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## Distributive Justice and the Politics of Difference

### ABSTRACT

This essay identifies a point of convergence between economically oriented, distributive approaches to social justice and culturally oriented, identitarian ones. The primary problem of difference politics, I claim, is insuring that disadvantaged groups have equal abilities to participate in the social processes that construct and value identities. I argue that this is best accomplished through a conception of equality promoting human agency in both the cultural and economic spheres.

KEYWORDS: social justice, distributive justice, identity politics, recognition

The past decade has seen a sea change in our notions of social justice. Issues of multiculturalism, identity politics, group rights, new social movements, and the 'recognition of difference' have injected new energy into our thinking, forcing us to significantly reconfigure some old views and to develop more differentiated and nuanced versions of others. More radically, though, this work has also questioned the soundness of many dominant conceptions of social justice. Distributive

justice has come under particular fire. Distribution, its critics maintain, only reallocates pieces of an already-given pie, failing to ask why the pie was unequally divided in the first place and whether extra pie is what people really need. These critics claim that distributive justice ignores the symbolic and cultural character of unjust inequalities, that it focuses too heavily on *equality* rather than *difference*, and that it frames problems as purely distributive in nature, excluding other types of solution.

The result has been a recent series of debates over the relative merits of economic versus cultural approaches to social justice, and more particularly, over distributive justice versus new forms of cultural identity politics focusing on the 'recognition of difference'. In these discussions it has become fairly clear that we cannot construe social justice *either* as strictly economic *or* strictly cultural in character, and that both are unavoidable aspects of some broader picture. It has also become clear, however, that the task of reconciling socio-economic egalitarianism and cultural identity politics is fraught with problems.

A principal difficulty from a political theorist's point of view is that the two bodies of thought focusing on these issues are so distinct from one another in approach, subject matter, and theoretical commitment. Distributive justice deals primarily with the reallocation of goods and the structural alteration of markets, while identity politics focuses on the ideological effects of social knowledge and symbolic representation. Thus it seems that ne'er the twain should meet. This, I believe, is simply an artifact of our own conceptual narrowness, however, and not an accurate reflection of the complex social reality underlying our theoretical constructions. What we need, clearly, is a better way of thinking about the cultural character of socio-economic injustice and the economic effects of culture.

My goal is to tackle this problem and outline a plausible solution to it. I will try to blur the lines that are often drawn between 'old-fashioned distributive justice' and the 'new politics of difference', highlighting the close connections between economic and cultural issues of social justice. I am particularly interested in seeing what forms of universalism and egalitarianism can meet the challenges posed by identity politics. This is not intended as a rear-guard action, however - as some desperate attempt to save an out-moded, mod-

ernist egalitarianism from the ascendant threat of post-modern agonism. Rather, my intentions are pluralistic, searching for an approach to social justice that is simultaneously difference-sensitive *and* egalitarian.

In section one, I outline some of the challenges we face in dovetailing redistribution and recognition. Section two examines the resources of several contemporary distributive theories to cope with the challenges of identity politics. This provides the basis for a model conception of social justice in section three. The 'capability' approach I outline there simultaneously addresses interconnected problems of economic inequality *and* cultural disrespect. It takes a concrete, distributive approach to problems of identity, developing materialist solutions for symbolic, cultural problems. Section four refines this approach, showing that distributive justice and the politics of difference are not only compatible, but necessary and intertwined aspects of a broader picture of social justice.

## **I. Tensions Between Cultural and Economic Justice**

The problem of reconciling economic and cultural justice has a long history, reaching back at least to the epistemological Marxism of Lukács, Gramsci, and Althusser and to subsequent work in critical theory and Birmingham School cultural studies. One of the central moves in this tradition is to level the hierarchy between economic base and cultural/political superstructure, so that culture and economy are seen as equally primary aspects of society that condition and interact with one another. In the more sophisticated renderings of this picture, economic relations are reproduced partly through cultural means; and cultural tastes, needs, and epistemic frameworks are conditioned in many ways by economic relations. Thus there is no purely economic nor purely cultural sphere of social life, and anyone pursuing justice in one sphere will be forced to deal with both of them as interconnected parts of a larger whole.

The problems of pursuing social justice simultaneously on both of these fronts have been most forcefully posed in Nancy Fraser's recent work.<sup>1</sup> Like her Western Marxist predecessors, Fraser views culture and political economy as complexly intertwined aspects of a larger social whole. Her account makes a major advance over earlier ones, however, because of its analytical acumen

in theorising the historically specific tensions between modern economies and contemporary cultures. Fraser makes a series of perspectival distinctions that will be very useful for pursuing the project I have outlined. Among these are (1) a distinction between cultural and economic perspectives on social justice, and (2) a matrix for organising possible strategies to integrate these two perspectives.

(1) To clarify the interrelations between cultural and economic justice, Fraser makes an analytical distinction between economic and cultural *perspectives* on social justice.<sup>2</sup> This is a social-theoretic distinction between perspectives rather than an ontological distinction between separate realms of human activity. It views social reality through lenses of two different colours, in order to characterise more precisely the ways in which contemporary economies and cultures are intertwined, yet not identical.<sup>3</sup> To avoid possible misunderstandings at the cost of wordiness, I will refer to this distinction below as ‘social justice from the perspective of political economy’ versus ‘social justice from the perspective of culture’.

An analytical distinction between two perspectives makes it possible to account for the partial decoupling of economy and culture in contemporary social life. Rationalised economies and cultures have been differentiated out of social life to some extent, but they are still embedded in a common social, institutional, and material order that yokes them together. Particularly in cases of gender and “race” (and to a lesser extent, class and sexual preference), there are unfortunate synergies between economy and culture.<sup>4</sup> Cultural attributions of identity are complexly interconnected with the structural and institutional sources of economic disadvantage. The causal connections between them run in both directions, sometimes forming a descending spiral of cultural denigration and economic inequality. Therefore the economic and cultural realities underlying our theories of social justice can neither be collapsed into one another nor neatly separated (as theorists of both distributive justice and multiculturalism tend to do). By distinguishing culture from economy in a perspectival sense, however, Fraser provides us with a pair of idealised standards against which we can measure the actually-existing tangle of contemporary cultural-economic relations.

(2) This distinction also provides us with a more precise way to formulate the challenge of unifying distributive justice and difference politics. The chal-

lenge, in this case, is to discover new ways of theorising social justice that are adequate from each perspective. In order to sketch a direction to follow, Fraser develops a conceptual two-by-two matrix formed by the intersection of two further distinctions. They are 'redistribution' versus 'recognition' as remedies for social injustices; and 'transformative' versus 'affirmative' outcomes of such remedies.<sup>5</sup>

The key question invited by this analysis is whether it is best to pursue a broadly affirmative program or a broadly transformative one in combining recognition and redistribution. Is it better, on one hand, to valorise differences by recognising them while simultaneously reallocating goods to compensate for market injustices? Or is it better, on the other hand, to dismantle differences by deconstructing them while structurally altering the economy to prevent injustice?

Fraser shows that affirmative strategies - that is, affirmative cultural politics combined with affirmative approaches to economic justice - tend to be self-defeating. Each of these types recognises and emphasises differences. Affirmative recognition does this as its central goal, while affirmative redistribution does it indirectly, distributing goods and services over and over to the same groups of people and symbolically framing them as deficient and needy. Such distributions entrench stereotypes directed against subordinate "races," ethnicities, and genders, even while attempting to equalise the material bases of respect. As a result, they often generate a backlash of resentment and denigration, creating *disrespect*. Recognising differences in such cases creates a cultural undertow in which the positive advantages of recognition and redistribution are undermined by stigmatisation. Fraser thus identifies a short-circuit between affirmative redistribution and recognition of identity which she calls the "redistribution-recognition dilemma."<sup>6</sup>

Because of the inherent problems that she diagnoses in affirmative remedies, Fraser concludes that we ought to pursue transformative ones in order to bring recognition and redistribution together most successfully. The most radical strategies also turn out to be the least dilemmatic. The preferred solution, then, is transformative redistribution restructuring the economy and transformative recognition deconstructing stigmatising identities.

These two aspects of Fraser's work provide us with a clear direction to follow in combining distributive justice and the politics of difference, as well as some keen insights into the pitfalls that await us along the way. In order to put this work to its fullest use, however, I will develop several of its themes more fully.

First, a close look at the redistribution-recognition dilemma reveals that it is dilemmatic specifically within the sphere of *identity*, not political economy. The dilemma occurs when stigmatised identities are either purposely or inadvertently reinforced - purposely, by a politics advocating the affirmation of differences, or inadvertently, by distributive policies that mark certain groups of people as chronically 'needy' or deficient in some way. Therefore, the actual contradiction is *symbolic* rather than socio-economic in nature. It is a problem arising because affirmative remedies tend to differentiate identities and attach negative valuations to them, rather than a problem of economic disequilibrium and crisis.

Because it is primarily a problem of identity, the redistribution-recognition dilemma takes different forms, depending upon the case in question. In the case of recognition, the dilemma is wholly a cultural problem. Some forms of recognition (the affirmative ones) are self-contradictory in a cultural and symbolic sense: they cause both positive and negative revaluations of identity, with a net negative effect. When we evaluate different strategies of recognition, then, we must therefore keep an eye out for multiple, self-defeating effects within the sphere of identity. In contrast, redistribution manifests the dilemma in a somewhat different manner. It is not a self-contradictory strategy as such. Rather, it runs into problems because it is inseparably bound up with cultural side effects. When we evaluate different strategies of redistribution, then, we must be careful to examine them both from the perspectives of the economy (noting their primary effects) and culture (noting their side effects). In this case, we are trying to avoid negative cultural side effects that would counterbalance a strategy's structural-economic benefits.

This insight should shape our strategy in reconciling economic and cultural justice. In order to discover whether a given strategy is dilemmatic, we must always ask what effect it has on identity. Any strategy that entrenches or further stigmatises stigmatised identities is self-defeating. Therefore, prime dis-

advantages of certain strains of distributive justice will likely be seen from a *cultural* rather than economic perspective. When I begin examining distributive strategies in section two, I will further develop this kind of approach, paying particular attention to cross-over effects from economy to culture.

Second, we must go into a bit more detail about the nature of ‘transformation’ in cultural justice. According to Fraser, transformation generally requires “correcting inequitable outcomes precisely by restructuring the underlying generative framework.”<sup>7</sup> This, she says, is a matter of uprooting the processes that create undesirable outcomes, rather than simply changing the outcomes themselves in superficial ways. In the case of political economy it is clear what this requires. It is a matter of making structural alterations in an economic system that generates material inequalities as a necessary side effect of its operation. To leave the system in place while reallocating goods is no real solution, because the effects of this remedy will always be undone.

It is not as clear, though, which generative frameworks or underlying processes stigmatise identities. To develop a fuller view, we must go into more detail about the mechanics of identity formation and change. As Fraser makes clear in her exchange with Judith Butler, cultural injustices are not simply a matter of denigration in attitude or belief.<sup>8</sup> Rather, they are the result of materially anchored, institutionalised processes of representation and evaluation. They are rooted in symbolically reproduced social relations, which are in essence *status* relations. As such, when we talk about transforming stigmatised identities, we are intervening in a complicated process in which identities are symbolically differentiated and valued, social relations are patterned, and institutions are reconstructed.

Because the causal connections between identity, social relations, and institutions are so difficult to disentangle, it is hard to find a way around problems of misrecognition. Minimally, however, we can identify several points of attack for someone trying to transform a stigmatised identity. First, the identity label can be shown to be a false and misleading one, thus dedifferentiating the group in question. The rejection of a biological basis for “race” has the potential to have such an effect, for example, if “races” are eventually seen as unfounded categories of classification.<sup>9</sup> Second, an identity can be *revalued* (as long as it is not thereby essentialised or entrenched). Debunking

the popular connection between African-Americans and laziness, for instance, makes it harder to devalue the former by linking them with the latter.<sup>10</sup> Third, the content or connotations of an identity can be altered. The replacement of 'black' with 'African-American' maintains the boundaries of the identity group (given that 'white' Africans like Afrikaners seem not to be included), but substitutes the relative dignity of an ethnicist, historicist label for a more stigmatising binaristic/racial logic. Or fourth, the institutional roots of stigmatisation can be torn out. Civil rights laws banning lending and housing discrimination and segregated buses, restrooms, and drinking fountains are examples.

Stigmatised identities can thus be transformed in a number of different ways. They can be dedifferentiated, or revalued in some fundamental way, their content or connotations can be changed, or their institutional anchors can be rooted out. I call this process the 'renegotiation' of identity. Here identities are treated as intersubjectively created categories of classification.<sup>11</sup> They are developed and reproduced through social processes of communication. Thus the problems I have been discussing - problems of stigmatisation and bias - occur most prominently when people do not have an equal say in developing the identity labels applied to them. Correlatively, such labels are reproduced when their bearers do not have the means to challenge the identity characteristics ascribed to them.

A properly transformative solution, on this view, is not simply a matter of dissolving or celebrating stigmatised identities. Rather, it would require a piecemeal process of critique and revaluation, in which people take a hand in defining and articulating fairer and less stigmatised understandings of themselves. These processes are part of the social construction of identity; they disaggregate what were previously taken to be natural categories of human existence, remodelling them in part and leaving them partly intact. In this process group identities are rearticulated bit by bit, changing their valuation to an extent, sometimes shifting the boundaries of who counts as a member of the group, and often restructuring the institutional anchors of identity as well.

The previous discussion provides us with the outlines of a fairly subtle approach to the problem of reconciling distributive justice and the politics of difference. We can draw several lessons from it. First, the project of reconcil-



ing cultural and economic justice is an analytical, critical, perspectival project. It is not a matter of reconciling actually-existing economies with actually-existing culture (since they already deeply interpenetrate one another, in spite of the divisive logic of rationalisation). Rather, it requires us to find forms of social change that are transformative from each of these perspectives. We must recognise the actual intertwinement of the economic and the cultural and find a better way to mirror this reality in constructing one coherent theoretical perspective on social justice.

Second, in this more productive fusion the remedies for injustices should reinforce rather than detract from one another. We should look for forms of recognition and redistribution that can *simultaneously* improve the overall symbolic status of stigmatised identity groups *and* the material equality of their individual members.

Third, we are looking for transformative solutions, ones that restructure the economy and the symbolic order. In order to do this, we should steer away from potentially self-defeating strategies - those that further stigmatise identities or more deeply entrench them. To be properly transformative, a remedy should either rearticulate negative labels or make it possible for the people affected by them to do so. This holds for strategies acting through recognition *or* redistribution.

Fourth - and this point will become clearer in a moment - solutions for problems diagnosed from the perspective of culture need not be distinctively 'cultural' in character; nor need problems diagnosed from the perspective of the economy be met with distinctively 'economic' solutions. Rather, any acceptable solution, regardless of its type, must have desirable effects as viewed from both perspectives. We would therefore do well not to limit our investigation to the kinds of change narrowly associated with either one. Instead, we should look for a common set of institutional and social measures that have desired effects *both* from the perspective of culture *and* from the perspective of political economy.

## **2. Models of Distribution**

We are now at the point of asking what a combined politics of distribution and difference should look like. Are two separate agendas set here, one for

distributive theorists and another for theorists of difference? Or is some more complete fusion of redistribution and recognition possible? In what follows I will begin sketching an answer to these questions, working first from the perspective of distributive justice but connecting in the end with forms of cultural politics.

As we have seen, an adequate distributive theory must satisfy two criteria: it must be transformative from the perspective of the economy and transformative from the perspective of culture. For the moment, I will set aside one half of this inquiry - the question of how *economically* transformative various distributive theories are. Instead, I will focus on a more unusual but pressing task here, asking how *culturally* transformative they are. My goal is to get a clearer idea of what cultural transformation looks like in a distributive theory, in order to decide what redistribution can contribute to the project of unifying cultural and economic justice. Ultimately, of course, this kind of analysis must be bi-perspectival, and I will reconnect these two phases of the investigation in the end.

To begin the hybridisation project that I have outlined, I will perform a brief thought experiment. I will examine three highly promising classes of distributive theory: equality of resources, equal opportunity for welfare, and equality of capabilities. I will assume that each of these types is adopted as the distributive logic of a policy regime. Then I will project the social and cultural effects of this kind of distribution. In order to do this as realistically and usefully as possible, I will assume that each distributive theory would be introduced into a society much like our current one, with something like its existing mix of economic, political, legal, social, and cultural characteristics. The question that I will pose from this basis is how well does each of these theories attenuate cultural injustices?

Before I begin, it important to emphasise that this exercise is not a conclusive argument. It does not decisively eliminate any of the approaches from consideration. Rather, it surveys the territory and suggests the greater efficacy of one particular approach. The three types I have chosen are rich and complex theoretical positions, and there is much to be said for each of them. The results of this experiment are provisional, then. They are intended as a heuristic introduction to the more rigorous argument that follows them.

## **(I) Resource Equality**

First I will examine the effects of instituting equality at the point of resource distribution. This form of egalitarianism has had several prominent exponents in recent years, chief among them John Rawls and Ronald Dworkin. Such theories provide people with some set of generally fungible or useful goods which can be employed for many different purposes. These 'resources' can be traded for other goods, used to produce other goods, or converted into forms of welfare. In Rawls' formulation, they are a set of 'primary goods' that a rational person would want, whatever else she wants.<sup>12</sup> These goods are to be distributed according to a mix of strict equality, "fair equality of opportunity," and pareto-optimality. Dworkin, in contrast, is more strictly egalitarian.<sup>13</sup> He claims that the bundle of resources used by each person over the course of her life should be equal to that devoted to any other person. Equality is defined by means of an 'envy test,' in which each person has an equal amount of resources when no one wants to trade her life-bundle for anyone else's. Resources are valued and allocated through trade, starting from a hypothetical position of equality. Redistributions are made only to compensate people for misfortunes which could not have been prevented through their own foresight.

Resource egalitarianism has an ambiguous effect on cultural injustices. The cultural equality that can be promoted by theories of this type depends largely upon the material effects of distribution. The more material equality they promote, the more they would displace cultural stigmata and stereotypes with notions of equal respect. It is an open question, however, how materially egalitarian such theories are. Equality at the point of resource allocation allows people to do with their resources what they will. In an economic system like ours, some will succeed in producing exponentially more goods, while others will not. This results in a tendency towards material inequality, though that tendency is restrained by certain theoretical devices (the difference principle, envy-freedom over the span of a life). In any case, it is reasonable to assume that ambition is only contingently associated with other identity traits. We can therefore expect that after several generations in which people of all identities have equal resources at their disposal, it would be clear that ambition is the source of prosperity, rather than "race," gender, or other coincidental characteristics. This cultural decoupling of wealth and identity would

count as a very positive development. We can infer, then, that some headway could be made against cultural stigmata by resource egalitarianism. It is an indirect effect mediated by material equality and by iterated redistribution across identity groups.

In sum, resource redistributions have an indirect though likely beneficial relation to cultural change. For these theories cultural improvements are fortuitous side effects of material redistribution rather than intended results. Because unequal distribution of resources is the metric of injustice for these theories, they are often inattentive to the institutional and cultural *sources* of such inequalities. For a resource egalitarian, a capitalist economy plus compensatory redistribution is normatively equivalent to a socialist economy without. Similarly, a society with potent forms of hiring and wage discrimination plus compensatory redistribution is normatively equivalent to a society in which no one is stigmatised.<sup>14</sup> Resource egalitarianism is thus neutral in principle on the question of affirmation versus transformation, in both their cultural and economic forms.

It may be tempting to use resource distributions in a targeted manner to selectively improve the lot of disadvantaged groups. Such a mechanism could be modelled on Ronald Dworkin's proposal to compensate individuals for their bad luck in winding up with disabling traits. In Dworkin's view, special redistributions should be made to restore resource equality to the handicapped and perhaps to the less-talented. This is based on the general claim that anyone who fares poorly in the economy due to involuntary personal characteristics should have an opportunity to 'insure against them', receiving compensation based on a hypothetical insurance market. The logic of this argument could be extended to insure against other morally arbitrary traits that result in economic inequality. Being a "racial" minority or a woman in a racist or sexist society would be obvious candidates. The additional resources provided by such distributions would be designed to compensate for the unjust though real disadvantages experienced as a result of coincidental personal characteristics.

Such a proposal would have strong cultural side effects, however. Taking out insurance against being born, say, black - or receiving its equivalent in a targeted scheme of distribution - would be so culturally damaging that it would

completely negate the material benefits of redistribution. This problem would arise whether insurance markets were used as actual mechanisms of resource allocation or merely as normative thought experiments. The problem lies not in the market itself, but in the fact that this otherwise ingenious mechanism requires people to express the strength of their preferences against being the kind of person in question. It thus translates subjectively held preferences into public, cultural stigmata. Therefore, resource egalitarianism must find some other, less culturally damaging method of evaluating the disadvantage associated with unchosen personal traits like “race,” gender, or physical handicap.

Like its direct effects on material equality, the subtler, symbolic effects of resource egalitarianism are also ambiguous. Its explicit universalism promotes universal respect to an extent, by devoting equal resources to each over the course of her or his life (Dworkin) or by providing literal equality of some basic goods and opportunities (Rawls). Because it orients core distributions around the idea that everyone has equal value, this paradigm portrays people as equal in a basic way and avoids making distinctions between different identities or groups. It thus has some positive symbolic effect on the valuation of different kinds of people.

We see, then, that resource egalitarianism is relatively ineffective in resolving cultural problems and possibly complicit in their reproduction. Its universalism and its focus on equalising the possession of goods have certain positive effects, but they also tend to blind it to the cultural problems that identity poses for social justice. In some circumstances resource egalitarianism could be modestly progressive, but hardly to the extent that we would call it a transformative remedy.

## **(2) *Equal Opportunity for Welfare***

The second model that I will examine, equal opportunity for welfare, has been developed by Richard Arneson.<sup>15</sup> This model is best defined by two characteristics. First, it equalises *opportunities*, rather than either goods or welfare. This avoids the paternalism and partiality inherent in equalising welfare itself.<sup>16</sup> People are provided with equivalent sets of opportunities to pursue their own notions of welfare; whether or not they successfully avail

themselves of these opportunities is a matter of individual initiative. Second, this model defines welfare as a matter of *subjective preference satisfaction*. It thus distributes goods in order to give people equal chances of pursuing their own ends and goals, rather than equalising welfare *per se*. In sum, equal opportunity for welfare provides people with equal chances to realise their own conception of their own well-being.

It is difficult to assess this model's impact on cultural stereotypes. Equal opportunity for welfare is universalist at the relatively abstract level of opportunity, but extremely particularistic in countenancing many individual conceptions of the good. These traits would seem to have different effects. The universalism of this approach would promote equal respect, though probably to a lesser degree than resource egalitarianism. Although the idea that everyone is entitled to the same level of opportunity presupposes a certain conception of equal respect, it is likely undercut to the extent that people want very different *kinds* of opportunity. In particular, people with expensive, different, or 'non-normal' tastes could invite resentment or stigmatisation. In this case, the weakly transformative universalism of equal opportunity would be offset by its stronger tendency to allow many stigmatising differences in what people actually want and get from a distributive scheme. The extent to which this would occur is dependent upon many factors, particularly a society's degree of cultural diversity and the extent to which its members tend to tolerate and respect difference.

In general, a distributive theory emphasising taste and personal preference is more likely to run into problems with cultural stereotyping than one focusing, say, on a more universal equalisandum like resources. Such problems arise because tastes and social identity are significantly intertwined: a person's various identities are connected with what she *likes* to a considerable extent. The affluent prefer fish, tennis, and the *New York Times*, while the working classes prefer meat, football, and *USA Today*.<sup>17</sup> Such differences in consumption and taste function as mechanisms of group differentiation and exclusion: having proper tastes is one of the requirements for being recognised as part of a group. Because of their basic relation to social identity, such differences would exist despite any restrictions one places on the rationality of preference formation - unlike the distorted preferences of the famous "tamed housewife," basic subcultural differences of this kind go too deep to be cor-

rected by rational-critical reflection.<sup>18</sup> Thus the group-identity basis of tastes can further stereotypes about 'different' groups. If notions of welfare vary significantly from group to group and if these differences are institutionalised as a basis for public policy, they can deepen divisions between groups. This particularly holds in cases where some groups perceive that they are underwriting the expensive, different, or 'non-normal' tastes of others. In this case, the kinds of cultural backlash we discussed above are greatly exacerbated.

In addition, people's notions of welfare are often relational and status-conscious: doing well is often defined as doing *better than* others. Thus *inequality* is often part of a person's idea of well-being. Distributions that enable people to pursue their own notions of well-being, then, risk undermining the kind of solidarity necessary for equal respect.

Equal opportunity for welfare therefore seems to have opposite and symmetrical problems to those of resource egalitarianism. It is extremely flexible in accommodating diverse values, tastes, and preferences, so it can hardly be said to ignore differences. This flexibility, however, risks undermining universal respect and furthering stereotypes about the consumption habits and preferences of various groups. It may further stigmatise identities and further differentiate one group from another. Thus equal opportunity for welfare has a fairly large potential for entrenching identities and creating backlash problems, making it an affirmative model of distribution that runs aground on the redistribution-recognition dilemma.

### **(3) Capabilities**

The final model that I will examine synthesises many of the advantages of the previous two while avoiding their drawbacks. Amartya Sen has developed a distributive theory aimed at equalising people's "capabilities" to do certain things.<sup>19</sup> Properly speaking, a capability is a potential one has to do or be something, or as Sen puts it, a potential to "achieve some functioning." If one has a capability, then one's actual traits, circumstances, and resources open up a possibility of action or existence that one would not otherwise have. A capability is thus a set of possible functionings, or a set of possibilities to achieve certain actions and/or states of being.

The concept of capability is designed to promote people's functionings while still allowing them choice in which functionings to develop. It would be paternalistic to equalise functionings *per se*. There may well be functionings - such as skills of democratic political participation - that political theorists think are very important, yet which some people simply do not want. And whereas it is only wasteful to provide an opportunity that no one wants, it would be downright odious to provide them with an unwanted functioning. Because functionings are partly rooted in a person, this would require a substantial amount of coercion.

A capability is therefore a kind of opportunity, rather than a personal characteristic or activity. It is an opportunity, however, of a very specific kind. Having a capability not only opens some possibility to me in a formal sense; it also guarantees me the resources, circumstances, and abilities to actualise that possibility. Thus Sen's view equalises opportunities to achieve various functionings, or to be perfectly accurate, it offers "actual equality of opportunity to develop equivalent sets of functionings." It is, then, a fairly rich and far-reaching conception of equal opportunity.

Sen's work leaves the issue open of exactly how or to what extent capabilities should be equalised. Most narrowly, capability egalitarianism could be interpreted as guaranteeing people real opportunities to develop any of a set of 'basic' functionings. Such a basic bundle might include things like equal rights to education or job training, where an actual opportunity to achieve some minimum level of attainment is guaranteed. We might call this 'equal opportunity for basic functionings'. More broadly, Sen's view could be interpreted as a full-blown egalitarian theory in which equality would be measured in terms of equivalent indices of capabilities. Here people would not only have choices about which functionings they pursue, but further choices about which sets of choices are open for them to choose amongst. In this case, they would not be limited in the kinds of capabilities they pursue: a person's chosen set would be promoted to an index level equivalent to everyone else's. I could decide to distribute my allotment amongst a variety of things on which I place value, for instance. I could give myself a wide range of choices in developing, say, business acumen, artistic talents, and political savvy. Or rather than be a jack-of-all-trades, I could focus my allotment on one thing:



being a world-champion surfer, for instance. As long as these capability sets could be given a comparable and equivalent index value, such a 'generalised theory of capability distribution' would be indifferent amongst them.

From the general standpoint of distributive justice, it is not clear which of these variants one ought to prefer. From the perspective of cultural transformation, however, things are much clearer. The latter, generalised variant of capability egalitarianism gives a great deal of weight to personal preference and obligates the state to insure equal satisfaction of different sets of preferences. This variant, then, shares characteristic features of Richard Arneson's preference-based view of equal opportunity. Those features are exactly the ones that I identified as problematic above. Specifically, its emphasis on personal preference satisfaction could emphasise subcultural differences and lead to resentment about the expense or character of others' choices. The other variant, in contrast, narrows the range in which preferences will be satisfied by redistribution. By establishing a set of 'basic' capabilities that have a fairly universal functionality within a given society, it is much less likely to run into stigmatisation problems.

For reasons that will become clearer in section three, then, I believe that capability egalitarianism is more useful the more independent it is from individual preferences, and the more it conceives of equality as a bundle of universally important capabilities rather than as an index of personally preferred ones. Although it is certainly important to allow people free choice in developing whichever functionings they choose (at risk of paternalism), we may not want to provide people with the means to develop any functioning they happen to value.<sup>20</sup> I may agree, for example, that surfers should be fed and clothed, but not necessarily that they should be *coached*. As I will show below, it is most important to promote capabilities that lead to broader forms of cultural equality.

The central goal of capability distribution is to promote agency.<sup>21</sup> This gives it a unique adaptability and usefulness in dealing with the problems of difference. The universalistic core of this model - the idea of giving everyone opportunities to cultivate various functionings - promotes solidarity and universal respect for people. This universalism is greater to the extent that

capabilities are conceived of as a basic bundle, rather than as a set of personal preferences. The basic bundle approach mimics and improves upon the progressive universalism of resource egalitarianism. Whereas the resource paradigm simply *treats* people as deserving of equal respect, however, the capability model actively *enables* such forms of equality. By fostering agency, it empowers people and makes it less possible to negatively stereotype them. Supporting the agency of disadvantaged people can counteract public perceptions of them as lazy, dependent, or incompetent. Regardless of whether these stereotypes are accurate or not, they are harder to hang on to if public policy works actively to falsify them. Promoting agency does not counteract actual laziness, of course, but it does force us to stop confounding it with lack of opportunity.

### **3. Capabilities for What?**

In the rough process of elimination that I have just conducted, we see that the capability model fares fairly well. It shares an attention to individual specificity and choice with equal opportunity for welfare, tailoring distributions to people's individual needs and providing them with means to pursue their own ends. It also improves upon resource egalitarianism's relative immunity from backlash, actively promoting equality and universal respect rather than passively implying it. Because capability distributions actively undermine some stigmatising stereotypes and work towards equal respect, we can conclude that they are culturally transformative in at least a moderate sense. This argument is primarily negative, however: it shows that capability distribution avoids many of the problems faced by other distributive paradigms, allowing us to conclude that it is difference-sensitive in a minimal way. I would now like to provide a positive argument for this model, showing more clearly that capability distribution has a vital role in combining cultural and economic justice.

Let us start by taking a more schematic look at why capability distributions help to curtail cultural injustices. I claimed above that increasing agency or enablement in a general sense is likely indirectly to benefit other aspects of a person's life as well. We have seen, for instance, that promoting agency has spill-over effects on solidarity and universal respect. It also actively undermines certain kinds of stigmatisation, especially those that connect identities

with laziness or dependency. In many cases stigmatisation is actually the result of unequal opportunities, and it can be removed by helping a person to develop capabilities whose lack makes them appear to be inferior. We might call this kind of general capability provision an indirect, 'all boats rise with the tide' approach. It would be consistent with something like Martha Nussbaum's broad-ranging 'essentialist' model of capability distribution.<sup>22</sup>

Now consider the much more direct effects that capability distributions could have if they were focused on the problems we have been examining. I have argued that the key to unifying economic and cultural justice lies in preventing the stigmatisation of identities. Any truly transformative remedy for cultural and economic injustice must help to renegotiate stigmatised identities, rather than reinforce them. Identities, of course, are rarely understood in daily life as social constructions; they typically function below the level of people's consciousness, implicit in their practices but not explicit in thought. They are, in other words, part of the discursively reproduced cultural background that Charles Taylor calls a society's 'strong evaluations' and Jürgen Habermas refers to as its 'ethical self-understanding'.

Because such identities are discursively ascribed and reproduced, they can only be challenged by such means as well. The 'renegotiation' of identity that I have outlined above requires people to be active and equal partners in the cultural affairs of their society. Because of the public, discursive nature of this process, specific kinds of agency are needed. These might include capabilities for public discourse, capabilities that give one the status equality and self-confidence necessary to take equal part in public discussion, or capabilities to function as an effective group-member in democratic self-organisation, political opposition, and cultural activism.<sup>23</sup> Additionally, people need capabilities to identify the forms of representation and belief that put them at a disadvantage. In general, these are all capabilities needed to participate as an equal in the process of identity construction itself.

Denigrated or marginalised people, then, need particular forms of agency to change the definition and value of their own identities. Specifically, they need to be equal participants in defining the dominant cultural images of their society. We can presume, from the fact that such people *are* stigmatised, that they lack an equivalent amount of this agency compared to those who

predominantly define and value identities. Therefore, another way of looking at the problem of recognition is as a form of distributive inequality. In this view, lack of participation in social processes of representation and identity definition is the problem. The primary inequity, then, lies in what we might call 'cultural agency'.

Inequities of cultural agency are of course distributive problems, and ones that a theory of capability distribution is uniquely equipped to meet. Equalising the right capabilities could put people in a better position to redefine or revalue their own identities. It has the potential to provide them with the discursive abilities, material preconditions, and social status needed to challenge negative stereotypes. By focusing directly on the promotion of cultural agency, capability distributions can provide a transformative, distributive basis for cultural politics. In this sense capabilities are considerably more transformative than something like resources. They actively pursue the cultural enablement of people, rather than relying on fortuitous spill-over effects from the promotion of economic equality.

The question that needs to be asked, however, is which capabilities can accomplish this? Since we have been looking at social justice from the joint perspectives of culture and economy, we should theorise capabilities through the same two registers. Capabilities can be viewed from two different perspectives: those that address problems of social justice as diagnosed from the perspective of political economy, and those that address such problems diagnosed from the perspective of culture. In general, such an analysis captures the basic intuition that we are looking for forms of agency which allow people to challenge the structural aspects of society that disadvantage them. The dual perspectives of 'culture' and 'economy' provide us with a schema for identifying the ways in which people are *not* sufficiently autonomous to articulate their own self-identities and pursue their own economic interests. The perspective of culture dictates that we should provide people with capabilities for symbolic struggle, allowing them to influence the processes through which identities are constructed and valued. From an economic perspective, in contrast, we ought to be concerned with providing people means for economic autonomy. This might include, for example, basic knowledge of labour markets, collective bargaining, and labour law; being able to cooperate in the

management of production; or having access to job training that enhances labour market mobility.

A bifocal analysis of this kind gives us general outlines for a *critical theory of social justice*, designed to take the perspectives of both culture and political economy into account. It derives normative guidelines for social change from an analysis of distributive inequalities. In this view, a dual-perspective conception of disablement provides critical standards for social policy. This conception is based on the insight that empowerment in the right dimensions can have a double effect, counteracting injustices that are simultaneously economic *and* cultural. Distributive remedies of this kind have effects that count as transformative both from the perspective of political economy and from the perspective of culture. At bottom, then, this discussion shows that distributive justice and the politics of difference have a hidden point of intersection in agency. Cultural politics presupposes important forms of agency, and distributive justice has the potential to encourage their development. One fertile pathway to combining distributive justice and difference politics, then, lies in using capability distributions to promote the kinds of agency required for a 'culturally fair' society.

#### **4. Structural Versus Agent-Rooted Capabilities**

Several lines of objection could be made to the view I am proposing. (1) One could claim that this view is (implicitly) modelled on a biased conception of an identity group, one functioning in the way "race" does in American culture. The argument would go something like this: 'This view is too quick to assume that people with stigmatised identities lack capabilities, either in a general sense or in a more specifically 'cultural' one. Women and gays demonstrate this. Overall and as a group, they do not lack any of the abilities possessed by the straight, white, male elite. On the contrary, their problems are a combination of structural exclusion from opportunity and flat-out bias. The stigmatisation of women and gays as identity groups is not a result of disablement, then, but of straight male domination and discrimination'. (2) Additionally, one could argue with some plausibility that a theory attempting to compensate for unequal capabilities runs a strong risk of stigmatising as 'deficient' the people whom it is supposed to benefit. If this

is the case, then capability distributions would be affirmative rather than transformative.

Countering these claims provides me with an opportunity to specify more carefully what I mean by 'capability distribution' and how I intend it to function here. First, it is important not to interpret the notion of capability too tangibly. Capabilities, I must emphasise, cannot literally be moved back and forth or handed out; nor do exponents of capability distribution suppose that they can.<sup>24</sup> They are also not simply rooted in individual agents, as *abilities* are. Their value and use is more abstract.

In the model of distributive justice I have developed, it is necessary to interpret 'capability' more broadly than is often done. I am using this term as a critical concept, not simply as a set of possible activities or states of being. The difference is the following. On my analysis, it does not matter *why* a person can or cannot do something - whether she cannot do it because of personal limitations, say, or because of structural impediments. The crucial question is whether or not she *can in fact* do it. A capability in this sense is dependent both upon a person's individual competencies *and* her environment.<sup>25</sup>

A person's capabilities as a symbolic actor and deliberative citizen are similarly dependent upon social and material circumstances. If these kinds of capabilities were only rooted in a person, their use would be constrained by the structural causes of economic and cultural inequality - by the very factors that promoted injustice in the first place. It would thus do little good to promote such capabilities without changing the economic, political, and legal environment that limits their use. In the case of cultural agency, this would require things like equal access to the media, equal support for group organising, and equal effectiveness in public discourse. In other words, equalising people's capabilities to function requires structural reform as well as individual improvement.

Two further examples will help to refine this point. First, visualise the case of a gay media executive, someone with money, education, high social status, and privileged access to the means of symbolic production. An astute critic could point out that this person is not only 'capable' in a general sense,

but more specifically in the sense of symbolic enablement I have described. Yet he is not less misrecognised or stigmatised for his homosexuality, in spite of his abnormally high ability to define cultural images and norms. Because this person is both stigmatised and symbolically capable, his case seems to provide a direct counterexample to the position I am advancing. What has escaped notice here, however, is the fact that the normative constraints placed upon the executive by his job prevent him from freely *using* the capabilities he may otherwise be said to 'have'. Television networks and viewers, for instance, may have strong negative reactions to programming that contests social values around sexual preference. In this case 'not having a capability' and 'having it, but not being able to use it' are analytically indistinguishable. This person is culturally disabled in a very real sense.

Now consider the case of the African-American Wall Street banker who couldn't hail a cab.<sup>26</sup> He was stigmatised because of "race," even though his socio-economic position and educational level imply substantially above-average capabilities. Again, because this person is both highly capable yet still stigmatised, his case seems to cut against the logic I have outlined. This is only a failure properly to understand what a capability is, however. While people are *individually* capable or disabled, their identities are an aggregate phenomenon. A social identity is a commonality ascribed to a number of people, who are thereby constituted as a group by being said to share the features in question. As such, the value placed on an identity is predicated on the entire group; likewise, changes in it are the aggregate result of many individual actions, events, and judgements. The banker wasn't refused a ride because he had *individually* failed to contest the value ascribed to his identity. Rather, it was the result of the collective symbolic disablement of his group as a whole.<sup>27</sup> This example reveals a more general truth: when we use capability as a metric of equality in cultural justice, we must use it at the level of groups. In these cases, it must be employed as a statistical rather than individual concept.

It is important, then, to think of capabilities as composed of two phases or aspects. One of these is the agent-rooted aspect describing what skills and competencies inhere in particular people; the other is a structural and institutional aspect, which requires alteration of an individual's social and material circumstances to permit the development, maintenance, and use of such

competencies. Further, we must think of these two phases in a statistical sense, as they apply to the aggregate characteristics and circumstances of a group of people. Only then is capability a meaningful metric of cultural agency. In this sense, a 'capability' is actually a fairly abstract guide for distribution that requires several very different kinds of change. It functions as a critical concept by summing up the inherent competencies a group of people and the structural, institutional, and material limitations placed on them.

Now we can meet the charges posed above. Regarding (1), we can see that not all 'disablements' are simply rooted in a person. Rather, they are some combination of agent-rooted capability and structural circumstance. For example, gay, white, middle-aged men might not seem less abled than straight, white, middle-aged men *in themselves*. Gay men occupy equivalent positions of power, income, and opportunity to straight ones, and do not seem personally limited in what they can accomplish. Nonetheless, gays are less able as a group to define and revalue their own identities. Implicit but very real heterosexual norms place a cost on gay men for contesting the stigmata associated with gayness. Challenging these representations brings risks of outing oneself, of looking like a shrill activist, or of simply standing outside the norm. There is no equivalent cost for straight men who valorise straightness. In addition, there are restrictions on what the media are willing to discuss. Highly controversial and sensitive topics like homosexuality are often considered too hot to handle by the mainstream media, so it is difficult to find a mass audience for renegotiating the stigma attached to it. Valorisations of heterosexuality, in contrast, are the primary subject-matter of most fiction and drama. We see, then, that structural and social limitations are placed on gay men which limit their capabilities of self-representation. This symbolic disablement functions in the same way that a subject-rooted lack of capability would. It *does* indeed make sense to claim, then, that there is a disparity in certain important capabilities here.

The answer I have just given to objection (1) partially answers (2) as well. If people are disabled by structural conditions, rather than by anything that they personally lack, it is harder (though certainly not unheard of) to stigmatise them as deficient or lacking in any way. Additionally, the removal of structural disablements would significantly undermine such stigmata. This is only a partial answer, though. We still must consider the case of those who



*do* lack some personal ability that others have. These cases demonstrate the value of capability distributions compared with something like resources. Distributing capabilities may well result in additional, short-term stigmata, because they literally recognise one as “deficient.” This recognition, however, is in the service of enablement. It is only a transitory evil, one aimed at its own termination. So we should not expect the same kind of backlash that results from the chronic end-state redistributions of the liberal-democratic welfare state. Capability distributions are different, because they use short-term, targeted distribution in the service of long-term equality and solidarity.

## **5. Conclusion**

My purpose here has been primarily synthetic. I have outlined some challenges posed by identity politics and attempted to readjust our ideas about distribution accordingly, searching for a middle ground where the two can meet and productively interact. This middle ground, I believe, can be found in human agency - in the insight that social injustices are reproduced when people do not have the means to act against them. The capability view that I have sketched has an intuitive appeal in this light. It uses economic and structural tools of public policy to promote autonomy across a broad spectrum of human capacities. Those include forms of economic agency - the capabilities needed in a market-based economy - as well as forms of cultural agency - the capabilities required to act as an equal citizen in composing the dominant images of one's society. Capability distributions work to promote justice jointly along these two axes precisely because they can be targeted to many different kinds of problem. Thus a critical theory of social justice using capability development as a guide can serve as a versatile instrument for promoting both cultural and economic justice.

From this perspective, we can see that distributive justice and identity politics are neither as unconnected nor as opposed to one another as many people presume. Distributive justice, in this case, actually allows us to define the new and different kinds of equality that would be required for a truly effective politics of difference and a ‘culturally fair’ society. This normative standpoint is rooted in basic notions of equal agency. It links distributive justice and identity politics by using structural reform as a means of cultural change. Distribution, then, is a valuable tool for identity politics.

The converse is true as well, however. As distributive theorists have pointed out repeatedly in the past decade (in the ‘equality of what?’ debate), it is difficult to determine what grounds should be used for the distribution of social goods. The cultural problems associated with identity politics provide us with one such normative standpoint. The critical-theoretic model I have developed here gives us a non-essentialist, contextual, situated justification for particular sets of distributions. It is clear, then, that ‘difference’ and identity can provide one set of normative foundations for distributive justice.

If any overarching conclusion can be drawn from this essay, it is that theories of economic justice and theories of cultural justice ignore one another at their own peril. I have argued in some detail that theorists of economic justice must be much more sensitive to culture, and correspondingly that the distributive component in cultural politics must be more carefully attended to. Politicising identity is an incomplete solution if the material inequalities that anchor and reproduce identities persist, or if people do not have the agency to rearticulate and sustain their own definitions of self. On the other hand, attempts to achieve material equality that do not take identity into account will run into cultural problems that systematically subvert the achievement of their goals. Because of the complex and intricate relations between cultural and economic justice, it is unfortunate that these lines of research have developed for so long in isolation or mutual indifference to one another. I hope to have counteracted this tendency to some degree, establishing a productive middle ground between the two that can serve as the basis for a more complete theory of social justice.

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## Notes

- <sup>1</sup> Collected in N. Fraser, *Justice Interruptus*, New York, Routledge, 1997.
- <sup>2</sup> N. Fraser, “From Redistribution to Recognition? Dilemmas of Justice in a ‘Postsocialist’ Age,” in Fraser, *Justice Interruptus*, at 13-6; “A Rejoinder to Iris Young,” in Fraser, *Adding Insult to Injury: Social Justice and the Politics of Recognition*, London, Verso, (forthcoming) pp. 126-129.

- <sup>3</sup> See N. Fraser, "A Rejoinder to Iris Young," in response to Iris Young, "Unruly Categories: A Critique of Nancy Fraser's Dual Systems Theory," also in Fraser, *Adding Insult to Injury*.
- <sup>4</sup> Fraser argues that gender and "race" are problems from the perspectives of both culture *and* economy in ways that class and sexual preference are not. See her exchange with Judith Butler on this subject: Butler, "Merely Cultural"; Fraser, "Heterosexism, Misrecognition, and Capitalism," both in Fraser, *Adding Insult to Injury*. In this essay I follow Fraser's convention of bracketing "race" as an unfounded, ideological category of identity. Alain Locke made this argument quite elegantly as early as 1916. See *Race Contacts and Interracial Relations*, Howard University Press, 1992, chap 1.
- <sup>5</sup> Fraser, "From Redistribution to Recognition?" 27ff.
- <sup>6</sup> Fraser, "From Redistribution to Recognition?" pp. 15-33. Cf. what Martha Minow calls the "dilemma of difference." Minow, *Making All the Difference*, Ithaca, Cornell University Press, 1990, pp. 19-48.
- <sup>7</sup> Fraser, "From Redistribution to Recognition?" p. 23.
- <sup>8</sup> Fraser, "Heterosexism, Misrecognition, and Capitalism" p. 280.
- <sup>9</sup> See the bottom of note 4 above.
- <sup>10</sup> Martin Gilens, "'Race Coding' and White Opposition to Welfare," *American Political Science Review* 90:3, 1996, pp. 593-604.
- <sup>11</sup> Cf. Charles Taylor's 'dialogical' view of identity, which he develops with help from Mead and Bakhtin. Taylor, *Multiculturalism: Examining the Politics of Recognition*, ed. Amy Gutmann, Princeton University Press, 1994, pp. 32-37.
- <sup>12</sup> John Rawls, *A Theory of Justice*, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1971, esp. chaps. 11-17; "Social Unity and Primary Goods," in eds., Sen and Williams, *Utilitarianism and Beyond*, Cambridge UK, Cambridge University Press, 1982; *Political Liberalism*, New York, Columbia University Press, 1993, pp. 178-190.
- <sup>13</sup> Ronald Dworkin, "What is Equality? Part 2: Equality of Resources," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 10:4, 1981, pp. 283-345.
- <sup>14</sup> The two are normatively equivalent, that is, from the perspective of resource equality itself. Such practices are obviously unjust, however, so other measures can be invoked to reduce their injustice. In Rawls' case, for instance, fair equality of opportunity prevents discrimination in hiring.
- <sup>15</sup> Richard Arneson, "Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare," *Philosophical Studies* 56, 1989, pp. 77-93; "Liberalism, Distributive Subjectivism, and Equal Opportunity for Welfare," *Ethics* 19, 1990, pp. 158-94.
- <sup>16</sup> I have excluded straightforward equality of welfare from this discussion because not enough people seriously endorse it. The problems with this position are ably

- characterised in Ronald Dworkin, "What is Equality? Part 1: Equality of Welfare," *Philosophy and Public Affairs* 10:3, 1981, pp. 185-246.
- <sup>17</sup> Here I am paraphrasing Pierre Bourdieu's excellent study in an American idiom. Bourdieu, *Distinction: A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1984.
- <sup>18</sup> Pace Arneson, "Equality and Equal Opportunity for Welfare," 82-3; "Autonomy and Preference Formation," in eds., Jules Coleman and Allen Buchanan, *In Harm's Way: Essays in Honour of Joel Feinberg*, Cambridge UK, Cambridge University Press, 1994.
- <sup>19</sup> Amartya Sen, "Well-Being, Agency and Freedom," *Journal of Philosophy*, 82, 1985, pp.169-221; *Commodities and Capabilities*, Amsterdam, North-Holland, 1985; "Justice: Means versus Freedoms," *Philosophy and Public Affairs*, 19, 1990, pp. 111-21; *Inequality Re-examined*, Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, 1992; "Capability and Well-Being," in eds., Martha Nussbaum and Amartya Sen, *The Quality of Life*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1993.
- <sup>20</sup> Elizabeth Anderson provides a clear defense of this idea with reference to a similar conception of capability egalitarianism. "What is the Point of Equality?" *Ethics* 109, 1999, pp. 287-337, at 329-331.
- <sup>21</sup> Sen, "Well-Being, Agency and Freedom."
- <sup>22</sup> Martha Nussbaum, "Aristotelian Social Democracy," in eds., R.B. Douglass, G. Mara, and H. Richardson, *Liberalism and the Good*, New York, Routledge, 1990; "Human Functioning and Social Justice: In Defense of Aristotelian Essentialism," *Political Theory*, 20, 1992, pp. 202-46; and "Human Capabilities, Female Human Beings," in eds., Martha Nussbaum and Jonathan Glover, *Women, Culture and Development*, New York, Oxford University Press, 1995.
- <sup>23</sup> Cf. James Bohman's discussion of capabilities for democratic deliberative participation in *Public Deliberation: Pluralism, Complexity, and Democracy*, Cambridge MA, MIT Press, 1996, pp. 123-142.
- <sup>24</sup> Pace Iris Young, *Justice and the Politics of Difference*, Princeton, Princeton University Press, 1990, pp. 24-30.
- <sup>25</sup> Cf. Sen, "Capability and Well-Being" p. 33; *Commodities and Capabilities* pp. 25-27.
- <sup>26</sup> Cf. Nancy Fraser, "Social Justice in the Age of Identity Politics: Redistribution, Recognition, and Participation," *Tanner Lectures on Human Values*, vol. 19, ed. Grethe Peterson, Salt Lake City, University of Utah Press, 1998, p. 28.
- <sup>27</sup> I am reminded here of G. A. Cohen's elegant argument about the "collective unfreedom of the proletariat." G. A. Cohen, "The Structure of Proletarian Unfreedom," in John Roemer, ed., *Analytical Marxism*, New York, Cambridge University Press, 1986.