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EDUCATION AND COMMUNITY.

BY- NEWMANN, FRED M. OLIVER, DONALD W.

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THIS PAPER PRESENTS A DISSENTING VIEW OF PREVAILING
CONCEPTS OF EDUCATION AND APPROACHES TO EDUCATIONAL REFORM.
THE AUTHORS STATE THAT REFORMS CURRENTLY DIRECTED AT AMERICAN
SCHOOLS ARE GROUNDED IN CONCEPTUAL AND INSTITUTIONAL
FRAMEWORKS THAT FAIL TO CONFRONT THE MOST FUNDAMENTAL
PROBLEMS OF THE AGE. THEY OUTLINE THE NATURE OF THESE
PROBLEMS, SUGGEST WAYS IN WHICH EDUCATION IN AMERICA BOTH
REFLECTS AND EXACERBATES THE PROBLEMS, AND FINALLY SKETCH AN
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This essay presents a dissenting view of prevailing concepts of education and approaches to educational reform. Reforms currently directed at American schools are grounded in conceptual and institutional frameworks that fail to confront the most fundamental problems of our age. The authors outline the nature of these problems, suggest ways in which education in America both reflects and exacerbates the problems, and finally sketch an educational model they feel is more appropriate to the challenges of modern America.

FRED M. NEWMANN

DONALD W. OLIVER

Harvard University

U. S. DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE
Office of Education

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Education and Community*

We assume that the most fundamental objective of education is the development of individual human dignity, or self-realization within community. The broadly stated objective can be specified in many ways, emphasizing either individualism or social association. However one defines dignity or fulfillment, the nature of the society within which it develops is critical. As Kateb (1965, p. 456) points out:

First, the relation between social practices and institutions and the self is not simply one of support or encouragement. To put it that way is to imply that there could be selves without society, that society is at most a device for helping the self to do what it could do alone but only very laboriously, and that eventually the self can outgrow society and be realized in splendid isolation. The plain truth is that without a society there are no selves, that, as Aristotle said, the community is prior to the individual, that the selves to be realized are given their essential qualities by their societies,

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and that the process of self-realization is a process of continuous involvement with society, as society not only shapes but employs everyone's inner riches. The upshot is that thought about possible styles of life or about the nature of man is necessary to give sense to the idea of individuality. Far from being an oppressive encroachment, social theory (utopian or not) is a basic duty.

Kateb's point applied to education means that educational policy should be based on deliberation and inquiry into needs of the individual within community. Every educator faithful to this premise should be able, therefore, to explicate and clarify the particular conception of society or community upon which he justifies educational recommendations.

I. TWO INTERPRETATIONS OF MODERN AMERICAN SOCIETY

Contemporary American civilization can be interpreted with reference to two general concepts: missing community and great society. The former notices effects of industrialization, urbanization, specialization, and technology that tend to destroy man's sense of relatedness, to disintegrate common bonds, to increase apathy, to depersonalize activities, and to reduce identity and meaning in the human career. In contrast, the vision of a great society exudes a sturdy optimism in man's progress, a desire to accelerate urbanization, technology, and economic development, on the assumption that such inevitable historical forces can be harnessed to make man more free and more secure to allow him to be more "human" than ever before. Education for the great society involves raising teacher salaries, building more schools, using computers and audio-visual devices to supply training and meet the manpower needs of the "national interest." Seen from a missing community perspective, however, major objectives of education involve the creation and nourishment of diverse styles of life which allow for significant choice in the reconstruction of community relationships—formal training and "national interest" are of minor significance. Before delving into the two theories, we must examine the concept of community, for its definition lies at the heart of the distinction between these two views of American civilization.

Redefining Community

Nineteenth century sociologists (and earlier thinkers as well) compared human relationships and groups by referring to a general construct bounded at one end by the concept "community" and at the other by "society" (Tönnies, 1963).¹ The former signifies a closely knit, generally self-sufficient, rural

¹In the foreword to this edition, P. Sorokin mentions eternal parallels between the work of Tönnies and Confucius, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero, and others. In the introduction, J. C.

group in which the extended family serves not only the function of procreation but also the functions of economic production, education, recreation, religion, care of the sick and aged, safety, and defense. Individuals in such a group know each other well; they share common experiences and traditions; they depend upon each other and assume responsibility for solving group problems. Style of life varies inappreciably from one generation to the next.

A sharp contrast to this type of group is mass society, characterized by large numbers of people within an urban industrial environment, influenced by many institutions each of which performs the separate functions of education, religion, economic production, defense, medicine, recreation, care of the aged, and legal and political control. People shift their places of residence, change their occupations, and follow living styles quite different from those of previous generations. Because of mobility, specialization, and a rapid rate of change, people have less in common with each other and weaker ties to a basic or primary group; their allegiances and loyalties are diffused among many social units instead of focused on one.

Relationships within a community have been described as "organic," and "natural," while societal relationships are seen as "mechanical," and "rational." Community becomes an end in itself, while society is a means toward other separate ends. Thus did Tönnies distinguish between *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society), the former based on shared intimacy and interdependence—the folkways and mores of primary groups; the latter signifying impersonal, logical, formally contractual relationships inherent in commerce, science, and bureaucracy. Tönnies helps to clarify the distinction by asserting that in a community, human relationships are characterized by acquaintance, sympathy, confidence, and interdependence; whereas in a society, relationships reveal strangeness, antipathy, mistrust, and independence.

Conventional sociological definitions of community emphasize (a) a set of households concentrated within a limited geographical area; (b) substantial social interaction between residents; and (c) a sense of common membership, of belonging together, not based exclusively on kinship ties. The essential criterion seems to be a psychological one—"a sense of common bond," the sharing of an identity, holding things in common esteem (Inkeles, 1964, pp. 68-9). Communities are frequently identified by references to legal-political boundaries, ethnic groups, occupational classifications, or simply areas of residence. Standard definitions fail to distinguish among

McKinney and C. P. Loomis discuss analogous concepts in the work of Durkheim, Cooley, Redfield, Becker, Sorokin, Weber, and Parsons.

more specific criteria that *lead to* the development of interaction or a sense of belonging; the above criteria, for example, make it difficult to distinguish between a group and a community. We should like to offer a more differentiated set of criteria, each of which is viewed as a continuum. It is thus possible to have greater and lesser degrees of community depending upon the extent to which each of the criteria described below is fulfilled. These criteria include attributes valued by the authors and encompass characteristics beyond those needed for a minimally adequate definition. For instance, tightly knit groups or communities do not necessarily allow competing factions (attribute 3, below); the Puritans in Massachusetts Bay and the Amish in Pennsylvania are examples. By our definition, such groups constitute less of a community than groups which tolerate more diverse conceptions of "the good life." A community is a group

(1) in which membership is valued as an end in itself, not merely as a means to other ends;

(2) that concerns itself with many and significant aspects of the lives of members;

(3) that allows competing factions;

(4) whose members share commitment to common purpose and to procedures for handling conflict within the group;

(5) whose members share responsibility for the actions of the group;

(6) whose members have enduring and extensive personal contact with each other.

This working definition omits residence, political units, occupations, etc. as necessarily valid boundaries by which to distinguish one community from another.

As we speak of "missing community," we are constantly reminded of the foolishness of wishing for the establishment in the modern world of communities similar to the traditional rural model. We are told either (a) that such communities never did exist; or (b) they may have existed, but they were certainly not very pleasant—on the contrary, that human life in the by-gone community contained anxieties and problems more tragic than the ones we face today; or (c) they may have existed and been delightful, but inevitable forces have pushed them aside and it is impossible to turn back the clock. But these points are irrelevant. Our definition makes no historical claims, nor does it implore a return to days of old. The only claim is that in the modern world, community (as defined above) is missing.

It is not that the number of associations and human groups has decreased. On the contrary, we find more organizations than ever before: professional associations, credit unions, churches, corporations, labor unions, civil rights groups, clubs, as well as families. Yet few, if any, of such groups fulfill our

definition of community, mainly because of the relatively special and narrow functions that each of them serves. The emergence of many institutions, each with specialized functions, has created discontinuities, such as the major one described by Nisbet:

Our present crisis lies in the fact that whereas the small traditional associations, founded upon kinship, faith, or locality, are still expected to communicate to individuals the principal moral ends and psychological gratifications of society, they have manifestly become detached from positions of functional relevance to the larger economic and political decisions of our society. Family, local community, church, and the whole network of informal interpersonal relationships have ceased to play a determining role in our institutional systems of mutual aid, welfare, education, recreation, and economic production and distribution. Yet despite the loss of these manifest institutional functions, we continue to expect them to perform adequately the implicit psychological or symbolic functions in the life of the individual (Nisbet, 1962, p. 54).

What institutions *do* perform psychological or symbolic functions necessary for viable community? In mass society few can be found, and Nisbet traces historical developments that account for their disappearance. He sees at the root of the problem the growth of a centralized economic and political system which, by concentrating on serving *individual* needs, has neglected and eroded community. Objectives of the "great society" are to provide selected products and services: housing, jobs, food, education, medical aid, transportation, and recreation for individuals; and centralized bureaucracies now meet many of these particular needs. But the process of centralization and specialization has caused the breakdown of communication among differing groups, the rise of transient rather than enduring relationships among people, the disintegration of common bonds and the reluctance to share collective responsibility. Whether it is possible to create new forms of community appropriate for urban and industrial society should be of great concern in planning for education. The extent to which one takes this problem seriously depends largely upon whether he accepts a *missing community* or a *great society* frame of reference. These contrasting ways of construing social issues and educational needs are described below. Our intent here is to describe, rather than to defend or justify either view.

The Missing Community

Modern technological society proceeds at an ever increasing rate toward the breakdown of conditions requisite to human dignity. Neither the contented, other-directed, organization man, nor the American female, nor the alienated youth finds genuine integrity or a sense of relatedness to the human community. Experience becomes fragmented, and humans become en-

capsulated, as occupational specialization and social isolation make it difficult for diverse groups to communicate effectively with each other. Human relationships take on mechanistic qualities and become determined, not by tradition, human feeling, or spontaneous desires, but by impersonal machines or bureaucratic flow charts. Career patterns, social roles, and environments change rapidly, producing conflicting demands on the individual, and threatening the establishment of identity. The size, complexity, and interdependence of political and economic institutions dwarf his significance. The destiny of the community appears to be guided either by elite, inaccessible power blocs or by impersonal forces, insensitive to individual protest or opinion. People lack direction and commitment; they betray either lethargic denial of basic problems, ambiguity and conflict regarding value choices, or outright repudiation of a concern for significant choices.²

The first theme prominent in the missing community view is *fragmentation* of life. Modern society, it is argued, accelerates a process of specialization, division of labor, and personal isolation, making it difficult for the individual to relate to other human beings outside of a narrow social class or vocational group. The inability to associate or communicate beyond the limits of one's special "place" is destructive to a sense of identity within community, because community demands the ability to perceive (or at least unconsciously assume) relatedness among a variety of people, institutions, events, and stages of life.

Second, and related to fragmentation, is the theme of *change*. In a way, the essence of American character is zeal for change; yet the exponential rate of social change in modern society tends to destroy the essential stability required to establish a sense of relatedness among people. Social change aggravates the difficulties of one generation's relating to the next; it thwarts the opportunity to observe or sense continuity within the human career; and it places considerable strains on the human personality by valuing primarily adjustment and flexibility.

Third, critics decry our present state of *ideological and aesthetic bankruptcy*. It is argued that modern society, through a reverence for technology, cultivates excessive stress on the fulfillment of instrumental values, and pays scant attention to ends or ideals. Mass culture discourages utopian thought;

² These observations relate to a wide range of phenomena, represented in studies of bureaucracy (Blau, 1956; Whyte, 1956); corporate power (Berle, 1954); political and legal institutions (Mills, 1956; Wheeler, 1965); ideology (Bell, 1962); youth (Friedenberg, 1959, 1963; Goodman, 1956; Keniston, 1965); education (Kimball and McClellan, 1962); work and leisure (Mumford, 1934; Swados, 1957; Veblen, 1957); women (Friedan, 1964); American character (Riesman, 1953; Gorer, 1964); voter behavior (Berelson, Lazarsfeld, & McPhee, 1954); or more generally, the human condition (Arendt, 1958; Royce, 1965). The authors of such studies address themselves to a number of questions, only a few of which are explicitly raised in our characterization of the missing community.

it has slight regard for ideals of beauty and contemplation because it directs its major energy toward producing more products with less effort. This quantitative rather than qualitative emphasis is most evident in the cult of the consumer. Commitment to conspicuous consumption and means of social mobility seem to outweigh commitment to what may be considered more vague or visionary ends such as social justice, personal salvation, or the attainment of inner virtue. Total emphasis on the instrumental and the material (it is argued) is harmful because commitment to more intangible ideals is a prime requisite for building a sense of individual worth.

Fourth, and centrally related to all of these themes, is the trend toward *depersonalization* of experience, typically noted in humanist attacks upon the influence of automation and cybernetics. Delegating to machines a vast number of activities formerly performed by humans may well erode our ability to discriminate the more subtle, less easily communicated differences among human beings—the differences that make each person unique. Not only automation, but a variety of conditions of modern and suburban living (specialization, extreme mobility, geographic isolation of production and consumption) tend to inhibit the development of meaningful interpersonal experience. Outcries against depersonalization—the prospect of man being governed totally by computer-based, predictable decisions—reveal widespread concern over this problem.

Finally, the missing community is characterized by a feeling of *powerlessness*—the sense that no individual has significant control over his own destiny. Powerlessness becomes a central issue in American culture because of its contradiction to premises of liberal political thought; namely that the destiny of the community is determined by the wishes of individuals, by the consent of the governed, rather than by unresponsive elites, aloof bureaucracies, or impersonal forces. But in the face of such conditions as impersonal bureaucracies, the growing influence of corporate structures, and extreme social mobility and change, it is difficult for the individual to see how he affects the determination of social policy or the making of decisions that have profound effects on his life.

Consequences of the above themes can be viewed from a psychological standpoint, leading to internal states of feeling and thought characteristically labeled anomie, alienation, disaffection, identity diffusion, and estrangement of man from himself and community. But a psychological interpretation of these phenomena is difficult to establish for two reasons: first, because of problems in accurately assessing inner psychic conditions, and second, because of the possibility that people may believe themselves to be contented, when in fact they may be unconsciously disillusioned and their community proceeding to a condition of irretrievable disaster. For these reasons, it is

particularly important to examine the various themes not only from the standpoint of reports of "how people feel" but also from more analytic examination of the roles and functions of family, religion, occupation; the procedures for attaining justice in metropolitan and bureaucratic environments; and the legal-political arrangements for resolving various kinds of human conflict. In other words, one might see community "missing" in two senses: in terms of individuals' feelings about it, or in terms of a developing institutional framework inimical to the pursuit of human dignity.

The Great Society

Opposed to the missing community interpretation is the more optimistic view that conditions and trends in modern America will lead not to the demise of but to more hopeful forms of self realization. Our economic, political, and social institutions offer virtually unlimited promise for the meeting of material needs, the establishment of justice, and the cultivation of creativity and other elements associated with conceptions of the good life. Having reached a level of high mass consumption, our system may now proceed to stress the development of advanced forms of human service—education, medical care, recreation, psychological counseling, and community planning (Fuchs, 1966). The accelerated growth of technology offers unprecedented opportunity for solving persistent human problems, whether in making work meaningful, extending the life-span, beautifying the countryside, or increasing the motivation of children to learn (National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress, 1966). The political system, having zealously guarded basic rights and freedoms, continues on a solid basis of consensus, while still encouraging dissent and experimentation with new approaches to public issues (Schattschneider, 1960; Key, 1966).

The great society interpretation has answers to points raised in the missing community view. We notice a tendency to deny claims made in the latter. For example, evidence is gathered to show that most people work in small firms, rather than large bureaucracies, performing personal human services, rather than manufacturing goods on impersonal assembly lines (Fuchs, 1966). Advances in communications and transportation, far from creating divisive fragmentation, have produced unforeseen possibilities for people of widely differing backgrounds to share common experience. Automation has not produced impersonal, mechanistic individuals, but has freed individuals to be more genuinely human than ever before (Weiner, 1954). People do in fact have power to determine the destiny of the community through their participation in groups designed specifically for the pursuit of given interests. (Bell, 1962, mentions some of the thousands of groups which Americans join—evidence both that man is not alone and that his groups give him

power to protect his basic interests.) Rather than apologize for a lack of ideological commitment, one might gather evidence of fervent commitment to basic and traditional American values such as equality of opportunity and general welfare. Programs like the Peace Corps, poverty programs, and civil rights advances attest to this. By reference to figures on the publishing industry and on the state of the arts, one might also argue that aesthetic appreciation and activity begin to flourish more than ever.

Although the great society school would accept the existence of many trends mentioned in the missing community view, it would argue that their effects are beneficial rather than harmful. For example, specialization and division of labor are said to provide additional alternatives or areas of choice never before open to the individual. A highly differentiated and specialized society offers greater possibilities for meeting specific interests, idiosyncratic skills, and desires. Though change does proceed rapidly, it has the refreshing effect of ensuring flexibility, a safeguard against stagnation into fixed styles of living and thinking. Automation and technology also have liberating influences, allowing individuals to pursue interpersonal relationships less constrained by the demands of the environment or material needs. While decisions on important matters may be left in the hands of diffuse bureaucracies or distant "experts," these bureaucratic forms and expert fields of knowledge make helpful contributions in the process of decision-making and management of human affairs.

The optimism inherent in the great society view does not dampen its fervor in attacking a number of social problems. The National Commission on Technology and the American Economy refers to several "social costs and dislocations" caused by technological advance: rapid migration of rural workers to the city, decrease in the number of factory production and maintenance jobs, economic distress due to closing of plants, pollution of the water and air, and 35 million people living below the poverty level. Yet the Commission concludes, "Technology has, on balance, surely been a great blessing to mankind—despite the fact that some of the benefits have been offset by costs. There should be no thought of deliberately slowing down the rate of technological advancement. . . ." (National Commission on Technology, Automation, and Economic Progress, 1966, p. xiii). This report and others (e.g. U.S. Department of Labor, 1966) call for bold and inventive new approaches to the solution of serious social problems, but the basic tasks are seen as unfinished business, or clean-up operations, within a general context of unprecedented prosperity and social accomplishment. There is no tendency to debate or question ultimate goals, but only to confront practical problems of putting existing institutions to work, of devising programs to fulfill unquestioned objectives (such as full employment, higher teacher

salaries, or stability in the Negro family). The solution of problems as construed in the great society approach does not require changes in the institutional structure of society at large (Rossiter, 1960).

Two major reasons are offered by proponents of the great society for not questioning current social trends: (a) much of what is objected to (urbanization, automation, specialization, rapid change, etc.) arises as part of an inevitable stream of social development that has inevitable social costs; and (b) challenging the fundamental premises and organization of the society would result in irrevocable rupture, chaos, and destructive revolution, which would shatter the foundations of modern society rather than improve it. This is what Keniston (1965, p. 433 f.) calls the argument of "psycho-social vice."

Finally, the proponents of great society explain away many of the missing community criticisms. They claim that critics who embrace the missing community view cling to an outdated and inappropriate frame of reference, a characteristically Lockean or Jeffersonian view of society—an agrarian community of yeomen, artisans, and gentleman aristocrats living a relatively stable existence, close to nature, with deep-rooted personal relationships and a simple social organization whereby individuals exercise power in a way that in fact determines their own destiny. Great society enthusiasts reject the missing community view by pointing out that the concepts of individuality and community take on entirely new meaning in modern society. For example, consent of the governed should not be grounded in the simple-minded notion that each individual can influence decision-makers in government; realistically, influence must be pursued by joining large pressure groups. Or, meaningful work should no longer be judged in terms of obsolete notions of craftsmanship, or pursuing a task from origin to completion; rather, that white collar administrative work within a bureaucracy has important meaning but in a different sense. Modern society cannot be realistically judged through the lenses of what Keniston calls "romantic regression."

Choosing between Interpretations

An adequate evaluation of the merits of each interpretation requires extended investigation, and this paper is only the beginning of our efforts to move the inquiry along. The outlined interpretations presented above are not intended as comprehensive social theories, but as two broadly sketched descriptive statements which contain, on the one hand, clear overtones of protest against current social development, and on the other, a self-assured optimism with the political, economic, and technological character of the "great society." For the moment, we are more persuaded by the missing community view. We believe that, in general, the great society orientation is more

sensitive to superficial symptoms than to fundamental problems, while that of the missing community attacks major issues directly.

By way of example, consider contrasting approaches to the problem of old age. The great society approach focuses on the attainment of fairly obvious kinds of material needs to reduce direct burdens that the aged can impose on the young: guaranteed medical treatment, guaranteed income, physical environments suited to the physical capabilities of the aged (fewer stairs to climb, convenient transportation, moderate climate, etc.). The missing community approach, however, points up the far-reaching impact of programs aimed only at such specific needs. In catering to the specific needs of the aged, we have created entire communities of "senior citizens," segregated and literally fenced off from the rest of society. Their physical isolation helps to reinforce a self-fulfilling mystique about old age which Rosenfelt (1965, pp. 39-40) describes:

Health and vigor, it is assumed, are gone forever. The senses have lost their acuity. The memory is kaput. Education and new learning are out of the question, as one expects to lose his mental faculties with age. Adventure and creativity are for the young and courageous. They are ruled out for the old, who are, *ipso facto*, timid and lacking in moral stamina. . . .

While the old person is taking stock of himself, he might as well become resigned to being "behind the times," for it is inconceivable he should have kept abreast of them. As a worker, he has become a liability. His rigidity, his out-of-date training, his proneness to disabling illness, not to mention his irritability, lowered efficiency and arrogant manner, all militate against the likelihood of his being hired or promoted. . . .

Nothing is to be expected from the children. They have their own lives to lead. Furthermore, they are leading them, like as not, in distant locations, bridged only by the three-minute phone call on alternate Sundays, if contact is maintained at all. . . . Grandparents make people more nervous than it's worth—easier to get a babysitter, and the youngsters like it better that way.

The aged are not only isolated, but clearly discriminated against when it comes to basic decisions in medical services: the life of a young person is generally more highly valued (Kalish, 1965). A missing community concern with old age focuses on general questions such as the relationship between the quality of aged life and the nature of community, the meaning of retirement in an age of constantly changing careers and universal leisure, the challenge of creating integral relationships among generations.

As another illustration, consider two ways of construing the problem of the automobile in America. As Detroit increases its auto production, the great society proposes solutions to relatively specific problems: build more

highways, clear the polluted air with special devices, and require more effective safety standards. Those viewing the auto from a missing community framework would focus on such issues as (a) the changes in styles of life caused by the auto (e.g. the fact that we may live, work, spend weekends in separate geographic areas) and their implications for "community," (b) the possibility that the auto serves the function of psychological protest against modern society by providing one of the few opportunities for man to enjoy power and freedom and (for young people) privacy, and (c) changes in our sensitivity to the physical environment (the building of highways, gaudy signs, junkyards, parking lots) that affect aesthetic experience and the conservation of natural resources.

The great society neglects basic issues of community by focusing instead on relatively immediate individual needs, and creating *national* organizations to meet them. The President says, "Our goal is not just a job for every worker. Our goal is to place every worker in a job where he utilizes his full productive potential for his own and for society's benefit" (U.S. Department of Labor, 1966, p. xii). The target is the individual worker, the bureaucracy is the Department of Labor, and, of course, we have an eminent national commission on technology and economy which, in a farsighted manner, proclaims that the conditions of work must be humanized, and we must allow for a flexible lifespan of work. Expansive programs are justified and evaluated by reference to the national interest or to "society's benefits."³ There is, in great society thinking, a huge gap between the concepts of national interest and the dignity of the individual. That gap is the symptom of missing community. The major issues lie *between* obvious economic needs of individuals and the national interest: the problem of creating complex relationships where humans share common bonds which are strengthened not by consensus but by conflict and diversity, relationships in which they associate for enduring and important purposes and in which national interest is only *one* of many competing ways to justify policy. Whereas the missing community view gives these issues highest priority, the great society approach virtually ignores them.

The great society, in its attention to immediate and specific needs, tends to neglect and stifle consideration of basic, long range issues. The missing community view, on the other hand, attunes itself to forces and trends that suggest ominous consequences for the human condition. This, we feel, provides the sort of healthy discontent required to construe and deal with major prob-

³ See for example, Keppel (1966, Ch. IV), who justifies increased federal spending in education almost entirely on the grounds that it will result in more economic use of human resources; that it is, therefore, in the national interest to make a greater investment in education.

lems. Our sense of missing community, though clearly influenced by conceptions of former social organization (in this country and other cultures), is *not* based on a nostalgic desire to restore types of communities long obsolete and inappropriate for the modern world. Community is "missing" not in the sense that "old fashioned" ones no longer exist, but in the sense that we have not yet devised conceptions of community that deal with particular challenges of the modern environment. To further explore implications of the missing community view, we shall examine its relevance to trends in American education.

II. A RE-EXAMINATION OF THE PREMISES OF CONTEMPORARY AMERICAN EDUCATION

The acceptance of existing social trends characteristic of the great society advocate is perhaps one of his more serious limitations. He sees the present as manifesting historically irreversible conceptions of society, e.g., technology, urbanization, or centralization. Desirable outcomes of obvious historical forces are labeled "progress" (e.g. increased leisure), while adverse consequences are called the "price of progress" (e.g. the increasing loss of privacy or the threat of nuclear war). Applied to education, this perspective postulates that we have a type of education, with us here and now, that is obviously consistent with our equalitarian democratic heritage; and although it may have problems, we can build on the foundation that history has provided. But from the missing community point of view, one scrutinizes historical trends as possible *roots* of present problems—roots that may need to be destroyed rather than built upon. The process of evaluating tradition (rather than accepting it as a foundation) allows one to identify a broad range of alternatives and to question the extent to which they may be applicable to present choices. Honest inquiry leads one to ask whether future actions should be built on prior historical choices or whether one might reconsider premises underlying the initial choices themselves.

Because of its apparent inability to re-examine, in either contemporary or historical terms, major premises underlying its approach to education, the great society view manifests a narrow construction of what education is and ought to be. It accepts as given the premises that education is (a) formal schooling, operating as (b) a public monopoly, (c) modeled after the organizational structure and utilitarian values of corporate business. Great society proposals for educational change accept these as traditional, inevitable conditions rather than simply as one peculiar set of options against which a number of alternatives may be continually argued and tested. Below we shall raise questions concerning these premises, questions which sug-

gest that it is time, not simply for "reform," but for a radical re-evaluation of our present conception of education and schooling.

Education as Formal Schooling

To most Americans the term *education* is synonymous with schooling, defined as formal instruction carried on in an institution which has no other purpose. In conventional rhetoric one "gets" an education by going to school. One therefore improves education by improving schools. Whether we read progressive (Dewey, 1900, 1902), traditionalists (Rickover, 1960), public educational statesmen (Conant, 1959), prominent professors venturing into curriculum reform (Bruner, 1960), or contemporary analysts of education in America (Kimball & McClellan, 1962; Benson, 1965), we find universal agreement that better education requires better schooling.

Federal and foundation moneys are channeled into hundreds of projects designed to improve instruction in the schools. New approaches to instruction such as team teaching, programmed instruction, the nongraded schools, use of computers, simulation, educational television are all designed as methods for improving schooling. Millions are spent in pre-school training programs to prepare the "disadvantaged" for success in school, to prevent adolescents from dropping out of school, to train teachers to teach in schools. In addition to the traditional elementary-secondary-college sequence of schools, we aim to improve education by creating more schools: summer school, night school, graduate and professional schools.

The proliferation of schools leads one to ponder whether it might be possible to become educated without going through a process of conscious formalized instruction in institutions designed only for that function. Bailyn (1960) notes the emergence of formal schools in the Anglo-American colonies as an historical development responding to radical social changes. He boldly suggests that even before formal schools emerged, people acquired an effective education through less formal processes.

The forms of education assumed by the first generation of settlers in America were a direct inheritance from the medieval past. Serving the needs of a homogeneous, slowly changing rural society, they were largely instinctive and traditional, little articulated and little formalized. The most important agency in the transfer of culture was not formal institutions of instruction or public instruments of communication, but the family. . . .

. . . the family's educational role was not restricted to elementary socialization. Within these kinship groupings, skills that provided at least the first step in vocational training were taught and practiced. In a great many cases, as among the agricultural laboring population and small tradesmen who together comprised the overwhelming majority of the population, all the vocational instruction necessary for mature life was provided by the family. . . .

What the family left undone by way of informal education the local community most often completed. It did so in entirely natural ways, for so elaborate was the architecture of family organization and so deeply founded was it in the soil of stable, slowly changing village and town communities in which intermarriage among the same groups had taken place generation after generation that it was at times difficult for the child to know where the family left off and the greater society began....

More explicit in its educational function than either family or community was the church.... It furthered the introduction of the child to society by instructing him in the system of thought and imagery which underlay the culture's values and aims....

Family, community, and church together accounted for the greater part of the mechanism by which English culture transferred itself across the generations. The instruments of deliberate pedagogy, of explicit, literate education, accounted for a smaller, though indispensable, portion of the process.... The cultural burdens it bore were relatively slight... (Bailyn, 1960, pp. 15-19).

The modern American, however, no longer construes family, church, or other community agencies as vital educational institutions. He is in fact still in the process of distilling from other institutions their normal educative functions and transferring them to the school; e.g., vocational training, auto safety and driver training, rehabilitation of the disadvantaged, early childhood training, homemaking. The consequences of assuming that education necessarily takes place in school, or *should* take place in school, have been profound and far reaching, and require serious re-examination.

The allocation of the educational functions of society to a single separate institution—the school—suggests that such an institution must have a unique responsibility and that the separation must somehow be intrinsically related to this responsibility. This assumption becomes highly suspect, however, when we look at three important aspects of the separation: (a) we conceive of education as necessarily “preparation,” and we carefully separate “learning” from “acting,” “doing,” or productive work; (b) we separate the school environment from the “noninstructional” life of the community at large; and (c) we construe teaching as a specialized occupation, isolated from the world of action and decision-making—a world that is considered to have no pedagogical function.

Education as preparation. The establishment of formal schooling is commonly justified on the ground that we need a specialized institution to prepare children and youth for life as productive adults. The value of education is seen as instrumental, leading to ends extrinsic from the processes of formal instruction itself. We get an education *now* so that at some *later* time we can earn money, vote intelligently, raise children, serve our country, and

the like. The preparatory emphasis implies closure—education is begun and finished. Graduation or commencement signifies the termination of learning and the beginning of real life. Education in America most often consists of formal training through discrete courses and programs. How many institutions have we designed to foster education, not as preparatory activity but as a legitimate end in itself, insinuated as a continuing integral element throughout one's career?

Preparatory aims of formal schooling are often embedded in a concept of growth. As Bruner remarks, "Instruction is, after all, an effort to assist or to shape growth" (Bruner, 1966, p. 1). To implement such a mandate, schools have isolated children and adolescents from adults and have focused most of the formal training on young people. This, however, betrays a confusion between biological and mental development. Let us assume that the schools should be primarily concerned with mental-emotional development (they can have relatively minor affects on biological growth). First, we wonder whether it is possible to make a useful distinction between people who are "growing" versus those who have "matured" with regard to mental-emotional development. One could argue that adulthood, far from being a period of stable maturity, is no more than a continuing process of mental-emotional growth (and biological change) presenting conflicts and problems of adjustment as "stormy" and challenging as growth during childhood and adolescence. Marriage, child-rearing, occupational decision, pursuit of leisure, adaptation to geographic and occupational change, and adjustment to retirement and death continually demand growth by adults. With the entirety of a human life cycle before us, we would ask, when is mental-emotional maturity reached? If growth, change, and decay continue until death, then why confine education to the early years of biological development?

Second, by assuming young people to be dynamic and growing and adults to be static and ripe, one is led to postulate that adults have needs essentially different from the needs of young people—that conflicts and differences *between* generations are greater than conflicts and differences within a given generation. We would suggest, however, that members of differing generations do have common problems and educational needs, and the needs of members of the same generation may be radically diverse. Compare for example, an unemployed man of 40 with an unemployed teenage dropout, both of whom lack literacy and vocational skills. Could they not share with benefit a common educational experience? Or suppose an oppressed ethnic group is attempting to combat discrimination. Members of that group from all generations face a common problem. Conversely, groups *within* a generation may have quite different educational needs: a 30-year-old mother on public assistance versus a 30-year-old attorney attempting to establish a law

practice; or a teenage girl from a broken lower-class home versus a teenage boy from a stable upper-class family.

Our exclusive emphasis on preparation raises another basic question: Is it possible that, in spite of certain commonalities across generations, childhood and adolescence constitute in themselves integral parts of the human career, with certain roles, needs, and behavior that may be quite unrelated to the demands of a future adulthood? Schools are designed mainly to implant in students knowledge, attitudes, and skills revered by adult scholars and educators, yet we can legitimately question why it is necessary to stress almost exclusively adult values before children and youth have attained that biological and social status.

We also note a certain pragmatic folly in education as preparation for future adulthood in the modern world. A leading educational innovator remarks on "the colossal problem of educating youngsters for jobs which do not exist and for professions which cannot be described" (Brown, 1963, p. 14). Is it even possible to prepare children to behave fruitfully in a future world, the dimensions and complexities of which educated adults are presently unable to grasp?

The tendency of formal schooling to isolate children during a period of "preparation" for adulthood has produced a rigid system of age-grading which has as one effect a fractionation of the human career. This tends to hinder the development of meaningful relationships among generations and cultivates a fragmented, rather than continuous concept of self. The prevailing conception that children can learn only *from*, rather than with, adults and the forced submission of youth to the rule of adults amplifies the conflict between generations and encourages a posture of dependency, a sense of powerlessness that may carry over from youth to adulthood.

School and the community at large. A large portion of school training is separated from, and has no significant effect on students' behavior outside of school mainly because of the isolation of the school establishment from problems, dilemmas, choices, and phenomena encountered beyond school walls. Teachers readily attest to students' capacity to "tune-out" or memorize but not apply lessons taught in school. There is a sense of unreality inherent in living in two discontinuous worlds, if one is to take both seriously.

The progressives tried to handle this separation by bringing more "real life" activities into the school. They tried to match work in school with work in real life, introducing various manual skills and decision-making activities similar to those occurring outside of school. Modern efforts in curriculum reform have pursued the same idea through the development of simulation activities—attempts to make school relevant to more instructional life. But

simulation still occurs within *instructional* contexts and is, therefore, detached from actual and significant concerns. It may cultivate an attitude that learning or life or both are synonymous with playing games. The attempt to make school "fun" by exploiting the motivational power of competition or curiosity in children simply avoids the challenge of applying learning to life outside the school. In spite of progressive efforts in the direction of anti-formalism (for example, allowing students more individual freedom, emphasizing play and a variety of arts and crafts), they did much to solidify a conception of education as equivalent to formal schooling. In fact, the most dramatic way for the progressive to demonstrate his ideas was to found a new *school*, which soon became isolated from genuine conflicts and decisions of students' lives beyond school walls.

Teaching as a specialized occupation. Formal schooling provided the basis for a new specialized "profession of education." As Cremin (1964) points out, the profession was quick to isolate itself from other professions and fields of knowledge. It also built an education establishment dedicated to the study, servicing, and expansion of formal schooling as a separate and discrete institution, often accumulating powerful vested interests irrelevant to the real improvement of education (Conant, 1963, 1964). As an alternative to the unquestioned policy of requiring professionally trained teachers in schools, one might argue that in fact students could gain valuable education from each other and from a variety of "untrained," though interesting individuals, be they blue-collar laborers, politicians, bureaucrats, criminals, priests, athletes, artists, or whatever. To the extent that schools are staffed by professional educators, learning tends to become isolated from the significant concerns of the community, and the narrower functions and tasks of the *school* come to dominate the broader purposes of education.

Education as Public Monopoly

That schooling was eventually expanded as a stable and universal service through governmental compulsion rather than private voluntary associations, raises questions regarding the political philosophy that underlies such a system. American political thought has traditionally distinguished between society (a collection of various private groupings) and government (the combination of political and legal organs that make up the state). As Tom Paine described the distinction,

Society is produced by our wants and government by our wickedness: the former promotes our happiness positively; the latter negatively, by restraining vices (quoted in Lindsay, 1943, p. 124).

Lindsay's comments on the distinction illustrate the special value that Americans placed on voluntary associations:

The English or the American democrat takes it for granted that there should be in society voluntary associations of all kinds, religious, philanthropic, commercial: that these should be independent of the state at least in the sense that the state does not create them. The state may have to control and regulate them. Questions concerning their relations with the state are indeed continually turning up, but it is always taken for granted that men form these societies and associations for their own purposes; that their loyalty to such associations is direct; that it therefore does not follow that the state will prevail in any conflict between such associations and the state (Lindsay, 1943, p. 120).

The spirit of this laissez-faire philosophy implies that the state exists to facilitate a plurality of diverse interests inherent in men's *voluntary* associations and enterprises. The commitment of a community representing such a plurality of interests was applied to many domains of experience: to religion where sectarianism flourished; to economic affairs through the development of overlapping and competing business enterprises. Traditional notions of ordered artisan industries controlled by disciplined guilds, agriculture controlled by the feudal lords, mercantile trading policies encouraged and regulated by a central government, monopolistic industry sanctioned by restrictive state charters, all of these institutions fell before the laissez-faire economics practiced in America. It was assumed that the life of the community at large would be infused by the vigor and drive of private enterprise and association, that natural laws of competition and cooperation would prevent any serious conflict between private interests and the public good.

As was not the case in religious institutions and business enterprise, pluralism in the schools was short-lived. The concept of the common school took firm roots in Massachusetts early in the nineteenth century and spread to the other states. The common school was apparently conceived as a deliberate instrument to reduce cultural and religious differences. "The children of all nationalities, religions, creeds, and economic levels would then have an opportunity to mix together in the common schoolroom" (Butts & Cremin, 1953, p. 194). Once the common school was firmly established, pressure grew to establish secondary schools and to open the private academies to all. The schools faced a critical choice: once the common-school concept was accepted, how would the traditional commitment to pluralism be worked out? When children from diverse economic, ethnic, religious, and political backgrounds came together, how would the differences be recognized and handled?

Rapidly increasing immigration from Europe in the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth century created in the common school a major test for the pluralistic philosophy. Some Americans viewed the floodtide of newcomers as an opportunity to renew and invigorate the national and ethnic dimension of American pluralism. In 1915 Horace Kallen sentimentally envisioned

... a democracy of nationalities, cooperating voluntarily and autonomously through common institutions in the enterprise of self-realization through the perfection of men according to their kind. The common language of the commonwealth . . . would be English, but each nationality would have for its own emotional and involuntary life its own peculiar dialect or speech, its own individual and inevitable esthetic and intellectual forms. The political and economic life of the commonwealth is a single unit and serves as the foundation and background for the realization of the distinctive individuality of each *nation* that composes it and of the pooling of these in harmony above them all (Kallen, 1953, pp. 29-30).

But not all Americans had faith in the "distinctive individuality" of national groups. Fearing that continued cultivation of national differences would be disruptive to society, the common schools apparently stressed the need for pooling or assimilating immigrants into a common melting pot.

In addition to tension created by religious sectarianism, free enterprise, and ethnic diversity, the nineteenth century labored under severe strains created by the process of rapid industrialization. Evidently the public school responded to these strains by stressing the common values of routine monotonous work, progress, and the Horatio Alger hope of social mobility.

In the end, public schools attained a virtual monopoly on the life of youth between ages six and sixteen. This development represents a clear shift in political philosophy. It signifies a blurring, if not total rejection, of the distinction between society and government, formerly so crucial to the American democrat; that is, it indicates a loss of faith in the ability of a pluralistic system of private associations to provide an education that would benefit both the individual and his nation.

Perhaps at this point in history it was necessary and useful for the common school to serve a cohesive and integrating function by emphasizing a common heritage, common aspirations, common learnings, common dress, and a common routine within the school. One could suggest, in fact, that the school simply reflected the needs and requirements of the society by stressing *integrating* elements in the society, rather than the diversity, so blatant and obvious. Granted that the society might have been on the brink of disintegration and in need of cohesive institutions at that time, uniformity and conformity have been continuously characteristic of public education ever since the development of common and secondary schools. One might

argue theoretically that even though education is public and compulsory, it can conceivably encourage and reinforce cultural diversity by providing a wide range of alternative types of education. This, however, has not been true of public education in America. On the contrary, the schools have attempted to file down or erase distinctive cultural traits, denying that important cultural diversity ever existed; the instruction and procedures of the school reflect a mandate to persuade youth that all groups share a common language, common political and economic institutions, and common standards of right and wrong behavior. And although it is somewhat more stylish to recognize the importance of "individual differences," these are construed in psychological rather than cultural terms. In so far as the recent effort to educate slum children has forced us to recognize cultural differences, these are still construed largely as cultural deficiencies.

We are concerned with two general effects of the decision to make education an exclusive, compulsory, public function.⁴ The first relates to the way in which the public monopoly has fundamentally altered the nature of childhood and adolescence in America. Young people spend more than half of their working hours from age six to their early twenties trying to meet demands of formal schooling. This has destroyed to a large extent opportunities for random, exploratory work and play outside of a formal educational setting. One could argue that, psychologically, it is most important for youth (and for that matter all humans) to spend a significant portion of their life in spontaneous, voluntary kinds of activity, as in Erickson's (1962) suggestion of a psycho-social moratorium, rather than in regimented, required, planned learning tasks. By denying to students basic responsibility and freedom, public schooling prevents development of a sense of competency in making personal decisions. Though schooling requires large quantities of work ("industry"), its evaluation system generally assumes the work of youth to be inferior to work of adults (teachers). The public institutional milieu of the school discourages the development of intimacy among students, or between students and teachers. Schooling prevents exploratory, experimental activity, it prohibits total involvement in any single interest, it refuses to delegate to students responsibility for seeking their own "education." If public schooling were only one among many major areas of experience for young people, these would be less important criticisms. What makes the criticisms most significant is the fact that schooling has a virtual monopoly on youth's time and energy, possessing the power to suppress the quest for individuation through extra-school activity.

⁴The fact that state laws allow youth to fulfill educational obligations by attending private as well as public schools does not diminish the influence of the public monopoly. A

In addition to psychological dangers, the monopoly carries as a second major threat its potential for creating cultural uniformity, destroying diversity in points of view, in styles of life, in standards of taste, and in underlying value commitments. The standard rebuttal for this criticism is to point out that although we do have required public education, it is controlled by local communities, it is not a national system. One can, therefore, have radically diverse types of education, depending upon the unique needs of each community. In theory this answer seems persuasive, but in fact there are a number of forces at work in modern America—mass media, the publishing industry, national curriculum development programs, and professional educators—which combine (however unintentionally) to produce overall institutional similarity. If one examines programs in schools throughout the country, one finds an incredible similarity among curricula of different communities. (The apparent differences between schooling in slums and suburbs cannot be accounted for by assuming that slum dwellers have chosen to have one type of education, suburbanites another.) Although public schooling should not bear all of the responsibility for this cultural uniformity, the fact that it has captive control of youth allows it to accelerate the process of cultural standardization. Our objection to such a trend is based on the assumption that the essence of freedom lies in the opportunity for significant choice, and that choice becomes increasingly limited as individual and cultural differences are blurred or erased.

Given the failure of the school to support a vital pluralistic tradition, one might ask why must education be carried on as a publicly controlled compulsory activity? Law and medicine, certainly as vital as education for society, have remained largely under the control of the private sector. Communication and transmission of knowledge to the community at large, equally important, is accomplished by powerful, but essentially private media industries (books, newspapers, cinema, television). To meet basic subsistence needs, we use a system of production and distribution run mainly by private enterprise. Spiritual-religious activities are exclusively reserved for private associations. Curiously, public schools are required to provide ideological indoctrination (the American Creed) of an order comparable to religious institutions, yet we have refused public support for "religious" education. In the field of citizenship education, the public schools provide instruction for citizen participation in political process, but in fact that instruction is

relatively small proportion of children do attend private schools (approximately 16 per cent at the elementary level and 11 per cent at the secondary level). Moreover, even private schools must conform to publicly established standards.

obstructed by myths and misinformation; the most effective training for political life occurs within various private interest groups, or parties.

Education Modeled after Corporate Bureaucracy

Education, having developed into a concept of formal compulsory instruction publicly sponsored, could conceivably have taken many forms. Public schools might have become coordinating agencies which channeled the students into a variety of educational experiences provided by existing political, economic, cultural, and religious institutions. Schools might have become supplementary agencies, like libraries, appended to small neighborhood communities. In the long run, however, education adopted the prevailing institutional structure in the society at large: the factory served by an industrial development laboratory and managed according to production-line and bureaucratic principles. Architecturally, the schools came to resemble factories (instruction carried on first in rooms but more recently in large loft-like spaces, with different spaces reserved for different types of instruction) and office buildings (with corridors designed to handle traffic between compartments of uniform size). Conceivably, schools could have been built like private homes, cathedrals, artists' studios, or country villas.

The schools came to be administered like smooth-running production lines. Clear hierarchies of authority were established: student, parent, teacher, principal, superintendent, and school committeeman, each of whom was presumed to know his function and the limits of his authority. Consistent with the principle of the division of labor, activities were organized into special departments: teaching (with its many sub-divisions), administration, guidance, custodial services, etc. The process of instruction was seen by the administrator as a method of assembling and coordinating standardized units of production: classes of equal size, instructional periods of equal length; uniform "adopted" books and materials that all students would absorb; standard lessons provided by teachers with standardized training. Departures or interruptions in the routine were (and still are) discouraged for their potentially disruptive effect on the overall process (e.g., taking a field trip, or showing a film that requires two periods' worth of time, or making special arrangements to meet with students individually). Conceivably, the schools could have been organized on a much less regimented basis, allowing a good deal of exploratory, random, unscheduled sort of activity. However, as Callahan (1962) persuasively argues, the corporate bureaucratic model, guided by the cult of efficiency, exerted a major influence on the organization and program of public education.

In our view the effects of corporate organization in education lead to three

major developments all of which have important contemporary implications: (a) the research and development mentality which limits its attention to finding or building technology and instrumentation to achieve given specifiable goals, rather than questioning or formulating the goals themselves; (b) the increasingly fragmented school environment, which is sliced according to administrative and subject matter categories prescribed by educational specialists rather than according to salient concerns of children, youth, or the larger community; and (c) the trend toward centralized, coordinated decision-making for schools by a combination of agencies in government, business, universities, foundations, and "non-profit" research and development institutes.

The research and development mentality. The great society seeks to build a highly educated final product (a graduate) at the lowest possible cost per unit. Armed with such a mandate, policy makers and educators scurry to devise and implement techniques that will achieve visible "pay-offs" in the "terminal behavior" of students. A host of new devices and programs emerge: nongraded schools, advanced placement courses, independent study, programmed instruction, self-administered TV and cinema, computer-based instruction. They are lauded and increasingly in demand for their apparent effectiveness in speeding up the educational process by "individualizing" instruction for students. The Federal government invests millions of dollars through universities, research and development centers, and private industry to produce more efficient methods. Administrators use the techniques both as yardsticks by which to evaluate and as symbols by which to advertise their schools and build their personal reputation. Policy makers and curriculum advisers beg for definite answers concerning which methods are best. But who seeks reasons for the emphasis on acceleration and efficiency? Why read at age three? Why learn quadratic equations at age ten? Why study American history a year or two earlier? Why try to think like an MIT physicist or an anthropologist at all? The research and development mentality thrives on gadgets, engineering metaphors, and the fever of efficiency, but rarely questions the purposes to which its technology is applied.

A new and fashionable manifestation of this general mentality is the current emphasis on systems. The aim of this approach is to describe in schematic (and often mathematical) detail relationships among all components in a system (i.e., a curriculum, classroom, school, or school district) and to evaluate the extent to which given objectives are being achieved by specific components or the system as a whole at certain points of time. Using diagnostic information provided by intensive testing, the job is to build a related set of components and experiences that will lead to specifiable ter-

minal behavior. The general purpose is to *clarify* and *increase* the *effectiveness* of the entire process through which a given input is changed into an output that meets given criteria or standards of performance. The responsibility of systems development is limited to devising techniques for attaining objectives previously fed into the system; the formulation of ultimate aims is delegated to external sources. (The systems engineer boldly proclaims, "You tell us what you want, and we'll program it.") Though one could build a system that would allow for flexibility and even respond to changing objectives, we believe that in essence the systems approach avoids rather than recognizes or deals with the most important problems of education, namely objectives and substance. The excessive concern with technique, rather than a searching examination of ends, results in a tendency to accept as legitimate those objectives that can be translated into operations and those products which can be schematically and quantitatively measured.

Despite its "practical" outlook, the R & D mentality constantly runs up against the "relevancy problem": the fact that children and youth do, in fact, see the content of school as bookish and artificial, unrelated to the decisions and actions that lead to important consequences either in school or in the outside world. Both students and teachers attempt to right the disproportionate emphasis on abstract words and thought by stressing instead concrete procedures that provide a context of action and decision—prompt attendance, assignments completed, tests taken—and success. The progressive approach to the relevancy problem was to abandon rigid work and grade standards without recognizing that these constraints served the fundamental function of providing structure, definition of task, and consequences of decisions that are palpable and immediate. The new R & D proponent is somewhat more sophisticated: instead of stressing the concrete procedures associated with abstract verbal tasks, he seeks to simulate the real tasks of the outside world. Students play war, peace-making, monopoly, empire building, showing all the involvement of adult poker and bingo players. Although the R & D specialist sees the conceptual relationship between elements of the simulated activity or game and real life decisions, does the student? Perhaps the student simply learns that adults get their intellectual kicks out of playing games, rather than dealing with real problems in the noninstructional world. At any rate there is some evidence that what students learn from playing games is how to play games, not how to construe either academic or worldly problems more effectively.⁵

Unfortunately, the underlying difficulty cannot be corrected by R & D

⁵ Unpublished work by Mary Alice White of Teachers College, Columbia University suggests this conclusion.

specialists. It is a result of the fact that we have chosen to divorce schooling from problems and choices that have genuine significance for youth and community. Since the kind of learning we prescribe is not intrinsically important to students, we invent trivial tasks and procedures to capture their attention, and we contract with engineers and R & D centers to do this as efficiently as possible. Significant problems and decisions emanate not from R & D laboratories (questions of basic objectives are beyond their concern), but from strains and dilemmas in the world beyond school walls. In short, educational reform must be construed in more fundamental terms than what is implied in transferring the students attention from nature study to meal worms.

The fragmented school environment. In the spirit of Durkheim's analysis of the effects of division of labor, Thelen comments that one of man's most important inventions was the development of concepts about how to organize human activity. But organization requires division and fragmentation which can, at times, have undesirable results:

We have made hard and fast divisions between thinking and doing, creating and applying, planning and acting, preparing and fulfilling. The age of reason, the development of science, the domination of organization, and the simple increase in density of human population have interacted among each other to create these divisions. But these divisions have made modern life purposeless. For as long as we maintain the division we shall never have to find an organizing principle to integrate the parts. The organizing principle we have thus succeeded in avoiding is *purpose* (Thelen, 1960, p. 215).

The school, faithful to principles of bureaucratic organization and division of labor, has fostered the development of a number of specialized compartments many of which have no apparent relationship to, or communication with, each other: English, social studies, science, math, physical education, home economics, industrial arts, guidance. Boundaries between the departments often arise from legitimate distinctions among subject matter or fields of knowledge, but lack of communication among fields can be attributed to the parochial interests of human beings who place the highest priority on their own area.

Fragmentation may also be seen as arising from underlying disagreements over the fundamental purposes of education. In broad terms we might classify differing objectives as: work skills (competencies required for successful careers and bread-winning), socialization (values and skills necessary to perform in the role of citizenship), psychological guidance (development of mental health), intellectual excellence (acquisition of knowledge and cultivation of various mental abilities). These categories are by no means mu-

tually exclusive, but suggestive of distinguishable factors or values used to support various educational prescriptions. To this list we would add a less commonly stated objective: social reconstruction, that is, the effort to justify schooling as a vehicle for the establishment of a particular social order. Many progressives saw the school as a microcosm of a particular kind of ideal society. Other groups, from Puritans and Amish to Nazis and Communists, have similarly valued schooling as an instrument of social reconstruction.

The corporate educational enterprise tends to minimize conflict among differing objectives and fields of interest; it accommodates a number of philosophies and priorities by establishing isolated compartments, allowing each to pursue its own goals in peaceful co-existence. The "philosophy" of the school is articulated by a simple *listing* of all the differing objectives and course offerings. We have no quarrel with the diversity of objectives and subjects. On the contrary, our commitment to pluralism strongly supports them. We do, however, object to the organizational principle which attempts to minimize conflict by isolating and separating various interests from each other. This attempt has the effect of aggravating fragmentation in community. It discourages tendencies to relate various purposes of man in community within comprehensive social theory; it stifles healthy ferment that might arise from tough public discussion of the merits of different specialties and objectives.

New corporate coalitions. Current efforts to construe education as a system of fully articulated components intended to shape terminal behavior are increasingly evident in mergers among communications, electronics, and publishing industries: Time-Life, Inc. owns television stations, a text-book company, and has recently become associated with General Electric; Xerox owns University Microfilms, Basic Systems, Inc., and American Education Publications; other mergers include RCA with Random House, IBM with Science Research Associates, and Raytheon with D.C. Heath and Company. These companies or their subsidiaries, often with the assistance of university research and development centers, are planning programs, financed by federal funds, to "solve" America's educational problems. Similar coalitions of government, industrial complexes, and universities have long cooperated in the development of America's war hardware and space exploration. The Federal government raises research and development funds, university and industry supply engineering talent and laboratories, and industry manufactures and distributes the final product. A prototype of this pattern applied to education is the urban Job Corps training center, financed by the Federal government which contracted with private corporations to recruit staff,

refurbish physical facilities, and manage the centers. Industry then turned to universities to help train personnel, and to advise and evaluate the operation. Presumably this type of coalition could expand its horizons beyond special groups (such as drop-outs, unemployed, pre-school disadvantaged, or Peace Corps and Vista volunteers) and reform all public education in the country at large.

We view with suspicion the emergence of national super-corporations venturing into education production. It signifies most obviously the demise of any hope that education might be rooted in the concerns and pursuits of primary communities. It offers unprecedented possibilities for cultural uniformity, as the large coalitions begin to sketch long-range plans for the production of standardized educational kits or packages to be marketed throughout the nation. The packages will be designed within professionalized and bureaucratized organizations, single-mindedly devoted to educational "projects" as isolated goals. The great society evidently assumes that since the government-industry-university coalition seems to have solved problems of economic affluence and defense, it should therefore be able to solve educational problems.

It should be clear from our basic criticisms that we seriously question this assumption. In the next section we shall review the nature and deficiencies of contemporary approaches to educational reform. First, however, let us summarize the three criticisms we direct at the present education enterprise: (a) it fails to accept as legitimate, or to support, the rich educational potential available in noninstructional contexts—conversely it conceives of education narrowly as mainly formal instruction occurring in schools; (b) by becoming a compulsory public monopoly, it neglects the educational value of diverse public and private associations; (c) it is organized by the model and motivated by the values of corporate industry and bureaucratic civil service.

III. THE DIRECTION OF MODERN EDUCATIONAL CHANGE

For the most part, none of the deficiencies in education discussed above are being challenged or attacked by current reforms in American education. On the contrary, what we have attacked as questionable premises and assumptions are being further strengthened in the emerging programs.

Conventional Reform

1. *Redesign of content.* Stimulated in part by massive federal funds spent to improve courses in the physical sciences and mathematics in the late fifties, projects now burgeon in virtually all subjects of the curriculum. The

attempt is generally to restructure or rethink the content of existing courses or to introduce into the schools courses previously taught in the university. These curriculum projects are sometimes heralded as revolutionary in nature because of the great financial resources expended and because of the participation and leadership of university experts outside of the education establishment. The much trumpeted "structure of the disciplines" has presumably replaced most other considerations as the foundation of curriculum building. While we applaud increased attention given to the substance of school programs, we fail to see any fundamental departures from the past; new programs take the form of conventional courses of study designed to fit into or extend the conventional school offering.

2. *Increased use of new media.* Emphasis on the technological challenge of creating more effective and persuasive educational messages absorbs much of the effort in educational innovation. Courses of instruction conceived and constructed by content specialists are being embellished through the application of new and glamorous "multi-media" devices: slide-tapes, educational television, programmed instruction, demonstration apparatus, language laboratories, simulation devices, and films. These serve the laudable objective of communicating more fully and more effectively knowledge that the experts consider worth transmitting. We wonder, however, whether the new media are not valued primarily for their mesmeric quality, rather than for any qualitative change in the students' perception of subject matter-in-school. These new forms of communication have a significant impact on the organization of schools, on scheduling, and possibly on the teacher's role in the classroom; but it is doubtful that they will affect in any profound way the role of the student or the way he perceives his task in school.

3. *Reorganization of school environment.* New approaches to the scheduling and grouping of students and teachers have allowed greater sensitivity to individual differences, more efficient use of staff energy, and opportunities for flexibility. Team teaching, the nongraded school, independent study, large-group instruction, and homogeneous grouping are examples of a general concern for making the school program more responsive to obvious and long-standing inefficiencies. Departures from traditional forms of school organization have been aided by more effective information dissemination systems and architectural innovation. Such advances as those in media development may make schooling more efficient, but we wonder whether they provide any major breakthrough in the student's ability to explore new learning roles or new relationships with adults.

4. *Use of high-speed information processing.* Another salient focus of current reform is the data processing revolution, which is making it possible

for schools to obtain, store, manipulate, and retrieve vast amounts of information. Taking attendance, constructing schedules, and issuing report cards by computer are only a small beginning. New agencies formed primarily to collect and disseminate information hold momentous possibilities for more efficient use of diverse resources and information. Through this process, schools from different geographic areas will be able to share instructional materials, communicate new ideas, and receive feedback on them with a minimum of administrative red tape. The more efficient information retrieval becomes, the more options the educational specialist has, but is the student included in the choice-making process? How is this rapidly retrieved information to be related to some concept of the good life in the great society? Can teaching and learning be construed as something besides information processing?

5. *Intensive recruitment of talented personnel.* Apart from innovations in content, specific techniques of instruction, and personnel organization, quality education is said to depend primarily on the profession's power to attract more talented people into the field. Increased salaries, financial assistance to students, increasing diversity of specialized roles made possible by developments in the areas mentioned above are seen as transforming education into an unusually challenging and attractive career. Federal legislation as well as support from private foundations provides impetus for these changes, and apparently the prestige of the educationist is already on the rise.

Talented specialists will undoubtedly enhance the image of the profession, but will they deliberately disturb the questionable assumptions which underlie the very concept of specialized fields of educational experts? Or in a less radical vein, will they alter conventional schools and utilize technology in a variety of educational settings to benefit a broader spectrum of the population than those in the 6-22 age range? Will they plan types of community education which minimize formal requirements, but provide a number of exciting voluntary opportunities running the gamut from literacy training to political action to training in the fine arts? Will they consider encouraging youth to work beside adults in real jobs, and will they allow adults more opportunities for both formal study and play?

We predict that new talent and technology will not be directed toward such innovations, because the new breed of specialist has no particular stake in viewing problems broadly. He has more to gain by applying his skills to reform *within* the existing establishment, constrained by a number of vested interests. To name a few, the publishing industry will not promote a "product" unless a profitable market can be shown to exist; the parent views education mainly as a vehicle for economic and social mobility and therefore

withholds support from programs that do not offer such a guarantee; the teacher has a deep emotional investment in traditional bodies of knowledge and conceptions of teaching that would be threatened by radical change.

At first glance, one might applaud recent great society programs for their apparent circumvention of establishment constraints, their presumed departure from the status quo. The Job Corps, for example, through its relationship with private enterprise, government, and university might conceivably have developed a fresh approach. Unfortunately, however, its objectives were conservative ones of literacy, hygiene, vocational skill; it adopted the traditional institutional models of college dormitory life and military training; and its instruction is guided by the advice of "experienced" educators. The program as a whole serves the vested interests of business by educating young people to "fit in" to employment in the corporate world.

6. *Orchestration of modern techniques.* One might argue, of course, that while all of the various reforms suggested above are less than radical or revolutionary, if they were allowed to converge in a single school it would truly be the "school of the future," offering education of unprecedented quality. The curriculum would contain the latest approaches such as the "new math," PSSC physics, advanced placement courses, new approaches in reading, and the teaching of "advanced" concepts and skills at younger ages. Wide use would be made of films, slides, tapes, language labs, programmed instruction, overhead projectors, and educational television. By way of organizing and grouping, it would provide for team teaching, nongraded sequence, and independent study. It would employ the latest contributions in information processing to take advantage of educational resources beyond the school building. Its staff would be composed of talented teachers equipped with the best liberal-arts education and the experience of closely supervised practice teaching. The teachers would be constantly evaluating and revising the curriculum in cooperation with professors from nearby universities and media experts from a regional educational laboratory. The system would include a "comprehensive" high school catering to the needs of diverse types of students—those with aspirations for business, commerce, and technical occupations as well as those interested in the professions.

We doubt whether a school system like this exists anywhere at present, but from Brown's description (1963) one would assume that the nongraded Melbourne High School in Florida approximates the model. The school environment is designed to respond to individual educational needs (grouping by achievement rather than by age, giving students keys to laboratories and study rooms for use after school hours), and thrives on a spirit of innovation. Although the school seems to foster a more relaxed attitude toward the

student than most, its program continues to isolate youth from adults and the school from the community, and it doesn't include students in significant decisions which might fundamentally alter the role of youth in the school or community. The educational philosophy relies heavily on the judgment that "the primary purpose of education is the development of the intellect" (Brown, 1960, p. 145). Again we are reminded of a business analogy: allow employees enough personal latitude to increase productivity—but prevent the radical conversation which questions the value of the product itself.

Radical Reform

1. *Utopianism.* Reforms which question underlying assumptions of modern education have been carried out largely in isolated schools. Plans and proposals for such schools have often assumed hypothetical or unrealistic conditions of community, or no outside community at all. They resemble the utopian experiments of the nineteenth century or the Walden II of the twentieth. Real examples in education have usually taken the form of private boarding schools, e.g., Putney and Summerhill. Such schools have attempted to establish a broad, coherent inner community in which education is viewed not as the province of an isolated, separate system or as a nine-to-five task. The decision to build a separate educational community is generally occasioned by the fact that the existing community would not approve of or condone aspects of programs that the utopians seek to establish; for example, giving children total freedom to choose the kind of education they want, allowing them to develop their own norms regarding relations between the sexes, or, more generally, delegating to them responsibility for governing their community.

Utopian schools have concentrated heavily on the reduction of adult control over students and have broadened the notion of education to include far more than the completion of traditional or newly thought-out intellectual exercises—for example, by providing more opportunity for artistic expression, craftsmanship, manual labor, experience in child-rearing and self-government. Because activities in such schools are insulated to a large extent from pressures of the community beyond, they can explore possibilities for radical innovation that would not be possible otherwise. The catch comes, of course, when the "citizens" of such educational communities find it necessary to return to the larger society. How does the student cope with the re-entry problem, after having been educated within a system of values many of which contradict those of the "real world"? As one college student remarked, "The trouble with girls from Bennington is that they think they've been to Heaven. Where is there to go after that?" Presumably former citizens of utopian educational communities are prepared to have an impact on the

great society, an effect which will move it in the direction of the values and aspirations reflected in the utopian school. Common sense, as well as psychological evidence, (Webster, 1962) indicates that the graduate of a utopian school is more likely to move back into the mainstream of the great society and slough off the effects of an extraneous and temporary educational environment. The major argument for the isolated, utopian educational community—that it is the only feasible and realistic way to implement radical reform—is vitiated by the questionable, long-range consequences of such ventures. They probably have little permanent impact either on the students or on the society to which the students return. In practice, they appear more as temporary aberrations of affluent intellectuals than as viable educational models worthy of emulation.

2. *Reconstruction of the system.* Instead of radical reform through utopian withdrawal, it is still remotely possible that fundamental change might be brought about in the nature of both the institution and the larger community within which it operates. Some might, in fact, point to progressive education in the first half of this century as evidence that general educational reconstruction is possible. We disagree. On the basis of Cremin's (1964) history of "pedagogical pioneers," we would characterize most of the progressive movement not as an effort to change the system radically, but as moderate reform or utopian model building. Though countless changes were made in schooling (creating within the school an "embryonic community," emphasizing creativity and freedom of inquiry and manual as well as symbolic learning, and in many cases involving adults of the community in school programs), the progressives continued to focus on improving the *school* as a means to better education. Whether the school was a utopian community in microcosm or simply a more relevant and humanitarian way of leading youth through verbal mazes, in either case there was no attempt to reconstruct the total context through which the community pursues its educational aims.⁶

As something of an exception to this generalization, Harold Rugg (1936) deserves special comment. He saw the school exercising its responsibility as the major agency of education within the community by using the total community as its workshop or laboratory.

If we should trail one of the new school groups for a week or two and record what they did, we should find that the students spend much of their time outside of their

⁶ This is not meant to criticize the efforts of "progressives" in general, many of whom focused on problems in the wider community such as revising patterns of political representation, establishing social welfare services, or curbing abuses of monopolistic business. Our point is directed only toward the relatively narrow efforts of professional educators known by the progressive label.

assigned classrooms—for example, in the library, shops, laboratories, studies, auditorium, and offices of the school itself. The scenes of their activity, however, are not only the entire reaches of the new-school plant but also the whole community and the region round about—the government offices, stores, markets, industries, the water supply, the docks, and the like. Pupils survey the layout of the town, collect pictures and old records, and interview old residents, city officials, social welfare secretaries, and a host of others (Rugg, 1936, pp. 340-341).

As a stop-gap measure, Rugg suggested that the “nearest approach to a School of Living” is to build the whole educational program of a community around the life of the school itself. While Rugg prescribed a utopian school as an immediate solution, in the long run that school was to insinuate itself into the adult activities of the community, both as a method of study and as a means of social reconstruction.

An impressive modern proposal for radical reform within the context of the broader community is Herbert A. Thelen's *Education and the Human Quest* (1960). Thelen makes a provocative plea for the community to conceive of education as consisting basically of four parts: personal inquiry, group investigation, reflective action, and skill development. The school should be considered only one of a number of possible contexts in which to pursue the development of these areas, and the education in a particular community would be planned by a broadly based “citizens’ education council.” Adult citizens in their regular jobs would assume educational responsibility for each other and for the youth. Youth would participate in “out-of-school” activities such as vocational exploration, recreation, social-political action, religion, etc. This is not simply a proposal for more “field trips” or “projects,” but an attempt to create in a more permanent sense whatever institutional arrangements may be required to implement a broader conception of education. Thelen translates this idea into organizational-financial terms, and proposes that the citizens’ education council present a budget for all the educational efforts in the community, with the school budget as only one part of the total—that part enabling the school to carry out its particular mandate (most likely in the fields of skill development and the guiding of personal and group inquiry).

The spirit of Thelen's work is genuinely radical, and strikes at the center of a number of common assumptions behind both conventional and “reformed” schools. He sees education as a function of the total community, not the province of specialized “education” experts. While there is some tendency for him to view education across generations as a one-way street (adults are constantly helping or guiding young people to learn those things that adults value), at least he is concerned that different generations carry

on a dialogue. Unfortunately, like Rugg's futuristic scheme, Thelen's proposals have apparently fallen on sterile soil.

IV. A PROPOSAL FOR EDUCATION IN COMMUNITY

Since we believe that efforts at reform have generally failed to consider the fundamental importance of *contexts* in which education is pursued, we begin by conceptualizing alternative modes of, and environments for, learning. Imagine a hypothetical community in which learning is pursued in three quite different contexts: the "school" context, the "laboratory-studio-work" context, and the "community seminar" context. Subjects or problems for study and also the relations between students and teachers would be construed quite differently in each of these contexts.⁷

The school context. There is a clear need for systematic instruction in basic literacy skills, health and hygiene, driver education, and the like. Learning of this sort is pre-planned, programmed, and formalized. The teacher has clear objectives or "terminal behaviors" in mind as the products of instruction. Most of the activity in schools as we now know them falls in this category. This is not to suggest that school-based learning should continue to follow traditional subject matter lines, nor that instruction be didactic and rote. On the contrary, school learning should be problem-centered and exciting and should constantly consider reorganizing basic content to make it lead toward more powerful insights and understandings; for example, coordinate and symbol systems used in graphs, charts, and maps, might be combined with linguistic analysis and musical notation in teaching a course in symbolics. Technology has thrust upon us rich possibilities for more effective instruction through (a) greater opportunity for self-instruction, (b) availability of multi-media approaches, and (c) more accurate assessment of student needs and progress. Teaching within a school context may take many forms: tutorial between teacher and student, student with computer or programmed instruction, students in small groups, or large groups watching films. The distinguishing feature of the school context is that it concerns itself only with those aspects of education involving systematic, planned instruction. It should be clear from the explanation of the following two contexts that we see this kind of learning as only *one* among three critical types.

⁷ These "three contexts" are discussed in a mimeographed document, *Walden III*, by Joseph C. Grannis and Donald W. Oliver, presented to a seminar at the Harvard Graduate School of Education, 1965. Similar ideas are also contained in an earlier paper by Grannis (1964).

Laboratory-studio-work context. In the laboratory context, the major objective is not formal instruction, but the completion of a significant task, the solution of problems which the learner wants to attack, regardless of educational by-products that dealing with the problem might bring. The physical location of the laboratory context might be a factory, art studio, hospital, library, science or industrial laboratory, political party headquarters, or government agency. The activity of participants would be governed, not by a skill or a product that is programmed for students to learn, but only by the developing nature of the problem-task itself. Such problems might include painting a picture, rebuilding an auto, writing an essay, promoting a concert, organizing a protest demonstration, lobbying for legislation, selling insurance, programming a computer, acting in a play, nursing in a hospital, competing in a sport, participating in conservation and wildlife management, caring for children, planning and participating in a church service, broadcasting on radio and television, making a dress, printing a newspaper, making physical and chemical experiments, serving as a guide at the UN, organizing a raffle to raise money, or even creating instructional materials for use in a school context. Laboratories are contexts for learning in the midst of action; learning occurs not because it is planned, but only as an inevitable by-product of genuine participation in problem- and task-oriented activities. The laboratory is seen not primarily as apprenticeship or vocational training for breadwinning, but rather as the opportunity to satisfy broader humanistic and aesthetic goals. At present many adults are engaged in laboratory contexts—that is, their jobs—which are not recognized or supported for their educational value. Young people are deemed not “ready” to participate until they first spend twelve to sixteen years in “school.” We believe the laboratory offers important educational benefits at all ages; it should not be restricted to adults.

Community seminar context. The purpose of the seminar would be the reflective exploration of community issues and ultimate meanings in human experience. The seminar would provide an opportunity for the gathering of heterogeneous or homogeneous groups, for youth and/or adults, to examine and discuss issues of mutual concern. Seminars might begin by focusing on problems specific to members of the group (e.g., the meaning of productive work for people unemployed, retired, or dissatisfied with their jobs). Discussion might be stimulated by outside provocateurs who present new ways of viewing economic, ethical, or aesthetic questions. Seminars could have at their service a qualified resource staff that would gather information (readings, films, TV programs) and make arrangements for experiences, such as field trips, to observe unfamiliar ways of life, technological innovations, social problems in action. In addition to relatively specific prob-

lems (What kinds of working conditions are we entitled to?) and general public policy questions (How should the community be zoned?), we would hope that the seminars would concern themselves with the broadest questions raised in planning for education in community. Other possible topics include: understanding various conflicts between youth and adults, the functions of the family in modern society, attitudes toward nonconformity and deviance in the community, prejudice and pluralism among ethnic groups, changing mores in sex and religion, various approaches to child-rearing, the use of increased leisure, population control, protection of the consumer, moral implications of advances in biology (e.g., selective breeding), reconstruction of the political and legal system, evaluation of current programs sponsored by government and private agencies, creation of new professions and problems of vocational retraining. The major thrust of the seminars would be reflection and deliberation, though the questions discussed would be highly relevant to the laboratory context or the world of "action." Learning in the seminar would not be pre-planned, nor would there be specific tasks or problems to solve. Questions would be raised, investigated, and discussed—this process, regardless of numerous and unpredictable possible outcomes, is of high educational value. Generally both youth and adults are denied the kind of learning afforded by this context; the time of youth is monopolized by school, and that of adults by jobs or "laboratories."

Points of clarification. The contexts described above are intended to convey the major point that education consists of three important facets: systematic instruction, action, and reflection. The facets are not listed in order of importance, nor chronologically. All three should occur concurrently at all stages of life. A child learning how to read in a school context can participate in a laboratory project of building a model airplane (using the symbolic skills acquired in "school"); he can also discuss with children and adults in a seminar what to do about noise control for the local airport. An adult interested in politics might study government systematically in school; he might participate in the "laboratory" of a political campaign; and in the community seminar, he might lead discussions on political organization appropriate for the modern community. While some communities may choose to place most young children in the school context and allocate much of adult education to the seminar, we see no logical reason for this particular arrangement. Our scheme allows for various mixtures of the three components to be tailored to the needs of various stages of life or to the unique requirements of different types of communities.

Who would fill the leadership roles in such an educational scheme? If formal school comprises only one-third of the educational program, will professional educators be put out of work? Possibly, but not necessarily. Those

most qualified to carry on instruction may well be teachers and educators currently working in schools. Thus many teachers and administrators would stay in schools (although advances in technology suggest radical changes in their roles and jobs even if they do stay there). Since learning in school would occupy only a small portion of the student's day—perhaps three hours—one might expect school staffs to dwindle. If, however, adults also used the school for instruction, then the school's student population would increase, even though any given student spent only a small amount of time there. The demand for professional educators would remain high.

Leaders in the laboratory contexts would be experienced persons in the various laboratory areas (engineers, lawyers, mechanics, poets, politicians, athletes, secretaries) who would be given released time to take on educational responsibility for youth and adults interested in laboratory activity. It is possible that professional educationists can be converted into laboratory leaders; for example, an English teacher could take on apprentices in the writing of poetry, but in his laboratory role, he would be interested primarily in the creation and analysis of artistic works, not in teaching. The laboratory context would rely primarily upon private enterprise, government, the arts, labor, etc. to provide creative practitioners willing to assume on-the-job educational responsibility. If we are willing to recognize as teachers the vast number of talented practitioners in such fields, we shall approach a dramatic solution to the manpower problem of finding enough intelligent "teachers." By taking advantage of the educational value of the on-the-job activities, we may begin to break the strangle-hold by which the education profession has restricted our conception of education.

Community seminars could be run by professional educators, businessmen, politicians, parents, laborers, policemen, boy scouts, gang leaders, criminals, musicians, or journalists. The community seminar, perhaps more than the school or laboratory, raises the issue of incentive. What would induce people to participate in such activities? The success of such programs depends upon the willingness of various organizations to provide released time for leaders and participants. Financial arrangements must insure that such activities do not economically penalize participants. On the contrary, it would be reasonable to give monetary rewards for participation in educational activities. Paying people for undergoing training is already done on a large scale (neighborhood youth corps, Jobs Corps, scholarships and fellowships, prizes and rewards for high grades, in-training programs of businesses, etc.), and is quite consistent with the idea of making an investment in the development of human resources. We would assume that, given the time and money, the tasks and issues explored in these contexts could be sufficiently exciting to attract wide participation.

A community concerned with implementing some of these general ideas would require coordination of several resources, including private voluntary agencies such as churches, businesses, museums, and libraries, political parties, economic and political pressure groups, and social service organizations. It would require flexibility and attention to individual differences; yet to avoid the problems of fragmentation or specialization, it would have to facilitate participation in common experiences through which members could relate across economic, racial, political, ethnic, or occupational lines.

Implementing a program along these lines seems at first glance an administrator's nightmare, involving the coordination of disparate agencies and the cooperation of people with conflicting vested interests. Will colleges recognize the value of laboratory and seminar experience in their admissions policy? Would the education establishment be willing to relinquish much of its control over the learning of youth? Would business accept for employment people with varying, rather than standardized educational backgrounds? Who would have the power to accredit educational programs, and what new criteria would be needed? At the moment, we have no satisfactory answers for such problems, and we recognize the difficulty of putting some of these ideas into practice. It is possible, that in implementing the three contexts, an educational bureaucracy as rigid as the present one would evolve, with tight scheduling and compartmentalization equal to, or worse than, the current system. All we can say at this point is that implementation must be guided by serious attention to criteria for building community (such as those mentioned above, p. 64), else the purpose of educational change will be defeated. It thus becomes clear that when we speak of educational change, we speak of social and community change—a process for which few people have useful administrative guidelines.

Moreover, we hesitate to suggest specific plans or models, because we feel these should arise from the basic concerns of particular communities. We envision no national model that could be replicated across the land. Instead, there should develop a plurality of structures and programs. Jencks (1966) has suggested ways in which private groups could compete with each other and with the public education establishment by offering qualitatively different types of education, sensitive to community needs. In a single community, schools, laboratories, and seminars might be run by businesses, parents' groups, teachers, and churches—each competing with each other for students. It should be possible to fund competing enterprises without allowing a single centralized bureaucracy to gain total control. In some communities, literacy training may be a major problem (e.g., an urban slum); in others technical re-training (e.g., an area with a rapidly growing electronics industry); other areas may have particularly acute problems in human relations, or even in the use of leisure time.

Basing education on the needs of particular communities does not imply that students (youth and adults) are being trained for life within that community only. On the contrary, with communication and transportation breakthroughs likely to continue, all communities are becoming more dependent upon each other; their problems are therefore increasingly generalizable. The production of a TV program to publicize the plight of migrant workers involves the same considerations as producing a program to plead for better equipment for the local football team. Organizing tenants to protest against landlords involves processes similar to organizing real estate brokers to protest to Congress. Painting a picture of harvest time is in many ways similar to painting a scene of industrial smokestacks. A discussion of the boring process of cotton picking may be helpful in a later discussion on the meaning of work in an assembly-line. We see no reason to be alarmed that a community's education be focused on critical contemporary issues. If critical, they are, by definition, of relevance to other communities in other times.

To what extent is this tri-school proposal related to the problems of missing community? Will our recommendations result necessarily in the fulfillment of the criteria of community mentioned earlier (p. 64)? The proposal is not offered as a panacea; it is not intended as a model of community itself. We see the three contexts as vehicles that may broaden our search for solutions. (The existing schooling establishment generally inhibits and stifles that search.) The contexts of *action* and *community reflection* provide alternative techniques of search not ordinarily available in present schooling. Recognizing the educational value of these activities may help to nourish common commitments. The sense of community may also be improved by the dissolution of artificial barriers that tend to fragment certain experiences—barriers based on age, ethnicity, occupation, and especially the distinction between students and those who participate in "real life." We clearly recognize the dilemma between allowing for flexibility and diversity on the one hand, and the need to increase communication among different styles of life on the other; but the proposal argues that attacking this dilemma be acknowledged as an educational activity to be supported and encouraged; it also suggests new contexts in which this attack may be pursued. Conventional educational reforms largely ignore such problems by restricting their concept of education to formal instruction.

Assuming that one could find a community willing to alter its patterns of education along some of the general lines mentioned above, where would it turn for direction? Much of its work would move over uncharted waters. There are, however, a number of educational experiments that could be used as possible illustrations of the broader view. Such projects are not

necessarily aimed at the construction of community; their efforts may focus on narrower educational matters. Nevertheless, they represent interesting approaches that could be adapted to particular community needs. The following examples have come to our attention, but we feel certain they comprise only a small portion of the total available catalogue. Additional examples should be sought and recorded.

Some Examples

In connection with Harvard's Research and Development Center, Robert Belenky, James Reed, and Jonathan J. Clark have instituted a combination preschool and school study group, which we would consider an excellent example of a laboratory activity. Four kinds of people are involved: university educationists, mothers, youths, and young children from a lower-class ghetto in Boston (consisting of two public housing projects: one white and one Negro). Under the supervision of the educationists and mothers, the youths teach young children in a basement recreation room of the Negro project. The educationists and mothers take field trips to explore a variety of the more progressive schools in the greater Boston area to provide information from which to discuss the kind of school experience they would like for their children. There is hope that these discussions will lead to constructive dialogue with the formal school establishment, and, if need be, political and social action to bring about a change in the formal schools. One member of the educationist group is from the ghetto, an artist skilled also in methods of social action and protest. Rather than viewing this project as an educational program to improve formal education, i.e., the schools, one might view this as a continuing educational program in its own right. Rather than construing this kind of activity as mainly temporary, compensatory, or rehabilitative (though it may in fact be the latter), why not consider this as one of a number of normal educational opportunities in which adults and youth might choose to engage?

A second example is a radio club sponsored by an electronics firm in Concord, Massachusetts. Two days a week a group of youths comes to the main factory and works with engineers and technicians, building ham radio sets, exploring radio theory, and exchanging technical information. Presently this club is extracurricular, piled on top of what for many high school students is an already overburdensome amount of school work. Why not include adult "hams" as well as young people? Why not construe this as a genuine educational setting and allow the participants to account this time against the school or work responsibilities in their normal schedules?

Some churches are becoming increasingly involved in activities designed to restore community in urban areas. While many of their efforts may be

seen as traditional welfare and settlement house services having relatively small influence, others reveal a broader concern for the total pathology in community. Church-sponsored projects have combined the buying and renovating of slum housing for low-income people with manpower training and protests for civil and consumer rights. The Urban Training Center for Christian Mission in Chicago participates in a number of such activities and uses these programs as major parts of a training process for prospective ministers. Trainees live in the slums with the poor (they are given only a few cents for several days), and they participate in action projects like the above as workers for various sponsoring groups. After periods of intensive involvement working in the community, the seminarians withdraw for reflection and deliberation. They are temporarily released from immediate pressures of the day, given time for study and discussion of general issues. The UTC's approach combines the laboratory with the community seminar context and seems to have success in both areas.

Another church-sponsored project illustrates a type of community seminar. Sponsored by the Presbytery of Detroit, the Episcopal Diocese of Michigan, and the Michigan Conference of the United Church of Christ, the Detroit Industrial Mission (DIM) sends clergymen into industrial plants to initiate contacts with men who organize small discussion groups among the workers. Topics are drawn from concerns of the workers themselves. The mission does not preach any particular point of view, but attempts to foster better communication and deeper levels of understanding among all groups in industry. The responsibility of staff members is merely to arrange opportunities for men to say to each other what they think about human and ethical issues that occur in the plant. This illustration has a number of interesting characteristics: (a) it was initiated and carried out by a private, voluntary group, without public funds or public officials; (b) its purpose was to provide neither vocational training nor an opportunity to philosophize about "great books," but rather to raise fundamental questions of immediate relevance and importance; (c) the "teachers" operate from a clear ideological base, but are not interested in evangelical conversion; (d) the "students" are not seen as preparing for some distant goal, but as learning to make better decisions here and now; and (e) there are no sharp age or status distinctions—men at different points in their careers talk sincerely with one another.

The Highlander Folk School, in the Cumberland Mountains of Tennessee, began in the Depression as a labor school to teach workers in the South how to organize and run unions. Often the center of controversy, it offers another example of an environment of reflection directly related to community action. A nonprofit institution supported by private donations and

foundation grants, Highlander runs resident adult education programs, teaching adults how to teach others to deal with social problems. The programs consist mainly of workshops arranged in response to specific pressing issues. For example, in 1960, the Student Nonviolent Coordinating Committee asked for help in evaluating their own future program. A workshop was held, yielding the decision to concentrate upon voter registration. The School is the scene of many workshops related to civil rights issues and has always been racially integrated. The emphasis is not only on the making of policy decisions, but also on leadership training and the dissemination of knowledge gained through the Highlander programs. Concerned with the most explosive of social issues, the School has been attacked in the courts (the state revoked its charter), investigated for subversive activities, and destroyed by fire. Similar institutions could be developed as retreat seminars, not limited to a single community, but available as resources to many.

Conclusion

The deliberate effort to view education in community from three vantage points and to look for contexts, outside of the formal school, where people learn is only the first step in any important effort at educational reform—but it is the hardest. After one wrenches oneself loose from the paralyzingly constricted posture that all true education must be programmed, planned, compulsory, and public, and it must all happen in schools, one's imagination trips over a host of exciting places for youth and adults to learn, by themselves, and in association with one another. Only after this first step has been taken do really important questions of educational policy arise:

What does the educational system have to do with the system of government, of economics, of politics? It is all very well to say that education is for the purpose of maintaining our nation or developing a world order, but what does that mean? Does it mean that every individual must be made literate, wise, loyal and conforming? . . . Is a school a cultural island, separated from the community mainland by the same kind of thing that separates fantasy from real life? Does the school lead or follow the community or both? We hear a lot about the need to "involve" citizens in school problems. Who, how, why? Is it just to keep them quiet? or to manipulate them into contributing more money? Is school supposed to "induct youth into the community"? What does that mean? . . . Can the school do the job alone? Or is the school only one part of a community-wide educational system which exists in fact whether the school board knows it or not? (Thelen, 1960, pp. 13-14)

Critics of this position tend to ask for specific blueprints and definite answers to such policy questions. They ask for outlines, schedules and programs, raising such issues as: How much time would students spend in school? Would the rest of their time be completely free or planned and su-

pervised in some way? Who would pay for extra-curricular activities? How could adults be released from their jobs to take responsibility for community education? How would legal authority be allocated among community agencies? Would state departments of education change their requirements? Would colleges accept students with this sort of education? Would the students perform better on standard tests and attain standards of "excellence" comparable, for example, to European education? Can we demonstrate that education organized around these ideas would have any real pay-off in later life?

To answer such questions directly at this point would be inappropriate. Until people in a community have argued about and accepted some of the premises in this paper and are vitally concerned with implementation for their particular situation, it would be foolhardy for armchair professors to prescribe programs. Providing blueprints in the abstract, not tied to a specific situation, would be inconsistent with our premise that education should arise from real needs and issues within community, not from the drawing boards of distant national planners.

We are chastized for evading the issue of practicality, as critics throw up their hands in despair with our "unrealistic," "unfeasible" ideas. This basic criticism and questions like the above reflect a commitment by critics to the present system, a reluctance to search for fundamental deficiencies in the status quo. The major issue from our point of view is not our inability to give blueprints and specific answers to such questions; financial, logistic, and administrative problems of plural educational contexts are relatively minor difficulties. Instead, the major issue is whether or not we can find people willing to begin serious discussion on premises and ideas rather than only on blueprints and programs. The next step lies not in a more concrete plan, but in a *search for a group of people*, some "missing community," with the courage and energy to re-examine how education, most broadly conceived as the interaction between reflection and action, can invigorate the lives of all its citizens.

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