the actions of agents, this dissertation has added a slightly different dimension to this body of work. At the same time, the focus on mistrust as a structuring predisposition highlights the role that uncertainty and ignorance play in world politics, particularly their role in sustaining security dilemmas.

Secondly, I showed that unofficial diplomacy is able to harness the often-ambiguous social connectedness of its participants in order to claim a position of inbetweenness – neither official nor fully unofficial – which imbues it with productive power as space liminal to the state. Chapter 5 critically assessed who the participants are and how networks emerged from their interactions. In most cases, the elite cast of foreign policy professionals know they are not officially sanctioned to mediate estrangement yet, in part because of who may be implicated at arm's length, are aware they are not simply exchanging knowledge in an academic sense. This is just one way in which the transfer of information and impressions away from the meeting spaces is a key resource for gathering information as well as facilitating communication between siloed communities. Not only does transfer take place to the governments whose official diplomacy is unproductive but through the networks and strategic communities of those involved, the mediated knowledge percolates in domestic and global policy space.

In general, more emphasis in Track Two research should be given to accounting for how participants are professionals in their own right, embedded in domestic fields of activity and other networks, and self-interestedly seeking to generate policy-relevant knowledge and claim authority. This can open up enquiries into how 'lateral' transfer operates and encourage researchers to think in terms of networked knowledge transfer, rather than seeing endeavours

as isolated 'islands' of activity. Moreover, the emphasis on the networked quality of the work speaks to a vibrant research area of IR: investigating transnational professionals and the knowledge they wield is of vital importance for understanding the sociality and authority claims of those involved in global governance. Again, the focus on practices highlights that there are many types of professionals – active as well as retired – that contribute to governing issues in myriad ways, even if it is not their intention to formally do so. The ways in which such actors seamlessly transition between their domestic environ and these much more 'thinly' socialized transnational environments relies upon knowledge and, particularly, claims to authoritative knowledge.

Thirdly, the resolution of conflict is not the only thing at stake in these processes but in fact we see the refraction and replaying of political narratives and diplomatic disputes that expose the underlying social and political dynamics among those involved. As such, the actual mediation of knowledge is not unproblematically net-positive: while the activity physically and psychologically brings people together it can also practically reinforce estrangement and political difference. Chapter 6 illustrated that influence is largely constituted through social recognition that helps determine who may be viewed as knowing well, a signal that an individual can both represent the knowledge of their strategic community and also be trusted to refract and communicate mediated knowledge back to that strategic community. The chapter also reinforced that these spaces are realms of possibility for strategic behaviour, as participants engaged in various games that constitute and reconstitute what knowledges are of value.

There is certainly scope for Track Two researchers to elaborate into what happens practically in meeting spaces. To be sure, there are ethical and methodological issues that I have highlighted throughout; however, frankly-documented accounts of what kinds of practices

make up the experiences of participants and facilitators alike will have analytical purchase beyond the field of Track Two. This chapter, and the dissertation more generally, speaks to how IR scholars are stepping away from monolithic conceptions of expertise, influence, and authority to look at how knowledge is produced in practice. What we find is that increasingly the label of expertise reflects underlying social and political processes of recognition and that these then rally around certain narratives. In particular, I have briefly shown how certain types of ignorance and uncertainty can be mobilized to great effect: this joins a quite new set of conversations which critically address the different ways knowledge is put to use in world politics and shows where power is exercised. Above all, the examples presented in Chapter 6 reveal why the state (as such) may see fit to engage and imbricate its representatives in these networks that will speak in interesting ways to other scholars seeking to understand tensions and changes in how 'public' and 'private' are being redefined by what is actually done in practice.

Ultimately, these latter reflections speak to a recurrent theme of this dissertation: the autonomy dilemma that faces these kinds of processes. In Herman Kraft's work, and those others who have studied the particularities of the Southeast Asian circuits of 'unofficial' dialogue, the conclusion drawn is that "track two is moving towards greater alignment with government and their agenda. In this context, how far can track two maintain its autonomy and provide effective support to track one?" (H. J. S. Kraft 2000, 347). While this is of course specific to the Asia Pacific region, the empirical detail of this dissertation speaks to the same theme. As governments become more aware and engaged in the efforts of informal mediation, their role in 'providing support' diminishes: we see not only the reproduction of state-diplomatic logics but also an increasing constraint on the originality of conflict *resolution* ideas – in fact, one might conclude that processes tend toward conflict *management*, in the sense of maintaining

the status quo. There is a clear link here between the notions of practice, habit, and power that is exposed when we complicate the proposition of a strict state/non-state divide. As I have shown, even where representatives of the state are not directly involved, other people – retired officials and non-officials – find themselves representative of something diplomatic.

7.3 Diplomacy at work

Overall, the insights of my research have painted a complex picture of what takes place in these spaces and this has a number of implications for the study of diplomacy. The sociological perspective has allowed me to show how the activity engages and implicates a wide range of professionals, all of whom are variously impacted by the effects of what happens because of the socially networked quality of professional political life – this involves not just diplomats but paints a different background to where diplomacy takes place. As noted above, the research demonstrates that the location between fields, the ambiguity, liminality, and tensely political nature of this unofficial activity all contribute to producing something quite unusual: that the multi-faceted mediation – of estranged political communities, of different professionals, of contested knowledges – does not generate neatly bounded or homogenizing interactions. Rather, the contact can often be characterized by struggle. In Bourdieusian terms, there is no singular field of unofficial diplomacy; and yet, I want to suggest that, in spite of this, a key set of practices that guides participants comes from the underlying sense of diplomacy in this work.

Despite the plethora of smaller practices which I have illustrated that make up the overall activity of unofficial diplomacy, there is arguably a central 'anchoring practice' (Swidler 2001) which draws participants back to viewing the work of unofficial diplomacy through a frame of official diplomatic engagement. In this sense, the activity of unofficial diplomacy is organized

according to a largely diplomatic logic, which in turn orders the other practices around it. At its most basic level, this argument can be seen to be a product of the very fact that the activity is often labelled as diplomacy (whether unofficial, Track Two, even citizen) and this very instantiation directs participants to understand and use it in such a way. Interestingly, in the practical form that meetings often take, this is quite deliberately avoided: participants are instructed to dress casually and rarely do two sides sit opposite one another to negotiate; efforts by the organizers frequently attempt to reduce formality. Nevertheless, where the *habitus* of a good number of participants has been shaped by years of officialdom, and where the background of the international relations is so profoundly marked by estrangement and mistrust, interactions between nationals of conflicting countries seem to reproduce a diplomatic character. The focus on practices helps us to look beyond consciously chosen action and rather to the more unconscious and routinized patterns of discourse and physical engagement that participants often fell back upon.

Ultimately, the participants to both case studies generally believe that states – those territorial representations of political order – have the final word on conflict resolution. In South Asia, the repeated protest that 'we are just track two' implies a sharp awareness of the limits of their actions; equally in Pugwash, the very engagement of officials reflects that unofficial diplomacy is viewed in some sense as not just complementary but subsidiary to state diplomacy. The kinds of emergent networks that appear in this research and the imbrication of state actors within them show not the withering of the state but the pursuit of the same goals by other means (Picciotto 2000). To different degrees, states understand the latent potential of unofficial diplomacy and engage accordingly. What might be said to be novel, however, is that those agents involved – both official and unofficial – are increasingly implicated in the production and performance of certain governing-like tasks.

Some studies view unofficial diplomacy as possibly competing with or undermining official diplomacy while others see the activity in terms of 'new' actors and a new diplomatic system (Cooper, Heine, and Thakur 2013, 19). Presenting diplomacy as a trans-historical institution that begins at contact between different polities, I have sought to show that we must pay attention to the form that this interaction takes. Above all, this dissertation shows how diplomacy is, in fact, increasingly embedded in the social life of many different types of actor, who now perform some practices very much like those of the traditional diplomat.[8] It is worth noting that I was not just pleasantly surprised by the willingness of nearly all participants approached to be interviewed and be a part of the research, but that this very fact helped me to understand that they were engaged in something not so secretive or precious – the exercise of travelling to be a part of these kinds of discussions made up one aspect of their professional lives that they largely conducted elsewhere. Many of the individuals featured throughout the preceding chapters produce and mediate knowledge (information-gathering), perform and contest political narratives (communication), and mediate estrangement in a fashion that their own national diplomats at times cannot or will not do.[9]

This *diplomatization* of everyday practices has become a fact of professional life for many presented in this research, as well as for many other kinds of actors in the extensively-networked knowledge economy that is central to modern political life.[10] As the quote from the

[8] Of course, these actors and groups do not perform all of the tasks of the diplomat all of the time, leaving the professional jurisdiction of diplomats over diplomacy relatively robust (Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann 2011).

[9] They also may, at times and to different degrees, perform the other key function of the diplomat, namely negotiation, but this is a much rarer task as I have shown.

[10] Jönsson and Hall's attempts to capture the dynamic nature of "processes and relationships that contribute to the differentiation of political space" (2005, 15) led them to suggest 'diplomatize' as an active process. 'Diplomatization' was then coined by Iver Neumann to describe how "present preconditions for knowledge production… are making other professions and other fields of expertise more similar to diplomacy and the diplomat's way of being in the world" (2012, 177).

former Defence Secretary opening this chapter acknowledges, diplomacy can be seen everywhere if one looks for it. The analytical importance of this is to look beyond buying bananas and concentrate the mind on how important issues of international security and state-to-state relations are now governed through loose, informal arrangements, taking place in liminal policy spaces by actors ambiguously connected to the state, in ways that replicate the forms of diplomacy. This exemplifies the merging of the research agendas of diplomacy and global governance: we see how the traditional conception of 'club diplomacy' is being challenged and supplanted by an increasing emphasis on 'network diplomacy' (Heine 2013) that necessarily involves combinations of actors other than the state to (competently) perform the tasks at hand. It is in this sense that I re-assert that what these actors of unofficial diplomacy do *becomes* the epithet of diplomacy. At the same time, diplomacy is *becoming* more nuanced because of the complex movements and relationships enabled by the sociality of participants in their efforts to frame the various problems connected to estrangement.

One final set of thoughts emerge from this in relation to the tasks of the traditional diplomat as seen through the eyes of those who participate in unofficial diplomacy. Other scholars have illustrated the ways in which diplomacy has adapted to the abundance of information and speed of transmission facilitated primarily by the internet (Seib 2012). Although such revolutionary change has proceeded since at least the use of sub-oceanic cables in the mid-19th century (Wille 2016), professional diplomats have continually had to compete with increasing information and a wider variety of professionals who produce, transmit, and contest knowledge that would have ordinarily been a part of diplomatic reporting.[11] One dimension of this that I believe my research emphasizes is, in fact, the continuation of practice rather than change. At a time of

[11] Neumann, for example, points to similar cases in 1917 and in 2003 where diplomats explicitly prefer to use the local newspapers as a basis for reporting rather than 'in-field' information-gathering (2012, 179).

hyper-saturation of information, those diplomats whom I spoke with emphasized the significance of retaining access to networks which help them to understand the views of a strategic community and how knowledge was produced within it. The point underscores the resistance of diplomats – and diplomacy more generally – to others infringing on their role as recognized representatives of the sovereign (Neumann 2012).

Nevertheless, the empirical detail of this project has shown that other diplomatic tasks are evolving. To a modest degree, representation as a principle can be viewed as moving away from strictly geospatial forms (that is, the territorial diplomat) toward the inclusion of more symbolic expressions of community, solidarity, and expertise (Sending, Pouliot, and Neumann 2011). A key feature of unofficial diplomacy is the strategy of deploying ambiguity as a basis of a claim to represent the larger thinking of a country. In South Asia, the Indian and Pakistan former officials are the crucial 'continual link' back to officialdom. To be sure, they themselves do not claim to be representatives of the state but their presence in these dialogues is specifically to *re*-present what is not there, as the earliest emissaries did for their sovereign. In lieu of official participants, retirees are chosen precisely because they so carefully embodied the state in their own careers and are now called upon to access the vestiges of this experience. This polite fiction, accepted as practice, is what allows the Ottawa Dialogue to occupy an 'inbetweenness' that works for participants and governments alike. Similarly, within the Pugwash network the shuttle diplomacy of the Secretary-General is designed precisely to get around the estrangement of relations and represent the views of people who could not always sit together. Of course, "playing the part of the other side"[12] is a slightly different mode of re-presenting than seen in the OD,[13] but in the history of professional diplomats even, this is not

[12] JUN15.PW5

[13] It was described thus: "The whole point of going to listen to different people's perspectives is to then be sure that those perspectives are heard around the table" NOV16.PW6. This was recognized by the Israelis, who saw

atypical: not only did this happen before the crystallization of the modern state system but equally micro-states in the present day hire 'foreigners' as essentially diplomatic mercenaries (Neumann 2012, 2). Again, there is fictional aspect to accepting this kind representation and this is afforded by the boundary location of third parties such as Pugwash.

There remain some crucial questions as to whether this shift in representation constitutes something accepted as legitimate. As Sending, Neumann, and Pouliot note in their reflections on the future of diplomacy, "representation is organized around the idea of advancing the interest of a given constituency, where those interests are presumed to be defined through communication with the constituency" (2011, 539). To varying degrees, the governments implicated in this research accept that the landscape around them is shifting. Indeed, diplomats have been somewhat complicit in allowing their practices to be reproduced in the ways that I have described. Communication works both between estranged communities and then from those socially authorized to represent back to their strategic communities. It is thus not so much because the conditions of estrangement and mistrust push governments and their official representatives toward alternative forms of contact but, perhaps, that they see that imbricating their people inside of these networks in turn maintains power and influence. Unofficial diplomacy provides us with a rich set of insights into how governance and diplomacy are adapting to an evolving global configuration of social and political relations.

the opportunity of "access to Tehran. [It's] useful to hear Paolo because he has been briefed at highest level." JUN15.PW4

APPENDIX 1: SAMPLE INTERVIEW GUIDE

[Example of interview questions for a participant of the Ottawa Dialogue]

I have a set of questions I would like to ask you but this is very much an open-ended conversation – there may be certain areas you have more to say than others, and if there is something you feel I may have missed please do speak up or interrupt me.

Background: Impressions of and personal involvement in track 2

I've heard many participants in the meetings repeat that we are "just track 2". I'm interested, at a broad level, in what your impression is of what we're doing here.

- So just briefly, what does the term track 2, or track 2 diplomacy, mean to you?
- What do you believe the purpose of track 2 diplomacy to be?
- Are there situations where it is more useful than others?
- Does it imply that a conflict or dispute is not being managed at the official level?
- How long have you been involved in any kind of track 2? Did you hear about track 2 diplomacy while still serving in government?
- What motivated you to become initially involved in track 2 [when retired/serving]?
- Did you know what to expect when you arrived at your first meeting? How?
- [You mentioned you had heard of track 2 while serving in government, what were your impressions of it then?]

Transfer and influence

It is said that a prominent aspect of track 2 is the individuals involved, such as yourself, and the ways in which they are able to promote and push the ideas coming from these meetings through personal connections. Something known as transfer.

- How would you evaluate the dissemination of the ideas, proposals or initiatives from our meetings as related to the Dialogue as a whole? Is it a central purpose?
- How do you see your own role; do you view yourself as an expert?
- Peter often asks that participants consult or speak to their connections in government upon returning home to share the ideas and discussions we have had here.
- How would you describe your interactions when speaking to officials?
- What kinds of words would you use to describe your role [prompt? influence, conversational, personal, informational…]
- Given that as a group you are nearly all retired officials, what do you make of the reception of track 2 ideas by current officials or policymakers?

- Do you ever feel concerned that the more you do track 2 and potentially become associated with the Ottawa Dialogue the less officials might wish to hear from you?

Authority and personal connections

- Do you feel any kind of special responsibility to conduct track 2? Do you feel you have an obligation based on your experience to conduct such work?
- One of the themes of my research is this relationship between those outside of track 2 and those people who participate, who are on the inside if you like.
- Do you feel that what you do in the track 2 world is recognized beyond it, for example by officials or in the think tank world? In a negative or positive light?
- Do people outside of the track 2 world enquire to you how to become involved in track 2? Is there interest or intrigue from them to participate?
- Do you think that there are some participants who hold more authority than others? That is, are there some who, for example, have more respect given to them within meetings and also in the official world?
- What kinds of things would you say go in to creating this sense of authority?

Public and private

Another thing I have been trying to think through is that really a track 2 is composed of individuals with their own perspectives and opinions on the matters under discussion. You mentioned earlier that your reasons for participating are XXX and so I wanted to ask,

- To what extent do you find yourself frustrated with current policy within your country and how comfortable do you feel expressing this in a track 2 meeting?
- Do you feel that track 2 settings are good locations to co-develop alternative policy initiatives (with the other side)?
- Do you have a sense that everyone feels liberated to participate in their personal capacities? If not, what do you feel might be behind a reluctance to express personal views?
- Do you feel that as a group, you are all like-minded, in the sense that ultimately you all desire peace between the two countries?
- How does this contrast from when you served in government?

Identity: The creation of a group of track 2 proponents

The development of a group of people across conflict lines able to talk to one another is often stated as another aim of track 2. While you might well encounter the same individuals in

other meetings, track 2 or otherwise, within this track 2 you have come to know both Indians and Pakistanis, and in a sense, you might identify as being part of the Ottawa Dialogue.

- To what extent do you feel a sense of comradery with fellow participants, both those from your same country but also those from other countries?
- Do you feel that this identification as a member of the Ottawa Dialogue is useful for your interactions with current policymakers?
- Do you think this has been a useful experience for learning from others who do not share the same opinions, that is to say, people who you disagree with in the meetings?

Diplomatization

Track 2 often has the word diplomacy attached to it, but as Peter often stresses and many of you also mention, you are of course not a group of officials conducting diplomacy.

- While some track 2 meetings do involve serving officials (e.g. in Pugwash) these Ottawa Dialogue meetings have links to official diplomacy in the sense that members of this group brief or speak to policymakers – do you see distinct differences in the purpose of track 2 from official diplomacy?
- Do you think that there are any problems of legitimacy with track 2 work?
- Based on your experience, do you ever consider that at times track 2 meetings feel like similar interactions to official diplomacy? (For example, disagreeing on the language in a document or airing accusations of past official activity.)

Process

I just want to finally get some of your impressions of what goes on in the room. Not on specific people or initiatives but rather a generalized sense of how track 2 works in practice.

- How would you describe the nature of the meetings in the room? [prompt: constructive, tense, friendly]
- How does this differ to the interactions once we have left the room? (i.e. over dinner)
- Without being specific, do you find that there are some people who play specific roles? (For example, to be disruptive, pedantic, etc.)
- Do you feel that some people over-represent the official positions or do people generally present their own views?
- Where points of tension arise, do you think it is detrimental to the overall goals of the dialogue?
- What makes someone “good” at track two?

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