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Education and the Quality of Government  
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**ABSTRACT**

Generally speaking, better educated countries have better governments, an empirical regularity that holds in both dictatorships and democracies. We suggest that a possible reason for this fact is that educated people are more likely to complain about misconduct by government officials, so that, even when each complaint is unlikely to succeed, more frequent complaints encourage better behavior from officials. Newly assembled individual-level survey data from the World Justice Project show that, within countries, better educated people are more likely to report official misconduct. The results are confirmed using other survey data on reporting crime and corruption. Citizen complaints might thus be an operative mechanism that explains the link between education and the quality of government.

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## I. Introduction

Just about every measure that might be used to define the quality of government, such as the degree of democracy, political freedom, respect for property rights, absence of corruption, or efficiency in the provision of public services, is higher in richer and more educated countries (see, e.g., La Porta et al 1999, Barro 1999, Treisman 2000, Svensson 2005). Figure 1 illustrates some well-known correlations between education and the quality of government. The positive correlation between education (or per capita income) and the quality of government holds in both dictatorships and democracies (Figure 2). It also holds in countries with different legal traditions, ethnic heterogeneity, and inequality (La Porta et al. 1999). Most studies find that education and development lead to improved government (e.g., Barro 1999, Glaeser et al. 2004, Bobba and Coviello 2007, Castello-Climent 2008, Murin and Wacziarg 2011), although some disagree (Acemoglu et al. 2005). In this paper, we ask *why* the quality of government improves with education and development, assuming that it does.

The answer to the question is not entirely obvious. Take the case of corruption. The decline in corruption as countries get richer and more educated is nearly universal (Treisman 2000, Svensson 2005; Figure 1). It occurs in both dictatorships and democracies (Figure 2), so it is implausible that corruption falls only because voters turn out the corrupt politicians. Corruption falls regardless of whether a country has an anti-corruption campaign, pays efficiency wages to bureaucrats, is ethnically divided, or has free press. Theoretically, as a country grows, both government regulation and the scale of economic activity rise, which if anything should stimulate corruption. The mechanisms of improvement in the quality of government as countries develop appear to be too universal to attribute them to the particular policies.

We propose and test empirically a new explanation of such improvement in the process of development, one based on educational attainment as the driving mechanism. In our view, one reason why government improves is citizen complaints against public officials who mistreat them: policemen who beat them up, officials who demand bribes, teachers who do not show up. All countries have some laws against police abuse, corruption, and public employee absenteeism, which include penalties for official misconduct. Of course, in many countries these rules are enforced with only a small probability. But a public official choosing to break rules must trade off the risk of being disciplined, no matter how small for each individual complaint, against the benefits of misconduct. As citizen complaints proliferate and become more effective, the risk of an investigation and disciplinary action rises. We propose that educated people are more likely to complain against official misconduct, and to complain more effectively. As education levels in a country rise, so do complaints when officials misbehave, raising the expected costs of misconduct and thus encouraging officials to follow the rules – to ask for fewer bribes, to avoid abusing people, to show up to work. Through this entirely decentralized process, only roughly dependent on the prevailing political mechanisms, government improves.

The idea that citizen “voice” can improve government performance is Hirschman’s (1970). Hirschman focuses on voting rather than complaints as the expression of voice, and does not link voice to education. Verba and Nie (1972) and Verba, Schlozman and Brady (1995) are among the first prominent studies in political science linking education to political participation. These studies consider both voting and other form of participating, such as volunteering. Dee (2004) and Milligan, Moretti, and Oreopoulos (2004) provide evidence of causal links between education and voting. Voting is surely important, but the fact that the quality of government improves with education in dictatorships as well as in democracies is an indication that voting is

not the only mechanism linking the two. With respect to the complaining mechanism, Soares (2004a, b) finds that richer and more educated countries report a higher fraction of crimes. Related findings are presented in DiTella et al. (2010). Yet, to the best of our knowledge, the idea that citizen complaints about government are the route to its improvement is new here.

This discussion raises the question of why the more educated people are more likely to complain, and to complain more effectively. There are at least three possibilities. First, educated people might merely know better how to complain effectively: they are more literate, more articulate, more knowledgeable where to go and how to complain. This is a pure human capital channel: complaining is like any other activity for which productivity rises with education. Verba and Nie (1972), Verba, Scholzman, and Berry (1995), and Nie, Junn, and Stehlik-Berry (1996) take this point of view with respect to political participation. A second channel is that educated people are more pro-social, share common values, and are less tolerant of injustice (Dewey 1944, Hayek 1960, Putnam 1993, Campbell 2006, Glaeser, Ponzetto, and Shleifer 2007, Algan et al. 2011). Because better educated people are better socialized, they are more willing to complain against public misconduct even when the odds of private success are low. A third channel, intimately related to the first, sees educated people as less fearful of official reprisals. This might be in part because they know the law and the rules, and hence can stand up to officials, but it might also be because they are themselves “legal” -- work formally, occupy their residence formally – and hence do not feel at risk.

An alternative but related view holds that it is the levels of income per se, rather than education, that drive complaints and through them governmental improvement. For example, richer people might be able to hire lawyers, or even to find time, to make their complaints more effective (on the other hand, their time is more valuable, so they might not bother). Wolfinger

and Rosenstone (1980) show empirically that education is more important than income as a determinant of political participation. One can perhaps also argue that it is not the complaining process, but rather the improvement in the education and the general quality of bureaucrats that leads to better government in richer countries. In our empirical work, we seek to distinguish between income and education as drivers of complaints.

To organize the discussion, in the next section we present a simple model of equilibrium quality of government driven by citizen complaints. The following sections test the main assumption of the model, namely that better education citizens are more likely to complain. Our main data source is the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index [Agrast et. al. 2011]. Over the last three years, the WJP has conducted extensive surveys of both citizens and legal professionals in 61 countries about individuals' experiences with the law (Appendix A presents the list of countries covered by the WJP). The countries were selected to ensure diversity and representation of all regions, income levels, population sizes, and legal traditions of the world. One part of the data contains surveys of the general population (1,000 respondents per country) eliciting both their opinions about the legal system and personal experience with it. Care was taken to assure broad representation by gender, education level, and socio-economic status. The data contain information about the demographic characteristics of the respondents, including their education. In this paper, we only use experience-based questions.

The principal questions from the WJP survey we focus on deal with official misconduct and whether it was reported by the victim. There are two main questions in the survey. The first asks whether people have complained about some aspect of government services in general during the previous year. The second question asks whether respondents experienced police abuse, and if so whether they reported it. In addition, the WJP survey contains information about

respondents reporting crime, specifically break-ins and armed robberies. Although these questions do not pertain to complaints about public misconduct per se, they do give us information about the propensity to report problems to the government, and thus shed light on the relationship between education and voice.

We supplement WJP data with some questions from the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS), which contains information about households' experiences with crime, including reporting to the police for thousands of respondents in 78 countries. The ICVS contains a number of questions concerning the reporting of crime, which enable us to assess the robustness of our WJP findings on reporting using different data. In addition, on a few questions, the ICVS asks the respondents the reasons for reporting or not reporting the incidents of crime and corruption, and we can use these data. We also use the Corruption Barometer from Transparency International to examine the incidence of corruption, its reporting, and the reasons for reporting or not reporting, in a number of countries.

Our main findings can be easily summarized. First, the cross-country relationship between education and institutional quality holds in our data as well. Second, we find consistent support for the proposition that, within countries, the more educated people complain more both about government misconduct when it occurs, and crime in general. This relationship is particularly strong in developing countries, consistent with the view that, in the developed countries, even the less educated have the knowledge and lack of fear to complain. Third, the results are particularly strong in autocracies, suggesting that voting might not be the only important exercise of voice in the political process. Fourth, the results are robust to the inclusion of respondent-level measures of trust, income, and social status. Fifth, the analysis of additional data sets confirms our main findings, but also suggests that fear of police reprisals and the lack of

knowledge of how to complaint are important factors behind silence. Sixth, we find that educated countries have a lower incidence of public and private misconduct. These results are consistent with the central assumption of the theory, as well as with its aggregate implications.

## II. A Simple Model

The players in the model are a citizen, an official, the official's superior, and possibly also the superior's manager. The citizen has an interaction, or a possible interaction, with the official, who chooses whether to do his job. The official can be a doctor deciding whether to pay attention to the patient's complaint, a teacher deciding whether to go to work that day, a policeman considering whether to beat up a citizen he does not like, or a bureaucrat deciding whether to ask for a bribe. We assume that the benefit to the official of misbehaving is  $b$ , which is distributed as  $F(b)$  in the population of officials.

In case the official misbehaves, the citizen can complain to the official's superior. Let the probability of complaint be  $p(e,s)$ , where  $e$  is the citizen's education, and  $s$  is the probability of success. We assume for simplicity that  $e$  is known to the official, which can be interpreted either as citizen's education known to the official or as average education in the country (so the official does not know whom he is dealing with). We assume that  $p_1 > 0$  and  $p_2 > 0$ . The probability of success will be determined in equilibrium.

Begin with the simplest version of the model. The official's superior is honest with an exogenous probability  $h$ , and punishes the official upon receiving the complaint if and only if he is honest. The punishment is exogenously given by  $D$ . In this case, the equilibrium probability that the complaint succeeds is  $s = h$ , and the overall probability of punishment is  $p(e,h)h$ . In this case, the official misbehaves provided that  $b > p(e,h)hD$ . Letting  $b^*$  be the cutoff benefit level



for misbehavior, we can think of  $F(b^*)$  as the share of officials who behave, and therefore the quality of government in the country. It is trivial to show that this quality rises with the probability that the superior is honest but also with  $e$ , the level of education of the citizen(s). Intuitively, citizen complaints discourage misbehavior, and thus improve institutional quality. If one makes the additional assumption that  $h$  – the “quality” of officials -- rises with  $e$ , there is a further reason why the quality of government rises with  $e$  as well.

We can extend the model slightly and assume that if the superior ignores the complaint, the citizen can complain about him to his manager, who responds with the same exogenous probability  $h$  upon receiving a complaint. This means that even a dishonest superior with a low enough cost of acting might punish the official, so the total probability of success of a complaint is now given by  $h + (1-h)P(e,h)$ , where  $P(e,h)$  is the equilibrium probability that the dishonest superior punishes the official in fear of his own punishment. Higher citizen education thus provides an extra incentive for the official to behave, because he knows that even a dishonest superior might punish him in fear of continuing complaints, and possible action, up the chain. Solving backwards, we can compute the equilibrium  $b^{**} > b^*$  such that the officials with  $b < b^{**}$  now behave. The quality of institutions,  $F(b^{**})$  is even higher in this case, and it remains the case, with an extra kick, that the quality of institutions rises with education.

In summary, even this very simple analysis suggests three potential channels through which the complaint mechanism works. Government officials are more likely to do their job when citizens are better educated because 1) such citizens are more likely to complain, leading to a higher probability of punishment for misconduct, 2) the officials’ superiors are more likely to act and punish misbehaving officials because they themselves are more vulnerable to citizen complaints up the chain of command and therefore to punishment for inaction in response to

complaints, and 3) better educated officials might perhaps be more honest. In our micro regressions, we do not disentangle these mechanisms, but test the fundamental assumption of the model, namely that better educated citizens are more likely to complain about official misconduct. We also examine the aggregate implications of the theory across countries.

### **III. Data**

We use data on citizen complaints and reporting from the general population polls of the World Justice Project Rule of Law Index. Over the last three years, WJP has conducted extensive surveys in 61 countries of the perceptions and experiences of ordinary people concerning their dealings with the government, the police, and the courts; the extent of corruption; as well as the magnitude of common crimes to which the general public is exposed. The surveys were carried in two waves, 2009 and 2011, on probability samples of 1,000 respondents drawn from the three largest cities in each country, and were conducted by professional polling organizations using face-to-face, telephone, and online interviews. All questions we use deal with personal experiences of individuals or their families.

Our basic measures of citizen complaints against public officials come from two questions. The first question, available only in the 2011 wave, is worded as follows: “*During the last year, did you submit any complaint about the services provided by the different government agencies in your country (including registration office; customs office; public health services; tax office; land allocation office, etc.)?*” The second question asks whether respondents experienced police abuse, and if so whether they reported it. The question reads “*In the last 3 years, have you or someone in your household, been subjected to physical abuse by the police or*

*the military?”* and is followed by the question *“Did you or anyone else report the crime to the police or other authority?”*

The WJP polls also ask respondents whether they were victim of crime during the last three years and whether they reported it to the police. We use two of these questions. The first question is: *“In the past 3 years, did anyone actually break into your home/residence without permission, and steal or try to steal something?”* and *“Did you or anyone else report the crime to the police”*. The second question asks: *“In the past 3 years, were you a victim of an armed robbery (with a weapon such as a knife or a gun)?”* and *“Did you or anyone else report the crime to the police?”* This question was only asked in the 2011 wave.

The WJP data also contain demographic information, including education and income. We construct two indicators of education level: College and High/Middle school. The first indicator equals 1 if the respondent answered “Bachelor's degree” or “Graduate degree (Masters, Ph.D.)” to the question *“What is the highest degree you received?”* The second indicator is coded 1 if the respondent answered “Middle school diploma” or “High school diploma or equivalent”.

We supplement the WJP data with information from the International Crime Victims Survey (ICVS) and the 2009 TI Global Corruption Barometer. The ICVS is an international poll designed to provide comparable data on people’s recent experience with common crime around the world. By 2005, over 140 surveys had been completed in 75 different countries, totaling over 320,000 individual respondents. We construct a sample using the most recent data for each country and focus on two groups of questions. The first group asks respondents whether they have experienced burglary, attempted burglary, robbery, fraud, and personal theft; and whether the crime was reported to the police. The second group asks whether respondents have been solicited for bribes in the previous year, whether they reported the incident, as well as the reasons

for reporting or not reporting it. The ICVS includes demographic characteristics, but education is not consistently asked throughout the different waves. Accordingly, we define college by the highest degree attained, the years of schooling (more than 15) or if the respondent completed school when he/she was older than 21 years. Similarly, we define High/Middle school if the respondent finished Middle or High school, have between 9 and 15 years of schooling, or completed school when he/she was between 15 and 21 years old.

The TI Global Corruption Barometer is a worldwide public opinion survey on the general public's views and experiences of corruption. Each country sample is probabilistic and is weighted to provide a representative sample of the national population. We use three questions from the 2009 wave, which covers 69 countries: "*On the past 12 months, have you or anyone living in your household paid a bribe in any form?*" and the follow up questions "*Did you present a formal complaint in this regard?*" and "*Why you did not present the complaint?*"

Table 1 presents the definitions of the variables from WJP and the supplementary sources used in the analysis. Figure 3 confirms that the cross-country relationship between education and institutional quality holds in the WJP data as well. Figure 3 shows that the value of WJP's aggregate rule of law index rises sharply with a country's level of educational attainment.

#### **IV. Evidence**

In this section, we focus on the relationship between education and the reporting of government misconduct or crime at the individual level, holding country fixed effects constant. Table 2 contains results for 7 questions from the WJP database. Four questions were administered in 61 countries, for a total of about 61,000 observations. The remaining questions were asked in only 31 countries. The first three questions deal with reporting government

misconduct; the last four deal with reporting crime. For each individual in the survey we have information of whether he or she is a college graduate, a high school graduate, or has less than high school education. All the results are estimated using OLS with country fixed effects and standard errors clustered at the country level. The dependent variables are dummies equal to zero or one depending on whether a particular event occurred.

The first question asks whether the respondent submitted a complaint about services provided by any government agency during the past year. Compared to individuals with less than a high school degree, college graduates are 4.5 percentage points more likely to have submitted a complaint ( $t = 3.47$ ), while high school graduates are 2.2 percentage points more likely to have submitted a complaint ( $t = 1.61$ ). These are large effects compared to the worldwide complaining mean of 13.6 percent. The second question asks whether, during the last three years, the respondent or someone in their household has been unfairly subjected to physical abuse by the police or the military. There is a reduction in the likelihood of abuse for college and high-school graduates, but the effects are not statistically significant. Critically for our study, the next question asks the 3,614 individuals in the WJP survey who had been victimized whether they had reported the abuse. Here we find a sharply higher and statistically significant probability of reporting (compared to the 44 percentage point world mean) among college and high school graduates. Compared to respondents with less than high school education, college graduates are 13.0 percentage points more likely to report abuse, and high school graduates are 5.1 percentage points more likely. The data on reporting government misconduct from WJP suggest that education is associated with a sharply higher probability of complaining.

The remaining four questions in Table 2 deal with reporting crime. The evidence shows that the more educated people are, if anything, more likely to experience break-ins and armed

robberies than the less educated ones. At the same time, better educated crime victims were much more likely to report the crime. Relative to the world-wide mean of 61 percent of reporting break-ins, college graduates were 9.6 percentage points more likely, and high school graduates 4.7 percentage points more likely to report than those without a high school degree. Relative to the world-wide mean of 58 percent reporting armed robberies, college graduates were 9.8 percentage points more likely, but high school graduates no more likely, to report than those without a high school degree. The effect of education, particularly college education, on reporting crime is huge.

Table 3 examines the robustness of these results for educated and uneducated countries in the sample. The results are extremely strong in uneducated countries. In these countries, for example, a person with a college education is 6 percentage points more likely (compared to a mean of 13.2) to complain about government services, and 14.2 percentage points more likely (compared to a mean of 44.1) to report police abuse, than a person without a high school degree. The results are not as strong for the educated countries. There is no effect of education at all for complaints about government services, although there is a positive but insignificant effect of education on reporting police abuse. This evidence is consistent with our expectations. The uneducated people in uneducated countries might indeed not know how to complain, or be fearful of the authorities (see the evidence described below). In educated countries, in contrast, the knowledge of how to address government misconduct is more widespread, and there is less fear of reprisal. As a consequence, the relationship between education and complaints is not nearly as clear cut, either theoretically or empirically, as that in uneducated countries.

The next series of tables examines the robustness of the results. Table 4 distinguishes autocracies and democracies. The results hold very strongly in both autocracies and

democracies, consistently for complaining about government officials, reporting police abuse, as well as reporting crime. The fact that the results hold strongly in autocracies is important. It suggests that it might not be only the voting mechanism stressed by Hirschman and Verba, but also the decentralized process of individuals complaining against government misconduct, that serves to discipline government officials and improve institutional quality as countries develop.

An important question about our finding is whether education is a proxy for something else that may encourage complaining. The leading possibilities are 1) trust or social capital, 2) income, and 3) social status. More trusting people may have greater confidence that their complaints would be addressed fairly, richer people may have greater resources to complain and perhaps greater sums to complain about, and higher status people may feel more empowered to complain. Fortunately, WJP data contain some information on each of these matters, so the concerns can be addressed empirically.

Several of the respondent-level questions asked in the WJP survey concern the level of trust in institutions, and we aggregate them into an index. The results in Table 5 do not offer consistent evidence that trust matters for complaining, while education coefficients remain both sizable and statistically significant. Education is not merely a proxy for trust in these data. Table 6 uses a proxy for respondent's income to assess whether it is income rather than education that influences complaining. Higher income individuals are more likely to report burglary, but not to complain more in other respects. We find no significant changes in the estimated effects of education from including income proxies (we have tried other specifications to check robustness). Education is not merely a proxy for income in these data.

As a rough proxy for social status as distinct from income, we included an indicator of whether the respondent owns a car. As Table 7 shows, car ownership increases the probability of

reporting crime, but not of complaining about the government (we have also checked the effects of ownership of a second home, which are not significant). The effects of education remain large and significant. An alternative view is that social status is related to gender. In WJP data, men report a higher probability of complaining about officials, and higher probabilities of being victimized, but not higher incidence of reporting crime. These effects of gender do not, however, reduce the coefficients on education (results not reported). We have also checked whether religion influences the probability of complaining, and found no evidence that it does.

Another concern is that the propensity to complain is shaped by access to the complaint technology, such as a cell phone or a computer, rather than by education per se. Fortunately, WJP data contain information on whether the respondent has a cell phone or a computer. Table 8 shows that, indeed, having a cell phone sharply raises the probability of reporting a crime, though not of complaining about government generally. At the same time, having a cell phone does not have much of an effect on education coefficients. (There is also no evidence of complementarities between education and cell phones.) We do not find that having a computer affects the probability of complaining or reporting a crime (results not reported). The evidence suggests that cell phones do indeed facilitate crime reporting, but education is by no means a proxy for having a cell phone.

#### **IV. Other Data Sources.**

The next series of tables examine the robustness of our results in other data sources, and probe the reasons for reporting on not reporting government misconduct and crime. Table 9 reports, for a sample of 125,000 observations from 71 countries, that the incidence of reporting



burglary, attempted burglary, robbery, consumer fraud, and theft was sharply higher for better educated individuals. Across specifications, the results confirm the findings in the WJP data.

Table 10 focuses on ICVS data on corruption, and the reasons for reporting and not reporting requests for bribes. The first column shows, not surprisingly, that better educated people are more likely to be asked for a bribe. The next two columns show that educated people are not more likely to report the request for a bribe to the police, but more likely to report it to a public or private agency. In explaining the reasons for not reporting, the educated people are less likely to report that the matter was inappropriate for police, but also less likely to worry that the police will not do anything or to fear/dislike police. There is evidence here that the less educated people are more concerned with police reprisals, and hence fail to use their voice. In the final panel of Table 10, we examine affirmative reasons in ICVS for reporting corruption, but do not find any interesting and statistically significant effects.

Table 11 deals with the data from the TI Global Corruption Barometer 2009 produced by Transparency International. The sample is over 60,000 people from 62 countries. As with ICVS, educated people report much higher probabilities of being asked for a bribe: 4.3 percentage points higher for a college graduate than for a person with no high school education (compared to a mean of 17.7 percent). There is also strong evidence of college graduates being more likely to present a formal complaint against being asked for a bribe: with a world-wide average probability of a complaint of 19.8 percent, college graduates are 2.4 percentage points more likely to file a complaint. With respect to reasons for not reporting corruption requests, the evidence here is again considerably stronger than with ICVS. College graduates were 6.1 percentage points less likely to report that they did not know how to file a complaint as the reason for not doing so than individuals without a high school education (the mean of this

variable is 16 percent). They are also more likely to report that it would not have helped. Last, they are 3.2 percentage points less likely to report a fear of reprisals (the mean of this variable is 21.8 percent). The evidence points to a combination of the pure human capital story whereby the more educated people know how to complain, and a related story that these people do not fear the police. The Corruption Barometer evidence is broadly consistent with our basic theory.

Yiqing Xu (2012) re-examines our hypotheses using the data set of complaints against provincial and local government officials in China, using the China Public Governance Survey. He finds that in the Chinese data as well, better educated citizens are more likely to complain about both government misconduct and public services. Xu finds even larger effects of education than we do. He also finds that the reasons for higher complaints by the better educated include greater knowledge, greater civicness, and lower fear of reprisals. Xu's evidence strongly reinforces our hypothesis that the complaint mechanism of institutional improvement is of particular importance in non-democratic countries.

As a final step, we check whether higher education countries have lower rates of victimization of citizens by criminals and government officials. Figure 4 summarizes these findings, and confirms this basic aggregate prediction of the theory, namely that higher education countries have lower crime and better government performance. This particular prediction, of course is not new: it is the within-country mechanism that represents this paper's innovation.

## **V. Conclusion**

We have proposed a new explanation of the universal positive association between a country's educational level and the quality of its government, namely citizen complaints. We argued that educated citizens complain more, and that these complaints lead to better conduct by

officials fearful of being punished, and therefore a higher quality government. One attractive feature of this mechanism is that it is entirely decentralized, and does not rely on any particular institution, such as democracy. The evidence from a newly collected data set and two additional ones indeed suggests that within countries better educated citizens are more likely to complain both about crime and about government misconduct, such as corruption and police abuse.

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Figure 1: The quality of government and education (TI, WB and Freedom House)







Figure 2: The quality of government and education in autocratic and democratic regimes




Figure 3: The quality of government and education (WJP rule of law index)





Figure 4: Incidence of mistreatment, bribing, and crime and education (WJP, Barometer and ICVS data sets)





**Table 1: Description of the variables**

Variable	Description
<i>1. Cross-country variables</i>	
Education	The expected number of years of schooling, or school life expectancy (SLE). It is defined as the total number of years of schooling which a child can expect to receive, assuming that the probability of his or her being enrolled in school at any particular future age is equal to the current enrolment ratio at that age. It is a synthetic summary indicator of the overall pattern of enrolment ratios at one particular point in time, and has no predictive value except in so far as it is believed that enrolment patterns will remain unchanged into the future. Source: <a href="http://unstats.un.org">http://unstats.un.org</a>
Transparency International Corruption Perceptions Index	The score of the Transparency International Corruption Perception Index in 2010. The index provides a measure of the extent to which corruption is perceived to exist in the public and political sectors. The index focuses on corruption in the public sector and defines corruption as the abuse of public office for private gain. It is based on assessments by experts and opinion surveys. The index ranges between 0 (highly corrupt) and 10 (highly clean). Source: <a href="http://www.transparency.org">www.transparency.org</a> .
World Bank Governance Indicators	The averaged score of the Worldwide Governance Indicators 2010 (WGI). The WGI 2010 reports aggregate and individual governance indicators for 213 economies for six dimensions of governance: Voice and Accountability, Political Stability and Absence of Violence, Government Effectiveness, Regulatory Quality, Rule of Law, and Control of Corruption. The individual data sources underlying the aggregate indicators are drawn from a diverse variety of survey institutes, think tanks, NGOs, and international organizations. Source: <a href="http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/">http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/</a>
Heritage Economic Freedom Index	The score of the Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom in 2011. The index measures ten components of economic freedom, assigning a grade in each using a scale from 0 to 100, where 100 represents the maximum freedom. The ten component scores are then averaged to give an overall economic freedom score for each country. The ten components of economic freedom are: Business Freedom, Trade Freedom, Fiscal Freedom, Government Spending, Monetary Freedom, Investment Freedom, Financial Freedom, Property rights, Freedom from Corruption, and Labor Freedom Source: <a href="http://www.heritage.org">www.heritage.org</a> .
Democracy	An indicator variable coded 1 if the Polity 2 score from the 2010 Polity IV data set is below 0. The Polity2 score is computed by subtracting a county's autocracy score from its democracy score. The resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Source: <a href="http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4">http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4</a>
Autocracy	An indicator variable coded 1 if the Polity 2 score from the 2010 Polity IV data set is equal or larger than 0. The Polity2 score is computed by subtracting a county's autocracy score from its democracy score. The resulting unified polity scale ranges from +10 (strongly democratic) to -10 (strongly autocratic). Source: <a href="http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4">http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4</a>
WGI- Government Effectiveness Estimate	The score of the Worldwide Governance Indicator 'Government Effectiveness' 2010, which captures perceptions of the quality of public services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and the credibility of the government's commitment to such policies. Source: <a href="http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/">http://info.worldbank.org/governance/wgi/</a>
WJP Rule of Law Index	The WJP Rule of Law Index is the average of the eight factors of the Rule of Law Index measured in 2011: Limited Government Powers, Corruption, Order and Security, Fundamental Rights, Open Government, Effective Regulatory enforcement, Access to Civil Justice, Effective Criminal Justice. Scores range between 0 and 1, with 1 representing a higher adherence to the rule of law. Source: <a href="http://www.worldjusticeproject.org">http://www.worldjusticeproject.org</a>

Variable	Description
<i>2. Within-country variables(World Justice Project database)</i>	
College (WJP)	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered “Bachelor’s degree” or “Graduate degree (Masters, Ph.D.)” to the question “What is the highest degree you received?” Source: World Justice Project database
High/Middle school (WJP)	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered “Middle school diploma” or “High school diploma or equivalent” to the question “What is the highest degree you received?” Source: World Justice Project database
Complained about government services	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “During the last year, did you submit any complaint about the services provided by the different government agencies in your country (including registration office; customs office; public health services; tax office; land allocation office, etc.)?” Source: World Justice Project database
Police abuse	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “In the last 3 years, have you or someone in your household, been subjected to physical abuse by the police or the military?” Source: World Justice Project database
Report police abuse	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “(For those who have been victimized) Was the crime reported to the police or other authority?” Source: World Justice Project database
Burglary (WJP)	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “In the past 3 YEARS, did anyone actually BREAK into your home/residence without permission, and steal or try to steal something?” Source: World Justice Project database
Report burglary (WJP)	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “(For those who answered Yes to Burglary) Did you or anyone else report the crime to the police?” Source: World Justice Project database
Assault	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “In the past 3 YEARS, were you a victim of an ARMED ROBBERY (with a weapon such as a knife or a gun)?” Source: World Justice Project database
Report Assault	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “(For those who answered Yes to Assault) Did you or anyone else report the crime to the police?” Source: World Justice Project database
Trust Index	Index between 0 and 1, where 1 indicates more trust. The index is the average of four questions: How much TRUST do you have in each of the following categories of people, groups of people, and institutions? (1) Officers working in the local government; (2) Officers working in the national government; (3) The police; (4) The courts (On a 4-point scale from 0 (No trust) to 1 (A lot of trust)). Source: World Justice Project database

Variable	Description
Income above median	Indicator variable equal to 1 if the income or socio-economic level of the respondent is above the median in the country. Source: WJP database
High Income	Indicator variable coded 1 if the income or socio-economic level of the respondent is in the highest tertile in the country. Source: WJP database
Middle Income	Indicator variable coded 1 if the income or socio-economic level of the respondent is in the middle tertile in the country. Source: WJP database
Car	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question "Do you or any member of your household living in this house have: a car?" Source WJP database
Cell phone	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question "Do you or any member of your household living in this house have: a mobile phone?" Source WJP database
<i>3. Within-country variables(ICVS)</i>	
College (ICVS)	Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent answered: (1) "High/university" to the question "How would you define your level of education?" (43 countries in our sample); or (2) if the respondent reported more than 15 years of formal education (24 countries in our sample); or (3) if the respondent had completed school when he/she was older than 21 years (8 countries in our sample). Source: ICVS
High/Middle school (ICVS)	Indicator variable equal to 1 if the respondent answered: (1) "Secondary" or "College" to the question "How would you define your level of education?" (43 countries in our sample); or (2) if the respondent reported between 9 and than 15 years of formal education (24 countries in our sample); or (3) if the respondent had completed school when he/she was between 15 and 21 years old (8 countries in our sample). Source: ICVS
Burglary (ICVS)	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question "Over the past five years, did anyone actually get into your home/residence without permission, and steal or try to steal something? I am not including here thefts from garages, sheds or lock-ups." (C06A000) Source: ICVS
Report burglary (ICVS)	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question "Did you or anyone else report the last burglary/housebreaking to the police?" (C06B400) Source: ICVS
Attempt	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question "Apart from this, over the past five years, do you have any evidence that someone tried to get into your home/residence unsuccessfully. For example, damage to locks, doors or windows or scratches around the lock?" (C07A000) Source: ICVS
Report Attempt	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question "(The last time this happened) did you or anyone else report the attempted burglary/housebreaking to the police?" (C07B400) Source: ICVS
Robbery	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question "Over the past five years has anyone stolen something from you by using force or threatening you, or did anybody try to steal something from you by using force or threatening force." (C09A000) Source ICVS
Report Robbery	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question "(The last time this happened) did you or anyone else report the robbery to the police?" (C09B400) Source: ICVS
Fraud	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question "Last year, in 2004 were you the victim of a consumer fraud. In other words, has someone--when selling something to you or delivering a service-- cheated you in terms of quantity or quality of the goods or services?" (C13A100) Source: ICVS
Report Fraud	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question "(The last time this happened) did you or anyone else report the robbery to the police?" (C13B400) Source: ICVS

Variable	Description
Theft	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “Apart from theft involving force there are many other types of theft of personal property, such as pick-pocketing or theft of a purse, wallet, clothing, jewelry, sports equipment, This can happen at one’s work, at school, in a pub, on public transport, on the beach, or in the street. Over the past five years have you personally been the victim of any of these thefts?” (C10A000) Source: ICVS
Report Theft	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “(The last time this happened) did you or anyone else report the robbery to the police?” (C10B400) Source: ICVS
Corruption (ICVS)	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “During 2004, has any government official, for instance a customs officer, a police officer or inspector in your country asked you, or expected you to pay a bribe for his or her services?” (C14A100) Source: ICVS
Report Corruption Police (ICVS)	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “(The last time) did you or anyone else report this problem of corruption to the police?” (C14B400) Source: ICVS
Report Corruption Other (ICVS)	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “(The last time) did you or anyone else report it to any public or private agency?” (C14B600) Source: ICVS
Reasons for not reporting (ICVS)	Indicator variables coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the options of the question “If not, why didn’t you report it?” (A) not serious enough; (B) solved it myself; (C) inappropriate for police; (D) other authorities; (E) my family solved it; (F) no insurance; (G) police could do nothing; (H) police won’t do anything; (I) fear/dislike of police; (J) did no dare; (K) other reasons (C14B411 to C14B421) Source: ICVS
Reasons for reporting (ICVS)	Indicator variables coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the options of the question “If yes, why did you report it?” (A) recover property; (B) insurance reasons; (C) should be reported; (D) want offender caught; (E) to stop it; (F) to get help; (G) compensation; (H) other reasons (C14B401 to C14B408) Source: ICVS
<i>4. Within-country variables(Corruption Barometer)</i>	
College (Barometer)	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered “High level education (e.g. university)” to the question “What is the highest education attained?” (educ) Source: TI Corruption Barometer 2009
High/Middle school (Barometer)	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered “Secondary school” to the question “What is the highest education attained?” (educ) Source: TI Corruption Barometer 2009
Corruption (Barometer)	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “On the past 12 months, have you or anyone living in your household paid a bribe in any form?” (ti5) Source: TI Corruption Barometer 2009
Report Corruption (Barometer)	Indicator variable coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the question “If in the past 12 months you or any member of your household were asked to pay a bribe to obtain a service or to resolve a problem, did you present a formal complaint in this regard?” (ti6a) Source: TI Corruption Barometer 2009
Reasons for not reporting (Barometer)	Indicator variables coded 1 if the respondent answered YES to the options of the question “Why you did not present the complaint?” (A) Did not know how to do it; (B) It would have taken too much time; (C) It would not have helped at all; (D) Tried but couldn’t; (E) Fear of reprisals; (F) Other reasons (ti6bm1- ti6bm6) Source: TI Corruption Barometer 2009

**Table 2: Complaints and education**

This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the dependent variable from the WJP data set (shown in the first row) on indicator variables for the education status of the respondents. All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Clustered standard errors are shown in brackets.

	Complained about government services (1)	Police abuse (2)	Report police abuse (3)	Burglary (WJP) (4)	Report burglary (WJP) (5)	Assault (6)	Report Assault (7)
College	0.045*** [0.013]	-0.004 [0.004]	0.130*** [0.032]	0.020*** [0.006]	0.096*** [0.020]	0.022** [0.011]	0.098** [0.036]
High/Middle school	0.022 [0.013]	-0.004 [0.004]	0.051* [0.026]	0.009 [0.007]	0.047*** [0.016]	0.017 [0.011]	0.007 [0.030]
Observations	29,820	59,984	3,614	60,199	7,822	30,338	1,759
R-squared	0.001	0.000	0.009	0.000	0.005	0.001	0.008
Mean Dep Var	0.136	0.0638	0.442	0.132	0.611	0.0586	0.581
Number of countries	31	61	61	61	61	31	31
Fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Significance levels: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 3: Complaints and education (Educated vs. Uneducated countries)**

This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the dependent variable from the WJP data set (shown in the first row) on indicator variables for the education status of the respondents. Panel A shows the results for uneducated countries (educational attainment is greater than 14 years). Panel B shows the results for educated countries (educational attainment is less than or equal to 14 years). All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Clustered standard errors are shown in brackets.

	Complained about government services (1)	Police abuse (2)	Report police abuse (3)	Burglary (WJP) (4)	Report burglary (WJP) (5)	Assault (6)	Report Assault (7)
<i>Panel A: Uneducated countries</i>							
College	0.060*** [0.014]	0.004 [0.005]	0.142*** [0.034]	0.025*** [0.008]	0.104*** [0.025]	0.034** [0.014]	0.109*** [0.034]
High/Middle school	0.034** [0.014]	0.001 [0.004]	0.067** [0.027]	0.012 [0.008]	0.042** [0.018]	0.027** [0.012]	-0.013 [0.030]
Observations	16,726	34,826	2,846	34,913	5,313	16,827	1,358
R-squared	0.003	0	0.01	0.001	0.006	0.002	0.012
Mean Dep Var	0.132	0.0868	0.441	0.154	0.541	0.0808	0.549
Number of countries	17	35	35	35	35	17	17
Fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
<i>Panel B: Educated countries</i>							
College	-0.007 [0.026]	-0.030*** [0.008]	0.042 [0.090]	0.004 [0.012]	0.090** [0.037]	-0.017 [0.019]	0.089 [0.124]
High/Middle school	-0.027 [0.029]	-0.027*** [0.008]	-0.05 [0.082]	-0.005 [0.012]	0.063* [0.037]	-0.02 [0.021]	0.091 [0.100]
Observations	13,094	24,179	760	24,301	2,488	13,511	401
R-squared	0.001	0.001	0.007	0	0.003	0.001	0.003
Mean Dep Var	0.143	0.033	0.442	0.104	0.761	0.0309	0.688
Number of countries	14	25	25	25	25	14	14
Fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Significance levels: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 4: Complaints and education (Autocracies vs. Democracies)**

This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the dependent variable from the WJP data set (shown in the first row) on indicator variables for the education status of the respondents. Panel A shows the results for autocracies. Panel B shows the results for democracies. All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Clustered standard errors are shown in brackets.

	Complained about government services (1)	Police abuse (2)	Report police abuse (3)	Burglary (WJP) (4)	Report burglary (WJP) (5)	Assault (6)	Report Assault (7)
<i>Panel A: Autocracies</i>							
College	0.080** [0.026]	0.006 [0.009]	0.186** [0.062]	0.033** [0.011]	0.119* [0.064]	0.057* [0.024]	0.068* [0.033]
High/Middle school	0.045 [0.032]	0.005 [0.008]	0.099 [0.065]	0.034* [0.018]	0.062 [0.044]	0.049* [0.022]	0.02 [0.034]
Observations	7,908	9,952	522	9,990	1,379	8,000	629
R-squared	0.004	0	0.018	0.001	0.006	0.004	0.003
Mean Dep Var	0.148	0.054	0.525	0.139	0.558	0.0788	0.558
Number of countries	8	10	10	10	10	8	8
Fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
<i>Panel B: Democracies</i>							
College	0.031** [0.012]	-0.006 [0.005]	0.122*** [0.036]	0.017** [0.007]	0.092*** [0.020]	0.009 [0.010]	0.117** [0.049]
High/Middle school	0.013 [0.012]	-0.005 [0.004]	0.045 [0.028]	0.004 [0.007]	0.044** [0.017]	0.006 [0.011]	-0.001 [0.038]
Observations	21,912	50,032	3,092	50,209	6,443	22,338	1,130
R-squared	0.001	0	0.008	0	0.004	0	0.011
Mean Dep Var	0.132	0.0658	0.428	0.13	0.622	0.0514	0.594
Number of countries	23	51	51	51	51	23	23
Fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Significance levels: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 5: Complaints and education controlling for the level of trust on public institutions**

This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the dependent variable from the WJP data set (shown in the first row) on indicator variables for the education status of the respondents. All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Clustered standard errors are shown in brackets.

	Complained about government services (1)	Police abuse (2)	Report police abuse (3)	Burglary (WJP) (4)	Report burglary (WJP) (5)	Assault (6)	Report Assault (7)
College	0.045*** [0.013]	-0.013* [0.007]	0.157*** [0.052]	0.026** [0.010]	0.098** [0.040]	0.022* [0.011]	0.098** [0.036]
High/Middle school	0.022 [0.013]	-0.012* [0.007]	0.085* [0.045]	0.019* [0.011]	0.069** [0.030]	0.017 [0.011]	0.006 [0.030]
Trust Index	-0.052* [0.029]	-0.058*** [0.018]	0.075 [0.065]	-0.039** [0.017]	0.003 [0.048]	-0.028 [0.018]	-0.044 [0.064]
Observations	29,510	29,764	1,545	29,924	3,967	29,957	1,752
R-squared	0.003	0.004	0.012	0.001	0.004	0.001	0.008
Mean Dep Var	0.137	0.0539	0.465	0.134	0.61	0.0591	0.58
Number of countries	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
Fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Significance levels: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1



**Table 6: Complaints and education controlling for the income of the respondent**

This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the dependent variable from the WJP data set (shown in the first row) on indicator variables for the education status and the income of the respondents. Panel A shows the results using an indicator coded 1 if the income of the respondent is above the median. Panel B uses two indicators for high and middle-income respondents. All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Clustered standard errors are shown in brackets.

	Complained about gov services (1)	Police abuse (2)	Report police abuse (3)	Burglary (WJP) (4)	Report burglary (WJP) (5)	Assault (6)	Report Assault (7)
<i>Panel A</i>							
College	0.040*** [0.012]	-0.004 [0.005]	0.135*** [0.033]	0.018** [0.007]	0.077*** [0.022]	0.019* [0.010]	0.064* [0.034]
High/Middle school	0.021* [0.012]	-0.003 [0.004]	0.071*** [0.025]	0.008 [0.007]	0.034* [0.017]	0.015 [0.010]	-0.032 [0.048]
Income above median	0.011 [0.008]	-0.002 [0.004]	0.012 [0.023]	0.004 [0.005]	0.052*** [0.013]	0.007* [0.004]	-0.009 [0.020]
Observations	25,541	53,292	3,227	53,463	7,008	25,950	1,520
R-squared	0.002	0	0.009	0	0.008	0.001	0.008
Mean Dep Var	0.141	0.0644	0.454	0.133	0.618	0.0592	0.596
Number of countries	31	61	61	61	61	31	31
Fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES
<i>Panel B</i>							
College	0.040*** [0.012]	-0.004 [0.005]	0.122*** [0.031]	0.015** [0.007]	0.076*** [0.023]	0.018* [0.010]	0.049 [0.039]
High/Middle school	0.02 [0.012]	-0.003 [0.004]	0.062** [0.025]	0.006 [0.007]	0.036* [0.018]	0.015 [0.010]	-0.039 [0.052]
Middle income	0.016 [0.011]	-0.006 [0.006]	0.028 [0.025]	0.007 [0.005]	0.060*** [0.017]	0.009 [0.005]	0.03 [0.025]
High income	0.012 [0.010]	-0.005 [0.006]	0.057 [0.036]	0.015* [0.008]	0.108*** [0.024]	0.008 [0.007]	0.009 [0.052]
Observations	25,498	48,646	3,070	48,814	6,519	25,906	1,518
R-squared	0.002	0	0.01	0	0.01	0.001	0.008
Mean Dep Var	0.141	0.0671	0.459	0.135	0.607	0.0592	0.597
Number of countries	31	55	55	55	55	31	31
Fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Significance levels: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 7: Complaints and education controlling for socio-economic status**

This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the dependent variable from the WJP data set (shown in the first row) on indicator variables for the education status and indicator variables coded one if the respondent has a car. All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Clustered standard errors are shown in brackets.

	Complained about gov services (1)	Police abuse (2)	Report police abuse (3)	Burglary (WJP) (4)	Report burglary (WJP) (5)	Assault (6)	Report Assault (7)
College	0.048*** [0.013]	-0.01 [0.007]	0.149** [0.055]	0.032*** [0.010]	0.087* [0.043]	0.027** [0.010]	0.083** [0.038]
High/Middle school	0.024* [0.013]	-0.009 [0.006]	0.078 [0.048]	0.024** [0.010]	0.062* [0.032]	0.021** [0.010]	-0.005 [0.030]
Car	-0.018 [0.024]	-0.019 [0.014]	0.024 [0.033]	-0.033 [0.023]	0.062* [0.035]	-0.027* [0.014]	0.073* [0.036]
Observations	29,820	30,131	1,552	30,295	3,981	30,338	1,759
R-squared	0.002	0.001	0.011	0.001	0.005	0.002	0.01
Mean Dep Var	0.136	0.053	0.466	0.132	0.61	0.057	0.581
Number of countries	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
Fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Significance levels: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 8: Complaints and education controlling for access to complaint technology**

This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the dependent variable from the WJP data set (shown in the first row) on indicator variables for the education status and indicator variables coded one if the respondent has a mobile phone. All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Clustered standard errors are shown in brackets.

	Complained about gov services (1)	Police abuse (2)	Report police abuse (3)	Burglary (WJP) (4)	Report burglary (WJP) (5)	Assault (6)	Report Assault (7)
College	0.048*** [0.013]	-0.01 [0.007]	0.149** [0.055]	0.032*** [0.010]	0.087* [0.043]	0.027** [0.010]	0.083** [0.038]
High/Middle school	0.024* [0.013]	-0.009 [0.006]	0.078 [0.048]	0.024** [0.010]	0.062* [0.032]	0.021** [0.010]	-0.005 [0.030]
Cell phone	-0.018 [0.024]	-0.019 [0.014]	0.024 [0.033]	-0.033 [0.023]	0.062* [0.035]	-0.027* [0.014]	0.073* [0.036]
Observations	29,820	30,131	1,552	30,295	3,981	30,338	1,759
R-squared	0.002	0	0.011	0	0.006	0.001	0.01
Mean Dep Var	0.136	0.0534	0.466	0.132	0.61	0.0586	0.581
Number of countries	31	31	31	31	31	31	31
Fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Significance levels: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 9: Crime victimization and reporting using the International Crime Victim Survey**

This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the dependent variable from the ICVS data set (shown in the first row) on indicator variables for the education status of the respondents. All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Clustered standard errors are shown in brackets.

	Burglary (ICVS)	Report burglary (ICVS)	Attempt	Report Attempt	Robbery	Report Robbery	Fraud	Report Fraud	Theft	Report Theft
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)
College	0.021*** [0.003]	0.105*** [0.011]	0.034*** [0.003]	0.044*** [0.012]	0.023*** [0.002]	0.091*** [0.016]	0.104*** [0.003]	0.012*** [0.005]	0.084*** [0.003]	0.036*** [0.009]
High/Middle school	0.011*** [0.002]	0.056*** [0.010]	0.028*** [0.002]	0.024** [0.010]	0.019*** [0.002]	0.029** [0.013]	0.052*** [0.003]	0.014*** [0.004]	0.044*** [0.003]	0.014* [0.007]
Observations	126,318	15,289	125,596	13,382	126,367	8,546	115,860	24,906	126,162	24,475
R-squared	0	0.006	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.004	0.008	0	0.005	0.001
Mean Dep Var	0.128	0.571	0.114	0.305	0.0782	0.356	0.218	0.0505	0.206	0.276
Number of countries	71	71	71	71	71	71	69	67	71	71
Fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Significance levels: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 10: Corruption victimization and reporting using the International Crime Victim Survey**

This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the dependent variable from the ICVS data set (shown in the first row) on indicator variables for the education status of the respondents. All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Clustered standard errors are shown in brackets.

	Corruption (ICVS)	Report corruption Police (ICVS)	Report corruption other (ICVS)	If not, why didn't you report it?										
				A) not serious enough	B) solved it myself	C) inappropriate for police	D) other authorities	E) my family solved it	F) no insurance	G) police could do nothing	H) police won't do anything	I) fear/dislike of police	J) did no dare	K) other reasons
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)	(13)	(14)
College	0.096*** [0.005]	0.007 [0.007]	0.011** [0.005]	0.038* [0.022]	-0.025 [0.019]	-0.030** [0.015]	-0.005 [0.019]	-0.004 [0.010]	0.025 [0.017]	-0.004 [0.014]	-0.014* [0.007]	-0.023** [0.011]	0.01 [0.013]	0.037*** [0.012]
High/Middle school	0.058*** [0.004]	-0.002 [0.006]	0.002 [0.005]	0.028 [0.019]	-0.013 [0.016]	-0.014 [0.013]	-0.014 [0.016]	-0.008 [0.008]	0.013 [0.015]	0.011 [0.012]	-0.006 [0.006]	-0.003 [0.009]	-0.006 [0.011]	0.012 [0.010]
Observations	46,022	5,324	4,432	5,239	5,231	5,082	5,221	5,082	5,082	5,082	5,233	5,221	5,082	5,260
R-squared	0.01	0.001	0.001	0.001	0	0.001	0	0	0	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.001	0.002
Mean D.V.	0.118	0.0195	0.0111	0.344	0.215	0.112	0.208	0.046	0.16	0.0927	0.0294	0.0575	0.0803	0.0741
Countries	23	23	22	23	23	22	23	22	22	22	23	23	22	23
Fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Significance levels: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 10 (Cont): Corruption victimization and reporting using the International Crime Victim Survey**

This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the dependent variable from the ICVS data set (shown in the first row) on indicator variables for the education status of the respondents. All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Clustered standard errors are shown in brackets.

	If yes, why did you report it?							
	A) recover property	B) insurance reasons	C) should be reported	D) want offender caught	E) to stop it	F) to get help	G) compensation	H) other reasons
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
College	-0.277*	-0.097	-0.044	0.207	-0.038	0.045	-0.045	0.152*
	[0.159]	[0.170]	[0.147]	[0.184]	[0.142]	[0.103]	[0.061]	[0.079]
High/Middle school	-0.094	-0.06	-0.014	0.14	0.022	0.092	-0.025	0.057
	[0.132]	[0.135]	[0.122]	[0.154]	[0.119]	[0.086]	[0.051]	[0.064]
Observations	105	86	110	107	108	106	105	82
R-squared	0.044	0.005	0.001	0.016	0.005	0.017	0.007	0.058
Mean D.V.	0.343	0.291	0.236	0.364	0.222	0.0755	0.0286	0.0366
Countries	23	22	23	23	23	23	23	14
Fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Significance levels: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

**Table 11: Corruption victimization and reporting using the TI Global Corruption Barometer**

This table summarizes the results of OLS regressions of the dependent variable from the TI Global Corruption Barometer 2009 data set (shown in the first row) on indicator variables for the education status of the respondents. All regressions include fixed effects for countries. Clustered standard errors are shown in brackets.

	Corruption (Barometer)	Report Corruption (Barometer)	Why you did not present the complaint?					
			A) Did not know how to do it	B) It would have taken too much time	C) It would not have helped at all	D) Tried but couldn't	E) Fear of reprisals	F) Other reasons
	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)
College	0.043*** [0.004]	0.024** [0.011]	-0.061*** [0.012]	0.006 [0.013]	0.072*** [0.016]	-0.001 [0.008]	-0.032** [0.013]	-0.002 [0.008]
High/Middle school	0.022*** [0.004]	0.013 [0.010]	-0.015 [0.011]	0.005 [0.012]	0.049*** [0.014]	-0.005 [0.007]	-0.030*** [0.012]	0.003 [0.008]
Observations	60,184	10,179	8,160	8,160	8,160	8,160	8,160	8,160
R-squared	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00	0.00
Mean Dep Var	0.177	0.198	0.163	0.24	0.494	0.0558	0.218	0.075
Number of countries	62	62	62	62	62	62	62	62
Fixed effects	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES	YES

Standard errors clustered by country in parentheses. Significance levels: \*\*\* p<0.01, \*\* p<0.05, \* p<0.1

## Appendix A: Countries covered by the WJP Rule of Law Index

Country	Year	Country	Year
Argentina	2009	Mexico	2009
Australia	2009	Morocco	2009
Austria	2009	Netherlands	2009
Bangladesh	2011	New Zealand	2011
Belgium	2011	Nigeria	2009
Brazil	2011	Norway	2011
Bulgaria	2009	Pakistan	2009
Cambodia	2011	Peru	2009
Cameroon	2011	Philippines	2009
Canada	2009	Poland	2009
Chile	2011	Romania	2011
China	2011	Russia	2011
Colombia	2009	Senegal	2011
Croatia	2009	Singapore	2009
Czech Republic	2011	South Africa	2009
Dominican	2009	South Korea	2009
El Salvador	2009	Spain	2009
Estonia	2011	Sweden	2009
Ethiopia	2011	Thailand	2009
France	2009	Turkey	2009
Germany	2011	UAE	2011
Ghana	2009	Uganda	2011
Guatemala	2011	Ukraine	2011
Hong Kong	2011	United Kingdom	2011
India	2009	United States	2011
Indonesia	2009	Venezuela	2011
Iran	2011		
Italy	2011		
Jamaica	2011		
Japan	2009		
Kazakhstan	2011		
Kenya	2009		
Kyrgyzstan	2011		
Lebanon	2011		
Malaysia	2011		