

Economics, environmentalism and party alignments: A note on partisan change in advanced industrial democracies

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Abstract. ‘We are neither Left nor Right, we are out in front’ was the mantra of the environmental movement in the 1970s and early 1980s. This research examines the relationship between the traditional left/right economic cleavage and the environmental cleavage in structuring party competition in advanced industrial democracies. It begins by discussing the theoretical rationale for the separation of environmentalism from the traditional economic cleavage, and utilises new expert data to describe the evolution of party positions between 1989 and 2002–2003. An initially strong relationship between party positions on both dimensions in 1989 has strengthened over time. The convergence occurs largely because of changes by Green parties and by the addition of new parties that define themselves on both dimensions. This points to the ability of democratic party systems to integrate a new political cleavage, and the process of integration. However, leftist parties still continue to diverge with respect to how they respond to the environmental cleavage.

One saying captures the essence of the environmental movement of the late 1970s and early 1980s: ‘We are neither Left nor Right, we are out in front.’ Early environmental leaders such as Jonathan Porritt of the British Friends of the Earth and Petra Kelly of the German Green Party frequently repeated this slogan. Green activists claimed that the established left and right parties were unresponsive to the environmental problems facing advanced industrial democracies, and these new issues transcended traditional left/right ideologies. One consequence was the emergence of new Green parties to represent these issues, and these Green parties reiterated the position that they did not fit the traditional left/right party alignment.

Research generally confirmed this distinction between the environmental dimension and the traditional left/right economic alignment. Political theorists claimed that the Green *Weltanschauung* challenged the capitalist market system of advanced industrial democracies, and thus the established parties could not easily integrate this perspective into their electoral coalition (Milbrath 1984; Pahlke 1989). Electoral research found that existing parties struggled to address new issues of environmental quality, nuclear power and the rest of the Green alternative agenda (Inglehart 1984, 1990; Knutsen 1987;

Dalton et al. 1984). For instance, social democratic parties strained to bridge a voter base consisting of blue-collar workers and young, postmaterial voters; Conservative parties were divided between their business clientele and the liberalism of the new middle class. Thus, Green parties claimed to represent a new ideological orientation that would reshape party alignments (Müller-Rommel 1989; Richardson & Rootes 1995), and party positions on the environmental dimension often differed markedly from their traditional left/right alignments (Laver & Hunt 1992).

At the same time, environmentalism was gradually winning acceptance by Western publics and political elites. As political orientations changed, this may have facilitated the incorporation of these issues into the established left/right framework, so that environmental policy may no longer form a distinct partisan dimension. In addition, the entrance of some Green parties into government generated pressures for these parties to moderate their alternative positions as part of an expanded leftist alliance (Müller-Rommel & Poguntke 2002; Poguntke 2002).

Now, more than a decade of additional partisan history provides further evidence of whether environmentalism persists as a separate dimension of party competition, or whether these issues are being integrated into previous left/right alignments. At one level, this research provides new empirical evidence on the evolution of Western party systems. Even more important, environmentalism was presented as a fundamental challenge to the traditional left/right party structures of Western party systems. If the separation between dimensions continues, it implies that contemporary systems are still struggling to reconcile these conflicting political frameworks. If environmentalism has been largely integrated into the pre-existing party structure, this suggests that either the nature of the initial environmental challenge was overstated, or democratic party systems display an impressive ability to integrate even alternative political frameworks.

This article examines the relationship between these two dimensions – the traditional left/right economic dimension and the environmental dimension – in the democratic party systems of advanced industrial democracies. Our goal is not to provide a general model of party alignments (see Benoit & Laver 2006), but to examine the theoretical and empirical relationship between these two dimensions. We begin by discussing the theoretical rationale for the separation of environmentalism from the traditional economic cleavage, and the hypotheses that this pattern may have changed in recent years. Then, we utilise new expert data to describe the evolution of party positions. Finally, we discuss the implications of our empirical findings for understanding the environmental cleavage, and how it is affecting Western party systems.

Environmentalism as a new partisan dimension

The economic cleavage has provided a basic framework for party competition since the formation of mass party systems (Lipset & Rokkan 1967).¹ Social democratic/Labour parties have been the advocates for the working class and their interests, and often institutionalised this relationship to labour in the party's name, dual union/party membership or formal representation for labour within the party organisation. Conversely, Conservative parties' ties to business and the middle class were often just as strong. Elections were typically fought over conflicting party programmes for the economy. A large body of empirical research subsequently demonstrated the importance of the economic cleavages in most contemporary democracies (Franklin et al. 1982). 1

Over the past several decades, however, postmaterial and cultural issues have provided a new basis of political and partisan division – most clearly typified by environmental issues (Inglehart 1984, 1990; Knutsen 1987). New environmental interest groups often sought representation from the established parties. However, parties on both the left and right typically had difficulties reconciling their traditional economic programmes and these new environmental policies. Leftist parties experienced a tension between their support for economic growth as a means of improving the life conditions of the working class and the new demands for environmental protection that might challenge economic development projects and pro-growth policies. For instance, the *Die Grünen* in Germany and *Les Verts* in France have had a tempestuous relationships with the Social Democrats and Socialists – first as rivals, and then as allies in government, and now again in opposition (Poguntke 2002; Knapp 2004: 70–73). To a lesser extent, Conservative parties also struggled with these tensions. Environmentalists' opposition to nuclear power typified their distinct political position. Anti-nuclear groups frequently found themselves facing an alliance of labour and business (and their partisan supporters) who favoured the development of nuclear power. Similar cross-cutting alliances often occurred on other economic development projects.

Because green issues were not easily accommodated in the traditional left/right framework, they spawned new Green parties or reformed left-libertarian parties to represent their views (Müller-Rommel 1989). The Greens also adopted other alternative policies on women's right, life style choices, foreign policy and multiculturalism that further distinguished them from the economically oriented left/right party structure. Several analysts thus saw environmentalism as providing a new ideological framework for society and politics that sharply contrasted with the dominant paradigm shared by social democratic and Conservative parties (Milbrath 1984; Pahlke 1989; Carter 2001). Furthermore, this new cleavage was reinforced by the emergence of

New Right parties, such as the National Front in France or the *Republikaner* in Germany, which formalised an opposing right-authoritarian pole on many of the cultural issues advocated by Green parties (Cole 2005; Ignazi 2003). For instance, Hooghe et al. (2004) labeled this the 'GAL-TAN dimension', and argued that it crosscuts the traditional left-right alignment.²

Environmentalism thus appeared to represent a new political dimension that was orthogonal to the traditional economic dimension. A number of electoral studies started describing a two-dimension space of party competition (e.g., Dalton et al. 1984; McAllister 1992: Chapter 5; Borre & Andersen 1997: Chapter 2; Dalton 2008: Chapter 7). Many studies of political parties added the 'family' of Green parties to their ideological comparisons (e.g., Knutsen 1995; Budge et al. 2001; Benoit & Laver 2006). Moreover, analysts speculated that these parties could produce a fundamental realignment in the structure of Western party systems (Kriesi 1998; Inglehart 1990).

In contrast, other scholars argued that environmentalism is gradually being incorporated into the established left/right party alignment. For instance, Kitschelt (1989) was one of the first to suggest that Green parties were developing a left-libertarian agenda that merged traditional leftist economic positions with new libertarian policies toward the environment, women's rights and other issues. Rohrschneider (1993) found that some established European parties were responding to the Green agenda even by the end of the 1980s. Other research showed that the meaning of left and right was gradually changing to include environmentalism within a leftist identity (Inglehart 1990; Knutsen 1995). Furthermore, as Green parties entered leftist coalition governments in several European democracies in the 1990s, these experiences may have forced the parties to adopt more pragmatic policies because of coalition politics and governing responsibility. Müller-Rommel (2002: 10–11), for instance, suggested that when Green parties entered governments they faced political and governing pressures to moderate their policy positions, their political style, and even their organisational structures. Thus both Green parties and their conservative opponents may be becoming more consistent in their economic and environmental stances. Summing up this position, Jacques Thomassen (1999: 54) claimed that 'political cleavages in western societies have become more and more one-dimensional in the sense that the left-right dimension has gradually absorbed other conflict dimensions'.

This article examines these contrasting images of the impact of environmentalism on the party systems of advanced industrial democracies. From one perspective, environmentalism is seen as a new worldview that conflicts with the dominant economic paradigm of these societies, and is institutionalised by a network of environmental groups and Green parties. Thus, environmentalism generates a dimension of partisan competition distinct from the traditional

left/right economic dimension. From the contrasting perspective, environmentalism has gradually found social acceptance, and is being integrated into a single dimension of left/right cleavage. Consequently, parties are realigning so that a left-libertarian pole stands in opposition to economic and social conservatism. We compare these two contrasting visions in the research presented here.

Data sources

The challenge in studying party change is to identify evidence sufficient to track party positions over time for a large set of nations. There are three common methods of assessing party positions (Benoit & Laver 2006: Chapter 3; Budge et al. 2001). The first method uses citizen perceptions of party positions derived from national public opinion surveys. However, broad cross-national comparisons are rare because different national surveys use different question wordings and longitudinal cross-national surveys on citizen perceptions of party positions across multiple policy dimensions do not exist.

A second method is based on the coding of party programmes such as the Comparative Manifesto Project (CMP) (Budge et al. 1987, 2001). However, the CMP measured the salience of issues in campaigns, rather than the party's positions on each issue. This methodology has generated considerable debate about whether it produces accurate left/right party positions.³ In any case, the coding system was not designed to distinguish effectively between separate sub-dimensions as we propose here.

We therefore rely on a third method: asking experts to position the political parties along a series of political dimensions. We analyse two waves of expert surveys conducted by Michael Laver and his colleagues (Laver & Hunt 1992; Benoit & Laver 2006). The first survey was conducted in 1989 and included 24 advanced industrial democracies.⁴ A total of 355 experts placed parties along more than a dozen policy scales. Laver and Benoit repeated this project with a new expert survey in 2002–2003 that spanned 47 nations, including a new set of democracies in Eastern Europe. A total of 1,491 experts provided information in this second survey.

These surveys draw upon the knowledge of these 'experts' and presumably integrate a complex set of evidence (such as manifestos, campaign rhetoric and legislative activity) into these summary judgements.⁵ These surveys yield unique longitudinal data. There are 387 parties in our database, 146 from established democracies in the first wave and 170 in the second wave (plus 181 parties from the new democracies in East Europe that are used later in the analyses). A total of 110 parties or their equivalents are included in both waves.

In addition, the expert surveys separately assess party position on the economic and environmental dimensions, rather than the overall left/right scales that are typically derived from opinion surveys or the CMP project.

Tracking party alignments

Our research compares party positions on the economic and environmental dimensions across nations and time. The economic dimension should reflect the continuing debate about the role of government along the left-right economic cleavage. This implies leftist support for an activist government, social welfare programmes and a concern for the disadvantaged – all issues with a long basis in the economic programme of Labour and social democratic parties. In contrast, the other pole reflects a Conservative orientation to reduce the government's role in society, reduce social programmes and lower tax rates. The environmental agenda includes policy goals such as reducing the industrial degradation of the environment, preserving nature, promoting biodiversity and restricting nuclear energy. Thus, the core of environmentalism is the contrast between the growth and consumerist paradigm of capitalist market systems versus the protection of nature and sustainable economic policies. This contrast is the source of conflict between Green parties and established parties of the left and right that endorse the present economic paradigm, albeit with different emphases.

To tap these two dimensions, we use two questions that asked party experts to position the parties along 1–20-point scales:

Taxes versus Public Services

- (1) Promote raising taxes to increase public services
- (20) Promote cutting public services to cut taxes

Environmental Policy

- (1) Support protection of environment, even at the cost of economic growth
- (20) Support economic growth, even at the cost of damage to the environment

The first item taps the economic dimension in terms of the role of government. This should clearly display the traditional left/right partisan competition between social democratic/Labour parties and Conservative parties. The environmental dimension should have Green parties congregating at one pole, with established parties of the traditional left and right located toward the other pole. At issue is the degree of relationship between these old and new dimensions.




Figure 1. Party positions in 1989.
Source: 1989 Party Expert Survey.

Figure 1 plots the position of parties on these two dimensions in 1989. Rather than orthogonal dimensions, there is a strong positive relationship between the economic and environmental dimensions even by 1989 ($r = 0.64$, $N = 146$).⁶ However, the figure also displays the cross-pressures between these two dimensions. The relationship appears as a V shape, with the narrow end to the upper right and a wider spread to the lower left.⁷ Economically right parties are generally 'conservative' on the environment dimension, but there is a much wider variation among economically left parties. This is more apparent if we compare party families. Green parties, for example, are more than five points more liberal on the environmental dimension than the economic dimension. Conversely, in 1989 Communist parties were nearly four points more conservative on the environmental dimension than the economic dimension. Similarly, the Greens and social democratic/Labour parties are located at about the same point on the economic dimension, but differ by more than eight points on the environmental dimension. Thus, on the environmental dimension, the social democratic/Labour parties are actually closer to conservatives and Christian democrats than to Green parties.

Thus, the distinction between the two dimensions primarily reflects the cross-cutting patterns among parties on the economic left. Blue-collar workers are the voter base of established leftist parties, while environmentalism and other libertarian issues attract young, middle-class, postmaterial voters to a new left orientation (Kriesi 1998; Inglehart 1990). Leftist parties struggle to balance, or choose between, these two constituencies. The German case provides a natural example. The SPD tried to build an electoral coalition between




Figure 2. Party positions in 2002–2003.
Source: 2002–2003 Party Expert Survey.

these two distinct constituencies, and in successive elections from 1983 until 1998 its chancellor candidates varied from trying to incorporate potential Green voters to arguing against an environmental agenda.⁸

The relationship between both dimensions may have changed with the passage of time, however.⁹ Environmentalism has won wider public acceptance, Green parties/groups built alliances with established political parties on the left, and in some instances even joined national governments as part of a leftist coalition. Figure 2 presents party positions on the economic and environmental dimensions in 2002–2003. The relationship between party positions on both dimensions has strengthened over this time span ($r = 0.76$, $N = 170$).¹⁰ However, we again see a V-shaped distribution of parties. Parties on the economic right generally advocate a conservative position on the environmental dimension, while parties on the economic left are still somewhat divided. However, there is now less division among leftist parties.¹¹

What are the sources of this partial partisan realignment? There are several possible explanations. The end of the Cold War has eroded the ideological base of Communist parties, and many reformed and renamed former Communist parties have attempted to recreate their image; this often includes new attention to environmental issues. Alternatively, the experiences of Green parties in running for election and governing may have prompted these parties to moderate their environmental positions, and attempt to broaden their appeal (Müller-Rommel & Poguntke 2002). Thus, Green parties may have adopted less extreme positions on the environmental dimension that is more in tune with their position on the economic dimension. And more generally, as

environmentalism has won acceptance among Western publics, other parties may have altered their environmental stance. For instance, European social democratic/Labour parties were initially hostile to environmentalists, but many have found a *modus vivendi* with the Green movement and added some environmental issues to their programmes.

We can determine whether there are general patterns across advanced industrial democracies that are consistent with these rival hypotheses by examining how *party families* have changed over time. We focus on party families because many of the specific parties differ between the two time points.¹² If Green parties as a group have significantly altered their ideological stances, this should be evident by comparing the average position of Green parties in both surveys. Similarly, if Communist parties have moderated their views, this should be apparent in longitudinal comparisons. There is also potential change on the right. Europe's New Right parties have apparently taken a clearer opposition position on many of the cultural issues that Green parties represent, and this may strengthen the relationship between dimensions over time (Cole 2005).

Figure 3 tracks the patterns of change by plotting the average position of parties within eight ideological families at both time points. The party groups are Communists (COM), Greens (G), Social Democratic/Labour (SD),




Figure 3. Change in the position of party families.

Notes: COM = Communist parties. G = Green parties. SD = Social Democratic/Labour parties. LIB = Liberal parties. CD = Christian Democrat parties. CON = Conservative parties. R = regional parties. EXR = extreme right parties.

Sources: 1989 and 2002–2003 Party Expert Surveys.

Liberals (LIB), Christian Democrats (CD), Conservatives (CON), Regional (R), and Extreme Right Parties (EXR).¹³ Across all parties, there is relatively little change along the economic dimension over time, and only the extreme right party family average changed by more than a scale point.¹⁴ For all parties, the average position on the environmental dimension moderated by nearly a full scale point between time points, but only two party groups shifted by more than a point. The Green party family moved almost a scale point away from the environmental pole, while becoming more leftist on the economic dimension.¹⁵ In addition, regional parties became more environmentally conservative. However, changes among the other party families are generally quite modest, and there is little evidence of a systematic moderation of the anti-environmental stance of (post-)Communist parties or a pro-environmental shift by social democratic/Labour parties.

In summary, we would not argue that the environmental dimension is now fully integrated into an overarching left/right framework in Western party systems, but there has been movement in this direction. By 2002–2003 there was a stronger relationship between where a party stands on the traditional old politics economic cleavage and where it stands on the new politics of the environment. Environmental policy debates are not orthogonal to traditional left or right party alignments. At the same time, however, Green parties retain their distinctive identity as advocates for environmental issues, keeping them separate from all other parties. Even in 2002–2003, the social democratic/Labour parties were closer to Conservatives, Christian democrats and even extreme right parties on the environmental dimension, than they were to the Greens.

Party change in advanced industrial democracies

One of the prime democratic functions of political parties is to articulate and represent the interests existing within a society. The emergence of the environmental movement reflects the changing issue agendas of advanced industrial societies, where traditional class-based alignments are decreasing in salience and new values-based issues are increasingly salient.¹⁶ Environmental interests initially struggled to find voice and representation within the system of established parties. As Green parties formed to represent these interests, this apparently created a new source of partisan polarisation and a potential for partisan realignment.

We examined the relationship between the existing left/right economic framework of party competition and the new environmental cleavage. Our first interest was empirical: to what extent are these dimensions independent of one

another? Already by the end of the 1980s, the economic and environmental cleavages were strongly related, but at the same time, environmentalism created cross-cutting divisions among economically leftist parties. By 2002–2003, party positions on both dimensions had become more consistent, even though significant differentiation still exists. Thus, there has been a convergence of party positions on both dimensions, but this remains an incomplete process.

In broader theoretical terms, the emergence of the environmental dimension provides an opportunity to track how party systems change in response to a new programmatic challenge. As Downs (1957: 110–111) argued as a theoretical principle and others have demonstrated with empirical evidence, established parties displayed an inertia in the face of the emergence of Green parties because they are dependent on an existing clientele and constrained by their past identity. Even the social democratic and Communist parties that were susceptible to losing young, liberal voters to the Greens nevertheless modified their own positions only slightly (at least over the 1989–2003 time span). We do not mean that these parties did not address environmental issues, but that they adopted positions that do not alienate their traditional class base and are consistent with their economic ideology.

Because of the resistance of the established parties, an initial response was the creation of new political parties to represent Green demands. Once these new parties found an electoral base, further change came from two sources that probably reflect a general pattern of party system adaptation. First, the Green parties generally shifted to positions where their mix of environmental and economic positions are more consistent with existing party alignments – along a left-libertarian to right-authoritarian (or GAL-TAN) dimension. Green parties moderated their environmental position by nearly a point between surveys. This appears to be a typical pattern of democratic incorporation, in which new political actors begin with a fundamentalist challenge to the political order, but then they face substantial systemic pressures to moderate their positions in order to endure and achieve some policy success. In addition, the Green parties adopted a more leftist position on the economic dimension despite their initial rejection of traditional economic leftism. Consequently, their positions on both dimensions became more congruent by the second time period (a 5.3 point gap in 1989 to a 3.1 gap in 2002–2003).

Second, party systems adaptation occurs through the creation of new parties, even in the relatively brief period of 12–13 years. New parties entered a system defined by two cleavage dimensions, and developed their identity within this framework. For instance, the extreme right parties that emerged in several nations began with conservative positions on both the economic and the environmental cleavage. Both of these processes strengthened the relationship between party positions on both dimensions. These processes mean

that a broad dimension of conflict between left-libertarian and right-authoritarian parties is developing in most Western party systems.¹⁷ Moreover, the evidence from the experts survey is similar to the overlap between dimensions found in the attitudes of partisans based on mass public opinion surveys. This convergence will not be without problems because the potential contradictions between economic growth and environmental protection remain, and the Green parties still articulate a distinct alternative programme. However, it appears that gradually party systems are responding to these new political demands and integrating them into a reformist left-libertarian agenda, with new opposition from right-authoritarian parties.

Notes

1. The Lipset and Rokkan (1967) framework and subsequent empirical research demonstrated that religion, region and urban/rural residence were other important bases of social cleavage and potentially party competition. We focus on the relationship between the economic dimension and the environmental dimension as portraying the tension between the traditional economics cleavage and the new politics of advanced industrial democracies.
2. Hooghe et al. (2004) define GAL/TAN as green, alternative and libertarian positions versus traditional, authoritarian and nationalist positions. This is similar to Inglehart's (1984) dimensional analyses that juxtapose New Left environmental and feminist groups in contrast to New Right advocates.
3. See Laver and Garry (2000); Benoit and Laver (2007). Harmel et al. (1995) claim that the coding of issue salience is not sufficient to measure the policy positions of the parties on a left/right scale. This is even more problematic when one wants to compare parties along separate policy dimensions such as the economic and environmental cleavages.
4. We want to thank Benoit and Laver for sharing these data with the research community (www.politics.tcd.ie/ppmd/). We include the following 24 nations in our analyses of both waves: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Britain, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Malta, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United States.
5. Benoit and Laver (2006: Appendix) have extensively examined the reliability of these measures, and their comparison to other data sources.
6. To validate the expert data, we compiled data on the position of party supporters on both dimensions from the 1996 ISSP (ZA 2900); services/spending (V56) and support for environmental spending (V25). We coded mean scores on both questions when a party had at least 25 supporters in the survey. The mean attitude score for partisans on both questions are strongly related, albeit weaker than for the party expert survey ($r = 0.57$, $N = 60$). Partisans' positions are also strongly related to the expert's party placement for the services/taxes dimension in 1989 ($r = 0.55$) and the environmental dimension ($r = 0.62$).
7. Although we do not present these data, there is an analogous V-shaped pattern for social/moral issues in the Benoit/Laver data, except in this instance the economic leftist parties are the narrow end of the V because they are also leftist on social issues. In

contrast, economically rightist parties show a wider dispersion on the social/moral cleavage (Benoit & Laver 2006; Dalton 2008: Chapter 11). In other words, the environmental cleavage divides economically leftist parties while moral issues divide the right.

8. In the 1989 comparison, the Greens and SPD differ by barely one scale point on the economic dimension, but by more than six points on the environmental dimension. The SPD was closer to the CDU/CSU or the FDP on the environmental dimension.
9. The full correlation matrix for the two dimensions at two time points follows. Note that the number of parties varies at each time point, and across both time points. This was a period of substantial partisan change in Europe, and it is reflected in the changing party lineups.

	Economic 1989	Environmental 1989	Economic 2002	Environmental 2002
Economic 1989	1.00			
N	146			
Environmental 1989	0.64	1.00		
N	146	146		
Economic 2002	0.83	0.58	1.00	
N	110	110	170	
Environmental	0.70	0.89	0.76	1.00
N	110	110	170	170

10. The asymptotic standard error is 0.04 for 1989 and 0.03 for the 2002 correlation, and thus the difference in correlations is significant at the 0.05 level.
11. We correlated the two dimensions separately for economic right and left parties. In 1989 the two dimensions are correlated at 0.65 among economically right parties, and this is 0.60 in the 2002 survey. For economically left parties, the 1989 correlation is 0.22, and this increases to 0.46 in 2002.
12. To illustrate this, there are 146 parties coded for the established democracies in 1989, and 170 for the 2002 study; but there are only 110 parties included in both waves of the study.
13. In most instances, we relied on the coding of party families in the Comparative Study of Electoral Systems datasets (www.cses.org). In cases where a party is not included in the CSES, the author coded party family.
14. The extreme right parties moved from a mean of 15.9 in 1989 to a mean of 12.6 in 2002–2003. However, this may also arise because the number of parties coded as extreme right nearly doubled between the two time points, and the new parties may have entered politics with more moderate views.
15. This moderation of environmental stances is not related to whether the Green party had joined a national government or not.
16. To illustrate this point, the Benoit/Laver 2002–2003 survey included the new democracies of Eastern Europe. In these nations, the economic cleavage is still forming, but there is less attention to environmental issues and less relationship between the dimensions. The correlation between party positions on both dimensions is only $r = 0.18$ ($N = 181$). Moreover, among parties to the left on the economic scale there is a negative correlation between the dimensions ($r = -0.06$, $N = 96$), and only a weak positive correlation among parties on the right of the economic scale ($r = 0.24$, $N = 85$).

17. Benoit and Laver (2006: Table 6A.2) found that environmentalism was significantly linked to a party's overall left/right positions in most established democracies, even while controlling for the dimensions of services/taxes and social policy.

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