2004

Emotional Intelligence as a Facilitator of the Emotional Labor Process

L Melita Prati

THE FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY
COLLEGE OF BUSINESS

EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE AS A FACILITATOR OF THE EMOTIONAL LABOR PROCESS

By

L. MELITA PRATI

A Dissertation submitted to the
Department of Management
in partial fulfillment of the
requirements for the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy

Degree Awarded
Fall Semester, 2004

The members of the Committee approve the dissertation of
L. Melita Prati, defended on August 18, 2004.

Gerald R. Ferris
Professor Co-Directing Dissertation

Pamela Perrewé
Professor Co-Directing Dissertation

Robert A. Brymer
Outside Committee Member

Larry Giunipero
Outside Committee Member

Ceasar Douglas
Committee Member

Wayne Hochwarter
Committee Member

Approved:

Bruce Lamont, Chairman, Department of Management

Melvin T. Stith, Dean, College of Business

The Office of Graduate Studies has verified and approved the above named committee members.

I can do all things through Christ which strengtheneth me.

-- Philippians 4:13 KJV

And we know that God causes all things to work together for good to those who love God, to those who are called according to His purpose.

-- Romans 8:28 KJV

The first quote is a statement of faith, the second is a call for courage and perseverance.

There are so many wonderful people to whom this dissertation is dedicated. First, to my Lord Jesus Christ, who has carried me through many trials and provided me many blessings. To my dear husband, Robert, who is my champion, best friend, and the love of my life. Without his love, support, and encouragement, I would have never taken this journey. To my two beautiful sons, Robbie and Ray, I love you very much. You inspire me to be the best person I can be. To my mother, Lillis, who instilled in me the understanding that an education is the most valuable possession you can have. To my sister, Kathy, who's innocence and love show me how to enjoy the simple pleasures in life. To my mother and father in-laws, Ron and Mary, who are always generous with their time and love. And finally, this dissertation is also dedicated in loving memory to my father, Green. He was not aware of my pursuit of this degree, but I am sure he is aware of my accomplishment now.

I love you all. Thank you for making my life complete.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to first acknowledge my dissertation Co-chairs, Dr. Pam Perrewé and Dr. Gerald Ferris. Your help and support was invaluable. I am honored to have had the opportunity to work with such incredible researchers and wonderful individuals. Also, I am grateful to my committee members, including Dr. Ceasar Douglas, Dr. Wayne Hochwarter, Dr. Robert Brymer, and Dr. Larry Giunipero, for their interest and support throughout the dissertation process.

I would also like to acknowledge the many people at Florida State University who helped me along the way. Dr. Lamont your encouragement helped me keep going in the roughest times. Dr. Anthony you are a gem, and I really enjoyed working with you. Thanks to all of the members of the Management faculty. I was so blessed to have been nurtured in the wonderful environment you created. Scheri Martin deserves a great deal of thanks. She is always a help to graduate students in need.

Finally, I would like to acknowledge the incredible friends I have met during these grueling years. I am grateful to have been a member of Thomasville Road Baptist Church. This is a church that truly gives meaning to the phrase "Church Family." Bill and Pat Brueckheimer, your witness meant a lot to me, and I appreciate all the prayers. Thanks to the Sunday School class members as well. Don, Janey, Kate, Karen, and Kassidy, thanks for your help, friendship, and the free room and board! Wendy, you've been many things to me…an office mate, a prayer partner, a supplier of fabulous eats, and a great friend.

THANK YOU SO MUCH!

TABLE OF CONTENTS

LIST OF TABLES

LIST OF FIGURES

ABSTRACT

Beginning as an area of popular and business press interest, emotional intelligence is fast becoming a legitimate area of research for organizational science theorists. The many potential benefits of emotional intelligence have yet to be evaluated within the realm of legitimate academic research, and there are many areas of organizational concern that may be beneficially influenced by this empowering attribute. Emotional labor is one such area, and it has grown as a legitimate concern for organizational participants involved in the practice of using their emotions for organizational purposes. Furthermore, it is a concern for the organizations these individuals serve.

The purpose of this dissertation is to review and analyze the literature on emotional intelligence and emotional labor and to discover how emotional intelligence moderates relationships within the emotional labor process. It is hypothesized that this investigation will reveal evidence supporting the general hypothesis that emotionally intelligent organizational members enjoy more effective participation in the emotional labor process, and that emotional intelligence, as a moderator, will alleviate detrimental individual and organizational outcomes of this process.

Data were collected using questionnaires. The questionnaires were distributed to 29 stores of an 87 year-old retail chain with over 200 stores centralized in the Southeastern United States. A sample of 210 usable employee responses having matching supervisor evaluations was obtained from these efforts. Hierarchical multiple regression was used to test the hypotheses.

Results were found to support a number of the hypotheses set forth, including affirmative findings for the moderating influence of emotional intelligence on the relationship between various emotional labor performance efforts and outcomes of the emotional labor process. In addition, further analyses of unsupported hypotheses revealed direct main effects of emotional intelligence

on some outcomes. A discussion of the results includes an evaluation of research limitations, practical limitations, and directions for future research.

CHAPTER 1

OVERVIEW OF DISSERTATION

Emotional Intelligence

Emotional intelligence is a product of a century of research in emotions and intelligence. Beginning in the early 1900's, intelligence became an area of great interest and was heavily researched. The endeavor to understand intelligence did not only involve the interest in academic ability, but other abilities such as music, performance, social abilities, and more. The notion was that the realm of intelligence contained many diverse and distinct abilities that existed to make one successful in life.

Scientists such as Thorndike (1920) (social intelligence) and Gardner (1983) (personal intelligence) established the idea of interpersonal intelligence from which emotional intelligence developed. Then, Salovey and Mayer (1990) originated the term emotional intelligence in the United States academic literature. The concept bloomed into what many considered the golden characteristic for success in life. Academics, Salovey and Mayer included, as well as those in the professional arena, theorized that emotional intelligence encompassed a plethora of valuable abilities and characteristics.

In 1995, Daniel Goleman published a book that is widely noted as the springboard from which emotional intelligence was launched as a principal topic of interest in both areas. His book was based on Salovey and Mayer's (1990) theory, and explained the application of emotional intelligence for life success. Goleman claimed emotional intelligence is equal to, if not more valuable than, IQ as an important indicator of one's professional and life success. He asserted emotional intelligence led to more effectiveness in leadership, organizational membership, and social involvement (also see Goleman, 1998). He described those who are emotionally intelligent as more motivated, self-aware, self-confident, and socially adept. Along with Goleman's interpretation, other conceptual characteristics grew out of this simple idea. Large conceptual frameworks were developed to explain the characteristics and behavior of the emotionally intelligent individual.

After five years of theoretical development, it appeared to some that the definitional boundaries of the construct were being stretched too far. In 1997, Salovey and Mayer intervened to bring emotional intelligence back to the realm of academic rigor. They admitted that their

earlier model of emotional intelligence was mixed with ability and other characteristics, and that the definitional structure was sketchy and vague in some areas. At first, they related emotional intelligence to extraversion, warmth, motivation, and other traits or outcomes of personality as well as cognitive abilities. Over time, Salovey, Mayer, and their colleagues have refined the model of this cognitive construct. They have restricted its representation to cognitive abilities and have culled personality traits from the defined theory.

In their more current examination of the construct, Mayer and Salovey (1997) updated this definition to better clarify how emotional intelligence represents cognitive abilities. These abilities include perception and appraisal of emotion, facilitation of thought using emotion, understanding emotional knowledge, and regulating emotional thought and display toward goals. Not only does this definition more clearly define the construct as an intelligence of emotion, it also excludes extraneous elements that have been determined more representative of personality constructs.

As emotional intelligence developed in the academic literature, some principal issues were raised to challenge the construct as an actual intelligence. Several academics have challenged Salovey, Mayer, and associates' attempts to establish emotional intelligence within the realm of intelligence. Salovey and Mayer (1990), using Wechsler's definition of intelligence, proposed that emotional intelligence is a set of abilities that can be classified as mental or cognitive abilities using emotions for rational thought, action, and control of one's environment. Mayer, Caruso, and Salovey (1999) attempted to show emotional intelligence as an actual intelligence construct using standards generally used to determine types of intelligence. According to some academic critics, they have yet to successfully do so.

Another issue challenges the distinctiveness of emotional intelligence. This issue questions whether emotional intelligence is actually a set of abilities or simply a collection of traits. The 'trait versus ability' debate can be attributed largely to the many attempts by researchers to create and validate a measure of emotional intelligence. Over the past decade or so, researchers have made many attempts to create a measure that is acceptable to academic standards and useful as a precise yet easy to use tool to measure this concept. These measures are based on various different conceptualizations and interpretations of the emotional intelligence construct, which has further muddled the debate.

Of the many attempts, all but one of the measures is self-report, which is argued to be a weak form of evaluation for the measurement of individual abilities. All of these self-report measures have closely correlated with personality measures. Again, this fact adds fuel to the fire in the debate. The only measure to be distinct from established personality measures is the *MSCEIT* and its predecessor the *MEIS* (Mayer, Carouso, & Salovey, 1999). This scale is a performance measure used to determine the specific abilities outlined by Meyer and Salovey's (1997) theory. So far, the psychometric properties have provided evidence that emotional intelligence is a set of abilities rather than traits.

Emotional Labor

Over the last century, the United States economy has evolved from a production orientation to a service orientation. With this evolution came a marked increase in the percentage of jobs requiring direct, face-to-face interactions with customers. The health of organizations in large part depends on these interactions, therefore, certain rules of interactions are established to ensure the employee-customer transaction goes smoothly and promotes the organization according to customer expectations. Hochschild (1983) was the first to coin the term emotional labor, which is the compliance of the employee with established rules of emotional display. She warned that prolonged emotional effort to fulfill such requirements could lead to detrimental outcomes for employees.

As well, Ashforth and Humphrey (1993) warned of potential harm to the organization if these negative effects on employees are not quelled. There is a great deal of evidence to support these notions, however, there are also a number of studies to show that emotional labor does not always result in negative outcomes. In fact, there is evidence of positive effects such as better service performance with some forms of emotional labor, as well as increased job satisfaction, self-efficacy, and self-esteem (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Morris & Feldman, 1997; Diefendorff & Richard, 2003; Totterdell & Holman, 2003).

Abraham (1998) cited several studies in which the emotional labor requirement is an enjoyable experience and actually serves to increase job satisfaction. This equivocal nature indicates that moderating effects exist to alter the outcomes of the emotional labor process (Baron & Kenny, 1986). Consequently, researchers have indicated that individual characteristics such as self-efficacy, control, self-monitoring, and emotional intelligence may provide further

information as to how the emotional labor process affects individuals involved in such work (Abraham, 2000; Grandey, 2000).

Emotional Intelligence: A Piece of the Puzzle

Up to the past few years, emotional intelligence has been treated as a variable with direct effects on leadership and performance, but with little application to the many other fields within the science of organizational behavior. There has been little investigation of how emotional intelligence indirectly influences social interaction processes. Few studies, as yet, have distinguished emotional intelligence as a moderator of these processes and resulting outcomes (Douglas, Frink, & Ferris, 2004).

Emotional labor is a social interaction process that focuses on the display of emotion as a requisite to one's job performance. It would appear that the characteristics of emotional intelligence are directly relevant to the requirements of the emotional labor process. Definitional comparison of the concepts has shown this to be readily apparent. The qualities of emotional intelligence are essential to the effective practice of emotional labor. Additionally, emotional intelligence is necessary to reduce the stress that is common as a result of emotional labor practices. Few studies have evaluated the impact emotional intelligence has on reducing stressors such as emotional labor and resulting strains (Humpel, Caputi, & Martin, 2001; Ciarrochi, Deane, & Anderson, 2002; Slaski & Cartwright, 2002). The purpose of this study was to expand the literature in both fields by analyzing the emotional labor process as it is defined by current literature, and to examine the role of emotional intelligence.

Chapters Summary

Chapter 2 of this dissertation discusses the literatures of both fields of research. Background information is given on theoretical development of emotional intelligence and the significance of the impact this set of abilities has on individual and organizational well-being. Also, the emotional labor literature is analyzed and a model of the emotional labor process is formulated in order to give a clear picture of the stages in which emotional intelligence may have an impact. Chapter 3 presents models and hypotheses based on the literature review of Chapter 2. The moderating effects of emotional intelligence on the emotional labor process are illustrated, and individual aspects of the process are presented for empirical examination of moderating effects. Chapter 4 describes the samples and measures used in the study, as well as explaining the data analytic methods used in testing the hypotheses. Chapter 5 reports the results of the study,

and Chapter 6 provides the discussion and practical implications of these results, in addition to providing directions for future research.

CHAPTER 2

LITERATURE REVIEW

Chapter Overview

This chapter reviews the relevant constructs pertaining to the study. The origins and development of the emotional intelligence and emotional labor constructs are discussed. Because emotional intelligence is still in the developmental stage, this chapter focuses more so on the development and establishment of emotional intelligence as a construct. Also, a thorough analysis of all measures used to date in academic research to measure emotional intelligence is presented in order to reveal the most efficacious and applicable measure of emotional intelligence for the present study. Finally, a review of the emotional labor literature is reported to ascertain the theoretical structure of the emotional labor process, and to more thoroughly understand the influences of one's emotional intelligence in each stage throughout this process.

The Emotional Intelligence Construct

Background and Original Conceptualizations

The theory of emotional intelligence emerged from several areas of research. Exploration in the areas of intelligence, cognition, and affect laid a solid foundation for the development of this theory. The early 1900's saw a great deal of interest in the area of intelligence. During this time, the notion developed that there was more to the realm of intelligence than academic ability. Theorists began to introduce the idea that certain abilities other than academic intelligence existed to predict success in life.

Thorndike (1920) was one of the first theorists to introduce the idea of different types of intelligences. His notion of social intelligence was defined as the ability of the individual to act competently within the realm of social interaction, using one's understanding of the self and others to guide those actions. He believed social intelligence to be a component within the universal domain of intelligence. Beginning with Thorndike and others, the idea that there is more to intelligence than academic ability continued to develop even when met with firm opposition by the majority of intelligence theorists (Goleman, 1995).

Gardner's (1983) theory of multiple intelligences introduced the notion of personal intelligence, which narrowed the field of social intelligence to focus on the individual and the specific abilities needed to facilitate social interactions. He described personal intelligence as

having two subtypes: (1) intrapersonal intelligence -- involves the examination, understanding, and representation of one's own feelings; and (2) interpersonal intelligence -- involves the examination and understanding of the feelings of others and the facilitation of action based on others' feelings.

By the later part of the Twentieth century, the field of intelligence had many various theories that Sternberg (1985a) reasoned was the source of a great deal of conflict within the field. Sternberg's (1985b) triarchic theory of intelligence was proposed as a unified framework of intelligence theory. His effort was intended to encompass all of these seemingly conflicting or competing theories, and to show the complementary nature of these theories in order to advance the field of intelligence beyond the problems created by warring factions of theorists. The triarchic framework divided intelligence into three realms of information-processing: (1) the mental processes internal to the individual; (2) the use of internal mental processes in the interaction with one's external environment; and (3) the acquisition of experience used to mediate the relationship between internal mental states and external displays of one's mental functions.

In Sternberg's (1988) book, *The Triarchic Mind: A New Theory of Human Intelligence*, he explained that these intelligence realms were adaptive in the individual's life experience. He proposed that adaptive skill is an important ability afforded by intelligence, and lamented the fact that traditional tests of intelligence do not estimate adaptive skill. He portrayed this adaptive function of intelligence as the means by which intelligence serves one's mental self-management. This concept of mental self-management provides one with the ability to adapt to, select out of, and shape environments in which one interacts.

In addition to these revolutionary theories in the field of intelligence, there were other movements that contributed to emotional intelligence theory. Mayer (2001) attributed the emergence of the emotional intelligence construct partly to the emergence and evolution of research in cognition and affect, which became popular in the late 1970's. Mayer (2001) cited several key articles that brought emotions research to the attention of behavioral theorists. He mentioned Isen, Shalker, Clark, and Karp's (1978) idea of a "cognitive loop" that demonstrated an interaction between cognition and mood. Another such notion, by Ajzen and Fishbein (1974), suggested that attitudes are formed from three components: cognition, affect, and behavior. These components interact to influence how one will respond to various stimuli.

These theorists, as well as Thorndike (1920), Gardner (1983), Sternberg (1985), and many others, cultivated the ideas from which emotional intelligence developed. In 1990, Salovey and Mayer originated the term emotional intelligence in the United States academic literature. They first proposed emotional intelligence as "the subset of social intelligence that involves the ability to monitor one's own and other's feelings and emotions, to discriminate among them and to use this information to guide one's thinking and actions" (p. 189). This definition integrates the ideas of Thorndike, Gardner, and others into a coherent list of abilities that constitutes the emotional intelligence construct. Further, these abilities place affect as a primary stimulus that influences social interaction.

In a more current examination of the construct, Mayer and Salovey (1997) updated this definition to better clarify how emotional intelligence represents cognitive abilities. They suggested that previous definitions, theirs included, were not clear enough or inclusive of all abilities represented by emotional intelligence. The most current definition offered by these theorists lists the actual components or abilities that they believe comprise the construct. Mayer and Salovey (1997) stated, "Emotional intelligence involves the ability to perceive accurately, appraise, and express emotion; the ability to access and/or generate feelings when they facilitate thought; the ability to understand emotion and emotional knowledge; and the ability to regulate emotions to promote emotional and intellectual growth" (p. 10). Not only does this definition more clearly define the construct, it also excludes extraneous elements that have been determined to be more representative of personality constructs.

Theoretical Development

Since the conception of the theory, emotional intelligence enjoyed limited notice in the academic and professional literatures. Then, in 1995, Daniel Goleman published a book called *Emotional Intelligence: Why it can matter more than IQ*. This, his first book on the subject, is widely noted to have made the term emotional intelligence popular in the corporate arena, as well as generating further interest in the area of academics. The book explained his concept of emotional intelligence based on Salovey and Mayer's (1990) original theory. Among Goleman's many claims, he argued that emotional intelligence is equal to, if not more valuable, than IQ as an important indicator of one's professional and life success. Goleman's (1998) second book, *Working with Emotional Intelligence*, further elaborated on the ideas in his previous work by

explaining how an individual's emotional intelligence can affect one's work situation. He also applies his conceptual understanding to the organization as a whole.

In one of his most recent works, *Primal Leadership: Realizing the Power of Emotional Intelligence*, Goleman, and his co-authors, Boyatzis and McKee (2002), assert that the effective use of emotion is basic to the function of successful leadership. They state that leaders are emotional guides influencing not only follower emotions, but also follower actions through that emotional influence. Leaders effect this influence through relationship management, motivational appeal, and goal setting, and the leader's emotional intelligence is necessary to effectively performing these efforts.

Following the popularity of Goleman's publications, professionals and academics became very interested in the theory, and how it can make a difference for individual and organizational success. In the professional culture, consultants took on their own theoretical concept of emotional intelligence to create measures that could be used as consulting tools. Organizations could use these tools to gauge the emotional intelligence level of organizational members, and to reveal areas that could be improved and developed. Several of these consultant measures became popular and are still being used in both the professional and academic arenas. Of these, the most commonly used are the Emotional Quotient Inventory *(EQ-i)* (Bar-On, 1997), the Emotional Competence Inventory *(ECI)* (Sala, 2000), and the Emotional Quotient Map *(EQ Map)* (Orioli, Jones, & Trocki, 2000). These measures are discussed and evaluated in the measures section of this chapter.

In the academic arena, the interest was not only in developing the theory itself, but also in investigating how the construct plays a role in individual and organizational success. The primary areas of interest include leadership, individual and organizational performance, training, and stress. However, the most involved research to date has been focused on the development of emotional intelligence theory in order to discover if it is indeed a valid construct or simply a repackaging of personality traits. The following section addresses this and other issues that were investigated to further develop the theory.

Several theoretical questions have emerged from the pursuit of research in the emotional intelligence area. Of these questions, two have been avidly discussed, and have contributed substantially to the development of the construct. The first issue is whether emotional

intelligence can be considered a set of traits or a set of abilities. The second issue involves the question as to whether emotional intelligence is, in fact, an actual form of intelligence.

Is emotional intelligence a collection of traits or abilities? There are several researchers in the field of biology that have argued for emotional intelligence as an ability (Bechara, Tranel, & Damasio, 2000; Lane, 2000; Taylor & Bagby, 2000). Taylor and Bagby (2000) discussed a condition called alexithymia, which is diametrically opposed to the emotional intelligence construct. Individuals with alexithymia are unable to clearly understand and describe their feelings, express emotion appropriately, and in many cases to interpret emotional symbols expressed by others. In effect, individuals with alexithymia have little, if any, emotional intelligence. These researchers have suggested that a lack of emotional intelligence can be the result of inadequate development or interruption in neurological functioning. In other words, the cognitive abilities of individuals are limited in the use of emotional symbolism due to some problem in their neural pathways.

Several researchers have started a line of inquiry to investigate the connection between emotional intelligence and personality constructs. A study by Douglas et al. (2004) showed the moderating effect of emotional intelligence on the relationship between the conscientiousness dimension of personality and individual performance. They presented evidence to show that emotional intelligence actually facilitates and stimulates the relationship between personality and performance. In their establishment of emotional intelligence as a moderator in this relationship, they posited emotional intelligence as a social effectiveness construct such that emotional intelligence is a set of skills used to evaluate the feelings and perceptions of others and use this information to influence others. According to their position, they distinguished the emotional intelligence construct from personality, arguing that personality dimensions are stable dispositions, whereas emotional intelligence not only is dispositional, but also can be developed through training and experience.

Setting aside the biological evidence and limited empirical research that directly addresses the discrimination of emotional intelligence from personality traits, the 'trait versus ability' debate can be attributed largely to the many attempts by researchers to create and validate a measure of emotional intelligence. All but one of the emotional intelligence measures available is self-report in nature, which has given trait proponents a strong argument. The various measures available are discussed further in the measures review section to follow, but it is

necessary to have a limited discussion of some of the measures at this point to address the 'trait versus ability' debate.

Salovey and Mayer (1990) began with what they consider now to be a mixed model of emotional intelligence. Initially, they related emotional intelligence to extraversion, warmth, motivation, and other traits or outcomes of personality as well as cognitive abilities. Other researchers have developed so called mixed models that define emotional intelligence as a set of competencies or social skills that represent one's traits as well as abilities. For example, an emotional intelligence measure created by Bar-On (1997), the *EQ-i*, represents a model that is not centrally focused on the emotional intelligence construct, but more equally divided between emotional intelligence, social intelligence, and peripheral facilitators of the two intelligences. In fact, Bar-On described the *EQ-i* as a measure of social intelligence as well as emotional intelligence, and he also acknowledged that some of the subscales are not components but facilitators of the construct. Another popular model was developed by Boyatzis and Goleman who described emotional intelligence as a multidimensional construct with a number of competency clusters that describe how one's personality serves to achieve successful performance outcomes (Boyatzis, Goleman, & Rhee, 2000). The theoretical framework behind their *ECI* measure attempts to link personality and performance within this integrated non-cognitive concept of emotional intelligence.

Both of the above alternative theories are based on the idea that emotional intelligence is not a cognitive construct, but a construct that represents capabilities or traits of the individual. These theories represent several of the (self-report) measures available that estimate emotional intelligence. However, a majority of the self-report measures are based on Salovey and Mayer's (1990; 1997) model. Regardless of the theoretical basis, the pursuit of an acceptable measure of emotional intelligence has been complicated by the issue that self-report measures of emotional intelligence have been found highly correlated with personality factors.

Many have argued that self-report measures should be characterized as measures of dispositional tendancy or of a trait as opposed to measures of ability (Petrides & Furnham, 2000; Saklofske, Austin, & Minski, 2003). Brackett and Mayer (2003) compared the Bar-On self-report *EQ-i* and the Self-Report Emotional Intelligence Test *(SREIT)*, and found these measures weakly related to the Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test *(MSCEIT)*, an ability-based measure of emotional intelligence. From this information, one might conclude that self-report

measures evaluate some dimension of the individual other than his or her emotional intelligence abilities. There has not yet been a self-report measure developed that has not been convincingly shown to be distinct from established personality measures.

Salovey, Mayer and their colleagues have acknowledged that the trait-based intelligence measures may provide interesting insights by evaluating individuals from a different view (i.e., that of emotional intelligence rather than established personality theory), but these measures are detrimental to the true efforts to develop emotional intelligence theory (Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 2000a; Salovey, Woolery, & Mayer, 2001). They argued that involving any issues other than emotion and intelligence obscures the development of the emotional intelligence construct. Over time, Salovey, Mayer and their colleagues have refined the cognitive-based emotional intelligence model to be restricted to cognitive abilities, and have culled personality traits from the defined theory (Mayer & Salovey, 1993; Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Mayer, Caruso, & Salovey, 1999; Mayer et al., 2000a; Salovey et al., 2001; Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2001). Their development of an ability-based intelligence measure has shown validity and much promise as an acceptable measure distinct from established personality measures.

Davies, Stankov, and Roberts (1998) argued that emotional intelligence not only should be distinct from established personality factors, but also from traditional intelligence measures as well. In answer to this point, Mayer, Salovey, and Caruso (2000b) explained that the *MSCEIT* was created to only measure the processing of emotion information, and to exclude any indicators of other types of intelligence. For example, they have designed the test in such a way as to eliminate verbal content that could contaminate results. Therefore, one's verbal intelligence should not play a role in how one responds to test items.

The self-report measures that now exist as measures of emotional intelligence have drawn a great deal of criticism about the construct itself. Because of the significant correlations of these measures with pre-existing personality measures, the construct has been viewed by many as a new name for personality traits. Salovey, Mayer, and colleagues have maintained that this construct is representative of cognitive ability, and they continue to work toward evidence of this notion (Mayer & Salovey, 1997; Mayer et al., 1999; Mayer et al., 2000a; Salovey et al., 2001; Mayer et al., 2001). Their work in establishing emotional intelligence as an actual type of intelligence should further establish the construct as an ability rather than a personality trait.

Can emotional intelligence actually be considered a valid form of intelligence? Mayer et al. (1999) received criticism for aligning their construct with the venerated and established field of intelligence. After all, emotion has been regarded as a non-rational, non-logical concept. Perhaps further reason for this question comes from the different conceptualizations of emotional intelligence that have emerged. As to be expected, there is considerable refinement required from newly developed theory. These models have served a great purpose in that they have brought about this and other questions as theorists attempted to determine what emotional intelligence is and is not.

In order to answer this question, one must understand what the originators of the term intended by labeling the construct as a type of intelligence. Salovey and Mayer (1990) cited Wechsler's definition of intelligence because it more broadly encompasses what is generally accepted as intelligence. They reported Wechsler's (1958) definition of intelligence as "the aggregate or global capacity of the individual to act purposefully, to think rationally, and to deal effectively with his environment" (p. 7). According to this definition and thorough research in the area of intelligence, Salovey and Mayer (1990) determined that emotional intelligence is a set of abilities that can be classified as mental or cognitive abilities.

Mayer et al. (2000b) reasoned that emotions can be characterized as a system of symbols that are available to cognitive evaluation and function, just as the numerical and verbal systems are. Therefore, one can use these symbols in abstract thought and problem solving. Mayer and Salovey (1997) argued that alternative definitions are less valid in that they do not refer only to cognitive abilities with regard to emotion, but also to other competencies, characteristics, or outcomes of emotional intelligence. These other competencies, characteristics, and outcomes cloud the pure theory because they are not components of what can be termed intelligence abilities.

Several researchers have considered emotional intelligence to be the answer to the variance not accounted for by current intelligence tests (Mayer & Salovey, 1993; Goleman, 1995; Dulewicz & Higgs, 2000; Fox & Spector, 2000; Kaufman & Kaufman, 2001; Lam & Kirby, 2002). Mayer et al. (1999) went a step further in attempting to establish emotional intelligence as an actual intelligence construct. After their article, which stated affirmatively that emotional intelligence is a type of intelligence, the issue stimulated considerable academic arguments and concerns. In the article, the authors used the *MEIS* to show how emotional

intelligence satisfies three particular standards that must be met in determining a type of intelligence.

The first standard to be met is whether the intelligence indicates mental function rather than a type of behavior or personal trait. The theory established by Salovey and Mayer (1997) had defined emotional intelligence as a set of cognitive abilities rather than behaviors or personality traits. The *MEIS* was constructed to operationalize the emotional intelligence abilities set forth by theory, and to reveal these abilities based on subjects' analysis of test items. The creators argued that this method of measurement is more appropriate than a self-report instrument, which would simply ask the subject to answer questions according to how the subject might feel or perform in certain situations.

The second standard requires that the intelligence should be similar to, but distinct from, other established types of intelligence. Mayer et al. (2000b) stated that emotional intelligence is a form of intelligence by which one can use emotions though abstract thought and solve problems. Mayer and Salovey (1997) indicated that emotional intelligence is only truly represented by a definition that links emotions with intelligence (via such abilities) and should not be defined through personality, motivational, or outcome terms. In the 1999 study, Mayer et al. found a moderate correlation (.36) between emotional intelligence, as measured by the *MEIS*, and verbal intelligence. The third standard states that the intelligence should develop over time as one matures. A test of adults versus adolescents, using a modified version of the *MEIS*, revealed a significant difference in scores of the two groups with the adult group reflecting higher scores.

Roberts, Zeidner, and Matthews (2001) answered this article posing some valid concerns with whether or not these standards for intelligence were actually satisfied in the earlier study. At the outset, the authors admitted that an ability-based measure, such as the *MEIS*, is more likely to reveal a construct distinct from personality. However, they took exception with the method of scoring used for this measure, as well as the factor structure revealed by Mayer et al. (1999). These issues led Roberts et al. (2001) to question the *MEIS* as an effective measure that appropriately operationalizes the emotional intelligence construct (this is discussed further in the next section on emotional intelligence measures). This issue brings to question the first criteria to establish an intelligence; that is, can it be operationalized as a set of abilities. At this point, the *MEIS* is the only ability-based measure. If the measure's reliability and validity are not well established, then the first criterion cannot be satisfied.

With regard to the satisfaction of the second and third criteria, Roberts et al. (2001) questioned some of the measures and techniques used by Mayer et al. (1999). The second criteria, that emotional intelligence is appropriately correlated with other established measures of intelligence, was challenged with several arguments. Roberts et al. (2001) argued that the verbal intelligence measure used by Mayer et al. (1999) was no longer a contemporary test of cognitive ability. They also cited Ciarrochi, Chan, and Caputi (2000), who performed a similar correlational test using a different measure of cognitive ability, the Ravens Standard Progressive Matrices test. This study found minimal, and in one case negative, correlation between emotional intelligence factors and the IQ measure.

The third criterion to be satisfied is the development of intelligence with age and experience. Roberts et al. (2001) argued that the method of analysis used by Mayer et al. (1999) could only evaluate the difference between groups, as the researchers only used a cross-sectional sample rather than a measure of the same individuals' emotional intelligence over time. Therefore, developmental differences in emotional intelligence levels were not established. Mayer et al. (2001) answered several of the concerns Roberts et al. presented, but did not provide answers to the correlational test with other IQ measures, nor the lack of valid evidence that emotional intelligence is developmental.

Schaie (2001) mirrored the concerns of Roberts et al. (2001) regarding the second and third criteria in establishing intelligence. He added that, for the second criterion to be fulfilled, there was not only a need to show convergent validity of other accepted intelligences, but also to show discriminant validity of the ability-based measure of emotional intelligence with established personality constructs. A recent effort by Brackett and Mayer (2003) has provided a reasonable amount of evidence toward satisfying concerns about the second criterion being met by the *MSCEIT* as a measure of emotional intelligence. In their comparison of the *MSCEIT*, the *EQ-i*, and the Self-Report Emotional Intelligence Test *(SREIT)* (Schutte, Malouff, Hall, Haggerty, Cooper, Golden, & Dornheim, 1998), Brackett and Mayer reported a moderate distinction between the *MSCEIT* and the Big Five dimensions of personality and well-being scales. The *EQ-i* and the *SREIT* shared considerable variance with the Big Five dimensions and well-being scales. The third criterion, relevant to the development of emotional intelligence with age and experience, has yet to be longitudinally established.

Evaluation of Measures

Researchers have had over a decade to explore the emotional intelligence construct. During this time, there have been many attempts to create measures to gauge this ability, or components of this ability, for the purposes of scientific research. The emotional intelligence measures now available include measures made for magazine articles, consultant measures, as well as formal measures produced from scientific research. For the purposes of this investigation, most of the measures reviewed here have been used or reported in the academic literature. An extensive search of the organizational behavior and management literatures, as well as other related literatures, was performed in order to identify all available emotional intelligence measures that might be applicable and useful to this investigation. The search included the databases: Psych Info, ABI Inform, Science Direct, Social Sciences Abstracts (OCLC First Search), Social Sciences Citation Index (ISI Web of Science), Social Services Abstracts, Sociological Abstracts, and the general Academic Index for the university.

This extensive review of the literature revealed eleven measures that have been used to evaluate subjects' global emotional intelligence levels. Numerous measures were found that measured particular aspects or components of emotional intelligence. These measures are included in the discussions of the global scales, but are not topics of discussion because the purpose here is to evaluate possible global emotional intelligence scales for use in the present study. The fact that there are several apparently reliable and valid scales with none being defined by consensus in the academic arena as the best measure available, makes choosing one a complicated task. Compounding this decision further, the measures discussed are based on various different conceptualizations and interpretations of the emotional intelligence construct. Therefore, the purpose of this section is to discuss and evaluate each measure according to the theoretical content, reliability, validity, and applicability in form and content to this study.

Measurement Issues

Self-report vs ability measures. Of the many scales purporting to measure emotional intelligence, the majority found were self-report measures. One concern in this decision is determining which method will provide the most benefits to the present study. There are positive and negative aspects of each form, each of which should be addressed in the decision.

Self-report measures. There are several positives to using self-report measures. Such measures are less time consuming for researchers and subjects. It takes much less time for a

researcher to simply use an available self-report measure to evaluate subjects' emotional intelligence levels, than if the researcher were to devise an experiment to elicit subject responses. Also, it takes less time for a subject to answer a few questions than to participate in a lengthy experiment. Self-report measures are simpler than laboratory measures, and less dependant on specific equipment (Geher, Warner, & Brown, 2001). With a paper and pencil measure, these two tools are all that is needed to gain a response. With a laboratory experiment, subjects may be required to complete lengthy and complicated tasks, and there is much more required of the researcher. Because of the ease of use for self-report measures, it is much easier to obtain subjects for a study, and more subjects mean more reliable results.

Two common arguments against self-report measures involve the inability of subjects to respond logically and with scientific discipline. One such argument is the susceptibility of these measures to social desirability bias (Mayer & Geher, 1996; Geher et al., 2001). Subjects may answer questions in such a way as to be seen in a more positive light rather than responding truthfully and risk being perceived in a negative way (Mayer & Geher, 1996; Mayer et al., 2000a).

Another argument is that the subject's self-understanding may be skewed or inaccurate (Mayer & Geher, 1996; Mayer et al., 2000a; Brackett & Mayer, 2003). In order to be useful for their intended purpose, self-report measures rely on respondents to possess an accurate understanding of themselves and their abilities. If the subjects reporting do not have an accurate conception about themselves, then the data gathered will only represent what the subjects believe about themselves, and will not render an accurate measure of the subjects' ability (Mayer et al., 2000a). Salovey et al. (2001) argued that self-report measures can not be measures of one's capabilities in the area of emotional intelligence, only one's belief about his or her capabilities, which could be biased either positively or negatively.

In addition, there is a major controversy with regard to the argument that emotional intelligence self-report measures are measures of traits rather than ability. This controversy requires that another important decision be made concerning whether the moderator proposed in this study is an ability or trait of individuals who experience emotional labor, and whether the measure used should be a self-report or a performance-based ability measure. There have been arguments made that self-report measures should be characterized as measures of dispositional

tendancy or of a trait as opposed to measures of ability (Petrides & Furnham, 2000; Saklofske et al., 2003).

Petrides and Furnham (2000) suggested trait emotional intelligence and ability emotional intelligence are psychometrically different, and Brackett and Mayer (2003) found this to be the case. They compared two self-report measures, the *EQ-I* (Bar-On, 1997) and the *SREIT* (Schutte et al., 1998), and found them to be weakly related to the *MSCEIT* (Mayer et al., 2000a), which is an ability measure of emotional intelligence. Therefore, the self-report measures and the ability measure appear to be measuring different dimensions of the same individual.

Performance-based measures. Salovey, Mayer, and colleagues argued that performance-based scales of emotional intelligence better predict actual ability (Mayer & Geher 1996; Mayer et al., 1999; Geher et al., 2001; Salovey et al., 2001). Geher et al. (2001) found that their performance-based empathy scale (EARS) predicted the ability to be empathetic or to perceive others' emotions better than the self-report empathy scales tested in the study. Mayer and Geher (1996) stated that performance tests directly operationalize an ability more so than self-report tests.

Some have used the argument that self-report tests lack discriminant validity. Reviews of emotional intelligence measures have shown that self-report measures have fairly strong correlations with other measures of constructs such as well-being, personality, and depression scales (Davies et al., 1998; Petrides & Furnham, 2000; Salovey et al., 2001; Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Saklofske et al., 2003). In other words, the self-report measures are not purely measuring the construct of emotional intelligence, but have a great deal of overlap with other established measures of personality and well-being.

The arguments in this section establish a very good case for using a performance-based ability test for emotional intelligence as opposed to a self-report measure. Further reasons are explored in the part of this section covering the *MSCEIT*. For the present study, it is necessary to use a measure that specifically addresses only emotional intelligence competencies.

Target, consensus, and expert scoring methods. How an emotional intelligence scale is scored can affect its content validity, and result in very different measures conceptually. Specifically, these methods that impose a criterion of correctness for responses to items in a certain measurement tool can result in a measure of emotional intelligence that may differ according to perspective. This assertion will become clearer as the scoring types are reviewed.

Target scoring records the actual emotions felt as a result of circumstances described in the measure. For example, a vignette describes a certain situation where an emotional reaction is provoked. The person who actually is exposed to this situation describes his or her emotional reaction to the situation in order to establish what the correct answer would be for someone attempting to predict the emotional reaction when completing an emotional intelligence inventory.

There are problems with target scoring that can affect the accuracy of measurement. One problem is that social desirability bias can alter emotional reports (Mayer & Geher, 1996; Mayer et al., 2000). For example, when answering the question of how one feels in a situation, the target may alter his or her description to make it sound less negative. Another problem is that complex feelings experienced by the target may make analysis, or expression, of those feelings difficult, depending on the targets' ability to know and understand their own emotions (Mayer & Geher, 1996). In effect, certain aspects of the target's emotional intelligence level actually may affect the answers of those being measured with an emotional intelligence test.

Also, the self-evaluation of the target may be accurate according to that person's psychological makeup, but the prescribed emotional reaction may not necessarily be applicable to one who has a disparate composition of personal traits. Therefore, the target-scored test becomes a measure of emotional intelligence with regard to the target's perspective on emotional reactions. This variation of perspective can result in low reliability for the above-mentioned measure when applied as a general measure of emotional intelligence. Geher et al. (2001) found that target scoring and consensus scoring resulted in largely independent dimensions. Determining which dimension is desirable for a particular study is of great importance when evaluating measures to be used in that study.

Consensus scoring is based on collective assessment of specific circumstances that evoke emotional reactions. Because the judgments of many are taken into account to obtain a criterion by which to judge an answer right or wrong, the collective answer tends to be more reliable than the target criterion (Geher et al., 2001; Mayer et al., 2000a; Mayer & Geher, 1996). As such, the measure has a higher level of content validity because it is not one specific perspective of emotional aptitude being measured, but a conglomeration of perspectives lending to a more general representation of emotional aptitude (Geher et al., 2001). In fact, Geher et al. (2001)

found that consensus scoring produced results that correlated closely with other indices of emotional intelligence.

Expert scoring establishes criteria based on the judgments of experts in the area of emotions. There are benefits to expert scoring that may not be available with the other two forms. One benefit is the availability of an expanded knowledge base of emotions. Experts understand emotions better than non-expert groups. Thus, experts may be able to more accurately determine the feelings associated with described scenarios. Another benefit is that experts may interpret a scenario with more detailed analysis, allowing them to perhaps capture more information from the scenario than might be obtained by non-expert groups.

A reasonable case can be made for each scoring method as none are without merit. Mayer et al. (1999) found the three scoring methods to have fairly high correlation, meaning that inevitably some answer criteria will be more correct than others, and the right answers can be found by the various means. Mayer and Geher (1996) agreed that target and consensus criteria may agree in limited instances, but warned that more complicated scenarios can result in less agreement.

The simpler scenario may be easier to evaluate, whereas the more complicated scenario has more information to discern and analyze. Therefore, individuals are less likely to use all of the available information to make informed evaluations, where the group consensus is more likely to take all of the information and make a more comprehensive evaluation as an aggregate. Geher et al. (2001) endorsed consensus scoring as a more reliable method of setting criteria. They found consensus scoring of their measure was the most predictive of other indices measuring facets of the emotional intelligence construct.

As mentioned in the beginning of this section, the scoring method used can result in a measure of emotional intelligence that may differ according to perspective. From their findings, Geher et al. (2001) reasoned that consensus scoring took into account the emotional understanding of both actor and observer perspectives. The perspective of the actor in target scoring may be skewed by incomplete or faulty self-knowledge (Mayer & Geher, 1996), whereas the inclusion of the observer perspective in consensus scoring allows for a more comprehensive criterion to judge emotional understanding and ability. In fact, it is argued that the definition of emotional intelligence excludes target scoring by stating that an important aspect of the

emotional intelligence ability is to recognize emotions as defined by culture, an aggregately defined social environment (Mayer & Geher, 1996; Mayer et al., 1999).

Mayer et al. (2000a) endorsed consensus scoring as the best means of determining correct answers for test criteria. They argued that target scoring suffers from social desirability bias, and consensus scoring ultimately offers more reliable answers due to pooling the answers of many. They also argued that emotional signaling information is evolutionary and culturally established. Therefore, they set their criteria for the *MSCEIT* scores based on the hypothesis that "…emotional knowledge is embedded within a general, evolved, social context of communication and interaction" (Mayer, Salovey, Caruso, & Sitarenios, 2003, p. 98). In other words, our emotions have developed as humans have evolved and advanced, and our culture influences how we interpret and react with various emotions.

All of the above arguments make a very good case that the consensus of individual judgments, or consensus scoring, will provide the clearest picture of emotional understanding, and the best criteria for emotional intelligence tests. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that consensus scoring would be the most valuable type of scoring for an emotional intelligence ability test. Accordingly, the test chosen for the current study should have criteria established by consensus.

Measures of Emotional Intelligence

There are several self-report measures of emotional intelligence available. Some were created with scientific rigor and discipline to provide useful measurement tools for future research, and others were created for use in consulting activities. Regardless of the purpose of creation, these scales are reviewed in order to determine the most useful and appropriate measurement tool for the present study.

The EQ Test. Goleman's (1995) *EQ Test* has not received good reviews in the few academic articles that included it in evaluations of various emotional intelligence measures. The *EQ Test* is a self-report measure that offers ten different scenarios, and participants are supposed to respond by choosing from four alternative choices of action. The claim is that this measure can assess all aspects of the emotional intelligence construct. Davies et al. (1998) noted that the scale focuses more on two aspects, the regulation of others' emotions and the use of emotions. In their evaluation of the measure, these researchers found the *EQ Test* to have weak psychometric properties, especially its internal consistency reporting an unsatisfactory reliability of α=.18.

The Emotional Competence Inventory (ECI). The *ECI* is a self/other report, 360-degree measurement tool designed to estimate individual emotional competencies. It has been marketed primarily as a consulting tool for organizations interested in evaluating their employees' emotional intelligence. This inventory was created by Boyatzis and Goleman (1998), and is based on Goleman's (1998) emotional intelligence model and formulated from a manager's self-assessment questionnaire created by Boyatzis (1991), which estimated performance competencies of managers.

Boyatzis et al. (2000) described emotional intelligence as a "convenient phrase" to describe competencies in which people may demonstrate their ability to use emotions toward certain social and professional ends. The authors took a more extensive view of the concept than Salovey and Mayer (1990). The theoretical framework behind the *ECI* attempts to link personality and performance within this integrated, non-cognitive concept of emotional intelligence. In other words, emotional intelligence is a multidimensional construct, and the focal point of a number of competency clusters that describe how one's personality serves to achieve successful performance outcomes.

Several academics, including Mayer et al. (2000b) and Hedlund and Sternberg (2000), identified some critical flaws with this view of emotional intelligence. They expressed the concern that the inclusion of so many aspects of personality under that label of emotional intelligence expands the concept well beyond acceptable limits. In addition, there is concern that the 360-degree approach cannot provide an adequate measure of one's emotional intelligence, because it depends on the perceptions others have about a target. These perceptions are not conclusions resulting from a comprehensive knowledge of the target in question, but simply glimpses of how the target demonstrates his or her emotional intelligence level. As yet, there has been little research to allay these concerns and show the *ECI* to be an acceptable scientific tool to measure emotional intelligence.

The *ECI* technical manual (Sala, 2002) shows some evidence of validity, but provides little evidence after the scale was restructured. The measure of reliability provided was not found using scientifically rigorous methodology. The sample was n=20 and the retest was performed after 7 months. Therefore, the report that the test-retest reliability was within acceptable limits is a questionable conclusion. With regard to convergent validity, a comparison of the *ECI* to the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator *(MBTI)* (Myers, 1962) resulted in moderate to strong correlations

(Sala, 2002). This gives reason to be concerned about considerable overlap of the *ECI* scales with already established measures of personality.

A study of inter-competency correlations resulted in over 50 between-competency correlations greater than .70. Statistically, using these competency scales in the same measure will result in multicollinearity problems. Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) warned that any correlation of subscales higher than .70 should be carefully scrutinized before using the correlated subscales together in an analysis. Sala (2002) reported in the technical manual that the scale was restructured and trimmed in order to eliminate all inter-competency correlations above .60. Items also were evaluated in order to determine whether they would be good candidates for reverse-scoring. Also, a confirmatory factor analysis was performed in order to evaluate and adjust the structure of the *ECI*. These results were not published in the technical manual.

There is some reference to the *ECI* in the academic literature, but most of the references are criticisms of the theoretical structure on which the *ECI* was built. An extensive review of the empirical literature has not revealed any academic studies that used the *ECI* in the measurement of emotional intelligence. In light of the lack of acceptance of this measure among the experts in this field, as well as the limited evidence of validity and reliability, the *ECI* is not a good measure for the present study.

The EQ Map. The *EQ Map* is primarily a consulting tool sold by Q Metrics. The claim is that it measures emotional intelligence, but more by an inventory of certain social and life skills held by the subject. The *EQ Map* technical manual stated that emotional intelligence is "…the ability to sense, understand, and effectively apply the power and acumen of emotions as a source of human energy, information, creativity, connection and influence" (Orioli et al., 2000, p. 4). The *EQ Map* is comprised of five dimensions: current environment, emotional literacy, EQ competencies, EQ values and attitudes, and EQ Outcomes (Orioli et al., 2000). These dimensions include assessments of personal characteristics such as creativity, trust, and life satisfaction.

Upon a cursory review of the scale itself, it could be argued that the measure includes an exorbitant amount of personal qualities and adaptive attributes that separate it from being true to the theoretical roots of the emotional intelligence construct defined in the academic literature (Mayer et al., 2000b). Because of the nature of this measurement device and the scientific criticisms of the theoretical reasoning from which it was created, it is safe to conclude that the *EQ Map* is not a measure to be used for scientific research in the academic arena.

The Emotional Intelligence Inventory (EII). Tapia (2001) based this scale on the model developed by Salovey and Mayer (1990; 1997). The scale also used items from a scale of emotional intelligence created by Acker, Baggett, Davis, Kuhajda, Weaver-Stern, Sutarso, and Tapia (1996) that was based on Goleman's (1995) book. Tapia (2001) began with a total of 45 items purported to represent four areas of emotional intelligence. The subdimensions of these four areas appear to incorporate both of sources' models. These subdimensions include: (1) Perception, appraisal and expression of emotion; (2) Emotional facilitation of thinking; (3) Understanding and analyzing emotions, employing emotional knowledge; (4) Reflective regulation of emotion (Tapia, 2001).

The scale was administered to high school students in a Mexican private school. The data revealed an acceptable internal consistency reliability (α=0.82). However, there were eight items with item-to-total correlations below .20. The authors deleted items one at a time and deleted a total of four items. They kept the other four items with item-to-total correlations below .20 because they did not cause the α and variance to change significantly. After a factor analysis with a varimax rotation, a four-factor structure accounting for 35.5% of the variance was revealed. The authors claim content validity, and acceptable internal consistency, and test-retest reliability.

Tapia (2001) took an interesting slant in creating this scale, as two different models of emotional intelligence were used to create items. The analysis of those items and the resulting final scale is questionable. First, it was created and tested using high school students from Mexico as subjects. The age of the subjects and the fact that there were no other subjects used limits generalizability. Second, the factor analysis performed was not according to theory. The authors should have performed an oblique rotation to start with as the subcomponents of emotional intelligence are believed to be dependant on one another, and thus correlated (Petrides & Furnham, 2000).

Third, the items with item-to-total correlations below .20 should not have been retained as the excepted minimum correlation for such items is greater or equal to .40. Nineteen of these items were below the minimum correlation. The fact that four items with item-to-total correlations below .20 were retained simply because the reliability estimate and variance did not change significantly when they were removed, demonstrates a lack of rigorous statistical method, which detracts from the credibility of the scale. Overall, this scale does not appear to be useful

for the present study. Along with the reasons presented above, it has not been tested and does not appear to have a stable factor structure.

The Wong and Law 16-item EI measure. The 16-item measure created by Wong and Law (2002) is another attempt to create a psychometrically sound self-report measure for use in organizational research. The scale is based on the model developed by Salovey and Mayer (1990; 1997). MBA and undergraduate students in Hong Kong (n=120) generated items, after the concept of emotional intelligence was explained to them using Salovey and Mayer's (1990; 1997) model. The authors then extracted usable items and constructed a 36-item measure.

Data were collected from two separate samples for further analysis. An exploratory factor analysis with varimax rotation was performed on the 36-item measure, and eight factors with acceptable eigenvalues (i.e., greater than 1.0) were revealed. The first four factors with the largest eigenvalues were considered representative of the four dimensions of the model. A majority of the items for each factor had loadings over .50. The authors reasoned that choosing the first four items of each factor (i.e., all with loadings over .50) would yield a psychometrically and theoretically sound scale with only 16 items. A second factor analysis resulted in a clear four-factor structure for the 16-item scale. The internal consistency reliability of the four subscales of the structure ranged from .83 to .90.

Two samples of undergraduate students were used to perform confirmatory factor analyses. Both analyses concluded that the data fit the model reasonably well. The authors concluded they had achieved the proposed scale and attempted to test convergent and discriminant validity. The method of testing they used was not totally thorough as they only used parts of the comparison scales in order to avoid a long questionnaire. For example, only six items from each personality dimension were chosen from the Big Five scale, and only five items from each of Bar-On's four dimensions of emotional intelligence were used to establish validity. The authors reported that the comparisons with these scales showed evidence that the 16-item emotional intelligence measure had acceptable convergent, discriminant, and incremental validity, and that it should be used in future studies.

There are several problems with this scale that give reason to reject its use in the present study. First, some of the items are questionable with regard to content validity. Items such as "I am a self-motivated person" and "I always set goals for myself and then try to achieve them" are used in the measure to evaluate the use of emotion dimension. However, these items seem to fit

better contextually to motivation as opposed to any realm of emotion. Second, the manipulation of scales, including the new emotional intelligence scale as well as the scales to which it was being compared for validity, conveys the impression that the statistical methodology used was not as rigorous as it should be when attempting to establish a measure for use in scientific research. Finally, this is the first study in which the scale was used, and there does not appear to be any other studies that have attempted to test it. Because of these issues, this scale will not be used in the present study.

Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i). Bar-On (1997) designed this self-report measure to assess emotional as well as social intelligence. The *EQ-i* is a 133-item measure with 5 composite scales encompassing 15 subscales. The 5 composite scales are titled: intrapersonal EQ, interpersonal EQ, stress management EQ, adaptability EQ, and general mood EQ. Upon review of the 15 subscales, it is most evident that this measure is not centrally focused on the emotional intelligence construct, but more equally divided between emotional intelligence, social intelligence, and peripheral facilitators of the two intelligences. For example, there are several subscales that pertain to emotional intelligence such as emotional self-awareness and empathy, and there are several that are clearly social intelligence components, such as social responsibility. In addition, Bar-On (2000) pointed out that the subscales for optimism and happiness are considered by the literature as facilitators of emotional and social intelligence, rather than actual components.

Bar-On (2000) analyzed interscale correlations and found a great deal of overlap. Interestingly, the author did not express any concern over the high correlations, but explained that the overlap is due to one subscale being perhaps causal to the other. For example, there was a correlation of .80 between the empathy and social responsibility scales. Bar-On explained that the reason for this may be that one's socially responsible actions could depend upon one's level of empathy. The question of whether the content of two scales overlaps considerably is addressed in a later factor analysis, yet other high correlations were not so clearly addressed. Statistically, using both of these subscales could create multicollinearity problems. Tabachnick and Fidell (1996) indicated that it is questionable to use correlated subscales reflecting a correlation higher than .70. Bar-On found several interscale correlations above .70. Internal consistency of subscales and overall was acceptable. Subscale internal consistency reliabilities ranged from .69 to .86, and the overall average of the survey was .76.

Factor analysis of the *EQ-i* was performed to examine the factor structure and assess its theoretical relevance. Bar-On first performed an exploratory analysis and found a 13-factor structure. The original 15 factors in the measure did not survive intact. In fact, items from several scales were consolidated under one or several other factors. A confirmatory factor analysis resulted in a 10-factor structure. Problematic subscales were excluded from this analysis, but they were later added back to the measure. Bar-On (2000) explained that these problematic subscales are not actual components of emotional or social intelligence, but should be included in the *EQ-i* because they are important correlates and facilitators of the constructs.

The author insisted that the *EQ-i* only measures components of social and emotional intelligence and not personality factors or cognitive ability (Bar-On, 2000). Extensive analyses of the *EQ-i* were performed in order to validate the measure. An analysis of divergent validity showed support for the assertion that the *EQ-i* is not a measure of cognitive ability (Derksen, Kramer & Katzko, 2002; Bar-on, 2000). Bar-On (2000) reported results of several articles comparing the *EQ-i* to the Wechsler Adult Intelligence Scale (*WAIS*; Wechsler, 1958) and the General Ability Measure for Adults (*GAMA*; Naglieri & Bardos, 1997). Results showed weak correlations of .12 and .08, respectively.

The assertion that the *EQ-i* is not a measure of personality factors was shown to be questionable at best. Substantial shared variance was found between the *EQ-i* and certain measures of personality. The *EQ-i* total score had a correlation of .72 with emotional stability, Factor C of the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (*16PF*) (Cattell, Eber, & Tatsuoka, 1970). Bar-On (2000) reported other substantial shared variances between the subscales and personality measures from an extensive collection of articles. For instance, the self-regard subscale was highly correlated with emotional stability, Factor C of the *16PF* questionnaire (.64). The assertiveness subscale was highly correlated with risk tolerance, Factor H of the *16PF* (.54). The interpersonal relationship subscale was highly correlated with the Personality Assessment Inventory (*PAI*) Warmth Scale (Morey, 1991) (.73). The happiness subscale was highly correlated (.61) with extraversion, Factor E of the NEO Five Factor Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1991). The correlations reported by Bar-On (2000) were not addressed as problematic in that the EQ-i is measuring personality factors, in fact, the correlations were viewed as positive in that the Bar-On model measures personal and social abilities.

There are several experts who disagree with this assertion that the *EQ-i* is not, at least in part, a personality measure. Taylor and Bagby (2000) regarded the adaptability, stress, and mood factors as outcomes of the emotional intelligence construct, as opposed to actual components. McCrae (2000) compared the content of Costa and McCrae's NEO Personality Inventory to Bar-On's (1997) *EQ-i* and found a great deal of similarity between the personality factors and the *EQ-i* subscales. For example, McCrae found great similarity between the *EQ-i* subscales and the *NEO*, interpersonal relationships and empathy and Agreeableness. He also related the *EQ-i* subscales, assertiveness, and optimism with Extraversion. Overall, he was able to fit 14 of the 15 *EQ-i* subscales under one of the five personality factors. Brackett and Mayer (2003) argued that the *EQ-i* is not easily distinguishable from the *NEO* Five Factor Inventory. They found a .75 correlation between the two measures. Newsome, Day, and Catano (2000) also found high multicollinearity among the *EQ-i* subscales and the *16PF* factors. In a review of the empirical literature, Roberts et al. (2001) concluded that the *EQ-i* is "nothing but a proxy measure of a composite of Big Five personality constructs" (p. 201).

There are several reasons why the *EQ-i* is not useful for the present study. First, Bar-On's (1997) model does not follow the theoretical structure of Salovey and Mayer's (1990) model of the emotional intelligence construct, which is endorsed in this work. This dissertation supports the idea that emotional intelligence is comprised of a simple set of cognitive abilities used for emotional perception, understanding, management, and facilitation. In fact, Salovey and Mayer (1997) explained that certain interpretations of emotional intelligence can be misleading especially if cognition is not taken into account.

Salovey and Mayer (1997) warned, "Definitions of emotional intelligence should in some way connect emotions with intelligence if the meanings of the two terms are to be preserved" (p. 4). Alternatively, Bar-On's (2000) interpretation described emotional (and social) intelligence as "… a multifactorial array of interrelated emotional, personal, and social abilities that influence our overall ability to actively and effectively cope with daily demands and pressures" (p. 385). These capabilities are considered by Bar-On to be non-cognitive in nature. Therefore, what Salovey and Mayer (1990) described as emotional intelligence is significantly different from Bar-On's (1997) concept of the construct.

Second, the *EQ-i* is proclaimed to be a measure of emotional as well as social intelligence. The measure not only estimates the abilities and skills encompassed by emotional

intelligence, it also includes scales to estimate social ability. Taken at face value, it appears to be an acceptable measure of both constructs combined. However, the focus of this study is the emotional intelligence construct alone. Further, validity analyses provide questionable results at best with regard to its efficacy as a measure of emotional intelligence alone.

Third, correlations between this measure and established personality measures share substantial variance. Theoretical and empirical evidence support the idea that the Bar-On (1997) measure, as a self-report test, is more an inventory of personality traits as opposed to an estimate of the factors encompassed within the emotional intelligence construct (Brackett & Mayer, 2003; Hedlund & Sternberg, 2000; McCrae, 2000; Newsome et al., 2000; Bar-On, 2000). The self-report nature as well as the lack of parsimony in measuring the single construct of interest, emotional intelligence, gives further reason to decline the use of the *EQ-i* in this investigation.

Japan Emotional Quotient Inventory (J-EQ-i). This 65-item self-report measure of emotional intelligence was developed in Japan, and is based on the *EQ-i* scale created by Bar-On (1997). Basically, this scale appropriated the first two factors of Bar-On's dimensional configuration of the emotional intelligence construct, intrapersonal factors and interpersonal factors. They then added an additional dimension that essentially groups the remaining minor factors of Bar-On's scale, such as flexibility, into a third and final factor labeled situational factors.

The scale was purported to have sound reliability and criterion-related validity. Salovey et al. (2001) reviewed information on this scale, but could find no information to evaluate it based on reliability or validity. They indicated that, similar to Bar-On's (1997) scale, the *J-EQ-i* includes measures of personal attributes that are beyond the scope of the dimensions that characterize emotional intelligence. Because there is little information on this scale with regard to validity, and because of the analysis of this measure by Salovey et al. (2001), this scale is not acceptable for the present study.

Trait Meta-Mood Scale (TMMS). Although the *TMMS* was devised as a measure to index the reflective mood experience, it has been used extensively as a measure of perceived emotional intelligence (Salovey, Stroud, Woolery, & Epel, 2002; Extremera & Fernandez-Berrocal, 2002; Salovey et al., 2001; Palmer, Donaldson & Stough, 2001; Palmer, Walls, Burgess, & Stough, 2001; Salovey, Mayer, Goldman, Turvey, & Palfai, 1995). Salovey et al. (1995) concluded that the *TMMS* is a reasonable operationalization of some aspects of the

emotional intelligence construct, specifically the self-regulation dimension. They suggested that it has utility in identifying fundamental characteristics of emotionally intelligent individuals, and, therefore, it is a useful measure for studies involving emotional intelligence. For these reasons, it is important to examine this measure for the present study.

In creating the *TMMS*, Salovey et al. (1995) began with items from an earlier study by Mayer, Mamberg, and Volanth (1988). They drew 48 items from that study, tested the items on 200 individuals, and factor analysis results identified a three-factor solution. The factors, from the highest loading to the lowest, were attention to feelings, clarity of feelings, and mood repair, and three scales were created from these results. The scales were further refined by eliminating items with loadings below .40, as well as items reflecting significant loadings on more than one factor. The resulting scale included 30 items. A confirmatory factor analysis was performed with a second sample (n=148), and results indicated that the three-factor model fit the data well. A study of convergent validity showed that the *TMMS* appeared to not only be closely related to similar existing scales, but also appeared to efficiently represent several existing scales, while showing evidence of divergent validity among measure subscales. Full-scale internal consistency reliability was acceptable (α=.82), and the subscales had similarly high internal consistency reliability estimates with low intercorrelations (Salovey et al., 2001).

As mentioned earlier, several studies have used the *TMMS* as a measure of emotional intelligence or to measure components of the construct. Extremera and Fernandez-Berrocal (2002) used the *TMMS* to measure interpersonal emotional intelligence. Palmer et al. (2002) used the *TMMS* to measure subjects' ability to regulate and manage emotions. Salovey et al. (2002) used the scale to measure perceived emotional intelligence in relationship to stress reactivity. Palmer et al. (2001) used the *TMMS* as a measure of ability to manage emotions in oneself and others. All of these studies listed as a limitation to their conclusions the fact that the *TMMS* is a self-report measure, and that there is a need to explore emotional intelligence research using a performance-based scale to measure this collection of abilities.

The *TMMS* does not measure all of the abilities and skills encompassed by the emotional intelligence construct. The scale appears to be a useful tool in the analysis of individuals' ability to monitor and regulate their individual emotions and mood, but it does not provide measurement of individuals' ability to monitor and regulate the emotions of others or to use emotions toward

an end. Also, the fact that it is a self-report measure limits it as an effective measure of one's abilities in the realm of emotional intelligence. Therefore, it is not useful to the present study.

Self-Report Emotional Intelligence Test (SREIT). Schutte et al. (1998) created this scale because of the need for a brief, theoretically-sound, self-report measure of emotional intelligence. The authors based their original composition on the models by Salovey and Mayer (1990; 1997). After creating a pool of 62 items representing aspects of the relevant construct, the authors used expert evaluation to establish face validity and readability of the scale. A pilot test was performed in order to study the factor structure of the scale. The factor analysis resulted in what appeared to be a general factor of emotional intelligence with 3 other minor factors. The other 3 factors were discarded because they were not recognized by the authors to be conceptually distinct from the items in factor 1.

The 33 items that loaded on the first factor were determined generally proportionate to Salovey and Mayer's (1997) model and to fit the model relatively well. Items of the first factor were reported to parsimoniously represent model catagories including: appraisal and expression of emotion, regulation of emotion, and utilization of emotion. The authors concluded that this scale measured a homogeneous construct of emotional intelligence. The first internal consistency reliability estimate was α=.90, with a cross-check of the measure in a second study resulting in α=.87. Another study resulted in a test-retest reliability over two weeks of α=.78.

Schutte et al. (1998) tested predictive ability of the scale by testing it among students and comparing their emotional intelligence scores with their cumulative grade point averages. Results showed predictive validity of cumulative grade point average. Scores on the scale given in the first part of the academic year were found to significantly predict students' grade point averages at the end of the year.

The authors tested discriminant validity with SAT scores and the big five personality dimensions measured by the NEO Personality Inventory (Costa & McCrae, 1991). Scores on the SAT and scores on the Schutte et al. scale were not related (r=-.06). The scale was not correlated with four of the big five dimensions of personality. However, higher emotional intelligence scores were significantly related to greater openness to experience (r =.54). The authors noted that redundancy is not an issue as the correlation is not unacceptably high. However, when Brackett and Mayer (2003) compared the *SREIT*, they found that it was less separable from personality constructs and psychological well-being measures than the *MSCEIT*.

Reviews and evaluations of the *SREIT* have been mixed. Arguments for the scale being a useful tool in research have cited the brevity of the scale as well as the reliability and validity evidence (Schutte & Malouff, 1999; Abraham, 1999; 2000). Salovey et al. (2001) acknowledged the above-mentioned positive characteristics of the scale, but contended that the scale is limited because only 3 out of the 33 items are negatively keyed.

Petrides and Furnham (2000) conducted a rigorous step-by-step statistical analysis on the *SREIT* and raised many concerns. The primary concern they mentioned is that Schutte et al. (1998) dropped the last three factors because they were unable to interpret them. Several issues were raised with regard to this concern. First of all, there is a minimal amount of total variance explained by the first and only factor (i.e., 17.4%). Second, the operation performed in factor analysis was a-theoretical. Petrides and Furnham (2000) pointed out that it is reasonable to assume that the three subdomains are interrelated and not independent. They stated, for example, that appraisal and regulation of emotions are not totally separate actions, but one depends on the other in order to take place. Therefore, the varimax, orthogonal rotation was an inappropriate statistical method, because it does not allow factors to be correlated.

Third, they argued that the three conceptually distinct subdomains that Schutte et al. (1998) claimed the scale represented were not demonstrated by their analysis in creating the scale. Petrides and Furnham (2000) rationalized that if the scale represented the three domains that were specified, then clear factors would have emerged from the analysis. Finally, they acknowledged that the high reliability coefficient, α=.90, indicated that something is measured, but because of the problems they listed, as well as the fact that there are only three items keyed in the opposite direction, it is hard to determine exactly what is measured.

After pointing out these valid concerns, Petrides and Furnham (2000) performed statistical analyses on the scale to more clearly define what it measures. They performed a confirmatory factor analysis first, in order to determine if the scale was in fact unifactorial. The resulting analysis showed that the data did not fit the proposed one-factor model. The authors then performed an exploratory factor analysis to see if a better solution would result. An oblique rotation did not yield adequate results, so the authors resorted to varimax rotation where four clear, interpretable factors were found to account for 40.4% of the variance. The resulting factors were labeled: optimism/mood regulation, appraisal of emotions, social skills and utilization of emotions. The authors warned that data obtained with this scale should undergo factor analysis to

confirm these results, as they are unsure of the stability of their solution. Ciarrochi et al. (2002) and Saklofske et al. (2003) also have reported results confirming the four-factor solution.

The evidence thus far appears to describe the *SREIT* as a reasonably useful scale to measure self-perceived emotional intelligence. It should be noted that there are several unresolved weaknesses, including the small number of negatively keyed items, the questionable stability of the factor solution, and some evidence that give researchers reason to believe that one or more factors may too closely overlap with other established measures. Taking all of this information into consideration, one must conclude that the scale should be used with caution. However, despite the measure's self-report nature and the other concerns mentioned, the *SREIT* was considered for the present study.

The Workplace Survey of Emotional Intelligence (WSEI). Tett, Wang, Fisher, Martinez, Griebler, and Linkovich (1997) originally compiled a scale based on Salovey and Mayer's (1990) model. The researchers included not only components of the construct as described by the model, but also components that would be regarded more as applications of emotional intelligence rather than actual elements. Altogether, 10 components were garnered from Salovey and Mayer's model to create the original measure. These components include: emotion in the self (verbal and nonverbal), emotion in others (nonverbal), emotion in others (empathy), regulation of emotion in the self, regulation of emotion in others, flexible planning, creative thinking, mood redirected attention, motivating emotions.

Experts from various relevant areas, such as personality, cognitive psychology, and industrial/organizational psychology, were asked to create items for the scale. The resulting non-redundant 307 items were then given to the experts, and they were asked to sort the items into the dimensions in order to insure content validity. The resulting scales were distributed in questionnaire form along with items from a scale used to measure the tendency toward social desirability bias.

Results in their study of the survey thus far are promising but not convincing that the survey is an adequate measure of emotional intelligence as a set of traits. Their first study did not produce sufficient evidence to establish internal consistency reliability of scales. With the addition of items, the scales' reliabilities increased, which is to be expected. With regard to convergent and discriminant validity, some of the scales had uncomfortably high correlations

with the personality inventory used. Also, when social desirability was partialled out, many relationships were weakened.

A confirmatory factor analysis was performed to analyze how the data fit the model, with disappointing results. Because of the lack of fit, an exploratory factor analysis was performed. Three factors were revealed to explain 60.5% of the variance. Resulting factors were internal emotional intelligence, external emotional intelligence, and passion. Tett et al. (1997) explained that all of the original 10 components fell under these three factors. Discriminant and convergent validity for the survey is still in question at this point.

There are several limitations evident in the development and analysis of the Tett et al. (1997) scale. First, in the opinion of many involved in the trait-versus-ability controversy of emotional intelligence, the nature of the survey as a self-report measure is a limitation (Mayer & Geher 1996; Mayer et al., 1999; Mayer et al., 2000a; Petrides & Furnham, 2000; Geher et al., 2001; Salovey et al., 2001; Saklofske et al., 2003). Tett et al. addressed the theoretical controversy of emotional intelligence being regarded as a set of traits versus the construct being considered a set of abilities. They concluded that emotional intelligence has not been clearly distinguished as either, and argued that their investigation will provide prima facie evidence that the construct is more a set of traits.

Second, the survey does not capture the construct in a parsimonious manner. Tett et al. (1997) simply created items based on all of the specific components of the model set forth by Salovey and Mayer (1990). This not only includes the primary components of emotional intelligence, as described by Salovey and Mayer, but also secondary components or applications of the construct. Mayer et al. (2000b) argued that measures of extraneous components are unnecessary if they are beyond the scope of the dimensions that characterize emotional intelligence. Finally, Salovey et al. (2001) pointed out that several of the items have questionable validity. They explained that some of the items in the Tett et al. survey are prone to social desirability bias, and several items have questionable face validity.

The survey remains under development, and the authors appear to be straying from Salovey and Mayer's (1990) original model. Two new scales have been added based on the work of other scholars such as Goleman (1995; 1998). Because the scale is in development and appears fairly unstable at this point, it is not acceptable for use in the present study.

The Mayer-Salovey-Caruso Emotional Intelligence Test (MSCEIT). The *MSCEIT* has a ten-year history of development. Early attempts at an objective measure of emotional intelligence based on the Salovey and Mayer (1990) model, such as the Emotional Accuracy Research Scale (*EARS*) (Mayer & Geher, 1996), and a scale to measure affective content (Mayer, DiPaolo, & Salovey, 1990), were limited ability scales designed to measure singular components of emotional intelligence. The *MSCEIT* is a culmination of these earlier ability scales, and, as such, is based on the original and revised theory of emotional intelligence devised by Salovey and Mayer (1990; 1997).

The theory developed and expanded by Mayer, Salovey, and other like-minded researchers is cognitive in that it refers to the term emotional intelligence as a set of abilities that enables one to mentally process and use emotional information. The previous information in this literature review has provided a thorough explanation of the original theory, and how that theory has evolved. In an attempt to fully understand the benefits and shortcomings of this scale, it is reviewed from its origins as the Multi-factor Emotional Intelligence Scale (*MEIS*), to the present version, the *MSCEIT*.

In their revised theory of emotional intelligence, Mayer and Salovey (1997) divided the construct of emotional intelligence into four theoretical factors: emotional perception, emotional facilitation of thought, emotional understanding, and emotional management. The *MEIS* was Mayer et al.'s (1999) first attempt at creating an objective ability measure to estimate emotional intelligence based on theory. The authors created a set of 12 ability measures based on the four theoretical factors of emotional intelligence. The measures included tasks such as viewing faces, abstract designs, and landscapes, as well as listening to music and reading stories, in order to answer questions with regard to emotional content of the stimuli. (A more extensive description of the actual tasks and the relevant measures of specific emotional intelligence components follows in a description of the *MSCEIT*.) The *MEIS* was not only tested as a reliable and valid scale, but was also tested as an acceptable measure that can establish the measured construct as a type of intelligence.

The reliability of the *MEIS* measure was .96, with subscale reliabilities ranging from .81 to .96, thus all reflecting acceptable levels. The correlation between the *MEIS* and a measure of verbal intelligence was .36, which is well within acceptable limits of correlation between types of intelligence (Mayer et al., 1999).

An exploratory factor analysis was performed in order to verify assumptions about the factor structure of the model, and a three-factor solution resulted, revealing a hierarchical structure. The first factor was interpreted as general emotional intelligence with two secondary factors. The *MEIS* was further analyzed by oblique rotation of the factor structure. The rotation resulted in a similar three-factor solution: emotional understanding, emotional perception, and managing emotion. Because the original scale was based on a model with four theoretically distinct branches, the authors attempted to establish a four-factor model, but the fourth factor was redundant with emotional understanding (i.e., r=.87). The authors adopted the three-factor model for further research and modified the scales accordingly.

As mentioned above, Mayer et al. (1999) not only tested the psychometric properties of the *MEIS*, but they also attempted to use this scale to establish their theory of emotional intelligence as a new domain of intelligence. Citing the literature, the authors found three common features of accepted intelligence domains: (1) these domains are demonstrated as abilities; (2) they are intercorrelated and correlate among other intelligences; and (3) the level of intelligence develops with age and experience. The authors found all three features were characteristic of the emotional intelligence model as operationalized by the *MEIS*, and concluded that it does, in fact, fit in the domain of intelligence.

Evaluations of the *MEIS* have shown promising results. Ciarrochi et al. (2000) found similar psychometric results in their evaluation of the *MEIS*. The emotional perception subscale showed reliabilities very close to those of Mayer et al. (1999). The other subscales had similar or lower reliabilities in comparison. The understanding subscale had a troubling reliability issue with regard to blends tasks and progression tasks, a problem which also was revealed in a study by Lam and Kirby (2002). Ciarrochi et al.'s (2000) examination of dimensionality revealed a two-factor structure, with an overall emotional intelligence factor as the first factor and a second factor that combined the last two factors of Mayer et al.'s (1999) three-factor structure, perceiving versus understanding and managing emotions. Ciarrochi et al. (2000), as well as Lam and Kirby (2002), concluded that the *MEIS* shows promise as a distinct and useful measure of emotional intelligence, but warned it has need for further refinement and development.

Other evaluations of the *MEIS* addressed specific issues that should be clarified further. Roberts et al. (2001) performed a rigorous evaluation of the *MEIS* and found two major concerns. One concern was the lack of convergence between the scoring dimensions, consensus-

and expert-scores; r=.26. With regard to this concern, Mayer et al. (2001) suggested the lack of convergence was due to the fact that only two experts contributed to the expert-scoring dimension. They explained that this scoring dimension was only introduced as a rudimentary exploration to determine whether there could be another criterion of correctness for the test. In addition, Mayer et al. (2001) reported that their evaluation of the newer version, the *MSCEIT*, more adequately tested the scoring dimensions again. This time 21 experts contributed to the expert-scoring dimension. The intercorrelation between the two sets of scores for the *MSCEIT* was r=.98.

The other concern of Roberts et al. (2001) was the low level of reliability among the subtests, with alphas ranging from .49 to .94. Mayer et al. (2001) suggested that this concern was valid in that it is necessary to have reliable measures for general use. However, they explained that simply adding items could improve reliability. This solution would make the tasks required even more cumbersome and limiting to use. Mayer et al. (2001) reasoned that the overall test reliability was high, r=.96, and the reliabilities of the four branches of emotional intelligence measured were high, with alphas ranging from .81 to .96. High reliabilities at these levels of measurement are deemed satisfactory for the sake of test efficiency and functionality. Mayer et al. (2001) added that the *MSCEIT* has improved subtest reliabilities, with alphas ranging from .64 to .88.

The *MSCEIT* maintained most of the structure and tasks of the earlier version. It is constructed of eight subtests used to measure the four branches of emotional intelligence as dictated by Salovey and Mayer's theory (1990; 1997). The test yields an overall score of emotional intelligence as well as scores for the four branches of abilities including perception of emotion, emotional facilitation, understanding emotion, and managing emotion.

The perception of emotion is measured by the presentation of visual stimuli including graphic designs and landscapes in the Pictures tasks, and faces in the Faces tasks, which must be labeled according to the amount of emotional content. Visual stimuli are used as opposed to verbal stimuli to prevent contamination of the task. The task involves the exposure of the visual stimuli, and the participant is instructed to evaluate the stimuli based on the amount of anger, sadness, and so forth displayed in the picture. In order to further reduce the possibility of verbal contamination, the response alternatives offered are in the form of facial expressions for the pictures portion and numerical values for the faces portion.

Emotional facilitation is measured with Synesthesia tasks and Facilitation tasks. In the Synesthesia tasks, the participant equates an emotional feeling like anger with other internal experiences such as temperature. For example, the participant would be asked how a hot temperature is like anger, and he or she is given a scale of one to five from which to choose the answer, with one being not alike and five being very much alike. The Facilitations task asks respondents to determine the mood most appropriate for certain specified cognitive tasks such as writing a complaint letter.

Blends tasks and Changes tasks determine the measure of a participant's emotional understanding. Blends tasks ask the respondent to match a set of emotions with another single emotion. For example, respect and awe might be matched closely with admiration. The Changes task requires the respondent to indicate what emotion results when another emotion is greatly amplified. For example, if anger were greatly amplified, rage would be the resulting emotion.

Participants' ability to manage their and others' emotions is measured by Emotion Management tasks and Emotional Relationships tasks. The Emotion Management tasks give a scenario where one wishes to maintain or change a specified emotional state and the participant is given alternatives to choose the most appropriate course of action for the stated goal. For example, a scenario is given where the target is sad and the goal is to change the target's emotion to happiness. The respondent might choose the alternative "listen to upbeat music" in order to achieve the goal. The Emotional Relationships tasks also ask respondents to choose effective courses of action to manage the emotions of others. These scenarios refer to complex social situations and are more involved than the Emotion Management tasks scenarios.

As mentioned above, many of the concerns expressed by evaluators of the *MEIS* have been addressed in the revised version. The preliminary evaluation of the *MSCEIT*, involving a sample of over 2,000 respondents, demonstrated a marked improvement over the *MEIS*. Confirmatory factor analysis revealed several factor structures that fit the data. The one-factor structure loaded all eight *MSCEIT* subtests. The two-factor structure included an "Experiential" factor and a "Strategic" factor. Also, the four-factor structure fit the theoretical model.

One criticism of other measures is that varimax rotation was used to establish the factor structure of those measures. The problem with this type of operation, when factor analyzing the structure of emotional intelligence, is that it goes against the established theory of the construct. Petrides and Furnham (2000) argued that the defined components of emotional intelligence are

interrelated and not independent. They stated that the components of the construct depend on each other in order to take place. For example, one must have knowledge of emotions in order to use them for certain ends. Therefore, the varimax, orthogonal rotation was inappropriate. The structure of the *MSCEIT* was established using oblique, oblimin rotation, which allows for factors to be correlated.

Reliabilities were maintained and in some areas improved on the already acceptable *MEIS* levels. Total *MSCEIT* internal consistency reliability, based on consensus scoring, was .93. A test-retest reliability of the total scale reliability was .86, using a sample of 60 within a three-week period (Brackett & Mayer, 2003). The four branch reliabilities ranged from .79 to .91. Mayer et al. (2001) reported the *MSCEIT* had improved subtest reliabilities, with alphas ranging from .64 to .88. A more recent investigation by Mayer et al. (2003) showed lower, but similar, alphas for the subtest reliabilities ranging from .55 to .88. Because of these results, the authors warned that the test should be used to evaluate emotional intelligence at the total scale, area, and branch levels, but task level results should be interpreted with caution.

With regard to criterion-scoring, Mayer et al. (2003) compared reliabilities of both consensus- and expert-scoring methods. Expert-scoring was based on "correct answer" judgments of 21 expert volunteers who are members of the International Society for Research on Emotions. This was a much improved sample size over the two experts who created the expert-scoring criteria for the *MEIS*. The reliabilities of both scoring methods were very close, differing at the total, two- and four-branch levels by no more than .03. Therefore, one method has not yet demonstrated its superiority, and both are used presently in scoring responses on the *MSCEIT*.

Because of the arguments discussed in the Measurement Issues section, and based on the individual analysis of each measure, the *MSCEIT* appears to be the most appropriate measure of emotional intelligence ability. The theoretical arguments presented in this chapter are based on Salovey and Mayer's (1990; 1997) ability theory of emotional intelligence, and the *MSCEIT* is, as yet, the only ability-based measure of the total emotional intelligence concept. The *MSCEIT* analyzes responses based on consensus- and expert-scores, and both of these scoring methods have been argued to be most adequate for setting test criteria. Finally, even though the measure is relatively new, the psychometric properties of the *MSCEIT* have been found acceptable in several studies.

Emotional Intelligence Measure Chosen for this Investigation

Several of the emotional intelligence measures examined were specifically created for the purpose of consulting. Scientific and theoretical rigor did not appear to be properly applied and was not a priority in most cases. Other measures were created for academic use, but the scale creation method was questionable or the measure was simply untested. In some cases, measures were created based on theory other than the Salovey and Meyer (1990; 1997) definition of emotional intelligence. Some of these measures had a record of extensive use, but the theoretical basis of the scales invalidated their use in this study.

If circumstances were favorable, the *MSCEIT* would be the logical choice of measurement for the current investigation. However, circumstances, including time and financial constraints and sample issues, have limited this option. Even though the *MSCEIT* is theoretically the most appropriate measure of the emotional intelligence construct, its use would not be practical in the present study. The potential sources for the sample (see Chapter 4) would not have the ability to contribute employee resources toward a lengthy evaluation process. The *MSCEIT* alone takes approximately 45 to 60 minutes to complete. Also the logistics of administering the test would complicate and impede the investigation procedure. Due to the above reasons as well as the high cost of the measure, and considering that other measures are necessary to evaluate the impact of emotional intelligence on the emotional labor process, use of the *MSCEIT* would be impractical in this investigation.

The most reasonable, acceptable, and appropriate emotional intelligence measure for this study is the *SREIT*. The decision to choose this measure is based on established theory, along with the reasonable validity and reliability of the measure, as well as time constraint and cost issues. Even though this measure has all the limitations of a self-report evaluation, the benefits contribute to its favor. It is a parsimonious measure of emotional intelligence with acceptable psychometric properties, and is based on Salovey and Mayer's (1990; 1997) concept of the construct. Petrides and Furnham's (2000) evaluation of the measure, as well as more recent evaluations, have shown it to be a reasonably effective measure of one's self-perception of emotional intelligence. The warnings of a possibly unstable factor structure are considered, and an evaluation of the factor structure is included in the analysis procedure.

Emotional Labor

Background

The evolution of organizations in the United States from a production orientation to a service orientation has brought about an increase in the percentage of jobs requiring direct, face-to-face interactions with customers. The concept of emotional labor was borne out of this evolution. Ashforth and Humphrey (1995, p. 98) stated, "The experience of work is saturated with feeling." Emotion has become an entity with which organizations are forced to contend because of the proliferation of service jobs where the employee is a prominent representative of the organization having constant contact with organizational customers. Employees are emotional beings, and, as such, must be instructed by the organization to present themselves according to certain emotion rules that are dictated in keeping with the culture and values the organization aspires to present. This is especially so in service jobs where the employee-customer interaction is dynamic with uncertain outcomes (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Mann, 1997; Morris & Feldman, 1997).

There are several reasons why appropriate emotion rules must be established and followed. The manner by which employees present themselves to customers, including the emotions that employees display during interactions, will contribute to the overall perception customers formulate about the organization and the quality of the organization's products (Sutton & Rafaeli, 1988; Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Morris & Feldman, 1996; Abraham, 1998; Zapf, 2002; Diefendorff & Richard, 2003; Totterdell & Holman, 2003). This organizational representation by employees, termed as an "emotional front" by Sutton and Rafaeli (1988), serves as an organizational attribute. They explained that emotional fronts differ from organization-to-organization depending on the values and norms adopted by the organization. In turn, these organizational fronts draw customers to them or repel customers depending on the individual customer's preferences of treatment.

Hochschild (1983) stated that emotional display acts as a signal function. That is to say, emotions directed at a customer will define the status of that customer according to the organization's emotional front. This is another reason why defined emotion rules are important and should be observed. If the customer appreciates the status given by the organization through its associates, then the customer will continue to patronize that organization. Also, this perception of the organization may promote or prevent opportunities with third parties, such as

the customer's close associates (Rafaeli & Sutton, 1987; Diefendorff & Richard, 2003; Totterdell & Holman, 2003).

Theoretical Development

The information presented above illustrates how the organization's future health can be partly determined according to the overall perception of organizational customers, resulting from employee compliance with rules of emotional display. This action of compliance was termed by Hochschild (1983) as emotional labor. Hochschild's work *The Managed Heart*, defined emotional labor as "the management of feeling to create a publicly observable facial and bodily display; emotional labor is sold for a wage and therefore has exchange value" (p. 7).

Hochschild (1983) distinguished two types of emotional labor: surface acting and deep acting. Surface acting is the physical expression of an emotion that is not actually felt. An example would be the retail sales clerk who must maintain a smile and generally sociable demeanor even though his or her actual emotion may lean more toward anger, sadness, or frustration. Deep acting is more involved than just the simple curtailing of emotional expression. Hochschild described deep acting as the attempt by an organizational member to feel the actual target emotion, rather than maintaining the original felt emotion. In this situation, the sales clerk may feel sad when he/she arrives at the job, but because he or she is required to display positive emotions, the clerk may reprogram felt emotions for more job appropriate emotions. These two types of emotional labor are discussed in greater detail later in this section.

After Hochschild's (1983) seminal book, a fairly steady line of research followed to further develop the concept. As a result of this research, several conceptualizations of the construct were formulated. Ashforth and Humphrey (1993; 1995) were the first to present a notable contribution to Hochschild's work. In their conceptualization, Ashforth and Humphrey (1993) concentrated on the actual observable display of emotion as emotional labor, rather then the management of feelings, which was Hochschild's approach (Grandey, 2000). As such, their objective was to evaluate how emotional labor impacted the outcome of effective task performance (Grandey, 2000).

Ashforth and Humphrey (1993) warned that there are some dysfunctions of emotional labor that could potentially harm the organization by alienating the customer. These dysfunctions are associated with customer expectations of the service provided. One problem occurs when the organization has promoted certain expectations to be fulfilled during service interactions, and

these expectations go unmet. The other problem concerns the quality of emotional display during the service interaction, where the emotional display is perceived by the customer to be insincere. Ashforth and Humphrey (1993) also addressed employee well-being by proposing that role identification may help alleviate negative effects caused by the performance of emotional labor.

In the introduction of this research area, Hochschild (1983) and Ashforth and Humphrey (1993) treated emotional labor as a unidimensional construct (Abraham, 1998; Zapf, Vogt, Seifert, Mertini, & Isic, 1999). Equivocal findings have shown this assumption of unidimensionality to be inadequate. More recent analysis of the construct has revealed a multidimensional nature to the construct according to which the present model has been constructed.

Theoretical Components of the Emotional Labor Process

Several researchers expanded upon Hochschild's (1983) definition and approach in an attempt to develop an understanding of the multiple underlying dimensions of emotional labor. The formulation of the emotional labor process presented in this dissertation is based on an extensive review of the emotional labor literature to date. It includes primarily accepted, as well as empirically tested, theory from available academic research. Figure 1 provides a representation of the proposed process.

In an attempt to mine the rich deposit of information afforded by Hochschild's (1983) theory, Morris and Feldman (1996) proposed four dimensions of emotional labor according to defined job requirements. The first dimension is the frequency of emotional displays. Frequency in the number of emotional displays required by organizational members may increase the amount or intensity of emotional labor effects. The second dimension they listed is organizational member attentiveness to organizational rules of emotional display. Morris and Feldman identified this dimension reasoning that emotional labor effects may increase because of the duration or intensity of the emotional display required.

The third dimension is the variety of emotions that are required for expression in certain circumstances. If a variety of emotions are required of an individual, emotional labor effects are increased due to the increased mental energy needed to monitor each situation in order to determine which emotional display is required for that situation. The final dimension of emotional labor is the emotional dissonance of emotional display. Emotional dissonance is the conflict between emotion portrayals required by the organization and those emotions actually felt

by the organizational member (Hochschild, 1983; Morris & Feldman, 1996; Abraham, 1999; Grandey, 2000).

By definition, this dimension is the actual premise for some forms of emotional labor either through evocation or suppression. Viewed from either perspective, emotional dissonance occurs when the emotion required for display by the organization is not actually felt by the organization member at that time, and through the display of incongruent emotions emotional dissonance is made evident. The dimensions posed by Morris and Feldman (1996) have been appraised to have some value in the theoretical development of emotional labor, but the dimensions have not been deemed conclusive in defining the emotional labor construct.

Organizational rules of emotional display. Grandey (2000) argued that Morris and Feldman (1996) used circular reference to represent frequency, duration, and variety as dimensions of the construct. For example, she explained how Morris and Feldman defined variety of emotional labor as the variety of emotional labor actions required by the organization. In effect, they defined emotional labor as emotional labor. In her model, produced from a summary of the literature, Grandey listed Morris and Feldman's dimensions as expectations of interaction later called "job-focused emotional labor" by Brotheridge and Grandey (2002). Several researchers have considered these dimensions as antecedents or cues in the emotional regulation process (Brotheridge & Lee, 1998; Kruml & Geddes, 2000; Zapf et al., 1999; Grandey, 2000). These "job-focused emotional labor" antecedents delineate one part of the organization's rules for emotional display.

The second part of the organization's rules for emotional display is represented by organizationally prescribed emotional display which may include the rules to display positive or negative emotion, to hide negative emotion, to show empathetic concern, or all of these actions. These prescribed emotion efforts come from the information summarized by Zapf, Seifert, Schmutte, Mertini, and Holz (2001). Zapf et al. (2001) listed five aspects of emotional labor based on a review of previous theory and research. These five aspects include: (1) positive emotional display; (2) negative emotional display; (3) empathy for customer; (4) control of the interaction process; and (5) emotional dissonance. These aspects concentrate more on the abilities and effort of the employee rather than specific emotional labor characteristics of the job, as Morris and Feldman's (1996) dimensions do, and thus aid in providing a clearer picture of organizational expectations of emotional display.



Figure 1 The Emotional Labor Process

Emotional dissonance. The last aspect listed by Zapf et al. (2001) is emotional dissonance. Hochschild (1983) argued that emotional dissonance is the aspect of emotional labor that is detrimental to one's health and well-being. Many researchers have since specified emotional dissonance as a dimension of the emotional labor construct (Morris & Feldman, 1996; Abraham, 1998; Kruml & Geddes, 2000; Grandy, 2000). In addition, emotional dissonance has been empirically established as a reason for negative outcomes of emotional labor (Morris & Feldman, 1997; Abraham, 1998; Brotheridge & Lee, 1998; Pugliesi, 1999; Zapf et al., 1999, 2001; Kruml & Geddes, 2000; Erickson & Ritter, 2001; Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002). Some have reasoned these detrimental effects are due to the practice of emotional labor, when emotional dissonance exists, in which one's true self or one's sense of authenticity is threatened (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Erickson & Ritter, 2001).

It has been theoretically argued that the experience of emotional dissonance results from the employee perceiving certain display rules that dictate the employee-customer interaction, and acting against his or her true emotions to fulfill those display rules. Deep acting and surface acting are methods by which employees can modify their actual emotional state to conform to those display rules (Hochschild, 1983; Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Adelmann, 1995; Abraham, 1998; Grandey, 2000; Erickson & Ritter, 2001; Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002; Brotheridge & Lee, 2002; Zapf, 2002; Totterdell & Holman, 2003). Thus, emotional dissonance should be represented as an outcome of deep acting and surface acting.

Conversely, Grandey (2000) operationalized emotional labor with deep acting and surface acting without direct connection to emotional dissonance, noting that individual and organizational factors moderate the performance of these methods. Also, many of the aspects of emotional labor listed by Zapf et al. (2001) are executed or controlled by surface acting or deep acting, where emotional dissonance may not necessarily come into play in such actions. Therefore, the present model proposes qualified methods of surface and deep acting to represent the efforts of emotional labor both with (i.e., surface acting, active deep acting, and non-acting) and without (i.e., non-acting and passive deep acting) the presence of emotional dissonance as a result of these efforts. This connection is further explored in the next chapter.

Emotional effort operationalized. Emotional effort, specified by several researchers as a dimension of emotional labor (Kruml & Geddes, 2000; Grandy, 2000; Brotheridge &

Lee, 2002), is represented in the present model by the four methods of emotional labor: surface acting, active deep acting, non acting, and passive deep acting. This is an extension of Brotheridge and Lee's (2002) distinction of surface and deep acting as applied emotional effort. Emotional effort was clearly indicated as at least an aspect of emotional labor in Morris and Feldman's (1996) definition of emotional labor: "the effort, planning, and control needed to express organizationally desired emotion during interpersonal transactions" (p. 987).

In this article, Morris and Feldman (1996) discussed the idea that emotional display required a certain amount of effort, regardless of the existence of emotional dissonance, and explained that labor or effort occurs when the organizational representative attempts to translate their feelings into organizationally required displays. For example, a retail clothing sales person may enjoy working with customers in putting outfits together. Being on the job may make the sales person happy, but he or she will not continuously walk around the store with a smile and enthusiastic tone of voice. The sales person may perform or work to exhibit these displays during customer interactions in order to represent their good feelings toward the customer and his or her job.

Effort also may be required if the sales person has had negative experiences with a particular customer and must deal with them in subsequent interactions. Even if the sales person is in a positive emotional state, his/her attitude toward the customer will influence the emotional display. In addition, Kruml and Geddes (2000) explained that emotional effort exists, regardless of the existence of dissonance, such as when the customer exhibits negative feelings. In this situation, emotional contagion may come into play to test the sales person's present positive emotional state and, in turn, require more effort in maintaining his or her positive emotional display.

Surface acting. Surface acting was described by Hochschild (1983) as disguising what we feel, or visually pretending to feel what we do not. Zapf et al. (2002) suggested that surface acting is the physical attempt to conceal emotional dissonance. They described surface acting as the employee's attempt to manage physical or visible displays of emotion. There are several drawbacks to surface acting. Ashforth and Humphrey (1993) suggested that it is the lesser of the two forms with regard to concern for one's customer. Surface acting often may be interpreted as superficial and insincere (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Zapf,

2002). Such customer perceptions not only are detrimental to the organization-customer relationship, but also to the health of the portrayer of the insincere emotion (Morris & Feldman, 1997; Abraham, 1998; Pugliesi, 1999; Zapf et al., 1999; Grandey, 2000; Zapf et al., 2001; Erickson & Ritter, 2001; Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002; Totterdell & Holman, 2003). Accordingly, the proposed model indicates surface acting as a type of emotional effort out of which emotional dissonance arises as a stressor in the emotional labor process.

Deep acting. Hochschild (1983) considered deep acting a step above surface acting in that the employee not only attempts to fool the customer with his or her emotional display, but also considers it an attempt at self-deception. The employee not only controls his or her physical display, but endeavors to modify internal thoughts and feelings (i.e., emotional dissonance) in order to fulfill expectations of emotional display (Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002). Hochschild (1983) discussed two catagories of deep acting, passive and active. *Passive deep acting* simply means that the employee already feels the desired emotion, so there is no need for cognitive manipulation of emotion. Passive deep acting is thus considered to be a direct result of perceived behavioral expectations with no resulting emotional dissonance.

Active deep acting is the second category. This form of deep acting is termed active because some amount of emotional management is necessary due to the emotional dissonance felt as the interaction occurs. It requires cognitive manipulation of feelings in order to fulfill emotional labor requirements.

Totterdell and Holman (2003) explained two techniques for active deep acting. The first is attention deployment whereby one changes his or her focus of thought. For example, a retail sales clerk who is required to display positive emotions such as happiness may think of his or her impending graduation from college in order to change his or her emotional status after being angered by receiving a speeding ticket on the way to work. The other technique, cognitive change, is the attempt to reappraise a situation in order to adopt a perspective that will induce the appropriate emotion. For example, a sales person who is confronted with a customer's anger at receiving broken merchandise might react with less defensiveness and more sympathy and helpfulness if he or she were to consider the interaction from the customer's point of view. Less emotional dissonance is felt in this interaction due to the active deep acting employed.

Summary

The information contained in this chapter summarizes the extent of the literature to date on emotional intelligence and the constructs and characteristics of the emotional labor process. In the past twenty years, great progress has been made toward understanding how the emotional labor process plays out in employee-customer interactions. The proposed model in Figure 1 is a direct application of these significant efforts. The next chapter applies emotional intelligence to a portion of this model, and details how it moderates relationships between efforts of the proposed emotional labor process and outcomes.

CHAPTER 3

DISSERTATION MODEL AND HYPOTHESES

Chapter Overview

In this chapter, background theory is presented to explain the impetus for this study. Theoretical links are established in the beginning to illustrate the role played by emotional intelligence in the emotional labor process. Theoretical and empirical evidence is introduced to establish the proposed connection of emotional intelligence as a moderator in the relationship between emotional labor efforts and certain outcomes of emotional labor. The conceptual model depicting these relationships is presented, and related hypotheses are offered as each point of impact in the process is explained.

Background: Building Theoretical links

Ashforth and Humphrey (1995) argued that emotion is inseparable from the organizational work setting, and that this is especially so in the customer service setting. There are many opportunities for emotion to play a significant role in customer service interactions. Because of the dynamic quality of service interactions, the organization favors the more rational approach of preprogramming work setting interactions. Norms of rationality are established to dictate the allowable and appropriate levels and forms of emotional display. Any emotional display that goes beyond the determined limit of social norms or is not appropriate to the prescribed situation is deemed unacceptable.

Ashforth and Humphrey (1995) juxtaposed the characteristics of rationality in interaction processes with the characteristics of emotionality. This description of rationality poses the emotional being, an organizational member, as one who fills a defined organizational role. The individual's level of performance takes precedence over satisfaction of the individual upon filling this role. The rational employee focuses on understanding and is cognizant of the emotions he or she may feel and of how to deal with those feelings in a socially acceptable manner. This description of the rational organization member given by Ashforth and Humphrey offers many characteristics similar in nature to the emotionally intelligent individual.

Many factors play a role in the regulation of emotional display. Organizational identity sets boundaries for emotional expression. The position of organization members

defines their organizational identity and the organizational expectations of their actions. Members are responsible to be aware of the expectations placed upon them, and this awareness is used to guide them in regulating personal actions in order to remain within the organizationally determined limits of emotional expression.

Emotionally intelligent individuals are aware of how their actions are received in the organizational setting. This information is obtained from formal appraisals administered by one's superiors, as well as through one's astute observance of the informal feedback given by the individuals with whom the he or she interacts. Emotionally intelligent individuals maintain an awareness of the way they behave, and of the labels that are placed upon them (Averill, 1980). In this way, emotionally intelligent individuals are better equipped to maintain their responsibilities of emotional display, and avoid undesirable feedback or other undesirable outcomes.

As described previously, emotional intelligence is the cognitive, rational approach to the decision to display or suppress emotions. Emotional labor is the act of suppressing or displaying certain emotions. Therefore, according to the definition of emotional labor, emotional intelligence is essential to the quality performance of emotional labor. The importance of emotional intelligence, in this relationship, is further revealed as the dimensions and outcomes of emotional labor are discussed in further detail.

According to Baron and Kenny (1986), a moderator "affects the direction and/or strength of the relation between an independent or predictor variable and a dependent or criterion variable" (p. 1174). Further, they stated that a moderator variable is useful in clarifying relationships that have been found weak or inconclusive between predictor and dependent variables. There has been a great deal of conflicting and inconclusive empirical results in the area of emotional labor research. Also, it is a relatively young area of research, and, as such, has many questions yet to be answered. Jordan, Ashkanasy, and Hartel (2002) proposed emotional intelligence has great potential in the analysis of work related behavior and affect issues.

Grandey (2000) acknowledged a possible moderating effect of individual characteristics, such as emotional intelligence, in relationships between emotional labor efforts and outcomes. Lam and Kirby (2002) indicated that future research may seek to uncover the impact of emotional intelligence on interaction processes and productivity

influences of individuals. There has been little research on emotional intelligence as a moderator variable (Douglas et al., 2004), and much less research on this topic specifically in the area of emotional labor. Schaubroeck and Jones (2000) proposed, and found support for, emotional adaptability as a moderator of the relationship between emotional labor and physical outcomes. Slaski and Cartwright (2002) found evidence to suggest that emotional intelligence may serve as a moderator in the stressor-strain relationship. They discovered that managers with higher emotional intelligence scores suffered from fewer stress outcomes and had overall better health and well-being, and they also demonstrated better performance as managers.

Research to date only indirectly has brought emotional intelligence into the investigation of the emotional labor process. There has been a small amount of indirect evidence presented to show a possible moderating effect of emotional intelligence in the relationship between emotional labor and its outcomes. Before the possible moderating effects are discussed with regard to outcomes, the actual application of the emotional intelligence dimensions to the emotional labor process must be discussed in order to illustrate how emotional intelligence promotes quality emotional labor.

Emotional Intelligence Dimensions and the Emotional Labor Process

Douglas et al. (2004) regarded the emotional intelligence construct as a form of social effectiveness, a set of skills enabling one to "read and understand others, and utilize such knowledge to influence others in the pursuit of individual and/or organizational goals" (sic, p. 2). Emotional intelligence allows employees to not only perceive and regulate their emotions (Lam & Kirby, 2002), but the emotions of customers as well. Thus, employees are able to achieve a positive outcome from the interaction, as well as building a rapport and level of trust to serve them in future interactions with these customers (Diefendorff & Richard, 2003; Prati, Douglas, Ferris, Ammeter, & Buckley, 2003a). The emotional labor process dictates the cognitive management of emotion through actions of evocation and suppression, in order to achieve organizational goals (Zapf et al., 1999; Erickson & Ritter, 2001; Zapf et al., 2001). As such, the distinct dimensions of emotional intelligence, as a set of social effectiveness skills within the realm of emotion, serves to facilitate emotional labor in the management of employee-customer interactions toward that end. The following

divisions in this section will elaborate further on the distinct abilities of emotional intelligence and how they might influence the emotional labor process.

Perception/expression of emotion. Mayer and Salovey (1997) identified this dimension as the most elementary dimension of emotional intelligence. It is elementary in that it is the basic building block from which the other dimensions expand within the framework of emotional intelligence. Individuals must have the ability to accurately perceive the emotions of themselves and others in order to facilitate accurate expression of emotions and understand others' expressions of emotion. With regard to emotional labor, this ability to accurately perceive and express emotions facilitates the effective performance of emotional labor duties (Lam & Kirby, 2002). According to Zapf et al. (2001), this ability is a principal aspect of emotion work.

The emotion perception skill is especially useful when employing active deep acting techniques. For instance, the accurate perception of others' emotions is especially useful in the technique of cognitive change used in deep acting (Grandey, 2000). Individuals must be able to discern the emotions of customers in order to address the cause of those emotions, whether the cause is a positive or negative factor, and capitalize on that understanding to promote future relations (Zapf et al.,1999; Zapf, 2002). In other words, if employees are able to discern the basis for customers' negative feelings, they may be able to empathize with the customers' situation and employ the accurate expression of appropriate emotion. In this way, the customers' emotions may be neutralized or perhaps transformed (Zapf et al., 2001; Diefendorff & Richard, 2003).

Additionally, the benefit is not only to the customers and the organizational bottom line, but also to the employees. This empathetic involvement serves to reduce the employees' emotional dissonance, allowing a more genuine understanding for their customers by which they can act with more emotive effort resulting in more effective customer service performance (Kruml & Geddes, 2000). Also, any physical or psychological stress felt by employees as a result of emotional dissonance may be reduced when such a customer situation is addressed in this way.

Further, evidence has shown that the accurate perception of one's emotions may moderate the other technique of deep acting, emotion deployment (Ciarrochi et al., 2000). There is some indication that one's induction of positive thoughts may serve to reduce

negative emotions, and that this action may be moderated by one's emotional intelligence (Totterdell & Holman, 2003). However, a significant amount of evidence has not shown this influence as yet. In any event, it is reasonable to assume that the accurate perception of one's own emotional state in an interaction will give one a basis from which to judge whether the emotion is appropriate according to organizational rules, and endeavor to alter or display the emotion accordingly.

Emotional facilitation of thought. This dimension of emotional intelligence builds on the dimension of emotional perception to create a reference by which one's emotions may be guided or utilized to alter emotional states (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). For instance, in the above example, the employees, through accurate perceptions of their own and the customers' emotions, are able to guide their emotional displays according to priority of goals. The most important goal here is to ensure the customers' positive perception of the organization over and above the employees' personal needs or wishes. Abraham (1999) and George (2000) suggested that emotional intelligence facilitates the prioritization of goals. In addition, employees may be able to modify their perceptions of the situation in order to facilitate an appropriate emotional response (Grandey, 2000; Totterdell & Holman, 2003).

Jordan et al. (2002) asserted that those with a high measure of emotional intelligence, in reference to this dimension, engage in "emotional assimilation," whereby they are able to choose from a range of perspectives in order to facilitate satisfactory outcomes for the organization as well as satisfying personal needs. Those without an adequate level of emotional intelligence in relation to this dimension may be unable to disengage from deleterious emotional responses in order to appropriate a modified situational perception that would be more advantageous to the situation (Ciarrochi et al., 2000).

Resulting strains from emotional labor efforts also may be reduced because of one's ability to use emotional facilitation of thought. The level of skill in this area may serve to buffer the negative effects of emotional dissonance, for example. Through this skill, one can guide and thus enjoy the perception of control over the employee-customer situations. As such, it enables employees to drive the emotional exchange in the interaction (Mann, 1997). According to stress research, this feeling of control over situational events produces a buffering effect between emotional labor stress, such as emotional dissonance, and resulting strains (Morris & Feldman, 1996; Zapf, 2002). Also, emotionally intelligent individuals can

use the various perspectives at their disposal to reduce actual felt or experienced dissonance. Viewing a situation from the customer perspective increases concern for a satisfactory solution, and decreases emotional dissonance by taking oneself out of the picture to focus on the customer.

In addition, individuals' ability in this area can facilitate an overall focus on organizational goals as a priority in the performance of emotional labor acts. Ashforth and Humphrey (1993) suggested that an orientation of emotional labor toward organizational well-being will benefit employees through reduced emotional dissonance. Due to the fact that employees are dedicated to the organization's well-being, their acts of emotional labor should be in line with that focus. In this case, the act of emotional labor is a means by which they fulfill a purpose rather than acting against a personal orientation of purpose, such as the need to display felt emotions. Accordingly, emotional labor acts as a means of self-satisfaction rather than a stressor (Schaubrock & Jones, 2000). In fact, Abraham (1998) suggested emotional facilitation of thinking programmed toward an organizational orientation may be a buffer to reduce job dissatisfaction, which has been shown to be an effect of work-related emotional dissonance.

Understanding emotion. The third highest level in the framework of emotional intelligence dimensions includes skills such as analyzing and understanding emotional antecedents, formulations, and outcomes (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). With regard to emotional labor aspects, deep acting, definitionally infers that one have a certain measure of this dimension of emotional intelligence. After all, for individuals to be able to use emotion to alter an emotional state, they must understand their present emotional state and how it evolved, and which emotion might best be employed to alter the current emotional state.

Along with perception, the understanding of emotion is useful to employees in working toward organizational goals, such as engendering customer rapport. The quality of surface and deep acting and respective outcomes of those emotional labor methods are dependent upon individuals' level of emotional knowledge and understanding. Prati et al. (2003a; 2003b) explained prior research indicating that one's emotional display may positively or negatively influence others' emotional states. As well, this influence can motivate individuals to act in accord with the desire of the person providing that emotional influence. Goffman (1969) referred to acts of presentational influence, similar to emotional

influence, as "control moves." Rafaeli and Sutton (1987) gave the example of tip earners, such as wait staff, to illustrate this influence. They indicated from previous research that the use of positive emotional display earns reward. They also asserted that the organization can benefit from the effective use of emotional display because of the efficacy of emotional display to engage and establish relationships with customers. Therefore, one's understanding of emotion is crucial to the successful employment of emotional labor practices (Grandey, 2000).

In addition to aiding in the effective use of emotional labor practices and their expected outcomes, understanding emotions and how to use them coupled with facilitation of thinking may help to reduce job dissatisfaction. Abraham (1998) explained that one who is motivated to comply with organizational display rules, and has the ability to understand and use emotions, may have a resulting reduction in job dissatisfaction. Perhaps this motivation and ability also might help in the reduction of other work strains, such as burnout and physical strains resulting from job stress. Also, these influences may work in alleviating organizational dysfunctional outcomes, such as tardiness, absenteeism, and turnover, as well as contributing to functional outcomes such as effective performance.

Regulation of emotion. The final branch or dimension of emotional labor is the skill by which one regulates or manages feeling of oneself and others based on openness to all emotions, reflection on experienced emotions, and goal-oriented emotional behavior (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). This ability to process emotion is built from and enabled by the previous levels in the emotional intelligence framework. As stated earlier, the ability to manage one's emotions facilitates the effective performance of emotional labor duties (Lam & Kirby, 2002). According to Morris and Feldman (1996), emotional labor involves cognitive processes in order to fulfill organizational expectations with regard to emotional display. These cognitive processes, including "effort, planning, and control," primarily fall under the branch of emotional regulation (Grandey, 2000). With regard to emotional labor functions, this dimension of emotional intelligence provides the channel through which surface- and deep acting methods are employed.

With regard to benefits of proficiency in this skill as applied to emotional labor functions, the organization benefits from employees who are adept and flexible in their emotional reactions. The previously mentioned "control moves" of Goffman (1969) are used

with more tactical precision in order to build and maintain relationships with customers, which helps to ensure the organization's financial health. The organization also benefits from the employee's well-being derived from individual benefits of having a high level of this skill. For example, individuals who are able to effectively manage their emotions might suffer less from burnout, depression, and physical strains. In turn, organizational dysfunctions, such as excessive absenteeism, turnover, and inadequate performance are alleviated. As well, improvements in organizational commitment and job satisfaction also may result from having employees with this skill.

Researchers have presented some evidence to support the idea that emotional intelligence dimensions, including emotion management, can benefit employees. Individual benefits that have been investigated thus far include a negative relationship with emotion management skill and hopelessness, hassles, depression, and suicidal ideation (Ciarrochi et al., 2002). Ciarrochi et al. (2000) proposed this evidence supports the moderating effect of emotional intelligence skills, including emotional regulation, on the stressor-strain relationship.

The Moderating Role of Emotional Intelligence in the Emotional Labor Process

The above discourse has established the evident links between emotional intelligence abilities and the emotional labor process. Evidence has been presented as to how each dimension of emotional intelligence plays a moderating role in the emotional labor process, contributing to the effective performance of emotional labor, as well as, providing certain contribution toward alleviating detrimental emotional labor outcomes. The discussion regarding how the distinct emotional intelligence abilities may affect the emotional labor process is used simply to support the idea of emotional intelligence as an integral component of the emotional labor process. The impact of these separate abilities will not be specifically analyzed in this dissertation. This part of the investigation has been reserved for a future project.

As an aid in the discussion of how the emotional labor process is influenced by emotional intelligence, as an inclusive construct, a theoretical representation of the proposed model is shown in Figure 2. The process represented in this study is a summation of theory to date from the emotional labor and intelligence literatures. The following sections of this chapter present the proposed theoretical model of the emotional labor process, and explain

the impact of emotional intelligence on each stage of this process. First, each aspect of the process is introduced and analyzed according to the impact of emotional intelligence at each stage. Second, the individual effects of emotional labor in the outcome stage of the process are discussed, and each outcome is evaluated according to the moderating impact of emotional intelligence. Finally, organizational implications are proposed and discussed.

Emotional Labor Process and Emotional Intelligence

As seen in Figure 1, the first stage of the proposed emotional labor process model suggests organizationally established rules result in employee perceptions of those rules, which lead to some level of emotional effort. Diefendorff and Richard (2003) provided evidence supporting the rules-perceptions relationship. The study indicated that perceptions of organizational rules for emotional display were related to actual rules established and consistently followed within the organization. As well, this study and Brotheridge and Grandey's (2002) study found that one's attempts to follow organizational rules of emotional display did relate to those perceptions of organizational rules.

The current research model is represented by Figure 2. In this conceptual model, emotional labor efforts are positioned as initiating the emotional labor process taking off from the rules-perceptions stage. Individuals' perceptions of organizational rules can result in any of four types of emotional effort: passive deep acting, non-acting, surface acting, and active deep acting.

Emotional Labor Efforts

Emotional labor efforts are proposed as directly related to individual outcomes of the emotional labor process. These efforts may or may not have the added encumbrance of the emotional dissonance stressor. Surface acting and active deep acting do contribute a certain amount of emotional dissonance to the process. Non-acting may or may not involve the experience of emotional dissonance, depending on the individual's emotional state, and passive deep acting, as defined, does not involve the experience of emotional dissonance.

The moderating effect of certain individual characteristics has been suggested to influence the relationship between individuals' emotional states and the emotional labor efforts they perform. Such moderators include personality dimensions such as extraversion, neuroticism, positive and negative affect, as well as individual skills like social skill (e.g., Morris & Feldman, 1996; Abraham, 1998; Diefendorff & Richard, 2003). Certainly,



Figure 2 The Moderating Role of Emotional Intelligence in the Emotional Labor Process

emotional intelligence should fall within the realm of individual skills that moderate this relationship between felt emotion and emotional labor efforts. Those with emotional intelligence skills, more specifically the skills within the first dimension of perception and expression of emotion, are knowledgeable of the most appropriate ways to display emotion. These skills allow them to not only display their emotions appropriately, but to do so in an honest, sincere manner (Mayer & Salovey, 1997). In addition, the ability of the emotionally intelligent individual to understand the emotional requirements of others and the organization engenders empathetic concern that can intensify emotional effort toward the display of required emotions.

The proposed model suggests that the various types of emotional labor efforts are affected by emotional intelligence, and that the relationships between all four emotional labor efforts and outcomes of the emotional labor process are moderated by emotional intelligence. Individuals' tendencies to fake emotion, attempt to feel emotion, or to refrain from emotional display will vary in frequency depending on their level of emotional intelligence. As discussed earlier, one with a high degree of emotional intelligence will prioritize certain goals, namely organizational goals, over individuals' own wishes, as it can be reasoned that satisfaction of organizational goals lead to satisfaction of their own goals. This priority should be sustained no matter the employee's level of commitment to the organization. For example, the employee may intend to leave the organization, possibly as a result of low job satisfaction or lack of organizational commitment. However, the emotionally intelligent employee continues to act in the organization's best interests in order to maintain a good reputation as an organizational member for future job prospects.

Surface acting, active deep acting, as well as non-acting are emotional labor efforts that result in emotional dissonance. Although the construct, emotional dissonance, is not specified in the proposed conceptual model, it deserves further explanation at this point, because it is considered an integral part of the emotional labor process as a result of individuals enacting the above mentioned emotional labor efforts. Zapf (2002) cited research representing emotional dissonance as a social environmental stressor as well as a dimension of emotional labor. Abraham (2000) indicated from previous research, the emotionally intelligent individual possesses the skills necessary to alleviate strains due to work stressors (e.g., emotional dissonance), because they are able to understand the causes of such strains and develop tactics to reduce the impact of these stressors. Therefore, one who is emotionally intelligent will confront

the cause of emotional dissonance and contrive a plan to reduce the stressor as it occurs in the emotional labor process. Specifically, the individual will refrain from the behavior that causes emotional dissonance.

Under such circumstances, emotional intelligence is seen as a moderating resource used to minimize the effects of work stressors, such as emotional dissonance. Zapf et al. (2001) referred to the idea that one's "given cognitive capacities" are resources used to alleviate stressors. The various cognitive abilities of those with high levels of emotional intelligence provide them the resources necessary to reduce dissonance (Zapf et al., 1999) through reducing the emotional labor efforts that cause the stress. For example, the emotional intelligence ability to use emotion in the facilitation of thought provides for the use of relevant information in prioritizing attention to more important issues. For those on the job, facilitation of thought would give high emotionally intelligent individuals the motivation to prioritize organizational gain over individual need to express felt emotion (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Schaubroeck & Jones, 2000; Prati et al., 2003a). In this way, emotionally intelligent individuals are more able to reason that their emotions should be more in line with organizationally required emotions, thus reducing emotional dissonance from the source, namely their own emotional state and its effect on their emotional labor efforts.

Also, Kruml and Geddes' (2000) findings indicated that empathetic concern, which comes from emotional perception and understanding, will negatively affect emotional dissonance. One reason why this might be the case is that empathetic concern applies more to identification with the other's feelings, and thus employees are less focused on their own feelings and more on what the customer needs. In this way, perception and appraisal skills, as well as reflective regulation skills of emotional intelligence, serve to alleviate the level of emotional dissonance felt by those involved in emotional labor jobs.

Emotional intelligence also can be considered a resource to minimize the effects of work stressors through the additional resources engendered from this set of abilities. Zapf (2002) stated that previous stress research points to one's level of control over stressful situations, and one's level of social support as resources that may alleviate detrimental stressor effects. These two are available resources for those with high levels of emotional intelligence. The resource of control over stressful situations, regardless of restrictions on emotional display dictated by the organization, allows a variable amount of control for the employee. This idea is supported by

Zapf et al. (1999) in their definition, "Control means having an impact on one's conditions and on one's activities in correspondence with some goal" (p. 377).

Also, Sosik and Magerian (1999) claimed that emotionally intelligent individuals feel more secure in their ability to control and influence life events. Therefore, one with a high level of emotional intelligence may still feel a certain amount of control over employee-customer interactions, and thus the ability to achieve the goals of their role. This control comes from the employee's innate ability to drive the emotional exchange in the interaction using their emotional intelligence skills. For instance, one with developed skill in perceiving and appraising the emotions of others as well as a well-developed understanding of emotion will be more able to extinguish the anger of an irate customer and create good will for the organization from that exchange. Because of this control over emotional exchanges, the emotionally intelligent individual will feel less stress from such interactions, and thus less stress from the work situation overall.

With regard to social support, researchers have found a plethora of evidence demonstrating the buffering effect of social support on stress. This is especially true in the organizational setting where emotional labor is a common practice. A social support system of coworkers and supervisors allows one the resources of reference, experience sharing, and emotional support as ways to cope with the emotional effort necessary in such jobs. Furthermore, a link has been indicated between emotional intelligence and relationship building. There has been considerable research in the area of leadership and group systems that indicate emotional intelligence is key to forming solid support systems (Goleman, 1995, 1998; Sosik & Megerian, 1999; George, 2000; Lewis, 2000; Prati et al., 2003a). Hence, it is reasonable to assume that one's level of emotional intelligence will indirectly alleviate stress through the creation of support systems to buffer such stress.

The effects of work stressors are directly related to the resources individuals have at their disposal to battle these stressors. If these resources are depleted through extensive role demands of emotional labor, stress results (Zapf et al., 2001; Brotheridge & Lee, 2002). Because of the personal and social resources available to the emotionally intelligent individual, the risk of stressors resulting in experienced strains is greatly reduced.

Surface acting. Throughout the literature on emotional labor, surface acting has been considered a superficial response to emotional labor requirements when emotional dissonance

was experienced in the process (Hochschild, 1983; Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Adelmann, 1995; Abraham, 1998; Grandey, 2000; Erickson & Ritter, 2001; Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002; Brotheridge & Lee, 2002; Zapf, 2002; Totterdell & Holman, 2003). Individuals are aware of the organizational rules of emotional display, but, in the case of surface acting, they choose only to display the emotions when necessary to the employee-customer interaction. There is no attempt by the employee to genuinely feel the required emotion.

Active deep acting. Active deep acting is also an emotional labor effort from which emotional dissonance results. Active deep acting is the cognitive adaptation of feeling to organizationally required rules of emotional display. In other words, this emotional labor effort involves an attempt by the employee to engage the actual emotion that is required and display the emotion. The literature also supports this action as a distinct emotional labor effort (Hochschild, 1983; Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Abraham, 1998; Grandey, 2000; Erickson & Ritter, 2001; Brotheridge & Grandey, 2002; Brotheridge & Lee, 2002; Zapf, 2002; Totterdell & Holman, 2003). Ashforth and Humphrey (1993) considered deep acting to be consistent with the employee having more concern for the customer in that active deep acting requires more emotive effort than surface acting.

Even though active deep acting requires more emotive effort, empirical evidence has shown that it is the less stressful method of employing emotional labor. Totterdell and Holman (2003) found that deep acting was associated with quality performance and was not associated with emotional exhaustion. Brotheridge and Grandey (2002) reported evidence that deep acting was negatively associated with the depersonalization dimension of burnout and positively associated with the personal accomplishment dimension. Due to these findings, it is reasonable to assume that those possessing a high degree of emotional intelligence, when confronted with the challenge of performing emotional effort where emotional dissonance is a factor, will respond more with the active deep acting method rather than surface or non-acting.

Non-acting. This investigation has found no information in the literature with regard to non-acting. However, it is logical to assume that various reasons may cause employees to respond to their perceptions of organizational display rules in this way with or without the resulting experience of cognitive dissonance. With non-acting, individuals may or may not feel the required emotion, but simply decide not to follow the perceived rules. The rules and perceptions of those rules may be there, but the intention to act on those perceptions may not be

there. One reason for this response to display rule perceptions may be the employee is in a final stage of burnout where emotional exhaustion and/or depersonalization have taken a toll. Another reason might be the employee, for reasons other than burnout, may have little or no organizational commitment and be on the way out of the organization.

Passive deep acting. Hochschild (1983) defined passive deep acting as a response where the employee already feels the emotion required for display in the interaction. This type of emotional effort requires no cognitive manipulation of emotion in order to comply with display rules. Emotional dissonance does not come into play as a stressor in this situation. When participating in the interaction, the employee simply demonstrates the emotions already felt. Evidence thus far indicates that passive deep acting is positively associated with high levels of emotional intelligence. Ciarrochi et al. (2000) reports that those with high levels of emotional intelligence will attempt to maintain positive or desirable moods.

H1a: Emotional intelligence will have a negative association with surface acting.

H1b: Emotional intelligence will have a positive association with active deep acting.

H1c: Emotional intelligence will have a negative association with non-acting.

H1d: Emotional intelligence will have a positive association with passive deep acting.

Emotional Intelligence and the Emotional Labor Efforts-Outcomes Relationship

Hochschild (1983) contended that fulfillment of certain organizationally required rules of emotional display results in detrimental outcomes for the organizational participant, including drug abuse, absenteeism, and physical strain. Indeed, the detrimental effects of emotional labor are not limited to individual psychological and physical strains, but extend to organizational problems as well. There have been many subsequent theoretical and empirical analyses to support this notion. In this section, individual and organizational strains, noted in academic research, as resulting from emotional labor practices, both dissonance and non-dissonance related, are addressed. As these strains are explained, the moderating effect of emotional intelligence is analyzed according to how the sources of these strains can be minimized with the benefit of advanced emotional intelligence skills.

Psychological strains. The emotional labor efforts expended in organizationally directed employee-customer interactions may result in psychological strains such as burnout, depressed mood at work, and job tension. With regard to the detrimental outcomes of emotional labor, burnout has become a subject of concentrated focus. Over the past twenty years of

research on the burnout construct, there have been several interpretations of burnout. One of the most commonly applied conceptualization comes from Maslach and Jackson's (1981) three-dimension definition. According to Maslach and Jackson (1981) burnout is a syndrome characterized by emotional exhaustion, depersonalization, and decreased personal accomplishment. They cited several previous studies that support the relationship between burnout and many troublesome organizational and individual problems including: job turnover, absenteeism, decreased productivity, and physical as well as psychological problems. It must be noted that emotional dissonance is seen as a contributing factor to most of these negative outcomes resulting from the emotional labor process.

Emotional exhaustion is the depletion of emotional resources as well as physical energy to such a degree that adequate resources are no longer available to the employee for the effective management of emotions in the employee-customer interaction. Many adverse effects have been associated with this symptom of burnout, such as depression, reduced organizational commitment and job performance, as well as an increase in turnover intentions (Cropanzano, Rupp, & Byme, 2003). Demerouti, Bakker, Nachreiner, and Schaufeli (2001, p. 499) surmised: "Emotional exhaustion closely resembles traditional stress reactions that are studied in occupational stress research, such as fatigue, job-related depression, psychosomatic complaints, and anxiety."

From the abundance of information in the literature compared to the other dimensions, it appears this dimension of burnout is the most analyzed dimension in the field at this point. Perhaps because of the idea, as Shirom (1989) explained, emotional exhaustion is the integral component in the conceptualization of burnout. A number of studies have found unequivocal evidence linking emotional exhaustion to one's state of emotional dissonance in the emotional labor process (Zapf et al., 2001; Zapf, 2002). Totterdell and Holman (2003) found that surface acting has a stronger association with emotional exhaustion than (active) deep acting, a more cognitively pleasing form of emotional effort that results in emotional dissonance. Regardless of the method, emotional labor efforts have been shown to result in emotional exhaustion.

Pines and Aronson (1988) delineate the burnout construct to include emotional exhaustion, as well as, physical and mental exhaustion. Their view of emotional exhaustion includes feelings of depression and hopelessness. Physical exhaustion includes feelings of being weak and tired, in addition to inability to sleep or maintain immunity to illness. Pines and

Aronson (1988) define mental exhaustion as feelings of ineffectiveness and resentment, which is similar to Maslach and Jackson's (1981) personal accomplishment dimension.

Much of the emotional labor literature indicates that burnout is a possible outcome of the emotional labor process. The causes of burnout with regard to this process are primarily attributed to the emotional labor efforts and, in some cases, the accompanying emotional dissonance of certain types of efforts. Although a great deal of research points to burnout as a cause of physical symptoms and negative organizational effects, it is listed as only one of the detrimental outcomes of emotional labor, as there are other contributors to these physical and organizational problems other than burnout.

Emotional intelligence abilities can be useful resources in jobs where demands for emotional regulation are excessive. The accurate perception of one's emotional state and the ability to facilitate emotions to maintain, improve, or modify one's emotional state provides emotionally intelligent individuals with invaluable coping mechanisms to defeat the adverse effects of psychological stressors. The symptoms associated with burnout can be alleviated when one draws upon these resources. Emotional, physical, and mental exhaustion can be more successfully tempered or avoided because of the additional resources available to emotionally intelligent individuals (i.e., basic emotional intelligence skills, social support networks, perceived control over interactions).

Cropanzano, Rupp, & Byme (2003) cite depression as one of the many adverse effects associated with burnout. Demerouti, Bakker, Nachreiner, and Schaufeli (2001, p. 499) surmised: "Emotional exhaustion closely resembles traditional stress reactions that are studied in occupational stress research, such as fatigue, job-related depression, psychosomatic complaints, and anxiety." In addition, there have been several direct connections found with emotional intelligence having a favorable impact on measures of depression. Saklofske et al. (2003) found a negative correlation of EI with depression-proneness, and Ciarrochi et al. (2002) found a negative correlation of the emotion self-managing ability factor of EI with depression. Therefore, it is reasonable to assume that emotional intelligence has a similar impact on depression, in the emotional labor process, as it has on the burnout symptom.

Similar to depression, there has been little to no information in the literature regarding the impact of emotional intelligence on job tension. It is reasonable to assume that there is some influence emotional intelligence may have over individuals' experienced job tension, because of

the resources emotional intelligence abilities provide the employee. The following hypotheses incorporate all three psychological strains in the current investigation.

H2a: Emotional intelligence will moderate the relationship between surface acting and psychological strain such that the positive relationship between surface acting and psychological strain (i.e., burnout, job tension, and depressed mood) will be attenuated when emotional intelligence is high and exacerbated when emotional intelligence is low.

H2b: Emotional intelligence will moderate the relationship between active deep acting and psychological strain such that the negative relationship between active deep acting and psychological strain (i.e., burnout, job tension, and depressed mood) will be exacerbated when emotional intelligence is high and attenuated when emotional intelligence is low.

H2c: Emotional intelligence will moderate the relationship between non-acting and psychological strain such that the positive relationship between non-acting and psychological strain (i.e., burnout, job tension, and depressed mood) will be attenuated when emotional intelligence is high and exacerbated when emotional intelligence is low.

H2d: Emotional intelligence will moderate the relationship between passive deep acting and psychological strain such that the negative relationship between passive deep acting and psychological strain (i.e., burnout, job tension, and depressed mood) will be exacerbated when emotional intelligence is high and attenuated when emotional intelligence is low.

Physical strains. Physical strains such as headaches, muscle aches, backaches, high blood pressure, and a lower immunity to illnesses have been shown to be a result of emotional labor efforts. Schaubroeck and Jones (2000) presented evidence supporting the idea that individuals required to suppress emotions are vulnerable to minor illnesses due to the negative effect on immune levels. They found physical symptoms of stress were related to the perceived requirement to display positive emotions, and based this finding on the idea that emotional labor is most taxing on physical and mental well-being when individuals are not allowed to represent their true "authentic" self. Zapf et al. (1999) showed that emotional labor in connection with emotional dissonance was a contributing factor to psychosomatic complaints, including headaches and high blood pressure. Salovey et al. (2000) noted that the connection between suppression of emotion and detrimental health effects was empirically challenging to

substantiate. Regardless of this problem, they and Grandey (2000) indicated that the suppression of emotion, either positive or negative, was associated with serious detrimental health effects, such as high blood pressure, heart disease, and cancer progression.

Totterdell and Holman (2003) construed from previous research that physical strains may be closely associated with the effort of emotional regulation, and suggested that emotional intelligence levels may alleviate the deleterious effects of this effort. They reasoned that the higher an individual's emotional intelligence level, the less effort will be required to carry out emotional regulation. For example, understanding how to demonstrate appropriate emotions through facial expressions, voice inflection, or other physical actions will aid emotionally intelligent individuals in the execution of surface acting or either form of deep acting.

Also, the ability to perceive the emotions of oneself and others, as well as reflectively regulating these emotions, will aid employees in controlling the interaction process by placing them in the position of directing the emotional content of the interaction. In addition, Schaubroeck and Jones (2000) explained that individuals' perceptions of emotional labor contribute to these harmful effects. This notion increases the importance of the ability of emotionally intelligent individuals to facilitate thought through emotional perception and understanding. Because of this ability, individuals view certain emotional displays as part of the job, and act with the understanding that the displays fulfill necessary organizational goals (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Schaubroeck & Jones, 2000; Prati et al., 2003a).

Using their ability to emotionally facilitate thought, individuals are able to redirect the focus in the emotional labor process from a self-aware position to an organizationally aware position. Individuals more readily attribute efforts of enacting emotional effort to the needs of the organization and its goals, rather than their individual perspectives. Therefore, they are more motivated to perform according to established rules. Also, individuals view acts involving emotional dissonance as performances that will fulfill necessary organizational goals, rather than acts of false self-presentation.

Abraham (1999) indicated this notion when she explained that emotionally intelligent individuals are able to cognitively rationalize the organization's purpose for requiring certain emotional displays. For all of the above reasons, the abilities of emotionally intelligent individuals should moderate and, in some sense, positively refocus the perspective of the emotional labor effort experienced by the organizational member. In so doing, emotional

intelligence effectively reduces the emotional dissonance experienced (if any) and the resulting physical strains associated with the emotional labor effort.

H3a: Emotional intelligence will moderate the relationship between surface acting and physical strain such that the positive relationship between surface acting and physical strain will be attenuated when emotional intelligence is high and exacerbated when emotional intelligence is low.

H3b: Emotional intelligence will moderate the relationship between active deep acting and physical strain such that the negative relationship between active deep acting and physical strain will be exacerbated when emotional intelligence is high and attenuated when emotional intelligence is low.

H3c: Emotional intelligence will moderate the relationship between non-acting and physical strain such that the positive relationship between non-acting and physical strain will be attenuated when emotional intelligence is high and exacerbated when emotional intelligence is low.

H3d: Emotional intelligence will moderate the relationship between passive deep acting and physical strain such that the negative relationship between passive deep acting and physical strain will be exacerbated when emotional intelligence is high and attenuated when emotional intelligence is low.

Employee affect. Job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and job involvement are areas in which emotional labor has been argued, and in some cases reported, to have an impact. If employees' attitudes toward the organization and their jobs are not positive it could prove detrimental to the organization in several aspects. These organizational issues will be covered in the next section.

There is a great deal of evidence demonstrating the negative effect of emotional labor on job satisfaction. Ashforth and Humphrey (1993) cited research supporting the argument that the "alienation from work," due to the requirement to perform emotional displays and resulting emotional dissonance, will cause a reduction in job satisfaction. Abraham (2000) proposed that a feeling of little control over the work situation as a result of emotional dissonance could lower job satisfaction. Similarly, Zapf et al. (1999) argued that the psychological insecurities resulting from counterfeit displays of emotion will cause the employee to resent the organization, and could accordingly lead to decreased job satisfaction. Morris and Feldman (1997) found

unequivocal support for the argument that a negative relationship exists between emotional labor and job satisfaction when emotional dissonance mediates the relationship.

Evidence also suggests that job satisfaction, as an outcome of emotional labor practices, may be positively affected by one's emotional intelligence level. Wong and Law (2002) found emotional intelligence has a significant positive effect on one's job satisfaction regardless of the situational aspects of the job. One reason could be that emotionally intelligent individuals understand the influence positive emotion has on the elevation or maintenance of positive attitudes, and in order to reduce the negative effects of emotional dissonance, facilitate positive emotions to improve their attitude while on the job. Abraham (1998) suggested social support moderates the negative relationship between emotional dissonance and job satisfaction. Accordingly, emotional intelligence will have an indirect moderating effect on this relationship because of the positive impact one's emotional intelligence skills have on one's social support resources.

Fisher (2000) stated the catagorization of job satisfaction as an attitude means that emotion and cognition are integral to its evaluation. Interestingly, Diefendorff and Richard (2003) presented further evidence of the beneficial influence of positive affect on attitudes in their finding that perceptions of organizational rules to display positive emotions resulted in increased job satisfaction. They also found that perceptions of organizational rules to suppress negative emotions had a negative impact on job satisfaction. This finding indicates that employees would be at an advantage if they were able to cognitively evaluate the affective elements of the job in order to have a less adverse reaction to enforced emotional display rules. Skills falling under the realm of emotional intelligence provide this advantage. In other words, employees' attitudinal reaction to rules, such as suppressing negative emotions, will be less negatively affected if they are able to facilitate their thoughts toward organizational goals and customer needs, rather than focusing on personal discomfort from performing emotional efforts creating emotional dissonance.

Organizational commitment is subjectively related to many areas of the organizational experience, from personally relevant justice and benefits issues to organizationally related leadership and mission issues. Emotional labor experiences fall under the areas of organizational experience relevant to personal concerns. Abraham (2000) noted that the lack of control over one's emotional expressions, as a result of emotional dissonance and required emotional

displays, will cause one's organizational commitment to deteriorate. Similarly, Zapf et al. (1999) indicated that emotional dissonance and emotional effort, in the form of required actions to display unfelt emotions, could lead to a resentment of the organization.

Cropanzano et al. (2003) argued that resentment of the organization and a reduction in organizational commitment result from emotional exhaustion, an outcome of the depletion in emotional resources. They proposed that emotional intelligence could alleviate this problem through the provision of resources, such as support systems and coping methods. Another way in which this problem may be alleviated is through the emotional intelligence skill of emotional facilitation. Ashforth and Humphrey (1993) suggested an organizational orientation will reduce emotional dissonance in the emotional labor process. Abraham (1998) suggested that emotional facilitation of thinking, programmed toward an organizational orientation, aids in reducing job dissatisfaction. These findings indicate advanced emotional intelligence skills might possibly benefit one's organizational commitment.

Compared to the other two employee affect outcomes, job involvement has not been a great focus in the study of emotional labor. In the few studies that do include this variable in related investigations, there have been no significant findings to link a positive impact of emotional intelligence, or a negative impact of emotional labor efforts, on job involvement. Schaubroeck and Jones (2000) reported results indicating a negative, albeit insignificant, relationship between emotional labor efforts and job involvement. Carmeli (2003) argued that job involvement may be a response to emotional rather than rational needs, indicating that individuals' emotional valuations could play a role in determining their level of job involvement. However, Carmeli (2003) did not find job involvement was significantly related to emotional intelligence, even though a positive direction in association was indicated.

H4a: Emotional intelligence will moderate the relationship between surface acting and affect such that the negative relationship between surface acting and employee affect (i.e., job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and job involvement) will be attenuated when emotional intelligence is high and exacerbated when emotional intelligence is low.

H4b: Emotional intelligence will moderate the relationship between active deep acting and affect such that the positive relationship between active deep acting and employee affect (i.e., job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and job involvement) will be

exacerbated when emotional intelligence is high and attenuated when emotional intelligence is low.

H4c: Emotional intelligence will moderate the relationship between non-acting and affect such that the negative relationship between non-acting and employee affect (i.e., job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and job involvement) will be attenuated when emotional intelligence is high and exacerbated when emotional intelligence is low.

H4d: Emotional intelligence will moderate the relationship between passive deep acting and affect such that the positive relationship between passive deep acting and employee affect (i.e., job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and job involvement) will be exacerbated when emotional intelligence is high and attenuated when emotional intelligence is low.

Organizational issues. Issues such as withdrawal and performance are continuous concerns for organizations. Emotional labor is simply one of the organizational activities that affect these areas of concern. How the emotional intelligence of organizational members serves to alleviate these concerns, which can be valuable to organizations as well as the individuals who inhabit them.

Withdrawal behaviors are a particularly important area of concern for the organization. There is considerable evidence to show that emotional labor duties and outcomes lead to actions of withdrawal. Grandey (2000) proposed that surface acting was an antecedent to withdrawal behaviors of organizational employees. She explained behaviors such as tardiness, absenteeism, and turnover could be attributed to organizational requirements to regulate emotions. Maslach and Jackson (1981) found evidence to support a relationship between some dimensions of burnout and increased break times and absenteeism. Additionally, they indicated from their prior empirical research that burnout was correlated with intention to turnover. Because of the effort involved in emotional regulation, and in many cases the great expenditure of emotional resources, one may try to avoid situations requiring the actions. This avoidance of emotional labor duties can lead to individuals having intentions to turnover and ultimately their withdrawal from the organization.

Depending on the quantity, quality, and type of resources available to emotionally intelligent individuals, as well as the requirements of the job and the fit of individuals to those requirements, the decision to withdraw from the organization will be made. Jordan et al. (2002)

reasoned that individuals with high emotional intelligence may decide that a certain job environment is not healthy for them and they might leave. Alternatively, emotionally intelligent individuals may enjoy the challenge of directing employee-customer interactions and thrive in a job with requirements of intense emotional effort. Because of the equivocal nature of this association, the following hypothesis is evaluated using tenure as a control variable. It is reasonable to assume that employees with a reasonable length of tenure (e.g., two or more years) would have enough time to evaluate their fit to the organization and the job. Therefore, those emotionally intelligent individuals who would elect out of an unhealthy job environment would have already done so within that reasonable time frame.

H5a: Emotional intelligence will moderate the relationship between surface acting and intentions to turnover such that the positive relationship between surface acting and intentions to turnover will be attenuated when emotional intelligence is high and exacerbated when emotional intelligence is low.

H5b: Emotional intelligence will moderate the relationship between active deep acting and intentions to turnover such that the negative relationship between active deep acting and employee intentions to turnover will be exacerbated when emotional intelligence is high and attenuated when emotional intelligence is low.

H5c: Emotional intelligence will moderate the relationship between non-acting and intentions to turnover such that the positive relationship between non-acting and employee intentions to turnover will be attenuated when emotional intelligence is high and exacerbated when emotional intelligence is low.

H5d: Emotional intelligence will moderate the relationship between passive deep acting and intentions to turnover such that the negative relationship between passive deep acting and employee intentions to turnover will be exacerbated when emotional intelligence is high and attenuated when emotional intelligence is low.

The importance of performance, long a dependent variable in organizational behavior research, is no less evident in the areas of emotional labor and intelligence. Until recently, the impact of emotional intelligence on performance was a highly controversial claim. There have been reports in the past few years to indicate that emotional intelligence shows a fairly strong and significant, positive affect on performance. Slaski and Cartwright (2002) found evidence to suggest that managers with higher emotional intelligence scores demonstrated better managerial

performance. Carmeli (2003) found evidence of a significant and positive association between performance and emotional intelligence. Douglas et al. (2004) found the level of emotional intelligence showed a significant main effect on peer ratings of job performance.

Prior research has argued that emotional performance, although not termed specifically as such, is affected by emotional intelligence. Grandey (2000) proposed that regulating emotion in certain ways will affect performance, especially in jobs involving employee-customer interactions. Lam and Kirby (2002) explained that emotional intelligence can impact performance by preventing individuals from being "hijacked" by adverse emotions in the employee-customer interaction. Diefendorff and Richard (2003) argued that the effective execution of emotional display requirements will significantly influence job performance in emotional labor tasks. Certain emotional labor efforts have also been found to have a more beneficial impact on performance than others. Totterdell and Holman (2003) found that deep acting was associated with quality performance of emotional labor efforts. Clearly, emotional intelligence provides individuals the skills necessary to function in such roles. Advanced emotional intelligence abilities provide for more effective emotional regulation and, in turn, will positively affect emotional performance.

H6a: Emotional intelligence will moderate the relationship between surface acting and performance such that the negative relationship between surface acting and employee performance (i.e., job performance and emotional performance) will be attenuated when emotional intelligence is high and exacerbated when emotional intelligence is low.

H6b: Emotional intelligence will moderate the relationship between active deep acting and performance such that the positive relationship between active deep acting and employee performance (i.e., job performance and emotional performance) will be exacerbated when emotional intelligence is high and attenuated when emotional intelligence is low.

H6c: Emotional intelligence will moderate the relationship between non-acting and performance such that the negative relationship between non-acting and employee performance (i.e., job performance and emotional performance) will be attenuated when emotional intelligence is high and exacerbated when emotional intelligence is low.

H6d: Emotional intelligence will moderate the relationship between passive deep acting and performance such that the positive relationship between passive deep acting and

employee performance (i.e., job performance and emotional performance) will be exacerbated when emotional intelligence is high and attenuated when emotional intelligence is low.

The moderating impact of individuals' emotional intelligence on the outcomes associated with emotional labor efforts and resulting strains is affected by all four abilities delineated in the emotional intelligence literature. In this dissertation, emotional intelligence, as an all-inclusive construct, has been proposed as a moderator in several relationships throughout the emotional labor process. Specific to this study, it serves as a moderator between actions of emotional effort and the deleterious outcomes that may result from those efforts. Because of these arguments, the emotional labor efforts put forth in employee-customer interactions may be beneficial, rather than detrimental, to emotionally intelligent employees' job involvement, job satisfaction, and organizational commitment, as well as their performance, and their physical and psychological health.

CHAPTER 4

RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

Chapter Overview

This chapter provides a description of the methods used in this dissertation. The data collection method and the sample characteristics are presented, as well as a description of the measures used in the study. Also, the results of analyses performed on these measures are explained.

Sample

Just as societal norms vary across cultures, organizational norms of emotional display vary across organizational cultures. Therefore, in an examination of the emotional labor process, it is important to study an organization that holds rules of emotional display important, and actively enforces these rules. Such organizations should provide clear presentations of organizational rules to their employees through active management instruction and training. In addition, these organizations should have some way in which employee-customer interactions are monitored to ensure proper performance of emotional labor.

Another requirement necessary for an effective investigation of the involved constructs is the type and number of emotional displays required. The most appropriate sample would involve employees required to display a variety of emotions with varying duration, intensity, and frequency. The variety of emotional suppression and evocation will be maximized with this type of sample, and as a result, the potential will exist for a more extensive emotional labor process to be available for evaluation.

The organization also will have to provide an adequate sample size to achieve an effect size necessary for the interactions being tested. In general, research in the organizational sciences has shown moderator effects to be small, .01 to .03 (Champoux & Peters, 1987; Chaplin, 1991; Douglas et al., 2004). The estimation of sample size depends on established statistical rules of thumb for effect sizes, theoretical structure, and the little empirical evidence available regarding the effect size of emotional intelligence as a moderator. Douglas et al. (2004) reported a relatively large effect for the conscientiousness-emotional intelligence interaction (ΔR^2=.03). Ciarrochi et al. (2002) reported similar elevated effect sizes.

Therefore, it is reasonable to assume, from this evidence, that the effect size falls within the small to medium range, according to Cohen (1992). For the purposes of this investigation, the moderating effect size of emotional intelligence is expected to be (ΔR^2)=.03 or greater because of the expected strength of relationship between the moderator and corresponding links in the model. Also, the rule of thumb used to calculate the sample size was suggested by Green (1991), $N \geq (8 / f^2) + (m - 1)$. Therefore, the sample size expected to yield a result with .80 power and .05 significance is N=207.

Procedures

Survey Distribution

Approval for the surveys used in this investigation was obtained from the Florida State University Institutional Review Board, Human Subjects Committee (Appendix A). In the solicitation of organizations to obtain a sample, letters were sent to various retail organizations and health care facilities (Appendix B). The organization that consented to provide access to its employees for this investigation was an 87 year-old retail chain with over 200 stores centralized in the Southeastern United States. Employees and managers from 29 stores were surveyed. Two rounds of survey collection were performed. In the first round of data collection, 14 stores were surveyed in the North and Central Florida area. A total of 281 employees participated in this round. In the second round of data collection, 15 stores were surveyed in South Florida and across Georgia, gathering responses from an additional 293 employees.

This project employed a dyadic design in that employee surveys were coded in order to match them with manager evaluations of performance for participating employees. The employee survey was a self-report questionnaire developed to collect information regarding emotional intelligence, emotional labor aspects of the job, and the employees' demographic characteristics, physical strains, psychological strains, relevant personality characteristics, and attitudes. Information regarding employee performance was obtained by submitting individual performance evaluations for each employee to the supervisors of those employees Assurance of anonymity was given to respondents in the instructions for each of these documents.

In the first round of data collection, involving the 14 northern and central Florida stores, boxes were personally delivered and arranged in the storage area of each store. Individual packets were distributed to volunteer subjects by the store management. All employees,

including those holding positions in management, were given an employee packet. Employee packets included a cover letter and consent form, a questionnaire, and an envelope in which to seal their responses. In addition to an employee packet, supervisors were given individual performance evaluations to complete for each employee with whom the supervisor worked and an envelope in which to seal their responses. Because supervisors were also included as subjects in the study, the General Manager of the store was asked to complete employee evaluations for the supervisory staff. The Assistant General Manager was asked to complete an evaluation for the General Manager.

Subjects were provided with detailed instructions on how to participate in the study. They were asked to complete the confidential questionnaire, seal it in the envelope provided, and deposit it in the open slot of a sealed collection box located in the employee common area. Postage was provided for store managers to prepare the collection box for mailing and return the box to the research team at Florida State University.

In the second round of data collection, involving the 15 stores across Georgia and in south Florida, a box of materials for each store was sent to the respective store managers to distribute materials to employee volunteers and employee managers. All materials included in the package were the same as in the first round of data collection. Again, return postage was provided for store managers to seal the collection box and return it to the research team at Florida State University.

Survey Response

All data from both rounds was collected in essentially the same manner. Therefore, response results will be reported for all collectively. Out of the 574 surveys distributed to the employee volunteers, 210 returned usable responses having matching supervisor evaluations (36.6% response rate).

The sample was primarily female (69.5%) and white (81.0%), with 7.1% African-American, 1.0% Asian, 5.2% Hispanic, and 5.7% who regarded themselves as multicultural. The average age was 31 with a range of ages between 18 and 72. The average tenure with the organization was 2 years with a range of tenure between 1 month and 30 years. The education level of associates was fairly split with 46.2% having high school degrees and 52.4% having at

least some college level course work. Managerial positions were held by 26.2% of the sample. Table 1 displays the composition of the sample.

Demographic/Individual Information as Control Variables

Demographic information for the sample was collected on the questionnaire. This information included: education level, tenure, ethnicity, as well as, age and gender (control variables). Negative affectivity is used in the analyses as a control variable, in addition to age and gender, and so it is also included in this section.

Age. A space was provided on the questionnaire for the subject to indicate his or her age. The age of subjects will serve as a control variable in the analyses. Mayer et al. (1999) have indicated that age is an influencing factor on one's level of emotional intelligence. This idea is based on the idea that emotional intelligence is a form of intelligence, and they cite established intelligence theory.

Gender. A space was provided on the questionnaire for the subject to indicate gender. There are indications from previous research that females generally have a higher level of emotional intelligence than males. This idea will be tested, and if shown to be relevant, will be controlled for in testing the hypotheses.

Other demographics. A space was provided for subjects to indicate their highest level of education. They were also asked to indicate how long they have been on the job, and to give their job title. These variables may be useful as controls for turnover intentions as well as providing data for avenues of future research.

Affectivity. Negative and positive affectivity was measured with the Positive and Negative Affect Schedule (PANAS) (Watson, Clark, & Tellegen, 1988). This is a scale commonly used in academic research to measure these constructs.

Measures

This section presents the measures used in the present study. The scales are described and results from analyses are discussed. Cronbach alpha estimates of internal consistency reliability and variable intercorrelations are presented in Table 2.

Table 1: Sample Composition

	Percent		Percent
White	81.0	Male	30.5
Black	7.1	Female	69.5
Asian	1.0	High School Degree	46.2
Hispanic	5.2	Some College/ College Degree	52.4
Multicultural	5.7	Non-Managers	73.8
		Managers	26.2

	Mean(years)	Standard Deviation(years)
Age	31	13.40
Tenure	2	3.25

Table 2: Factor Analysis Results for *SREIT* Emotional Intelligence Scale

Items	Factor 1 Emotion Regulation	Factor 2 Access/Generate Emotion for Thought	Factor 3 Perceive, Appraise, and Express Emotion	Factor 4 Understand Emotions	Item-Total *r*
I easily recognize my emotions as I experience them.	.65				.51
I have control over my emotions.	.64				.39
I know why my emotions change.	.63				.34
I expect that I will do well on most things I try.	.61				.38
When I am faced with a challenge, I give up because I think I will fail.	.56				.34
When I am faced with obstacles, I remember times I faced similar obstacles and overcame them.	.52				.32
I am aware of my emotions as I experience them.	.50				.51
When I experience a positive emotion, I know how to make it last.	.48				.59
I present myself in a way that makes a good impression on others.	.47				.54
I motivate myself by imagining a good outcome to the tasks I take on.	.46				.55
When I am in a positive mood, solving problems is easy for me.	.43				.48
I use good moods to help myself keep trying in the face of obstacles.		.67			.55
When I feel a change in emotions, I tend to come up with new ideas.		.62			.57
When my mood changes, I see new possibilities.		.60			.39
I expect good things to happen.		.59			.54
When I am in a positive mood, I am able to come up with new ideas.		.59			.58
Emotions are one of the things that make my life worth living.		.58			.44
I like to share my emotions with others.		.54			.23
When another person tells me about an important event in his or her life, I almost feel as though I have experienced this event myself.		.49			.45
By looking at their facial expressions, I recognize the emotions people are experiencing.			.75		.45
I can tell how people are feeling by listening to the tone of their voice.			.74		.48
I know what other people are feeling just by looking at them.			.70		.39
I am aware of non-verbal message other people send.			.70		.57
I find it hard to understand the non-verbal messages of other people.			.59		.40
I am aware of the non-verbal messages I send to others.			.57		.56
Other people find it easy to confide in me.				.62	.33
It is difficult for me to understand why people feel the way they do.				.54	.38
I compliment others when they have done something well.				.50	.45
I help other people feel better when they are down.				.49	.49

Table 2 (continued)

Other Results	Factor 1	Factor 2	Factor 3	Factor 4
Eigenvalue	8.28	2.43	2.31	1.49
Percentage of Variance Explained	25.10	7.35	6.99	4.53
Cumulative Percentage of Variance Explained	25.10	32.46	39.44	43.97
Coefficient Alpha Reliability Estimates	.82	.79	.83	.61

Emotional Intelligence. The Measurement Issues section of Chapter 2 presents a comprehensive evaluation of the available measures of the emotional intelligence construct. The evaluation in Chapter 2 supports the *SREIT* as the most appropriate measure for the present study. Arguments for the scale being a useful tool in research cite the brevity of the scale as well as the reliability and validity evidence (Schutte & Malouff, 1999; Abraham, 1999; 2000). The *SREIT* is a 33-item self-report measure of emotional intelligence. The items for this scale are listed in Appendix C.

There have been several concerns expressed regarding this measure. These concerns are reviewed in the Measurement Issues section of Chapter 2, therefore they will not be repeated here. There is one concern expressed by Petrides and Furnham (2000) and others, which is particularly relevant to the current study. Petrides and Furnham (2000) warned that data obtained with the *SREIT* should undergo factor analysis to confirm the four-factor structure found in their analysis, as they are unsure of the stability of their solution. It should be noted that Ciarrochi et al. (2002) and Saklofske et al. (2003) also have reported results confirming the four-factor solution.

Because there is a question of the stability of the *SREIT* factor structure, a factor analysis using SPSS was conducted for this investigation. The four-factor solution was confirmed as a reasonable fit to the theoretical model of Mayer and Salovey (1997). All but four standardized factor loadings exceeded .40 (See Table 2), and the factors were highly to moderately correlated. The internal consistency reliability estimate of the emotional intelligence measure for all items with factor loadings exceeding .40 was α=.89.

Items in each factor category revealed characteristics similar to the emotional intelligence abilities proposed by Mayer and Salovey (1997). Items catagorized in factor 1 reflected one's ability to regulate emotions for promotion of emotional and intellectual growth. The items loading on factor 2 indicated the ability to access and/or generate feelings when they facilitate

thought. Factor 3 items addressed one's ability to perceive, appraise, and express emotion. Factor 4 was the weakest factor in composition for the ability it represented, which was the ability to understand emotion and emotional knowledge.

Subscales representing emotion regulation (α=.82), emotional facilitation of thought (α=.79), and emotion perception/appraisal/expression (α=.83) exceeded the α=.70 reliability threshold of Nunnally (1970). Unfortunately, the subscale representing emotional understanding/knowledge (α=.61) did not.

The four subscales of the *SREIT* measure were analyzed in order to get a clear picture of the scale structure. These subscales will not be used in the analysis of the hypotheses proposed in this dissertation. However, the information has been reserved for future study in this area.

Emotional Labor Efforts. Efforts that represent emotional labor are similar to emotional intelligence with regard to development, in fact there are fewer measures of emotional labor and specific emotional labor efforts than there are for emotional intelligence. Four emotional labor efforts were measured for this study. Grandey's (2003) scales of surface and deep acting were used. Scales were created to measure non-acting and passive deep acting, because there are no scales available to measure these types of emotional effort. Items for each of the four scales measuring the various types of emotional effort are listed in Appendix D.

Because these scales have not been extensively used in research as yet and two of the scales are new, factor analyses using SPSS were conducted on each scale. Factor analysis and reliability results are provided in Table 3. All standardized factor loadings for retained items exceeded .40. Items for the surface acting and active deep acting scales were highly correlated, and the passive deep acting and non-acting scales were moderately correlated. The surface acting, active deep acting, and non-acting scales met or exceeded the α=.70 reliability threshold of Nunnally (1970). Unfortunately, the reliability for the passive deep acting scale was α=.63, fairly short of the acceptable reliability standard.

Physical Strain. The physical strains that are considered outcomes of the emotional labor process include high blood pressure, headaches, muscle pain, and a lowered immune system. Accordingly, subjects were asked questions from the 5-item somatic anxiety scale (House & Rizzo, 1972). As well, a few additional health questions were asked. Reliability for this measure was α=.76. The items for this scale are listed in Appendix E.

Table 3: Factor Analysis Results for Emotional Efforts Scales

Scale Items	Loadings	Eigenvalue	Percent of Variance Explained	Cumulative Percent of Variance Explained	Reliability
Surface Acting Scale					
I put on an act in order to deal with customers in an appropriate way.	.662				
I fake a good mood.	.637				
I put on a "show" or "performance."	.547				
I just pretend to have the emotions I need to display for my job.	.465				
I put on a "mask" in order to display the emotions I need for the job.	.594	3.37	24.09	24.09	α=.87
Active Deep Acting Scale					
I try to actually experience the emotions that I must show.	.959				
I really try to feel the emotions I have to show as a part of my job.	.933				
I make an effort to actually feel the emotions that I need to display to others.	.909	2.69	19.18	43.28	α=.93
Passive Deep Acting Scale					
I feel emotions similar to those I am required to express at work.	.811				
I experience the emotions I am required to express on the job.	.745				
I don't need to pretend to have the emotions that I am required to express at work.	.731	1.70	12.13	55.41	α=.63
Non-Acting Scale					
I do not find it necessary to display any emotion when I am at work, whether I feel it or not.	.845				
I prefer to have a reserved attitude with customers, where I do not express any emotion.	.763	1.86	13.27	68.68	α=.70

Psychological Strain. The psychological strains due to the emotional labor process usually fall under the established burnout dimensions. A common tool used to measure burnout is the career burnout scale. This 21-item scale measures the three primary symptoms determined to indicate burnout, according to Pines and Aronson (1988). These symptoms are emotional exhaustion, physical exhaustion, and mental exhaustion. The burnout scale (α=.94) exceeded the α=.70 reliability threshold of Nunnally (1970). The items for this scale are listed in Appendix F.

Other indicators of psychological strain were measured. The 7-item scale created by House and Rizzo (1972) was used to determine job tension. In this study, the job tension scale had a reliability of α=.83. The items for this scale are listed in Appendix G.

The 10-item depressed mood at work scale created by Quinn and Shepard (1974) was used as another measure of psychological strain. In this study, the depressed mood at work scale had a reliability of α=.82. The items for this scale are listed in Appendix H.

Employee Affect

Job satisfaction was measured in the self-report survey using the 3-item measure from Michigan Organizational Assessment. Questions in this scale included:

1. All in all, I am satisfied with my job.
2. In general, I don't like my job.
3. In general, I like working here.

In this study, the job satisfaction scale had a reliability of α=.89.

Organizational commitment was measured using questions developed by Meyer, Allen, and Smith (1993). Specifically, their 6-item measure of affective commitment was used. In this study, the organizational commitment scale had a reliability of α=.85. The items for this scale are listed in Appendix I.

Job involvement was measured with a 20-item scale created by Lodahl and Kejner (1965). In this study, the job involvement scale had a reliability of α=.84. The items for this scale are listed in Appendix J.

Organizational Issues

Intention to turnover was measured in the self-report survey using the 2-item measure from Michigan Organizational Assessment. Questions in this scale were:

1. I often think about quitting this job.
2. I will probably look for a new job in the next year.

In this study, the intention to turnover scale had a reliability of α=.79.

Two scales measured employee performance. Supervisors were asked to rate employees' performance using these scales. The first scale from the work of Waldersee & Luthans (1994) had 16 items, and measured employees' customer service performance. The scale had a reliability of α=.94. The items for this scale are listed in Appendix K.

The second scale was created by Grandey (1999) as a 9-item emotional labor measure. It was used in this dissertation as a measure of emotional performance by allowing supervisors to evaluate the level at which employees fulfilled emotional labor requirements. In this study, the emotional labor performance scale had a reliability of α=.94. The items for this scale are listed in Appendix L.

Data Analyses

Several of the hypotheses simply require the determination of emotional intelligence as a predictor of certain emotional labor behaviors. In these cases, hierarchical regression was used. The majority of hypotheses involve the assessment of emotional intelligence as a moderator. Hierarchical moderated regression was used to analyze the moderating effects of emotional intelligence in the relationships between emotional labor efforts and outcomes. This form of analysis has been credited as the most rigorous test of moderator effects (Baron & Kenny, 1986; Champoux & Peters, 1987; Chaplin, 1991; Abraham, 1998). Using this method in the analysis allows for the effects of control variables and main-effect variables to be excluded from the final result so that the variance due to the moderator variable is clear.

CHAPTER 5

RESULTS

Chapter Overview

Chapter 4 presented the data collection source and method as well as the measures used in the study. This chapter provides the results of the statistical analyses used to test the hypotheses formulated in Chapter 3. Additional analyses are also provided at the end of this chapter. The intercorrelations of the variables are presented at the end of the chapter in Table 4.

Analysis of Hypotheses

Hypothesis 1a-d

Hypothesis 1a. Table 5 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 1a. In this analysis, the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed emotional intelligence on surface acting. According to the results, emotional intelligence did not predict the emotional effort of surface acting (β = .00, *n.s.*). Hypothesis 1a is not supported.

Hypothesis 1b. Table 5 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 1b. In this analysis, the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed emotional intelligence on active deep acting.

According to the results, emotional intelligence was found to be a positive and significant predictor for the emotional effort of active deep acting (β = .22, p<.01), and explained incremental variance beyond that explained by the control variables (ΔR^2=.04, p<.01). Hypothesis 1b is supported, as emotional intelligence is associated with an increase in active deep acting (see Figure 3).

Hypothesis 1c. Table 6 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 1c. In this analysis, the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed emotional intelligence on non-acting.



Figure 3 Association of Emotional Intelligence with Active Deep Acting

Hypothesis 1d. Table 6 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 1d. In this analysis, the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed emotional intelligence on passive deep acting.



Figure 4 Association of Emotional Intelligence with Non-Acting

According to the results, emotional intelligence was found to be a positive and significant predictor for the emotional effort of passive deep acting (β = .22, p<.01), and explained incremental variance beyond that explained by the control variables (ΔR^2=.04, p<.01). Therefore, Hypothesis 1d is supported, as emotional intelligence is associated with an increase in passive deep acting with increasing levels of emotional intelligence (see Figure 5).



Figure 5 Association of Emotional Intelligence with Passive Deep Acting

Hypothesis 2a-d

Hypothesis 2a. Table 7 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 2a where burnout represents psychological strain. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed burnout on surface acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term surface acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

The interaction explained a significant incremental portion of variance (ΔR^2=.05, p<.01) in burnout over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of surface acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of psychological strain, Hypothesis 2a is supported, as increased surface acting is associated with a much sharper increase in burnout for individuals having lower levels of emotional intelligence than for individuals with higher levels of emotional intelligence (see Figure 6).



Figure 6 Emotional Intelligence x Surface Acting on Burnout

Table 8 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 2a where the psychological strain is represented by depressed mood at work. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed depressed mood on surface acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term surface acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

The interaction in this case explained a significant incremental portion of variance (ΔR^2=.03, p<.01) in depressed mood over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of surface acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of psychological strain, Hypothesis 2a is supported, as increased surface acting is associated with a much sharper increase in depressed mood for individuals having lower levels of emotional intelligence than for individuals with higher levels of emotional intelligence (see Figure 7).

Table 9 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 2a where the psychological strain is represented by job tension. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed depressed mood on surface acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term surface acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.



Figure 7 Emotional Intelligence x Surface Acting on Depressed Mood at Work

Using job tension as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in job tension over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of surface acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of psychological strain, Hypothesis 2a is not supported.

Hypothesis 2b. Table 10 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 2b where burnout represents psychological strain. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed burnout on active deep acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term active deep acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

The interaction explained a significant incremental portion of variance (ΔR^2=.02, p<.05) in burnout over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of active deep acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of psychological strain, Hypothesis 2b is partially supported. Low emotional intelligence does not appear to be associated with an increase or decrease in burnout based on active deep acting. However, those low in emotional intelligence seem to report more burnout at low levels of active deep acting.

Interestingly, active deep acting is associated with a slight increase in burnout for individuals with higher levels of emotional intelligence (see Figure 8).

Table 11 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 2b where psychological strain is represented by depressed mood. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed depressed mood on active deep acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term active deep acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.



Figure 8 Emotional Intelligence x Active Deep Acting on Burnout

According to the results for this regression, emotional intelligence was not found to moderate the relationship between active deep acting and depressed mood. The interaction did not explain a significant incremental portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in depressed mood over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of active deep acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of psychological strain, Hypothesis 2b is not supported.

The last psychological strain to be represented in the analysis of Hypothesis 2b is job tension. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed job tension on active deep acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence

to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term active deep acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

According to the results show in Table 12, emotional intelligence was not found to moderate the relationship between active deep acting and job tension. The interaction did not explain a significant incremental portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in job tension over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of active deep acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of psychological strain, Hypothesis 2b is not supported.

Hypothesis 2c. Table 13 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 2c where burnout represents psychological strain. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed burnout on non-acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term non-acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

According to the results shown in Table 13, emotional intelligence was not found to moderate the relationship between non-acting and burnout. The interaction did not explain a significant incremental portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in burnout over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of non-acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of psychological strain, Hypothesis 2c is not supported.

In the next analysis used to test Hypothesis 2c, psychological strain is represented by depressed mood. The control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed depressed mood on non-acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term non-acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

According to the results shown in Table 14, the interaction explained a significant incremental portion of variance (ΔR^2=.01, p<.10) in depressed mood over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of non-acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of psychological strain, Hypothesis 2c is supported, as increased non-acting is associated with a much sharper increase in depressed mood for individuals having higher levels of emotional intelligence than for individuals with lower levels of emotional intelligence (see Figure 9).

In the last analysis used to test Hypothesis 2c, psychological strain is represented by job tension. The control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed job tension on non-acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term non-acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.



Figure 9 Emotional Intelligence x Non-acting on Depressed Mood at Work

According to the results shown in Table 15, emotional intelligence was found to moderate the relationship between non-acting and job tension. The interaction explained a significant incremental portion of variance (ΔR^2=.01, p<.10) in job tension over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of non-acting and emotional intelligence. Therefore, Hypothesis 2c is supported in this case.

Hypothesis 2d. Table 16 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 2d where psychological strain is represented by burnout. In this analysis, the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed burnout on passive deep acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term passive deep acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

According to the results, emotional intelligence was found to moderate the relationship between passive deep acting and burnout. The interaction explained a significant incremental portion of variance (ΔR^2=.02, p<.05) in burnout over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of passive deep acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of psychological strain, Hypothesis 2d is partially supported, as there is a moderating effect of emotional intelligence on the relationship between passive deep acting and burnout. However, the effects were not completely as expected. At low levels of passive deep acting, low emotional intelligence is associated with higher levels of burnout than high emotional intelligence. The results also show that increased passive deep acting is associated with a more significant decrease in burnout for individuals with low levels of emotional intelligence (see Figure 10).



Figure 10 Emotional Intelligence x Passive Deep Acting on Burnout

In the next analysis used to test Hypothesis 2d, psychological strain is represented by depressed mood. The control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed depressed mood on passive deep acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term passive deep acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

According to the results in Table 17, emotional intelligence was not found to moderate the relationship between passive deep acting and depressed mood. The interaction did not explain a significant incremental portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in depressed mood over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of passive deep acting and emotional intelligence. Therefore, Hypothesis 2d is not supported in this case.

In the final analysis used to test Hypothesis 2d, psychological strain is represented by job tension. The control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed job tension on passive deep acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term passive deep acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

According to the results in Table 18, emotional intelligence was not found to moderate the relationship between passive deep acting and job tension. The interaction did not explain a significant incremental portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in job tension over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of passive deep acting and emotional intelligence. Therefore, Hypothesis 2d is not supported in this case.

Hypothesis 3a-d

Hypothesis 3a. Table 19 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 3a. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed physical strain on surface acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term surface acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

The interaction explained a significant incremental portion of variance (ΔR^2=.03, p<.01) in physical strain over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of surface acting and emotional intelligence. The results support Hypothesis 3a, as increased surface acting is associated with a much sharper increase in physical strain for individuals having lower levels of emotional intelligence than for individuals with higher levels of emotional intelligence (see Figure 11).

Hypothesis 3b. Table 20 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 3b. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed physical strain on active deep acting. Step 3 added

emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term active deep acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.



Figure 11 Emotional Intelligence x Surface Acting on Physical Strain

According to the results for this regression, emotional intelligence was not found to moderate the relationship between active deep acting and physical strain. The interaction did not explain a significant incremental portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in physical strain over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of active deep acting and emotional intelligence. Therefore, Hypothesis 3b is not supported.

Hypothesis 3c. Table 21 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 3c. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed physical strain on non-acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term non-acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

According to the results for this regression, emotional intelligence was not found to moderate the relationship between non-acting and physical strain. The interaction did not explain a significant incremental portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in physical strain over and above the

control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of non-acting and emotional intelligence. Therefore, Hypothesis 3c is not supported.

Hypothesis 3d. Table 22 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 3d. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed physical strain on passive deep acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term passive deep acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

According to the results for this regression, emotional intelligence was not found to moderate the relationship between passive deep acting and physical strain. The interaction did not explain a significant incremental portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in physical strain over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of passive deep acting and emotional intelligence. Therefore, Hypothesis 3d is not supported.

Hypothesis 4a-d

Hypothesis 4a. Table 23 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 4a where employee affect is represented by job satisfaction. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed job satisfaction on surface acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term surface acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

Using job satisfaction as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in job satisfaction over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of surface acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of employee affect, Hypothesis 4a is not supported.

Table 24 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 4a where employee affect is represented by organizational commitment. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed organizational commitment on surface acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term surface acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

Using organizational commitment as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in organizational commitment over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of surface acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of employee affect, Hypothesis 4a is not supported.

Table 25 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 4a where employee affect is represented by job involvement. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed job involvement on surface acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term surface acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

Using job involvement as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in job involvement over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of surface acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of employee affect, Hypothesis 4a is not supported.

Hypothesis 4b. Table 26 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 4b where employee affect is represented by job satisfaction. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed job satisfaction on active deep acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term active deep acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

Using job satisfaction as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in job satisfaction over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of active deep acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of employee affect, Hypothesis 4b is not supported.

Table 27 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 4b where employee affect is represented by organizational commitment. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed organizational commitment on active deep acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence

to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term active deep acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

Using organizational commitment as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in organizational commitment over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of active deep acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of employee affect, Hypothesis 4b is not supported.

Table 28 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 4b where employee affect is represented by job involvement. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed job involvement on active deep acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term active deep acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

Using job involvement as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in job involvement over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of active deep acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of employee affect, Hypothesis 4b is not supported.

Hypothesis 4c. Table 29 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 4c where employee affect is represented by job satisfaction. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed job satisfaction on non-acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term non-acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

Using job satisfaction as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in job satisfaction over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of non-acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of employee affect, Hypothesis 4c is not supported.

Table 30 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 4c where employee affect is represented by organizational commitment. In this

analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed organizational commitment on non-acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term non-acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

Using organizational commitment as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in organizational commitment over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of non-acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of employee affect, Hypothesis 4c is not supported.

Table 31 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 4c where employee affect is represented by job involvement. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed job involvement on non-acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term non-acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

Using job involvement as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in job involvement over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of non-acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of employee affect, Hypothesis 4c is not supported.

Hypothesis 4d. Table 32 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 4d where employee affect is represented by job satisfaction. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed job satisfaction on passive deep acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term passive deep acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

Using job satisfaction as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in job satisfaction over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of passive deep acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of employee affect, Hypothesis 4d is not supported.

Table 33 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 4d where employee affect is represented by organizational commitment. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed organizational commitment on passive deep acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term passive deep acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

Using organizational commitment as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in organizational commitment over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of passive deep acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of employee affect, Hypothesis 4d is not supported.

Table 34 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 4d where employee affect is represented by job involvement. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed job involvement on passive deep acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term passive deep acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

Using job involvement as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in job involvement over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of passive deep acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of employee affect, Hypothesis 4d is not supported.

Hypothesis 5a-d

Hypothesis 5a. Table 35 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 5a. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, negative affectivity and tenure, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed turnover on surface acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term surface acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

The interaction explained a significant incremental portion of variance (ΔR^2=.01, p<.10) in burnout over and above the control variables, age, gender, negative affectivity and tenure, and the main effects of surface acting and emotional intelligence. Hence, Hypothesis 5a is supported,

as increased surface acting is associated with a much sharper increase in intentions to turnover for individuals having lower levels of emotional intelligence than for individuals with higher levels of emotional intelligence (see Figure 12).



Figure 12 Emotional Intelligence x Surface Acting on Intentions to Turnover

Hypothesis 5b. Table 36 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 5b. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, negative affectivity, and tenure, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed intentions to turnover on active deep acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term active deep acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

Using intentions to turnover as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.01, *n.s.*) in turnover intentions over and above the control variables, age, gender, negative affectivity, and tenure, and the main effects of active deep acting and emotional intelligence. Hence, Hypothesis 5b is not supported.

Hypothesis 5c. Table 37 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 5c. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, negative affectivity, and tenure, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed turnover intentions on non-acting. Step 3 added

emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term non-acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

Using turnover intentions as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in turnover intentions over and above the control variables, age, gender, negative affectivity, and tenure, and the main effects of non-acting and emotional intelligence. Hence, Hypothesis 5c is not supported.

Hypothesis 5d. Table 38 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 5d. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, negative affectivity and tenure, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed turnover on passive deep acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term passive deep acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

The interaction explained a significant incremental portion of variance (ΔR^2=.01, p<.10) in turnover intentions over and above the control variables, age, gender, negative affectivity and tenure, and the main effects of surface acting and emotional intelligence. Hence, Hypothesis 5d is supported, as increased passive deep acting is associated with a sharp decrease in turnover intentions for individuals with lower levels of emotional intelligence. However, higher levels of emotional intelligence are associated with a negligible decrease in turnover intentions (see Figure 13).

Hypothesis 6a-d

Hypothesis 6a. Table 39 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 6a where employee performance is represented by supervisor-rated job performance. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed job performance on surface acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term surface acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

Using job performance as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in job performance over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of surface acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of employee performance, Hypothesis 6a is not supported.



Figure 13 Emotional Intelligence x Passive Deep Acting on Intentions to Turnover

Table 40 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 6a where employee performance is represented by supervisor-rated emotional performance. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed emotional performance on surface acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term surface acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

Using emotional performance as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in emotional performance over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of surface acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of employee performance, Hypothesis 6a is not supported.

Hypothesis 6b. Table 41 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 6b where employee performance is represented by job performance. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed job performance on active deep acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term active deep acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

Using job performance as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.01, *n.s.*) in job performance over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of active deep acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of employee performance, Hypothesis 6b is not supported.

Table 42 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 6b where employee performance is represented by emotional performance. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed emotional performance on active deep acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term active deep acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

Using emotional performance as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in emotional performance over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of active deep acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of employee performance, Hypothesis 6b is not supported.

Hypothesis 6c. Table 43 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 6c where employee performance is represented by job performance. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed job performance on non-acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term non-acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

Using job performance as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in job performance over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of non-acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of employee performance, Hypothesis 6c is not supported.

Table 44 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 6c where employee performance is represented by emotional performance. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed emotional performance on non-acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the

analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term non-acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

Using emotional performance as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in emotional performance over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of non-acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of employee performance, Hypothesis 6c is not supported.

Hypothesis 6d. Table 45 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 6d where employee performance is represented by job performance. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed job performance on passive deep acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term passive deep acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

Using job performance as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in job performance over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of passive deep acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of employee performance, Hypothesis 6d is not supported.

Table 46 displays the results of the hierarchical regression analysis used to test Hypothesis 6d where employee performance is represented by emotional performance. In this analysis the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, were entered in step 1. Step 2 regressed emotional performance on passive deep acting. Step 3 added emotional intelligence to the analysis, and step 4 included the interaction term passive deep acting x emotional intelligence as the test for moderation.

Using emotional performance as the dependent variable in this analysis, the results did not indicate support for the hypothesis. The interaction did not explain a significant portion of variance (ΔR^2=.00, *n.s.*) in emotional performance over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effects of passive deep acting and emotional intelligence. For this type of employee performance, Hypothesis 6d is not supported.

Additional Analyses

Although some of the hypotheses specifying moderating effects were not supported, there were some interesting relationships found in those situations when the main effects were analyzed. These main effect associations indicate that emotional intelligence does have an association with the dependant variables of interest. However, the associations between emotional intelligence and these variables are not as a moderator, but perhaps as a mediator. These relationships are mentioned in order of the original hypotheses.

Hypothesis 2

Hypothesis 2a. While analyzing the constructs representing various psychological strains, job tension was used as the dependant variable in the evaluation of the emotional intelligence x surface acting interaction. Emotional intelligence was not found to be a moderator in the relationship between surface acting and job tension. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.03, p<.01) is a predictor of job tension over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, surface acting (see Table 9). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is negatively associated with job tension in emotional labor interactions when surface acting occurs.

Hypothesis 2b. There was no support found for Hypothesis 2b when two forms of psychological strain, depressed mood at work and job tension, were used as dependent variables in the hierarchical regression used to evaluated the emotional intelligence x active deep acting interaction. Emotional intelligence was not found to be a moderator in the relationship between active deep acting and depressed mood. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.10, p<.01) is a predictor of depressed mood over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, active deep acting (see Table 11). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is negatively and significantly associated with depressed mood in emotional labor interactions when active deep acting occurs.

Similarly, emotional intelligence was not found to be a moderator in the relationship between active deep acting and job tension. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.03, p<.01) is a predictor of job tension over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, active deep acting (see Table 12). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is negatively associated with job tension in emotional labor interactions when active deep acting occurs.

Hypothesis 2c. Support was not found for Hypothesis 2c burnout was used as a dependent variable in the hierarchical regression used to evaluated the emotional intelligence x non-acting interaction. Emotional intelligence was not found to be a moderator in the relationship between non-acting and burnout. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.06, p<.01) is a predictor of burnout over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, non-acting (see Table 13). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is negatively associated with burnout in emotional labor interactions when non-acting occurs.

Hypothesis 2d. There was no support found for Hypothesis 2d when two forms of psychological strain, depressed mood at work and job tension, were used as dependent variables in the hierarchical regression used to evaluated the emotional intelligence x passive deep acting interaction. Emotional intelligence was not found to be a moderator in the relationship between passive deep acting and depressed mood. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.08, p<.01) is a predictor of depressed mood over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, passive deep acting (see Table 17). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is negatively and significantly associated with depressed mood in emotional labor interactions when passive deep acting occurs.

Similarly, emotional intelligence was not found to be a moderator in the relationship between passive deep acting and job tension. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.02, p<.05) is a predictor of job tension over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, passive deep acting (see Table 18). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is negatively associated with job tension in emotional labor interactions when passive deep acting occurs.

Hypothesis 3

Hypothesis 3b. While analyzing physical strain as the dependant variable in the evaluation of the emotional intelligence x active deep acting interaction, emotional intelligence was not found to be a moderator in the relationship between active deep acting and physical strain. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.03, p<.01) is a predictor of physical strain over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, active deep acting (see Table 20). The results indicate that

emotional intelligence is negatively associated with physical strain in emotional labor interactions when active deep acting occurs.

Hypothesis 3c. Also, emotional intelligence was not found to be a moderator in the relationship between non-acting and physical strain. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.02, p<.05) is a predictor of physical strain over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, non-acting (see Table 21). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is negatively associated with physical strain in emotional labor interactions when non-acting occurs.

Hypothesis 3d. Similarly, the analysis of physical strain as the dependant variable in the evaluation of the emotional intelligence x passive deep acting interaction showed no support for this hypothesis. Emotional intelligence was not found to be a moderator in the relationship between passive deep acting and physical strain. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.02, p<.05) is a predictor of physical strain over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, passive deep acting (see Table 22). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is negatively and significantly associated with physical strain in emotional labor interactions when passive deep acting occurs.

Hypothesis 4

Hypothesis 4a. While analyzing the constructs representing various forms of employee affect, job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and job involvement, no support was found for emotional intelligence as a moderator in the relationship between surface acting and the proposed forms of employee affect. However, in the case of job satisfaction, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.05, p<.01) is a predictor of job satisfaction over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, surface acting (see Table 23). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is positively and significantly associated with job satisfaction in emotional labor interactions when surface acting occurs.

While analyzing organizational commitment as the dependant variable in the evaluation of the emotional intelligence x surface acting interaction, emotional intelligence was not found to be a moderator in the relationship between surface acting and organizational commitment. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.05, p<.01) is a predictor of organizational commitment over and above the control variables, age, gender, and

negative affectivity, and the main effect, surface acting (see Table 24). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is positively and significantly associated with organizational commitment in emotional labor interactions when surface acting occurs.

In the same way, emotional intelligence was not found to be a moderator in the relationship between surface acting and job involvement. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.02, p<.05) is a predictor of job involvement over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, surface acting (see Table 25). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is positively and significantly associated with job involvement in emotional labor interactions when surface acting occurs.

Hypothesis 4b. As in the case of surface acting, no support was found for emotional intelligence as a moderator in the relationship between active deep acting and the proposed forms of employee affect. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.03, p<.01) is a predictor of job satisfaction over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, active deep acting (see Table 26). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is positively associated with job satisfaction in emotional labor interactions when active deep acting occurs.

While analyzing organizational commitment as the dependant variable in the evaluation of the emotional intelligence x active deep acting interaction, emotional intelligence was not found to be a moderator in the relationship between active deep acting and organizational commitment. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.03, p<.01) is a predictor of organizational commitment over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, active deep acting (see Table 27). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is positively associated with organizational commitment in emotional labor interactions when active deep acting occurs.

Similarly, emotional intelligence was not found to be a moderator in the relationship between active deep acting and job involvement. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.01, p<.10) is a predictor of job involvement over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, active deep acting (see Table 28). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is positively associated with job involvement in emotional labor interactions when active deep acting occurs.

Hypothesis 4c. Support was not found for emotional intelligence as a moderator in the relationship between non-acting and the proposed forms of employee affect. However, in the case of job satisfaction, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.04, p<.01) is a predictor of job satisfaction over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, non-acting (see Table 29). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is positively and significantly associated with job satisfaction in emotional labor interactions when non-acting occurs.

In addition, emotional intelligence was not found to be a moderator in the relationship between non-acting and organizational commitment. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.03, p<.01) is a predictor of organizational commitment over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, non-acting (see Table 30). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is positively and significantly associated with organizational commitment in emotional labor interactions when non-acting occurs.

Also, support was not found for emotional intelligence as a moderator in the relationship between non-acting and job involvement. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.02, p<.10) is a predictor of job involvement over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, non-acting (see Table 31). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is positively associated with job involvement in emotional labor interactions when non-acting occurs.

Hypothesis 4d. As in the case of all the other forms of emotional effort, support could not be found for emotional intelligence as a moderator in the relationship between passive deep acting and the proposed forms of employee affect. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.03, p<.01) is a predictor of job satisfaction over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, passive deep acting (see Table 32). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is positively associated with job satisfaction in emotional labor interactions when passive deep acting occurs.

In the case of organizational commitment as the dependant variable in the evaluation of the emotional intelligence x passive deep acting interaction, emotional intelligence was not found to be a moderator in the relationship between passive deep acting and organizational commitment. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.03,

$p<.01$) is a predictor of organizational commitment over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, passive deep acting (see Table 33). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is positively associated with organizational commitment in emotional labor interactions when passive deep acting occurs.

Similarly, emotional intelligence was not found to be a moderator in the relationship between passive deep acting and job involvement. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence ($\Delta R^2=.01$, $p<.10$) is a predictor of job involvement over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, passive deep acting (see Table 34). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is negatively associated with job involvement in emotional labor interactions when passive deep acting occurs.

Hypothesis 5

Hypothesis 5b. While analyzing intent to turnover as the dependant variable in the evaluation of the emotional intelligence x active deep acting interaction, emotional intelligence was not found to be a moderator in the relationship between active deep acting and intent to turnover. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence ($\Delta R^2=.07$, $p<.01$) is a predictor of intent to turnover over and above the control variables, age, gender, negative affectivity and tenure, and the main effect, active deep acting (see Table 36). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is negatively and significantly associated with intent to turnover in emotional labor interactions when active deep acting occurs.

Hypothesis 5c. Also, emotional intelligence was not found to be a moderator in the relationship between non-acting and turnover intentions. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence ($\Delta R^2=.06$, $p<.01$) is a predictor of intent to turnover over and above the control variables, age, gender, negative affectivity and tenure, and the main effect, non-acting (see Table 37). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is negatively and significantly associated with turnover intentions in emotional labor interactions when non-acting occurs.

Hypothesis 6

Hypothesis 6a. While analyzing the constructs representing forms of employee performance, job performance and emotional performance, no support was found for emotional intelligence as a moderator in the relationship between surface acting and these proposed forms of employee performance. However, in the case of job performance, an analysis of main effects

found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.02, p<.05) is a predictor of job performance over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, surface acting (see Table 39). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is positively associated with job performance in emotional labor interactions when surface acting occurs.

While analyzing emotional performance as the dependant variable in the evaluation of the emotional intelligence x surface acting interaction, emotional intelligence was not found to be a moderator in the relationship between surface acting and emotional performance. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.01, p<.10) is a predictor of emotional performance over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, surface acting (see Table 40). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is positively associated with emotional performance in emotional labor interactions when surface acting occurs.

Hypothesis 6b. As was the case in surface acting, no support was found for emotional intelligence as a moderator in the relationship between active deep acting and the proposed forms of employee performance. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.02, p<.05) is a predictor of job performance over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, active deep acting (see Table 41). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is positively and significantly associated with job performance in emotional labor interactions when active deep acting occurs.

Similarly, in the analysis of emotional performance as the dependant variable in the evaluation of the emotional intelligence x active deep acting interaction, emotional intelligence was not found to be a moderator in the relationship between active deep acting and emotional performance. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.02, p<.10) is a predictor of emotional performance over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, active deep acting (see Table 42). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is positively associated with emotional performance in emotional labor interactions when active deep acting occurs.

Hypothesis 6d. In the analysis of passive deep acting, support could not be found for emotional intelligence as a moderator in the relationship between passive deep acting and the proposed forms of employee performance. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.02, p<.05) is a predictor of job performance over and above the

control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, passive deep acting (see Table 45). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is positively associated with job performance in emotional labor interactions when passive deep acting occurs.

In the case of emotional performance as the dependant variable in the evaluation of the emotional intelligence x passive deep acting interaction, emotional intelligence was not found to be a moderator in the relationship between passive deep acting and emotional performance. However, an analysis of main effects found that emotional intelligence (ΔR^2=.01, p<.10) is a predictor of organizational commitment over and above the control variables, age, gender, and negative affectivity, and the main effect, passive deep acting (see Table 46). The results indicate that emotional intelligence is positively associated with emotional performance in emotional labor interactions when passive deep acting occurs.

Table 4 Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations of All Variables

	Mean	SD	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
1. Age	31.36	13.40	1.00																		
2. Gender	1.70	.46	.00	1.00																	
3. N A	15.93	5.02	-.34**	-.06	1.00																
4. Tenure	1.99	3.25	.53**	-.01	-.22**	1.00															
5. E I	111.01	11.82	-.01	.17*	-.38**	.02	1.00														
6. Surface Act	10.87	3.99	-.28**	-.05	.42**	-.20**	-.14*	1.00													
7. Active Deep Act	8.99	3.62	-.21**	.24**	-.03	-.16**	.26**	-.03	1.00												
8. Non-Act	3.88	1.78	.03	-.23**	.08	.02	-.25**	.08	-.28**	1.00											
9. Passive Deep Act	9.61	2.61	.04	.32**	-.26**	.03	.33**	-.37**	.43**	-.27**	1.00										
10. Burnout	43.15	12.05	-.24**	-.00	.56**	-.20**	-.45**	.42**	-.04	.21**	-.32**	1.00									
11. Depressed Mood	21.47	5.68	-.25**	-.00	.51**	-.20**	-.47**	.37**	-.02	.20**	-.34**	.77**	1.00								
12. Job Tension	15.52	5.24	-.09	.02	.38**	-.08	-.29**	.30**	.05	.11	-.25**	.55**	.47**	1.00							
13. Physical Strain	16.34	4.97	-.26**	.05	.42**	-.21**	-.28**	.35**	.08	.06	-.15*	.63**	.61**	.44**	1.00						
14. Job Sat	12.09	2.35	.30**	.23**	-.31**	.16**	.31**	-.40**	.18*	-.18**	.31**	-.41**	-.38**	-.36**	-.26**	1.00					
15. Org Commit	19.25	4.90	.24**	.20**	-.35**	.25**	.33**	-.43**	.21**	-.25**	.34**	-.41**	-.35**	-.22**	-.19**	.66**	1.00				
16. Job Involve	59.55	9.83	.16*	.22**	-.21**	.15*	.23**	-.32**	.23**	-.17*	.28**	-.30**	-.21**	-.02	-.13	.59**	.67**	1.00			
17. Turnover Intentions	4.71	1.99	-.34**	-.10	.29**	-.18*	-.33**	.33**	-.08	.18**	-.20**	.50**	.44**	.41**	.31**	-.68**	-.56**	-.48**	1.00		
18. Job Perform	66.74	9.33	.26**	.07	-.12	.19**	.15*	-.07	-.05	-.22**	.00	-.17*	-.17*	.03	-.24**	.19**	.28**	.09	-.16*	1.00	
19. Emotion Perform	37.89	5.50	.24**	.02	-.09	.15*	.11	-.06	-.03	-.23**	.00	-.11	-.13	-.08	-.15*	.17*	.21**	.06	-.16*	.83**	1.00

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).

Table 5 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Association of Emotional Intelligence with Surface Acting and Active Deep Acting

Predictor	Surface Acting				Active Deep Acting			
	Step 1		Step2		Step 1		Step2	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	-.16*	.02			-.21**	.02		
Gender	-.02	.55			.20**	.51		
Negative Affectivity	.36**	.06			-.01	.05		
Step 2: Emotional Intelligence			.00	.02			.22**	.02
Model F	16.85**		12.57**		8.57**		9.11**	
Overall R^2	.19**		.18		.10**		.13**	
R^2 change	.20**		.00		.11**		.04**	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.

† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 6 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Association of Emotional Intelligence with Non-Acting and Passive Deep Acting

Predictor	Non-Acting				Passive Deep Acting			
	Step 1		Step2		Step 1		Step2	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.02	.01			-.02	.01		
Gender	-.20**	.26			.27**	.36		
Negative Affectivity	-.01	.03			-.16*	.04		
Step 2: Emotional Intelligence			-.23**	.01			.22**	.02
Model F	4.46**		5.85**		12.96**		12.76**	
Overall R^2	.05**		.09**		.15**		.18**	
R^2 change			.04**				.04**	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.

† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 7 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Surface Acting and Psychological Strain (Burnout)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	-.06	.05						
Gender	.07	1.34						
Negative Affectivity	.35**	.15						
Step 2: Surface Acting			1.92**	1.25				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					.25 †	.15		
Step 4: Surface Acting x Emotional Intelligence							-1.74**	.01
Model F	31.63**		28.12**		31.13**		30.91**	
Overall R^2	.31**		.34**		.42**		.46**	
R^2 change			.04**		.08**		.05**	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 8 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Surface Acting and Psychological Strain (Depressed Mood at Work)

Predictor	Depressed Mood at Work							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	-.10 †	.03						
Gender	.08	.66						
Negative Affectivity	.29**	.07						
Step 2: Surface Acting			1.67**	.62				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					.13	.07		
Step 4: Surface Acting x Emotional Intelligence							-1.51**	.01
Model F	24.95**		21.25**		26.70**		25.47**	
Overall R^2	.26**		.28**		.38**		.41**	
R^2 change			.03**		.10**		.03**	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 9 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Surface Acting and Psychological Strain (Job Tension)

Predictor	Job Tension							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.05	.03						
Gender	.07	.72						
Negative Affectivity	.26**	.08						
Step 2: Surface Acting			.53	.67				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					-.07	.08		
Step 4: Surface Acting x Emotional Intelligence							-.35	.01
Model F	12.01**		10.98**		10.47**		8.78**	
Overall R^2	.14**		.16**		.19**		.18	
R^2 change			.03**		.03**		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.

† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 10 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Active Deep Acting and Psychological Strain (Burnout)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	-.09	.05						
Gender	.07	1.46						
Negative Affectivity	.42**	.15						
Step 2: Active Deep Acting			-1.04*	1.49				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					-.57**	.13		
Step 4: Active Deep Acting x Emotional Intelligence							1.15*	.01
Model F	31.63**		23.86**		26.47**		23.50**	
Overall R^2	.31**		.31		.38**		.39*	
R^2 change			.00		.08**		.02*	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.

† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 11 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Active Deep Acting and Psychological Strain (Depressed Mood at Work)

Predictor	Depressed Mood at Work							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	-.14*	.03						
Gender	.07	.71						
Negative Affectivity	.33**	.07						
Step 2: Active Deep Acting			.48	.72				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					-.26**	.06		
Step 4: Active Deep Acting x Emotional Intelligence							-.49	.01
Model F	24.95**		18.75**		23.95**		20.11**	
Overall R^2	.26**		.25		.35**		.35	
R^2 change			.00		.10**		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.

† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 12 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Active Deep Acting and Psychological Strain (Job Tension)

Predictor	Job Tension							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.04	.03						
Gender	.05	.75						
Negative Affectivity	.32**	.08						
Step 2: Active Deep Acting			.19	.76				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					-.19	.06		
Step 4: Active Deep Acting x Emotional Intelligence							-.09	.01
Model F	12.08**		9.24**		9.35**		7.76**	
Overall R^2	.14**		.14		.17**		.16	
R^2 change			.00		.03**		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.

† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 13 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Non-Acting and Psychological Strain (Burnout)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	-.11 †	.05						
Gender	.10 †	1.45						
Negative Affectivity	.41**	.15						
Step 2: Non-Acting			.53	3.36				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					-.18	.14		
Step 4: Non-Acting x Emotional Intelligence							-.38	.03
Model F	31.63**		27.65**		28.45**		23.77**	
Overall R^2	.31**		.34**		.40**		.40	
R^2 change			.04**		.06**		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 14 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Non-Acting and Psychological Strain (Depressed Mood at Work)

Predictor	Depressed Mood at Work							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.02	.03						
Gender	.08	.75						
Negative Affectivity	.32**	.08						
Step 2: Non-Acting			-.35	1.72				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					-.27 †	.07		
Step 4: Non-Acting x Emotional Intelligence							.40	.02
Model F	12.01**		9.57**		8.95**		7.53**	
Overall R^2	.14**		.14		.16*		.16	
R^2 change			.01		.02**		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 15 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Non-Acting and Psychological Strain (Job Tension)

Predictor	Job Tension							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	-.14*	.03						
Gender	.10 †	.70						
Negative Affectivity	.34**	.07						
Step 2: Non-Acting			-.70	1.61				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					-.53**	.07		
Step 4: Non-Acting x Emotional Intelligence							.81 †	.02
Model F	24.95**		21.90**		25.27**		21.69**	
Overall R^2	.26**		.29**		.37**		.37 †	
R^2 change			.03**		.08**		.01 †	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 16 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Passive Deep Acting and Psychological Strain (Burnout)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	-.09 †	.05						
Gender	.11 †	1.46						
Negative Affectivity	.41**	.15						
Step 2: Passive Deep Acting			-1.28**	2.09				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					-.68**	.18		
Step 4: Passive Deep Acting x Emotional Intelligence							1.32**	.02
Model F	31.63**		28.61**		29.04**		25.82**	
Overall R^2	.31**		.35**		.40**		.42*	
R^2 change			.04**		.06**		.02*	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 17 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Passive Deep Acting and Psychological Strain (Depressed Mood at Work)

Predictor	Depressed Mood at Work							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	-.14*	.03						
Gender	.13*	.71						
Negative Affectivity	.31**	.07						
Step 2: Passive Deep Acting			-.55	1.01				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					-.44*	.09		
Step 4: Passive Deep Acting x Emotional Intelligence							.42	.01
Model F	24.95**		24.75**		27.23**		22.74**	
Overall R^2	.26**		.31**		.39**		.38	
R^2 change			.06**		.08**		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.

† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 18 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Passive Deep Acting and Psychological Strain (Job Tension)

Predictor	Job Tension							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.02	.03						
Gender	.11 †	.76						
Negative Affectivity	.30**	.08						
Step 2: Passive Deep Acting			-.25	1.08				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					-.18	.09		
Step 4: Passive Deep Acting x Emotional Intelligence							.11	.01
Model F	12.01**		11.19**		9.98**		8.28**	
Overall R^2	.14**		.16**		.18*		.17	
R^2 change			.03**		.02**		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 19 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Surface Acting and Physical Strain

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	-.12 †	.02						
Gender	.10 †	.65						
Negative Affectivity	.25**	.07						
Step 2: Surface Acting			1.60**	.60				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					.28 †	.07		
Step 4: Surface Acting x Emotional Intelligence							-1.43**	.01
Model F	16.63**		14.98**		13.76**		13.31**	
Overall R^2	.18**		.21**		.23**		.26**	
R^2 change			.03**		.03**		.03**	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 20 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Active Deep Acting and Physical Strain

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	-.14*	.03						
Gender	.08	.69						
Negative Affectivity	.30**	.07						
Step 2: Active Deep Acting			.23	.70				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					-.16	.06		
Step 4: Active Deep Acting x Emotional Intelligence							-.16	.01
Model F	16.63**		12.57**		12.01**		9.98**	
Overall R^2	.18**		.18		.21**		.21	
R^2 change			.00		.03**		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.

† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 21 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Non-Acting and Physical Strain

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	-.16*	.03						
Gender	.10	.70						
Negative Affectivity	.30**	.07						
Step 2: Non-Acting			.22	1.59				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					-.13	.07		
Step 4: Non-Acting x Emotional Intelligence							-.19	.01
Model F	16.63**		12.64**		11.60**		9.65**	
Overall R^2	.18**		.18		.20**		.20	
R^2 change			.00		.02**		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.

† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 22 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Passive Deep Acting and Physical Strain

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	-.15*	.03						
Gender	.10	.70						
Negative Affectivity	.31**	.07						
Step 2: Passive Deep Acting			-.65	1.01				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					-.39 †	.09		
Step 4: Passive Deep Acting x Emotional Intelligence							.71	.01
Model F	16.63**		12.88**		11.70**		9.98**	
Overall R^2	.18**		.19		.20*		.21	
R^2 change			.01		.02*		.01	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 23 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Surface Acting and Employee Affect (Job Satisfaction)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.21**	.01						
Gender	.18**	.30						
Negative Affectivity	-.01	.03						
Step 2: Surface Acting			-.01	.28				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					.33*	.03		
Step 4: Surface Acting x Emotional Intelligence							-.29**	.00
Model F	15.42**		17.34**		17.42**		14.54**	
Overall R^2	.17**		.24**		.28**		.28	
R^2 change			.07**		.05**		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.

† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 24 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Surface Acting and Employee Affect (Organizational Commitment)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.13*	.02						
Gender	.15*	.63						
Negative Affectivity	-.06	.07						
Step 2: Surface Acting			.05	.58				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					.37*	.07		
Step 4: Surface Acting x Emotional Intelligence							-.39**	.01
Model F	14.24**		17.98**		18.08**		15.15**	
Overall R^2	.16**		.25**		.29**		.29	
R^2 change			.09**		.05**		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.

† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 25 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Surface Acting and Employee Affect (Job Involvement)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.10	.05						
Gender	.18**	1.38						
Negative Affectivity	.02	.15						
Step 2: Surface Acting			.24	1.28				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					.33 †	.15		
Step 4: Surface Acting x Emotional Intelligence							-.52	.01
Model F	7.17**		9.18**		8.57**		7.31**	
Overall R^2	.08**		.14**		.15**		.15	
R^2 change			.06**		.02**		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 26 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Active Deep Acting and Employee Affect (Job Satisfaction)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.29**	.01						
Gender	.15*	.32						
Negative Affectivity	-.12 †	.03						
Step 2: Active Deep Acting			.09	.33				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					.19	.03		
Step 4: Active Deep Acting x Emotional Intelligence							.06	.00
Model F	15.42**		13.92**		13.38**		11.10**	
Overall R^2	.17**		.20**		.23**		.23	
R^2 change			.03**		.03**		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 27 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Active Deep Acting and Employee Affect (Organizational Commitment)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.22**	.03						
Gender	.12 †	.67						
Negative Affectivity	-.18**	.07						
Step 2: Active Deep Acting			.07	.69				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					.18	.06		
Step 4: Active Deep Acting x Emotional Intelligence							.11	.01
Model F	14.24**		13.57**		13.03**		10.81**	
Overall R^2	.16**		.19**		.22**		.22	
R^2 change			.04**		.03**		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 28 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Active Deep Acting and Employee Affect (Job Involvement)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.18**	.05						
Gender	.14*	1.43						
Negative Affectivity	-.09	.15						
Step 2: Active Deep Acting			.16	1.46				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					.11	.12		
Step 4: Active Deep Acting x Emotional Intelligence							.04	.01
Model F	7.17**		8.16**		7.12**		5.90**	
Overall R^2	.08**		.12**		.13 †		.12	
R^2 change			.04**		.01 †		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 29 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Non-Acting and Employee Affect (Job Satisfaction)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.26**	.01						
Gender	.16**	.32						
Negative Affectivity	-.12 †	.03						
Step 2: Non-Acting			.13	.74				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					.27 †	.03		
Step 4: Non-Acting x Emotional Intelligence							-.21	.01
Model F	15.42**		12.77**		12.66**		10.53**	
Overall R^2	.17**		.18*		.22**		.22	
R^2 change			.02*		.04**		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 30 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Non-Acting and Employee Affect (Organizational Commitment)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.18**	.02						
Gender	.12 †	.67						
Negative Affectivity	-.19**	.07						
Step 2: Non-Acting			.27	1.55				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					.31*	.06		
Step 4: Non-Acting x Emotional Intelligence							-.42	.01
Model F	14.24**		13.63**		13.07**		10.97**	
Overall R^2	.16**		.20**		.22**		.22	
R^2 change			.04**		.03**		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 31 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Non-Acting and Employee Affect (Job Involvement)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.14*	.05						
Gender	.17*	1.45						
Negative Affectivity	-.09	.15						
Step 2: Non-Acting			-.35	3.34				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					.08	.14		
Step 4: Non-Acting x Emotional Intelligence							.25	.03
Model F	7.17**		6.28**		5.81**		4.85**	
Overall R^2	.08**		.09 †		.10 †		.10	
R^2 change			.02**		.02**		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 32 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Passive Deep Acting and Employee Affect (Job Satisfaction)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.26**	.01						
Gender	.13*	.33						
Negative Affectivity	-.09	.03						
Step 2: Passive Deep Acting			-.27	.47				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					.04	.04		
Step 4: Passive Deep Acting x Emotional Intelligence							.51	.00
Model F	15.42**		14.42**		13.69**		11.51**	
Overall R^2	.17**		.20**		.23**		.23	
R^2 change			.04**		.03**		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.

† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 33 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Passive Deep Acting and Employee Affect (Organizational Commitment)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.19**	.02						
Gender	.10	.68						
Negative Affectivity	-.15*	.07						
Step 2: Passive Deep Acting			-.17	.98				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					.06	.08		
Step 4: Passive Deep Acting x Emotional Intelligence							.44	.01
Model F	14.24**		14.48**		13.63**		11.42**	
Overall R^2	.16**		.21**		.23**		.23	
R^2 change			.05**		.03**		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.

† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 34 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Passive Deep Acting and Employee Affect (Job Involvement)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.14*	.05						
Gender	.13 †	1.47						
Negative Affectivity	-.05	.15						
Step 2: Passive Deep Acting			-.28	2.10				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					-.05	.18		
Step 4: Passive Deep Acting x Emotional Intelligence							.54	.02
Model F	7.17**		7.72**		6.79**		5.76**	
Overall R^2	.08**		.11**		.12 †		.12	
R^2 change			.04**		.01 †		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 35 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Surface Acting and Turnover Intentions

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	-.29**	.01						
Gender	-.04	.26						
Negative Affectivity	-.01	.03						
Tenure	.01	.04						
Step 2: Surface Acting			1.09*	.24				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					-.02	.03		
Step 4: Surface Acting x Emotional Intelligence							-.89 †	.00
Model F	9.45**		9.80**		12.56**		11.35**	
Overall R^2	.14**		.18**		.25**		.26 †	
R^2 change			.04**		.08**		.01 †	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 36 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Active Deep Acting and Turnover Intentions

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	-.34**	.01						
Gender	-.03	.27						
Negative Affectivity	.07	.03						
Tenure	.01	.04						
Step 2: Active Deep Acting			-.83	.28				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					-.47**	.02		
Step 4: Active Deep Acting x Emotional Intelligence							.83	.00
Model F	9.45**		8.37**		10.46**		9.35**	
Overall R^2	.14**		.15 †		.21**		.21	
R^2 change			.01 †		.07**		.01	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 37 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Non-Acting and Turnover Intentions

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	-.33**	.01						
Gender	-.02	.27						
Negative Affectivity	.06	.03						
Tenure	.01	.04						
Step 2: Non-Acting			-.16	.63				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					-.35*	.03		
Step 4: Non-Acting x Emotional Intelligence							.26	.01
Model F	9.45**		9.04**		10.87**		9.32**	
Overall R^2	.14**		.16**		.22**		.22	
R^2 change			.03**		.06**		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.

† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 38 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Passive Deep Acting and Turnover Intentions

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	-.32**	.01						
Gender	-.03	.28						
Negative Affectivity	.07	.03						
Tenure	.02	.04						
Step 2: Passive Deep Acting			-.97 †	.40				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					-.62**	.03		
Step 4: Passive Deep Acting x Emotional Intelligence							1.06 †	.00
Model F	9.45**		8.52**		10.53**		9.52**	
Overall R^2	.14**		.15*		.22**		.22 †	
R^2 change			.02*		.07**		.01 †	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 39 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Surface Acting and Performance (Job Performance)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.27**	.05						
Gender	.05	1.37						
Negative Affectivity	.03	.15						
Step 2: Surface Acting			-.29	1.27				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					.06	.15		
Step 4: Surface Acting x Emotional Intelligence							.30	.01
Model F	5.42**		4.05**		4.23**		3.57**	
Overall R^2	.06**		.06		.07*		.07	
R^2 change			.00		.02*		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.

† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 40 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Surface Acting and Performance (Emotional Performance)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.23**	.02						
Gender	.00	.49						
Negative Affectivity	.05	.06						
Step 2: Surface Acting			-.01	.46				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					.14	.05		
Step 4: Surface Acting x Emotional Intelligence							-.03	.00
Model F	3.83**		2.94*		3.01**		2.50*	
Overall R^2	.04**		.04		.05 †		.04	
R^2 change			.00		.01 †		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 41 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Active Deep Acting and Performance (Job Performance)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.26**	.05						
Gender	.06	1.39						
Negative Affectivity	.03	.14						
Step 2: Active Deep Acting			.60	1.42				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					.33*	.12		
Step 4: Active Deep Acting x Emotional Intelligence							-.71	.01
Model F	5.42**		4.07**		4.36**		3.87**	
Overall R^2	.06**		.06		.07*		.08	
R^2 change			.00		.02*		.01	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.

† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 42 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Active Deep Acting and Performance (Emotional Performance)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.24**	.02						
Gender	.01	.50						
Negative Affectivity	.03	.05						
Step 2: Active Deep Acting			.17	.51				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					.18	.04		
Step 4: Active Deep Acting x Emotional Intelligence							-.20	.01
Model F	3.83**		2.86*		2.95**		2.47*	
Overall R^2	.04**		.03		.05 †		.04	
R^2 change			.00		.02 †		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 43 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Non-Acting and Performance (Job Performance)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.28**	.05						
Gender	.01	1.37						
Negative Affectivity	.04	.14						
Step 2: Non-Acting			-.55	3.15				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					.03	.13		
Step 4: Non-Acting x Emotional Intelligence							.34	.03
Model F	5.42**		7.06**		6.16**		5.17**	
Overall R^2	.06**		.10**		.11		.10	
R^2 change			.05**		.01		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.

† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 44 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Non-Acting and Performance (Emotional Performance)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.24**	.02						
Gender	-.04	.49						
Negative Affectivity	.03	.05						
Step 2: Non-Acting			-.19	1.13				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					.09	.05		
Step 4: Non-Acting x Emotional Intelligence							-.01	.01
Model F	3.83**		5.61**		4.77**		3.95**	
Overall R^2	.04**		.08**		.08		.08	
R^2 change			.05**		.01		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.

† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 45 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Passive Deep Acting and Performance (Job Performance)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.27**	.05						
Gender	.07	1.43						
Negative Affectivity	.03	.15						
Step 2: Passive Deep Acting			-.02	2.04				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					.20	.18		
Step 4: Passive Deep Acting x Emotional Intelligence							-.07	.02
Model F	5.42**		4.13**		4.48**		3.71**	
Overall R^2	.06**		.06		.08*		.07	
R^2 change			.00		.02*		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.

† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 46 Hierarchical Regression Results for the Moderating Effect of Emotional Intelligence on the Relationship Between Passive Deep Acting and Performance (Emotional Performance)

Predictor	Burnout							
	Step 1		Step2		Step3		Step4	
	β	se	β	se	β	se	β	se
Step 1: Control Variables								
Age	.24**	.02						
Gender	.00	.51						
Negative Affectivity	.04	.05						
Step 2: Passive Deep Acting			-.24	.73				
Step 3: Emotional Intelligence					.04	.06		
Step 4: Passive Deep Acting x Emotional Intelligence							.30	.01
Model F	3.83**		2.94*		2.95**		2.48*	
Overall R^2	.04**		.04		.04 †		.04	
R^2 change			.00		.01 †		.00	

Notes: N=209. Standardized Beta Values are for the full model.
† $p<.10$, * $p<.05$, ** $p<.01$

Table 47 Results

Hypothesis	**Result**
1a. Emotional Intelligence ↓ Surface Acting	Not Supported.
1b. Emotional Intelligence ↑ Active Deep Acting	Supported: Emotional intelligence positively and significantly predicts the performance of active deep acting.
1c. Emotional Intelligence ↓ Non-Acting	Supported: Emotional intelligence negatively and significantly predicts the performance of non-acting.
1d. Emotional Intelligence ↑ Passive Deep Acting	Supported: Emotional intelligence positively and significantly predicts the performance of passive deep acting.
2a. Emotional Intelligence x Surface Acting on Psychological Strains	Supported: This interaction was found to be significant for 2 of the 3 types of psychological strain: Burnout (ΔR^2 =.05, p<.01), Depressed Mood at Work (ΔR^2 =.04, p<.01).
2b. Emotional Intelligence x Active Deep Acting on Psychological Strains	Supported: This interaction was found to be significant for 1 of the 3 types of psychological strain: Burnout (ΔR^2 =.02, p<.05).
2c. Emotional Intelligence x Non-Acting on Psychological Strains	Supported: This interaction was found to be significant for 1 of the 3 types of psychological strain: Depressed Mood at Work (ΔR^2 =.01, p<.10).
2d. Emotional Intelligence x Passive Deep Acting on Psychological Strains	Supported: This interaction was found to be significant for 1 of the 3 types of psychological strain: Burnout (ΔR^2 =.02, p<.05).
3a. Emotional Intelligence x Surface Acting on Physical Strains	Supported: This interaction was found to be significant (ΔR^2 =.03, p<.01).
3b. Emotional Intelligence x Active Deep Acting on Physical Strains	Not Supported.
3c. Emotional Intelligence x Non-Acting on Physical Strains	Not Supported.
3d. Emotional Intelligence x Passive Deep Acting on Physical Strains	Not Supported.

Table 47 (continued)

Hypothesis	**Result**
4a. Emotional Intelligence x Surface Acting on Employee Affect	Not Supported. The interaction was not supported for any of the 3 types of employee affect (i.e., job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and job involvement).
4b. Emotional Intelligence x Active Deep Acting on Employee Affect	Not Supported. The interaction was not supported for any of the 3 types of employee affect (i.e., job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and job involvement).
4c. Emotional Intelligence x Non-Acting on Employee Affect	Not Supported. The interaction was not supported for any of the 3 types of employee affect (i.e., job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and job involvement).
4d. Emotional Intelligence x Passive Deep Acting on Employee Affect	Not Supported. The interaction was not supported for any of the 3 types of employee affect (i.e., job satisfaction, organizational commitment, and job involvement).
5a. Emotional Intelligence x Surface Acting on Turnover Intentions	Supported: This interaction was found to be significant ($\Delta R^2 = .01$, $p < .10$).
5b. Emotional Intelligence x Active Deep Acting on Turnover Intentions	Not Supported.
5c. Emotional Intelligence x Non-Acting on Turnover Intentions	Not Supported.
5d. Emotional Intelligence x Passive Deep Acting on Turnover Intentions	Supported: This interaction was found to be significant ($\Delta R^2 = .01$, $p < .10$).
6a. Emotional Intelligence x Surface Acting on Performance	Not Supported. The interaction was not supported for either of the 2 types of employee performance (i.e., job performance and emotional performance).
6b. Emotional Intelligence x Active Deep Acting on Performance	Not Supported. The interaction was not supported for either of the 2 types of employee performance (i.e., job performance and emotional performance).
6c. Emotional Intelligence x Non-Acting on Performance	Not Supported. The interaction was not supported for either of the 2 types of employee performance (i.e., job performance and emotional performance).
6d. Emotional Intelligence x Passive Deep Acting on Performance	Not Supported. The interaction was not supported for either of the 2 types of employee performance (i.e., job performance and emotional performance).

CHAPTER 6

DISCUSSION

Chapter Overview

The purpose of this paper was to evaluate how emotional intelligence affects the process of emotional labor, primarily in the moderation of relationships within the emotional labor process. Specifically, the analysis focused on the links in the process involving emotional labor actions and the outcomes of emotional labor. This investigation has revealed evidence supporting the general hypothesis that emotionally intelligent organizational members enjoy more effective participation in the emotional labor process, and that emotional intelligence, as a moderator, alleviates some of the detrimental individual and organizational outcomes of this process.

Contributions to the Literature

The current study has made contributions to several literatures in the evaluation of emotional intelligence as a moderator of relationships in the emotional labor process, as well as analyzing the effects of emotional intelligence on different emotional efforts. Areas of research to benefit from these findings include: emotional intelligence, emotional labor, stress research, employee affect, turnover, and performance.

Emotional Intelligence

Emotional intelligence has been the subject of great interest in the area of social interaction processes. Until recently, work in this area has focused on emotional intelligence as a mediator in most models (e.g., a mediator between leadership and performance). Recent research has turned the focus to emotional intelligence as a moderator in these processes (e.g., Douglas et al., 2004, where emotional intelligence moderated the relationship between the conscientiousness dimension of personality and individual performance). The results of this dissertation clearly indicate that emotional intelligence is an effective moderator in part of the emotional labor process, specifically between emotional efforts and outcomes.

This research paves the way for investigation into many different areas of concern to the organization. This benefit is explored more thoroughly in the following sections. Suffice to say at this point that this study has shown legitimacy for the assumption that emotional intelligence may be a possible moderator in many different forms of social interaction, and other situations involving a social orientation within the organizational environment.

Emotional Labor

Attention was turned to possible moderating effects of emotional intelligence in the emotional labor process in 2000, when Grandey acknowledged a possible moderating effect of emotional intelligence in the relationship between emotional labor and outcomes. Lam and Kirby (2002) indicated that future research may seek to uncover the impact of emotional intelligence on interaction processes (e.g., emotional labor interactions) and productivity influences on oneself and others. Researchers have made little progress in evaluating emotional intelligence as a moderator variable (Douglas et al., 2004), and even less is known specifically in the area of emotional labor.

Researchers have proposed, and found some general evidence, that the emotionally intelligent individual possesses the skills necessary to alleviate strains due to work stressors (e.g., emotional dissonance resulting from some emotional labor efforts). In such cases, emotional intelligence has been seen as a resource used to minimize the effects of work stressors such as emotional dissonance (Abraham, 2000). The idea is that the personal and social resources available to emotionally intelligent individuals neutralize stressors resulting in experienced strains.

Thus far, there have been few studies of this phenomenon in the areas of emotional labor and stress. Schaubroeck and Jones (2000) proposed and found support for emotional adaptability as a moderator of the relationship between emotional labor and physical outcomes. Slaski and Cartwright (2002) found evidence to suggest that emotional intelligence may serve as a moderator in the stressor-strain relationship. They reported that the managers having higher emotional intelligence suffered from fewer stress outcomes.

Extending previous research, the findings of the current study indicate substantial and significant moderating effects of emotional intelligence on the relationships between emotional labor efforts and the detrimental outcomes that may result from the emotional labor process. Specifically, this study shows that stress outcomes resulting from emotional labor efforts, such as physical and psychological strains, are lessened with higher levels of emotional intelligence. Several supported hypotheses provide this evidence.

Physical strain. Researchers have postulated that emotional efforts outside of genuinely expressed emotion may have a negative effect on one's physical health. Grandey (2000) indicated that the suppression of emotion, either positive or negative, was associated with serious

detrimental health effects. Totterdell and Holman (2003) construed from previous research that physical strains may be closely associated with the effort of emotional regulation. They suggested that emotional intelligence may alleviate the deleterious effects of this effort. As expected, these theoretical assumptions have found support in the current study. The data shows that emotional intelligence moderates the effects of emotional effort, specifically the effort of surface acting, on resulting stress reactions in the form of physical strains.

Psychological strain. Research is also scarce in the area of emotional intelligence as a moderator of the relationship between emotional labor efforts and the resulting psychological strains. Historically, psychological strain (e.g., burnout, depression) has been the most discussed outcome of the emotional labor process. Researchers have pointed to psychological strain as one of the most prominent results caused by emotional labor efforts.

A concentrated focus in this area has been on burnout. Many studies have found unequivocal evidence linking emotional exhaustion (i.e., indicated by many as the most prominent dimension of burnout) to one's state of emotional dissonance in the emotional labor process (Zapf et al., 2001; Zapf, 2002). Totterdell and Holman (2003) found that surface acting, determined by many researchers to be an operationalization of emotional dissonance, had a stronger association with emotional exhaustion.

As expected, the current investigation found evidence of a substantial and significant moderating effect of emotional intelligence on the relationship between emotional labor efforts and two types of psychological strain, burnout and depressed mood at work. This is the first definite finding to represent emotional intelligence as a positive influence in connection with these two areas of psychological strain. In addition, emotional intelligence also was found to have a significant, negative effect on one's level of job tension experienced in the emotional labor job situation.

Job satisfaction. Several researchers have proposed and/or found evidence to support the idea that emotional dissonance as a result of emotional labor will cause a reduction in job satisfaction (Ashforth & Humphrey, 1993; Morris & Feldman, 1997; Zapf et al., 1999; Abraham, 2000). Evidence also suggests that job satisfaction, as an outcome of emotional labor practices, may be positively affected by emotional intelligence. Wong and Law (2002) found emotional intelligence had a significant, positive effect on job satisfaction regardless of the situational aspects of the job.

Hypotheses 5a-d proposed a moderating effect of emotional intelligence on the relationship between emotional labor efforts and job satisfaction in the current study. None of the hypotheses were supported by the data. However, the main effects of the regression indicated a significant main effect of emotional intelligence after taking into account the effects of emotional labor efforts in the respective analyses. Although the moderating effect of emotional intelligence was not shown, there is evidence that emotional intelligence contributed a significant amount of explanation over and above the effect of surface and non-acting on job satisfaction.

Organizational commitment. Several researchers have argued that the emotional labor process may adversely affect organizational commitment (Zapf et al., 1999; Abraham, 2000; Cropanzano et al., 2003). Cropanzano et al. (2003) proposed that advanced emotional intelligence skills might possibly benefit organizational commitment. Hypotheses 5a-d proposed a moderating effect of emotional intelligence on the relationship between emotional labor efforts and organizational commitment in the current study. These hypotheses were not supported by the data. However, the main effects of the regression indicated a significant main effect of emotional intelligence after taking into account the effects of surface acting and non-acting on organizational commitment in the respective analyses. Although the moderating effect of emotional intelligence was not shown, there is evidence that emotional intelligence contributes a significant amount of explanation over and above the effect of surface and non-acting on organizational commitment.

Turnover intentions. Another extension of emotional labor research comes from the issue of resulting organizational problems. Researchers have discussed job turnover as one of several troublesome organizational problems associated with emotional labor (Maslach & Jackson, 1981; Grandey, 2000; Cropanzano, Rupp, & Byme, 2003). In the current study, Hypotheses 5a-d proposed a moderating effect of emotional intelligence on the relationship between emotional labor efforts and turnover intentions. These hypotheses were partially supported by the data. The moderating effect of emotional intelligence was shown on the relationships between surface acting and turnover intentions and passive deep acting and turnover intentions.

When additional analyses were performed, emotional intelligence was also shown to be negatively and significantly associated with employee turnover intentions in connection with some emotional labor efforts. Evidence was found that emotional intelligence contributes a

significant amount of explanation over and above the effect of active deep acting and non-acting, respectively, on turnover intentions. The analysis indicated a significant main effect of emotional intelligence after taking into account the effects of active deep acting and non-acting on turnover intentions in the respective regressions.

As suggested earlier in this paper, the moderating effect of emotional intelligence on the relationship between emotional labor efforts and resulting negative outcomes may be due to several resources available to the emotionally intelligent individual that provide one with invaluable coping mechanisms to defeat the adverse effects of psychological stressors. Such negative outcomes can be more successfully tempered or avoided because of additional resources including the basic emotional intelligence skills, social support networks, perceived control over customer interactions, and an understanding of what is expected in such interactions.

Performance. With regard to performance, a common idea among researchers and popular consultants alike is that emotional intelligence has a positive association with performance. In the area of emotional labor, there are similar thoughts along that line. Grandey (2000) proposed that regulating emotion in certain ways will affect performance, especially in jobs involving employee-customer interactions. Lam and Kirby (2002) explained that emotional intelligence prevents one from being "hijacked" by adverse emotions in the employee-customer interaction. Diefendorff and Richard (2003) argued that the effective execution of emotional display requirements will significantly influence job performance in emotional labor tasks.

Again, there have been minimal cases of supportive findings in this area. Douglas et al. (2004) found the level of emotional intelligence showed a significant main effect on peer ratings of job performance. Clearly, emotional intelligence provides the skills necessary to function well in such roles involving emotional labor. Research has yet to provide solid answers to this particular query. In this study, it was assumed that advanced emotional intelligence abilities provide for more effective emotional regulation and, in turn, will positively affect performance by way of moderating the relationship between emotional labor efforts and performance. Hypotheses 6a-d proposed this type of interaction in the current study. These hypotheses were not supported by the data.

However, the findings indicated significant main effects of emotional intelligence on performance (i.e., job performance and emotional performance) for some emotional labor efforts. The main effects of the regression showed a significant main effect of emotional intelligence

after taking into account the effect of surface acting, active deep acting, and passive deep acting on job performance and emotional performance in the respective analyses. Although the moderating effect of emotional intelligence was not shown, there is evidence that emotional intelligence contributes a significant amount of explanation over and above the effect of these emotional efforts on both types of performance.

Stress Research

The benefits to stress research parallel the benefits found in the area of emotional labor research. In other words, emotional labor has long been considered a process from which certain forms of stress result. In fact, Demerouti et al. (2001) suggested, emotional exhaustion, a primary dimension of burnout resulting from the emotional labor process, closely resembles stress reactions traditionally studied in occupational stress research. By way of exploring the effect of emotional intelligence on this process and its outcomes, we are able to assume for future investigation that emotional intelligence may have the same type of effect on stressful situations in general.

There have been assumptions made in the stress literature connecting emotional intelligence to the alleviation of strains. Slaski and Cartwright (2002) and Ciarrochi et al. (2000) presented evidence that emotional intelligence serves as moderator in the stressor-strain relationship. The success in this investigation of establishing support for emotional intelligence as a moderator of the relationship between emotional labor stressors and physical and psychological strain further supports this function of emotional intelligence. This study also expands stress research by providing emotional intelligence as a legitimate construct to investigate in the area of coping mechanisms. For example, how might emotional intelligence activate or enhance certain coping mechanisms to alleviate strains. This is addressed further in the Future Research section to follow.

Summary of Contributions

In summary, this investigation provided several primary contributions. First, all emotional efforts are not the same. The results indicated that emotional intelligence has a positive effect on both forms of deep acting and a negative effect on non-acting. The effect of emotional intelligence on surface acting was inconclusive. Totterdell and Holman (2003) indicated that deep acting, in general, is considered to be more beneficial to the performer in that it is a less stressful form of emotional labor. Also, it appears to be more beneficial because they

found that deep acting was positively associated with quality performance. Therefore, the findings of this study support the idea that emotional intelligence could magnify those benefits provided by deep acting efforts.

Second, the literature has indicated that surface acting is a form of emotional effort having more detrimental effects on the individual and organization than deep acting efforts. Surface acting was found to contribute to psychological and physical strain as well as turnover intentions. The results indicated that emotional intelligence moderated this relationship causing the effects to be reduced.

Finally, the investigation found little support for the moderating effect of emotional intelligence on the relationship between emotional labor efforts and employee affect or certain organizational outcomes. However, support was found for direct associations between emotional intelligence and these factors. This indicates that, in job situations involving emotional labor, affect and performance are positively affected by the emotionally intelligent individual.

Limitations of Current Investigation

The current study has several limitations. Worthy of mention are the homogeneous sample, the cross-sectional design, and the fact that a newly formed and, as yet, untested model of the emotional labor process served as the theoretical foundation of this study. These limitations, especially homogeneous samples and cross-sectional design, are similar throughout many of the empirical works in management science today. However, they should not be discounted. They are important to consider not only because of their effects on the findings of this study, but also because they provide directions for future research on their own, in that, they provide for areas of improvement on original studies.

With regard to measurement issues, this study has several limitations. One issue of measurement is the lack of acceptable Cronbach alpha reliability estimates for a few of the measures used in this study. The acceptable range as set forth by Nunnally (i.e., α=0.70) was not achieved for the scale measuring emotional understanding/knowledge (α=.61) (a subscale of the *SREIT* emotional intelligence measure; Schutte et al., 1998), and the passive deep-acting measure had a reliability of α=.63.

The reliability problem does not necessarily impact the results derived from this investigation, aside from the analyses that involve passive deep acting. The subscales of the *SREIT* measure were not used in this analysis, and the overall reliability of this measure was

acceptable. In the case of passive deep acting, the lower than acceptable reliability measure creates concern over the significant interactions found in the analyses involving this emotional labor effort. Although this problem does not invalidate the findings, it is a concern because lower than acceptable reliabilities may overestimate the strength of the interaction and affect the consistency of relationship results.

Another measurement issue concerns the use of new measures, such as the passive deep acting and non-acting measures created for this study. Because these measures have not been tested outside of this study, there is no other evidence to support the reliability across subjects or the discriminant validity of the measures. Certainly, these measures should be examined more, because of the need to further investigate these emotional labor efforts as viable constructs in the emotional labor literature.

Also, the use of a self-report measure of emotional intelligence is a concern. As stated previously, emotional intelligence is a set of abilities. Therefore, as argued in Chapter 2, the most theoretically sound method of measure would involve a performance measure, where the subjects' actual performance of emotional intelligence abilities is measured, not their estimate of how they perform these abilities. The primary concern is that this self-report measure is evaluating something other than the individuals' actual emotional intelligence abilities. As such, some may argue that it is not measuring the emotional intelligence abilities of subjects, but their perception of those abilities. This is an issue of continuing concern in the field of emotional intelligence study, which deserves much more investigation before a resolution may be reached.

As with the other limitations mentioned in this discourse, the measurement issues provide subject matter for future investigations. There is a need for more measurements in the area of emotional labor. Researchers need established scales to measure emotional dissonance, emotional labor, and the various types of emotional effort (i.e., passive deep acting and non-acting). Scales measuring active deep acting and surface acting, which have been published, should continue to be tested with various samples to provide evidence of generalizability.

Directions for Future Research

Emotional Intelligence

Of course, the argument over how emotional intelligence may be effectively measured is still an item of hot debate. For the purposes of effective and plentiful studies in the analysis of emotional intelligence, there is a need for a self-report scale that can clearly delineate the

emotional intelligence construct, and that demonstrates a definite, theoretically sound structure reflecting solid and acceptable reliability at all levels. Also, further investigation is needed to evaluate performance (ability-measure) versus subject perception (self-report) of emotional intelligence, and how the use of these different types of measures might potentially impact studies of emotional intelligence. Is there any way to develop a self-report measure that can measure performance as opposed to perception of performance?

Emotional Labor

Further investigation is necessary to identify which emotional intelligence abilities apply to particular stages of the emotional labor process. Clearly, each ability delineated within the emotional intelligence construct have varied and different applications even though they build upon each other to formulate the overall construct. One may find, for example, that the ability to appraise and express emotion is all that is necessary for surface acting, but the ability requirements are more demanding for active deep acting efforts. Continuing this scenario, if one were to only have a portion of the necessary abilities for active deep acting to be successful, the researcher might question what effects this lack of ability will have on the emotional laborer's stress levels, as well as other outcomes.

In a more general context, there is a need to identify the effect emotional intelligence may have on other social interaction processes such as conflict resolution, organizational politics, negotiation practices, leader member exchange, and team dynamics. There has been considerable research started in the area of emotional intelligence and leadership. With regard to leadership and group systems, emotional intelligence has been proposed as a construct that may be beneficial to group member evaluation of duties along with member performance according to social influences on these outcomes (Goleman, 1995, 1998; Sosik & Megerian, 1999; George, 2000; Lewis, 2000; Prati et al., 2003a; Prati et al., 2003b). Prati et al. (2003a; 2003b) proposed that the emotional intelligence of leaders within the team context may have a positive impact on team members' actions and performance. Within the realm of emotional labor, it would be interesting to evaluate how the emotional intelligence of formal and informal customer service leaders affect subordinate individuals' participation in the emotional labor process.

With regard to the emotional labor process, there has not yet been a theoretical delineation of the process established in the literature. Therefore, the need exists to evaluate the various stages of the process and analyze where each stage fits in the process. Also, some of the

constructs within the process are still in need of evaluation and useful measures. For example, passive deep acting and non-acting have yet to be evaluated and clearly articulated as distinct types of emotional labor effort. Lastly, there is a particular need for an effective measure of emotional dissonance. This construct is fundamental to the evaluation of emotional labor, and the absence of a distinct measure for emotional dissonance is especially apparent.

Stress Research

Many have suggested that emotional intelligence includes various abilities engendering certain resources that serve to buffer one against strain. For example, Zapf (2002) cited previous stress research pointing to one's level of control over stressful situations, and one's level of social support as sources that may alleviate detrimental stressor effects. In the organizational setting where emotional labor is a common practice, a social support system allows one the resources of reference, experience sharing, and emotional support as ways to cope with the emotional effort necessary in stressful job situations. In this area, questions may be raised as to how the emotionally intelligent individual builds upon their social network more effectively than those with lower levels of emotional intelligence. Additionally, one might ask what abilities are necessary, or what abilities are the most important, for the formation of a reliable and beneficial social support network.

Emotional intelligence abilities also may provide the resource of control over stressful situations. In the case of emotional labor, these abilities may present the perception of control over oneself and one's social interactions. This feeling of control enables such individuals to more easily cope with those interactions. How the emotional intelligence level impacts this perception of control is yet to be determined. Future research might look into how emotional intelligence influences one's perceptions overall, in addition to perceptions that add strength to one's resources of coping.

Practical Implications

Because the employee providing customer service is the most visible representative of the organization, it would behoove organizations to address the needs of employees involved in the emotional labor process. The implications of this investigation are particularly important to human resource professionals, especially to those who manage employees in the service and sales industries. Several areas where this research may have significant impact include selection, training, and evaluation.

The impact of this research on selection and recruitment focuses on the assessment of abilities. This investigation found that those with higher levels of emotional intelligence are more equipped to perform emotional labor tasks and manage the interactions involved within the process. An evaluation of potential employees' emotional intelligence abilities is necessary to their job success and their success within the organizational setting.

The results of this study are especially important to training initiatives within the sales and service industries. Regarding emotional labor efforts, employees need to understand what efforts are more beneficial to their job success as well as their individual well-being. For example, active deep acting has been shown to be less stressful, more effective, and better received by customers, than surface acting. Therefore, it would serve the interests of the organization as well as the individual employee to train employees in the effort of active deep acting.

Emotional intelligence training would be valuable as well. Basic training in the four abilities that comprise emotional intelligence would enable employees to better understand and cope with the emotional efforts they are required to exert. As a part of this training, it also may benefit the employees, and in turn the organization, to include instruction with regard to social networking and customer interaction control. These two factors have been found repeatedly to reduce strains caused by stressful work situations.

Finally, employee evaluations may serve to eliminate those employees who do not fit as representatives of the organization in a service or sales capacity. For organizations that promote a pleasant atmosphere and exceptional customer service, it is absolutely necessary that the organization include an evaluation of emotional labor practices as a part of the employees' work performance evaluation. Those without the ability or desire to perform organizationally dictated duties should be evaluated and reassigned or trained according to the individual's circumstances. If they are left to perform in this capacity unchecked, not only will they suffer, but the organization will as well.

Conclusion

This study should be quite useful to the promotion of further research in the areas of emotional labor, emotional intelligence, and general stress research. For organizations with a great number of jobs reflecting emotional labor as a primary job requirement, the knowledge this research provides may serve those organizations well in controlling for some of the negative

outcomes particular to such job situations. Control may come in the form of more informed selection practices, more focused training initiatives, and/or additional management support toward increased guidance in emotional labor efforts including the creation of valuable social support systems within the organization.

Unfortunately some expectations in this study were not fulfilled. Previous articles have indicated that some outcomes of the emotional labor process might be affected by emotional intelligence. In this study, emotional intelligence was proposed to have a beneficial impact as a moderator of the relationships between emotional labor efforts and outcomes. In several instances, this was not the case according to the data. However, in most of these instances, additional analyses indicated that emotional intelligence did have an association with the dependant variables. Therefore, the additional analyses conducted were significantly beneficial in furthering our understanding of how emotional intelligence fits within the emotional labor process.

APPENDIX A
HUMAN SUBJECTS COMMITTEE APPROVAL

Florida State
UNIVERSITY

Office of the Vice President For Research
Human Subjects Committee
Tallahassee, Florida 32306-2763
(850) 644-8673 · FAX (850) 644-4392

APPROVAL MEMORANDUM

Date: 2/16/2004

To:
Melita Prati
MC: 1110

Dept.: **College of Business**

From: **John Tomkowiak, Chair**

Re: **Use of Human Subjects in Research**
Emotional Intelligence as a Facilitator of the Emotional Labor Process

The forms that you submitted to this office in regard to the use of human subjects in the proposal referenced above have been reviewed by the Secretary, the Chair, and two members of the Human Subjects Committee. Your project is determined to be Exempt per 45 CFR § 46.101(b) 2 and has been approved by an accelerated review process.

The Human Subjects Committee has not evaluated your proposal for scientific merit, except to weigh the risk to the human participants and the aspects of the proposal related to potential risk and benefit. This approval does not replace any departmental or other approvals, which may be required.

If the project has not been completed by **2/15/2005** you must request renewed approval for continuation of the project.

You are advised that any change in protocol in this project must be approved by resubmission of the project to the Committee for approval. Also, the principal investigator must promptly report, in writing, any unexpected problems causing risks to research subjects or others.

By copy of this memorandum, the chairman of your department and/or your major professor is reminded that he/she is responsible for being informed concerning research projects involving human subjects in the department, and should review protocols of such investigations as often as needed to insure that the project is being conducted in compliance with our institution and with DHHS regulations.

This institution has an Assurance on file with the Office for Protection from Research Risks. The Assurance Number is IRB00000446.

Cc: Gerald Ferris
HSC No. 2003.518

APPENDIX B
SOLICITATION LETTER TO OBTAIN DATA SAMPLE

Place of Business
Address

Dear Addressee:

My name is Melita Prati, and I am a doctoral candidate in Management in the College of Business at Florida State University. I am completing my dissertation under the direction of Professor Gerald R. Ferris.

The topic of my dissertation is emotional intelligence and how it may be used to facilitate the emotional labor process and positively impact outcomes of the process. The study focuses on the area of customer service and how your employees display certain emotions to develop positive relationships with your customers. The study will also examine any individual and organizational problems that may result from the stress of performing these emotional displays, and how these problems may be resolved. Specifically, the emotional intelligence of your customer service representatives will be examined as a factor in minimizing the negative effects of this emotional work, and how emotional intelligence can provide for increased organizational and employee benefits.

Emotional intelligence is an important issue to employers especially in the area of customer service and sales. Current research has found these skills to be positively associated with increased employee creativity and performance, as well as the development of trust and support necessary for quality interpersonal relationships. In addition, emotional intelligence has been shown to be negatively associated with job stress, burnout, and withdrawal behaviors such as absenteeism and turnover. It is anticipated that this study will scientifically identify emotional intelligence skills that are necessary elements to exceptional customer service.

What can your organization do to help?

Although both scholars and many organizations, such as Johnson and Johnson and American Express, have demonstrated the belief that emotional intelligence has tremendous value in the world of business, there have been surprisingly few studies that have attempted to scientifically study emotional intelligence in the customer service setting. As such, more research in this area is desperately needed. In order to advance our understanding of emotional intelligence as a facilitator in the customer service (emotional labor) process, we need to get data from real employees in actual organizations.

Consequently, I am respectfully requesting that your organization assist us in advancing this research by allowing me, under the direction of my dissertation chair (Dr. Ferris), the opportunity to survey your employees regarding their use of emotions in the employee-customer interaction. The study requires a relatively large sample, but would not necessitate participation

of all of your stores. In the interest of convenience for your associates as well as ease in distribution and collection, I am only requesting participation of a few of your stores.

What procedures will be followed?

A research study is more valid when the research data comes from multiple sources with multiple points of view. Thus, in this study we would be asking for information from both employees and their supervisors. Specifically, the procedure for this study would involve two parts.

The first part of the study would involve employees voluntarily completing a questionnaire that would ask them to respond to questions regarding themselves and their use of emotions at work. A copy of the current version of the employee questionnaire is attached to this letter as "Attachment A." This questionnaire should take approximately **15 minutes** to complete.

In the second part of the study, the immediate supervisors of the employees who completed the questionnaire in the first stage would be asked to describe the employees' performance and work behaviors. Supervisors will be asked to complete evaluation questionnaires for each employee. A copy of the current version of the supervisor questionnaire is attached to this letter as "Attachment B." The supervisor questionnaire is very brief. It should take a supervisor no more than **5 minutes** to complete questionnaires for each employee that he or she supervises. The supervisor will also be asked to evaluate the level of emotional display required of all employees by the organization. This is a single questionnaire that should take no longer than **5 minutes** to complete.

What are the benefits for your organization?

Besides my deep gratitude and the gratitude of Dr. Ferris and the FSU research community, this study will provide benefits to both your organization and your employees.

First, your organization will be able to participate in a cutting-edge line of management research conducted by a world-renowned scholar in Human Resources Management, Dr. Gerald Ferris. Dr. Ferris has authored over 100 journal articles and 80 book chapters in Human Resources Management, and for over twenty years he was the editor of the series "Research in Personnel and Human Resources Management." In 2001, he was honored by the Academy of Management with the Herbert Heneman Career Achievement Award, commemorating his lifetime achievement in the area of Human Resources Management. Dr. Ferris also has provided management consulting services to major corporations.

At the end of this study, your organization will be provided with a professional summary report of the results of the research and an explanation of its implications. Organizations spend thousands of dollars to outside management consultant firms to conduct similar studies and provide similar reports. However, for allowing us the opportunity to survey your employees, we will provide this to your organization **free of charge.**

Moreover, I will be happy to provide a complimentary employee seminar for participating stores, another service in which organizations and professionals invest thousands of dollars to receive. The training is titled *Emotional Intelligence: An Invaluable Tool for Exceptional Customer*

Service, and is programmed toward the improvement of the emotional intelligence skills of employees who provide customer service. The offer of the complimentary seminar is contingent upon the negotiation of travel expenses.

What steps will be taken to assure confidentiality?

First, let me underscore that the information obtained in this study will be **completely confidential.** Your organization will be given a summary report of the findings. However, no one other than Dr. Ferris and I will have access to the data provided by individual employees. As such, the confidentiality of individual employee responses can be assured.

All completed surveys will be collected by me personally or mailed directly to me at Florida State University. Only Dr. Ferris and I will view your responses to these questionnaires. Because we will need to match the employee questionnaires with the appropriate supervisor questionnaires, questionnaire respondents will be asked to provide their names. Additionally, each questionnaire will be marked with an individual numbered code to facilitate matching.

A master list of matched employee-supervisor responses will be kept until the data is entered into the computer, at which time **all identifying criteria will be destroyed** and there will be no further way to identify individual employee or supervisor responses. Until the master list is destroyed, it will be kept confidential and under lock and key at the College of Business at Florida State University. Moreover, every effort will be made to keep each respondent's identity confidential to the extent allowed by law.

Furthermore, the data obtained in this research may be used in future scholarly publications. **However, under no circumstances will your organization be specifically identified.**

What if you have questions or require additional information?

If I have not heard from you within ten days of the date of this letter, I will contact you to see if I can answer any questions you might have and/or provide you with any additional information.

Thank you for taking the time to read this proposal! Both Dr. Ferris and I thank you in advance for any assistance that you can provide. If you have any questions or concerns regarding this proposal, please do not hesitate to contact me at (850) 553-4777, (850) 644-4417 or lmr4910@cob.fsu.edu or Dr. Gerald Ferris at (850) 644-3548 or gferris@cob.fsu.edu.

Sincerely,

L. Melita Prati, Doctoral Candidate
Department of Management
College of Business
Florida State University
Tallahassee, FL 32306-1110

APPENDIX C
SELF-REPORT EMOTIONAL INTELLIGENCE TEST (SREIT)

Schutte, Malouff, Hall, Haggerty, Cooper, Golden, & Dornheim (1998) *SREIT*

Instructions:
Please read the following statements and circle the response that best reflects your level of agreement.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
---------SD ---------- D ---------- N ---------- A ---------- SA ---------

1. I know when to speak about my personal problems to others.
2. When I am faced with obstacles, I remember times I faced similar obstacles and overcame them.
3. I expect that I will do well on most things I try.
4. Other people find it easy to confide in me.
5. I find it hard to understand the non-verbal messages of other people.
6. Some of the major events of my life have led me to re-evaluate what is important and what is not.
7. When my mood changes, I see new possibilities.
8. Emotions are one of the things that make my life worth living.
9. I am aware of my emotions as I experience them.
10. I expect good things to happen.
11. I like to share my emotions with others.
12. When I experience a positive emotion, I know how to make it last.
13. I arrange events others enjoy.
14. I seek out activities that make me happy.
15. I am aware of the non-verbal messages I send to others.
16. I present myself in a way that makes a good impression on others.
17. When I am in a positive mood, solving problems is easy for me.
18. By looking at their facial expressions, I recognize the emotions people are experiencing.
19. I know why my emotions change.
20. When I am in a positive mood, I am able to come up with new ideas.
21. I have control over my emotions.
22. I easily recognize my emotions as I experience them.
23. I motivate myself by imagining a good outcome to the tasks I take on.
24. I compliment others when they have done something well.
25. I am aware of non-verbal message other people send.
26. When another person tells me about an important event in his or her life, I almost feel as though I have experienced this event myself.
27. When I feel a change in emotions, I tend to come up with new ideas.
28. When I am faced with a challenge, I give up because I believe I will fail.
29. I know what other people are feeling just by looking at them.
30. I help other people feel better when they are down.
31. I use good moods to help myself keep trying in the face of obstacles.
32. I can tell how people are feeling by listening to the tone of their voice.
33. It is difficult for me to understand why people feel the way they do.

APPENDIX D
EMOTIONAL LABOR MEASURE

Note: Items have been marked according to their source. Some items were created for this study, and some are credited to studies by Brotheridge and Lee (1998) and Grandey (1999).

Instructions:
Please read the following statements, and fill in the number that best reflects your behavior on the job with regard to that statement.

Never= 1 Occasionally = 2 Sometimes = 3 Frequently = 4 Always = 5

1. I put on an act in order to deal with customers in an appropriate way. *
2. I fake a good mood. *
3. I put on a "show" or "performance." *
4. I just pretend to have the emotions I need to display for my job. *
5. I put on a "mask" in order to display the emotions I need for the job. *
6. I make an effort to actually feel the emotions that I need to display to others. **
7. I try to actually experience the emotions that I must show. **
8. I really try to feel the emotions I have to show as a part of my job. *
9. I do not express any emotions at work.***
10. I experience the emotions I am required to express on the job.***
11. It is an effort to express the emotions I am required to show in my job.***
12. I must act as if I have certain emotions in my job, because I do not feel them.***
13. I consider expressing emotions required in my job as work.***
14. I don't need to pretend to have the emotions that I am required to express at work.***
15. My job does not require that I express any type of emotion.***
16. I feel emotions similar to those I am required to express at work.***
17. I prefer to have a reserved attitude with customers, where I do not express any emotion.***
18. I do not find it necessary to display any emotion when I am at work, whether I feel it or not.***
19. I work hard to feel the emotions that I need to show to others. *

* Grandey (1999)
** Brotheridge and Lee (1998)
***Items created for this study.

APPENDIX E
HOUSE & RIZZO (1972) SOMATIC ANXIETY SCALE

Note: Items have been marked according to their source. Some items were created for this study.

Instructions:
Please circle the number that indicates the frequency of how you feel for each item.

Never= 1 Occasionally = 2 Sometimes = 3 Frequently = 4 Always = 5

1.	I am often bothered by acid indigestion or heartburn.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
2.	I sometimes feel weak all over.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
3.	I have trouble getting to sleep or staying asleep.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
4.	I get irritated or annoyed over the way things are going.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
5.	I may now have an ulcer but I am not sure of it.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
6.	I experience chest pains.*	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
7.	I experience headaches.*	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
8.	My blood pressure is abnormally high when checked.*	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
9.	I experience colds and minor illnesses.*	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**

***** Item has been created for this study.

APPENDIX F
BURNOUT MEASURE

Pines and Aronson (1988) Burnout scale

Instructions:
Please read the following statements and circle the response that best reflects how often you have any of the following experiences.

Never= 1 Occasionally = 2 Sometimes = 3 Frequently = 4 Always = 5

1.	Being tired.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
2.	Feeling depressed.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
3.	Having a good day.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
4.	Being physically exhausted.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
5.	Being emotionally exhausted.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
6.	Being happy.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
7.	Being “wiped out.”	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
8.	“Can’t take it anymore.”	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
9	Being unhappy.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
10.	Feeling run-down.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
11.	Feeling trapped.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
12.	Feeling worthless.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
13.	Being weary.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
14.	Being troubled.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
15.	Feeling disillusioned and resentful.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
16.	Being weak and susceptible to illness.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
17.	Feeling hopeless.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
18.	Feeling rejected.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
19.	Feeling optimistic.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
20.	Feeling energetic.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
21.	Feeling anxious.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**

APPENDIX G
JOB TENSION MEASURE

House and Rizzo (1972) Job Tension scale

Instructions:
Please read the following statements and circle the response that best reflects your level of agreement.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
----SD ---------- D ---------- N ---------- A ---------- SA ----

1.	My job tends to directly affect my health.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
2.	I work under a great deal of tension.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
3.	I have felt fidgety or nervous as a result of my job.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
4.	If I had a different job, my health would probably improve.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
5.	Problems associated with my job have kept me awake at night.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
6.	I have felt nervous before attending meetings in the company.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
7.	I often “take my job home with me” in the sense that I think about it when doing other things.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**

APPENDIX H
DEPRESSED MOOD AT WORK MEASURE

Quinn and Shepard (1974) Depressed Mood at Work Scale

Instructions:
Please circle the number that indicates the frequency of how you feel for each item. For example, if you feel hopeful about the future, but not always, you might circle number 4.

Never= 1 Occasionally = 2 Sometimes = 3 Frequently = 4 Always = 5

1.	I feel downhearted and blue.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
2.	I get tired for no reason.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
3.	I find myself restless and can't keep still.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
4.	My mind is as clear as it used to be.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
5.	I find it easy to do things I used to do.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
6.	I feel hopeful about the future.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
7.	I find it easy to make decisions.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
8.	I am more irritable than usual.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
9.	I still enjoy the things I used to.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**
10.	I feel that I am useful and needed.	**1**	**2**	**3**	**4**	**5**

APPENDIX I
ORGANIZATIONAL COMMITMENT MEASURE

Meyer, Allen, and Smith (1993) Affective Organizational Commitment Scale

Instructions:
Read the following statements and circle the response that best reflects your level of agreement or disagreement.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
----SD ---------- D ---------- N ---------- A ---------- SA ----

1.	I would be very happy to spend the rest of my career with this organization.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
2.	I really feel as if this organization's problems are my own.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
3.	I do not feel a strong sense of "belonging" to my organization.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
4.	I do not feel "emotionally attached" to this organization.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
5.	I do not feel like "part of the family" at my organization.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
6.	This organization has a great deal of personal meaning for me.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**

APPENDIX J
JOB INVOLVEMENT MEASURE

Lodahl and Kejner (1965) Job Involvement Scale

Instructions: Please read the following statements and circle the response that best reflects your level of agreement.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
----SD ---------- D ---------- N ---------- A ---------- SA ----

1.	I'll stay overtime to finish a job, even if I'm not paid for it.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
2.	You can measure a person pretty well by how good a job he does.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
3.	The major satisfaction in my life comes from my job.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
4.	For me, mornings at work really fly by.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
5.	I usually show up for work a little early, to get things ready.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
6.	The most important things that happen to me involve my work.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
7.	Sometimes I lie awake at night thinking ahead to the next day's work.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
8.	I'm really a perfectionist about my work.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
9.	I feel depressed when I fail at something connected with my job.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
10.	I have other activities more important than my work.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
11.	I live, eat, and breathe my job.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
12.	I would probably keep working even if I didn't need the money.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
13.	Quite often I feel like staying home from work instead of coming in.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
14.	To me, my work is only a small part of who I am.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
15.	I am very much involved personally in my work.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
16.	I avoid taking on extra duties and responsibilities in my work.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
17.	I used to be more ambitious about my work than I am now.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
18.	Most things in life are more important than work.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
19.	I used to care more about my work, but now other things are more important to me.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
20.	Sometimes I'd like to kick myself for the mistakes I make in my work.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**

APPENDIX K
EMPLOYEE CUSTOMER SERVICE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

Waldersee and Luthans (1994) Customer Service Performance Scale

Instructions: Please read the following statements and circle the response that best reflects your level of agreement.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
----SD ---------- D ---------- N ---------- A ---------- SA ----

1.	Completes orders/requests correctly.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
2.	Quickly attends to customer complaints.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
3.	Greets all customers immediately.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
4.	Assures waiting customers the wait will be short.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
5.	Apologizes for mistakes.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
6.	Smiles at all times.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
7.	Maintains eye contact at all times.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
8.	Demonstrates knowledge of each product.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
9.	Leans toward customers when taking orders or listening to requests.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
10.	Personally invites the customer back again.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
11.	Uses open questions to determine the needs of customers.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
12.	After determining customer needs, suggests alternatives with benefits meeting those needs.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
13.	Says “please” and “thank you”.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
14.	Checks that all customers are satisfied.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
15.	Always appears neat and clean.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
16.	Keeps the counter and other work areas clean.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**

APPENDIX L
EMOTIONAL PERFORMANCE EVALUATION

Grandey (1999) Other-Report Emotional Labor Scale

Instructions: Please read the following statements and circle the response that best reflects your level of agreement.

Strongly Disagree Disagree Neutral Agree Strongly Agree
----SD ---------- D ---------- N ---------- A ---------- SA ----

1.	This person seems sincere when dealing with the public.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
2.	Customers seem to like interacting with this person.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
3.	This person shows friendliness and warmth to most customers.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
4.	This person treats customers with courtesy, respect, and politeness.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
5.	This person smiles and communicates expressively with customers.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
6.	This person shows enthusiasm when dealing with customers.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
7.	This person has revealed their true feelings to the public when upset or angry.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
8.	When in a bad mood, this person has trouble hiding those feelings from customers.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**
9.	This person has seemed “fake” while interacting with customers.	**SD**	**D**	**N**	**A**	**SA**

Note: In order to improve reliability of this scale, items 7-9, which are reversed-score items, were not used in the analysis.

REFERENCES

Abraham, R. (1998). Emotional dissonance in organizations: Antecedents, consequences, and moderators. *Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs*, *124 (2)*, 229-246.

Abraham, R. (1999). Emotional intelligence in organizations: A conceptualization. *Genetic, Social, and General Psychology Monographs*, *125 (2)*, 209-219.

Abraham, R. (2000). The role of job control as a moderator of emotional dissonance and emotional intelligence-outcome relationships. *The Journal of Psychology*, *134 (2)*, 169-184.

Acker, J., Baggett, L., Davis, E., Kuhajda, M., Weaver-Stern, P., Sutarso, P. & Tapia, M. (1996). *Emotional Intelligence Inventory*. Tuscaloosa, Alabama: The University of Alabama.

Adelmann, P. K. (1995). Emotional labor as a potential source of job stress. In S. L. Sauter & L. R. Murphy (Eds.), *Organizational risk factors for job stres*s (pp. 371-381). Washington, D. C.: American Psychological Association.

Ajzen, I. & Fishbein, M. (1974). Factors influencing intentions and the intention-behavior relation. *Human Relations*, *27 (1)*, 1-15.

Ashforth, B. E. & Humphrey, R. H. (1993). Emotional labor in service roles: The influence of identity. *Academy of Management Review*, *18 (1)*, 88-115.

Ashforth, B. E. & Humphrey, R. H. (1995). Emotion in the workplace: A reappraisal. *Human Relations*, *48 (2)*, 97-125.

Averill, J. R. (1980). A constructivist view of emotion. In R. Plutchik & H. Kellerman (Eds.), *Emotion: Theory, research, and experience* (Vol. 1, pp. 305-339). New York, NY: Academic Press, Inc.

Bar-On, R. (1997). *BarOn Emotional Quotient Inventory (EQ-i): Technical manual*. Toronto, Canada: Multi-Health Systems.

Bar-On, R. (2000). Emotional and social intelligence: Insights from the Emotional Quotient Inventory. In R. Bar-On & J. D. A. Parker (Eds.), *The handbook of emotional intelligence: Theory, development, assessment, and application at home, school, and in the workplace* (pp. 363-388). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Baron, R. M. & Kenny, D. A. (1986). The moderator-mediator variable distinction in social psychological research: Conceptual, strategic, and statistical considerations. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *51 (6)*, 1173-1182.

Bechara, A., Tranel, D. & Damasio, A. R. (2000). Poor judgement in spite of high intellect: neurological evidence for emotional intelligence. In R. Bar-On & J. D. A. Parker (Eds.), *The handbook of emotional intelligence: Theory, development, assessment, and application at home, school, and in the workplace* (pp. 191-214). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Boyatzis, R. E., Goleman, D. & Rhee, K. (2000). Clustering competence in emotional intelligence: Insights from the Emotional Competence Inventory (*ECI*). In R. Bar-On & J. D. A. Parker (Eds.), *The handbook of emotional intelligence: Theory, development, assessment, and application at home, school, and in the workplace* (pp. 343-362). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Brackett, M. A. & Mayer, J. D. (2003). Convergent, discriminant, and incremental validity of competing measures of emotional intelligence. *Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin*, *29* (*9*), 1147-1158.

Brotheridge, C. M. & Grandey, A. A. (2002). Emotional labor and burnout: Comparing two perspectives of 'people work'. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, *60*, 17-39.

Brotheridge, C. M. & Lee, R. T. (2002). Testing a conservation of resources model of the dynamics of emotional labor. *Journal of Occupational Health Psychology*, *7 (1)*, 57-67.

Carmeli, A. (2003). The relationship between emotional intelligence and work attitudes, behavior, and outcomes: An examination among senior managers. *Journal of Managerial Psychology*, *18 (8)*, 788-813.

Cattell, R. B., Eber, H. W. & Tatsuoka, M. (1970). *Handbook for the Sixteen Personality Factor Questionnaire (16PF)*. Champaign, IL: Institute for Personality and Ability Testing.

Champoux, J., & Peters, W. (1987). Form, effect size, and power in moderated regression analysis. *Journal of Occupational Psychology*, *60*, 243-255.

Chaplin, W. F. (1991). The next generation of moderator research in personality psychology. *Journal of Personality*, *59*, 143-178.

Ciarrochi, J. V., Chan, A. Y. C. & Caputi, P. (2000). A critical evaluation of the emotional intelligence construct. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *28*, 539-561.

Ciarrochi, J., Deane, F.P. & Anderson S. (2002). Emotional intelligence moderates the relationship between stress and mental health. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *32(2)*, 197-209.

Cohen, J. (1992). A power primer. *Psychology Bulletin*, *112 (1)*, 155-159.

Costa, P. T., Jr. & McCrae, R. R. (1991). *The NEO Five Factor Inventory: Manual*. New York: Psychological Assessment Resources.

Cropanzano, R., Rupp, D. E. & Byme, Z. S. (2003). The relationship of emotional exhaustion to work attitudes, job performance, and organizational citizenship behaviors. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *88 (1)*, 160-169.

Davies, M., Stankov, L. & Roberts, R. D. (1998). Emotional intelligence: In search of an elusive construct. *Personality Processes and Individual Differences*, *75 (4)*, 989-1015.

Demerouti, E., Bakker, A. B., Nachreiner, F., & Schaufeli, W. B. (2001). The job demands-resources model of burnout. *Journal of Applied Psychology, 86*, 499-512.

Derksen, J., Kramer, I. & Katzko, M. (2002). Does a self-report measure for emotional intelligence assess something different than general intelligence? *Personality and Individual Differences*, *32*, 37-48.

Diefendorff, J. M. & Richard, E. M. (2003). Antecedents and consequences of emotional display rule perceptions. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *88 (2)*, 284-294.

Douglas, C., Frink, D. D., & Ferris, G. R. (2004). Emotional intelligence as a moderator of the relationship between conscientiousness and performance. *Journal of Leadership & Organizational Studies*, *10 (3)*, 2-13.

Dulewicz, V. & Higgs, M. (2000). Emotional intelligence: A review and evalutation study. *Journal of Managerial Psychology*, *15 (4)*, 341-372.

Erickson, R. J. & Ritter, C. (2001). Emotional labor, burnout, and inauthenticity: Does gender matter? *Social Psychology Quarterly*, *64 (2)*, 146-163.

Extremera, N. & Fernandez-Berrocal, P. (2002). Relation of perceived emotional intelligence and health-related quality of life of middle-aged women. *Psychological Reports*, *91 (1)*, 47-59.

Fisher, C. D. (2000). Mood and emotions while working: Missing pieces of job satisfaction? *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, 21, 185-202.

Fox, S. & Spector, P. E. (2000). Relations of emotional intelligence, practical intelligence, general intelligence, and trait affectivity with interview outcomes: It's not just 'g'. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, *21*, 203-220.

Gardner, H. (1983). *Frames of mind: The theory of multiple intelligences*. New York: Basic Books.

Geher, G., Warner, R. M. & Brown, A. S. (2001). Predictive validity of the emotional accuracy research scale. *Intelligence*, *29 (5)*, 373-388.

George, J. M. (2000). Emotions and leadership: The role of emotional intelligence. *Human Relations*, *53 (8)*, 1027-1044.

Glomb, T. M. & Tews, M. J. (2004). Emotional labor: A conceptualization and scale development. *Journal of Vocational Behavior*, *64 (1)*, 1-23.

Goffman, E. (1969). *Strategic interaction*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press.

Goleman, D. (1995). *Emotional intelligence*. New York: Bantam Books.

Goleman, D. (1998). *Working with emotional intelligence*. New York: Bantam Books.

Goleman, D., Boyatzis, R. & McKee, A. (2002). *Primal Leadership*. Boston: Harvard Business School Press.

Grandey, A. A. (1999). *The effects of emotional labor: Employee attitudes, stress and performance.* Unpublished Doctoral Dissertation, Colorado State University.

Grandey, A. A. (2000). Emotion regulation in the workplace: A new way to conceptualize emotional labor. *Journal of Organizational Health Psychology*, *5 (1)*, 95-110.

Grandey, A. A. (2003). When "the show must go on": Surface acting and deep acting as determinants of emotional exhaustion and peer-rated service delivery. *Academy of Management Journal*, *46 (1)*, 86-96.

Green, S. B. (1991). How many subjects does it take to do a regression analysis? *Mulitvariate Behavioral Research, 26*, 499-510.

Hedlund, J. & Sternberg, R. J. (2000). Too many intelligences? Integrating social, emotional, and practical intelligence. In R. Bar-On & J. D. A. Parker (Eds.), *The handbook of emotional intelligence: Theory, development, assessment, and application at home, school, and in the workplace* (pp. 136-167). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Hochschild, A. R. (1983). *The managed heart: Commercialization of human feeling*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.

House, R. J. & Rizzo, J. R. (1972). Toward the measurement of organizational practices: Scale development and validation. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *56* (*5*), 388-396.

Isen, A. M., Shalder, T., Clark, M. & Karp. L. (1978). Positive affect, accessibility of material in memory and behavior: A cognitive loop? *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *36*, 1-12.

Jordan, P.J., Ashkanasy, N.M. & Hartel, C.E.J. (2002). Emotional intelligence as a moderator of emotional and behavioral reactions to job insecurity. A*cademy of Management Review*, *27 (3)*, 361-372.

Kaufman, A. S. & Kaufman, J. C. (2001). Emotional intelligence as an aspect of general intelligence: What would David Wechsler say? *Emotion*, *1 (3)*, 258-264.

Kruml, S. M. & Geddes, D. (2000). Exploring the dimensions of emotional labor: The heart of Hochschild's work. *Management Communication Quarterly*, *14 (1)*, 8-49.

Kruml, S. M. & Geddes, D. (2000). Catching fire without burning out: Is there an ideal way to perform emotion labor? In N. M. Ashkanasy & C. E. Haertel (Eds.), *Emotions in the workplace: Research, theory, and practice* (pp. 177-188). Westport, CT: Quorum Books/Greenwood Publishing Group.

Lam, L. T. & Kirby, S. L. (2002). Is emotional intelligence an advantage? An exploration of the impact of emotional and general intelligence on individual performance. *The Journal of Social Psychology*, *142 (1)*, 133-143.

Lane, R. D. (2000). Levels of emotional awareness: Neurological, psychological, and social perspectives. In R. Bar-On & J. D. A. Parker (Eds.), *The handbook of emotional intelligence: Theory, development, assessment, and application at home, school, and in the workplace* (pp. 171-191). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Lehrer, P. M. & Woolfolk, R. L. (1982). Self-report assessment of anxiety: Somatic, cognitive, and behavioral modalities. *Behavioral Assessment*, *4 (2)*, 167-177.

Lewis, K. M. (2000). When leaders display emotion: How followers respond to negative emotional expression of male and female leaders. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, *21*, 221-234.

Lodahl, T. M. & Kejnar, M. (1965). The definition and measurement of job involvement. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *49* (*1*), 24-33.

Mann, S. (1997). Emotional labor in organizations. *Leadership and Organization Development Journal*, *18 (1)*, 4-12.

Maslach, C. & Jackson, S. E. (1981). The measurement of experienced burnout. *Journal of Occupational Behaviour*, *2 (2)*, 99-113.

Maslach, C. & Jackson, S. E. (1986). *MBI*: Maslach Burnout Inventory manual (research edition—1st Edition, 1981). Palo Alto, California: Consulting Psychologists Press.

Mayer, J. D. (2001). Emotion, intelligence, and emotional intelligence. In Forgas, J. P. (Ed.), *Handbook of affect and social cognition* (pp. 410-431). Mahwah, NJ: Lawrence Erlbaum Associates.

Mayer, J. D., Caruso, D. R. & Salovey, P. (1999). Emotional intelligence meets traditional standards for an intelligence. *Emotion*, *27 (4)*, 267-298.

Mayer, J. D., Caruso, D. R. & Salovey, P. (2000a). Selecting a measure of emotional intelligence: The case for ability scales. In R. Bar-On & J. D. A. Parker (Eds.), *The handbook of emotional intelligence: Theory, development, assessment, and application at home, school, and in the workplace* (pp. 320-342). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Mayer, J. D., DiPaolo, M. & Salovey, P. (1990). Perceiving affective content in ambiguous visual stimuli: A component of emotional intelligence. *Journal of Personality Assessment*, *54 (3-4)*, 772-781.

Mayer, J. D. & Geher, G. (1996). Emotional intelligence and the identification of emotion. *Intelligence*, *22*, 89-113.

Mayer, J. D., Mamberg, M. H. & Volanth, A. J. (1988). Cognitive domains of the mood system. *Journal of Personality*, *56 (3)*, 453-486.

Mayer, J. D. & Salovey, P. (1993). The intelligence of emotional intelligence. *Intelligence*, *17*, 433-442.

Mayer, J. D. & Salovey, P. (1997). What is emotional intelligence? In P. Salovey & D. J. Sluyter (Eds.), *Emotional development and emotional intelligence: Educational implications* (pp. 3-27). New York: Basic Books.

Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P. & Caruso, D. R. (2000b). Emotional intelligence as zeitgeist, as personality, and as a mental ability. In R. Bar-On & J. D. A. Parker (Eds.), *The handbook of emotional intelligence: Theory, development, assessment, and application at home, school, and in the workplace* (pp. 92-117). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., Caruso, D. R. & Sitarenios, G. (2001). Emotional intelligence as a standard intelligence. *Emotion*, *1 (3)*, 232-242.

Mayer, J. D., Salovey, P., Caruso, D. R. & Sitarenios, G. (2003). Measuring emotional intelligence with the *MSCEIT V2.0*. *Emotion*, *3 (1)*, 97-105.

McCrae, R. R. (2000). Emotional intelligence from the perspective of the Five-Factor Model of Personality. In R. Bar-On & J. D. A. Parker (Eds.), *The handbook of emotional intelligence: Theory, development, assessment, and application at home, school, and in the workplace* (pp. 263-276). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Meyer, J. P., Allen, N. J. & Smith, C. A. (1993). Commitment to organizations and occupations: Extension and test of a three-component conceptualization. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *78 (4)*, 538-551.

Morey, L. C. (1991). *The Personality Assessment Inventory professional manual*. Odessa, Florida: Psychological Assessment Resources.

Morris, J. A. & Feldman, D. C. (1996). The dimensions, antecedents, and consequences of emotional labor. *Academy of Management Review*, *21 (4)*, 986-1010.

Morris, J. A. & Feldman, D. C. (1997). Managing emotions in the workplace. *Journal of Managerial Issues*, *9 (3)*, 257-274.

Myers, I.B., 1962. *The Myers–Briggs Type Indicator manual*, Educational Testing Service, Princeton, NJ.

Naglieri, J. A. & Bardos, A. N. (1997). *General Ability Measure for Adults (GAMA)*. Tucson, Arizona: National Computer Systems.

Newsome, S., Day, A. L. & Catano, V. M. (2000). Assessing the predictive validity of emotional intelligence. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *29 (6)*, 1005-1016.

Nunnally, J. C., Jr. (1970). *Introduction to Psychological Measurement.* New York: McGraw-Hill.

Orioli, E. M., Jones, T. & Trocki, K. H. (2000). *EQ Map: Technical manual*. San Francisco: Essi Systems, Inc.

Palmer, B., Donaldson, C. & Stough, C. (2002). Emotional intelligence and life satisfaction. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *33 (7)*, 1091-1100.

Palmer, B., Walls, M., Burgess, Z. & Stough, C. (2002). Emotional intelligence and effective leadership. *Leadership and Organization Development Journal*, *22 (1)*, 5-10.

Petrides, K. V. & Furnham, A. (2000). On the dimensional structure of emotional intelligence. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *29*, 313-320.

Pines, A. & Aronson, E. (1988). *Career burnout: Causes and cures*. New York: The Free Press.

Prati, L. M., Douglas, C., Ferris, G. R., Ammeter, A. P. & Buckley, M. R. (2003a). Emotional intelligence, leadership effectiveness, and team outcomes. *International Journal of Organizational Analysis*, *11 (1)*, 21-40.

Prati, L. M., Douglas, C., Ferris, G. R., Ammeter, A. P. & Buckley, M. R. (2003b). The role of emotional intelligence in team leadership: Reply to the critique by Antonakis. *International Journal of Organizational Analysis*, *11 (4)*, 361-367.

Pugliesi, K. (1999). The consequences of emotional labor: Effects on work stress, job satisfaction, and well-being. *Motivation and Emotion*, *23 (2)*, 125-154.

Quinn, R. P. & Shepard, L. J. (1974). *The 1972-73 quality of employment survey: Descriptive statistics, with comparison data from the 1969-70 survey of working conditions*. University of Michigan: Institute for Social Research Survey Research Center

Rafaeli, A. & Sutton, R. I. (1987). Expression of emotion as part of the work role. *Academy of Management Review*, *12 (1)*, 23-37.

Roberts, R. D., Zeidner, M. & Matthews, G. (2001). Does emotional intelligence meet traditional standards for an intelligence? Some new data and conclusions. *Emotion*, *1 (3)*, 196-231.

Saklofske, D. H., Austin, E. J., & Minski, P. S. (2003). Factor structure and validity of a trait emotional intelligence measure. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *34* (*4*), 707-721.

Sala, F. (2000). *Emotional Compentence Inventory (ECI): Technical Manual*. Boston: Hay Group, McClelland Center for Research and Innovation.

Salovey, P. & Mayer, J. D. (1990). Emotional intelligence. *Imagination, Cognition, and Personality*, 9 (3), 85-211.

Salovey, P., Mayer, J. D., Goldman, S., Turvey, C. & Palfai, T. (1995). Emotional attention, clarity and repair: Exploring emotional intelligence using the Trait Meta-Mood Scale. In J. W. Pennebaker (Ed.), *Emotion, disclosure, and health* (pp. 125-154). Washington, D. C.: American Psychological Association.

Salovey, P., Stroud, L. R., Woolery, A. & Epel, E. S. (2002). Perceived emotional intelligence, stress reactivity, and symptom reports: Further explorations using the trait meta-mood scale. *Psychology & Health*, *17 (5)*, 611-627.

Salovey, P., Woolery, A. & Mayer, J. D. (2001). Emotional intelligence: Conceptualization and measurement. In G. Fletcher & M. Clark (Eds.), *The Blackwell handbook of social psychology: Interpersonal processes* (pp. 279-307). Malden, MA: Blackwell Publishers.

Schaie, K. W. (2001). Emotional intelligence: Psychometric status and developmental characteristics—Comment on Roberts, Zeidner, and Matthews (2001). *Emotion*, *1 (3)*, 243-248.

Schaubroeck, J. & Jones, J. R. (2000). Antecedents of workplace emotional labor dimensions and moderators of their effects on physical symptoms. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, *21*, 163-183.

Schutte, N. S. & Malouff, J. M. (1999). *Measuring emotional intelligence and related constructs*. Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press.

Schutte, N. S., Malouff, J. M., Hall, L. E., Haggerty, D. J., Cooper, J. T., Golden, C. J. & Dornheim, L. (1998). Development and validation of a measure of emotional intelligence. *Personality and Individual Differences*, *25*, 167-177.

Shirom, A. (1989). Burnout in work organizations. In C. L. Cooper & I. Robertson (Eds.), *International review of industrial-organizational psychology* (pp. 25-48). New York: Wiley.

Slaski, M. & Cartwright, S. (2002). Health, performance, and emotional intelligence: An exploratory study of retail managers. *Stress and Health*, *18 (2)*, 63-68.

Sosik, J. J., & Megerian, L. E. (1999). Understanding leader emotional intelligence and performance: The role of self-other agreement on transformational leadership perceptions. *Group and Organization Management*, *24 (3)*, 340-366.

Sternberg, R. J. (1985a). Implicit theories of intelligence, creativity, and wisdom. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *49 (3)*, 607-627.

Sternberg, R. J. (1985b). *Beyond IQ: A triarchic theory of human intelligence*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Sternberg, R. J. (1987). Synopsis of a triarchic theory of human intelligence. In S. H. Irvine & S. E. Newstead (Eds.), *Intelligence and cognition: Contemporary frames of reference* (pp. 141-176). Boston: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers.

Sternberg, R. J. (1988). *The triarchic mind: A new theory of human intelligence*. New York: Viking Penguin.

Susskind, A. M., Kacmar, K. M. & Borchgrevink, C. P. (2003). Customer service providers' attitudes relating to customer service and customer satisfaction in the customer-server exchange. *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *88* (*1*), 179-187.

Sutton, R. I. & Rafaeli, A. (1988). Untangling the relationship between displayed emotions and organizational sales: The case of convenience stores. *Academy of Management Journal*, *31 (3)*, 461-487.

Tabachnick, B. G. & Fidell, L. S. (1996). *Using multivariate statistics (Third edition)*. New York: Harper Collins College Publishers.

Tapia, M. (2001). Measuring emotional intelligence. *Psychological Reports*, *88*, 353-364.

Taylor, G. J. & Bagby, R. M. (2000). An overview of the alexithymial construct. In R. Bar-On & J. D. A. Parker (Eds.), *The handbook of emotional intelligence: Theory, development, assessment, and application at home, school, and in the workplace* (pp. 40-67). San Francisco: Jossey-Bass.

Tett, R., Wang, A., Fisher, R., Martinez, A. Griebler, J. & Linkovich, T. (1997). *Development of self-report measures of emotional intelligence*. Paper presented at the Annual Convention of the Southeastern Psychological Association, Atlanta, Georgia.

Thorndike, E. L. (1920). Intelligence and its use. *Harper's Magazine*, *140*, 227-235.

Totterdell, P. & Holman, D. (2003). Emotion regulation in customer service roles: Testing a model of emotional labor. *Journal of Occupational Health Psychology*, *8 (1)*, 55-73.

Waldersee, R. & Luthans, F. (1994). The impact of positive and corrective feedback on customer service performance. *Journal of Organizational Behavior*, *15* (*1*), 83-95.

Watson, D., Clark, L. A. & Tellegen, A. (1988). Development and validation of brief measures of positive and negative affect: The *PANAS* scales. *Journal of Personality and Social Psychology*, *54 (6)*, 1063-1070.

Wanous, J. P., Reichers, A. E. & Hudy, M. J. (1997). Overall job satisfaction: How good are single-item measures? *Journal of Applied Psychology*, *82 (2)*, 247-252.

Wechsler, D. (1958). *The measurement and appraisal of adult intelligence*. Baltimore, Maryland: Williams & Wilkins.

Wong, C.S. & Law, K. S. (2002). The effects of leader and follower emotional intelligence on performance and attitude: An exploratory study. *Leadership Quarterly*, *13 (3)*, 243-274.

Zapf, D., Vogt, C., Seifert, C., Mertini, H. & Isic, A. (1999). Emotion work as a source of stress: The concept and development of an instrument. *European Journal of Work and Organizational Psychology*, *8 (3)*, 371-400.

Zapf, D., Seifert, C., Schmutte, B., Mertini, H. & Holz, M. (2001). Emotion work and job stressors and their effects on burnout. *Psychology and Health*, *16 (5)*, 527-545.

Zapf, D. (2002). Emotion work and psychological well-being: A review of the literature and some conceptual considerations. *Human Resource Management Review*, *12 (2),* 237-268.

Zeidner, M., Matthews, G. & Roberts, R. D. (2001). Slow down, you move too fast: Emotional intelligence remains an "elusive" intelligence. *Emotion*, *1 (3)*, 265-275.

BIOGRAPHICAL SKETCH

Melita Prati was raised in the Tallahassee, Florida area and received her bachelor's degree from Florida State University. After working a number of years, she chose to return to Florida State to pursue her doctoral degree in Management. During her years in the program, she has coauthored several articles. Melita lives with her family in Greenville, North Carolina where she teaches in the Management Department at East Carolina University.