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DOSSIER

ART MOVES:
PERFORMATIVITY IN TIME, SPACE AND FORM

by Mieke Bal

EL ARTE (SE) MUEVE:
PERFORMATIVIDAD EN EL TIEMPO, EL ESPACIO Y LA FORMA

por Mieke Bal

MOVEMENT AND THE STILL IMAGE

EL MOVIMIENTO Y LA IMAGEN FIJA

Mieke Bal[1]
Guest editor

Abstract

The dossier explores movement in four different meanings and their implications. This introductory article lays out these topics and places the contributions to the dossier in relation to them. It starts with movement in the most obvious sense – the cinematic. I examine how a few modernist figurative paintings display the primary features of the cinematic without resorting (only) to representing movement. The second meaning of movement comes from the act of perception. According to Henri Bergson, perception is a selection by the perceiving subject and that subject's memories. The third meaning of movement is affective. This is related to the synaesthetic nature of seeing, and the importance of especially tactility and hearing in it. The last meaning is the result of this: the potential to move us to action in the political domain.

Keywords
Moving images; Edvard Munch; cinematic; Jussi Niva; Henri Bergson.

Resumen
El presente dossier explora el movimiento y sus implicaciones en cuatro significados diferentes. Este artículo introductorio sienta las bases de estos temas y pone en contexto las contribuciones del dossier. Comienza con el análisis del movimiento en su sentido más obvio, el cinemático. Examino cómo algunas pinturas figurativas modernistas muestran las características primarias de la cinemática sin recurrir –únicamente– a la representación del movimiento. El segundo significado del movimiento procede del arte de la percepción. Según Henri Bergson, la percepción es una selección producida por el sujeto perceptor y sus recuerdos. El tercer significado del movimiento es afectivo. Está relacionado con la naturaleza sinestésica del ver y, especialmente, con la importancia del sentido del tacto y del oído implícitos en ella. El último significado es el resultado de esto: el potencial de conducirnos hacia la acción en el terreno político.

Palabras clave
Imágenes en movimiento; Edvard Munch; cinemático; Jussi Niva: Henri Bergson.

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RUNNING, PULLING, WALKING

FIGURE 1: EDVARD MUNCH, *GALLOPING HORSE,* OIL ON CANVAS, 1910-12 OSLO, Munch Museum.
FIGURE 2: EDVARD MUNCH, *UPHILL WITH A SLEDGE* OIL ON CANVAS, 1910-12 OSLO, Munch Museum.
FIGURE 3: EDVARD MUNCH, *WORKERS ON THEIR WAY HOME* OIL ON CANVAS, (1913-14) OSLO, Munch Museum.

A galloping horse, furiously approaching the picture plane, almost scaring the viewers as it is stampeding towards them. If not the viewer, at least we see that it scares the people around it in the picture. And so did the pioneering Lumière film of a train entering a station, titled *L'arrivée d'un train en gare de La Ciotat,* from 1895. How is that possible? In a painting, a horse cannot gallop; it can only appear to do so, in a stilled, «pregnant moment», to use the term introduced by Enlightenment writer Gotthold Ephraim Lessing (1729-1781) in his *Laocoon* from 1766. So, the viewer has nothing to fear. Any emotion of that kind would be contrived. And yet, even if we don't feel it, we *see* fear; fear is «in» the image.[2]

The painting was made by the great modern Norwegian artist Edvard Munch (1863-1944). Between Munch's 1910-12 work and the Lumière brothers' film a quarter of a century had passed, and at the time Munch painted this work, the cinema was already an established feature of urban life. Munch attended film screenings and even bought, and played with a camera himself. So, to say that his painting is cinematic would be easily be misunderstood in an utterly banal sense. But the idea that the painter was influenced by the cinema is not what I mean to say. Instead, I take «the cinematic» as an entrance into a theoretical question: what is a moving

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2. LESSING, Gotthold Ephraim: *Laocoon: an Essay on the Limits of Painting and Poetry*, translated by Edward Allen McCormick. Indianapolis, Bobbs-Merrill, 1962. See also the relevant commentary on this text and the topic of word-image relations in general by MITCHELL, J.W.Th.: *Iconology: Image, Text, Ideology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press 1985. On fear when watching early films, when close-ups of faces where easily seen as beheadings, see BUCK-MORSS, Susan: «The Cinema as Prosthesis of Perception», in *The Senses Still: Perception and Memory as Material Culture in Modernity,* ed. C. Nadja Seremetakis, Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 1993.

image? Or, to phrase it slightly differently: what makes an image moving? The same holds for the two other paintings I want to discuss in order to approach the issue of movement in art, *Uphill with a Sledge* (also from 1910-12) and the later *Workers on their Way Home* (1913-14), generally considered a masterpiece, and I would add: of cinematic painting. The two questions have very different answers, and the primary point of this dossier of papers of *Espacio, Tiempo y Forma* is to bring these together.

My choice for these paintings as objects to theorize through, in other words, as my «theoretical objects» is a double move – and here, I use the word «move» to underscore the fact that thought, and argumentation, is also a form of movement. In a first move, these three paintings stand for the cinematic quality of Munch's work. This quality, in turn, stands for me for the moving quality of images, including still ones. This moving quality does not have to be cinematic, nor even imply physical movement. But I choose the cinematic as my entrance into the discussion because this quality contains a number of different aspects, all relevant for the question of movement.[3]

I introduce the dossier *Art Moves* through these works. For, my argument concerns not only the movement in and of images but also the intellectual movement that happens when we take images as starting points, interlocutors, and supervisors in our attempts at theorization. All papers in this dossier theorize movement through a dialogue with an art object. The introductory text that follows presents four aspects of the dossier's topic: movement «in» the art object; its complex temporality and the place of the viewer in it; the interaction with the viewer, and the aftermath for the political. I begin with the most obvious one, which I here call «the cinematic». This concerns the image itself in its relationship to the «seventh art» that, anachronistically or «preposterously», illuminates it. Then I present the issue of time and its formal (linguistic) aspect, tense, through the question of perception, as the relation between image and viewer. There, my focus will be on the coexistence, in perception, of the act of perceiving in the present, and the role memory plays in that act. The following section concerns the effect on the viewer of the perception of moving art. This implies the political effectivity art can have. Together, these aspects define the moving quality of art.[4]

I have invited **Miguel Hernández Navarro**, an intellectual friend with whom I have collaborated on several occasions in the past, to add his unique vision to my

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3.   The concept of theoretical object was proposed by French philosopher and art historian Hubert Damisch in an interview with Yve-Alain Bois (1998, 8). Damisch says that a theoretical object «... obliges you to do theory but also furnishes you with the means of doing it. Thus, if you agree to accept it on theoretical terms, it will produce effects around itself ... [and] forces us to ask ourselves what theory is. It is posed in theoretical terms; it produces theory; and it necessitates a reflection on theory.» Bois, Yve-Alain et al.: «A Conversation with Hubert Damisch.» October 85 (Summer): 3–17 (8). On the idea of the move – in chess, thought, art and curating – see Alphen, Ernst van: «Moves van Hubert Damisch. Denken over kunst in geschiedenis»/ «Moves of Hubert Damisch. Thinking about Art in History», in Hubert Damisch, *Moves: Playing Chess and Cards with the Museum/Schaken en Kaarten met het Museum*. Rotterdam, Museum Boijmans van Beuningen, 1997, 35-73, 97-124.

4.   The qualifier «preposterous» is a multi-layered synonym of «anachronistic.» See Bal, Mieke: *Quoting Caravaggio: Contemporary Art, Preposterous History.* Chicago, the University of Chicago Press. For the many aspects of framing, see Bal, Mieke: *Travelling Concepts in the Humanities: a Rough Guide.* Toronto: the University of Toronto Press, 2002 (Sp. Conceptos viajeros en las humanidades: Una guía de viaje. Trans. Yaiza Hernández Velázquez. Murcia, Spain, Cendeac, 2009.)

inevitably limited one. He further elaborates the political aspect in its relation to history. He analyses art that demonstrate this aspect of movement that makes the topic relevant in relation to the world. Through the deployment of a concept of his invention, «art of history», illuminating thanks to its clarity, he details how the political aspects of art addresses history in the present. To facilitate a generalizing view of the moving quality of art not limited to the moving image that is cinematic but including still images, like Hernández Navarro I chose paintings rather than films to make this argument.[5]

THE CINEMATIC IMAGE

If I take these three paintings to make a case for the cinematic in still pictures, it is, however, not because in all three images we can see represented movement, nor because they move themselves, in the sense in which we consider the cinema to consist of moving images. In fact, in fig. 3 this is hardly the case. They are all three cinematic in different ways, as I will argue below. Conversely, nor is movement the only cinematic feature we can consider in a comparison of this kind. Of course, the cinema works with moving images. And not only do its images move; also, the «profilmic», the slice of the world parading in front of the camera, the space where characters perform their actions thanks to actors performing their roles, tends to be full of movement.[6]

Yet, there are many other elements that play their indispensable part in making an image cinematic, and **Nanna Verhoeff** analyses many of these. And thus, in my second theoretical move, I argue that such elements make the image moving in a rich, complex and multiple sense of that word, which in all its fullness is the topic of this dossier. The first of these, the most obvious one and the one cinematic images share with painting and photography, is *framing*. The choice of the pro-filmic field, as well as the limitations imposed by the lens, are both elements that make pictures what they are, and distinguish them from reality. We can also discern this determination to choose and delimit the «pro-filmic» field – the spatial field of what is represented in the picture – in Munch's paintings. This is quite emphatic if we consider that the lens of the camera dictates a format, called «aspect ratio» – what used to be 3x4 and is now a standard 9x16, for example – but the canvas does not. An artist can freely choose the size and proportions of the canvas or panel. The three paintings each have a different format and, one could say, a different aspect ratio. This makes signs of framing as an act significant.

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5. We have worked together in particular on the travelling exhibition *2MOVE,* which started in Murcia and for both of us stimulated further think on movement and time. Especially his article in the catalogue is a very useful complement to his article in this dossier. See Bal, Mieke and Hernandez-Navarro, Miguel Á.: *2MOVE: Video, Art, Migration*. Murcia, Spain: Cendeac, 2008

6. Although it is a term from cinema studies, not at all used in art history, I will use «profilmic» throughout this article to emphasize the cinematic aspect of non-cinematic images such as, here, paintings.

Framing can be simply an inevitable element, but it can also be foregrounded. The man on the left of *Galloping Horse,* for example, is cropped at the shoulder, a cropping that the painter could easily have avoided. This is the kind of detail that alludes to the medium itself, in self-reflection. Thus, in *Woman Holding a Balance* and quite a few other paintings, Vermeer painted a nail on a wall, suggesting that the depicted painting a bit to the right of that nail – already a doubling of the medium – had been changed from one place to another. This change of place would leave a trace in the physical world, but is not necessary in a representation of it. Doing so is a way of underscoring the fact that the work is a painting, precisely because that representational detail was not necessary. Similarly, cropping the man figure at the shoulder in an image that represents movement so emphatically is emphasizing the fact that the painting frames its profilmic reality. It turns the image into a snapshot – the man can retract and disappear out of the frame at any moment. This precludes a naïve view of the painting as a transparent, realistic representation. We see a man, but thanks to the cropping, we are aware that in fact, we see (only) an image of him. Moreover, the entire outside of the field of vision is invoked. The edge of the frame becomes a border between inside and outside the picture.[7]

Another key aspect of cinema results from editing, or montage. The painting *Workers on their Way Home* is a masterpiece of cinematic painting in this respect. And I contend that this is so because here, precisely, there is not such obvious movement, apart from what the title suggests. The three main figures seem to be standing still, but as if briefly stopping their walking. Thus, movement is implied, halted, and, the work suggests, will go on after we watch this scene. This foregrounds another aspect of visual art, cinema and painting alike: the encounter it stages and embodies. The man on the left is standing still. His is a full-bodied, frontal portrait. The second man, who seems to be shot from above, is making such a gigantic step that his front leg is long, his hind leg so short one could mistake it for something else. Especially since a similar shape, equally brown, perhaps a foot, is next to it, totally detached from the man behind to whom a realistic reading would make it belong.

The two extensions together give the figure an animal aspect. This second figure, who looks up to the viewer, is the most awkwardly positioned one in space, and thus most emphatically insists that the painting is (also) a flat image. The awareness of this double status of the picture comes in useful for reading the third figure. For, the third man is positioned in a perspectival reading in front of the second but in a flat reading rather to his right. This figure is proportionally the largest if we just consider the size of the three men's heads, and his body is half cropped not by the side edge but by the picture plane. He may be taking care of a cart, a child, or an undefined burden, and he may be standing, pushing or walking. We see that we cannot see what it is he is doing.

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7.   On Vermeer's nail and its theoretical implications, see Bal, Mieke: «Seeing Signs: The Use of Semiotics for the Understanding of Visual Art.» In *The Subjects of Art History: Historical Objects in Contemporary Perspectives*, eds. Mark A. Cheetham, Michael Ann Holly, and Keith Moxey, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1998, 74–93. On the frame as border between inside and outside, and the background in Kant, see Derrida, Jacques: *The Truth in Painting*. Trans. Geoff Bennington and Ian McLeod. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1987 (or. 1978).

The stream of people on the right and behind the larger figures derive their sense of movement more from their sheer number than from any visible movement. The person on the right-hand edge of the image is cropped so that it is hard to say with certainty whether or not he or she is riding a bicycle. The round shape, barely outlined, between its legs may be a wheel, or just one of those abstract whirling shapes through which Munch brings movement even where the image as depiction does not at all ask for it. What makes this painting cinematic, then, is the sense that each of the three men is «filmed» from a different angle; from left to right: frontal, from above, and sideways. Thus, the «film» this painting becomes is experimental, as a spatial collage, rather than a straightforwardly moving image. Unlike what Munch can have known about the cinema, this scene may have been shot by multiple cameras; or the montage has made it into a multiscreen film. Or, more simply, the painting presents three different, consecutive takes of the film. It is its internal lack of spatial coherence that brings movement into it. This is movement of a different sort: not profilmic but specifically filmic, and in that respect, examining the ins and outs of what the cinematic can be or do.[8]

As my comments on *Workers* already indicates, another feature of the cinematic is spatial organisation; what we are used to calling «perspective». The spatial perspective is remarkable in all three of these paintings. In *Galloping Horse* and in *Workers on their way home* this is due to an exaggerated linear perspective, elongated to create a deep space. Munch does this frequently, always to great effect. Sometimes the elongation is the most remarkable element; sometimes the exaggerated height makes the perspective seem longer. This is Munch's way of drawing attention to the dilemma of painting: as an image it is flat; as a picture, in the sense of depiction, it attempts to achieve the illusion of three-dimensionality.

Something like this happens in the middle painting. In *Uphill with a Sledge* the spatial effect comes from an equally exaggerated perspective, but now this is less elongated than tilted. This is a view from above that foregrounds the steepness of the hill and makes the shape below of a hardly plausible same size as the man, and entirely flat. I saw it as a boat, with its two rounded ends. It was as if we are seeing it not just from the top of the hill, but from a bird's eye view, straight above it. Then I realised it is a row of houses on a island, mirrored in the water, except that I don't see water, only dull snow that does not reflect. In this case, it is not a bird's eye view but a frontal view. This view is only applicable to that shape, however. This makes this painting, also, spatially incoherent enough to attract attention to its status as a painting – both image and picture. The two thirds of the image are still shot from above but not straight up; a bit more obliquely, not from a bird's eye view nor frontal but from the top of an adjacent hill. But this is not a single «take» either. The picture of the man pulling the sledge makes him more sharply oblique than is humanly possible without losing one's balance. The man in the green suit,

in contrast, although standing right next to the sledge-puller, is standing straight up without the slightest effort. His right arm, truncated, is lengthened by some fine lines, indicating movement. This must be a frontal take from eye level. Again, the spatial organisation makes the painting look more like a collage than a single image.

That playing with spatial organisation is more than a protest against the domination by linear perspective in the history of Western art becomes clear in this dossier in the contribution of **Nanna Verhoeff**, already mentioned. Her detailed commentary on the way Werner Herzog's 3D film *A Cave of Forgotten Dreams* both espouses the natural walls that support the millennia-old cave paintings he documents, and in the process designs a cartography of time that brings the long-gone past to life in what can be seen, also, as an animation. An indispensable complement to my presentation of movement, her analysis demonstrates the cultural relevance of the self-reflexion of the medium of 3D film, the moving image more in general, and exploration in time and space together. Verhoeff explores in great detail the layeredness of time and space in the moving image, and as such, her article can be considered a fundamental theorization of the movement of images.

Verhoeff also demonstrates that it would be missing the point of this dossier to equal movement with the cinematic, even if the latter is its most concrete embodiment. The way her analysis implicates the old cave paintings in the movement offers a beautiful transition to the consideration of movement in other media. **Ramón Salas Lamamié de Clairac** explores the movement of images from the side of still images – photographs – in the direction of the Benjaminian dialectical image. Taking José Luis Brea's last book as his point of departure, he adds, as Verhoeff does, a fourth dimension, or (in the dialogue with Brea) era, to the temporality of art. **Mar García Ranedo** also examines the cinematic qualities of photography when deployed sequentially, and then adds drawing, as a movement in space, body, and psyche. Central in her analysis of a range of photo sequences is the notion of displacement, in many senses of the word, when still images move. This can be brought to bear on Munch's many series of paintings, variations on themes not really designed as such but inevitably «becoming» (Deleuze) serial.

But this experimentation with space is not all there is. We can also notice something cinematic – not often recognized as such – that is most characteristic for Munch: «mistakes». Shifts, errors, glitches, and mistakes in perspectival drawing: these are all examples of a movement from one image to another that deploys the technical elements to make a change. The cinematic quality is enhanced by the fact that the image quality seems to vie with a camera that is able to play with depth of field. It is almost as if we see camera movement and change of focus – two notorious «mistakes» in filming that can also be used to enhance certain aspects and meanings. But, one can object, in this respect the painter is freer than the cinematographer, and can, and does vary with sharpness and blur regardless of how the depth of field, shallow or deep, justifies it. When seen as cinematic, this becomes

a self-reflexive devise. In this respect the middle painting is the most radical one.[9]

Both the man pulling the sledge and the figure in an amazing light green suit on his right are barely readable, blurry figures, consisting of stains of paint rather than clear brush strokes. The main character, if I may call this patch of blue and brown paint so, has a triangle by way of a face, like a snout, which makes him look like a wolf in human clothes. His legs, on the other hand, are molten into a single one, and his left arm seems also missing. The light, summery suit of the man on the right is doubtlessly coloured for chromatic effect, rather than for profilmic (realistic) reasons. The contrast between their colours makes the painting almost abstract.

And this bring us to colour. Colour is one of painting's aspects it has in common with the cinema, although not yet in Munch's time. The artist used colour not only to transgress the boundary between image and picture and in the wake of that distinction, between abstraction and figuration. He gave colour synaesthetic functions: in a medium that serves the sense of sight only, he «argued» through painting that sight is never alone; that the other senses participate in sense-perception. For this reason (among others) **Jeffrey Manoel Pijpers**' article on music, discussed below, is so relevant here. In the most famous of his paintings, *The Scream*, from 1893, Munch makes the colours perform the sound. Yet, the line between figuration and abstraction also becomes extremely fine. While the horse in the painting first mentioned has sharply distinguishable features, and an eye that signifies the fury, almost madness, of the wildly running animal, his rider, and the children on its right are again barely readable blurs.[10]

Nevertheless, the figure, perhaps a child, facing the viewer, with some spots of brownish-red in a white patch indicating her facial features, looks clearly terrified. Munch thus demonstrates that readability is not dependent on sharpness at all. Here, painting goes beyond cinema, and demonstrates that the aesthetic and representational modes of the two media are in dialogue with each other, rather than in imitation or critique. The work also demonstrates that media can interact, share features and functions, but not quite merge, as **Clara Laguillo Abbad Correo**'s analysis, discussed later, argues. Both media are able to deploy their art in «mistakes» in order to enhance the medium itself. The blur and variation of depth of field tell us that we are not watching a transparent depiction of a profilmic reality, but a crafted, artificial image as such. Similarly, the uneven application of paint of which Munch was a master keeps us aware that what we see is not at all some real life situation, but something that is more disturbing, rather than less. Instead of

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9. In our film *Madame B,* Michelle Williams Gamaker and I have also used both blurs and shallow depth of field to enhance the social isolation of the main character, and her being looked at by invisible others. See BAL, Mieke: *looking Sideways: Loneliness and the Cinematic*. Oslo, Munch Museum 2017 (in prep.).

10. On colour denoting sound in *The Scream* see YDSTIE, Ingebjørg: «'Painting is what the brain perceives through the filter of the eye'», in *Edvard Munch: the Modern Eye.* London, Tate Publishing, 2012, 257-263. Colour is also in important element in Jay A. Clarke's close analysis of *The Sick Child,* another one of Munch's famous paintings (1885-86). CLARKE, Jay A.: «Originality and Repetition in Edvard Munch's *The Sick Child*, in Erik Mørstad (ed.), *Edvard Munch: An Anthology.* Oslo, Olso Academic Press, 2006, 43-64. On colour in relation to abstraction, see the last chapter of BAL, Mieke: *Endless Andness: The Politics of Abstraction According to Ann Veronica Janssens.* London, Bloomsbury, 2013.

avoiding the realistic illusion by eliminating figuration altogether and move towards pure abstraction, the artist keeps the figuration in sight while emphatically showing how it is made, and using abstraction to do so. Mistakes can be a mediator between the false opposition of figuration and abstraction.

That the productive deployment of «mistakes» is a fundamental issue of the movement that characterises art is demonstrated in several articles in this dossier. **José Manuel García Perera** addresses the use of technological mistakes, called glitches in contemporary media art, comparing this to «mistakes» in old master art, which occur especially when movement is not only inherent in the image but explicitly represented in the picture. The challenge Perera discusses is the loss of a reality of which the glitch would then be a mistaken presentation, for these arts are entirely based on the idea of simulacrum, the image without referent; of a fundamental *in*authenticity.

This issue is of wider relevance when we consider that the abandonment of authenticity as a standard for the comparison, always active, always illusory, between *re*presentation and reality, is also at stake in «exoticism», or surprise before ethnic and cultural otherness, which impacts on our judgments of artistic value. In his contribution **Ernst van Alphen** thus brings up the question of «mistakes» in making value judgments that considered universal but in fact highly specific. Placing his article in this section is my way of enhancing that universalising value judgments is a true error, not just a difference of opinion. Van Alphen, who does not use the word «mistake», brings this issue to bear on the wider issue of globalisation of today, which makes us all prone to such errors. He argues that the early text by Victor Segalen, written in the 1910s but published posthumously only in 1955, theorised the consequences of the experience with diversity and the influence of the domestic cultural framing a traveller brings to it, with an understanding of the problem of judgment still rare today. All the travelling doesn't mean that the travellers «always carry in their baggage movements of thought and opinion». The loss of a reliable standard can actually be helpful for the «experience of diversity» Segalen advocates, rather than erasing difference or keeping it in place with polite respect. Thus, Alphen's article brings the question of art's moving quality and the contribution of mistakes and inauthenticity to bear on the tenacious problem of postcolonial views of globalisation.

In a comparable train of thought **Monica Alonso Riveiro** discusses the traumatic consequences of the Argentine dictatorship and its linguistic intervention when the verb «to disappear» became transitive, so that it was possible to assign a subject and an object to the act of «disappearing people». With great acuity Alonso Riveiro studies an art project by one of the members of HIJOS – children of the disappeared – who collaged photos of the absent parents into the family snapshots. Ghosts or shadows, or simple additions, these restorations of families through corrupting photographs are clearly – and in fact, emphatically – false, inauthentic. Like the use of glitches, these are wilful mistakes. And yet, the possibility of at least imagining what the family could have been offers an experience of the impossible. The artistic creation of «small memories» produces artworks that have no single author, nor a plausible referent, nor a moment of emergence. These negativities

set in motion a process that enables the public to participate in the making of an experience hitherto impossible. **Aylin Kuryel**, finally, makes a perceptual mistake by the viewer, a mistake her chosen artwork provokes, the starting point of her analysis. This leads to a theorisation of art's agency. This idea offers a fantastic mediating concept between the movement inherent in the image and the action, or performativity, of the image moving the spectator.

MOVEMENT AND MEMORY

In Munch's *Galloping Horse*, of the second child figure we don't see the face. Only her arms going up suggest fright. The difference between the two children's expression of fear is a theoretical object in itself: by positioning the children in opposite directions, one frontal and one with the back to the viewer, the artist seems to say that the whole body participates in the experience and subsequent expression of fear. Fear, of movement, and fear as movement. The element of fear in the painting relates the physical movement of the horse to the emotional movement of the children. This combination is at the heart of the attempt, in this dossier, of bringing the moving quality of images to the fore, whether they are moving images, such as cinematic or performative ones, or not, as in photography or sculpture, painting and drawing, or the work Alonso Riveiro analyses. What more do Munch's three paintings tell us about movement in the still image? This question concerns the issue of the temporal dialogue between present and past that is memory, which lies at the heart of Hernández Navarro's theoretical object. Munch has famously declared: «I paint not what I see but what I remember.»[11]

With that utterance, Munch demonstrates his «pictorial intelligence» – his capacity to articulate in philosophically relevant terms what matters in art. In this section I expand on that short statement with the help of the philosophy of perception. We care about art because it does something to us; hence, its performativity matters. But what is it that it does, and in which existential domains? The phrase «art moves» is meant to bring together reflections on the performativity of art in its foundation in space and time, and the way it works through its form. Art works performatively in space, since visual art exists and functions in space, and therefore, also influences the space around it, which, in turn, has an impact on the people who inhabit that space. Even in an exhibition of still images such as paintings and drawings, and more clearly sculptures, visitors walk around and hence, see the images in (their own) movement and if they are affected by them, in other words, moved, this happens in spatial movement.[12]

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11. Munch wrote this in a small publication with slogans and statements on art. Munch, Edvard: *Livsfrisens tilblivelse*, Oslo, 1928?, Munchmuseet MM UT 13], <*http://www.emunch.no/FACSIMILENo-MM_UT0013.xhtml#.VscUf53Kwll*>.

12. I borrow the phrase «pictorial intelligence» from the title of a book on Tiepolo. Alpers, Svetlana and Baxandall, Michael: *Tiepolo and the Pictorial Intelligence*. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1994. For a lucid overview on performativity, see Culler, Jonathan: «The Performative», 137-165 in *The Literary in Theory*, Stanford, CA, Stanford University Press 2007. For further study, see Austin, J.L.: *How to Do Things with Words*. Cambridge: Harvard University

Images also move in time, since artworks not only emerge from a time (usually in the past) and reach us from that past in the present. Also, they function in the time of the encounter, hence, in the present, and orient us towards the future. And, through the way the artwork looks, hence, through its form, it acts upon us emotionally as well. In this dossier we consider the three movements of the artwork together, whether it is a still or a moving work. In this, the title of this journal hits the nail on its, or art's head. This is not a relatively arbitrary view of art but an account that is anchored in a philosophical argument about the nature of perception and the way memory participates in that act. Art is only one, albeit a key instance of this.

What is at stake is an understanding of the relationship between the image and the moving image. Munch's three paintings have amply demonstrated that this is a lively «debate» conducted in painting. Both in painting and in cinema this relationship is reflected upon in the form of self-reflection; artists in each medium borrow from the other to enhance their own medium's capacities. Painting and cinema each produce images, different ones in many respects. Yet, they also share something fundamental that is a property of images as objects of perception. Here, I turn to Henri Bergson, one of the philosophers of the Western tradition who has had a lasting impact, not only on philosophy but on cultural thought and analysis more in general. He had an especially profound influence on Gilles Deleuze (1925-1995), who, in turn, was to become an important cultural philosopher of our time, in particular with his philosophical vision of the cinema. In a number of books, among which the famous *Cinema* books, Deleuze took on, and re-activated, Bergson's work. Through this detour, Bergson's legacy has become of prime importance for cinema studies, and conversely, cinema has anachronistically become a model, also, for other visual or audiovisual cultural expressions.[13]

Especially Bergson's book *Matter and Memory* from 1896 is of vital importance to my argument, and to the contributions in this dossier. This «essay on the relationship between body and mind», as the book's subtitle has it, starts with a thesis about perception. And perception is our access to, or entrance into art, with visual perception as the primary, but not only form of perception. To put it succinctly, Bergson opens his book with the claim that perception is not a *construction,* as we have considered it in the post-realist era, but a *selection.* The subject makes that selection from among all the perceptible things in the world around her, in view of her own interests. When Deleuze reminded us of it and elaborated it in relation to film, this simple idea has transformed contemporary thinking on representation, which for a long time was bound to an opposition between mimesis (seen as

Press, 1975 [1962] for the initial formulation; Derrida, Jacques: «Signature, Event, Context.» In *Limited Inc.*, trans. Samuel Weber, 1-23. Evanston, IL: Northwestern University Press, 1988, for an extension of the concept; and Butler, Judith: *Bodies that Matter: On the Discursive Limits of «Sex».* New York: Routledge, 1993 and *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative*. New York: Routledge, 1997 for a theorization of performativity's political relevance.

13. Deleuze, Gilles: *Cinema 1: The Movement-Image*. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1986; *Cinema 2: The Time-Image*. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Robert Galeta. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1989. On Bergson, Deleuze published *Bergsonism*. Trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam. New York: Zone Books, 1988. For an accessible introduction to Deleuze's philosophy of cinema, see Marrati, Paola: *Gilles Deleuze: Cinema and Philosophy*. Trans. Alisa Hartz, 2008.

imitation) and construction. Perception, in Bergson's radically different view, is an act *of* the body and *for* the body as it is positioned in the midst of things to select from. It also brings the viewer into the orbit of what art is, and thus questions the idea of art's autonomy.[14]

Perception is an act in the present. This is important as a definitional element of images. But this would entail a naïve presentism if it wasn't for the indispensable participation of memory. While occurring in the present, perception is bound to memory. Munch said as much in the sentence I quoted. He would not even have needed the denial («I paint not what I see») but merging the two temporalities, he could have written: I paint what I see, hence, what I remember». A perception image that is not infused with memory images is impossible. It would make no sense, nor would it have a sensuous impact, since we perceive *with* as well as *for* the body. In a very useful summary of his argument, at the end of the book, Bergson writes that memory participates in perception. That participation accounts for the subjective nature of perception, even if the things we perceive exist outside of our consciousness. He writes:

In concrete perception memory intervenes, and the subjectivity of sensible qualities is due precisely to the fact that our consciousness, which begins by being only memory, prolongs a *plurality* of moments into each other, *contracting* them into a single intuition.

The final part of this sentence explains why Bergson insisted on duration so strongly. As Gilles Deleuze wrote in *Bergsonism*, «Bergsonian duration is … defined less by succession than by *coexistence*». In other words, even if duration is a stretch of time, it exists itself in the present tense. The spatial incoherence of Munch's *Workers* foreground the multiplicity that moves half-way towards but not yet reached the contraction.[15]

But for our interest, in this dossier, in movement, which further specifies the bond between time, space, and form, it is important to realise that this coexistence of different moments (which is another way of saying, these memories) has a spatial aspect to it. It is a *timespace*. And this timespace is given shape in art. Again, a particular medium exemplifies this most clearly. Timespace is perhaps most typically visible in video installation. There, the simultaneous presence of – and, hence, the simultaneous movement on – multiple screens embodies the coexistence of duration and different moments. It is a visible instance of Bergson's plurality of moments contracted into «a single intuition». In this sense, video installation is the most extreme manifestation of the cinematic, as Pepita Hesselberth has argued. Writing about the work of Finnish video artist Eija-Liisa Ahtila, Leevi Haapala also points to this in his definition of video installation when he writes: «… a video installation displayed over several screens must be seen as a space for the pure movement of a *trace*». «Trace» is a very fortunate choice of word; for a trace, too,

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14. Bergson, Henri: *Matter and Memory*. Trans. N. M. Paul and W. S. Palmer. New York, Zone Books, 1991 [1896]. Part of this account of Bergson's ideas come from the introduction to my book *Thinking in Film: The Politics of Video Installation According to Eija-Liisa Ahtila.* London, Bloomsbury, 2013.

15. Bergson (op.cit.) 1991, 218–19; emphasis added. Deleuze, Gilles: *Bergsonism* (60; emphasis added).

embodies a conflation of past and present. **Amparo Serrano de Haro**'s analysis of a contraction of an old-master work with a contemporary video work thus turns a «mistake» into the occasion for a trace. This brings the mistake into the orbit of art practice «with» old master painting. And the term «trace» is meant, here, to suggest that mistakes in general must be seen as traces, hence, evidence of movement through time and space.[16]

Although it is obvious that time and space cannot be separated, it is still difficult to construe them as an indivisible unit. How can we see the articulation of space and time together? Through movement. We can do this through the notion that they are both only understandable and functional in relation to the subject of perceiving. According to Bergson, space is not geometrical, as Renaissance perspective tried to visually argue; consequently, it is neither measurable nor identical for everyone who perceives it. Instead, our sense of space develops according to what Bergson calls a «natural feeling» – with the subject as its beginning point. This natural feeling is heterogeneous and different for everyone, depending on wherever they are. The three paintings I am discussing are, among other things, devoted to exploring alternatives to homogenized space. The multiple perspectives of *Workers*, the eccentric height in *Uphill,* and the way the snowy road disappears in the far end of *Horse* whereas the vanishing point cannot be seen due to the horse's large size in the extreme foreshortening: all three painting exemplify spatial heterogeneity. And all three, as if arguing against linear perspective, focus attention on a spatially problematic foreground to emphasise the tricky nature of a perspectival conception of vision.

The same is the case for time. Duration is the model for this heterogeneity; hence, again, the function of the cinematic as model. But it is easiest to understand through the case of space. Like duration, Bergsonian space can be neither divided nor measured. In *Time and Free Will* Bergson calls this space «extensity», seeing it as something that emanates from the subject. In Munch's paintings taken together, space is precisely that: heterogeneous, multiple, both fictional and real, both subjective and extensive, or deictic. This is why they embody the relational aspect of the experience of them; why they compel «thinking in film», with equal emphasis on the filmic, time-bound, durational aspect of the images and on the spatial, extensive aspect of the preposition «in». This is how installation spaces, but equally, if well curated, all exhibition spaces, or even more generally, discursive spaces, become contact spaces, in the sense of Mary-Louise Pratt's «contact zones». In this sense, art is itself «exotic» according to Segalen as analysed by **van Alphen**.[17]

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16. Hesselberth, Pepita: *Cinematic Chronotopes: Here, Now, Me.* London, Bloomsbury, 2014. Haapala, Leevi: «A Divided Sentence, a Split Viewer: Observations on Distal Sensuousness in Eija-Liisa Ahtila's Moving Image Installations.» In Essling, Lena, ed. *Eija-Liisa Ahtila: Parallel Worlds*. Stockholm: Moderne Museet, 2012, 161–71 (171; emphasis added).

17. Bergson, Henri: *Time and Free Will: An Essay on the Immediate Data of Consciousness*. Trans. F. L. Pogson. New York: Harper and Row. 1960 [1889]. I have borrowed the phrase «thinking in film» from Eija-Liisa Ahtila, in an interview. See Iles, Chrissie, «Thinking in Film: Eija-Liisa Ahtila in Conversation with Chrissie Iles.» *Parkett* 68, 2003, 58–64. I have used the phrase also as a title for my book on Ahtila's work. For Pratt, see below.

In connection to his discussion of value judgment in the confrontation with difference, the pair of papers that analyse exhibitions, symmetrically, of the appropriation of otherness (**Elisa de Souza Martinez**) and, if I may say so, of the «ex-propriation» of self by **Noa Roei**, make the point very concrete and demonstrate how it works in practice. De Souza Martinez' analysis of the way ethnography in museums tend to counter the creation of a contact space because ethnography is based on otherness, rather than contact, can be productively juxtaposed to Roei's analysis, also of a museum exhibition, but one that is an artist project. This time the relation between the artist who presents the collection and the museum is inverted: it comes from the intimacy of his own culture – indeed, the artist's own work as the practice of exposition becomes an artistic theme. Again, at the heart of the project is the idea of the nation; in the case Roei studies, the artist's infelicitous experience as a national subject. Both articles also show how close art making and curating can be to one another.

The third article in that section discusses another paradoxical self-other relationship in a space we hardly consider as such: the human body. **Fernando de Felipe & Iván Gómez** follow what they call a performative, immersive journey in, mostly cinematic, explorations of the inside of the body. They consider especially the interest in not just understanding, but actually *seeing* the brain. The drive to probe into what cannot be reduced to materiality only – the heterogeneous «matter» of the brain and consciousness – leads to microscopic examinations, fictional ploys and props, and imaginative movements from outside to inside.

The effect of visual art, including still images and sculptures, the fact that artworks affect us, is the consequence of the heterogeneity and at the same time, the subjectivity of timespace in the sense sketched above. Bergson was a contemporary of Munch, even if it is highly unlikely they knew about each other's work. This is too bad, though, because they could have had a great dialogue. Munch would have been able to contribute to this dialogue a vision of the relationship between figuration and abstraction, for which Bergson's view of matter and memory would have provided the necessary philosophical underpinning. As would Deleuze's view of abstraction, not as a lack of form but as a promise of, or potential for form; its possibility. The loose brush strokes and semi-abstract shapes in the three paintings, especially *Uphill,* while fitting perfectly in the modernist painting styles of the time, also relate to the issue of memory. Bergson suggests that living in duration is a form of gathering: each moment is accompanied by the memory of preceding ones, not necessarily in the chronological or causal order of their occurrence.[18]

The bits of paint can be seen as such a gathering. They barely hang together formally. Yet, they end up serving the depiction of their subject matter excellently – if the subject matter is what each of us makes of it, that includes effort, cold, snow, people, height, a sledge and a boat. All these elements gathered together make sense of the painting. This is possible because we all remember seeing, not these

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18. For Deleuze's view of abstraction, see RAJCHMAN, John: «Another View of Abstraction.» *Journal of Philosophy and the Visual Arts* 5 (16), 1995, 16–24.

things but things like it: running animals or people, fearsome views and sensations. A summery light green suit or one of any other bright colour, even if it produces a strange encounter to see it in the snow. Memory works that way because it is a material, bodily practice. It is something we do; it consists of acts, not impressions that come to passive people from the outside. The acts of memory take place in the present. Just like perception. That is why the strange encounters with artworks are also close encounters, as we can learn from **van Alphen**'s analysis of Segalen's text - encounters of a special kind (a third kind?).[19]

Perception, like memory, involves both the materiality of objects and of the human body. Bergson considers the body to be a material entity, and he consequently sees perception as a material practice. Given his insistence on the inseparability of time and space, the image is, therefore, in movement *by definition*. It is material, not because of the support – canvas, paper, screens - we associate with images, but because the bodily action of mobilizing the image is material. Hence, my point for this dossier is this: *all images, including «still» ones, move*. And even if I have started to argue this through the idea of the cinematic, this moving quality is not limited to figurative images. Even radically abstract and emphatically still paintings move. The example of the abstract painting *Mime* by Jussi Niva can help understand this.

On one level, and with the help of its title, this painting an be considered a clever mimesis of three-dimensional formations in two-dimensional painting. And it is, but not without challenging a simplistic view of mimesis itself. What seems a collage of boards of wood is in fact painting on a flat board. The brush strokes are thick, to suggest – or let's say the word, imitate – not only the pattern of wood but also movement; the movement of the hand that painted coexists with the immobile support on which the work was painted. I have chosen this work because it imitates three-dimensionality in more ways than one. It is as if the panels jump out of their assigned space; as if the panel has exploded. So, on the one hand, the entire work is a model of mimesis. On the other hand, the suggestion of movement by means of thick brush strokes brings mimesis and abstraction together, not in a relation of imitation but of encounter. So, the avoidance of mimesis through the flight into abstraction as its alleged opposite is an unnecessary and even undesirable move.

As Andreas Huyssen explains in an essay on Art Spiegelman's contested two-part comic book *Maus* from 1996, the same Theodor Adorno who cautioned so vehemently against the dangers of representation («after Auschwitz») offers reflections on mimesis that complicate any taboo on representation – indeed, his reflections stipulate that mimesis is necessary (2003, 122–137). As a general solution, the move to abstraction as an avoidance of representation is neither logically tenable nor aesthetically or cognitively satisfactory. Contemporary art that seeks to have political effect is groping for strategies that avoid the drawbacks of reductive representation, facile

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19. With this formulation I am alluding to the 1977 Steven Spielberg film *Close Encounters of the Third Kind*. In another formulation, in the context of postcolonial theory, this can be seen as a «contact zone». For this concept, see Pratt, Mary-Louise: *Imperial Eyes: Travel Writing and Transculturation*. London: Routledge. 1992. On memory as an act performed in the present, see the collective volume ed. by Bal, Mieke, Crewe, Jonathan, and Spitzer Leo: 1999. *Acts of Memory: Cultural Recall in the Present*. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England, 1999.

emotion, and instant recognition of critical issues – three meanings of political art that must be bracketed. At the same time, it is also continually seeking ways in which it can *act* as art; how is it possible for the work to perform something for someone? Here, Niva's painting encounters **Aylin Kuryel**'s bust that re-presents neither Atatürk nor Hopkins.

Representation in that interactive sense is an indispensable tool to act qua art. For all these reasons, a relationship with representation – no matter how tenuous or negative – is indispensable for art to be able to act, and to achieve political effectivity. The way Niva's painting foregrounds the representation, by brush strokes, of something as seemingly irrelevant as the wood on which it is painted, in fact does something of the same order as Munch's cropping and collage. This, too is a collage; of panels, flat sheets, and three-dimensionality all in one. Especially the lower right-hand part of Niva's painting is making it possible to maintain the distinction between two- and three-dimensionality. The edge of the black on the right side of the suggested tear is unreadable in this sense. It can be a cut in a flat sheet or a fold in a 3D object. And the edge on the other side suggests that the wooden panel is moving upwards, the black an abyss. More to the left we see rigid folds, or creases, emphasizing that this is wood, not canvas. But it is not wood; it is paint, applied onto wood. The paint causes the creases, not the wood. And the creases are not «real», only painted; perfect mimesis, in an abstract painting.

Once we see this, the allegedly abstract painting becomes all movement, producing uncertainty about what we see. But Niva adds to, or thickens the idea of collage. More specifically, his work with its mimesis of wood and the movement of the painting hand suggests that Munch, too, challenges the distinction between support and painting when he leaves the canvas visible, covering it only partially and thinly with the paint that is meant to move from the ontological domain of the support to that of the imaginative and imaginary that rules in the image. Thus he bites into the flatness of the flat image. With Niva's work before us we can see that it is not so much a mimesis of the wood in paint strokes, but an encounter of the two, emancipating the support from its invisibility and turning it into a visible presence.[20]

Between Munch's visible patches of bare canvas, frequently with thin paint dripping over them, in figurative painting and Niva's perfect mimesis of the pattern of wood in what goes for abstract painting, there is, of course, a huge difference, even an opposition – albeit not the cliché one between figuration and abstraction. In distinction from Munch, Niva does not leave the panel unpainted. On the contrary, Niva's way of challenging the distinction between flat and three-dimensionality, which equals the distinction between image and picture, is the application of thick paint; so thick that wood pattern and brush pattern merge, and thus bring

20. Huyssen, Andreas: *Present Pasts: Urban Palimpsests and the Politics of Memory*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2003. For more on Niva's painting in relation to the tension between figuration and abstraction, see Bal, Mieke: «Timely Remains.» In *Jussi Niva: Timely Remains*, 66–117. Helsinki: Parvs Publishing, 2010. One example among many of Munch's bits of visually bare canvas (although it has been primed) is the lower portion of his 1925-26 *The Wedding of the Bohemian* (Woll, vol. IV, p. 1393).

FIGURE 4: JUSSI NIVA, MIME, OIL ON BOARD, 2015. 210 X 170 CM GALERIE FORSBLOM, STOCKHOLM. Photograph by Gunter Lepkowski.

FIGURE 5: JUSSI NIVA, MIME, OIL ON BOARD, 2015. 210 X 170 CM GALERIE FORSBLOM, STOCKHOLM.
Photograph by Gunter Lepkowski (detail of the lower right-hand corner).

movement in our act of seeing ambiguity. But this is a difference in, say, material method, not in the theoretical point both artists are making.

Niva's painting demonstrates that the art object does not consist of paint on a support but is one object; that flatness and three-dimensionality cannot be distinguished by eyes alone; that seeing such objects is not a still act but a movement. This makes Bergson's conception of the image synonymous with the moving image. Because the image – as a collation or conflation of both perception in the present and memory, also in the present even if it produces images of the past – is necessarily in movement, the question «What is a moving image?» becomes moot. It is not simply a more specific version of W.J.T. Mitchell's «What is an image?» question. The movement of the image in film is a technical concretization, a manifestation, or even an embodiment, of the movement inherent in the image as such. Such physical movement is theoretically relevant, foregrounding an aspect of all images, just as Munch did with paint.

And if we add to this the second meaning of the word «moving» as on the level of emotion – or, as I would prefer to say, affectively – engaging, we can see that the question already partially answers itself. For a more precise understanding of affect I refer the reader to the article by **Jeffrey Manoel Pijpers** mentioned above.

In addition to the sonic topic's help in «seeing-hearing» the synaesthetic quality of images, his article brings the indispensable theory of affect to bear on a concrete case. His is the discussion of affect that demonstrates the concept's usefulness in cultural analysis. He brings up what he calls «diasporic affect» produced in music and thus extends the realm of what we call images to a larger, multi-sensorial domain. This is not easy, and rarely done with the subtlety artworks require. Moreover, Pijpers' case study articulates the intricacies of affect with movement in time and space, through history and exile, in ways that foreground the political relevance of the concepts we are studying in this dossier. Thus he binds all aspects of art's movement together.

Bergson's thinking integrates a third movement. To the profilmic movement of the unique occurrence that is recorded – say, the running horse – and the movement inherent in perception – the bystanders, withdrawing from the path of the horse, move to do so – he adds a dimension by implicating memory. With affect in sight we can now also include the affective movement – say, the children's fright in process when the horse thunders by, in the memorial aspect of movement.

This movement of timespace and emotion is, of course, easiest to grasp in art that explicitly addresses all three. One such art form is performance, where the movement in time and space is obvious but the way the performers create affect, less so, and the analysis of the mix of movement and its ritualized minimalisation allow utopian encounters on a micro level, as **Laia Manonelles Moner** demonstrates in her analysis of work by Marina Abramovic and Ulay. In an analysis of two instances of «land art» **Patricia Limido & Hervé Regnaud** also bring the affective movement in contact with the physical one, of the artworks as well as of the viewer, who must walk along the coast to see the works in one case, and with the memorial one, through the discussion of allusions to historical events that had occurred on the site of the artworks. And **Clara Laguillo Abbad Correo** takes the complex interaction between the present, moving body of dance and the technology that aims to record it, on both sides of the twentieth century, as an opportunity for theoretical reflection on how media merge.

The Bergsonian knot of the moving aspects of images implies that the image itself – not its support – is both moving and material. Niva's work is the best thinkable incarnation of this idea. The Bergsonian knot implies that the image is plural and functional – it *does* something, which makes it *performative*. And although Munch could not know this term, he surely knew, or intuited, its meaning. His paintings, whether of movement, such as these three, or of still situations, of which there are many, bristle with performativity. And so does Niva's work, abstract as it may be.[21]

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21. For an excellent overview of the many aspects and implications of Bergson's conception of the image, see MOULIN, Olivier, «L'image comme fonction médiatrice chez Bergson.» *L'image*, ed. Alexander Schnell, Paris: Vrin 2007, 65–90. I cannot develop the conception of affect that underlies my view of the Bergsonian knot. On affect in relation to art, and in addition to Pijpers' contribution here, I rely mainly on these two publications: ALPHEN, Ernst van: «Affective Operations of Art and Literature», *RES: Journal of Anthropology and Aesthetics* 53/54 Spring/Autumn 2008, 20-30, a theoretical account, and «Making Sense of Affect», *Francis Bacon: Five Decades*, ed. Tony Bond, Sydney 2012, Museum of New South Wales, 65-73, an analysis of paintings in terms of affect.

ART MOVING US POLITICALLY

During the last decades of his long career Munch painted more and more what we would now call «social situations». While earlier on, thematically his work tended to be frequently concerned with sexual attraction, symbolic figurations, entertainment, and difficult relations between men and women, in these three paintings, labour, and especially here, in cold weather, is topical. This is not a necessary condition for art we would consider socially or politically relevant, however, even if in these three paintings this is quite obvious. This combination of the effort and the cold is likely to affect the viewer. To account for the political force of art beyond a thematic analysis, it matters that there is one more movement involved with Bergson's concept. In 1907, the philosopher coined the term «creative evolution».

He used this concept to describe this type of movement. It occurs when understanding and action are imbricated. Without such an understanding we would be powerless to effect change, and art would be politically impotent. This fourth Bergsonian movement, the *readiness to act*, lies at the heart of the political potential of the image, film, and video installation, on the condition that it works together with the other three. And just as the cinematic is the over-determined instance of the moving image, and Niva's work of the indissoluble bond between support and paint, as between figuration and abstraction, so video installation can be seen as an over-determined instance an art form that stimulates Bergson's fourth movement.[22]

If we consider the art form as a concrete instance of the multiply-moving image, then video installation, or Malani Nalani's shadow plays, can create the *literal* embodiment of this potential in a *fictional* space that, with the help of the viewer, can become a political, democratic space. This does not mean that video installation is somehow privileged as a medium for political art, but only that it foregrounds an aspect of art that makes it politically effective. As the cinematic helps to articulate the movement of images, and paint to mobilize its own dependency on a support, video installation can serve our theoretical purposes of grasping how art, in general and hence, including still images such as paintings, can be eminently operative for political effect by virtue of its fundamentally moving quality. But if we extend the thematic of the political from Munch's attention to labour to a more general domain, more needs to be said about what is political, and what makes art political.

The term «the political» as I use it here is best understood in distinction from «politics.» Although both belong to the domain where social life is structured and to which it is subjected, these two terms are each other's opposite. Political theorist Chantal Mouffe defines the two terms as follows:

22. BERGSON, Henri: *Creative Evolution*. Trans. A. Mitchell. Landham, MD: University Press of America, 1983 [1907]. I have been unpacking the political potential of art for the last eight years, on the basis of the ideas summed up in the following section. Four books on this topic have resulted so far, each exploring an artistic medium through the work of one artist: BAL, Mieke: *Of What One Cannot Speak: Doris Salcedo's Political Art.* Chicago, Ill, University of Chicago Press, 2010 (sculpture); translated as *De lo que no se puede hablar. el arte política de Doris Salcedo*. Bogotá, Colombia, Panamericana, 2014; *Thinking in Film* (op. cit.) (video installation); *Endless Andness* (op.cit.) (abstraction); and *In Medias Res: Inside Nalini Malani Shadow Plays,* Ostfilden, Hatje Cantz. (shadow plays).

… by «the political» I mean the dimension of antagonism which I take to be constitutive of human societies, while by «politics» I mean the set of practices and institutions through which an order is created, organizing human coexistence in the context of conflictuality provided by the political.[23]

In this distinction, politics is the organization that settles conflict; the political is where conflict «happens». Yet, it is by virtue of the political that social life is possible. It can thrive, be alive, and also be dangerous. No wonder, then, that we usually seek to avoid conflict by means of consensus. Politics comes in to avert the potential of danger. Politics, which responds to it, constantly attempts to dampen the political. As Mouffe cogently argues, the culture of consensus resulting from politics does not at all eliminate conflict; it suppresses it, and thus leaves it to its own, underground, and, hence potentially volcanic devices. We can think of that volcanic quality of social reality when seeing the sideways look of the furiously galloping horse, or the wolfish face of the man nearly falling sideways on the too-steep hill. The slanted look means that we cannot see *what* the eyes in the paintings see. We only see *that* they see. The sense that something is about to happen is not only about physical movement but can as well pertain to the social situation, perhaps about to erupt. Politics is in fact highly exclusivist, and lives by «the negation of the ineradicable character of antagonism» (10). It is also in blatant contradiction to the lived social reality, in which conflict is generally present.

French philosopher Jacques Rancière makes a similar distinction, but his terms are different. Mouffe's «politics» equals Rancière's «police,» and what Mouffe calls «the political» corresponds to «politics» in Rancière's work. Both thinkers argue that the conflictual nature of social life and the need to disagree, or at least have the opportunity and liberty to do so, are of vital importance. Rancière uses the term «mésentente» to describe this conflictual element of social reality. This is an untranslatable word that combines misunderstanding with not getting along. Unfortunately, it is unilaterally translated into English as «disagreement» (1999). The misunderstanding part is, however, just as crucial. Frequently, it is that misunderstanding that foments the disagreement. Even if I have reasons to use Mouffe's terminology, I do want to keep in mind the dual resonance of Rancière's «mésentente.»[24]

To suggest how this would work when it is a bit more concrete, I give an example from Mouffe. It concerns individualism as an ideology. She continues her presentation of the two antagonistic domains of politics and the political with reference to that area of real conflict in contemporary societies:

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23. MOUFFE, Chantal: *On the Political*. New York and London, Routledge, 2005, (9). The following is derived from the introduction to my book *Of What One Cannot Speak.*

24. I find Rancière's terminology confusing and even a bit manipulative, since the term «police» has a clear, established meaning that turns the broader use of it into a somewhat paranoid suggestion about what Althusser called «Ideological State Apparatuses» (1971). Badiou discusses Rancière's concepts and distinctions (2006, 107–123) and seems to sense also some paranoid tone when he says this about the distinction: «He has the tendency to pit phantom masses against an unnamed State» (121). Badiou considers the political militant the «central subjective figure of politics» (122) and thereby demonstrates that the distinction does not matter to him. RANCIÈRE, Jacques: *Disagreement: Politics and Philosophy*. Trans. Julie Rose. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1999; ALTHUSSER, Louis, *Lenin and Philosophy and Other Essays*. Trans. Ben Brewster. London: New Left Books, 1971; BADIOU, Alain: *Metapolitics*. Trans. Jason Barker, London: Verso, 2006.

... the dominant tendency in liberal thought is characterized by a rationalist and individualist approach which forecloses acknowledging the nature of collective identities. This kind of liberalism is unable to adequately grasp the pluralistic nature of the social world, with the conflicts that pluralism entails; conflict for which no rational solution could ever exist. (10)

Paradoxically, then, individualism, which takes multiplicity as its starting point, is unable to deal with the actual plural nature of the social world. The hypostasis of individual freedom is in fact a severe limitation of multiplicity. The repression of group identities in the name of the individual makes for an easy slide from individualism to consensus, or worse, dictatorship. Taking place within a contact zone, the encounter between individual and art work, where the art work can take considerable power and the individual is rarely alone, is a healthy antidote against excessive individualism.

Working with conflicts is necessary, not to eradicate them at the cost of plurality, but to makes things speakable, communicable; to turn enemies into adversaries, Mouffe contends. The former, the notion of enemy, draws sharp us/them distinctions that cast the «them» into the role of enemy to be fiercely combated, so that there is no need to come to terms with the conflict; the latter, the notion of adversary, accepts such distinctions between groups but still acknowledges the legitimacy of the «them» – the adversary, to be engaged in debate. Hence, the adversary is not a «them» but a «you» – another to be faced, with whom discussion and disagreement is possible and on whose account the hope that «mésentente» can one day be resolved is never quite given up. This is the encounter of the third kind that art helps us to experience, appreciate, and emulate.

Perhaps it is a bit clearer, now, what it entails that art integrates space, time and form. For, not only is its ontology bound to these three dimensions; also its capacity to function, to do something; to be performative. And since art exists in and for the public domain, it partakes inevitably of the political. The movement inscribes the art work in timespace. It mobilizes viewers, prepares them to be ready to act, including changing their minds where these are fixated on preconceived opinions. In an interview with Anita Seppä Niva does not talk about the political potential of his work at all. Instead, he explains, in lucid and even simple terms, how he makes his art moving. He states:

...the works in the Mime series are loaded with elements that lead to fracture, such as acute angles where the surface of the painting takes a surprising turn. I also deliberately use a forceful stroke technique to give the planes a spatial direction and an accelerated motion. Often, however, this conflicts with the three-dimensionality. I am intrigued by such disturbances, violation or intervention.[25]

Niva's insistence on fractures and disturbances betokens the movement that goes from the surface of the work with its vigorous brush strokes to the viewer willing to undergo the rhythm this creates. It is the specific, powerful form of the work that makes that movement possible.

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25. Niva, Jussi: *Mime.* Catalogue, Galerie Forsblom, 2016. (n.p.)

MOVEMENT: SPACE, TIME AND FORM AS ONE AGENT IN THE POLITICAL

The distinction discussed above takes movement into account in its insistence on the dynamic nature of the social sphere, or the political. But the distinction does not mean that politics and the political can be radically distinguished. On the contrary, the distinction is indispensable precisely because they cannot. They coexist because there is also a spatial aspect both domains share, and that is the aspect that zooms in on visual art. While staying closer to the political than to politics, throughout her prolific oeuvre, political theorist Wendy Brown offers a stimulating discussion that I bring in here because it is based on a sense of space. I see her definition of politics, which she bases on the Greek antecedent word, as being very close to Mouffe's «political»:

The rich connotative content of *politeia* suggests that politics refers always to a condition of plurality and difference, to the human capacity for *producing* a world of meanings, practices, and institutions, and to the constant implication of power among us – its generation, distribution, circulation, and effects.[26]

For Brown, the conditions of a functioning political domain are the formation of judgments, the performance of democratic acts, and the availability of what she calls «political spaces.» It is that sense of political spaces I am interested in here.

The first two of Brown's conditions are alternatives to the predominant derivation of the good from the true and to the institutionalized rituals of democracy, respectively. Art has great political potential if it disentangles the good from the true. Then, it compels viewers who are affected by it to make judgments about such issues as, for example, justice, or semiotic force, or affective intensity; not truth. Making such judgments is an exercise of democratic agency. I understand the latter term to require contexts where the issues that make up the political can be spoken. Where this is not possible («of what one cannot speak»), other means must be invented to prevent Wittgenstein's conclusion, which, abducted to this context, becomes dreadfully negative because of its submissiveness («thereof one must be silent»).[27]

Such a logic silences agency in the way violence does. The spaces that democratic agency necessitates are contexts in which the antagonisms can be enacted without resulting in the enmity that leads to war, terrorism, and other forms of lawless violence. They are places where, instead, judgments and acts of democratic dispute – even silently, in the form of thought and deliberation – are not only allowed but actively enabled and stimulated. It is in the absence or scarcity of such spaces, and

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26. BROWN, Wendy: «Postmodern Exposures, Feminist Hesitations.» In *States of Injury: Power and Freedom in Late Modernity*, 30–51. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press 1995 (38; emphasis in text).

27. I have derived the title of my book on Salcedo's work from the final sentence of the *tractatus.* WITTGENSTEIN, Ludwig: *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*. Trans. David Francis Pears, and Brian McGuinness. New York and London: Routledge, 2001 [1921]. I consider it, and the refusal of the conclusion he draws, as a guideline to understand the affective quality of art: Of what one cannot speak one must show. See also the film we made on this basis: BAL, Mieke and GAMAKER, Michelle Williams: *A Long History of Madness.* Amsterdam, Cinema Suitcase, 2012.

of access to them, or their invisibility, that art can be political by seeking to open them up. Art constructs political spaces. The museum, gallery, or other publically accessible spaces where art can live are, or should be, such political spaces.

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