

Spring 2010

Doubling NATO: Functional and Geographical Enlargement of the Alliance

Ergodan Kurt
Old Dominion University

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DOUBLING NATO:
FUNCTIONAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL ENLARGEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE

by

Erdogan Kurt
B.A. August 1996, Turkish Military Academy
M.A. July 2001, Naval Postgraduate School

A Dissertation Submitted to the Faculty of Old Dominion University
in Partial Fulfillment of the Requirements for the Degree of

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

INTERNATIONAL STUDIES


OLD DOMINION UNIVERSITY

May 2010

Approved by:


Regina C. Karp (Director)


William T. Jersild (Member)


Thomas E. Chapman (Member)

ABSTRACT

DOUBLING NATO: FUNCTIONAL AND GEOGRAPHICAL ENLARGEMENT OF THE ALLIANCE

Erdogan Kurt
Old Dominion University, 2010
Director: Dr. Regina Karp

This dissertation studies NATO expansion as institutional adaptation. More specifically, it examines the interaction between NATO's functional and geographical enlargement. This study asserts that there is a close relationship between NATO's new functions and its enlargement. Over time, NATO evolved from a collective defence alliance to a comprehensive security organization. As NATO undertook new functions, its capabilities no longer matched the requirements of the new functions. The geographical enlargement, in fact, constitutes a vehicle for the fulfilment of the capability shortfall.

Furthermore, this dissertation asserts that the new security environment will force NATO to focus on the regions at a strategic distance. More specifically, the Black Sea corridor will be the next area for NATO engagement. New functions such as energy security may bring new members from the wider Black Sea region into the club.

The case studies offer a detailed analysis of NATO's post Cold War functional and geographical enlargement. The second case study also highlights the fact that there is no an automatic geographical enlargement as a result of new NATO functions.

The timing of dissertation coincides with a significant transformation in NATO's structure and core tasks. 2010 will be the year of a NEW NATO with a new peace establishment and strategic concept. NATO will still be a relevant Euro-Atlantic

organization with a global area of responsibility in the twenty-first century security environment for as long as it continues to protect the vital interests of its members.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

It is a great honour for me to thank my dissertation chair and members, friends, and family, for supporting me during the writing of this dissertation. Professor Regina C. Karp, Ph.D., Director, Graduate Program for International Studies, has been the Committee Chair for this dissertation. Dr. Karp, thank you for your advice, guidance, and patience at every step since the beginning of the program. I want to also give a special thanks to Dr. Austin T. Jersild and Thomas E. Chapman for the significant role you played in reading and commenting on the drafts I wrote. I owe my dissertation committee a great intellectual debt. I am grateful to my fellow students and the entire faculty at the Graduate Program for International Studies for providing an intellectually challenging environment for my studies. I have been very fortunate to study with Dr. Peter Schulman, Dr. David Earnest, Dr. Jie Chen, Dr. Qiu Jin, Dr. Steve Yetiv, and Dr. Simon Serfaty. Thank you all very much.

My wife, Gulsen, to whom I have dedicated this dissertation, deserves my very special thanks. Thank you for making it possible for me to take on this goal.

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CHAPTER I

INTRODUCTION

Do we still need NATO? The question has been discussed extensively in the past two decades and at the dawn of the new millennium; there is a near consensus throughout the political spectrum that NATO still matters for international security. Considering the Soviet threat was eliminated successfully, it might have been costly to continue on the commitments of NATO when there is no any threat to the members. Even more, engaging additional commitments by accepting new members can be seen as a huge policy error within and outside of the alliance. Why is NATO enlarging continuously? This dissertation aims to provide a new perspective on NATO enlargement. As explained below, NATO's geographical enlargement is explicitly tied to the alliance's functional enlargement. When the alliance develops new functions to cope with the new challenges in the security environment, the new capabilities are required to satisfy the functions. NATO accepts new nations only when the required capabilities cannot be developed internally among the members. Though NATO expansion can be explained by other means such as alliance formation, hegemonic interests and cultural affiliation of the new and existing members, no study highlights the common characteristics of NATO enlargements throughout its history. Rather, the existing literature explains each enlargement round as a separate case, thus not providing a consistent answer to the enlargement phenomenon.

This paper follows the format requirements of *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 15th edition by University of Chicago Press.

Alliances typically cease to exist when the threat disappears. Having existed as a security organization of the last 60 years, NATO has not just surpassed the expectations of its most severe critics, but has also evolved into one of the core organizations of the twenty-first century. Today, there is no other international organization that can enforce peace and security in any part of the globe. The deficiencies of United Nations, OSCE and other similar organizations were underscored with the ethnic violence in ex-Yugoslavia in 1990s.

In the last twenty years, NATO underwent a huge transformation: New functions, new capabilities and new members. We are witnessing a new power shift in the international structure. Asia is rising as a power center in the new world order. NATO needs to continue to transform itself to cope with the new challenges.

What makes NATO's unique integrated military structure is the most important element that distinguish it from other organizations . NATO is the most successful political and military alliance of the history. The cold war ended peacefully without a bullet shot and Europe became one of the most prosperous regions of the world. Ironically, the success of NATO became also a question mark for the alliance's own existence. In spite of the cold war's peaceful resolution, discussions of NATO's future have not ended. Those who believe NATO will be dissolved prove redundant.¹ NATO managed to adapt and transform itself throughout the years. The adaptation of NATO has been twofold. First, it has expanded the functions it performs and second, it has accepted new members in the east.

¹ "There's no need for an acrimonious divorce, but perhaps NATO at 60 can look forward to NATO at 75 enjoying a quiet and well-deserved retirement -- still alive, but a lot less active." Stephan Walt, CFR Symposium on NATO at 60, http://www.cfr.org/project/1406/cfr_symposium_on_nato_at_60.html

The current debate on NATO's future is focused on NATO's effectiveness in the future international order. Especially, the war in Afghanistan is seen as a test case for NATO's future. The rise of death toll in the alliance's first Article-5 operation and the ever-increasing cost of the war has forced many countries in Europe to question NATO's roles and capabilities. Those who raise concerns about the war in Afghanistan state that NATO should act in accordance with its original mandate and just ensure the defense of the alliance territory. Out of area operations, like Afghanistan, can jeopardize the credibility of the alliance.

NATO enlargement is not a post cold war policy. In fact enlargement is a continuation of a NATO policy based on Article 10 of the Washington Treaty:

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty.²

NATO enlargement was widely discussed both in political and academic circles in the 1990s. NATO countries expressed their consensus and desire for accepting new members to the alliance in 1995 by publishing the study on NATO enlargement.³ The study underlines how NATO sees the enlargement issue and what it expects from the aspiring countries to be a member.

In principle, NATO countries propose membership to any Euro-Atlantic country having a market oriented democratic regime. The decision to admit a new country is

² NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_17120.htm, (accessed May 13, 2009).

³ NATO, "Study on NATO Enlargement," <http://www.fas.org/man/natodoc/enl-9502.htm>, (accessed April 14, 2009).

taken solely on consensus bases. There is no any automated procedure to accept new countries which meets the criteria of the membership. Rather, NATO evaluates every case separately.

NATO AT 60

NATO is not merely an alliance of the cold war. In fact NATO has become a security community with an embedded network of political and military structures. The alliance triumphed in the cold war without any tragedy. In the aftermath of the Soviet collapse, instead of becoming obsolete, NATO deepened and widened its structure. Nearly half of the current NATO members joined the club after the end of cold war.

Today, NATO involves all kind of operations besides the conventional task of territorial defense. As seen in the figure 1, NATO operations increased in complexity and range in time. As of 2009, NATO involved in one major operation in Afghanistan and five small operations across the globe:

INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND ASSISTANCE FORCE (ISAF) IN AFGHANISTAN

Established in 2001, ISAF operations in Afghanistan are lead by NATO since 2003. More than 42 nations contribute over 67.000 personnel for NATO operation in Afghanistan.⁴ NATO's mission in Afghanistan is to "extend the authority of the Afghan central government" and to foster the reconstruction efforts through 26 Provincial Reconstruction Teams (PRTs).

⁴ NATO, "International Security Assistance Force (ISAF): Facts and Figures," http://www.nato.int/isaf/docu/epub/pdf/placemat_archive/isaf_placemat_091001.pdf. (accessed October 15, 2009).




Fig. 1. NATO Operations

KOSOVO OPERATION

NATO's presence in Kosovo goes back to 1999 when NATO conducted military operations in order to prevent a humanitarian disaster against ethnic Albanians in Kosovo. Today, 15,000 NATO troops operate under the UN Security Council resolution 1244 to maintain security in Kosovo.⁵

NATO TRAINING MISSION IN IRAQ (NTM-I)

NATO engaged in Iraq after the Istanbul Summit in 2004. NATO's involvement in Iraq is in the form of a training mission. NTM-I trains Iraqi security forces.

⁵ Ibid.

OPERATION ACTIVE ENDEAVOUR (OAE)

After the 9/11 terrorist attacks, NATO initiated a number of counter terrorism operations. OAE is a maritime operation in order to deprive terrorists from using Mediterranean Sea.

SUPPORT TO THE AFRICAN UNION

NATO supported the African Union in Somalia and Sudan by providing air lift capability.

COUNTER PIRACY OPERATION

In 2009 NATO launched Operation Allied Protector to protect the sea lines of commerce in the horn of Africa.⁶

NATO'S PERSISTENCE

There are many explanations for NATO's persistence after the cold war. First of all, NATO is a highly institutionalized alliance. Most institutions outlive the initial purpose of their establishment. Once established, every institution will carry a sunk cost.

Institutions will most likely survive by adapting to the new structure even when their rationale fades away "because they are costly to create and less costly to maintain."⁷

Second, NATO is too valuable to forgo. It is valuable for the US because through NATO, the US can legitimize its worldwide security policies. NATO is the symbol of American supremacy of the last century. Current international structure is a post world war II

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Celeste A. Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War," *International Organization* 54, no. 4 (2000): 705.

institutional design of the US. The structure of US state apparatus is reflected worldwide through institutions such as NATO.⁸ Furthermore, the US feels more comfortable in an institutional environment than bilateral relations. Thus the demise of a highly popular organization will signal unintended messages about US power in the post cold war. Third, NATO guarantees the peace and stabilization for European countries. Especially for Germany, NATO means to mitigate the security concerns of other European powers. For Eastern European countries, NATO is the ultimate security guarantee for their survival.

To sum up, NATO survives as long as the members see themselves better off in the club.⁹ Especially in a time of multidimensional risks and threats, NATO will lengthen the shadow of the future. Before exploring NATO's double enlargement, it is important to determine when and how NATO did the right thing.

THE GOLDEN DAYS OF NATO

Needless to say, the cold war was a NATO era. The West recovered economically under the NATO's security umbrella. The consolidation of Europe was another achievement of the alliance. NATO exploited the opportunity to democratize the Central and Eastern Europe in the immediate aftermath of the fall of Berlin wall. NATO membership provided the conditions to foster the democratic reforms, temper the security competition and enabled the denationalization of the defense in Central and Eastern Europe. The new members were able to reform their political and economic systems and

⁸ Michael W. Reisman, "The United States and International Institutions," *Survival* 41, no. 4 (1999): 63.

⁹ Stephen M. Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," *Survival*. 39, no. 1 (1997): 156.

resolve disputes with neighboring countries peacefully.¹⁰ For the first time in the history, Europe is close to becoming an island of peace. To quote Brzezinski,

NATO enlargement was historically timely and also the right thing to do. By the early years of the twenty-first century, the almost total geopolitical overlap between membership in NATO and membership in the EU made it clear that Europe was finally both secure and united.¹¹

NATO'S FAILURES

The late reaction to the Yugoslavia conflict was one of the crucial mistakes for NATO. The war showed how the security of neighboring regions is linked to the Euro-Atlantic security. The spillover of conflict in Yugoslavia would have undermined the basic norms of the alliance if it had not intervened. The lessons of the Bosnian War helped NATO to prevent another regional crisis in Kosovo. Although Russians were alienated in the Kosovo intervention, the relative peace in Kosovo proves to be a positive mark for NATO.

THE ENLARGEMENT ISSUE

Looking at the NATO's achievements and faults, it is fair to say that enlargement issue is one of the most debated issue in NATO's history. To some it is the "centerpiece

¹⁰ Philip H. Gordon, "NATO: Enlargement and Effectiveness." Brookings Institution, 23, http://www.brookings.edu/testimony/2008/0311_nato_gordon.aspx (accessed November 21, 2009).

¹¹ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "An Agenda for NATO : Toward a Global Security Web," *Foreign Affairs* 88, no. 5 (2009): 6.

of a strategy to make NATO effective in meeting the challenges of the future”¹² and for others it is “a policy error of historic importance.”¹³

The alliance has long been discussing the geographical scope of the enlargement. Which countries should be invited and which should be out of the club is a big question to be addressed by the allies. NATO successfully survived four rounds of enlargement in the post cold era. There was a consensus on the post cold war enlargement. Baltic States and Central and Eastern European countries joined the club smoothly. But, the Ukraine and Georgia membership revealed the transatlantic rift for the NATO expansion. Although the Bucharest Summit Declaration states that these countries will be NATO members one day, France’s and Germany’s opposition to further NATO enlargement is publicized by their leaders.¹⁴ The opponents of enlargement believe that any future expansion should bring the suppliers of the security not the consumer ones.

In fact, NATO does not have a long term strategy for enlargement. Changing international structure brings the question of what kind of security approach is useful to cope with the future challenges: A functional approach or a geographical security approach. Should NATO be satisfied with the current zone of security or extend its coverage to new functions and territories? In this dissertation, I put forward an alternative explanation for NATO’s expansion. The study explores how open NATO’s door is and what influences NATO’s decision for enlargement. In other words, the following questions will be at the centerpiece of the study.

¹²Ronald D. Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door : How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era* (New York: Columbia University Press, 2002), xxiv.

¹³ Michael McGwire, "NATO Expansion: 'a Policy Error of Historic Importance'," *Review of International Studies* 24, no. 1 (1998): 23-42.

¹⁴ Reuters, “After Balkans duo, NATO enlargement to slow,” para. 6, <http://www.reuters.com/article/newsMaps/idUSTRE5304ZU20090401> (accessed November 21, 2009).

Should NATO be only a Euro-Atlantic collective security organization or reach to the areas traditionally beyond Europe? Does NATO need new functions or new territories or both? Is there a causal relation between functional and geographical enlargement? If yes, how is the functional enlargement related to geographical enlargement?

In order to explore the above unknowns, we need to take a close look at the security environment and NATO's tasks to cope with the challenges.

21ST CENTURY SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The security environment has substantially changed in the last decade. The new threats such as terrorism, nuclear proliferation, failed states, threats to Information networks, and insecurity of energy sources demand common commitment by the international community. No individual country is able to respond the above threats alone.

THREATS TO VALUES AND PEOPLE

NATO is not just an interest dominated organization. The democratic values and norms constitute the mere intra-alliance function. Any threat to the values and people is perceived a common security concern. As stated in the latest NATO Multiple Future Study, "the Alliance will face rivals for strategic influence, values and ideas; its vulnerabilities will be exploited on and beyond Alliance territory; and its populations and forces attacked in unexpected ways."¹⁵

¹⁵ NATO, "Multiple Future Study," 4, http://www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple_Futures/20090503_MFP_findings.pdf (accessed November 17, 2009).

THREATS TO TERRITORY

The collective defense is the glue of the alliance. Although rare, there is still a residual conventional threat to the alliance. The stability in Balkans and Caucasus is volatile and the spread of any conflict can undermine the Euro-Atlantic Security.

THREATS FROM FRAGILE OR FAILED STATES

NATO will have to engage intra state conflicts in the future. The instability caused by failed states can negatively affect the alliance security in terms of immigration and spill over of the conflict to the NATO territory. Thus, NATO might increasingly conduct peace keeping operations in areas at strategic distance.

WMD THREAT

Both state and non-state actors can easily develop or access to the WMD capabilities in the coming decades. In particular, terrorist access to the WMD can be catastrophic for the alliance security.

TERRORISM

Terrorism is one of the major threats to the alliance in the 21st century. As stated in the Declaration on Terrorism by NATO Foreign Ministers:

Defence against terrorism may include activities by NATO's military forces, based on decisions by the North Atlantic Council, to help deter, defend, disrupt and protect against terrorist attacks, or threat of attacks, directed from abroad, against populations, territory, infrastructure and forces of any member state,

including by acting against these terrorists and those who harbour them. Any operations undertaken in the defence against terrorism will have a sound legal basis and fully conform with the relevant provisions of the United Nations Charter and all relevant international norms and standards.¹⁶

CLIMATE CHANGE

Climate change might cause societal unrest in the near future. NATO, as being the only institutions that can provide security, may need to conduct humanitarian operations in order to assist national and international organization as it did in “the Asia Tsunami, the 2006 United States Hurricane season and the Kashmiri earthquake.”¹⁷

ENERGY SECURITY

The disruption of gas to Europe in 2007 demonstrated the vulnerability of allies in the energy sector. In the 1980s, NATO protected the tanker traffic during the Iran-Iraq war. Today, the energy security may necessitate a wide variety of actions including protecting the infrastructure, providing security to energy producer countries and to call for collective response in the face of a threat to the flow of energy.

In the Energy Security, NATO might have a role for “information and intelligence fusion and sharing; projecting stability; advancing international and regional cooperation;

¹⁶ NATO, “Declaration on Terrorism,” para. 3, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_21031.htm (accessed November 21, 2009).

¹⁷ NATO, “Future security Environment,” 58, http://www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple_Futures/ACTFutureSecurityEnvironmentFirstEdition.pdf (accessed November 21, 2009).

supporting consequence management; and supporting the protection of critical energy infrastructure.”¹⁸

VIRTUAL THREAT

The coordinated cyber attacks to Estonia in 2007 raised the security of the alliance information networks. As Estonian Defense Minister put it correctly, “ at present, NATO does not define cyber-attacks as a clear military action. This means that the provisions of Article V of the North Atlantic Treaty, or, in other words collective self-defense, will not automatically be extended to the attacked country. Not a single NATO defense minister would define a cyber-attack as a clear military action at present. However, this matter needs to be resolved in the near future.”¹⁹

To sum up, the world in the next 20 years will be more globalized and unpredictable.²⁰ NATO can not solve all kind of global problems, however NATO should be a part of network of organizations which will address the global threats and risks. The new threats “to vital interests will challenge the strategic unity, and solidarity within the alliance as well the common understanding of what constitutes an article 5 attack.”²¹

NATO IN THE 21ST CENTURY

Recent studies questions the relevance of NATO in the face of new challenges. Although politicians often refer to NATO as the most successful alliance in history, it is

¹⁸ NATO, “Bucharest Summit Declaration,” article 48, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_8443.htm (accessed November 23, 2009).

¹⁹Ian Traynor, “Russia accused of unleashing cyber war to disable Estonia,” *Guardian*, May 17, 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/may/17/topstories3.russia> (accessed November 23, 2009).

²⁰ NATO, “Multiple Future Project,” 3.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 22.

not uncommon to see the remarks of NATO being “insufficient to the agenda.”²² A new NATO should clarify the NATO’s roles and missions and find a balance between its core functions. To do that, NATO should reach a consensus on the future challenges especially regarding Russia.

Common sense requires that states in a collective security organization may have similar threat perceptions if the aggressor has a substantial aggregate economic, military and human resources. However, different perceptions of threats are not rare in the alliances. As claimed by Stephen M. Walt, the level of threats depends on the aggressor’s aggregate power, proximity, offensive capability and offensive intentions.²³ Thus, states close to the aggressor feel more threatened compared to the other states in a collective security organization. States having historical or territorial problems with the aggressor will assess the threat seriously.

The danger with the divergent threat perception is that it can jeopardize the effectiveness of the alliance. When we look at NATO, it is easy to discover that some NATO members want reassurance against Russian aggression which became evident after the Russia-Georgia conflict. The Western European countries, however, see Russia as a partner rather than a threat. In the last Munich security conference, Sarkozy stated that he does not “believe that modern Russia constitutes a military threat to the European Union and NATO.”²⁴ The below visions of NATO help understanding NATO in the new century.

²² Daniel Hamilton et al., "Alliance Reborn an Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century," (Washington, DC: Atlantic Council of the United States, 2009).

²³ Stephen M. Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," *International Security* 9, no. 4 (1985): 9.

²⁴ Craig Whitlock, “‘Reset’ Sought on Relations With Russia, Biden Says,” *The Washington Post*, <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2009/02/07/AR2009020700756.html> (accessed November 23, 2009).

MINIMALIST NATO

With the resurgence of Russia, some NATO nations felt the urgency of focusing on home missions instead of away missions. Mainly, the east European countries believe that NATO can be relevant only if it provides the core function of collective defense against the NATO territory. Even some old NATO members such as Norway, want “the need for renewed focus on security challenges on NATO territory and in our immediate neighborhood.”²⁵

EXPEDITIONARY NATO

Those who support an expeditionary NATO emphasize that a large scale military aggression against the alliance territory is very unlikely. The most formidable form of threat will likely originate far from the alliance territory. NATO needs to have the deployable capabilities to conduct expeditionary operations across the globe. Even the article 5 missions might be expeditionary type. The NATO Response Force (NRF) can be used in the full range of expeditionary operations in strategic distance.

GLOBAL NATO

Although not as powerful as the above voices, there are proposals to expand the alliance globally by including countries with the similar democratic values and culture, such as Australia, Japan and South Korea. Globalists believe that NATO should be the ultimate security institution of the all democratic countries:

²⁵ Espen Barth Eide, “Norway’s security outlook - strengthening the relevance of NATO,” Ministry of Defense, Government of Norway, http://www.regjeringen.no/nb/dep/fd/aktuelt/taler_artikler/politisk_ledelse/statssekretaer_espen_barth_eide/2009/norways-security-outlook-.html?id=562975 (accessed November 23, 2009).

NATO's next move must be to open its membership to any democratic state in the world that is willing and able to contribute to the fulfillment of NATO's new responsibilities. Only a truly global alliance can address the global challenges of the day.²⁶

NEW FUNCTIONS

NATO is the fundamental organization that ties both sides of the Atlantic. NATO will maintain its relevance as long as it guarantees the members' sovereignty. Past NATO enlargements have contributed enormously to the European pacification. However there is still work to be done in the Balkans, Black Sea and Caucasus. While NATO is the legitimate vehicle of the international community to handle global security concerns, it should not be expected to find solutions to all global problems. Instead, NATO should be a stage setter. It should serve as "a training tool, as a tool of assistance for other regional bodies."²⁷ NATO should match its capabilities with its ambitions to remain credible. The following functions are indispensable for a future NATO:

DETERRENCE AND COLLECTIVE DEFENSE

Article 5 is and should remain the core theme of the alliance. However, it needs to be reassessed to better reflect what it does and does not cover. On one hand, a large scale military aggression against NATO territory is unlikely. On the other hand, unconventional threats will be most likely. Therefore, NATO should decide whether

²⁶ Ivo Daalder and James Goldgeier, "Global NATO," *Foreign Affairs* 85, no. 5 (2006): 106.

²⁷ Charles A. Kupchan, "NATO At 60 Symposium: Session I: NATO in the International System," Council On Foreign Relations, http://www.cfr.org/project/1406/cfr_symposium_on_nato_at_60.html (accessed November 23, 2009).

these new threats warrant the implementation of the article 5 or not. NATO should effectively demonstrate its solidarity and will in the face of any threat to its territory and people. If NATO fails to guarantee the territorial sovereignty of its members, the renationalization of the defense in Europe will cause the old rivalries to resurface.

CONFLICT RESOLUTION

NATO will probably engage in a regional crisis beyond its territory in the coming decades. NATO will have to use its political and military assets to prevent any conflict that jeopardizes its security.

ENERGY SECURITY

NATO might have to ensure the undisrupted flow of oil and gas to the western markets. The stability of the energy producer countries is important for the alliance in this respect.

CYBER DEFENSE

NATO should have a capability to ensure the safety of not just the physical but also the virtual commons.

PREVENTION OF THE PROLIFERATION OF WMD

The worst scenario that can happen in today's globalized world is terrorist access to WMD. NATO needs to develop new instruments to prevent proliferation as highlighted in the latest comprehensive Counter-WMD policy:

the spread of WMD and their means of delivery and the possibility that terrorists will acquire them are the principal threats facing the Alliance over the next 10-15 years. Therefore, the Alliance seeks to prevent their proliferation through an active political agenda of arms control, disarmament and non-proliferation, as well as by developing and harmonising defence capabilities, and, when necessary, employing these capabilities consistent with political decisions in support of non-proliferation objectives.²⁸

TRANSATLANTIC LINK

NATO is the main platform for Euro-Atlantic Security. Any transatlantic rift will only contribute to the ineffectiveness of the alliance. In NATO's history, it is not uncommon to find examples of US-Europe disagreement. However in the past decade, the mutual blow to the alliance solidarity was a concern for every politician. One of the biggest tests of NATO's credibility occurred before the Iraq war. Based on the article four of the Washington treaty, Turkey requested NATO's assistance because it feared being drawn a big conflict with Iraq. Surprisingly, France and Germany resisted the request and caused a crisis in NATO. Although the decision to aid Turkey was taken late, the stalemate had already rung the alarm bells for NATO solidarity. As the NATO secretary asserts "the alliance has been damaged but it is not broken."²⁹ Similarly, US reluctance on calling NATO help for the conduct of Afghanistan and Iraq war was a big

²⁸ NATO, "NATO's Comprehensive, Strategic-Level Policy for Preventing the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) and Defending against Chemical, Biological, Radiological and Nuclear (CBRN) Threats," article 5, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-F8FB6D58-07B4753A/natolive/official_texts_57218.htm (accessed November 23, 2009).

²⁹ Michael R. Gordon, "NATO: The Inside Story," *New York Times*, February 25, 2003, http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/25/international/worldspecial3/25CND_DISP.html?pagewanted=all (accessed November 23, 2009).

disappointment for the allies. The US missed an unprecedented opportunity to transform the transatlantic relations in the wake of the Iraq war. To quote Asmus,

“for the first time ever, NATO invoked the defense clause enshrined in Article V of its charter, and U.S. allies offered to join the fight in Afghanistan. But the opportunity was then squandered. Instead, the decision to make Iraq the next target in the war on terrorism—and the manner in which the administration chose to topple Saddam Hussein—led to a spectacular political train wreck across the Atlantic.”³⁰

PARTNERSHIP NETWORKS

NATO should continue to enhance the partnership programs with other international organizations and countries. NATO should be able to access the civilian capabilities of the other organizations in any operations. NATO needs to develop a new partnership program with the neighboring regions of Black Sea, Caucasus, Central Asia and Middle East in order to secure the people and territory of the alliance.

THE MAIN ARGUMENT

The fast pace of globalization, the source of new threats and their asymmetric nature all forced NATO to change its security approach from a geographical to functional one. NATO's future missions and open door policy will depend on the consequences of the functional approach to security. In the past, NATO expansion was explained by the interest accumulation of several key nations. There is no study which looks at the

³⁰ Ronald D. Asmus, "Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance," *Foreign Affairs* 82, no. 5 (2003): 21.

implementation of NATO's new functions, however. Functional enlargement is a vehicle of NATO's adaptation to new security environment.

This study examines whether there is a linkage between NATO's functional and geographical enlargement. The main argument of the study is that NATO's functional enlargement requires new capabilities which in turn could result in geographical enlargement. A New Security Environment brings new challenges which in turns demand NATO adaptation. NATO functions are a part of the adaptation process. Required capabilities are derived from the NATO functions. Capabilities can be acquired by developing within NATO, cooperating with partners or importing from new members. The figure 2 depicts the main argument.

NATO has transformed itself from a cold war alliance to a more complex institution in the last two decades. During this period, NATO both widened and deepened in contrary to the expectations. My research shows that NATO's geographical widening is closely related to functional deepening. Indeed, NATO geographical enlargement is a capability aggregation process. NATO enlargement can be explained in two dimensions: Functional and Geographical enlargement.

The central hypothesis is that NATO's new functions drive the geographical enlargement. In other words, NATO enlarges geographically unless the capabilities needed to satisfy the new NATO functions can be developed by existing structure. Any geographical enlargement should bring additional capabilities to address the NATO's evolving functions.




Fig. 2. A Model for NATO Transformation

Without supplying a new capability, the geographical enlargement is to be unlikely and if it happens it will make NATO incapable of meeting its commitments. Not all functions require new membership. As long as NATO is able to perform its core functions, the geographical enlargement will more probably bring consumer rather than producer of security.

THE PURPOSE OF INQUIRY

There is an emerging discussion on NATO's effectiveness and functionality due to the war in Afghanistan. It is highly believed that a failure in Afghanistan will undermine NATO's credibility. This study examines how NATO's new functions affect the geographical enlargement. The theoretical and case studies provide answers for why the functional and geographical enlargement did not occur at the same time. The study examines the consequences of the NATO's involvement in the Wider Black Sea region as well.

THE IMPACT OF AFGHANISTAN

With the global war on terror, NATO's security paradigm has changed considerably. The allies' response to the 9/11 was quick and decisive. On September 12, 2001, NAC declared the implementation of the article-5 of the Washington treaty. The political contribution of NATO's decision was much more important than the military one. Although NATO did not join the Afghanistan operation initially, by 2003, Afghanistan becomes one of the most important NATO operations.

Afghanistan operation is important in two ways. First it is the first article-5 operation in NATO's history. NATO used its military muscle for the first time, which proves its capability and solidarity in the post cold war. Secondly, Afghanistan operation is the first full-scale out of area operation NATO is undertaking. So far all the operations were in Europe, thus governments could easily explain the rationale to the public. Afghanistan operation can not be explained with the old rationale of collective defense and European security. In fact, it is the new security paradigm that produced the

consensus: territorial security is no longer adequate to meet the challenges of the 21st century.

Afghanistan is seen by many as a test case for the alliance future. NATO has never been engaged in armed conflict before. It is the first time that NATO will prove its value as being the most powerful military alliance. A failure in Afghanistan would result in a paramount effect on Alliance credibility.³¹ In fact, policy makers across the alliance have begun to raise dissatisfaction on the way the NATO does its job in the region. Allies contribution to ISAF operation bring the issue of NATO's becoming a two-tiered alliance.³²

RENEWED INTEREST ON NATO

In the last three months there have been over 50 studies regarding the NATO's future roles and enlargement. This dissertation will add to the discussions on NATO's relevance in the 21st century.

A NEW NATO

A study on NATO is meaningful due to the emerging of a NEW NATO. NATO is new because of changing international security environment and its impact on NATO. As of 2010, NATO modified its military structure to accommodate the reentry of France and to better meet the new challenges.

³¹ Hamilton et al., "Alliance Reborn an Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century," 15.

³² Steven Lee Myers and Thom Shanker, "NATO Expansion, and a Bush Legacy, are in Doubt," *The New York Times*, March 15, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/03/15/world/europe/15nato.html?pagewanted=all> (accessed November 23, 2009).

France`s Reentry to Military Structure

France reintegrated to the military structure in 2009. As a result of the reintegration, France assumed the one of the top military posts in the alliance: Supreme Allied Transformation Commander.

Global Economic Crisis

The global economic crisis forced the NATO countries to further narrow their defense budget and contributions. The resource constraints will have a huge impact in NATO`s functions and accessions of new members.

Renewed Transatlantic Focus on NATO

With the new US administration, NATO regained the transatlantic focus. There is a consensus that NATO should retain its position as the sole security platform in Euro-Atlantic region.

New Secretary General

For the first time, an ex- prime minister assumed the position of Secretary General. Mr. Anders Fogh Rasmussen brought a fresh voice to the alliance.

New Strategic Concept

In 2010, NATO will decide on its new strategy which will guide the alliance in the next decade.

METHODOLOGY

This study is a qualitative analysis of NATO's functional and geographical enlargement focusing especially on the post cold war era expansion. The two case studies explore the validity of the hypothesis that there is a close relationship between NATO's functional and geographical enlargement. Functional enlargement is tending to drive the geographical enlargement. In figure 3, the conceptual framework of the dissertation is depicted.




Fig. 3. Conceptual Framework

The level of functional enlargement is the independent variable while the level of geographical enlargement is the dependent variable. The capability shortfall ties the two variables.

Each Case Study will be analyzed in terms of the Security Environment, changes to the NATO functions and capability Development. The goal of the case studies is to determine whether the new functions resulted in new members or not.

MILESTONES OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

There are three milestones in NATO's enlargement. The first milestone is the 1950 Korean War. The war reveals the dimensions of the Soviet threat. NATO

recognized that Soviet ideological and territorial expansion threatened the Western Security.

The second milestone is the collapse of the Soviet Union. In 1990 NATO gave a warm welcome to the developments in the communist world. NATO mentioned that there would be no security at the expense of any country. NATO changed its security approach dramatically with the end of the cold war. The change could be seen in the classification and preparation of the allies' top strategic document. NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept has been driven by the political authorities and allowed for public access.³³

The third milestone is the terrorist attack on September 11, 2001. The developments in the aftermath of the attack revealed the necessity for considering security not only conventional territorial defense but also new threats far away from NATO territory. The new motto is that Euro-Atlantic security starts from Hindu-Kush Mountains.

IMPORTANCE

This research enhances the empirical development of the existing literature in several ways. First, the current literature explains the NATO enlargement in only one dimension, accession of new members. This study looks at both functional and territorial dimension. The chapters explain why NATO enlarges functionally and geographically.

Second, the existing literature explains NATO's expansion, by the interaction of major powers. This research contributes to the expansion literature by explaining an untouched phenomenon: New NATO functions. The research also makes predictions

³³ NATO, "NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept," www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics-56626.htm (accessed November 17, 2009).

about the direction of future NATO expansion by examining the new NATO tasks and missions. In particular, the energy security and stability in the wider Black Sea has been extensively covered in the research. My research provides a new understanding of the NATO's role in the Caucasus corridor.

Third, the study contributes to the discussions of the NATO's adaptation to the new security environment. The enlargement is the centerpiece for the persistence of NATO in the post cold era. Here, my research brings the functional enlargement at the center of the discussion. The dissertation states that NATO enlargement is an institutional adaptation which should be "built on the logic of relative costs and the functions of institutions."³⁴

NATO ENLARGEMENT IN THE LITERATURE

NATO enlargement is heavily discussed from a territorial expansion point of view in 1990s. The studies can be categorized in three groups. In the first group, there are scholars who believe that with the demise of Soviet threat, NATO does not have a future and it will lose its significance.³⁵ Thus NATO enlargement does not make sense since it does not have a future. Even if it can survive artificially for some time, it is destined to fade away. The above argument is modified in later years by suggesting that as long as the US has an interest to keep NATO to interfere in European Defense and Foreign Policy, NATO's will continue to exist.³⁶

³⁴ Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War," 707.

³⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, "Back to the Future: Instability in Europe after the Cold War," *International Security* 15, no. 1 (1990): 5.

³⁶ Kenneth N. Waltz, "NATO Expansion: A Realist's View," in *Explaining NATO Enlargement*, ed. Robert W. Rauchhaus (London; Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 2001), 29.

In the second category, there are opponents of the expansion. The opponents claim that NATO enlargement will not help secure the Euro-Atlantic region. On the contrary, such a move will jeopardize the democratization of Russia and divide Europe with new lines. The countries who remain outside the line will feel insecure with NATO's enlargement. Moreover, the opponents claim that the cost of enlargement will outweigh the benefits of having new members. It will be difficult to reach consensus when the number of countries continue to rise.

In the last category of literature, there are the advocates of NATO enlargement. Mainly neoliberals and constructivists scholars support the NATO enlargement in that NATO will help the democratization of the Central and East Europe. By joining the club, the aspiring countries will forgo the security competition with their neighbors. There will be spillover effect in economic and social areas. The aspiring countries can focus on domestic reforms and democratization. The rationale behind the tampering security competition is that Article 5 of the Washington treaty provides ultimate security warranty for the new members. Not all the advocates have reached a consensus on the limits of the NATO enlargement. While some support only a European enlargement, others like Nicholas Burns support the idea of a more global NATO reaching Central Asia and the Middle East.³⁷

There are valuable studies on NATO functions in the literature as well. The central theme of these studies is the transformation of the alliance from "a predominantly defense-based military Alliance into a comprehensive political and military security

³⁷ Rebecca R. Moore, *NATO's New Mission : Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World* (Westport, Conn.: Praeger Security International, 2007), 5.

community.”³⁸ Especially Emanuel Adler argues that NATO enlargement is an example of the spread of security communities. Adler believes that NATO’s enlargement was a cooperative security enlargement to develop a common identity. The diffusion of NATO practices in the 1990s brought the geographical enlargement.³⁹ The Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) is the most important NATO practice after the cold war. The PfP practice cause the spread of NATO’s background knowledge which in turns socialize the PfP countries.⁴⁰ The enlargement studies done by Allied Command Transformation do not give a bright picture for the future of NATO’s expansion. The future world scenarios study articulates four scenarios of which only the last one result in enlargement:⁴¹

THE STRONG TOOLBOX

This future represents a strong US and a fragmented European commitment. There is a common threat perception among the allies. NATO is seen as the main vehicle for global security.

THE SHARED PARTNERSHIP

The future represents a strong US and European commitment. NATO is highly capable of conducting any operations globally. The capability gap is reduced between the allies. There is division in functional and geographical lines between EU and NATO.

³⁸ NATO, “Multiple Future Project,” 35

³⁹ Emanuel Adler, “The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO’s Post-Cold War Transformation,” *European Journal of International Relations* 14, no. 2 (2008): 196.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*: 208.

⁴¹ NATO, “Future World Scenarios,” http://www.act.nato.int/media/Multiple_Futures/ACTFutureWorldScenariosApr06.pdf (accessed November 3, 2009): Chapter 4-11.

While NATO conducts high intensity collective defense operations, the EU conducts low intensity peace keeping operations.

THE FRAGMENTED TOOLBOX

The US and European commitments are weak. There is no consensus on the threat. NATO can still have all kinds of operations. However, there is a transatlantic rift on the use of political and military assets.

EURO-CENTRIC TOOLBOX

This vision represents a weakened transatlantic link. NATO operates only at the region around Europe and US continue act unilaterally.⁴² The US engagement in NATO is very limited and there is no consensus on the threat perception. NATO conducts only low intensity operations. New European countries join the club.

As aforementioned, almost all of the studies examine only one dimension of NATO expansion: either NATO functions or the geographical enlargement. No connection between functions and membership has been offered yet

THE THEORETICAL APPROACH

Although the aim of the study is not to test any theory, but rather to highlight NATO's double enlargement, it is worth explaining the major theoretical approaches on NATO enlargement. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the enlargement theories.

⁴² Ibid.: Chapter 4-9

It is necessary to mention that this dissertation focuses on how structural factors shape the institutional design of NATO. Although the actors' choices are important, they do not provide an adequate explanation for the NATO enlargement.

CHAPTER SUMMARIES

The dissertation is divided into 7 chapters. The first three chapters explain the theoretical background and the process of functional and geographical enlargement. Two case studies analyze the relation between functional and geographical enlargement. The case selections are motivated with three criteria. First whether there is a major shift in international structure, second whether NATO has adapted new functions and third whether these functions lead a geographical enlargement or not. The last chapter lays out the findings and conclusions.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

This chapter provides an outline of the study and highlights the debate on enlargement. In the aftermath of the WWII, Europe was in a fragmented and devastated position. The economic recovery of Europe was not fast enough to bring stability due to the threat posed by the Soviet Union. NATO came to life in the context of a weak Europe and a strong Soviet Union. It was aimed to secure the European revival. Indeed, NATO's primary function was to "offset the shadow cast by Soviet Military power, thereby allowing recovery to go forward."⁴³

⁴³ Wallace J. Thies, *Why NATO Endures* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 98.

CHAPTER 2: THEORETICAL BACKGROUND OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

This study borrows mostly from the theories of institutional expansion, a term which refers to the process and practices of the organization rather than the structure of the international system that trigger the NATO's geographical enlargement.

CHAPTER 3: NATO'S FUNCTIONAL ENLARGEMENT

This chapter underscores the evolution of NATO's security approach from a collective defense to comprehensive security. In the last 60 years, NATO's core functions expanded dramatically. Having a Deterrence and Defense function in the early years of the alliance, NATO, today, has a wide variety of functions ranging from crisis management to high intensity operations. In order to satisfy these functions, NATO had to acquire the required capabilities. In some cases the capabilities are developed within the alliance with its own resources, in other cases they are developed by cooperating partners and in some cases new members are accepted to import the capabilities.

There are three critical thresholds in the NATO's post cold war functional enlargement: 1990 London Summit, 1994 Brussels Summit and 2004 Istanbul Summit. NATO countries agreed on the new directions for the Euro-Atlantic security in these summits.

CHAPTER 4: NATO'S GEOGRAPHICAL ENLARGEMENT

There were 12 members originally in the alliance. In the next 60 years, the alliance enlarged to 28 members. The geographical enlargement took place in 6 rounds. The bulk of enlargement took place in the post-cold era. I categorized the geographical

enlargement in three waves. The first wave enlargement consist of 1952 accession of Greece and Turkey, 1955 accession of Germany and 1982 accession of Spain. The first wave enlargement aimed at filling the gap in the western security and containing Soviet's threat. The geostrategic position of the new members was as important as their military contribution to the alliance security. The European Security would have been endangered if the first wave never had happened.

The second wave of enlargement occurred after the cold war and aimed to enhance dialogue and cooperation with the former eastern bloc. Initially the enlargement was not on the agenda. In fact, NATO had been an identity crisis. Many scholars claimed that the days of NATO were numbered. It was until the Bosnian war, that NATO realized that its post cold war security approach needed to be modified radically to better cope with the post cold war threats.

From 1997 until now, 12 central and Eastern European countries joined the alliance in the second wave. The membership of the CEEC helped the stabilization of all Europe. Furthermore it did not produce much resistance from Russians. The NATO membership was important for the CEEC since it is the ultimate warranty of their independence. Without NATO membership, the nationalization of the defense was probable.

The last round of enlargement occurred in 2009 with the accession of Albania and Croatia. This round is crucial for the "greater stability in southeastern Europe, especially given the independence of Kosovo and the enduring hostility to NATO of important political factions in Serbia."⁴⁴

⁴⁴ Vincent Morelli and Paul Belkin, "NATO Enlargement Albania, Croatia, and Possible Future Candidates," (Washington, D.C.: Congressional Research Service, 2008), 22.

What I called as the third wave of enlargement consists of the future NATO enlargement. Ukraine and Georgia with some other countries are in the list of candidates for the third wave of the enlargement. Though, the past enlargement has been successful in terms of the desired outcome, there is a huge rift among the allies for the future candidates. Especially, regarding Ukraine and Georgia memberships, European allies have been more reluctant than the Americans. The characteristics of the third wave are that the future members may not be necessarily in traditional European territories. The boundary of the Europe is contested among scholars. Some includes Russia in Europe while some draws the line from the western frontier of Russia to Mediterranean. It is more likely that NATO will focus on the Black Sea and Caucasus regions for the next wave of enlargement.

CHAPTER 5: KOREAN WAR AND NATO ENLARGEMENT

The Korean War was a huge blow to the alliance security. Until the Korean War, the politicians in the west did not worry about an immediate war with the Soviets.⁴⁵ The Korean War, though, demonstrated the weakness of the US and Allies military power. North Koreans easily overthrew the South Korean forces in a short time.⁴⁶

NATO fully realized the Soviets both ideological and material threat to the international peace. After the Korean War, Alliance transformed its institutional structure, force levels and membership structure. NATO international civilian and military staff, integrated military command and office of the Secretary General were introduced as a result of the Korean war. Allies increased their defense budgets and troop

⁴⁵Thies, *Why NATO Endures*, 106.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*, 107.

levels in Europe. NATO accepted Greece, Turkey and Germany to the club in order to match the Soviets' Military capabilities.

CHAPTER 6: BOSNIAN WAR AND NATO ENLARGEMENT

The case study highlights the volatility of the stability in Eastern Europe with the end of cold war. The honeymoon of the early 1990s ended with the tragic events of the Bosnia war. NATO was the only military power to be able to end the war. The vulnerability of new democracies in Europe was a concern for the west. As Crawford asserts Bosnian War provides NATO “a renewed legitimacy that it needed to expand eastward”.⁴⁷

The Bosnian War horrified the Central and East European countries (CEEC) as well. Therefore, the second wave of enlargement was driven not by NATO alone but the aspiring countries as well. The CEEC urgently requested to be a part of the alliance. These countries see the ineffectiveness of the EU in the Bosnian war. They do not want a victim of Russian hegemony anymore. The CEEC counts on Americans more than Europeans for their security. The new motto for these countries is Americans in, Russian Out and Europe down.⁴⁸

As long as Balkans and Eastern Europe remains the source of instability, the Europe will not be secure. The second wave of the enlargement is still underway. It will come to an end when the Balkan countries have been stabilized.

⁴⁷Beverly Crawford, "The Bosnian Road to NATO Enlargement," in *Explaining NATO Enlargement*, ed. Robert W. Rauchhaus (London; Portland, Or.: Frank Cass, 2001), 27.

⁴⁸ Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door : How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era*, 33.

CHAPTER 7: ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSIONS

The research concludes that NATO's enlargement is two fold. The geographical enlargement is a continuation of the functional enlargement. The time lag between these two enlargement process is a result of the alliance's adaptation to the new function. New functions do not always result in new members. But the allies' options are either gaining new capabilities within the existing membership structure, cooperating with other international actors or importing the new capabilities by inviting new members. The future geographical enlargement will depend on how effectively NATO can undertake the new functions. The research shows that stabilization of the wider Black Sea region is vital for energy security in the next decades. The black sea corridor constitutes a security black hole in the near future for the alliance. The area that stretches from Europe to Central Asia between Middle East and Soviet Union is the energy route of the NATO. Instability in this region will harm the vital security interests of the alliance. Therefore, it is important for the alliance to extend the security umbrella to the black sea region.⁴⁹ Although it is constantly denied by NATO members, Russian reaction is a major factor on NATO's decision to enlarge.

⁴⁹ Ronald D. Asmus, "Europe's Eastern Promise: Rethinking on NATO and Eu Enlargement," *Foreign Affairs* 87, no. 1 (2008): under "Uncertain Futures".

CHAPTER II

THEORETICAL BACKGROUND

INTRODUCTION

The goal of Chapter II is to identify the major explanations of NATO geographical enlargement. As examined in this chapter, scholars have different approaches to understanding the phenomenon of NATO enlargement. Although all the theories make significant contributions to the evolution of the field, the link between horizontal and vertical enlargement of NATO has not been identified yet.

In the past, NATO enlargement was explained mostly through international relations theories. Realist and Liberalist perspectives were offered to understand the expansion phenomenon. This chapter give an overview of not only the IR theories but also Comparative Politics theories on NATO enlargement. IR Theorists, Comparative Politic Theorists and Historians see the NATO expansion from different perspectives. Although individual actors' positions are important in NATO's decision to accept new members, this study suggests that a theory of institutional expansion can better explain NATO's enlargement.

POWER BASED THEORIES

Power based theories focus on the structure of the system and interest accumulation of the actors. Neo-realism has a negative view of the international cooperation while liberalism believes that cooperation will take place through the

institutions. Both theories explain the expansion of NATO in terms of rational decision making of the states.

NEOREALISM

According to Neorealism, NATO is a product of a bipolar international system. In the absence of a main threat, the alliance sooner or later will dissolve. It is just a matter of time. Suspicion will arise as a result of relative gain problems in the new structure. Balance of Threat theory suggests that “states prefer to join the less threatening side, where a perceived aggressive intention is one component of threat. Eastern European states, still feeling a potential threat from the East, turn to a less threatening alliance for shelter.”¹

As Walt argues, “states form alliances to balance against threats rather than bandwagon with them.”² Alliance requires the coordination of efforts to dismiss the external threats. Member countries are expected to share the costs of alliance. A considerable amount of resources are put aside for force developments. The military is the most common vehicle by which alliances meet their goals. NATO can only survive and grow when facing a substantial threat to its existence. In other words, NATO will eventually break down in the absence of the main adversary. The existence of a credible threat provides the venue of cooperation and makes free riding costly. Cooperation is more efficient and cost saving. Exclusion from the club makes punishment effective. Likewise, when the outside threat vanishes, the alliance may lose the glue that holds it together. In the absence of a common threat, a relative-gains problem among the

¹ Andrew Kydd, "Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement," *International Organization* 55, no. 4 (2001): 804.

²Walt, "Alliance Formation and the Balance of World Power," 5.

members will make cooperation difficult.³ The Allies' cooperation during the WWII might be a good example of the need for a common threat. After the removal of Hitler, the West and Soviet Union began to see each other as a threat rather than allies.

States in a security organization may have similar threat perceptions if the aggressor has substantial aggregate economic, military and human resources. The offensive capability of an aggressor also leads to successful collective action. On the other hand, proximity and offensive intentions of an aggressor are subjective. States close to the threat feel more threatened compared to the other states in a collective security organization. States having historical or territorial problems with the aggressor will assess the threat seriously. Therefore, when the main threat vanishes, the collective action is difficult to achieve.

Additionally, the unipolar international structure will force the NATO countries to balance the remaining superpower. Thus, internal balancing will bring an end to NATO. Neorealism has the best explanatory power for Cold War enlargement when the Soviet Union was the main threat to the alliance.

Some scholars also highlight the disengagement of the US from Europe. Waltz states that NATO is not a military treaty. It is more like a treaty of guarantee.⁴ The US guaranteed the security of Europe in exchange for preserving the balance with Soviets. After the cold war, the US may not be willing to share the huge portion of the cost.

³ Joseph M. Grieco, "Understanding the Problem of International Cooperation," in *Neorealism and Neoliberalism : The Contemporary Debate*, ed. David A. Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 314.

⁴Waltz, "NATO Expansion: A Realist'S View," 27.

ALLIANCE THEORY

Alliance Theory suggests that NATO expansion is a product of the alliance formation. Waltz argues that “an alliance is a formal or informal commitment for security cooperation between two or more states.”⁵ The main purpose of an alliance is to aggregate power in order to achieve a common objective. NATO is a highly institutionalized defensive alliance with asymmetrical membership.⁶ As the most powerful member, the US is both a leader and carrier of the alliance’s greatest burdens.

NATO enlargement is driven by countries outside NATO in order to reduce the vulnerability of their geographical locations. Germany was an especially strong and eager supporter of the enlargement.⁷ The alternative to the enlargement was a power vacuum in the region, which would be filled either by a security alliance of the regional countries or an anarchic environment in which all Central and European Countries would form ad hoc alliances to balance each other.⁸ Furthermore, the Bosnian war demonstrated the resurfacing of historical tensions in the region.

LIBERAL INSTITUTIONALISM

Keohane defines an institution as a “related complex of rules and norms, identifiable in space and time.”⁹ Liberal institutionalism suggests that alliances can still exist even after the threat has faded. Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons explain how

⁵ Walt, “Why Alliances Endure or Collapse,” 157.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Jonathan Eyal, “NATO’s Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision,” *International Affairs* 73, no. 4 (1997): 714.

⁸ Ibid.: 705.

⁹ Robert O. Keohane, *International Institutions and State Power : Essays in International Relations Theory* (Boulder: Westview Press, 1989), 163.

institutions matter in shaping the behavior of important actors in world politics.¹⁰ States choose institutions because of self-interest. After institutions are established, they shape the behavior of the state. Institutions can help collective security by resolving distributional problems. Although NATO's original *raison d'être* no longer exists, the reduced transaction costs and the costliness of the alternatives increase the value of the existing form of cooperation. It is easier to maintain international institutions than to creating them. Thus, states have incentives to value institutions even after they appear to be obsolete. According to institutional theorists, NATO is not merely an alliance. Its highly institutionalized structure is the core reason for its adaptation to the new security environment.¹¹ NATO enlargement can be seen as an institutional adaptation practice. To maintain NATO as a viable security organization, NATO members are to:

Utilize existing norms and procedures within NATO to deal with new problems rather than create new one,

Modify NATO as necessary, possibly including cuts and downsizing, to deal with problems that existing structures cannot,

Use the regime as the basis for ties to other actors, state and nonstate in pursuit of regime goals.¹²

CONSTRUCTIVISM

Constructivism underscores the formation of values and norms in an alliance.

These values and norms provide the momentum for the persistence of the alliance even

¹⁰ Lisa L. Martin and Beth A. Simmons, *International Institutions : An International Organization Reader*, International Organization Readers (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2001), 729.

¹¹ Robert B. McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War," *International Organization* 50, no. 3 (1996): 464.

¹² Ibid.

without a credible threat. Constructivism states that it is the evolution of cooperative security approach that enables NATO's existence and enlargement in the 21st century. It is also worth mentioning that when shared interests are sufficient, international regimes are easier to maintain.

EXPANSION OF SECURITY COMMUNITIES

To some scholars, NATO is a security community. Karl Deutsch popularized the sense of community in the international system by claiming that peaceful change is possible among the sovereign states as the transactions among the states increases.¹³ When states join an organization, the common values of the organization result in a mutual identity and sense of community. The shared environment in the organization generates shared perceptions of common threats and opportunities. Security communities survive and expand because they share common values.¹⁴

According to Emanuel Adler, NATO is more than a mere alliance. It has evolved into a security community over time. Adler suggests that the spread of security communities across functional and geographical boundaries can be explained by practices not by the actions of individual states.¹⁵

The political actors make their rational calculation on the institutional expansion in an environment whose background knowledge is provided by the institution itself.¹⁶ NATO expansion can bring peaceful change in the problematic regions.

¹³ Karl Wolfgang Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area; International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1957).

¹⁴ Emanuel Adler and Michael N. Barnett, *Security Communities*, Cambridge Studies in International Relations, 62 (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 59.

¹⁵ Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," 196.

¹⁶ *Ibid.*

NORM DIFFUSION

Acharya asserts that NATO enlargement is a norm diffusion process. He points out that local actors promote the transnational norm diffusion, which in turn gives birth to new tasks for the existing institution.¹⁷ Henceforth, the diffusion brings institutional change and expansion.

SOCIALIZATION

Socialization theory claims that NATO enlargement is a process of exporting Western values of democracy, accountability and transparency to unstable regions. The Western Countries believe that democratic norms and values bring stability and security. Therefore, NATO's eastern expansion was in fact a socialization process of Central and Eastern Europe.¹⁸ Checkel states that "in adopting community rules, socialization implies that an agent switches from following a logic of consequences to a logic of appropriateness."¹⁹ The socialization can be achieved either by "teaching and persuasion"²⁰ approach or by a "rational approach."²¹ The aspiring countries' decision depends on the cost and benefits of the compliance to the enlargement criteria enforced by NATO.²² According to Schimmelfennig, "in the constructivist perspective, the

¹⁷ Amitav Acharya, "How Ideas Spread: Whose Norms Matter? Norm Localization and Institutional Change in Asian Regionalism," *International Organization* 58, no. 2 (2004): 247.

¹⁸ Jeffrey T. Checkel, "International Institutions and Socialization in Europe: Introduction and Framework," *International Organization* 59, no. 4 (2005): 821.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*: 804.

²⁰ Alexandra Gheciu, "Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the New Europe," *International Organization* 59, no. 4 (2005): 973.

²¹ Frank Schimmelfennig, "Strategic Calculation and International Socialization: Membership Incentives, Party Constellations, and Sustained Compliance in Central and Eastern Europe," *International Organization* 59, no. 4 (2005): 827.

²² *Ibid.*

enlargement of an international organization is primarily conceived of as a process of international socialization.”²³

CULTURAL APPROACH

According to advocates of the cultural approach, NATO enlargement is a cultural expression of security. In his review article, Simon Dalby asserts that, after the cold war, NATO became a “civilisational entity.”²⁴ Similarly, Merje Kuus proclaims that the conception of Europeanness affects the discourse of the enlargement.²⁵ NATO enlargement is essential for the full Europeanization of the “not-yet –fully Europeans.”²⁶

INTEGRATION BASED THEORIES

Integration based theories highlights the deepening of the institutions over time. Especially it is useful to explain the evolution of the European Union and other post WWII institutions by these theories. Among these theories, the intergovernmentalism has the most merit to understand the structure and functions of NATO.

FUNCTIONALISM

Functionalism states that “forms follows functions.”²⁷ International institutions perform the functions that are identified objectively and rationally by the people. In other

²³ ———, “NATO Enlargement: A Constructivist Explanation,” *Security Studies* 8, no. 2/3 (1999): 211.

²⁴ Simon Dalby, “World Politics, Security and Culture: Critical Connections,” *Geopolitics* 14, no. 2 (2009): 405.

²⁵ Merje Kuus, “Europe’s Eastern Expansion and the Reinscription of Otherness in East-Central Europe,” *Progress in Human Geography* 28, no. 4 (2004): 473.

²⁶ *Ibid.*: 484.

²⁷ Ben Rosamond, *Theories of European Integration*, The European Union Series (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000), 34-35.

words, functions serve the actors' needs. Institutional change and expansion is a means of institutions' functions.

TRANSACTIONALISM

Transactionalism admits that international conflict can be reduced when states are integrated in a sense of community.²⁸ New members of an existing security organization will increase their level of communication, and thus reduce the level of violence.

NEOFUNCTIONALISM

Neofunctionalism highlights the spillover effect of the integration. The integration in one issue area will "create pressure for further integration beyond that sector."²⁹

INTERGOVERNMENTALISM

According to the intergovernmentalism theory, the state is the main actor for integration.³⁰ In order to provide collective goods through institutions, sovereign states bargain their preferences in an institutional environment. Societal demands and interdependence will require more deepening and widening of integration.

NEW INSTITUTIONALISM

The New Institutionalism of Comparative Politics also offers useful insight into how institutions expand. The emergence of institutions is a response to the problem of

²⁸Ibid., 42-48.

²⁹ Ibid., 51-52.

³⁰ Andrew Moravcsik, *The Choice for Europe : Social Purpose and State Power from Messina to Maastricht*, Cornell Studies in Political Economy (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1998), 18-86.

trust and protection from aggression.³¹ As the shadow of the future shortens and reciprocity diminishes, institutions are needed to solve the collective problems.

Rational Choice of New Institutionalism states that institutions affect the strategic interactions by providing information, policing, and putting alternatives on the table.³² Institutions will change in accordance with actors' preferences about collective gains. NATO enlargement is a rationalistic approach of the leading parties to pursue their interests. When there is a convergence of interests the expansion occurs.

As proponents of a second type of new institutionalism, sociological institutionalists believe that institutions change or develop not to have a more efficiency but rather to enhance the social legitimacy of the organization.³³

New Institutionalism rejects the aggregation of interests. The sum of all individuals' interest is not equal to the common interests. In fact, the aggregation process affects the interests. In other words there is an institution bias that affects some interests.³⁴

Institutional expansion can be explained by human learning.³⁵ Individuals' communication with each other results in the formation of shared mental models, "which provide the framework for a common interpretation of reality and give rise to collective solutions to the problems arising in the environment."³⁶ Learning first takes place in the family and neighborhood and forms the basic element of knowledge exchange.

³¹ C. Mantzavinos, Douglass C. North, and Syed Shariq, "Learning, Institutions, and Economic Performance," *Perspectives on Politics* 2, no. 1 (2004): 75-84.

³² Peter A. Hall and Rosemary C. R. Taylor, "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," *Political studies*. 44, no. 5 (1996): 936-57.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ellen M. Immergut, "The Theoretical Core of the New Institutionalism," *Politics & Society* 26, no. 1 (1998): 5-34.

³⁵ Mantzavinos, North, and Shariq, "Learning, Institutions, and Economic Performance," 75.

³⁶ Ibid.: 76.

ENLARGEMENT AS ADAPTATION

NATO expansion is also viewed from the mutual defense benefits and cost savings perspective. According to Todd Sandler,

The expansion issue is related to alliance formation (i.e., an expansion from zero allies), which hinges on whether prospective allies view their membership as providing a net gain after associated costs are covered. These net gains are dependent on alliance size and composition, which can affect benefits (e.g., cost reductions, enhanced deterrence) and costs (e.g., decision making, joint maneuvers).³⁷

Sandler asserts that expansion is driven by “spatial” location considerations. The geographical location and the size of a country determine its benefit from the expansion. The interior location causes less defense burden, thus decreasing cost to the members. Therefore, members in the outer circle of an alliance are eager to expand the alliance to friendly countries.

THE SECURITY DILEMMA AND RUSSIA

NATO enlargement can be seen as resolving the security dilemma in Euro-Atlantic area. Trust and mistrust are at the core of the NATO enlargement dilemma—the goal of enlargement is to foster trust among the new allies, and the unwanted side effect is to lessen trust with Russia. On the one hand, newly accepted members will acquire a security guarantee against any aggression, and on the other hand, the expansion itself can

³⁷ Todd Sandler, "Alliance Formation, Alliance Expansion, and the Core," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 43, no. 6 (1999): 727.

become a threat for the outsiders.³⁸ In fact, the Russian position is the single most important factor in the future of NATO expansion. In spite of countless statements by NATO countries that NATO enlargement is not against Russian interests, Russia still sees the enlargement as a zero-sum game. Enlargement threatens Russian Security interests.³⁹

AGENT-BASED EXPLANATIONS

In contrast to the structural explanation, agent-based theories look at the individual nations to explain NATO enlargement. For the most part, geopoliticians treat NATO enlargement as a spatial extension of the US, which is intended to help keep its world power status.

In that sense, enlargement of a community is “the diffusion of democracy and free-market principles through the guise of paninstitutions, in which those that are incorporated will not wage war one another and thus, in the case of NATO, will stabilize Europe from violent conflict that might otherwise erupt and disrupt the world order.”⁴⁰

According to Ian Oas, NATO is “a hegemonic institution of extraterritoriality.”⁴¹ Henceforth, NATO expansion is a tool for forging US hegemonic order. New markets are needed to maintain US hegemonic status. NATO is the major vehicle to integrate the ex-rival markets into the US-led global economy. Institutionalization is the most successful

³⁸ Kydd, “Trust Building, Trust Breaking: The Dilemma of NATO Enlargement,” 802.

³⁹ Russia Today, “NATO considers Russia’s security strategy,” <http://www.russiatoday.ru/Politics/2009-07-23/ROAR--NATO-considers-Russia-s-security-strategy.html> (accessed November 27, 2009).

⁴⁰ Colin Flint, ed. *The Geography of War and Peace : From Death Camps to Diplomats* (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 398.

⁴¹ *Ibid.*, 409.

method for enhancing hegemonic control globally.⁴² With the help of NATO, the US is able to exert its power without the use of force.

The expansion is a proof of “the surrender of the socialist modernity as global competitor to the west.”⁴³ Thus it is no coincidence that the US and Germany are the main enforcers of NATO enlargement.⁴⁴ However, the decline of US hegemonic power complicates the NATO expansion. On the one hand, the leader promotes expansion of the organization since it is the biggest benefiter of the cooperation. On the other hand, during the descent of the leader, the organization needs to expand to fulfill the capability gap. The hegemon has the ability to share the bulk of defense costs, which in turn enables the successful implementation of an arms control regime for the rest of the club. Although individual nations are always important, no agent-based theory would be adequate to explain the NATO enlargement in general. Any argument based on the interest of individual nations provide only one dimension of the NATO expansion.

To summarize, Liberal Institutionalism and Constructivism generally support the enlargement of NATO while Neorealism opposes an eastern expansion. Neorealism proclaims that expansion will cause a security dilemma and in fact will make the Euro-Atlantic region more insecure by allowing an assertive Russia to gain strength.

⁴²Ibid., 400.

⁴³ Ibid., 396.

⁴⁴ Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War," 707.

CHAPTER III

NATO'S FUNCTIONAL ENLARGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

This chapter is the first stage setter chapters of the dissertation. Here, NATO's functional evolution is examined thoroughly. As stated in the main argument, NATO adapted its main functions along with the changes in the security environments. The new functions necessitate new capabilities that are either fulfilled internally within NATO or imported from outside of the organization.

Over the years, NATO transformed from a Collective Defence organization to a Comprehensive Security organization. Throughout the past 60 years, NATO's functions increased in number and complexity. Today, NATO undertakes responsibilities which are beyond the military realm. During the Cold War, NATO was purely a collective defence organization which used mainly defensive military capabilities. With the fall of Iron curtain, NATO engaged with ex-communist countries in the Euro-Atlantic region. NATO used an active political approach during the 1990s. The rising new threats in the second millennium forced NATO to be proactive and use both political and military resources to meet its members' security needs. Today, NATO has become a comprehensive security organization engaging multiple partners globally. Figure 4 depicts NATO's functional evolution over time.




Fig. 4. NATO's Functional Evolution

COLLECTIVE DEFENSE ORGANIZATION

The main goal of a collective defense organization is to defend its members' territorial integrity. The source of the threat is generally military. Non geographical threats are not considered to be of paramount importance. Threats against stability of the non-members are not a concern for the alliance. Nations are strongly affected by whether they join or remain outside the alliance. NATO practices are targeted to achieve deterrence and intra-club political military cooperation. The security policy is state-centered, and the alliance takes action when there is a threat to any individual state's sovereignty.

COOPERATIVE SECURITY ORGANIZATION

Cooperative security is a practice of building trust and cooperation not just among the members, but also with non-members. The purpose of a cooperative security approach is to foster regional stability. The norms and values are the glue of the club. There is no a substantial difference between being a member and partner. In fact, the club acts as a magnet of peace and security, engaging in multi dimensional partnerships with the neighboring regions. Through partnership, NATO teaches partners that sharing a common identity will bring peace and security to all parties.¹ Cooperative security practices entail political, military and institutional cooperation with the partners. Both state and individual rights are linked to the new security perception. Even when there is no obvious threat to the alliances' interest or territory, the alliance still takes actions when there is aggression against civilians outside of its territory. As Lloyd Axworthy noted,

¹ Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," 215-16.

“the Kosovo crisis shows how individuals are increasingly the main victims and targets of state-sponsored aggression. It also demonstrates the human security dynamic at work, in that it was the humanitarian imperative that triggered the Allied intervention.”²

COMPREHENSIVE SECURITY ORGANIZATION

What this study names a comprehensive security is defined as a system of globalized cooperative security practices. The vision of the club is not regional but global, so that the instability in any region is a concern for the entire club. There is a new understanding of the security. Security is not just about territorial integrity. Threats against norms and people are also treated as a security concern. Global cooperation and peace is the main purpose of the organization. Comprehensive security practices entail cooperation with international organizations in a wide range of issue areas, and an understanding that states, Individuals and values are a all an integral part of security. The difference between cooperative and comprehensive security is that the latter is global, and therefore broader in the scale.

NATO's evolution can be seen clearly in the NATO summit declarations and strategies.

NATO SUMMITS ON ENLARGEMENT

Although not all summit declarations touch on the enlargement issue, after the Prague summit in 2002, there is a strong emphasize on NATO's expectations and goals from the future enlargement.

² Lloyd Axworthy, "NATO's New Security Vocation," *NATO Review* 47(1999): 8-11.

STRASBOURG – KEHL SUMMIT, 2009

Albania and Croatia joined the Alliance. NATO's open door policy is reaffirmed. NATO also launched an initiative to identify the alliance's new Strategic Concept. During the summit the leaders expressed their determination to secure Afghanistan. The alliance stated that "security in the Euro-Atlantic area is closely tied to Afghanistan's security and stability."³ In the 2009 summit, the France reintegrated NATO's military structure.

BUCHAREST SUMMIT, 2007

Albania and Croatia started the accession process. NATO declared that Ukraine and Georgia would each become a NATO member in the future.

ISTANBUL SUMMIT, 2004

NATO invented new mechanisms to reach out to Mediterranean countries, Central Asia and the Caucasus. The alliance aimed to establish new bilateral security relations in the above regions. These partnerships reveal the alliance's goal of promoting security to the world's problematic region. The Istanbul summit is a breakthrough in NATO's outreach to the south and east. The theme of the summit, "Projecting stability," reveals NATO's new strategy. NATO launched the Istanbul Cooperation Initiative to cooperate with the countries in the Middle East.

³ NATO, "Strasbourg – Kehl Summit strengthens Transatlantic Link and looks at NATO's future challenges," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_52845.htm (accessed November 24, 2009).

PRAGUE SUMMIT, 2002

The Prague Summit was an enlargement summit. NATO expanded to an alliance of 26 nations as a result of the decision taken at the summit. NATO capability development was also a key item on the summit agenda. In order to function effectively, NATO established the NATO Response Force and declared the Prague Capability Commitments.

MADRID SUMMIT 1997

Czech Republic, Hungary and Poland began accession talks with NATO. A partnership charter was signed between NATO and Ukraine as well.

BRUSSELS SUMMIT, 1994

The Partnership for Peace (PfP) initiative was launched. NATO decided to take serious action in regard to the Bosnian conflict.

ROME SUMMIT, 1991

The Alliance's new Strategic Concept was signed. NATO expressed its readiness for peace and cooperation with the Soviet Union.

LONDON SUMMIT, 1990

The London Declaration was announced. NATO underscored that the Soviet Union was no longer an adversary to NATO. The declaration highlights NATO's desire to cooperate in political and military areas with Central and Eastern Europe countries.

NATO STRATEGIES

NATO strategies are perfect example of the adaptation of NATO's to the new security environment. The evolution of NATO function can easily be seen in these strategies.

FORWARD DEFENSE

The Forward Defense strategy was accepted in the early 1950s as a result of the Korean War. It resulted from a perception of NATO's being inferior to Soviet military capabilities. The strategy called for defending Europe as far forward as possible. By holding the Soviets as far east as possible, the allies assumed to utilize the strategic air campaign and to gain time for a major offensive operation against the enemy.⁴ Moreover, NATO understood clearly that if any country was occupied by the Soviets, it would be much more difficult to liberate that country afterwards. In other words, there might not be another D-Day.⁵ NATO would use all available weapons including atomic bomb to destroy the Soviets.

MASSIVE RETALIATION

NATO adopted a massive retaliation strategy during the mid 1950s. According to the strategy, NATO would respond with its all strength including nuclear arsenal to defend the Allied territory. The nuclear monopoly of the US was seen the only way to be successful. The rationale behind the massive retaliation was that NATO forces were

⁴ Gregory W. Pedlow, "NATO Strategy Documents 1949-1969." (NATO, 1998), <http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/intro.pdf>.

⁵ Mark Smith, *NATO Enlargement During the Cold War : Strategy and System in the Western Alliance* (New York, NY: Palgrave, 2000), 73.

outnumbered by the Soviets in Europe, thereby leaving the option of a massive use of nuclear weapons to eliminate the threat. According to the estimates, NATO had around twenty divisions in Germany to confront the Soviets' 175 divisions.⁶ The deployment of the intercontinental ballistic missile complicated NATO's ability to defend both Europe and US soil as well. Under a massive retaliation strategy, the nuclear weapons would be the first resort to enable an effective deterrence.

FLEXIBLE RESPONSE

NATO's massive retaliations strategy became obsolete when the Soviets developed capability of a nuclear strike. The magnitude of the Soviet capability was visible with the launch of Sputnik. The reliance on nuclear weapons at the first stage would cause an all-out war even in small scale contingencies. Thus, NATO agreed to follow a flexible approach in its handling a possible conflict with the Soviets. Any conventional attack would be countered with the same level and type of defense.⁷ However, NATO could increase the magnitude of defense including an offensive nuclear capability to make the conflict very costly for the aggressor. Nuclear weapons were thought of more as a last resort than a primary source of deterrence. A gradual escalation concept with heavy reliance on the use of technology was more appropriate to defend the alliance territory. The flexible response strategy remained effective until the end of the Cold War.

⁶ Thies, *Why NATO Endures*, 147.

⁷ John S. Duffield, "The Evolution of NATO's Strategy of Flexible Response : A Reinterpretation," *Security Studies* 11(1991): 132-56.

THE CASE FOR NEW FUNCTIONS

The anarchic and self help structure of the international system forces the states to take measures that will help cope with the security threats to their existence. These threats might be direct or potential. Direct threats involve deliberate threats to a state and oftentimes lead to military conflicts. Potential threats are the risk perception of the international system. When states see themselves in an instable region, or when there is mistrust between neighbors, states may engage in threat mitigation policies.⁸ In either case, alliances have different functions to eliminate the perceived threats. Although the threat perception of an alliance is not an aggregate of its members' threat perceptions, an alliance deals with the core threats that every member has consensus on. Thus, functions are the core purposes of an organization. NATO's functions increased from only a few in 1949 to tens in the twenty-first century. Functional enlargement is an adaptation process of the enlargement as the new challenges force the security organizations to add new functions in order to survive. Alliances survive when they are flexible and can therefore develop new capabilities to face the new challenges. Highly institutionalized alliances, like NATO, have a great advantage in the adaptation process. NATO's civilian-military bureaucracy has a personal interest in the continuation of the alliance. Their career development is tied to the existence of the alliance. That is why NATO civilians are the driving force behind the functional enlargement of the alliance.

The sunk cost of a highly institutionalized alliance is also another factor that will help it survive. It will be always costly to establish a new alliance at the same level of institutionalization.

⁸ Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War," 710.

NATO's new functions are driven by the development of practices in the new security environment. As Aybet suggests, "NATO's new missions developed out of practice rather than a pre-conceived plan of agreement by its members."⁹ The success of NATO as an institution depends on the reciprocity.¹⁰ NATO functions are the source of reciprocal relationships among the members. Members do not want to defect, because they fear retaliation in another functional domain. McCallas suggest that an organization's priority is not adherence to its norms and values, but survival:

When an organization's central task is accomplished or not needed, new tasks will be sought and eventually valued—the process of goal succession. The organization's existing tasks will be defended, but not to the point where the organization itself is endangered. Eventually the organization will incorporate new tasks and goals as its core mission, with resulting changes in policies and practices.¹¹

NEW CAPABILITIES

Capabilities stem from NATO's functions. Every new function requires a new capability. As NATO functions evolve, so do the capabilities that are required. NATO needs new capabilities to match the new NATO functions. NATO has developed 'general and specific capabilities' to conduct each function.¹²

⁹ Gulnur Aybet, "NATO's New Missions," *Perceptions Journal of International Affairs* 4, no. 1 (1999): under "Defining NATO's Post Cold War Roles".

¹⁰ Robert O. Keohane and Lisa L. Martin, "The Promise of Institutionalist Theory," *International Security* 20, no. 1 (1995): 46.

¹¹ McCalla, "NATO's Persistence after the Cold War," 458.

¹² Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War," 711.

There are three methods of capability accumulation. One method, Capability Development, occurs within NATO and it is the most costly one. Nations increase their defense spending to satisfy the new functions if a long term capability is required in areas where NATO plays a leading role. NATO may engage in partnership in areas where NATO plays a supporting role. When NATO cannot develop a capability or cooperate with partners, the burden is transferred to the new member. Such a transfer occurs for long term capabilities in areas where NATO plays a direct role.

The enlargement cannot be understood without considering NATO's capability requirements. As Marc Grossman offers, "NATO enlargement is a means of achieving NATO's core purposes, and will contribute to NATO's continuing dynamism as the core security."¹³ NATO makes its decision based on the "capabilities and contributions potential new members will bring to the Alliance institution in the Euro-Atlantic area."¹⁴ That is why the theme of the NATO enlargement summit in 2002 was "new members, new capabilities, and new relationships."¹⁵

GEOSTRATEGIC CAPABILITIES

NATO's Cold War enlargement was generally aimed at acquiring geostrategic capability against the Soviet Union. Germany, Turkey, Greece and Spain provided such an advantage to contain the enemy. Even the enlargement during the post Cold War era stemmed from gaining geostrategic capabilities. Romania and Bulgaria both enabled NATO to reach the Black Sea region, as did Turkey. Moldovan, Pantev, and Rhodes state

¹³ Marc Grossman, "21st Century NATO: New Capabilities, New Members, New Relationships," *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda* 7, no. 1 (2002): 8.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*: 5.

¹⁵ NATO, "NATO After Prague," http://www.nato.int/docu/0211prague/after_prague.pdf (accessed October 15, 2009)

that Romania and Bulgaria were good candidates for NATO since “their strategic location within the Balkan and Black Sea areas and in close proximity to the Greater Middle East made them advantageous sites from which to address core post-9/11 security issues such as international terrorism, nuclear proliferation, transnational organized crime, weak states and ‘frozen conflicts,’ and energy security.”¹⁶

POLITICAL CAPABILITIES

NATO’s political capability is its ability to talk with one voice about international security issues. The consensus-based decision policy at the North Atlantic Council enables the members to make their voices heard. Thus, the resulting decision becomes a public good. Besides military capabilities, the new nations increase the ‘soft power’ of NATO. Being a representative of 28 nations helps legitimize NATO’s actions.

MILITARY CAPABILITIES

NATO’s military capability is its unique feature that distinguishes NATO from other international organizations. NATO both uses its own institutional assets and national contributions. The Command, Control, Communication, Consultation and Information systems are generally NATO’s common funded assets. NATO’s common funding mechanism is used to provide resources for the common infrastructure and C4I investments. National contributions are the forces and equipment that each ally commits

¹⁶ Dorinel Moldovan, Plamen Pantev, and Matthew Rhodes, "Joint Task Force East and Shared Military Basing in Romania and Bulgaria." (Garmisch-Partenkirchen, Germany: George C. Marshall European Center for Security Studies, 2009), http://www.marshallcenter.org/mcpublicweb/MCDocs/files/College/F_Publications/occPapers/occ-paper_21-en.pdf.

for NATO use. Aside from the above capabilities, NATO has two distinctive military capabilities.

The Integrated Military Command structure is a very important military capability, which allows NATO countries to operate under a unified command structure. The effectiveness of such an integrated command was proved in Bosnia and Kosovo. The interoperability of NATO forces is another remarkable military capability as well. NATO ensures that 28 different military forces can operate smoothly in all kind of missions.

NATO FUNCTIONS DURING THE COLD WAR

Although NATO was a political military alliance, the military pillar of NATO was at the centerpiece during the Cold War. The critical question during the Cold War was whether NATO can fulfill its primary function of defending Euro-Atlantic territory from aggression.

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

In the 1950s, due to the Soviet rapid rearmament program, the military balance tilted in favor of the Soviet Union. Allies had to take dramatic measures, including a massive buildup and rearmament of Germany in order to deter the Soviets. With the military buildup, NATO achieved strategic superiority over Russia after the early 1960s. The turning point in the NATO-Soviet power struggle was in 1962. The Soviets' attempt to install ballistic missiles in 1962 failed in the face of a clear determination of the Alliance to resort to the force. The crisis revealed the Soviets weaknesses and

capabilities. Another important development was the Moscow-Peking conflict. The rift in the Communist bloc put the Soviets in a defensive position until the Union's demise.

CORE FUNCTIONS

From the outset of NATO until 1989, the main function of NATO was the protection of the alliance territory from aggression. Territorial defense was dominant, especially in light of rising Soviet ideological and military aggression. The weakness of European powers due to the devastation of the World War II necessitated US military involvement in Europe. Without the security umbrella of the US, it would have been nearly impossible to establish a safe area for the recovery of West European democracies. By 1967, NATO declared that it had already achieved one of its main goals. The Soviet Union had to accept "peaceful co-existence" with the democratic countries.¹⁷ However, NATO made it clear that, unless the German problem was solved, there would never be real cooperation with the east bloc.

Collective Defense

The Korean War was a key turning point during the Cold War era. Allied countries realized that an integrated military was necessary to effectively deter Soviet aggression. NATO's Cold War strategy was based on the goal of protecting the status quo in Europe. That is why NATO developed defensive capabilities at the beginning. Indeed, the first strategic concept, approved in January 1950 by the NAC, recalls the

¹⁷ NATO, "The Future Tasks of the Alliance," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_26700.htm (accessed November 17, 2009)

primary function of NATO as deterring aggression.¹⁸ A revisionist Russia could not be deterred by defensive strategies alone.

Containment

After the Korean War, the containment of the Soviet Union became an indispensable function of NATO and the US. The Euro-Atlantic partners agreed that the containment of the Soviets was mandatory to prevent a catastrophic war. However, it is worth mentioning that NATO insisted not to engage with the Soviets on territory outside NATO. NATO did not pursue global containment of the Soviets. Indeed, there was an increasing resistance to US proposals for a global NATO role in the international order.¹⁹ Thus, Europe and neighboring regions of the Middle East and North Africa constituted NATO's area of containment.

Although containment continued until the collapse of the Soviet Union, the developments in the international arena during the 1960s fostered a calming down of the East-West relations. Both NATO and the Soviets initiated policies to relax the tensions.

Intra Alliance Functions²⁰

Beside securing its members from external threat, NATO also helps reduce the internal tensions among its members. The internal functions are as important as the external core functions in providing security in the Euro-Atlantic region.

¹⁸ Lord Ismay, "NATO: The First Five Years," NATO, <http://www.nato.int/archives/1st5years/chapters/9.htm>.

¹⁹ NATO, "Developments in regions outside the NATO area Report of Subgroup 4," Harmel Report, <http://www.nato.int/archives/harmel/harmel04.htm> (accessed October 21, 2009).

²⁰ John S. Duffield, "NATO's Functions after the Cold War," *Political Science Quarterly* 109, no. 5 (1995): 772.

Tampering Security Dilemma

As Karl Deutsch theorized in “Security Communities,”²¹ in the 1960s, states were integrated in a security formation which became, at some point, a community. Violence was no longer an option among the members of the security community. The norms of the community reduced the insecurity among the states. Hence, NATO began to focus on trust-building among the members. NATO evolved into a community over time due to the “common values, expectation of economic gain, a wide range of mutual transactions, broad elite networks and high levels of social communication.”²²

NATO provides transparency about the military capabilities of the member states. Members can access information about each others’ military assets through the NATO Defense Planning process. The chances of intra-alliance conflict would be reduced as a result of increased internal information exchange.²³

Additionally, the alliance pressured its members not to pursue provocative policy that might endanger peace, as a mistake made by an individual member could cause a total war with the adversary. In other words, being in the alliance means tying one’s own security to the actions of another country.²⁴

To sum up, NATO satisfied the security concerns of the old rivals in Western Europe. Without the security guarantee of NATO, geopolitical rivalry would have been inevitable between UK, France and Germany.

²¹ Deutsch, *Political Community and the North Atlantic Area; International Organization in the Light of Historical Experience*.

²² Walt, "Why Alliances Endure or Collapse," 169.

²³ David H. Bearce, Kristen M. Flanagan, and Katharine M. Floros, "Alliances, Internal Information, and Military Conflict among Member-States," *International Organization* 60, no. 3 (2006): 595.

²⁴ Thies, *Why NATO Endures*, 129.

Interoperability

NATO ensures that the allied forces will communicate and work with each other. Interoperability is probably the most important military function of the alliance in an era when multinational and expeditionary operations are imperative.²⁵

Denationalization of Defense

NATO enabled the member countries to denationalize their defense policies. NATO force planning provided transparency among the allies regarding each other's intentions and capabilities.

Transatlantic Link

NATO has always remained the primary security platform between North America and Europe. The consultation process enabled a common security policy for Euro-Atlantic region.

CAPABILITY ACCUMULATION

NATO aimed to acquire military capabilities during the Cold War. The force levels and the nuclear weapons were the two pillars of NATO's defense posture. Due to the rapid economic and technological developments in Western Europe, NATO achieved strategic superiority by 1970.

²⁵ Stephen F. Larrabee, *NATO's Eastern Agenda in a New Strategic Era* (Santa Monica, CA: Rand, 2003), 177.

Capability Development

During the cold war, NATO's capability development was concentrated on the modification of the military structure and acquiring new defense assets.

Integration of the military

Integration of the allies' military forces was a mean of achieving greater benefits from cooperation. Allies would not have to duplicate each other's capabilities. The pooling of their capabilities enabled the allies use their limited resources in the most efficient way possible.

New Institutional Bodies

To utilize the collective action, the alliance established a strategic command, Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (known as SHAPE), in Europe. General Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed as the commander in 1951. He was to be supported by an international military staff in the planning and execution of the operation plans for European Defense. Similarly, the Atlantic Command was established in January, 1952, at the west side of the Atlantic.

On the civilian side, new organizations were established as well. On 12th March, 1952, the North Atlantic Council appointed Lord Ismay to be Secretary General of NATO. To assist the Secretary General in conducting NATO business, an International Staff/Secretariat was drawn from the member countries.

Military Buildup

With the shock of Soviet aggression in Southeast Asia, the Allies agreed to build up their force levels significantly. In December 1949, NATO had 12 divisions, 400 aircraft and some naval vessels at its disposal to defend Europe. However, one year later, by December 1951, NATO increased its troops to 35 divisions, about 3000 aircraft and 700 naval vessels.²⁶

Capability Importation

When the North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949, neither Greece nor Turkey or Germany was considered a candidate for NATO membership. Indeed, to consider Turkey's membership, the wording of article six would have to be changed to cover Turkey's territory under the article 5 commitment.²⁷

Geostrategic Considerations

The Korean war was a turning point for NATO's assessment of the threat. The allies realized that "a 'forward strategy' should be adopted in Europe, i.e. that any aggression should be resisted as far to the east as possible, in order to ensure the defense of all NATO European countries."²⁸ Therefore, German accession to the alliance was a necessity of the NATO's geostrategic considerations. To quote, Ismay, "German participation in Western defense had been mooted several times in the preceding months, and the anxiety caused by the Korean War had brought the question to a head."²⁹

²⁶ Ismay, "NATO: The First Five Years."

²⁷ Smith, *NATO Enlargement During the Cold War : Strategy and System in the Western Alliance*, 63.

²⁸ Ismay, "NATO: The First Five Years."

²⁹ Ibid.

Greece and Turkey were as important as Germany for a successful forward strategy. They represented the south flank of NATO. According to Smith, Turkey played a key role in the NATO assault: "...from both an air and a naval perspective, that Turkey should enter an East-West War from the start."³⁰

Indeed, it was these two countries that opened the path for the Truman doctrine, which called for active US involvement in Europe. The US feared Soviet access to Middle East petrol and the Mediterranean if Greece and Turkey left outside of the club. Therefore, in the context of the Cold War environment, no country had the option of remaining neutral.

Military Contributions

NATO had serious discussions about the value of Turkey's and Greece's accession to NATO. In Lord Ismay's view, "on the one hand, that the addition of these countries to the coalition would carry obvious advantages; on the other hand, that it would involve extending NATO's strategic commitments as far east as the Caucasus."³¹

NATO FUNCTIONS IN THE POST COLD-WAR ERA

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, NATO had to change its core functions to adapt the new security environment. There was no more a direct threat to NATO members.

³⁰ Smith, *NATO Enlargement During the Cold War : Strategy and System in the Western Alliance*, 74.

³¹ Ismay, "NATO: The First Five Years."

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

With the end of the Cold War, the security environment changed substantially. The Soviet Union collapsed, leaving behind a security gap in Eastern Europe. Russia's orientation towards democracy was not smooth. The West had to calculate its every security policy in order not to further estrange Russia.

German unification was a key success for NATO, but that success also resurfaced the old concerns among the allies. UK and France fiercely opposed the unification of Germany. It was American pressure combined with a weak Soviet Union that ultimately led to the accomplishment of the long time German dream. Paradoxically, German unification also set the stage for later NATO enlargement. As Asmus states, the German unification became a model for the NATO enlargement in 1990s.³² Indeed, he believes that 1989 unification is the first NATO enlargement in the post Cold War era. Those observations point out that NATO's focus during the 1990s was more political than military.

By the early 1990s, Ethnic conflicts in Eastern Europe revealed that there could be no security in Europe without Europe-wide democratization and stability. Human security became a hot item on NATO's agenda. NATO could no longer turn a blind eye to the humanitarian disaster in the neighboring regions. As Nye suggests, the "CNN Effect" puts a tremendous pressure on the alliance to take action on the human rights violations.³³

NATO's 1990 London Summit was a key event in NATO's future role in the new security environment. NATO declared the end of adversarial relations with the east.

³² Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door : How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era*, 4.

³³ Joseph S. Nye, "Redefining NATO's Mission in the Information Age," *NATO Review* 47, no. 4 (1999).

The cooperation and dialogue becomes the most important issue on NATO's agenda. The 1991 Strategic Concept highlights changing face of the threat and new roles for NATO:

Risks to Allied security are less likely to result from calculated aggression against the territory of the Allies, but rather from the adverse consequences of instabilities that may arise from the serious economic, social and political difficulties, including ethnic rivalries and territorial disputes, which are faced by many countries in central and eastern Europe.³⁴

CORE FUNCTIONS

The 1990s marked the effect of globalization in every domain of societies. As British Prime minister Tony Blair articulates, NATO's actions are shaped by this new phenomenon:

Twenty years ago we would not have been fighting in Kosovo. We would have turned our backs on it. The fact that we are engaged is the result of a wide range of changes - the end of the Cold War; changing technology; the spread of democracy. But it is bigger than that. I believe the world has changed in a more fundamental way. Globalization has transformed our economies and our working practices. But globalization is not just economic - it is also a political and security phenomenon.³⁵

³⁴ NATO, "NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept."

³⁵ Tony Blair, "Doctrine of the International Community," Government of UK, <http://www.number10.gov.uk/Page1297> (accessed October 23, 2009).

In contrast to the Cold War era, NATO adopted a political-military function as the main NATO function: a Whole and Free Europe. Yet, the collective defense is still seen as the glue of the alliance. Practically speaking, NATO capabilities are diverted to satisfy the new main function. The shift in NATO's main function originated from the tectonic changes in the security environment after the Cold War.

Human Security

During the 1990s, NATO added new functions to overcome the new challenges. The state-centric security functions were no longer satisfactory for the alliance societies. Functions that focused on human security became the primary tasks of the alliance. However, these human security functions would still be Euro-centric until the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

A Whole and Free Europe

Securing a whole and free Europe became a top function for the alliance. This function has two dimensions: political and military. The political dimension is the establishment of Western style democracies throughout Europe. And the military dimension consists of establishing a stable Europe wide security system. NATO invented partnership mechanisms to satisfy the political dimension first. The NACC in 1991 was aimed at reducing tensions peacefully in Europe. The crisis management program was targeted to achieve the military pillar of a whole and free Europe.

Yet, NATO was not prepared for a crisis operation. The introduction of the Combined Joint Task Force was a first step in preparing NATO's military. Despite

partnership mechanisms and increased NATO's capability of crisis management, NATO could not prevent the escalation of ethnic tensions in Central and Eastern Europe. The outbreak of war in former Yugoslavia sounded the alarm for a new approach to meeting NATO's new functions. During this era NATO pursued, in Gheciusn terms, an inside mode of security which is promoting "stable, and peaceful institutions within states."³⁶

After the fall of the iron curtain, although triumphant and jubilant, NATO found itself in a very dynamic environment. The foremost new task was to preserve stability. The other important task was to secure the victory. In other words, it was to eliminate the threats against the alliance security. To do so, the promotion of democracy and ensuring the new countries' commitment to the Euro-Atlantic security was vital. Thus the whole and free Europe was the translation of the above considerations into reality. The conditions and timing were so appropriate that if not now, Europe might never be free again. Therefore, NATO's actions in the 1990s should be understood in the very unique context of the time.

By 1994, NATO realized that without tackling the sources of instability in the neighboring region, there would be no sustainable security in Europe. The political and military assets of the Central and Eastern Europe countries were vital resources for a secure Europe. Indeed, there was no other alternative than enlargement to achieve NATO's primary function of a whole and free Europe in 1990s. Initially, NATO asserted that the whole and free Europe can and should be achieved by the combination of efforts of European Union, CSCE and NATO.³⁷ But later developments in Yugoslavia demonstrated that NATO was the only show in the town. To conclude, the following

³⁶ Alexandra Gheciu, *NATO in The "New Europe" : The Politics of International Socialization after the Cold War* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2005), 4.

³⁷ Moore, *NATO's New Mission : Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World*, 18.

functions were prominent in the post Cold War security environment as identified by NATO itself:

To provide one of the indispensable foundations for a stable security environment in Europe, based on the growth of democratic institutions and commitment to the peaceful resolution of disputes, in which no country would be able to intimidate or coerce any European nation or to impose hegemony through the threat or use of force.

To serve, as provided for in Article 4 of the North Atlantic Treaty, as a transatlantic forum for Allied consultations on any issues that affect their vital interests, including possible developments posing risks for members' security, and for appropriate co-ordination of their efforts in fields of common concern.

To deter and defend against any threat of aggression against the territory of any NATO member state.

To preserve the strategic balance within Europe.³⁸

CAPABILITY ACCUMULATION

Two issues dominated the capability discussions in NATO during the post cold war era.. The first is the ever increasing capability between the two sides of the Atlantic. And the second is NATO's capability requirements. As a result of the diminished conventional threat in the continental Europe, most of the European countries reduced their defense spending in the 1990s. However, the peace dividend in the NATO allies' defense budgets put the burden mostly on a few allies in NATO. When the capability gap

³⁸ NATO, "NATO's 1991 Strategic Concept."

threatened the effectiveness of the alliance, NATO launched some initiatives to alleviate the gap.

The capability gap among the allies was no more evident than the Kosovo war. The European allies did not have the capability to match their American counterparts. In the 1999 Washington summit, the allies agreed on taking some measures in the following fields to alleviate the capability gap:

- Deployability and mobility: getting forces to the crisis quickly
- Effective engagement: improving forces' cutting edge capacity
- Consultation, command and control: giving forces maximum awareness and control
- Survivability: protecting forces
- Sustainability and logistics: supporting forces in the field³⁹

Capability Development

Having deployable multinational forces was the central effort in NATO's post cold war capability development. In that, Allied Rapid Reaction Corps and Combined Joint Task Force are the two most important new capabilities for NATO in 1990s.

Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC)

NATO's force planning evolves in accordance with its functions. During the Cold War, NATO had allied Command Europe Mobile Force (AMF) to deter Soviet Union. The US reinforced its troop level to contribute to the AMF. There was no standing

³⁹ NATO, "Improving NATO's capabilities," <http://www.nato.int/issues/capabilities/> (accessed October 19, 2009).

multinational military force. The AMF was a formation of national contributions in war time. The AMF was suitable for a conventional military conflict in the continental Europe however it can not be deployed to strategic distances. Thus when the Soviet Union collapsed, NATO introduced Allied Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC). The new ARRC was more flexible and capable. It was used in a wide spectrum of operations; peace enforcement operations in Bosnia-and-Herzegovina and conventional military operations against Serbia in Kosovo.⁴⁰

Combined Joint Task Force

NATO introduced the concept of CJTF in 1993. The main purpose of the JCTF was to provide flexible multinational and multiservice force for the new type missions especially to be used in crisis response operations.⁴¹ The first JCTF was implemented in 1999 after the lessons from Bosnian Conflict were incorporated. The JCTF can be tailored to the needs of any specific operation. The new NATO functions necessitated a deployable, rapid reaction force.

Capability Cooperation

In tandem with capability developments, NATO actively started cooperation initiatives with ex-communist states to secure a lasting peace in Europe. Some of the below initiatives were not as useful as was hoped, but they fostered further cooperation in international arena.

⁴⁰ Diego Ruiz Palmer, "From AMF to NRF," *NATO Review* 1(2009).

⁴¹ NATO, "The Military Command Structure," NATO Handbook, <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb1204.htm> (accessed October 17, 2009).

North Atlantic Cooperation Council (NACC)

The NACC was established in 1991 to incorporate the ex-Warsaw pact countries into the Euro-Atlantic security framework. The NACC was a political platform for cooperation and dialogue. The tensions and conflicts could be reduced by political cooperation. Although the NACC provided a venue for consultation in defense and security issues it did not have the operational cooperation to provide the desired results.

Partnership For Peace (PfP)

PfP was introduced in 1994 to fill the security gap in Central and Eastern Europe. NATO's core function of Whole and Free Europe was thought to be achieved by the PfP. The PfP is a bilateral cooperation of a non-NATO member with NATO. The goal of the PfP is to reinforce the stability and build trust among the parties. PfP is not a substitute for the enlargement, nor is it aimed at keeping the aspiring nations on the outside.

The PfP is a process of teaching NATO's norms and practices. PfP is a valuable mechanism for NATO to develop capabilities less costly. NATO does not need to invest huge resources to achieve stability in the neighboring countries. The only difference between a PfP and full membership is the article 5 commitment.⁴²

The PfP provided important training initiatives for the former communist countries. Educating the top officials, military exercises were fundamental to socialize the PfP countries. The purpose of the PfP is explained as "to increase stability, diminish threats to peace and build strengthened security relationships between individual Partner

⁴² Wallander, "Institutional Assets and Adaptability: NATO after the Cold War," 729.

countries and NATO, as well as among Partner countries.”⁴³ The PfP was favored initially since it did not necessarily exclude any country from partnering with NATO. If NATO was able to achieve its main function with PfP, the enlargement agenda would not be on the table considering the domestic and external pressures. Through the PfP, NATO was able to promote both its values and practices to partners. The partners’ military members and defense civilians were socialized through courses, exercises, formal and informal meetings. In 2008 nearly six thousand students were trained in the fifteen Partnership for Peace (PfP) Training and Education Centers.⁴⁴

The PfP is a political and military instrument to produce security without much NATO contribution. Although it was approached skeptically initially, its success in Bosnia conflict revealed its value in the crisis management and peace keeping operations. The PfP softened the relations among the old enemies as well. Public opinion in the partner countries tilted in favor of the NATO in the coming years.

Mediterranean Dialogue (MD)

NATO initiated Mediterranean Dialogue (MD) in 1994 to enhance the security and stability in the Mediterranean region. The dialogue reflects NATO’s ongoing efforts in providing security in the neighboring regions. Seven nations signed the dialogue agreement including Algeria, Egypt, Israel, Jordan, Mauritania, Morocco and Tunisia. This initiative became a model for the future cooperation attempts in the region. The dialogue areas cover public diplomacy civil emergency planning, crisis management,

⁴³NATO, “The Partnership for Peace,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_50349.htm (accessed August 18, 2009).

⁴⁴ NATO, “Partnership for Peace Training and Education Centres,” http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/news_59395.htm?selectedLocale=en (accessed August 12, 2009).

border security, small arms & light weapons, defense reform, consultations on terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.⁴⁵

The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council (EAPC)

In 1997, the EAPC was established to replace the NACC. As of 2009, twenty-two non-NATO countries had joined the EAPC to cooperate in security related issues.⁴⁶ The EAPC serves as the 'political framework' for NATO's partnership programs.⁴⁷ The partners consult on a wide variety of issues such as "crisis-management and peace-support operations; regional issues; arms control and issues related to the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; international terrorism; defense issues such as planning, budgeting, policy and strategy; civil emergency planning and disaster-preparedness; armaments cooperation; nuclear safety; civil-military coordination of air traffic management; and scientific cooperation."⁴⁸

NATO-Russia Council (NRC)

The NATO-Russia council was established in 2002 as a follow up of Permanent Joint Council between Russia and NATO. The NRC brings 28 NATO nations together with Russia to the same table. The goal of the council is to encourage cooperation in areas such as "the fight against terrorism, crisis management, non-proliferation, arms control and confidence-building measures, theatre missile defense, logistics, military-to-

⁴⁵ NATO, "NATO Mediterranean Dialogue," <http://www.nato.int/med-dial/summary.htm> (accessed September 1, 2009).

⁴⁶ NATO, "The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/topics_49276.htm (accessed September 3, 2009).

⁴⁷ NATO, "Security Through Partnership," <http://www.nato.int/docu/sec-partnership/sec-partner-e.pdf> (accessed October 4, 2009).

⁴⁸ NATO, "The Euro-Atlantic Partnership Council."

military cooperation, defense reform and civil emergencies. New areas may be added to the NRC's agenda by the mutual consent of its."⁴⁹ NRC meetings were halted after the Russian-Georgia conflict. But the work of council revitalized in 2009. In fact, NATO saw Russia as the indispensable partner for global security. NATO Secretary Rasmussen reiterated the importance of cooperation in his recent visit to Moscow: Rasmussen said that:

NATO will never attack Russia. Never. And we do not think Russia will attack NATO. We have stopped worrying about that and Russia should stop worrying about that as well.⁵⁰

NATO-Ukraine Commission

NATO-Ukraine Commission was established in 1997 to foster the relationship. Currently, NATO has an increasing footprint in Ukraine ranging from scientific cooperation to military assistance.

Force Reductions

After 1990, NATO revised its flexible response strategy. The allies have reduced their troop levels across the Europe:

The principal characteristics of the changes introduced to NATO's military forces structures since the end of the Cold War are reductions in size and readiness and increases in flexibility, mobility and multinationality... Ground forces committed

⁴⁹ NATO-Russia Council, Web Site, <http://www.nato-russia-council.info/htm/EN/nrc.shtml> (accessed December 4, 2009).

⁵⁰ Anders Fogh Rasmussen, "NATO and Russia, partners for the future," NATO, http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions_60223.htm (accessed December 4, 2009).

to the Alliance by member nations through NATO's integrated defense and force planning processes have been cut by 35 percent. Major naval vessels have been reduced by over 30 percent and air force combat squadrons by some 40 percent since the beginning of the 1990s.⁵¹

New Command Structure

In 1994, NATO revised its command structure and reduced its three commands to two commands.

Capability Importation

The rationale for accepting new nations can be varied, but the core capabilities the new members bring are the basic argument for NATO enlargement. The enlargement process is one of the options for NATO to achieve a lasting peace in Europe. The enlargement is not the only vehicle used by the alliance to promote democratization in Europe. NATO cooperated with the other international institutions to secure democratization in Europe. The incapacity of the European Union to provide enough momentum for the CEEC forced NATO to develop partnership relations with these countries. However, the Partnership program was a loose relationship and it did not solve the security concerns of the partner nations. Thus the membership option has been the last resort to achieve the NATO's Whole and Free Europe function. As NATO's Secretary General Lord Robertson states NATO enlargement is "about fulfilling the promise of building a stable, secure, democratic Europe - something that benefits all its

⁵¹NATO, "The Role of Allied Military Forces and the Transformation of the Alliance's Defense Posture," NATO Handbook, <http://www.nato.int/docu/handbook/2001/hb0204.htm> (accessed October 8, 2009).

inhabitants and all its neighbors.”⁵² Enlargement has a large impact on the domestic political reforms in the aspiring countries.⁵³ As Epstein suggests, “NATO has in fact contributed to democratization, as well as to other positive trends among its member states. NATO has significantly denationalized defense strategies and thereby stabilized relations among states.”⁵⁴

NATO enlargement increased the regional cooperation and supported the resolve of territorial disputes peacefully. According to the enlargement study, “states which have ethnic disputes or external territorial disputes, including irredentist claims, or internal jurisdictional disputes must settle those disputes by peaceful means in accordance with OSCE principles. Resolution of such disputes would be a factor in determining whether to invite a state to join the Alliance.”⁵⁵ As a result of the above criteria many disputes are resolved peacefully such as the Hungarian minority problem in Romania and Slovakia, and Poland’s border disputes with Ukraine.⁵⁶ Brzezinski asserts that NATO played an important role in resolving the many disputes among both nations and candidates:

Basic lesson of the last five decades is that European security is the basis for European reconciliation. Without NATO, France would not have felt secure enough to reconcile with Germany, and both France and Britain would have even more actively opposed Germany's reunification... Similarly, *the* ongoing reconciliation between Germany and Poland would not have been possible without *the* American presence in Germany and *the* related sense of security that

⁵² Lord Robertson, “Conference on Security Policy,” NATO, <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/2001/s010203a.htm> (accessed November 11, 2009).

⁵³ Moore, *NATO's New Mission : Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World*, 58.

⁵⁴ Rachel Epstein, “NATO Enlargement and the Spread of Democracy: Evidence and Expectations,” *Security Studies* 14, no. 1 (2005): 63.

⁵⁵ NATO, “Study on Enlargement.”

⁵⁶ Moore, *NATO's New Mission : Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World*, 63.

Poland's prospective membership in NATO has fostered in Poland. *The same is true of the Czech Republic and Germany, Hungary and Romania, Romania and Ukraine; and the desire to get into NATO is also having a similar influence on Slovenia's attitude toward Italy and Lithuania's toward Poland.*⁵⁷

NATO FUNCTIONS IN THE POST 9/11 ERA

The terrorist attacks of 9/11 opened a new chapter in NATO's functional evolution. The alliance implemented the article-5 of the Washington Treaty for the first time only one day after the attacks. NATO decided to operate out of NATO territory to prevent complex new threats towards Euro-Atlantic security such as terrorism, ethnic conflicts, WMD and economic meltdown.

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

After 9/11, NATO changed its geographical security approach to functional security approach. The security of the alliance is not geographically bound any more. The elimination of any kind of threat against the people and values of the alliance is incorporated into the NATO's to-do-list. Today, NATO functions are less Euro-Centric. NATO's main operation is in the heart of Asia. NATO is partnering with Middle East Countries and supporting African Union in its operations.

Apart from the previous decade, NATO aimed at pacifying not just the European continent but Central Asia as well. In 2004 Istanbul Summit, NATO took new initiatives to reach out the countries at Central Asia and Middle East.

⁵⁷ Zbigniew Brzezinski, "NATO: The Dilemmas of Expansion," *National Interest* no. 53 (1998): para. 4.

CORE FUNCTIONS

Though according to the 1999 Strategic concept NATO officially performs the functions of Security, Consultation, Deterrence and Defense, Crisis Management and Partnership, Counter-terrorism has become the main function in the last decade.⁵⁸ The Istanbul summit was a milestone in NATO's functional enlargement. Allies expressed their willingness to address any threats against NATO's territory, and people regardless of the origin of the threat.⁵⁹ NATO adopted a military solution to meet the new challenges. The Afghanistan operation is the clear example of NATO's new focus after the 9/11 terrorist attacks.

Security

NATO's functional approach to security demands cooperative strategy against the asymmetric and interdependent threats such as Counter-terrorism has become a major task for NATO after the 9/11 attacks.

Consultation

Consultation is a unique political asset in NATO. As the alliance enlarged to 28 nations, it became important to consult on wide array of topics regarding the alliance's security. In particular, through the consultation mechanism, NATO can develop common understanding of the threats and necessary commitments.

⁵⁸ NATO, "1999 NATO Strategic Concept," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27433.htm (accessed November 23, 2009).

⁵⁹ NATO, "The Istanbul Declaration," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_21026.htm (accessed June 30, 2009).

Deterrence and Defense

Deterrence and Defense is no doubt the core of the alliance. It is also the Achilles' heel of NATO. Under what conditions the article 5 would be invoked is blurred in the past decade due to the new threats. NATO needs to address the article 5 issue in the new strategic concept.

Crisis Management

NATO's post 9/11 experiences underscored the significance of reconstruction and stabilization operations. In particular, Afghanistan operation revealed that military solution is not satisfactory in the modern conflicts. A comprehensive approach merging civilian and military capabilities is needed to succeed.

Partnership

NATO does not and will not have all the required assets to realize its aspirations. In an increasingly interdependent world, NATO needs to engage with other institutions and countries. The current outreach initiatives should be reinforced with more carrot to tie the partners to the west. Without effective measures, the entire outreach program will be hollow and remain in the paper. As Chris Donnelly suggests, "the divide between 'Allies' and 'Partners' needs to close rapidly. Allies' security can only be assured by close collaboration with Partners in Central and Eastern Europe and the Greater Middle East as well as with each other."⁶⁰

⁶⁰ Chris Donnelly, "Forging a NATO partnership for the Greater Middle East," *NATO Review Istanbul Summit Special*, <http://www.nato.int/docu/review/2004/istanbul/2004-istanbul-e.pdf>.

The benefit of partnership can be seen clearly during the Afghanistan operation. NATO and US had enormous help from the Central Asia countries in the war against terrorism. As Moore asserts, “the cooperation that the United States and NATO enjoyed in the region after September 11, 2001, was made possible by political and military ties to the region during the 1990s through NATO’s PfP.”⁶¹ Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan and Turkmenistan provided either basing, refueling or over flight permissions to the US and Allies.⁶²

Overall, the contribution of non NATO members to the alliance operations is significant. NATO highlights that, “as of September 2008, approximately 62,500 NATO personnel were deployed in five NATO-led operations. These forces are provided by the 26 NATO Allies (about 58,200) and 16 NNCNs (about 4,300).”⁶³ Due to the ongoing outreach programs, NATO is now acting as a hub for international cooperation in the security field.

It is important to highlight that all non-NATO members must have the approval of NATO to contribute to an ongoing operation. The contributions of partner countries “speed achievement of the overall objective, lessen the burden on NATO members, and provide a visible demonstration of the broad international consensus that exists on the importance of NATO’s role in contributing to crisis resolution and preventing the spread of instability.”⁶⁴ Partnership efforts are a chance for NATO to export its norms and values to the partner countries as well.

⁶¹ Moore, *NATO's New Mission : Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World*, 117.

⁶² Jim Garamone, “Central Asia Crucial to War on Terror,” *American Forces Press Service*, June 27, 2002, <http://www.defense.gov/news/newsarticle.aspx?id=43709> (accessed December 12, 2009).

⁶³ NATO, “Contributions of Non-NATO Members to NATO Operations,” <http://www.nato-pa.int/default.asp?SHORTCUT=1475> (accessed December 4, 2009).

⁶⁴ Ibid.

CAPABILITY ACCUMULATION

New members are expected to contribute political, military and economic capabilities to fulfill NATO functions. As NATO's Prague summit declaration emphasizes, "Alliance enlargement will strengthen NATO in several ways making it more able to handle both its traditional and more recent security missions. Politically, the new members will see the extension of a zone of security over more of the Euro-Atlantic area. Militarily, they will be able to provide specific, niche capabilities as well as a general defense contribution appropriate to their means."⁶⁵

Capability Development

NATO initiated ambitious projects to satisfy the new functions. Especially reducing the capability gap between the Europe and US was addressed by these initiatives.

The Prague Capabilities Commitment

In the following four areas, nations agreed to improve their capabilities:

- defending against chemical, biological, radiological and nuclear attacks
- ensuring command, communications and information superiority
- improving interoperability of deployed forces and key aspects of combat effectiveness; and ensuring rapid deployment and sustainability of combat forces⁶⁶

⁶⁵ NATO, "NATO After Prague."

⁶⁶ John Colston, "Marrying Capabilities to Commitments," *NATO Review* (2004).

High Readiness Force (HRF)

In 2003, NATO agreed on a new command structure that can conduct any type of operations in any part of the world. Current deployable HRF headquarters are:

- The Allied Command Europe Rapid Reaction Corps (ARRC) HQ in Rheindalen, Germany
- The Rapid Deployable German-Netherlands Corps HQ in Munster, Germany
- The Rapid Deployable Italian Corps HQ in Olona, Italy
- The Rapid Deployable Spanish Corps HQ in Valencia, Spain
- The Rapid Deployable Turkish Corps HQ in Istanbul, Turkey
- The EUROCORPS HQ in Strasbourg, France, sponsored by Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg and Spain ⁶⁷

NATO Response Force (NRF)

Apart from the HRF, NATO introduced a new rapid reaction force which has a standing headquarter and multinational force. The new NATO Response Forces consist of land, maritime, air and special operations units that can be deployed in a short time and conduct all kinds of article 5 and non-article 5 operations. NRF is the engine of the transformation. The nations use NRF as a model for their militaries adaptation to the new concepts and technologies. Other than that, if used effectively, NRF can provide an early

⁶⁷ NATO, "NATO Force Structure," <http://www.nato.int/ims/docu/force-structure.htm> (accessed November 14, 2009).

stronghold during a conflict. Lord Robertson asserts that “another major breakthrough in the capability area was the agreement reached in Prague on the creation of a NATO Response Force (NRF). This state-of-the-art force will give the Alliance the capacity to respond quickly and effectively to new threats.”⁶⁸

The following NRF Missions demonstrates that NATO is aiming for military capability to meet its functions: Crisis Response (including Peacekeeping), Support Counter Terrorism operations, Consequence Management (including CBRN events and humanitarian crises), Peace Enforcement, Embargo operations – maritime, initial land, and no-fly zone, Initial Entry Force...or enabling force, Demonstrative Force Package, Quick response operations and Non-combatant Evacuation.⁶⁹

Capability Cooperation

Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI) was the main vehicle for the cooperation during this era. The goal of the ICI is to enhance security in the region through bilateral relations.⁷⁰ Until now, Bahrain, Qatar, Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates joined the ICI. NATO is seeking practical cooperation through ICI in the areas of defense reform, interoperability of forces , education and training activities, cooperation in the fight against terrorism and prevent of proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.⁷¹

⁶⁸ Lord Robertson, “Transforming NATO,” *NATO Review* (2003).

⁶⁹ NATO, “NATO Response Force Briefing,” <http://www.nato.int/docu/comm/2003/10-colorado/briefing02.pdf> (accessed December 1, 2009).

⁷⁰ NATO, “Istanbul Summit Communiqué,” <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/2004/p04-096e.htm> (accessed July 3, 2009).

⁷¹ NATO, “Istanbul Cooperation Initiative (ICI),” <http://www.nato.int/issues/ici/> (accessed July 3, 2009).

Capability Importation

NATO enlargement during the last decade was a continuation of the previous post-Cold War enlargement. Bulgaria, Romania, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Slovenia and Slovakia joined the club in 2004. With the accession of Albania and Croatia in March 2009, Europe is almost consolidated. But, there is still a potential conflict in Balkans due to the tensions between non-NATO members.

FUTURE NATO

NATO's future tasks will involve protecting not the NATO territory but the common values and peoples from any aggression.

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The latest upset in the Afghanistan war demonstrates the lack of consensus on the main threat among the alliance. While the eastern European members worry on a resurgent Russia, the rest of the alliance worry more about unconventional threats such as terrorism, climate change etc.

The future security environment will be complex and unpredictable with many state and nonstate actors affecting the global security. The likelihood of an open military aggression against the alliance territory will not be paramount. In fact in the twenty-first century, the threat will be in the form of network wars: Terrorist networks, drug networks, organized crime networks, hackers etc. These are the "networks that prey on other networks- the interconnected arteries and nodes of vulnerability that accompany the

free flow of people, ideas, energy, money, goods and services, and the complex interdependent systems on which free societies depend.”⁷²

NATO, itself, identifies the future threats as being hybrid:

Threats will come in hybrid form, as adversaries integrate conventional, irregular, terrorist and criminal assets operationally and tactically at the lowest possible level.⁷³

In order to address these hybrid threats, NATO needs to work with other institutions and develop niche capabilities. The Alliance might have to conduct a wide variety of operations near the borders of the alliance or at a strategic distance. In either case, the alliance needs deployable and flexible capabilities. NATO’s new roles should address the emerging global threats against the values, people and forces as well. Therefore the following roles which are identified by a large group of experts in the Multiple Future Study are likely to be adapted by the alliance in the new strategic concept.

CORE FUNCTIONS

Although NATO’s future functions will be addressed in the new strategic concept, NATO will likely focus on the following functions which is derived from numerous NATO documents such as Multiple Future Projects and Future Security Environment study.

⁷² Hamilton et al., "Alliance Reborn an Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century," 6.

⁷³ NATO, "Multiple Future Project," 7.

Deterrence and Collective Defense

The collective defense will remain at the core of the alliance functions. The commitment to defend collectively gives the best message to any kind of aggression against the alliance. Although NATO should retain the traditional nuclear and conventional capabilities, the article 5 should also be reevaluated to cover the virtual commons of the alliance. Deterrence can be achieved only when the alliance shows its unity and solidarity in a timely manner. Therefore, the alliance will need to revise its decision making and commitment procedures.

Transatlantic Link

NATO provides a strategic forum for 28 developed countries. It is “ the institutional expression of the transatlantic link.”⁷⁴ If used effectively, most of the global risks can be addressed collectively by the alliance.

Energy Security

Energy Security will be an important role for the NATO in the next decade. NATO members might need to address the issue before `extending invitations of membership to new countries “particularly if they are vulnerable to Russian pressure.”⁷⁵

Cyber Defense

NATO`s capabilities in the virtual common is very limited. Heavy dependence on the cyber networks requires common action by NATO allies.

⁷⁴ Hamilton et al., "Alliance Reborn an Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century," 12.

⁷⁵ Morelli and Belkin, "NATO Enlargement Albania, Croatia, and Possible Future Candidates," 23.

Piracy

The safety of land, sea and air transportation lines is to be ensured by the international community. However, it is only NATO that can deliver effective military protection in case of any threat.

Countering Hybrid Threats

New threats can be against both physical and virtual commons. NATO will have to conduct activities well beyond its territory. NATO should contribute the global security by engaging other institutions and countries.

Conflict Resolution

NATO will conduct the Crisis Response Operations in increasing numbers due to its unique military capabilities. NATO needs to utilize its material asset in the case of any humanitarian crises.

Counter Proliferation of WMD

2006 Comprehensive Political Guidance highlights terrorism and the spread of weapons of mass destruction as the principal threats in the next two decades.⁷⁶ NATO might need to develop new capabilities such as missile defense systems to protect its territory and people.

⁷⁶ NATO, "Comprehensive Political Guidance," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_56425.htm (accessed November 9, 2009).

Strategic Communication

The battle of Narrative becomes one of the NATO's priority in the new security environment.⁷⁷ Without explaining NATO actions and purposes to the people, NATO will lose its political assets to perform its core functions. The strategic communication should be a part of NATO capabilities in the information age. As stated in the Multiple Future Study:

NATO will need to communicate effectively the inter-relationship between security and defense, which includes the role of NATO in relation to other governance bodies, both internal and external to the Alliance.⁷⁸

The lack of an effective strategic communication can be understood diminished public support for the alliance in the last decade. A recent study by German Marshall Fund shows that although the NATO support "has been rebounding in a number of countries" it is still far from the previous heights.⁷⁹

Anchoring Caucasus to the West

NATO needs to, "enhance stability and security on Europe's periphery."⁸⁰

Caucasus is a conflict-ridden region due to the enormous territorial disputes. The instability in Caucasus affects the energy security of the alliance. NATO should involve constructive dialogue with Caucasus countries. As Asmus highlights, NATO can no

⁷⁷ NATO, "Multiple Future Project," 7.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ German Marshall Fund of the United States, *Transatlantic Trends Key Findings 2009*, 14, http://www.gmfus.org/trends/2009/docs/2009_English_Key.pdf (accessed December 28, 2009).

⁸⁰ Stephen F. Larrabee and Julian Lindley-French, "Revitalizing the Transatlantic Security Partnership: An Agenda for Action." (Santa Monica, CA: RAND), http://www.rand.org/pubs/reprints/2009/RAND_RP1382.pdf.

longer turn his back on the region. NATO needs “a more coherent strategy toward the Black Sea region and those countries lying further east ward around the Caspian.”⁸¹

European Pacification

Europe is not safe and totally free today. Although there is a remarkable achievement on the integration of the continent the insecurity in Balkans can initiate conflict Europe-Wide. NATO’s first and foremost task is to preserve the peace in Europe.

Partnership

NATO is partnering many countries since the early 1990s. Through partnership, NATO is able to achieve its security functions at lower costs. In particular the stability and security in Europe and periphery can be strengthened only with the cooperation of partners. NATO can use the capabilities of the partner countries to fight terrorism and to manage the crisis.

FUTURE CAPABILITIES

NATO’s capabilities need to match the NATO functions. NATO will be a viable security organization in the eyes of its members only if it can perform the core functions. If the capabilities do not match the functions, NATO will become “a hollow alliance.”⁸² NATO will lose its credibility and political assets to shape the crisis before escalating to conflict. On the other hand, if NATO breaks away from its commitments, the members whose security is at risk will be alienated. The NATO’s value will be zeroed. Countries at

⁸¹ Asmus, "Rebuilding the Atlantic Alliance," 24.

⁸² Hamilton et al., "Alliance Reborn an Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century," 23.

risk will increase their security either by renationalizing their defenses or with new alliances. In either case, NATO will be a dead alliance.

NATO should have a leading, partner or supporter role for the above roles.⁸³

Depending on the roles it plays NATO needs a flexible force structure. The deployable forces are essential in meeting the required capabilities. Afghanistan missions showed the NATO's awkward command and control processes. Without the deployable capabilities, NATO will not perform its functions. Thus the capabilities are essential for NATO's credibility. NATO Secretary General put it in a very clear way:

The Alliance needs capabilities for the future, not for the past. We need more wide-bodied aircraft, and fewer heavy tanks. We need more precision-guided weapons, deployable logistic support troops, ground-surveillance systems, and protection against chemical and biological weapons. We need forces that are slimmer, tougher and faster, forces that reach further, and can stay in the field longer. Such capabilities cost.⁸⁴

Joint Intelligent Surveillance and Reconnaissance (JISR)

NATO needs a well coordinated intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance data collection and analysis capability. AGS is a milestone in the JISR capability.

Command Control and Communication Systems

Without a C3 capability, the forces from 28 different nations and military cultures will not work in cohesion.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Lord Robertson, "Investing in Security," *NATO Review* (2002).

Strategic Lift

Most of the NATO nations do not have the strategic lift capability. Considering the future home away missions, Strategic Lift capability is essential for the deployable forces.

Missile Defense

In the 2002 Prague Summit, NATO decided to acquire a comprehensive missile defense capability due to the risk of WMD attack by terrorist groups or hostile countries. The interim capability is planned to be achieved by early 2010 covering the forces on theater.⁸⁵ NATO's Missile defense Capability links national missile defense system with NATO's command and control assets.

CONCLUSION

NATO enlargement poses no threat to any country. The goal of the enlargement is to establish a whole and free Europe. NATO promotes the democratic values to enhance the global security. NATO enlargement reinforces the European integration by helping the new members to cooperate in one of the most problematic issue area. The enhanced cooperation in the defense area spilled over to the other issue areas. Hence it will be much easier to cooperate in economic or technological platforms.

NATO's overall goal is to safeguard the territory and people of the member countries from any kind of aggression. NATO adopts new functions to increase the interdependence among member and non-member nations to resolve the problems

⁸⁵NATO, "Missile Defense," http://www.nato.int/issues/missile_defence/index.html (accessed November 26, 2009).

peacefully. NATO's internal functioning is mostly aimed to increase the interdependence among members. Common defense planning, research and development, new concepts and interoperability among the forces and equipment all foster interdependence in the alliance.

CHAPTER IV

NATO'S GEOGRAPHICAL ENLARGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

In this chapter, NATO's geographical enlargement will be analyzed with regard to the NATO's functional evolution. In accordance with the main argument, the chapter identifies the background information about the second pillar of NATO expansion.

The chapter is divided into three sections. The first section explains the Cold War era enlargement (the first wave): Why and How did NATO enlarge? The second section explains the post Cold War era enlargement (the second wave). Why did the enlargement take place after the Brussels Summit in 1994? Are there any differences between the first and second wave of enlargement? The impact of new democratic countries in the central and eastern Europe on NATO was examined in detail in order to understand the later enlargement rounds. The new members will be assessed according their contribution to required capabilities. The conclusion section highlights the linkage between the capability requirements and the new members.

Having been founded by 12 countries in 1949, the alliance enlarged to 28 members in the next 60 years. As seen in Figure 5, the geographical enlargement took place in six rounds. NATO's geographical enlargement is based on Article 10 of the Washington Treaty:

The Parties may, by unanimous agreement, invite any other European State in a position to further the principles of this Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area to accede to this Treaty. Any State so invited may become

a Party to the Treaty by depositing its instrument of accession with the Government of the United States of America. The Government of the United States of America will inform each of the Parties of the deposit of each such instrument of accession.¹




Fig. 5. NATO's Six Rounds of Enlargement

The Cold War era enlargement is the first wave of NATO expansion which included the accession of Greece, Turkey, Germany and Spain. In the first round Greece and Turkey joined the alliance in 1952. Germany's accession could only be realized in 1955 after overcoming the French opposition. In the third round, Spain became a member of the alliance in 1982. The Geostrategic and military capabilities of the aspiring nations

¹ NATO, "The North Atlantic Treaty."

were important criteria for being admitted to the club. NATO's primary goal for the enlargement was to deter and contain Soviet Union by incorporating new capabilities.

Especially after the North Korean Attack in 1950, NATO allies realized that there would be no cheap collective defense of the Europe. A credible deterrence necessitated new capabilities, forces, fixed infrastructure and the defense of allied territories as far east as possible. By mid 1950, NATO was behind the Soviet Union in military capabilities. In order to have a balance of power in Europe, NATO had to increase overall defense level. However, a defense buildup was NATO's biggest dilemma. On the one hand, the defense buildup would secure NATO countries militarily; on the other hand, an increase in defense budgets would jeopardize the economic reconstruction of Europe. Only the new accession could effectively fulfill the capability gap without disrupting economic recovery. The fierce opposition to Turkish membership was overcome when NATO military authorities underscored that Turkey in NATO could tie up a large amount of Soviets troops in the Caucasus. Similarly, German membership was no longer deferred as the Soviets had improved their conventional and nuclear forces. Since Germany would be the main battle field in a future war, German industrial and military potential was vital for NATO.

NATO's biggest enlargement took place after the Cold War. An alliance of 16 members enlarged to a 28 nations alliance as of 2009. The second wave of NATO expansion occurred in three rounds since 1999. Poland, Hungary, and Czech Republic were invited to the alliance in 1997 and they signed the accession protocol in 1999. Later, in 2004 Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia, Slovenia, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania joined

NATO. The last round of enlargement was in 2009. Albania and Croatia became full member of the alliance at NATO's Strasbourg-Kehl Summit.

NATO's second wave of enlargement differed from the previous enlargement in purpose and scope. NATO's main function became achieving a whole and free Europe after 1990. Only expansion could bring lasting peace to Europe by reducing tensions at the hotspots of the Balkan, Central European and Baltic regions. Henceforth, the new members were required contribute to NATO's new focus.

What I called the *third wave* of enlargement consists of the future NATO enlargement. Ukraine and Georgia with some other countries are on the list of candidates for the third wave of the enlargement. The characteristics of the third wave are that the future members may not be necessarily in traditional European territories. NATO's future expansion will be discussed more in the last chapter.

In evaluating each round of enlargement, it is important to distinguish the different capabilities new members contribute. In the remaining of the chapter, each country will be assessed by its value to the NATO from geostrategic, political and military capabilities. While geostrategic and military capabilities were sufficient enough to be accepted during the Cold War, the political and to some degree the specialized military capabilities became prominent for NATO's invitation to the aspiring countries.

COLD WAR ENLARGEMENT

Greece, Turkey, Germany and Spain joined NATO during the Cold War. With the exception of Spain, the other three countries' membership to the alliance is closely related. All three countries' membership candidacy became serious after the magnitude of

the Soviet threat was well perceived. In that perceived threat, Korean War played a major role. NATO was the unique security arrangement for the defense of Europe. However, open conflict in Korea worried the allies in terms of NATO's ability to provide security during a total war with the Soviets. Thus, containment of the Soviets led to the enlargement of NATO within three years of its foundation.

NATO's first wave of enlargement differs from the second wave in several ways. First, the decision maker for NATO enlargement in the 1950s was the big three of the alliance. Although consensus was sought in North Atlantic Council, the views of the standing group, US, UK and France was not opposed by any other members. Hence the enlargement was a product of the compromises of UK, France and US. Second, the enlargement had caused a reciprocal relation between NATO functions and new members. On the one hand, NATO's new functions, as a result of a changing security environment in 1950, brought the option of enlargement; on the other hand the accession of new members changed the basic characteristics of the alliance: NATO became more than an Atlantic alliance. The US presence in Europe was institutionalized. Third, NATO enlargement necessitated a dramatic institutional change in the first two rounds of the enlargement. NATO had to establish new commands to integrate the new members' militaries. In fact, the integrated military structure was able only to become effective after German accession.

Lastly, the Cold War enlargement was aimed at increasing the military potential of the alliance and hence the goal was to satisfy the military functions of NATO.

MEMBERSHIP CRITERIA

The membership issue was a key concern during the establishment of the alliance. The geographic criteria were proposed by the US to be the sole criteria for NATO membership. Any country located at the two coasts of the Atlantic could join NATO.² The criteria were aimed not to provoke the Soviets by including Italy and other centrally located European states. The rationale behind the criteria was that NATO was to be a defensive alliance of the North Atlantic countries. The countries outside of the Atlantic region would be excluded from the club regardless of their geostrategic position. In other words, membership was tied to the main function of the organization. The relaxation of the criteria came during the heyday of Korean War. First, the accession of Greece and Turkey, then Germany was at the center of discussions in North Atlantic Council.

The Greek and Turkish membership option was realized after the failure of the association relation. NATO offered a partnership relation in order not to bear the cost of commitments towards these countries. However, strong opposition from Greece and Turkey and the threat of going neutral left no alternative but the enlargement option.

THE ACCESSION OF GREECE

Greece was invaded during the Cold War, and the post war years were as terrible as the invasion years due to a civil war between communist guerillas and monarchists. Smith says that Greece reflects the two pillar divide of the Europe at the time.³ The civil war ended with the victory of the right wing groups in Greece. Nevertheless, the communist threat was still looming. In such a context, NATO membership was a big help

² Smith, *NATO Enlargement During the Cold War : Strategy and System in the Western Alliance*, 23.

³ *Ibid.*, 63.

for the domestic stabilization of the country. The NATO membership of Greece was more a geostrategic necessity than its political or military contribution to the alliance. If Greece were to fall to communism, NATO's Southern Flank would have been in great danger. The Soviets could have accessed the Mediterranean without the Turkish straits. Therefore, Greece's inclusion into NATO would secure Greece's political orientation to the West.

THE ACCESSION OF TURKEY

According to Melvyn P. Leffler, NATO's decision to accept Turkey as a full member was based on the US calculations that if the relations were not institutionalized and Turkey were not tied to the West via a formal structure, a golden opportunity from Turkish Geostrategic location and the military capability would be missed.⁴ Furthermore, Turkey was indispensable for Europe's defense, the protection of oil transportation from Middle East and NATO's communication lines in Mediterranean. Turkey's main driver for NATO membership was its ambition for the westernization. NATO was seen as a firm proof of westernization for Turkish policy makers. The Soviet Threat catalyzed her desire to be embedded to the West. Turkish contribution to the alliance was significant in all three capability areas.

Geostrategic Capabilities

Turkey's accession to NATO was a gradual policy beginning from the end of WWII. Turkey is located in the middle of Soviets, Middle East and Europe. The two

⁴ Melvyn P. Leffler, "Strategy, Diplomacy, and the Cold War: The United States, Turkey, and NATO, 1945-1952," *The Journal of American History* 71, no. 4 (1985): 808.

straits were the only sea passage for any naval power from the black sea to Mediterranean or vice versa.

Turkish geostrategic location was important in that Turkey could block the Soviets' invasion of the Middle East. Without Turkish support, any US strategic assault from Egypt was infeasible. Moreover, Turkish armed forces could prevent the advance of the Red Army in a possible conflict and gaining the much needed time to be ready for a Strategic Air assault from the Suez area. NATO estimated a conventional Soviet superiority in Europe. Without US strategic air offensive, Soviets could easily invade the West Europe. Thus, Turkey was the key for distracting Soviets troops from the European Flank. In fact in 1950, Turkey acquired the offensive air capability to Southern Soviet forces.

Political Capabilities

Turkish neutrality was another concern for NATO. In a Cold War context, neutrality meant being on the other side of the curtain. If Turkey were not given security guarantees, it was almost certain that Turkey would remain neutral considering Soviets refrain from open threat to Turkey.⁵ A neutral Turkey would ease Soviet security concerns and risk NATO's offensive against the Soviets.

Military Capabilities

With the Truman doctrine, the US started huge military assistance between 1946 and 1950 that enabled a well qualified Turkish Armed forces at the time. Turkish Army had the logistics, transportation system and communication systems were upgraded

⁵ Ibid.: 823.

making the army a mobile force. The Turkish Air Force acquired offensive capability against any aggression. The airfields were modernized to allow strategic bombardment aircraft. The Turkish Navy received considerable aid from the US as well, and thus gained the capability to stop a Soviet submarine passage from the straits.

THE ACCESSION OF GERMANY

After becoming a unified state in 1871, Germany had always been a major European power. The German question was the central issue of the intra-European struggle for a century. Germany was defeated in WWII, and its hegemonic ambitions and capabilities were thus destroyed well beyond expectations. Furthermore, Germany was at the center of bipolar division during the Cold War. NATO's acceptance of Germany as a full member was based on two different factors. First NATO would achieve a military balance with Soviets when Germany's contribution was guaranteed. And second, the German question would be settled forever by tying it to a supranational institution. Henceforth, Germany's accession enabled NATO to achieve its new function of deterrence and containment. The enlargement also satisfied a secondary function of eliminating the security dilemma among its members. NATO expansion to Germany was probably the most important enlargement round in the alliance history. In other words, a new stable European security system could only be developed by including Germany.

NATO membership was important for Germany although it might mean deferral of German Unification for the time.⁶ German politicians knew that Germany needed to join all the economic, political and military organizations in Europe to legitimize Germany's international outlook. Without NATO, Germany could not play its role in the

⁶ John A. Reed, *Germany and NATO* (Washington, DC: National Defense University Press, 1987), 31.

bipolar system. Economic reconciliation had another factor for German desire in NATO. Moreover, NATO membership was to offset the domestic neutralization tendencies in German society.⁷ Germany's capability contribution to NATO are as follows:

Geostrategic Capabilities

Germany's central location in Europe made it indispensable for a successful forward strategy. NATO was expecting a conventional Soviet attack if a conflict arose with Soviets. NATO strategy was based on slowing and blocking Soviets through as forward as possible to gain time for a counter-offensive under US strategic air bombardment. Henceforth, the German soil would be the main battle ground to stop the Soviet troops in a future war.

Political Capabilities

Germany's political contribution to NATO was much more important than its geostrategic and military contribution. The German question was much older than a Soviet question. And it needed to be addressed urgently. Smith suggests that 'German incorporation into the West European state system' could be achieved in an institutional environment.⁸ Allies were aware that Germany could become a trustable partner if her power and ambitions were checked by a hegemon. The US existence guaranteed an assurance for Germany's peaceful co-existence with other European states.

⁷Smith, *NATO Enlargement During the Cold War : Strategy and System in the Western Alliance*, 125.

⁸ *Ibid.*, 120.

Military Capabilities

German armament and military contribution was imperative for the alliance's overall military capabilities. Considering the limited defense spending of the Europeans in 1950, the burden sharing by Germany was a much needed relief for NATO's European members recovery. Without German forces, NATO would be far from balancing Soviet power in Europe.

THE ACCESSION OF SPAIN

Spain's NATO endeavor was ambiguous in that Spain had a different historic experience than other European powers. Spain never had a problem either Soviets or Germans. Instead, Gil and Tulchin claims that "Spain is deeply concerned with a threat from the south, from the Maghreb."⁹ Having located in the southwest part of Europe, Spain developed a unique national identity which kept itself intact from European power struggles.

Spain's entry to NATO was about when instead of whether. Although Spain had been the candidate for membership from the outset of NATO, Spain was a source of division at NATO at the heights of the Korean war. On one side, Americans were insisting to Spanish membership for NATO in order to use naval and air bases. On the other side, UK and France were strictly against the Spanish bid for NATO.¹⁰ The rift could not be resolved. The Spanish regime's ideological hostility to the West had thwarted the accession decision until the removal of the Franco regime.

⁹ Federico Guillermo Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin, eds., *Spain's Entry into NATO : Conflicting Political and Strategic Perspectives* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988), 3.

¹⁰ Melvyn P. Leffler, *A Preponderance of Power : National Security, the Truman Administration, and the Cold War*, Stanford Nuclear Age Series (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 1992), 417.

In the late 1970s, as Spanish democracy flourished, its NATO bid was revived as well. NATO accepted Spain mostly to secure its internal cohesion and solidarity. Hence, Spain membership was to satisfy NATO's internal functions. In fact, Spain was tied to the Western alliance with bilateral treaties. Spain signed a military agreement with the US known as 'Madrid Pacts. The pact enabled US forces stationed in Spain and thus securing Spain as a partner rather than adversary. Therefore, Spain's entry into NATO did not contribute too much from a military perspective.¹¹ It is difficult to make a counterfactual argument here but one can easily expect that if the Franco Regime were not incorporated to the West through bilateral security relations with US, it might become a NATO member long before 1982. From Spain's perspective, joining NATO meant a precursor to be embedded with the European Web of Institutions. Spain's security concern might have played a secondary role in her decision to be a NATO member, but the primary reason was more her fear of "decoupling from the North Atlantic strategic system."¹² As a late comer, Spain did not have a chance to shape the organization. Therefore, Spain's entry to NATO was a clear political choice rather. NATO had its cheapest expansion with Spanish accession. Without no extra commitments, NATO secured the continuation of Spanish capability contribution to the alliance.

Geostrategic Capabilities

The geostrategic value of Spain was evident for the alliance. She was located in a region that can control the crossroad of Mediterranean and the Atlantic. If a conflict arose

¹¹ Gregory F. Treverton, "Spain, the United States, and NATO, Strategic Facts and Political Realities " in *Spain's Entry into NATO : Conflicting Political and Strategic Perspectives*, ed. Federico Guillermo Gil and Joseph S. Tulchin (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 1988).

¹² Smith, *NATO Enlargement During the Cold War : Strategy and System in the Western Alliance*, 159.

with the Soviets, NATO could prevent Soviet naval forces use of Mediterranean, thus securing the south flank of the alliance. Spain territory provides a strategic depth to NATO's Central Europe flank. Reserve forces and logistic support units could be safely stationed in Spain. Meanwhile, transatlantic reinforcement of forces and equipment could be easily done via Spanish ports. Spain was a Euro- Atlantic nation and her presence in the alliance would be less controversial than any previous accession.

Political Capabilities

Smith suggests that Spain's real contribution to NATO was neither geostrategic nor military but political.¹³ The cohesion of NATO was in jeopardy as the European side of the alliance flourished and questioned the value of American leadership. Spain's accession provided fresh blood to the alliance. NATO showed its being the legitimate security organization by attracting new democracies.

Military Capabilities

Spain's military contribution to NATO stems from the air and naval base opportunities for NATO forces. Rota, Torrejon, Zaragoza and Moron hosted nearly 1200 American personnel.¹⁴ However, it is worth it to reiterate that the alliance had already secured the bases before accepting Spain as a full member. The conventional military contribution of Spain is worthwhile as well. Spain had the sixth biggest armed forces among the allies at the time of accession. The Spanish Navy and air force had well

¹³ Ibid., 157.

¹⁴ Treverton, "Spain, the United States, and NATO, Strategic Facts and Political Realities ", 127.

equipped forces that could strengthen NATO's maritime and air superiority over the Warsaw Pact.

POST COLD WAR ENLARGEMENT

As explained in Chapter 6, NATO was not considering an enlargement policy until the Bosnian War. NATO's European allies wanted to strengthen the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe as the main platform for security matters. All the European Countries had a seat in the OSCE. However, by the mid 1990s, it became clear that OSCE could not meet the security needs of the Central and Eastern European Countries. Especially after the Bosnian conflict, both NATO and CEEC realized the ineffectiveness of OSCE.¹⁵ The enlargement option began to be debated seriously at NATO's Brussels summit in 1994. The summit declaration highlighted that European integration could be achieved with NATO's leadership. In contrast to the Cold War era enlargement, NATO's second wave of enlargement should be assessed as a whole rather than individually. Although NATO enlargement occurred in several rounds, the aspiring countries had already made their bids before NATO's Madrid Summit in 1997. NATO's decision to extend the invitation gradually was a result of assessing each candidate's qualifications in detail. 1999, 2004 and 2009 enlargement rounds aimed at securing a whole and free Europe. As seen in figure 6, NATO's post cold war era enlargement has almost left unified the Europe.

NATO's new function has both a political and security dimension as discussed in the previous chapter. The political dimension involved promoting democratic reforms in the ex-communist countries while the security dimension is tampering the security

¹⁵ Eyal, "NATO's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision," 701.

concerns in Europe. Since the region is strategically located between Russia and European major powers, the stability of Central and Eastern Europe is key to the security of the whole Euro-Atlantic region. Henceforth, NATO's political goals played a major role in the post-Cold War enlargement.




Fig. 6. NATO's Second Wave of Enlargement

The gradual enlargement approach, instead of a *big-bang* one, is the result of the aspiring countries' readiness to bear the membership responsibilities. NATO's assessment on the Central and East Europe was that only NATO membership could mitigate the security concern of the region. In addition, any exclusion in this region could establish new division line in Europe, therefore the prospect for NATO membership has not been closed for any country in the region.

It is worth highlighting the capability contribution of the second wave countries here as well. After NATO's main adversary was diminished in 1990, NATO did not need a conventional military contribution. Indeed, NATO had excessive military capability that most of the members cut the defense spending and focus on economic developments. What NATO needed was political and military specialized capabilities that could make NATO achieve its new core function of *Whole and Free Europe*. As Thomas Szayna suggests, NATO's enlargement decision "stems from NATO's transformation into a conflict management organization and a tool for the reintegration of Europe."¹⁶

Meanwhile, the public support for NATO membership in the aspiring countries was over 60 percent even before NATO decided to enlarge.¹⁷ All of the new countries are staunch proponents of the atlanticism. The new members assured the necessity of the transatlantic link in a time of major power shift in the international environment. According to the new members, the US power is the main deterrence factor of the alliance. On the contrary to expectations, the military contributions of these new countries to NATO's new missions were indeed substantial.

¹⁶ Thomas S. Szayna, *NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015 : Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2001), 20.

¹⁷ Tatiana Kostadinova, "East European Public Support for NATO Membership: Fears and Aspirations," *Journal of Peace Research* 37, no. 2 (2000): 246.

From the aspiring nations' perspective, NATO membership was the choice of necessity between a European and Transatlantic option.¹⁸ The Bosnian war underscored a European option's ineffectiveness in the security field. NATO was the instrumental tool for securing the sovereignty of the newly independent countries.

According to Haerpfer, Milosinski and Wallace, neighboring countries, great powers, minorities and ethnic groups were security concerns for the aspiring NATO countries.¹⁹ A resurrected Russian threat was a primary consideration to join NATO. CEEC countries worried to be drawn into the Russian orbit once more in the future.

Szayna proclaimed that strategic calculations and membership criteria played a prominent role for the post Cold War NATO expansion. According to him NATO evaluates future members in terms of power projection capability, alternative costs, associated risks and meeting the political, economic and military criteria set by NATO.²⁰ A close look at the second wave enlargement will show that all of the candidates had the power projection capability to the NATO's focus area, which was basically the Balkan Region at the time. Besides, the candidates were eager to join any crisis management operation in order not to be seen as a free rider.²¹

One can raise a fair objection here in regard to the new members' military contribution to the NATO functions. For example, what might Slovakia or Albania be able to contribute to the collective defense of the alliance territory? The answer lies at the changing core function of NATO during the post Cold War era. Although the collective

¹⁸ Gale A. Mattox and Arthur R. Rachwald, *Enlarging NATO : The National Debates* (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2001), 5.

¹⁹ Christian Haerpfer, Cezary Milosinski, and Claire Wallace, "Old and New Security Issues in Post-Communist Eastern Europe: Results of an 11 Nation Study," *Europe-Asia Studies* 51, no. 6 (1999): 993.

²⁰ Szayna, *NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015 : Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping*, 73.

²¹ *Ibid.*, 76.

defense is still the essence of the alliance, there is no risk of a conventional threat to the alliance territory. Rather, the new function of *Whole and Free Europe* takes precedence in the list of NATO functions. Therefore, the new members should be assessed according to their contribution to the crisis management besides their political and geostrategic capabilities.

Additionally, the military contributions after the Cold War should be considered with NATO's transformation. NATO initiated a massive military transformation during the 1990s to acquire light, mobile forces suitable for the crisis management and unconventional operations. The new candidates were advantageous in acquiring mobile capabilities, in contrast to the older members due to the latter's huge sunk cost of conventional military. In sum, the new members of NATO are not the free-riders in the alliance, but rather are security providers.

Before exploring each individual case, it would be beneficial to explain the roadmap and the mechanics of NATO enlargement in the second wave. NATO institutionalized the membership procedure in 1995 by conducting an enlargement study. The criteria, expectations and commitments are laid down explicitly in the study so as not to cause unrealistic hopes

THE ROAD TO THE ENLARGEMENT

There was no discussion of NATO enlargement in the early days of the post Cold War era. Jonathan Eyal states that "the idea that the central European countries should become members of NATO did not even cross any Western leader's mind in 1989, when

all the communist regimes collapsed.”²² Indeed, NATO promised not to take advantage of the Russian weakness “that its loss in Europe would not be translated into a Western gain.”²³

NACC was the alliance’s first reaction to the developments in the new international structure. Without any restrictions, all countries in European continent were eligible for the membership. Later, there was no consensus among the allies on the decision for enlargement until 1995. While some countries favored the enlargement to increase their security, the others opposed it for fear of a Russian backlash. However, after NATO’s Brussels summit in 1994, it became clear that NATO would add new members in the coming years.

THE MECHANICS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

Before the second wave of enlargement, NATO prepared an extensive analysis of the options for the enlargement and their likely impact on the alliance. NATO’s Study on Enlargement was a stage setter for the enlargement.

Study on NATO Enlargement

The study was targeted both the alliance and the aspiring countries. It provided rationale and criteria for the enlargement. The Alliance’s criteria for the membership were very restrictive. If a country could not contribute to the alliance security it would not be a candidate for membership. The point was made clear by US Secretary of State at the time, Madeline Albright, during a NATO meeting:

²² Eyal, "NATO's Enlargement: Anatomy of a Decision," 698.

²³ Ibid.

This means that the first new members of NATO shall not be the last. If a European country is important to our security, and if it demonstrates that it is ready -- politically, economically, and militarily -- to contribute to our security, it will be in our interest to welcome it through the open door. This is central to the logic of a larger NATO. It also means that our approach to future rounds should be as pragmatic as our approach to the first. Our timetable should be driven not by political calculations, but by the performance of aspiring countries.²⁴

New members were to be not just the consumer of security but producers as well.²⁵ NATO emphasizes that “the ability of prospective members to contribute militarily to collective defense and to the Alliance's new missions will be a factor in deciding whether to invite them to join the Alliance.”²⁶ Especially after 9/11, aspirant nations are evaluated according to their political or military contribution to NATO once they are accepted.²⁷ However not explicit in the study, there are some informal criteria spelled out by NATO. Each candidate is expected to meet the following qualifications:²⁸

Political Qualifications

Aspiring countries are expected to have a functioning democratic regime with effective democratic control of the military. The eastern European armies

²⁴ NATO, “Speech by the US Secretary of State, Madeleine K. Albright at the North Atlantic Council,” <http://www.nato.int/docu/speech/1998/s980528d.htm> (accesses Dec 29, 2009).

²⁵ NATO, “Study on Enlargement.”

²⁶ Ibid.

²⁷ Moore, *NATO's New Mission : Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World*, 54.

²⁸ NATO, “Study on Enlargement.”

were affiliated deeply with the communist parties during the Cold War. NATO insisted on a professional military with no ideological or political orientation. A functioning democracy would ensure the transparency and accountability of the regime and its armed forces. Meanwhile, new members are expected to resolve all territorial and minority disputes. NATO membership was a strong incentive for the aspiring countries to eliminate the sources of instability.

Economic Qualifications

All the aspiring countries had a command economy which prevented a sufficiently competitive diverse economy. NATO's insistence on free market economy was in line with the global orientation to liberalization and openness. Furthermore, a working integration requires the compatibility of political, economic and military domains.

Military Qualifications

In general, NATO's criteria for military qualifications were less strict than the political ones. Almost all of the new members of the second wave did not match NATO's military standards. However, the new countries were expected to achieve a minimum military requirement at interoperability of the forces and standardization of the equipment. All NATO members were required to contribute to the collective defense of the NATO territory. Therefore, new nations need to allocate a significant portion of their GDP to defense.

NATO membership urges the member nations to build constructive relationships with the neighboring countries. To give an example, as Polish Ambassador to the United States, Przemyslaw Grudzinski, asserts “Poland signed treaties of friendship with all its neighbors and actively participated in regional initiatives such as the Visegrad Triangle (including Poland, Hungary, the Czech Republic and Slovakia) and OSCE (the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe).”²⁹

Membership criteria were aimed at reducing the cost of integration. From an economic standpoint, NATO decision makers weigh the commitments of the alliance to the benefit of the enlargement. The new commitments entail a risk of altering the security environment in favor of more conflict. If the aspiring country has some unresolved territorial or minority problems with the non-NATO members, NATO can find itself in the center of new disputes with non-members. Therefore, NATO necessitates the establishment of friendly relations with neighbors for the candidates.

As discussed in the previous chapter, NATO became a comprehensive security organization over time. The norms and values are important to maintain the healthy relations among the member states. NATO members resolve intra alliance disputes by using the established rules. Having the same identity is the primary factor to achieve the cohesion in NATO. Henceforth, NATO’s insistence on a democratic government based on market economy is a requirement of its intra-alliance functions.

Lastly, NATO membership is not a security warranty against a common threat. The membership also provides security from any threat from NATO. The self restraint is

²⁹ Przemyslaw Grudzinski, "Case Study: Results of First Round Expansion — Poland’s Experience," *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda* 7, no. 1 (2002): 35.

one of the key practices of NATO.³⁰ Members tend to avoid conflict with each other. In rare cases where a military conflict is probable, the club pressure force the adversaries to handle the problem diplomatically.

The Enlargement Process

NATO expansion takes place in three phases: In the first phase, aspiring countries that have an intention to be a member are invited to join the intensified dialogue with NATO. Nations demonstrate their willingness to join NATO by their participation or supporting of NATO activities. The invitation is offered via accession talks with a NATO team. During the talks, NATO reiterates the political, economic, military and legal preconditions for the membership. Candidates are expected to coordinate their policies with NATO.

In the second phase, Aspiring countries are invited to participate in the Membership Action Plan (MAP) and the Planning and Review Process (PARP). Through MAP and PARP, NATO and Aspiring Countries engage in common transactions and processes. New networks are constructed to diffuse background knowledge. NATO collects data on the countries' abilities to analyze how the membership affect NATO's article 5 commitment. The Social learning took place at this phase. The aspiring countries officially acknowledge their acceptance of the timetable and membership obligations.

In the third phase, when a common identity is developed and qualifications are met, the new countries join NATO after accession protocols are signed by all NATO

³⁰ Adler, "The Spread of Security Communities: Communities of Practice, Self-Restraint, and NATO's Post-Cold War Transformation," 204.

members. Any deficiencies in minimum military requirements should be mitigated at this phase prior to NATO's extension of article 5 commitment.

Intensified Dialogue

The mechanism was invented in 1997 Madrid Summit. Intensified dialogue would “cover the full range of political, military, financial and security issues relating to possible NATO membership, without prejudice to any eventual Alliance decision.”³¹ Currently, Ukraine, Georgia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Montenegro have intensified dialogues with NATO.

Membership Action Plan (MAP)

Having been established after the Washington Summit in 1999, Membership Action Plan is the principal vehicle to judge the qualifications of the aspiring nations. In NATO terms, MAP is “a NATO programme of advice, assistance and practical support tailored to the individual needs of countries wishing to join the Alliance.”³² MAP enables NATO to fully utilize the future members' capabilities by making them interoperable with NATO standards. Aspirant countries are entitled to achieve certain goals in political, economic, defense, security and legal areas. As for political and economic goals, MAP countries are required to solve territorial disputes with their neighbors, establish civil control on the military, achieve the international standards on human rights and sustain a stable free market economy. In defense and security sector, MAP countries are to

³¹ NATO, “Madrid Declaration on Euro-Atlantic Security and Cooperation ,” <http://www.nato.int/docu/pr/1997/p97-081e.htm> (accessed on Dec 12, 2009).

³² NATO, “Membership Action Plan (MAP),” <http://www.nato.int/issues/map/index.html> (accessed on Dec 17, 2009).

contribute to the NATO's functions. Aspiring countries are also expected to abide with the legal commitments in the alliance.

MAP is a well defined timeline for NATO membership. Annual assessment provides both the aspiring country and NATO on the status of application. A country needs to participate in the MAP at least three years before accepted to the membership.

THE ACCESSION OF POLAND, CZECH REPUBLIC AND, HUNGARY

These three states, called as Visegrad states, were prominent candidates for NATO membership. Democratic governance was well established in these countries. Although their militaries needed to be modernized before accession to NATO, their political value was big enough not to defer the enlargement decision further. Visegrad countries see NATO as the sole security guarantor in Europe. Although weakened, Russia was still a major concern if the democratization efforts fail. Additionally, Unified German power produced question marks especially in Poland and Czech Republic. That is why the first round of post Cold War enlargement was heavily supported by Germany. With an enlarged NATO, the lingering fears of Germany and Russia could easily be overcome in Europe.

Poland was the most qualified country among these only candidates for NATO membership. It not only met the criteria for membership; in fact, its accession to NATO provided substantial geostrategic, political and military capabilities. Poland was the strongest supporter of the NATO operations after the Cold War.

Czech Republic's NATO aspiration is a good example of the fragmentation and integration dilemma in Europe.³³ On the one hand, most of the ex-communist countries is aiming a homogeneous state, on the other hand, they need to integrate to supra-national bodies to ensure their newly gained sovereignty. Having been a victim of Soviet aggression during the Cold War, Czech Republic was seen a de facto NATO member. The Czechs did not have any territorial or ethnic tensions with their neighbors.³⁴ They had a well developed economic and military power. Thus Czech membership to NATO was a done deal from both sides. Hungarian aspirations were overshadowed by Hungarian minorities in the neighboring countries. The nationalistic feelings were especially strong in Hungary, which raises doubts about future conflicts with non-NATO nations. Yet, the Hungarian desire for NATO membership surprised most of her critics and Hungary not only resolved minority disputes with her neighbors but also promoted regional integration in the East Europe. Table 1 shows the Visegrad States' contribution to NATO in terms of armed forces and military expenditures at the time of accession.

Geostrategic Capabilities

Geostrategic opportunities that Visegrad countries offer played a major role in NATO's decision to expand.³⁵ Poland and Hungary are located between NATO territory and Russia. They could offer a buffer zone to the industrial core of the Europe. With

³³ Otto Pick, "The Czech Republic and Western Integration," in *The Challenge of NATO Enlargement*, ed. Anton Bebler (Westport, CT: Praeger 1999), 106.

³⁴ Daniel N. Nelson and Thomas S. Szayna, "NATO'S Metamorphosis and Its New Members," in *The Challenge of NATO Enlargement*, ed. Anton Bebler (Westport, CT: Praeger 1999), 119.

³⁵ Szayna, *NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015 : Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping*, 18.

NATO enlargement, to quote Sean Kay, “ the German, Polish and Russian security dilemmas are resolved.”³⁶

TABLE 1. Aspiring Countries' Population, Armed Forces, GDP, Military Expenditure as of 1999

Country	People	Armed Forces (AF)	Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Million \$	Military Expenditures (ME) Million \$	ME/GDP
	Millions	Thousands	Constant 2005	Constant 2005	%
Czech Republic	10.3	54	99,900	1,970	2.0
Hungary	10.2	51	85,100	1,400	1.6
Poland	38.7	200	250,000	4,730	1.9

Source: Data from US State Department, World Military Expenditures and Arms Transfers 2005, <http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rpt/wmeat/2005/index.htm>

Political Capabilities

NATO membership triggered a high degree of regional cooperation in the Northeast Europe. Poland signed bilateral agreements with Lithuania and Germany to

³⁶ Sean Kay, "NATO's Open Door: Geostrategic Priorities and the Impact of the European Union," *Security Dialogue* 32, no. 2 (2001): 210.

resolve the territorial disputes. Accordingly, Hungary softened her relations with Russia, Slovakia, Croatia, Slovenia, Ukraine and Romania over the Hungarian diaspora problem.³⁷

Military Capabilities

However, the militaries of the *Visegrad* countries lacked the training and technological level of NATO members.³⁸ These countries supported NATO's crisis management operations even before joining NATO.³⁹ The new air and navy bases that these countries contribute enhances NATO's force projecting capabilities. Among the three aspiring nations, Poland had an above-average, Czech Republic had a NATO average and Hungary had a less than NATO average military capabilities.⁴⁰

THE ACCESSION OF BULGARIA AND ROMANIA

Bulgaria and Romania can be singled out from the other 2004 candidates in their population size. Both countries were staunch supporters of the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Even after the collapse of communism, the Bulgarian public saw their "Slavic elder brother" not as a threat.⁴¹ Bulgaria and Romania surprised many foreigners in their reconciliation with the free world. Romania peacefully handled its dispute with the Hungarian minority. Similarly, Bulgaria dropped its claims over Macedonia. Both

³⁷ Monica Wohlfeld, "Eu and NATO Enlargement and Stability in Central-Eastern Europe," in *The Challenge of NATO Enlargement*, ed. Anton Bebler (Westport, CT: Praeger 1999), 139.

³⁸ Zoltan D. Barany, *The Future of NATO Expansion : Four Case Studies* (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003), 26.

³⁹ Szayna, *NATO Enlargement, 2000-2015 : Determinants and Implications for Defense Planning and Shaping*, 18.

⁴⁰ Nelson and Szayna, "NATO'S Metamorphosis and Its New Members," 117.

⁴¹ Alejandro Sanchez Cornejo Nieto, "A Drop in the Ocean: Bulgaria'S NATO Membership and Black Sea Geopolitics," *European Security* 17, no. 4 (2008): 525.

countries signed into the PfP and made available their resources to NATO way before membership.

Geostrategic Capabilities

Bulgaria, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia are located in the problematic Balkan region. Ethnic struggles triggered major conflicts in the past. The accession of these countries would both satisfy their security concerns and also prevent any exploitation of the region from a foreign aggressor. To quote Bulgarian Ambassador to NATO, Emil Valev, the alliance's new members will "help keep the instability in the Western Balkans at bay and entail lower costs for the NATO-led missions in the region."⁴² Moreover, as Sandler suggests, the seven new members enhance NATO border security by reducing the NATO's external border length with non members.⁴³

Political Capabilities

NATO's expansion to Bulgaria and Romania increased the dialogue in the Black Sea region. Historically and culturally having warm relations with Russia, these countries can be a catalyst to enhance the NATO-Russia cooperation. Tomislava Penkova states that Russians know that not all NATO members see herself as a threat:

It is worth noting that, contrary to the previous Conception where NATO was perceived solely as a threat and Russia did not enjoy any support from inside the Alliance, during the two presidential mandates of Putin, some NATO members took Russia's part (see 2008 and 2009 NATO summits). It is on them that

⁴² NATO, Web site, <http://www.nato.int/invitees2004/bulgaria.htm> (accessed Jan 1, 2010).

⁴³ Sandler, "Alliance Formation, Alliance Expansion, and the Core," 742.

Moscow can now count on when promoting its policy of conditional partnership.⁴⁴

Military Capabilities

The new nations in the second wave brought substantial capabilities to meet NATO's primary function at the beginning of the new millennium. Even before being a member, aspiring nations contributions to NATO was significant. Romania and Bulgaria joined NATO's operations in Bosnia and Kosovo. The two nations provided troops for the Afghanistan war Bulgaria offered a nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons decontamination unit to NATO for Afghanistan operation.⁴⁵ It is not just Romania and Bulgaria who offered their capabilities for NATO use. As Douglas J. Feith emphasizes, "in 2001, seven of the nine NATO aspirants made force contributions to NATO operations in Kosovo and eight of the nine to NATO operations in Bosnia. They have also shown much-appreciated solidarity with the United States through their contributions to Operation Enduring Freedom. They have conducted themselves as we want our allies to act. For operations in Afghanistan, the aspirants have provided troops, intelligence, over-flight rights, access to bases, and public diplomatic support."⁴⁶

In addition to NATO contribution, Bulgaria and Romania with five other partners established South-Eastern Europe Brigade (SEEBRIG). Through this

⁴⁴ Tomislava Penkova, "Russia's New Security Doctrine: "Security through Stable Development", *ISPI Policy Brief*.

⁴⁵ Moore, *NATO's New Mission : Projecting Stability in a Post-Gold War World*, 84.

⁴⁶ Douglas J. Feith, "NATO Transformation:Securing Freedom for Future Generations," *U.S. Foreign Policy Agenda* 7, no. 1 (2002): 14.

multinational brigade, Bulgaria and Romania fosters the regional security in South East Europe.

NATO's counter terrorism role has been another factor to accept new nations as members. Gallagher believes that Bulgarian and Romanian accession to NATO had a major boost after 9/11 terrorist attacks.⁴⁷

THE ACCESSION OF LATVIA, LITHUANIA AND, ESTONIA

The three Baltic States have unique characteristics in their bid for NATO memberships. They were treated as Soviet republic in the Cold War. Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia needed to be in the Euro-Atlantic club to ensure their sovereignty. Being occupied by Soviets during the WWII, the Baltic States had the golden opportunity to become a free member of international community after 1990. The NATO membership of Baltic States was on the table even during the previous round of enlargement. Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania achieved all the qualifications to become a full member. They resolved their border disputes with Russia and neighboring countries. Measures were taken to soften the tension with the Russian minority. All three countries allocate a substantial amount of their GDP to build the defense forces from scratch. However, the opposition to the Baltic membership continued in the alliance for a long time. The two issues regarding the Baltic States bid were worth mentioning here. The first is the fear of Russian step back to authoritarianism and second the over extension of NATO's collective defense commitment to a geography that may not be feasible to defend

⁴⁷ Tom Gallagher, "Balkan but Different: Romania and Bulgaria's Contrasting Paths to NATO Membership 1994-2002," *The Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics* 20, no. 4 (2004): para.33.

militarily.⁴⁸ The first concern was overcome when the Putin administration came into power in Russia. Putin reluctantly admitted the Baltic quest for NATO. The second concern was taken at risk by an assumption that Russia would not attack any NATO member in the near future. At least domestic and international conditions were not convenient for a Russian aggression to the most powerful alliance of the time.

Das Kundu asserts that the national security documents of all three Baltic States underscores that “the national security and defense system of the Baltic states is to be developed as part of common European and transatlantic arrangements.”⁴⁹ Baltic states, like most of the second wave members, provide niche military capabilities instead of full-scale contribution to NATO.

Baltic membership to NATO was fiercely objected to by Russia on the grounds of jeopardizing her national security. However, after 2001, Russia softened its language by realizing that a NATO membership would be better than a neutral position for Baltic States. If they were to stay neutral, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were to be a source of instability hole in the European Security framework due to the tensions with the Russian minority, organized crime and territorial disputes. In fact, NATO membership of the Baltic States stabilized the NATO-Russia relations in the Northern Europe.

Geostrategic Capabilities

Baltic states are located in the northeastern part of the alliance and all three have borders with Russia. The collective defense of Baltic territory was a concern for NATO members due to the Russian enclave of Kaliningrad.

⁴⁸ Mark Kramer, "NATO, the Baltic States and Russia: A Framework for Sustainable Enlargement," *International Affairs* 78, no. 4 (2002): 742.

⁴⁹ Nivedita Das Kundu, "The Baltic States' Search for Security," *Strategic Analysis* XXVII, no. 3 (2003): para.3.

Political Capabilities

Aside from Bulgaria and Romania, the other five countries that joined NATO in 2004 do not have a big impact on NATO's defense planning. These small European nations, though, revitalize the alliance in political terms. Stressing both US and European pillars, the new nations provide political assets for NATO's persistence as a valid Euro-Atlantic security platform. Under the NATO security guarantees, the regional cooperation increased substantially due to the mitigation of security concerns in Baltic and Southeast Europe.

Military Capabilities

In terms of Baltic States military contribution to NATO, the niche capabilities are important to count: such as developing specialized ordinance and minesweeping units, chemical biological units and medical units.⁵⁰ Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania have joint defense initiatives to acquire niche capabilities. The Baltic battalion, Baltic Naval Squadron, Baltic Defense College, Baltic Air Surveillance center are developed jointly before assuming full NATO membership.⁵¹

THE ACCESSION OF SLOVAKIA AND SLOVENIA

Czech Republic and Slovakia broke up in 1992 peacefully. After that, two countries followed separate security policies. The elite support for NATO membership was not as strong in Slovakia as it was in Czech Republic. Furthermore, Slovakia treated

⁵⁰ Stephen F. Larrabee, *The Baltic States and NATO Membership* (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2003).

⁵¹ Arvydas Pocius, *Joining NATO : Transforming the Lithuanian Armed Forces for New Tasks*, Usawc Strategy Research Project (Carlisle Barracks, PA: U.S. Army War College, 2004).

NATO enlargement mostly as a democratization issue while Czech Republic saw it as a security enhancement vehicle.⁵² NATO membership was seen mainly as a return to the west in Slovakia. Slovakia missed the first post Cold War round of enlargement due to its political problems. Slovenia was the most likely candidate for NATO membership among all the other aspiring countries. She gained her independence from ex-Yugoslavia after a short war in 1991. Since then, Slovenia aspired to be a permanent member of western economic and security institutions. NATO membership helped Slovenia solve its territorial disputes with Italy, Hungary and Austria.⁵³

Geostrategic Capabilities

Both Slovakia and Slovenia are located centrally in Europe. They are at the crossroads of Europe, thus preventing islands in the European security structure.

Political Capabilities

Support for NATO was not as strong as it was in other aspiring countries. Yet, the membership opportunity was the driving force for the democratization of these two countries.

Military Capabilities

Slovakia and Slovenia have military capabilities in accordance with their sizes. Although not comparable with the big countries in the alliance, the membership of these two countries did not bring extra commitments for NATO since they have adequate self

⁵² Stefan Sarvas, "The NATO Enlargement Debate in the Media and Civil-Military Relations in the Czech Republic and Slovakia," *European Security* 9(2000): 121.

⁵³ Ryan C. Hendrickson, "Expanding NATO: The Case for Slovenia," *Parameters* 32, no. 4 (2002): 67.

defense capabilities. The major upgrades in the weaponry and forces show that these new members would not be a consumer of the security if not contributors for the peace keeping operations in Southeast Europe and in out of Area operations.

THE ACCESSION OF ALBANIA AND CROATIA

Albania and Croatia were invited to NATO at the Bucharest summit in 2008. Both countries joined NATO in 2009. The last round of enlargement stems from the geostrategic and political contribution of these countries to the alliance. NATO's relation with Albania goes back to 1992. Albania, first, joined the NACC and then PfP in 1994. The domestic support for NATO membership had been always above 95 percent in Albania.⁵⁴ The membership process helped Albania to undertake major reforms in politics, economy and defense sectors. Albania's NATO aspirations rose dramatically after NATO's Kosovo operation.⁵⁵ It is not an exaggeration that NATO membership enabled a constructive Albania in Southeast Europe. Croatia's NATO aspirations started when the country signed the Partnership for Peace program in 2000. NATO membership candidacy help Croatia achieve good neighborly relations in the region.

Geostrategic Capabilities

Albanian and Croatian membership fills the hole in the Balkan region for European security. Moreover, these two countries' cultural and historical relations with Serbia and Kosovo can help with enhancing NATO's constructive role in the Balkans.

⁵⁴ NATO, "NATO's relations with Albania," http://www.nato.int/issues/nato_albania/index.html (accessed January 1, 2010).

⁵⁵ Jeffrey Simon, "NATO's Membership Action Plan and Defense Planning: Credibility at Stake," *Problems of Post-Communism* 48, no. 3 (2001): 33.

Political Capabilities

NATO membership helped democratization in Albania and Croatia. Especially after the death of Franjo Tudjman in 1999, Croatia followed a western foreign policy in the hopes of being admitted to the alliance.

Military Capabilities

Albania's and Croatia's contributions to NATO before being full members were worthwhile. Albania supported NATO's operation in Kosovo in 1999, and the ongoing peace keeping operation in Bosnia and Herzegovina and ISAF mission in Afghanistan. NATO established a new headquarter to support its presence in Kosovo as well. Croatia has joined the NATO-led operations actively as well. She provided sea /air bases and over flight rights for NATO operations, supported Afghanistan operation with 300 troops and donated weapons to Iraqi military through NTM-I.⁵⁶

Table-2 summarizes the seven new countries' contribution to NATO after the 2004 enlargement in terms of armed forces and military expenditures at the time of accession.

CONCLUSION

NATO's post Cold War enlargement was intended to achieve a political-military function. NATO used membership as a carrot for some of its aspiring members to establish stability in Europe. Without membership, these countries would never feel safe to foster the democracy. Similarly, NATO filled its military capability gaps for the new

⁵⁶ NATO, "NATO's relations with Croatia," http://www.nato.int/issues/nato_croatia/index.html (accessed January 1, 2010).

kind of missions. Although most of the new countries do not have significant militaries, they can provide specialized military capabilities for NATO's evolving unconventional tasks at the strategic distances.

TABLE 2. New members' Population, Armed Forces, GDP, Military Expenditure

Country	People	Armed Forces (AF)	Gross Domestic Product (GDP) Million \$	Military Expenditures (ME) Million \$	ME/GDP
	Millions	Thousands	Constant 2005	Constant 2005	%
Bulgaria	7.5	42	25,600	645	2.5
Estonia	1.3	4	12,700	194	1.5
Latvia	2.3	6	14,500	185	1.3
Lithuania	3.6	11	23,800	329	1.4
Romania	22.4	91	95,000	1,920	2.0
Slovakia	5.4	18	44,700	757	1.7
Slovenia	2.0	6	33,700	500	1.5

Source: Data from US State Department, World Military Expenditures and Arms

Transfers 2005, <http://www.state.gov/t/vci/rls/rpt/wmeat/2005/index.htm>

NATO's Cold War era enlargement was aimed to cope with the Soviet Union. All the aspiring countries are assessed according to whether their accession would help when deterring and containing its main rival. The geostrategic, military and political capabilities were compared with NATO's committeemen to the new members. Not all aspiring countries were to be accepted due to the high cost of the collective defense. The values are of secondary importance when assessing each country's eligibility for membership. Since the containment of Soviet power in all aspect was NATO's central goal, NATO's internal functions did not get much attention during the Cold War.

Greece, Turkey and Germany were not among the founder members of the NATO in 1949, but they were always thought to be of strategic importance to the west. UK and then US had bilateral security ties with Greece and Turkey before and after the war. Occupation powers still had troops in German soil. However, these three countries were not included into the western security ring initially due to the defensive function of NATO at its inception. As mentioned above, NATO would not make new commitments to new countries although they were strategically important. What made the difference in the 1950s was a changing perception of NATO's role in the new international context. With the open aggression in Korea, NATO members concluded that although being a defensive organization, NATO's security depended on the containment of the threat. Thus, Greek, Turkish and German membership can be understood by a shift in NATO's strategy from collective defense to an effective deterrence and containment of the enemy. When containing Soviet Union the periphery became as important as the core of the Western Alliance. While countries at the periphery could limit Soviets expansion, the core nations in the western alliance could raise the forces to punish the aggressor.

NATO's second wave enlargement was more value oriented. There was not a major power threat to any member of the alliance. Rather the stability of the neighboring eastern Europe was an issue in NATO's new security agenda. Since the threat was not directly militarily, NATO's response was enhancing security through cooperation and integration. Thus, post Cold War enlargement was aimed at exporting stability to the newly independent nations to the east. The diminishing ideological divide between east and west enabled NATO to follow its new function of Whole and Free Europe.

NATO was, indeed, rigid on the political qualifications of the aspiring countries . Military qualifications played a secondary role in most of the cases. As for economic criteria, NATO did not raise any objection for any under qualified country. The criteria are closely related to what NATO wants to achieve from enlargement: A political-military function of 'Whole and Free Europe' .

NATO became an alliance of 28 nations with the accession of Albania and Croatia in March 2009. The alliance's new functions are not just protecting the territory of its members but the social welfare and human rights from new asymmetrical threats. The alliance's new outlook is no longer just the Euro-Atlantic region. Every source of instability throughout the globe is now a concern for NATO. The Black Sea region, Caucuses and Central Asia will be NATO's strongest new focus in the coming decade. Whether NATO will enlarge further depends on NATO's willingness to fill the capability gap by using its members' contribution.

CHAPTER V

KOREAN WAR AND NATO ENLARGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

The Korean War and its implications for NATO enlargement will be explored in this case study. The chapter examines whether the capabilities of the new members in the aftermath of the Korean war could fulfill NATO's main function or not. To do so, the change in security environment, NATO's new functions and capability requirements are identified in the chapter. From 1945 till 1960, the security environment and accompanying challenges changed drastically. Although North Atlantic Treaty was signed in 1949, the security threats one year later were substantially different than it was in 1949. Hence, NATO's functional evolution in the first five years was very important. Many essential components of the current NATO were put in place in the early years of 1950s. The Korean War was a turning point in Cold War history. As Jervis suggests, "if the war had not taken place, no other events that were likely to have occurred would have produced the effects that Korea did."¹ NATO faced a major test after one year of its establishment. The Korean War in 1950 exacerbated the tension in Europe. NATO was not properly equipped to undertake the new threats posed by the Soviet Union.

THE WAR IN KOREA

Korea was occupied for more than 40 years by Japan until 1945. According with the WWII alliance agreement, the Soviets liberated Korea from Japanese forces in the

¹ Robert Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 24, no. 4 (1980): 563.

northern part of 38th parallel and US took control of the south part accordingly. After WWII, the first goal for the international community was to unite the country. However, as the tensions mounted between US and Soviet Union, the chances of a united Korea diminished along with the chance of Germany's unification. Although UN sponsored free elections were held and a central government took control of the country in 1948, a separate communist regime was established in the north with strong backing from Soviet Union.² After 1948, both sides attempted to unite the country under its authority. The West had an interest in keeping Korea democratic but the last US forces left the country in 1949.

On June 25, 1950, North Korean army crossed the dividing line of 38th parallel and attacked the South Korea. In less than a month, the North was able to capture Seoul. Alarmed with the open communist aggression, the US used the opportunity of Soviets' absence in the UN Security Council in order to pass a resolution to condemn the attack. UN resolution called the contribution of all members to defend the South Korea. Dominated mainly by US forces, the UN took control of Seoul in October 1950 and pushed back the North Koreans to the pre-war borders. However, UN forces' further progress was halted when the Chinese entered the war in favor of the North in the late October. By the mid 1951, the war became a stalemate. Neither side had substantial achievement. The armistice was able to be signed after Stalin's death in 1953.

There are different views on the source of the conflict. Some see the conflict as a pure civil war, ended with an international intervention, while other think it as a covert

² Priscilla Roberts, "New Light on A "Forgotten War": The Diplomacy of the Korean Conflict," *OAH Magazine of History* 14, no. 3 (2000): 11.

Soviet aggression against the free world.³ Whatever the real origin of the war, it is a fact that Soviet union tested the West's determination in Korea. Lawrence S. Kaplan suggests that "the Truman administration assumed that Stalin had incited the North Koreans to test NATO's resolve."⁴ The war revealed the Soviets revolutionary revisionism in the key confrontational regions.

US intervention in Korea was the reflection of major lessons derived from the pre-WWII era. According to Truman administration, there was a perfect analogy between what Soviets was trying to achieve in Korea and Nazi invasions before 1939. Were the west to appease the aggressor, she would have to pay a higher price later.⁵ In other words, it would be very logical to expect the next war in Europe through a divided Germany, in the same way a divided Korea ended up with a war.

THE IMPORTANCE OF THE KOREAN WAR

What makes Korean war a milestone in NATO history is its being a catalysis in NATO's functional and geographical evolution. Before the Korean war, NATO was more about a political organization aimed at coordinating policies to provide security which is essential for economic recovery. The allies did not see the Soviet threat as imminent. However with the Korean War, NATO concluded that the danger to the European security was much closer than the earlier assessments. The Korean war accelerated the evolution of NATO's role and missions.

³ James I. Matray, "Civil War of a Sort: The International Origins of the Korean Conflict," in *The Korean War in Retrospect: Lessons for the Future*, ed. Daniel John Meador (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1998), 5.

⁴ Lawrence S. Kaplan, *NATO Divided, NATO United: The Evolution of an Alliance* (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2004), 9.

⁵ Matray, "Civil War of a Sort: The International Origins of the Korean Conflict," 4.

SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The security environment changed substantially after the Korean war. Soviet Union was no longer a concern for NATO but a direct threat to the alliance's existence. The era between 1945 and 1950 in Europe can be categorized as rehabilitation of the nation states to the new world order. Along with the economic devastation, Europe now faced a more powerful Russia, a partition based on ideological lines, and a defeated but unresolved German question. Not a single country in Europe could handle the above challenges by itself. Ironically, the sources of conflict provided the venue for cooperation in the Europe.

The common concern for European powers was securing their sovereignty. Besides the Soviet threat each country had different interests. The UK was aware of its declining power but still wanted to play an equal role along with US and Soviet Union. France was looking to be the leading country in Europe by keeping Germany down. And the US was more concerned about containing Soviet power globally. However, without pooling the capabilities, the chances of success were too low considering the scale of challenges. Thus, NATO was founded as a political reassurance in the Euro-Atlantic region.

In regard to the common threat, The US and NATO did not adequately assess or evaluate the level of threat until the North Korean attack. The Soviets were considered a state with hostile intentions, however it was thought to be weak and would not choose a direct military conflict with the west in the near future. European and American leaders assumed that if a war with the USSR were to ever happen, it would be a total war

affecting all the European continent.⁶ Were that to happen, the American nuclear monopoly and strategic air assets were considered more than enough to punish the aggressor. Meanwhile, few policymakers would be willing to allocate resources to the military in a post war period.

The war confirmed NATO's fears on Soviet intentions. The coincidence with the publications of US NSC-68 document drew a global attention. The document highlights the logic of Western thinking in behind the military requirements as a result of the Korean War:

Unless the military strength of the Western European nations is increased on a much larger scale than under current programs and at an accelerated rate, it is more than likely that those nations will not be able to oppose even by 1960 the Soviet armed forces in war with any degree of effectiveness. Considering the Soviet Union military capability, the long-range allied military objective in Western Europe must envisage an increased military strength in that area sufficient possibly to deter the Soviet Union from a major war or, in any event, to delay materially the overrunning of Western Europe and, if feasible, to hold a bridgehead on the continent against Soviet Union offensives.⁷

NATO'S REACTION

The whole security paradigm of NATO was modified as a result of the Korean war. In Lord Ismay's words, "for NATO the period of cautious optimism and slow

⁶ Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," 572.

⁷ Government of the United States, *NSC 68: United States Objectives and Programs for National Security*, <http://www.fas.org/irp/offdocs/nsc-hst/nsc-68-9.htm> (accessed January 3, 2010).

methodical progress was over” after the North Korea assault began in 1950.⁸ The similarities of the Korean peninsula and Germany were striking. Korea had the same post Cold War division between a communist and a non-communist authority. In both geographies, Communist forces and Western forces had direct contact with each other. The communist authority of the country was armed and had the intentions to unite the country with force under the communist regime. If the Soviets were to attack to West Germany by using East German forces, it would be impossible to block the advance of communist forces in the Western Europe.

Thus, the allies were alarmed with the communist intervention in a country where US interests were highly evident. More importantly, NATO’s European partners feared from the ineffectiveness of the security guarantees of NATO if the US was stuck with another war in another region of the globe.⁹ Europe could easily become a victim of a power struggle in Asia.

THE IMPLICATIONS OF THE WAR

During its first years, NATO had the perception that although the allies did not have large scale standing militaries, the industrial potential and the nuclear stockpile would provide security in Europe without undergoing an expensive defense buildup.¹⁰ The Korean war was the solid proof of the Soviet capacity and intention to spread communism using force. The war united Western support for the collective action against Communism. The war transformed NATO from a political organization to a political-

⁸ Ismay, "NATO: The First Five Years."

⁹ Ted Galen Carpenter, "United States' NATO Policy at the Crossroads: The 'Great Debate' of 1950-1951," *The International History Review* 8, no. 3 (1986): 390.

¹⁰ Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," 566.

military organization. At the end of 1955, NATO was transformed into a military behemoth from a paper commitment.

INSTITUTIONALIZING NATO

NATO's basic documents emphasize that the strategic goal during the Korean war was "to develop a maximum of strength through collective defense planning."¹¹ In 1951, the office of the Secretary General was established. Before then, NATO did not have a permanent representative of the organization which prevented the effective execution of the policies. However, with the new Secretary General, NATO had the ability to talk in one voice and enhance political consultation in the alliance. In 1951, Dwight D. Eisenhower was appointed as the head of Supreme Allied Command Europe. The allies, for the first time in the history of alliances, established a concrete example of a multinational military integration. The appointment of Eisenhower as SACEUER was a sign of US commitment to the defense of Europe in the future as well.

RESOLVING GERMAN QUESTION

If there is one issue that is at the center of the European Security dilemma before and after WWII, it is without any doubt the accommodation of Germany into the international structure. With her geostrategic location, industrial base and human resources, Germany would always be one of the leading powers in Europe. Considering her potential, Germany's defeat in WWII did not offset the concerns of either France or other European powers. The tampering of the security dilemma in Europe, as mainly

¹¹ NATO, "The Strategic Concept For The Defense Of The North Atlantic Treaty Area," <http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a521203a.pdf> (accessed January 4, 2010).

referred as German question, necessitated a permanent solution to Germany's role in Europe. It is in this context that a European integration was thought to be a viable solution to achieve peace in Europe. The US and Britain had the idea of integrating Germany into the West long before the Korean war. However, it is the Korean War that provided the impetus for the integration. French opposition to German rearmament was only softened after the Korean War. France accepted German military buildup if there were to be a multinational oversight of the latter's military.

With the Korean intervention, the US gained credibility on holding her security commitment. The European allies realized that the US commitment to NATO had sound bases. Additionally, the shock of war almost guaranteed the public support for the unpopular defense increases just a couple years after the WWII.¹²

There are also a few unintended consequences of the Korean War. First, German accession to NATO practically put a stop to the German unification efforts. Second, the massive defense buildup accelerated the arms race between the USSR and the West.¹³ Third, the Warsaw pact was founded, in May 1955, as a counter organization to NATO by the participation of USSR, Albania, Bulgaria, Hungary, the German Democratic Republic, Poland, Romania, and the Czechoslovak Republic.

NATO'S NEW FUNCTIONS AFTER THE WAR

Until the Korean War, Jersey asserts that NATO was not an organization against the Soviet Union.¹⁴ The primary function of NATO was to achieve security by means of

¹² John Lewis Gaddis, *Strategies of Containment : A Critical Appraisal of American National Security Policy During the Cold War* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 110.

¹³ Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," 580.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*: 570.

collective defense commitments. The mismatch between the Soviet threat and NATO's capabilities were evident only with the Korean war. NATO's new function called for securing the Euro-Atlantic region with credible deterrence and containment of the enemy. While containment is a political instrument to limit the Soviet Power in every aspect, deterrence is the military counterpart of containment which is to convince the enemy that any aggression would bring more harm than benefits.¹⁵ The pledge for collective defense would not be adequate to deter the Soviets. The rationale behind the new function was the perception of the domino effect. Had Soviets been able to chew a small piece by limited war, then it would be more assertive and aggressive in the next steps. Thus, if the Soviets dared to start a proxy war in Germany or South East Europe, the next country to fall to communism would be either France, Italy, or any other country in the West Europe.

What the Korean War tells us is that there would not be a deterrence based purely on the nuclear retaliation concept. The USSR did not hesitate to trigger a war in a region where US interests involved openly. The Soviets used North Korean satellite regime to attack, instead of a direct confrontation with the US. The lack of credible conventional forces triggered the Soviets' adventure. According to Daniel J. Meador, Stalin was resisting the North Korean request for an invasion, but after the Soviet Atomic bomb and the withdrawal of US troops from Korea, Stalin changed his position and supported the North's aggression.¹⁶ In fact, all the war plans were made by Soviet advisors.

The Korean War is a perfect example of the deterrence failure. As, Thomas Schelling suggests, deterrence can be efficacious if it is credible, and its credibility

¹⁵Wolfram F. Hanrieder, "The Frg and NATO: Between Security Dependence and Security Partnership," in *The Federal Republic of Germany and NATO : 40 Years After*, ed. Emil Joseph Kirchner and James Sperling (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 194.

¹⁶ Daniel John Meador, ed. *The Korean War in Retrospect : Lessons for the Future* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 1998), x.

depends on the costs and risks associated with fulfillment for the party making the threat.¹⁷

NATO's answer to the Korean war was to install a credible deterrence system and to exploit every weaknesses of Soviet Union in order to contain it effectively. Hence, the Korean war urged NATO to raise the defense spending in order to match the conventional military power of Soviet Union in the Europe. NATO's 1952 Strategic Guidance clearly demonstrates the changing nature of NATO's function:

North Atlantic Treaty Nations will develop and mobilize their combined strength with the object of achieving the earliest defeat of the USSR and the attainment of allied war objectives.¹⁸

Thus, Korea was a limited war fought with conventional weapons. The implications of this kind of limited war were tremendous for European countries. A military capability based on air power would not guarantee the security if the aggressor's intention was to wage limited war. A balanced force structure of Army, Navy and Air Force was instrumental for a successful deterrence.¹⁹ The loss of American nuclear monopoly also complicated the defense of Europe. There was no longer a cheap way of deterring Soviet Union. The need for a well prepared conventional military force was clear by 1951. NATO countries had to exploit all options to increase their defense levels. And, as expected, to quote Robert Jervis, "the first meeting of the NATO Council after

¹⁷ Thomas C. Schelling, *The Strategy of Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University, 2002), 6.

¹⁸ NATO, "MC 14/1(Final) Strategic Guidance," <http://www.nato.int/docu/stratdoc/eng/a521209a.pdf> (accessed January 4, 2010).

¹⁹ David T. Fautua, "The "Long Pull" Army: Nsc 68, the Korean War, and the Creation of the Cold War U.S. Army," *Journal of Military History* 61, no. 1 (1997): 96.

the start of the war agreed to develop a large army, and three months later a central headquarters was established.”²⁰

What worried NATO most was the possibility of a Soviet miscalculation that could end up with a total war. NATO’s peacetime readiness was imperative in the face of such miscalculations. Otherwise, once the Soviets were to invade NATO territory, it would be much more costly to liberate the occupied countries, if not impossible.

Besides, security in Western Europe including Germany was a public good. An attack on Germany would in practice initiate a war between NATO and the Soviet Union. If Germany had been kept out of the alliance, she would be a free rider of the security. However, a huge allocation of resources to defense would undermine the economic recovery of Europe. Therefore European allies needed new partners to share the burden of defending Europe.

CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

While the military buildup was necessary to match the Soviet military capabilities, it had the risk of offsetting the economic recovery in Europe. When NATO started the military buildup, it became clear that European allies would not reach the defense goals without jeopardizing the economic recovery. On the one hand, NATO’s containment of the Soviet Union in the early 1950s could wipe off all the benefits of the Marshal plan.²¹ On the other hand, the increasing number of key US policymakers voiced the concern on US bearing the cost of defending Europe while European partners are free

²⁰ Jervis, "The Impact of the Korean War on the Cold War," 580.

²¹ Walter Lafeber, "NATO and the Korean War: A Context in American Historians Ant the Atlantic Alliance " in *American Historians and the Atlantic Alliance*, ed. Lawrence S. Kaplan (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press, 1991), 39.

riding.²² The unbalanced burden-sharing among the allies force NATO to look for external capability accumulation. Hence, the desired conventional military capability could be achieved via the new accessions to the alliance. A NATO expansion would offer deterrence in Europe less costly than the existing NATO structure. To summarize, NATO countries had fourteen ill-equipped divisions in Europe in 1949. As of 1953, there were fifteen well-trained divisions of which 6 were Americans.²³ The average defense spending rose from 5.5 percent of GNP to 12 percent GNP.²⁴

In addition to force contributions from nations, NATO invested heavily from its common funds into the fixed infrastructure. In his address to ministerial Meeting of the North Atlantic Council in Bonn, May 1957, NATO Secretary General at the time highlighted the accomplishments of NATO as a result of armament and new accessions:

In April 1952 there were less than 20 airfields available to NATO forces.

Today there are 150 usable by all types of aircraft.

In the communications field, 5,500 miles of land-lines, 1,250 miles of submarine cables, 1,940 miles of radio links have been added to the existing civilian networks.

In April 1952 there were no POL pipelines or storage facilities.

There are now 2,840 miles of pipeline, and storage facilities for 30 million imperial gallons.²⁵

²² Carpenter, "United States' NATO Policy at the Crossroads: The 'Great Debate' of 1950-1951," 408.

²³ William Stueck, "The Korean War, NATO, and Rearmament," in *A Revolutionary War : Korea and the Transformation of the Postwar World*, ed. William J. Williams (Chicago, IL: Imprint Publications, 1993), 171.

²⁴ Ibid.

²⁵ Lord Ismay, "NATO April 1952 - April 1957," NATO, <http://www.nato.int/archives/ismayrep/text.htm#6>

GEOGRAPHICAL ENLARGEMENT

NATO's new functions necessitated new members although NATO originally was founded as an alliance of North Atlantic region. Article 10 of the Washington treaty left the door open to the new members; the rationale for the enlargement was to enhance the Euro-Atlantic security by acquiring new contributions. The Article says that "any European state may be invited to join the Treaty if all the members agree that it is in a position to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. It was under this provision that invitations were extended to Greece and Turkey in 1951."²⁶

NATO expansion discussions began immediately after the North Korean aggression. NATO archives highlight that the main discussion in the North Atlantic Council were:

the political and diplomatic aspects of the accession of Greece and Turkey to the North Atlantic Alliance (1950/1951);

the various aspects of German participation in western defence and the progress of negotiations with the German Federal Government in regard to the part that Germany might assume in the common defence (1950 and later).²⁷

Three countries were accepted to NATO by 1955: Greece, Turkey and Germany. Although all three new members brought new contributions to the alliance, there were some differences in their contribution. German accession stemmed mostly from its military value and less from Germany's strategic location. Indeed, the Federal Republic

²⁶ Ismay, "NATO: The First Five Years."

²⁷ NATO, "The Evolution Of NATO Political Consultation 1949-1962," <http://www.nato.int/archives/docu/d630502e.htm> (accessed January 2, 2010).

of Germany was hosting occupation forces from US, UK and France already at the time of its accession to NATO. Therefore, German territory would no doubt be a battlefield in a future war with Soviets. However, German industrial and military capability was desperately needed to counterbalance the Red Army. Considering the American global commitments in Asia, German membership issue could not be deferred further.

However, Turkish and Greek membership was a factor of geostrategic considerations. These two countries would help allies to conduct effective counter offensive operations to the deep inside Russia from the south flank.

GERMANY'S ACCESSION TO NATO

From the German perspective, Germany's NATO bid is a policy of "self restraint and multilateralism."²⁸ Two important factors shaped West Germany's security policy after the WWII: The geostrategic location of Germany in the middle of Europe and the catastrophes of the past that must be avoided in the future.²⁹ Germany should be neither too weak to tempt the threats of the big powers nor too powerful to worry the rivals and thus left alone in the Europe. Self restriction is needed to accommodate the neighboring countries interests. France had special concerns about Germany's rise once again. In that respect NATO could reinforce German self restraint by allowing the alliance to oversee the rearmament of Germany. In regard to the multilateralism, NATO was the most effective way to broaden the venue for autonomy. WWII put Germany's sovereignty under the scrutiny of the four winning powers: France, UK, US and USSR. The German state could not follow any independent policy in 1950s because of the occupation

²⁸ Helga Haftendorn, *Coming of Age : German Foreign Policy since 1945* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2006), 6.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, 1.

authority. The only way to circumvent the occupation authority was through the international institutions of which NATO was the most important one at that time.

Acceptance into NATO was a major victory for Germany at a time when it did not have the right to stand equally with other states. NATO membership enabled both Germany's sovereignty and rearmament. Germany was not an occupied country anymore but rather an indispensable ally of the west against the USSR.

German membership was on the alliance's agenda along with the North Korean aggression. Before the Korean War, the prospect of German integration with the West was very little. France and the UK were "comfortable with the status quo" in the Europe.³⁰ It was only when the Korean war broke out that European allies realized that the security of Europe could only be achieved through German contribution to the alliance. By 1950, the defense of Europe became more important than political settlement with Germany. Hence, NATO could not match the Soviet military power without the German military capabilities. Without Germany's industrial and geostrategic contribution, NATO would remain "more of a screen than a shield."³¹

EUROPEAN DEFENSE COMMUNITY

German participation in NATO was fiercely opposed by France and small European countries. France did not want a revitalization of its former enemy. As a middle ground, France offered the Pleven plan which calls for a European Defense

³⁰ Marc Trachtenberg, *A Constructed Peace : The Making of the European Settlement, 1945-1963*, Princeton Studies in International History and Politics (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1999), 103.

³¹ Hajo Holborn, "Germany's Role in the Defense of Western Europe," *Proceedings of the Academy of Political Science* 26, no. 2 (1955): 156.

Community.³² Germany was to be allowed to join the EDC without having an operational planning capability. Furthermore, Britain and US extended security guarantees to make EDC a viable organization. From NATO's perspective, as long as it could guarantee Germany's capabilities, any solution would be suitable. Paradoxically the EDC treaty was killed by its own supporter, France, when she did not ratify the treaty in 1954. Stephan Keukeleire claims that the fear of German domination was the main reason for France's decision especially considering the absence of UK in EDC.³³ Henceforth, NATO proceeded with the accession of Germany into the alliance. The German military was to be embedded into NATO command structure instead of allowing an independent German Armed Forces. Germany would not have a separate operational planning capability. All the German military forces would be integrated into the NATO military command. Integrated military command helped eliminate the other members concern on Germany's rearmament.

NATO expansion during the Cold War was also gaining forward defense capability, which was a direct result of the Korean War. As Lord Ismay wrote, "from a military point of view, the main argument in favor of participation was that NATO's forward strategy made it imperative to defend Europe on German soil: this was hardly conceivable without the military and political participation of the German Federal Republic."³⁴

In a bipolar thinking, the German membership to NATO prevented a potential German alignment with Soviets in the future. In other words, German membership is a

³² Ibid.: 161.

³³ Stephan Keukeleire, "Franco-German Security Cooperation," in *The Federal Republic of Germany and NATO: 40 Years After*, ed. Emil Joseph Kirchner and James Sperling (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1992), 129.

³⁴ Ismay, "NATO: The First Five Years."

means of “preventive diplomacy.”³⁵ From a Soviet perspective, neutrality was the linchpin for a unified Germany. However, neutrality would mean depriving the West of German resources, and thus was unacceptable to the other three occupying powers.

TURKEY'S ACCESSION TO NATO

Turkey's NATO aspirations peaked especially after the USSR asked for a new agreement to control the Turkish straits. Turkey refused to alter the existing Montreux agreement. The Soviet intimidation was a key factor for Turkey to integrate the Euro-Atlantic security apparatus. NATO's Strategic Guidance in 1952 emphasizes the importance of Turkey for NATO's security in that:

The enemy will devote considerable effort to the conquest of Turkey, thus depriving the Allies of their dominating positions on the Black Sea, athwart the direct approaches to the Middle East, and of the air bases and other facilities which Turkey provides. The possession or neutralization of Turkey would give the enemy access to the Mediterranean and greater freedom of operation against the Middle East. In particular it would threaten important Allied oil producing areas, as well as extending the enemy's air warning cover and the range of his air operation.³⁶

Turkish accession to NATO provided NATO with “19 newly-equipped and well-trained divisions.”³⁷ But more importantly, Turkey divided the Soviet Union's troops and concentration from European flank. In addition to European defense, UK supported

³⁵ Gustav Schmidt, ““Tying”(West) Germany into the West-but to What? NATO? Weu? The European Community ” in *Western Europe and Germany : The Beginnings of European Integration, 1945-1960*, ed. Clemens A. Wurm (Oxford; Washington, USA: Berg Publishers, 1995), 142.

³⁶ NATO, “MC 14/1(Final) Strategic Guidance .”

³⁷ George C. McGhee, “Turkey Joins the West,” *Foreign Affairs* 32, no. 4 (1954): 618.

Turkish membership due to securing the Middle East from Soviet control. Turkish military and geostrategic capabilities were essential to protect Middle East oil. Therefore, the UK insisted on Turkey joining Middle East Command alongside NATO.³⁸

GREECE'S ACCESSION TO NATO

Greece's NATO membership was tied directly to Turkey's membership. NATO allies concluded that any southern Europe enlargement should include Greece and Turkey together. Although Greek military contribution to NATO would be less than a Turkish one, NATO would not afford a neutral non-aligned Mediterranean country.

Turkey and Greece contributed 25 divisions to NATO that made the alliance superior to USSR in the southeast flank of Europe.³⁹ In fact, Turkey and Greece were in one sense the main catalyst of the US new non-isolationist Truman doctrine. Thus it is fair to claim that US commitment to Greece and Turkey in 1947 was the start of a new European security structure.

The US initially tried a bilateral security arrangement with Turkey.⁴⁰ But fierce Turkish reaction to anything short of full membership to NATO forced the US and other allies to consider an associate membership for both Turkey and Greece. NATO did not want to extend its commitment to the Greece and Turkey if their capabilities would be guaranteed by other means. However, the solution of associate membership did not satisfy the aspiring two nations. Therefore full membership remained the only viable

³⁸ Behcet K. Yesilbursa, "Turkey's Participation in the Middle East Command and Its Admission to NATO, 1950-52," *Middle Eastern Studies* 35, no. 4 (1999): 86.

³⁹ Lawrence S. Kaplan, "The Korean War and U.S. Foreign Relations: The Case of NATO," in *The Korean War : A 25-Year Perspective*, ed. Francis Howard Heller (Lawrence, KS: Regents Press of Kansas, 1977), 65.

⁴⁰ George Crews McGhee, *The Us-Turkish-NATO Middle East Connection : How the Truman Doctrine Contained the Soviets in the Middle East* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1990), 81.

option to extend security guarantees to Greece and Turkey. After Greek and Turkish accession NATO established Land Forces South Eastern Europe Command, under Commander-in-Chief South in Izmir/Turkey in 1952.⁴¹

CONCLUSION

The war caused 'a new equilibrium' in the international structure.⁴² It became a global, more ideological and more expensive one.⁴³ Until the Korean War, NATO was, in fact, an alliance of 'one for all'. The US was practically committed to providing the West European Security under the legal binding of NATO treaty. However, the Korean War changed the paradigm of NATO by enforcing the organization into an 'all for one' alliance. The allies were no longer able to free ride without contributing the Euro-Atlantic security. The need for new members was obvious in light of European members' incapacity to generate the required capabilities.

Additionally, as a result of the war, a significant aspect of state sovereignty is surrendered to NATO to ensure the security of the members. The Supreme Commanders of NATO could plan, and conduct operations using the members' national forces. The allocation of national military forces to NATO during peacetime was important in that members voluntarily accepted the superiority of NATO to the state in exchange for protection from the aggressor.

The Korean War had paramount impact on the structure and functions of NATO as well. During 1950-53, NATO underwent huge organizational transformation. During

⁴¹Ismay, "NATO April 1952 - April 1957."

⁴²Lloyd Gardner, "Commentary," in *Child of Conflict : The Korean-American Relationship, 1943-1953*, ed. Bruce Cumings (Seattle, WA: University of Washington Press, 1983), 57.

⁴³Campbell Craig and Fredrik Logevall, *America's Cold War : The Politics of Insecurity* (Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2009), 127.

the war, NATO revised its main function from a collective defense based on the commitments into an effective deterrence and containment function. The capability requirements were met partly by military integration and accompanying defense buildup. However, the remaining capability gap between NATO and Soviet Union was relieved with the accession of Greece, Turkey and Germany. To quote Kaplan, "Greece and Turkey, on the southeastern flank, and Germany, in the center, joined the alliance to fulfill the new functions of NATO."⁴⁴

As shown in the previous sections, NATO did not directly offer membership to the aspiring countries. Instead, NATO first looked for a solution to acquire the capabilities with the least costly option. Thus, the European Defense Community in the case of Germany and Associate membership in the case of Greece and Turkey were an integration mechanism in which NATO could access all the capabilities of the embedded country without making full collective defense commitment. However, the failure of the mentioned alternatives left alone the enlargement option for NATO. In other words, in all three accessions, the capability contribution, either from military, political or geostrategic perspective outweighed the cost of commitments to the aspiring countries.

The Korean War highlighted that US nuclear deterrence might not work for Soviets indirect aggression. A limited, local, war could happen in Europe as it is seen by Korean War. The war forced NATO to fill the security gap in Europe. If acted lately, the Soviets could have penetrated into Greece and Turkey in the south either with open aggression or by covert action. That might trigger a domino effect across the globe putting NATO in a disadvantageous position.

⁴⁴ Kaplan, "The Korean War and U.S. Foreign Relations: The Case of NATO," 65.

Lastly, the Korean War is proof of the consequences when there is a mismatch between capabilities and functions. NATO's collective defense posture would be a hollow promise if not supported by a commensurate military force level.

CHAPTER VI

THE BOSNIAN WAR AND NATO ENLARGEMENT

INTRODUCTION

In the second case study, the implications of the Bosnian War on NATO's functional and geographical enlargement will be explored. The change in the security environment after the Bosnian war, NATO's main functions and capability requirements are identified accordingly. The chapter will examine why NATO changed its policy from not to enlarge in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet Union to an ambitious enlargement effort after the Bosnian war. The accession of new members are analyzed according to their ability to contribute to the NATO's main function in the new security environment.

The Yugoslavian crisis was the result of Europe's neglect and miscalculation. Preoccupied with the collapse of communism and the ousting of Iraqi troops from Kuwait, Europe did not evaluate the magnitude of the problems in Yugoslavia. Although expected, the brutality of the Bosnian war caused enormous reaction in European countries. Initially, NATO was reluctant to intervene to the conflict. The tipping point for NATO came only after the massacre of Srebrenica. Indeed, if the US had not put its weight on the issue, the conflict might not have ended in 1995. The operation Deliberate Force brought the Serbs to the peace table, but the damage to the alliance's credibility had already been made.

The Bosnian War demonstrated the alliance's inability to wage an unconventional war. First of all, NATO did not have the political solidarity when

it came to risking lives to fulfill a commitment. Secondly, there was a transatlantic technological gap. The allies did not have adequate military assets to wage war along with the US forces. Therefore, NATO had to rely on American assets to conduct the war. The capability gap resurfaced before the Kosovo war. The gap was evident when the US President declared that NATO was not the proper tool to intervene Afghanistan. Although NATO offered its help to Americans, the US formed a coalition of those willing to wage the war. Rebecca Moore claims that “for some at the Pentagon, the principal lesson of the 1999 Kosovo conflict was that NATO had few military capabilities that would warrant another war in which U.S. military strategy would require the blessing of the North Atlantic Council-NATO’s principal decision-making body.”¹

The Bosnian War also points out the vulnerability of the stability in the newly independent states. Unless, tying the Central and Eastern European states to the West, it would be a matter of timing for the chaos to resurface in Europe. It was a paradigm shift within NATO on the security of Europe. NATO realized that neither the existing military nor political structure could bring peace to the continent. NATO’s reluctance to act in a timely manner in the Bosnian War cast a shadow over its main function as a free and democratic European. Nevertheless, intervention to Yugoslavia opened the way for a new wave of NATO enlargement.

THE SECURITY ENVIRONMENT

The initial years of the 1990s were full of hope and uncertainties for international community. The fall of communism, the unification of Germany, and successful

¹ Moore, *NATO's New Mission : Projecting Stability in a Post-Cold War World*, 33.

liberation of Kuwait brought optimism for the future. However, the ethnic tensions throughout Eastern Europe and risk of backlash in Russia generated concerns. Cooperation, more than conflict, was thought to be dominating the new security environment in the next century. The main feature of Europe was a simultaneous fragmentation and integration process. On the one hand, the new democratic countries were rising in the continent, and on the other hand the European Union was heading towards a more economic-political union. Suffice it to say that the events in Yugoslavia was a shock to international community that presented the dark side of the new era.

THE BOSNIAN WAR

The Bosnian War was a part of a larger Yugoslavian conflict which lasted from 1991 until NATO's Kosovo operation in 1999. The conflict began when Croatia and Slovenia declared independence from Yugoslavia in 1991. Initially, the European Community (EC) was involved in the crisis since it was thought to be a pure European problem. However, the weakness of EC's military pillar prevented any success in the ongoing conflict between Yugoslavian army and the secession states of Croatia and Slovenia. By 1992, the conflict spread to Bosnia. The reaction of international community was not beyond condemnation and an arm embargo. EC, CSCE and UN all engaged in the crisis, but a *European solution* could not be found due to the disagreements among the major European countries.

In 1992, the Vance-Owen Plan was introduced to stop the ongoing conflict. However, due to the EC's reluctance and Russian opposition to an increased US role, the

plan was not enforced adequately.² Later, the plan was completely rejected by Bosnian Serbs. Meanwhile, the UN Security Council established a UN force (UNPROFOR) to provide humanitarian aid. In May 1993, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 824 which installed safe zones at Bihac, Sarajevo, Tuzla, Goradze, Srebrenica and Zepa to protect civilians. The UN resolution demanded that the mentioned towns 'should be treated as safe areas by all the parties concerned and should be free from armed attacks and from any other hostile act.'³ The turning point in the conflict came when Bosnian Serbs killed more than 8000 Bosnian Muslims at the UN declared safe zone of Srebrenica. NATO launched an air attack from 30 August until mid September 1995. The Bosnian War ended with the Dayton agreement in November 1995.

THE ROLE OF EUROPEAN COMMUNITY (EC)

The Yugoslavian crisis was seen initially as a European question. It was a chance for the European Community to prove its credibility. Moreover, the initial US position was not to push NATO to interfere into a local European conflict.⁴ However, the internal rift in EC prevented a cohesive policy towards the region. While France was emphasizing a European solution to the conflict, the UK was keen on an Atlantic settlement. Meanwhile, the EC's political and economic instruments did not deter the Serbs from aggression. EC's failure resulted in the resurrection of NATO as the leading security provider in Europe.

² Crawford, "The Bosnian Road to NATO Enlargement," 46.

³ NATO, "UN Resolution 824," <http://www.nato.int/ifor/un/u930506a.htm> (accessed December 17, 2009).

⁴ Joyce P. Kaufman, *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia : Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance* (Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield, 2002), 20.

Kori Schake claims that the Yugoslavian Crisis meant the subordination of an independent European Security and Defense Identity to NATO.⁵ The latter's military capabilities "defeated the French alternative security structure."⁶

THE ROLE OF UN

UN involvement in Bosnia goes back to early 1992. With the launch of UNPROFOR, UN peacekeepers were dispatched into the conflict zone. The mission of UNPROFOR was to create "conditions of peace and security required for the negotiation of an overall settlement of the Yugoslav crisis."⁷ UNPROFOR's mandate enlarged to encompass the safeguarding Sarajevo and its airport to maintain humanitarian assistance. Later, no-fly-zone and safe zones were established along with NATO's military assurance.

THE ROLE OF OSCE

In the aftermath of the Cold War, the general sense in Europe was to promote the Commission on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE), then the OSCE, as the leading apparatus in European security. Since Russia is a member of the CSCE, it would be much easier to integrate Russia as a security provider in Europe. Moreover, NATO did not want to engage in non-conventional tasks at a time when the allies wanted to ripen the peace dividends and focus on economic development. However, the internal divisions precluded the functioning of the OSCE. Despite the optimistic expectations, the

⁵ Kori Schake, "NATO after the Cold War, 1991-1995: Institutional Competition and the Collapse of the French Alternative," *Contemporary European History* 7, no. 3 (1998): 379.

⁶ *Ibid.*

⁷ UN, "United Nations Mission in Bosnia and Herzegovina," http://www.un.org/Depts/DPKO/Missions/unmibh_p.htm (accessed January 7, 2010).

divergence between the Russian and European perspective on permanent peace in Europe prevented the OSCE from playing a central role. As Beverly Crawford suggests, "the lesson of Bosnia was that institutions that included Russia were weak and could not provide security in Europe."⁸ No other organization was able to effectively intervene to the international crisis during an armed conflict. The UN had peacekeeping operations but they were mostly post-crisis operations in which UN forces did not risk the lives of its forces.

The effectiveness of NATO originated from its political cohesion and integrated military structure. As the hopes for an OSCE driven peace talks diminishes, an ad-hoc grouping took the lead to end the conflict.

CONTACT GROUP

In 1994, as the Serbs intensified their attacks in Sarajevo, the representatives from France, Germany, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States formed what is known as the contact group. The purpose of the group was to end the violence that the EC, OSCE and UN could not stop. The contact group convened several times throughout the year. European powers welcomed Russian involvement since it could exert pressure on the Serbian leader as a result of the Contact group agreements. Besides, Russia had an interest in continuation of the group because the next step would be a NATO involvement where she did not have any say.⁹ The group dissolved in the summer of 1995 as there was no unity and progress in the talks.

⁸ Beverly Crawford, "The Bosnian Road to NATO Enlargement," *Contemporary Security Policy* 21, no. 2 (2000): 40.

⁹ Helen Leigh-Phippard, "The Contact Group on (and in) Bosnia: An Exercise in Conflict Mediation?," *International journal*. 53, no. 2 (1998): 312.

NATO'S INTERVENTION

NATO's involvement in the Bosnian war was a gradual process. NATO's role evolved from a subcontractor of UN in 1992 into the leading power in 1995.¹⁰ After UN Security Council Resolution 787, NATO took the responsibility of enforcing UN embargo to the region. Operation Maritime Guard was launched to enforce the sanctions in November 1992.

What motivated NATO to intervene in the Balkans is not just the containment of the conflict, but the integration of the region with the rest of Europe was more evident in NATO's policies.¹¹ Therefore, NATO operations in the Balkans differed from those of previous missions, in that both the IFOR and KFOR mission aimed at preserving the dignity of human life. NATO interventions in the Balkans were commensurate with its value based new function. The Bosnian war was not the cause of NATO enlargement, but it provided a rationale for NATO's new roles in the European security, which in turn brought further enlargement.

OPERATION DENY FLIGHT

NATO's first active involvement in the Bosnian conflict was to enforce the no-fly-zones over six safe areas. Operation Deny Flight was launched in April 1993 for this purpose. While conducting Operation Deny Flight, NATO shot down four warplanes violating the no-fly zone in February 1994.¹² During this period, NATO's actions were limited in scope due to its seeking UN approval for the operations. According to what is

¹⁰ Gregory L. Schulte, "Former Yugoslavia and the New NATO," *Survival* 39, no. 1 (1997): 20.

¹¹ Peter Siani-Davies, *International Intervention in the Balkans since 1995* (New York:Routledge, 2003), 1.

¹² NATO, "Peace support operations in Bosnia and Herzegovina," <http://www.nato.int/issues/sfor/index.html> (accessed December 16, 2009).

known as “dual-key policy,” the consent of both the UN representative and the NATO commander was needed to launch an air strike.¹³

On 5 February 1994, the Serbs shelled an open market area in Sarajevo. Sixty civilians were killed in the bombing. Public outrage in the West encouraged NATO to take unilateral action against the Bosnian Serbs. Following the attack, NATO issued an ultimatum to the parties to stop fighting within 20 miles of Sarajevo or be threatened with air assaults.¹⁴ The ultimatum stated that:

...with immediate effect, if any Bosnian Serb attacks involving heavy weapons are carried out on the UN- designated safe areas of Gorazde, Bihac, Srebrenica, Tuzla and Zepa, these weapons and other Bosnian Serb Military assets, as well as their direct and essential military support facilities, including but not limited to fuel installations and munitions sites, will be subject to NATO air strikes, in accordance with the procedural arrangements worked out between NATO and UNPROFOR following the Council Decisions of the 2nd and 9th August 1993.¹⁵

OPERATION DELIBERATE FORCE

NATO's threats to the Bosnian Serbs continued until late August 1995 without any major accomplishments. NATO conducted Operation Deliberate Force from 30 August until 15 September 1995, which ended the conflict. NATO's air strikes targeted Bosnian Serb communication and heavy weapon sites. To some observers, the operation was a milestone in NATO history, in that it effectively put an end to the “out-of-area”

¹³ Ryan C. Hendrickson, "Crossing the Rubicon," *NATO Review* (2005): 1.

¹⁴ Jim Headley, "Sarajevo, February 1994: The First Russia-NATO Crisis of the Post-Cold War Era," *Review of International Studies* 29, no. 2 (2003): 209.

¹⁵ NATO, "Decisions on the protection of safe areas taken at the meeting of the North Atlantic Council," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_24462.htm (accessed December 16, 2009).

debate and transformed NATO from a Cold War era alliance to a security organization with new functions.¹⁶

IMPLEMENTATION FORCE (IFOR)

NATO's presence in Bosnia was confirmed by the agreement which called for "a multinational military Implementation Force, the IFOR, under the command of NATO, with a grant of authority from the UN."¹⁷ IFOR's primary function was to implement the Dayton Peace accord. Under the security umbrella, other international and non-governmental organizations were able to engage in reconstruction activities. IFOR's mandate was over after one year. In 1996, NATO activated a new force (SFOR) to stabilize the peace.

After the 1996 elections in Bosnia and Herzegovina, NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) replaced the IFOR. From December 1996 until June 2004, NATO's SFOR mission continued to support the reconstruction efforts. With NATO's Istanbul Summit in 2004, the responsibility in Bosnia and Herzegovina was handed over to EU led Operation Althea.

NATO's success in Bosnia triggered the NATO expansion.¹⁸ In Bosnia, NATO demonstrated that European security could not succumb to Russian concerns. The war caused major discussions in Europe on a future European Security structure. NATO's successful intervention showed that no other organization had the enforcement mechanism as NATO had. With the launching of a partnership for peace program (PfP),

¹⁶ Hendrickson, "Crossing the Rubicon," 1.

¹⁷ NATO, "Operation Joint Endeavour," <http://www.nato.int/ifor/gfa/gfa-summ.htm> (accessed December 15, 2009).

¹⁸ Crawford, "The Bosnian Road to NATO Enlargement," 43.

NATO took the lead in shaping of European security. Although some see the PfP as a natural step for NATO expansion, NATO's goal was not more than enhancing cooperation in Europe.¹⁹

NATO'S NEW FUNCTION

NATO's Cold War function was focused on securing the alliance from external aggression. However, by 1992, the stability in Central and Eastern Europe became a much important task than protection from the east.²⁰ NATO's long time deterrence function could not prevent the spread of instability from the East.²¹ Neither the UN nor NATO could was able to end the conflict with diplomacy. Even NATO's threat to air strike was not successful in bringing the Bosnian Serbs to the peace table. It was the use of the military along with diplomacy that enabled peace in Yugoslavia. The implications of the Bosnian war for NATO's functional enlargement is evident in NATO's Madrid Declaration:

NATO's continued contribution to peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the unprecedented scale of cooperation with other countries and international organisations there, reflect the cooperative approach which is key to building our common security. A new NATO is developing: a new NATO for a new and undivided Europe. The security of NATO's members is inseparably linked to that of the whole of Europe. Improving the security and stability environment for

¹⁹ Ibid., 49.

²⁰ Joseph Leggold, "NATO'S Post-Cold War Conflict Management Role, in Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics," in *Collective Conflict Management and Changing World Politics*, ed. Joseph Leggold and Thomas George Weiss (Albany, NY: State University of New York Press, 1998), 60.

²¹ Kaufman, *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia : Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance*, 140.

nations in the Euro-Atlantic area where peace is fragile and instability currently prevails remains a major Alliance interest.²²

The Bosnian conflict justified NATO's new roles in European Security. It would not be an exaggeration to state that NATO did finally reach a consensus on its role in new Europe as a result of the conflict. Unless the ex-communist countries were incorporated into NATO, the risk of a new Yugoslavia was high. For NATO, conflict prevention was far cheaper than ending an ongoing conflict. Hence, integration of the Central and Eastern Europe countries into the West was the only solution to check the forces of instability. Meanwhile, the war demonstrated that other European institutions were still too weak to provide security to Eastern Europe. Here, one can wonder why not the EU but NATO took the lead in the integration process. Bosnia was a test case for the international institutions. NATO apparently saved both Bosnia and its future in 1995.

CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

Bosnian War demonstrated the magnitude of the threat in the newly independent countries of the Central and Eastern Europe. Without promoting democratization and cooperation, the tensions would ignite new conflicts throughout the region.

DEPLOYABLE FORCES

The Bosnia operation openly necessitated a new force posture for the non-article 5 operations. The allies' conventional military forces were too cumbersome for the new

²² NATO, "Madrid Declaration," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_25460.htm (accessed December 17, 2009)

security environment. The NATO allies needed deployable forces in order to have enough flexibility when intervening the conflicts. The transformation of the existing force structure to a deployable force was costly and required domestic consensus. Not all allies were ready to undergo such a big transformation. A more affordable option was to acquire new forces for NATO's new operations. Especially the niche capabilities of the new members were suitable for this purpose.

PROMOTING DEMOCRACY AND STABILITY

The biggest challenge for NATO in the post Cold War era was to prevent a crisis before it happens. However, it would be impossible to stabilize the Central and Eastern Europe without satisfying the security concerns of the countries in the region. Although the PfP and other cooperation initiatives were a right step in stabilizing the region, they did not bring a lasting peace. NATO's proven record of tempering intra and inter-state relations was, then, a political asset that could be use to enhance security in Europe. Henceforth, the second wave NATO enlargement was aimed at achieving a political goal in Europe.

PARTNERSHIP AS CAPABILITY DEVELOPMENT

In order to enhance cooperation with non-members, NATO launched the Partnership for Peace Program (PfP) in 1994. The PfP was a direct result of the developments in former Yugoslavia. The underlying assumption of the PfP was that political and military interaction with NATO would promote democratization efforts in the partner countries. Furthermore, if a crisis were to erupt, NATO could use PfP assets

for the operations. According to Kaufman, the PfP was NATO's positive incentive to eliminate war from Europe.²³ Needless to say, the PfP lacked the NATO commitment that could end the region wide tensions.

GEOGRAPHICAL ENLARGEMENT

The NATO allies concluded that the PfP, although successful, could not guarantee stability in Europe. The PfP lacked the instruments to push the resolution for the ethnic and border problems in eastern Europe. Unless the security concerns of the CEEC were satisfied, the chances of conflict would always be high. Thus, NATO security coverage was offered to achieve the desired goal of a whole and free Europe. NATO enlargement would induce democratic reforms, eliminate the security concerns and soften the relations in the region. And also, the new members would enhance the political weight of NATO in the future crisis response operations.

1994 BRUSSELS SUMMIT

NATO resisted the expansion calls until 1994, at the Brussels Summit on 11 Jan. In 1994, NATO revealed its desire to expand the alliance. The Summit declaration stated that:

Building on the close and long-standing partnership among the North American and European Allies, we are committed to enhancing security and stability in the whole of Europe. We therefore wish to strengthen ties with the democratic states to our East. We reaffirm that the Alliance, as provided for in Article 10 of the Washington Treaty, remains open to membership of other

²³ Kaufman, *NATO and the Former Yugoslavia : Crisis, Conflict, and the Atlantic Alliance*, 92.

European states in a position to further the principles of the Treaty and to contribute to the security of the North Atlantic area. We expect and would welcome NATO expansion that would reach to democratic states to our East, as part of an evolutionary process, taking into account political and security developments in the whole of Europe.²⁴

The Brussels summit was the first enlargement summit. NATO members openly declared that NATO was considering enlargement in order to enhance security in Europe. By 1997, twelve Central and East European expressed their aspirations to join NATO. Among them, three Visegrad countries, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary, were invited to join NATO. The accession of the new members coincided with NATO's second biggest operation in the post Cold War. From 23 March 1999 until 10 June NATO conducted air strikes against Serbian Forces in order to prevent ethnic cleansing in Kosovo. The timing of the Air campaign was meaningful in that new nations were made fully aware that they were expected to be not just security consumers but also security providers.

ACCESSION OF POLAND, CZECH REPUBLIC AND HUNGARY

After some lengthy discussion in NATO circles, Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary were invited to join NATO in 1997. Their actual membership would be assumed in 1999. The accession of the Visegrad countries was just the beginning of the second

²⁴ NATO, "The Brussels Summit Declaration," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/SID-D67BD3CB-664663A2/natolive/official_texts_24470.htm (accessed December 16, 2009).

wave of NATO expansion. The Washington Summit declaration emphasizes NATO's intention for the next enlargement efforts:

Our Alliance remains open to all European democracies, regardless of geography, willing and able to meet the responsibilities of membership, and whose inclusion would enhance overall security and stability in Europe. NATO is an essential pillar of a wider community of shared values and shared responsibility. Working together, Allies and Partners, including Russia and Ukraine, are developing their cooperation and erasing the divisions imposed by the Cold War to help to build a Europe whole and free, where security and prosperity are shared and indivisible.²⁵

To assess the contribution of the new members to NATO's capabilities and missions, the second NATO operation in Balkans is a perfect example. Borrowing from Ryan C. Hendrickson, below, three countries' contributions to NATO's Kosovo operation were listed.²⁶

Poland

Poland was one of the strongest supporters of NATO's Kosovo operation. Public opinion polls report that 70 percent of people supported NATO air strike.²⁷ Poland offered a military force to protect NATO forces in Kosovo and accepted 2000 Albanian refugees in a humanitarian effort. During the post-conflict phase, 900 Polish troops were

²⁵ NATO, "The Washington Declaration," http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/official_texts_27445.htm, (accessed December 6, 2009).

²⁶ Ryan C. Hendrickson, "NATO Expansion to the East: NATO's Visegrad Allies: The First Test in Kosovo," *Journal of Slavic Military Studies* 13(2000): 25-38.

²⁷ *Ibid.*: 29.

in Kosovo as a peacekeeper force. Hence, Poland was very supportive in all bureaucratic, military and humanitarian perspective.

Czech Republic

The public support for Kosovo operation was the lowest in Czech Republic among the three new members. However, Czechs did not hesitate to join the Kosovo operations. They provided a field hospital in Albania.²⁸ Czechs also accepted 1000 refugees during the war.²⁹

Hungary

Hungary contributed substantially to the NATO operation in Kosovo, although a nearly 200.000 Hungarian minority was living in Serbia. Hungary opened its air space and allowed the use of airfields for NATO airstrikes.³⁰ Hungary supported the operation with logistic experts as well. The most important contribution of Hungary was accepting 4500 Albanian refugees during the operation. The above contributions show that the new allies were not the free riders of the alliance. In fact, the new members were staunch supporters of the Euro-Atlantic security apparatus even more than some old members.

ROADBLOCKS TO NATO ENLARGEMENT

Despite the necessity for new members, there were some concerns regarding the NATO's geographical enlargement. Specifically the Russian reaction, the cost of enlargement, and the prioritizing the candidates caused debates among the allies.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ Ibid.: 34.

RUSSIAN REACTION

NATO rejects any Russian influence on the enlargement decision. However, the evidence shows that Russia's policies had a great impact on NATO's timing of enlargement. It is an undeniable fact that Russia is still seen as the major threat by the most of the countries in east Europe. Until the Brussels summit, NATO avoided any enlargement option in order not to alienate the democratic reforms in Russia. The events in former Yugoslavia forced NATO to take action even if Russia was expected to oppose. The war enabled NATO to realize how far it could follow policies despite Russian reaction. The sidelining of Russia in NATO's Bosnia operation was an indication of NATO's further enlargement intention. Russia joined the PfP in the hope of shaping NATO's enlargement policy. However, the PfP was a very loose partnership initiative which could not determine NATO's future orientations.

As NATO's decision to enlarge unfolded in 1995, Russia hesitantly accepted NATO's new policy. Russia played its last card against NATO enlargement in the NATO-Russian Act. After the agreement was signed in 1997, virtually there was no objection from Russians on the accession of former allies to NATO.

THE COST OF ENLARGEMENT

The cost of new members to the alliance was raised after NATO concluded its study on the enlargement. There were different approaches to the cost issue. While some studies covered only NATO's expenditure to integrate the new members into the alliance, others were more broad in scope, covering new challenges as a result of NATO's new commitments. But the real cost of enlargement was less than what previously envisioned.

The new member itself carries the cost of membership rather than alliance. NATO's expenditure was not more than some infrastructure projects in the new members.

WHOM TO INVITE FIRST

The question of who would be the first to join NATO resulted in a major transatlantic rift among the allies. Some European allies were inclined to keep the initial enlargement as broad as possible. However, NATO's international staff did not want an unlimited enlargement. Study of NATO enlargement made it clear that only the countries who met the enlargement criteria could join the alliance. Thus, the first enlargement of Poland, Hungary and Czech Republic was an institutional choice of NATO.

CONCLUSION

The Bosnian war eliminated all the concerns about NATO's value in the post Cold War era and opened the path for new members. To put it differently, NATO's success in Bosnia extended the life of the organization. NATO's military intervention in Bosnia and subsequent enlargement initiatives are the two sides of the same policy. The common goal was to achieve the NATO's primary function in the post Cold War era. To conclude, the Bosnian war had the following important consequences for NATO:

- The inactivity of NATO from 1991 until 1994 resulted in thousands of lost lives not to mention the region-wide instability in Balkans. Ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia were an alarming bell for other hot spots in eastern Europe. NATO expansion was a natural solution to mitigate the ethnic and intra state conflict in the region.

- NATO's leading role was reaffirmed in the European security architecture with the Bosnian War. The Bosnia Intervention put a stop to the ongoing discussions in the future orientation of the alliance. The struggle between whether a European or an Atlantic Pillar was settled as it became clear that NATO would maintain its role of the leading security platform in Europe.³¹ In other words, an institutional hierarchy, with NATO at the top, was established as a result of the war.
- NATO was able to incorporate the Russian contribution without jeopardizing the NAC mandate. NATO's unilateral action in Bosnia was a message to the Russians that NATO would not accept any line of divisions in Europe.
- IFOR was NATO's first out of area operation. NATO had never used military force during the Cold War, and the IFOR operation was an indication of NATO's pursuit of new value based functions.
- The obvious implication of NATO's involvement in Bosnia was that NATO assumed the new function of providing a European security apparatus. The enlargement decision at the 1994 Brussels summit was necessitated by NATO's new function. NATO would accept new countries when their contribution to European Security would exceed the NATO's commitment to them.
- Bosnia proved that diplomacy could only work if backed by a credible military force. NATO had both instruments available in 1990s. The accession of new countries would contribute to the alliance's political and military capabilities. Since the alliance works on a consensus base, any decision of NATO is in fact the decision of each ally. NATO ties its members politically and militarily.

³¹ Schake, "NATO after the Cold War, 1991-1995: Institutional Competition and the Collapse of the French Alternative," 379.

- Institutional cooperation was essential but not adequate in bringing peace in Europe. Only NATO's military capability enabled a peace agreement. All the efforts to incorporate the UN, OSCE and Russia in Bosnian conflict did not produce any effective results. Although Russia was an important player in European Security, there was a huge gap between the interests of the two sides. NATO had to act unilaterally in the areas where disagreements between NATO and Russia were widespread. In fact, NATO's reluctance until 1994, made the conflict more brutal and prolonged.

The cooperation with other international organizations was desired but not indispensable for NATO's new roles. During the last days of conflict, NATO commanders were no longer seeking UN approval to conduct air strikes. Crawford says that the Bosnian war led an institutional hierarchy in which NATO had the prominent position.³² The OSCE was responsible to oversight the 1996 elections, the EU would assist in economic recovery of the Bosnia, the UN was to provide humanitarian aids if needed and NATO was to ensure the security of the new state.³³ NATO and Central and Eastern European Countries took the same lessons from the war. Without NATO's security umbrella, their future would not be better than their past. As the tensions were escalating in the former Yugoslavia, NATO's response to the changes in the security environment was to enlarge functionally and geographically.

With the successful Bosnia intervention, NATO explicitly declared that the alliance no longer accepted the east west divide in Europe. NATO was an article-5 alliance until the Bosnian War, when it became a comprehensive organization which had more non-article 5 operations than the article 5 ones. If NATO were to preserve the Cold

³² Crawford, "The Bosnian Road to NATO Enlargement," 54.

³³ Ibid.

War functions and structure, it would not have expanded to include new nations.

Therefore, the Bosnian War marked a transition point in NATO's history from a Cold War alliance to a security organization.

CHAPTER VII

ANALYSIS AND CONCLUSION

INTRODUCTION

This chapter will examine the results of the case studies in regard to the hypothesis: NATO's new functions drive the geographical enlargement. The restated thesis explains the dissertation's goal more clearly: NATO enlarges geographically unless the capabilities needed to satisfy the new NATO functions can be developed by existing structures.

The following questions that are highlighted at the beginning of the study will be the foundation of this chapter.¹ Is there a causal relation between functional and geographical enlargement? Was the past enlargement successful? Are there any side effects of the enlargement? Does NATO need new functions or new territories or both? Should NATO remain a regional collective security organization or reach to the areas traditionally beyond Europe?

The conceptual framework of the dissertation is threefold: First, NATO's functional adaptation as a result of changing security environment (independent variable); second, Required Capabilities to satisfy NATO's new functions (intervening variable); third, NATO's geographical enlargement (dependent variable). The framework explains what has driven NATO's continuous geographical enlargement throughout its history. Based on the model in the previous chapters, the findings are in line with the dissertation's main argument, which states that NATO's functional enlargement is key to

¹ The methodology for the analysis chapter is borrowed from Robert M. Antis, "The Reinvention of NATO" (Old Dominion University, 2006).

explaining its geographical expansion. Since NATO membership entails an “all for one” commitment, enlargement was the last resort in NATO’s search for capability fulfillment. The first round of enlargement was only available after the shock of the Korean War. The Greek, Turkish and German memberships relieved the defense burden of NATO allies and established the military balance in Europe.

Similarly, the possibility of enlargement was not on NATO’s agenda in the aftermath of the dissolution of the Soviet empire. The 1991 Strategic Concept and accompanying NATO summits did not raise the question of adding new members to the alliance. It was only when the new functions could not be satisfied by other means that enlargement became an option. As in the first wave of enlargement, NATO followed a partnership and cooperation path to achieve its new main function. However, as the conflict escalated in Yugoslavia, NATO concluded that only through enlargement would NATO prevail. Hence, the establishment of the North Atlantic Cooperation Council in 1992, the initiation of Partnership for Peace Framework in 1994, and accession of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary in 1997 were the means of achieving the same NATO function.

Two case studies marked significant changes in NATO history. While the Korean War transformed NATO from a paper organization to a military alliance, the Bosnian War ended the contraction of NATO. Although NATO was not directly involved in the Korean war, it perceived Soviet Union as a paramount threat to the vital interests of the alliance. Both occasions triggered the transformation of the alliance and thus it is no coincidence that NATO enlargement happened just after the two conflicts.

Previous studies on NATO enlargement handle NATO's new members and new functions as unrelated distinct issues. However, my analysis in the dissertation proves that in fact, there is a close relationship between the two phenomenon. The later is triggering the first one. The reason why the previous studies missed the relation is due to a narrow focus on the institutional expansion. Most of the studies, as explained in the previous chapters, employ only actor-based explanations concentrating on the US and a few other major European Powers' position. The arguments in this study do not mean that the preferences of individual nations, especially of the major allies, are irrelevant to the expansion. Rather, the study offers that an agent-based explanation is not adequate in understanding the institutional expansion. The dissertation proves that institutional choices provide a better understanding of the enlargement issue.

As explained in the previous section, many realists believe that the absence of threats lead to the demise of a security organization. But as we have witnessed in the last twenty years NATO has managed to exist after the Cold War. The main driver behind NATO's survival in cold war post Cold War era is its transformation from a collective defense alliance into a comprehensive security organization. Functional and geographical expansion is the engine of NATO's overall transformation.

THE CAUSAL RELATIONSHIP

An examination of NATO enlargement requires the clarification of the relationship between the security environment and its effects on NATO. As demonstrated by the case studies, NATO's functional expansion is in parallel with the major changes in the security environment. NATO adopted its main function in

accordance with the major changes in the security environment. The international system in the aftermath of WWII had two features. First, the defeat of Germany and Japan led to a power vacuum in the heart of Europe and in East Asia.² And, second, the “international landscape was permissive. No nation existed that could contain Russian expansion.”³

Originally committed to the collective defense of its members in 1949, NATO transformed itself into a military alliance which aimed at deterring and containing cold war Soviet Union . The new NATO function was the result of Korean War in 1950. NATO concluded that Korea was a typical example of a future war in Europe. If not checked and deterred, communism would spread to western Europe by force. NATO’s new function was different from its collective defense commitment in that new functions called for a permanent military structure with forces and equipment on the ground.

The second major change in the international structure occurred after the collapse of the Soviet Union. NATO’s optimism about European security did not last long. By 1991, the initial signals of violence came from Yugoslavia. The spread of conflict to all Yugoslavia threatened European security. If not contained, the conflict would withdraw the neighboring countries among which there were Turkey and Greece. More importantly the security concerns of the central and eastern European countries were the source of instability in the region. NATO had a secondary role initially. The European Community and CSCE were promoted as the main platform for European security. However the lack of military capabilities undermined any credible policies by these organizations. With the intervention in the Bosnia Conflict, NATO became the de facto organization responsible for Euro-Atlantic security.

² Melvyn P. Leffler, *For the Soul of Mankind: The United States, the Soviet Union, and the Cold War* (New York: Hill and Wang, 2007), 79.

³ *Ibid.*, 81.

In addition to the new functions, NATO added new members along with the changes in the security environment. The geographical enlargement is a direct result of the functional enlargement. To put it another way, functions determine the members. NATO missions define the commitment. Otherwise it would not be a cost effective solution to undertake responsibilities without satisfying any institutional interest.

It is worth mentioning that NATO's functional evolution is in line with the choices of member states. NATO's leading powers were opposing an enlargement agenda until the Bosnian Conflict. However, the previous argument does not mean that individual members drove the enlargement process totally. The decision for enlargement was a compromise of intergovernmental bargaining at the highest level. Hence, individual choices do not provide a correct picture of NATO's geographical enlargement.

Although the functional enlargement drives the need for new members, the case studies reveal that an important factor combines the two pillars of NATO expansion: capabilities. During the enlargement process, commitments are evaluated against the new capabilities. As a rational actor, NATO's geographical enlargement is based on the outcome of commitments vs. capabilities. On the one hand, every new nation contributes new capabilities to the alliance. On the other hand enlargement means the extension of NATO's commitments. Therefore, capabilities should be weighed against the commitments. New members are accepted only when their contribution exceeds NATO's commitment. Moreover, it is important that the new capabilities for the satisfaction of the new functions cannot be at the expense of other NATO functions. If the new members endanger NATO's existing functions, the enlargement should not take place.

Here, one might ask a fair question of whether new functions always result in new members or not. As underscored in the second case study, there is not an automatic enlargement process. Not all functions lead to geographical enlargement. NATO's open door policy is not limitless. Every new member means new commitment and new costs for NATO. Every new member has distinct political and military characteristics. Since consensus is the essence of decision making, from an organizational standpoint, as NATO becomes more heterogenic, the decision making would become more difficult. Meanwhile, NATO needs to look for the least costly alternative when performing new functions. Not all functions require a geographical expansion. Most of the non-military functions, such as Conflict Resolution, Counter Terrorism, Proliferation of WMD and Cyber Defense can be met via the changes in doctrine, organization and training. However, any function of regional stabilization tends to be achieved by accepting new members rather than exporting security. As long as NATO has the capacity to satisfy the new functions, the expansion alternative would be more costly. In other words, the geographical enlargement should be determined by the institutional functions and the associated costs which are the capability requirements in NATO's case.

The second wave of NATO enlargement highlights an important concern in NATO expansion. Russia's position cannot be sidelined totally in an enlargement decision. Russia has always been a major player for the Euro-Atlantic security. Contrary to the official statements that the decision on enlargement is taken solely by the alliance, Russia was accommodated by new privileges before the post Cold War enlargement. As Asmus underscores, the allies needed to follow a dual track strategy on the second wave of NATO enlargement. Indeed, the accession of Poland, Czech Republic and Hungary

had to await the result of the Russian elections in 1997.⁴ Only after Yeltsin secured reelection did NATO continue on with the enlargement agenda. If Russian fears and security needs are not met, the enlargement will be counterproductive. As the Georgia-Russia conflict in 2008 demonstrated, Russia can practically block a future NATO membership wave. On the one hand, NATO should provide real security guarantees that NATO is not a threat to Russia. On the other hand, NATO should avoid extending less than full membership to the aspiring countries. Direct confrontation with Russia as a declining power would be an invitation for a future conflict if the security environment turned in favor of Russia.

In addition to explaining the phenomenon of NATO enlargement, the findings of the case studies can be used to predict the way ahead for NATO. Any future enlargement will depend on new capability requirements.

As stated in the background chapters, the international security environment significantly changed in the last decade due to the new unconventional global threats. As 9/11 terrorist attacks to the US showed, the security of the alliance is under threat not from the intra-state threats but rather from hostile group or organizations which have the ability to use any non-military asset as a weapon against the high value civilian and military assets. These new type of threats can be dealt with through collective action by the alliance. The ISAF operation is the indicator of NATO's determination to protect its core interests against the new threats. Afghanistan is a laboratory for NATO's effectiveness in the new security environment. If the deficiencies are answered in a timely manner, NATO will preserve its dominant role in the Euro-Atlantic region.

⁴ Asmus, *Opening NATO's Door : How the Alliance Remade Itself for a New Era*, 105.

Otherwise, the member countries will no longer want to bear a huge cost to maintain the alliance.

NATO needs to transform itself to face the new challenges of terrorism, energy and cyber security. The new threats will be in the hybrid form and affect not just the geography but also the networks of the alliance. NATO's 2010 strategic concept should clearly identify the new functions and the course of the geographical enlargement in the coming years.

THE BENEFITS OF NATO ENLARGEMENT

As a result of the first wave of enlargement, Soviet power was first balanced and contained in the late 1950s. And NATO maintained its superiority over the Soviets until the latter's demise. With the second wave of enlargement, the security dilemma in the Eastern Europe was mostly mitigated. NATO's commitments enabled economic and political prosperity in the new members. However, NATO still needs to keep its focus on the Balkans. The integration of the Balkan Countries with NATO is essential for permanent peace in Europe.

The most important intrinsic benefit of a security organization such as NATO is its value in bringing strategic predictability. One of the implicit reasons behind the enlargement decisions has been 'What happens if the country in question is not accepted as a member.' It was a legitimate factor in Turkey's, Germany's, Spain's and Post Cold war enlargements. The alternative cost was so high in most of the enlargement rounds that it reinforced the support for enlargement.

Besides the direct result of enhancing the European Security, NATO's geographical enlargement in Europe led to further institutionalization and integration of the region. The European Union enlarged on a similar scale encompassing all former communist European countries. Since NATO is one of the iconic institutions of the West, NATO membership brings extra economic and political benefits. The new members attract foreign direct investments much needed for economic development. In fact, economic and political integration in Europe became reality only after NATO's security umbrella was established. Therefore, NATO membership is the key factor for the issue linkage among economics, politics and security. Moreover, NATO enlargement is insurance for internal balance. The existence of a credible threat provides the venue of cooperation and makes free riding costly. Cooperation is more efficient and cost saving in the existence of a major threat. Exclusion from the club makes punishment effective. Therefore, when the outside threat vanishes, the club may lose the glue that holds together the members. The allies' cooperation during WWII might be a good example of a need for a common threat. After the removal of Hitler, the West and Soviet Union began to see each other as a threat rather than allies. As the off-shore balancing of the US is fading, the new members contribute to the internal balance among the European states. No European country would prefer to increase its military power as long as NATO remains as the main security platform.

UNINTENDED CONSEQUENCES OF THE ENLARGEMENT

Although enlargement satisfies NATO's new functions, there are some negative consequences of the geographical enlargement that NATO should avoid in the future.

The first is the risk of over-enlargement. NATO enlargement should not be an open ended automatic procedure. Any open ended enlargement is the source of Security Dilemma in Euro-Atlantic Region. Like states, international organizations will be worse off when overstretched. NATO will be overstretched when it no longer has the required assets to meet its commitments. New members mean new threat perceptions. New countries might have divergent threat perceptions due to the geographical location and neighborhood relations. When NATO does not have the necessary assets to accommodate the fears of the aspiring nations, the credibility of the alliance will suffer substantially.

NATO should avoid accepting new nations unless they can contribute to NATO's capability to handle the identified NATO functions. Meanwhile, unlimited accession will decrease the essential attributes of centralization, control and flexibility of NATO.⁵ In the same way, an uncalculated enlargement will make the public support problematic. It will be difficult to explain why the nations should sacrifice life when the new nation does not bring any contribution to the alliance. Any reluctance in the commitment of the necessary national assets will jeopardize the alliance's *raison d'etre*. Without full socialization, new members could exploit NATO membership to solve their regional problems at the expense of their neighbors.

The second negative consequence is the establishment of a new dividing line. In order to avoid a new black and white division of the security environment, NATO should deliberately "blur the lines between members, potential future members, and partners" in the future enlargement rounds.⁶ As Chapter 6 reveals the post cold NATO enlargement was a success in terms of eliminating those lines. The second Wave of NATO

⁵ Barbara Koremenos, Charles Lipson, and Duncan Snidal, "The Rational Design of International Institutions," *International Organization* 55, no. 4 (2001): 761-99.

⁶ Asmus, "Europe's Eastern Promise: Rethinking on NATO and Eu Enlargement," para.9.

enlargement aimed at achieving a durable European security. NATO enlargement eliminated the gray zone of the security in Europe. Aside from Ukraine there is no any state left with unsatisfied security concern in continental Europe. Hence, the enlargement enhances not only the members` security but also the security of non-members.⁷ As explained in the previous chapters, the new members of NATO all developed good relations with non-member neighbors. It is fair to say that Russia and other non-members benefited hugely from the integration of unstable Central and Eastern European Countries into NATO. If enlargement policy is pursued without the concerns of the regional powers, it could cause new dividing lines. The countries that are not accepted to membership could be destabilized.

Lastly, NATO should take into consideration the increased risk of discomfort and disproportion of the vulnerability among members before accepting new members. The absence of a common threat and the problems of collective action can result in more distress in the alliance. Current threats do not affect each member equally, in contrast to the Cold War era threa.⁸ Like terrorism, energy security does not pose threat at the same level to all NATO countries. While the US and a few allies worry about NATO being a two tier alliance, the new countries of NATO worry about NATO`s overextension and going beyond what it is capable of. Moreover, the new functions can exacerbate the existing distress.⁹ Therefore, the alliance should identify the core functions that it wants to achieve instead of a wide array of functions. Meanwhile, the increased operational requirements can be opposed by many of the new comers due to the cost burden.

⁷ Wohlfeld, "Eu and NATO Enlargement and Stability in Central-Eastern Europe," 137.

⁸ Stephan M. Walt, "The Precarious Partnership: America and Europe in a New Era," in *Atlantic Security : Contending Visions*, ed. Charles A. Kupchan (New York: Council on Foreign Relations, 1998), 27.

⁹ *Ibid.*, 42.

NEW FUNCTIONS AND NEW TERRITORIES

NATO's strategic concepts are the highest level documents that encompasses the organizations' functions. In 2010, NATO will launch its new strategic concept.

Documents will show how NATO sees threats and opportunities in the future security environment.

NATO'S CORE FUNCTIONS IN THE NEW CENTURY

In order to meet the needs of the rising challenges the following functions are indispensable for NATO. The effectiveness of the new functions will depend on NATO's ability to develop the required capabilities.

Deterrence and Collective Defense

Deterrence and collective defense is the core function of the alliance. In order to protect NATO's security interests effectively, the meaning of collective defense should be clarified. Any threats to land, air, sea, space and cyber commons should be considered a violation of alliance's security. As the complexity of the threats increases, NATO needs to acquire not just military but also civilian capabilities to deter the potential adversaries.

Meanwhile NATO needs to balance missions at home and away. NATO faces the risk of losing its domestic support as a result of heavy concentration on the home away missions. Although it is necessary to operate at the strategic distances, any lack of attention to its members' core security needs will deteriorate NATO's solidarity and value. If NATO fails to deliver the core collective defense capability, the members can engage in bilateral security engagements which will make NATO a corpse over time.

An effective deterrence and defense strategy requires expeditionary capabilities. Past experiences demonstrated that every operation is unique in itself. No two operations are similar in scope, doctrine, or military technology that is used. NATO should develop flexible capabilities instead of a fixed territorial defense forces.

Transatlantic Link

NATO should remain the core transatlantic political-military alliance. As long as it serves as the main consultation forum between US and Europe, the indivisibility of Euro-Atlantic security will have credibility. The consultation mechanism is important to form a shared picture of NATO's engagements. Especially before an operation, allies should communicate with each other and establish a common understanding of the strategic interests and objectives of the mission.

Partnership

NATO can contribute to global security by establishing partnership networks. NATO's military capabilities are not enough to cope with the new challenges. Instead of competition and confrontation, NATO should choose cooperation with the other players in the security environment. In some cases, it might be in a supportive role, in others NATO can be in a leadership position.

Specifically, the UN, OSCE, and Shanghai Cooperation Organization are critical of establishing security in Euro-Atlantic region. The degree of cooperation will affect NATO's new capability requirements.

NEW TERRITORIES AND THE THIRD WAVE OF ENLARGEMENT

NATO's third wave enlargement will encompass countries not just located in Europe but in a wide Black Sea region as well. Having almost achieved its primary function of a Europe wide security, NATO needs to transform itself to cope with the new challenges. As explained in Chapter 3, Energy Security will be one item on NATO's agenda that was not thought to be a security issue in the past. The stability of the suppliers and transit route are important for NATO. Since the Caucasus is one of the energy rich regions of the world, NATO should pay special attention to the security of the region.

Although NATO has been a player in Euro-Asia since the Afghanistan operation, NATO should be sensitive to major powers in the region. Russia and China should not be kept out of any security arrangements in the region. Instead of an individual country approach, a regional approach towards Euro-Asia would enhance the NATO's strategic interests. NATO could promote regional institutionalization. The countries in the region should be granted the same level cooperation with NATO. Instead of a direct engagement, NATO should use institutional cooperation to achieve its main goals.

In regard to Ukraine and Georgia, NATO should keep its promise on the integration of these two countries. However, It is a fact that, NATO's involvement in the region will further deteriorate the NATO-Russia relations. The latest Russian security doctrine already defines NATO's further eastern enlargement as a threat. NATO should assess its commitments and benefits from the membership of Ukraine and Georgia. The timing and the domestic support of these two countries are critical. Georgia would be the next NATO member if the last war had not occurred. The Georgia-Russia War weakened

the prospect of Georgian membership. NATO allies already expressed their unwillingness to extend security commitments to a country that still has disputes with Russia. Therefore, NATO expansion should continue but at a slow pace.

REGIONAL VS. GLOBAL NATO

NATO should not be a global watch dog. Its functions should be linked to the allies' security. Even humanitarian missions such as Bosnia and Kosovo are conducted on the premise that if action is not taken, those conflicts would undermine NATO's security. A global NATO would have unintended consequences by changing the international structure. Russia and China might form a counter alliance to balance NATO.¹⁰

However, NATO should protect its people and territory from any threat in and out of its borders. In other words, "Geography is no protection from the spillover effect of 21st century challenges."¹¹ Global ambitions can be met by a unified alliance. In the future NATO will still be "a transatlantic organization with global partners, global missions and global capabilities."¹²

CONCLUSION

This dissertation examined an untouched area in a mature field. Throughout its inception, scholars did valuable studies on NATO enlargement. However, there was a missing link between NATO's functional and geographical enlargement that this study

¹⁰ Ministry of Defense, Government of France, *Geostrategic Perspectives for the next thirty years*, www.defense.gouv.fr/das/content/download (accessed November 13, 2009).

¹¹ NATO, "A speech by NATO's Former Secretary General Manfred Wörner," <http://www.nato.int/cps/en/natolive/opinions.htm> (accessed December 3, 2009).

¹² Hamilton et al., "Alliance Reborn an Atlantic Compact for the 21st Century," 25.

aimed to explore. Along with the background chapters, two case studies support the main argument that NATO functions drive the geographical enlargement.

During the initial years of NATO, the organization was not more than a commitment of collective defense on paper. The Soviet Union was the biggest concern; however, the US nuclear monopoly and limited Soviet military capabilities did not require any major commitments by the allies.

The Korean War was a game changer. The world was divided between the two superpowers. The neutrality of a country in Europe, in reality, meant a loss for NATO. The deterrence of the west, practically, failed. Instead of a total war with the west, Communism could spread through limited wars. Such a domino effect would end the democracies in Europe if the Soviets could not be contained and deterred actively. The conventional military capabilities became the main requirements for the new function. However, the economic burden of the new capabilities forced NATO to develop the capabilities through new accessions.

During the post-Cold War era, NATO's main focus was constructing a durable European security system. A Whole and Free Europe became the new motto of the alliance. NATO needed niche capabilities and coercive diplomacy to be successful. The ethnic conflicts in Yugoslavia revealed the fact that partnership was not realistic enough to promote democracies in a region which is historically conflict ridden. Moreover, apart from the gaining security, NATO could enable the aspiring countries to acquire a new western identity and to distance themselves "from the past Soviet modernity."¹³ NATO is the first threshold to join the global community. Thus, NATO started a new

¹³ Ioan Oas, "Shifting the Iron Curtain of Kantian Peace: NATO Expansion and the Modern Magyars," in *The Geography of War and Peace : From Death Camps to Diplomats*, ed. Colin Flint (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2005), 396.

geographical enlargement wave during late 1990s. As a result of the enlargement, NATO gained total dominance in the Euro-Atlantic region.

As NATO celebrated its 60th birthday, the new security environment looked more complex and full of risks. The stability of bipolarity or unipolarity will not be in the new international structure. In addition to the states, non-state actors will pose new threats to NATO. In such an environment, NATO's first and foremost function needs to be safeguarding territory, people and interests. The new environment will necessitate not only high end military capabilities but also non-military capabilities. Soft power along with hard power should be effectively used against the new challenges.

NATO should not be considered a military toolbox for any specific mission or country. NATO is a success story only because political consultation and coordination prevailed instead of coercion and confrontation. Even though the US has been unrivaled in the alliance, it did not force the other allies to follow specific policies, as Soviet Union did in the Warsaw pact.¹⁴ Table 3 summarizes the analysis of the dissertation:

THE AREA FOR FURTHER RESEARCH

As explained before, NATO is a mature field in international studies. However, as the alliance transforms itself, new gaps are arising for scholars. This dissertation does not explain how new functions are derived from the changing security environment. Hence, the dissertation does not answer why NATO adopted a normative function of 'Whole and Free Europe' in the post Cold War era. Is it due to the NATO's collective identity and moral values or due to the interests of NATO allies? This would be a valuable area for further research on institutions.

¹⁴ Craig and Logevall, *America's Cold War : The Politics of Insecurity*, 358.

TABLE 3. The Summary of Analysis

Milestone	International Structure	Source of Threat	Core Function	Capability Requirements	Geo-Enlargement
1949-1953	Bipolar	Soviet Union	Collective Defense	Security Commitments	None
1953-1989	Bipolar	Soviet Union	Active Deterrence and Containment	New Forces, New Infrastructure, New Bases	Limited
1989-2001	Unipolar	Ethnic Regional Conflict	Whole and Free Europe	Coercive Diplomacy with the New Democracies, Niche Capabilities, Deployable Forces	Expanded
2001-...	Nonpolar-Multipolar	Unconventional Threats	Safeguarding territory, people and interests	Expeditionary Operations Non-military Capabilities	...

Furthermore, the study does not cover the institutional decision making processes on both functional and geographical evolution. Although 28 nations are sitting in the council, the decision making process is much more complex than simple voting mechanism. Further investigation of NATO's internal procedures would provide significant data on how successful organizations manage change and adaptation.

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VITA

Erdogan Kurt
Graduate Program in International Studies
621 Batten Arts and Letters Building
Old Dominion University
Norfolk, Virginia 23529-0086

Education:

PhD	2010	International Studies Old Dominion University Norfolk, Virginia
MA	2001	Resorce Planning and Management for International Defense Naval Postgraduate School Monterey, California
BA	1996	System Engineering Turkish Military Academy Ankara, Turkey