

Error Log Processing for Accurate Failure Prediction

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Abstract

Error logs are a fruitful source of information both for diagnosis as well as for proactive fault handling – however elaborate data preparation is necessary to filter out valuable pieces of information. In addition to the usage of well-known techniques, we propose three algorithms: (a) assignment of error IDs to error messages based on Levenshtein’s edit distance, (b) a clustering approach to group similar error sequences, and (c) a statistical noise filtering algorithm. By experiments using data of a commercial telecommunication system we show that data preparation is an important step to achieve accurate error-based online failure prediction.

1 Introduction

Despite of some early work such as [1], preparation of data has long been seen as the “inevitable evil” and has hence been neglected in most scientific papers. This applies especially to logfile data. However, with the emergence of concepts such as IBM’s autonomic computing [2], the importance of logfiles as a valuable source of information on a system’s status continues to increase, as can be seen from a variety of recent works such as [3] and the development of standards such as the Common Base Event [4]. This paper shows that clever mining of information from logfiles can significantly improve accuracy of an error-based online failure prediction method. However, the goal is not to provide a comprehensive overview of various techniques that could be applied – we focus on a description of the techniques we have applied and how these techniques improved our results for online failure prediction.




Figure 1: Error-based online failure prediction.

The term *online failure prediction* subsumes techniques that try to forecast the occurrence of system failures during runtime based on continuous system observation. It should not be confused with failure prediction techniques in traditional reliability theory. More specifically, the failure prediction approach used in this paper is based on the observation of error events during runtime, i.e., upcoming failures are predicted by analyzing the errors that have occurred recently before present time (see Figure 1).

The failure prediction technique is based on hidden semi-Markov models (HSMM) and has been described in detail in [5]. However, the main focus of this paper is not the prediction model but the preparation of the data fed into the HSMM. More specifically, the main steps of data preparation are:

- Input data of the failure predictor are error sequences. Each error event consists of a *timestamp* and a distinctive *integer error ID* denoting the type of the error event. The process of sequence extraction is described in Section 3.
- Since the HSMM failure predictor applies techniques from machine learning, training data needs to be extracted that should represent system characteristics as precisely as possible. In this paper we propose a method to group similar failure-related error sequences. Grouping is based on a sequence clustering technique (see Section 4).
- Error logs often contain events that are unrelated to a specific fault, but due to parallelism in the system these events are interweaved with unrelated events. This can be seen as noise in the data set. We propose a noise filtering algorithm based on a statistical test in Section 5.

The data used in this paper derives from a commercial telecommunication system which is described in Section 2. In order to demonstrate the effect of sequence clustering and noise filtering on failure prediction accuracy we show experiments in Section 6. It is shown that without data preparation techniques failure prediction accuracy drops by up to 45%.

2 The Data Set

The data set used for experiments derives from a commercial telecommunication system. Its main purpose is to realize a Service Control Point (SCP) in an Intelligent Network (IN), providing Service Control Functions (SCF) for communication related management such as billing, number translations or prepaid functionality. Services are offered for Mobile Originated Calls (MOC), Short Message Service (SMS), or General Packet Radio Service (GPRS). Service requests are transmitted to the system using various communication protocols such as Remote Authentication Dial In User Interface (RADIUS), Signaling System Number 7 (SS7), or Internet Protocol (IP). Since the system is a SCP, it cooperates closely with other telecommunication systems in the Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM), however, it does not switch calls itself. The system is realized as multi-tier architecture employing a component-based software design. At the time when measurements were taken the system consisted of more than 1.6 million lines of code, approximately 200 components realized by more than 2000 classes, running simultaneously in several containers, each replicated for fault tolerance.

Specification of the telecommunication system requires that within successive, non-overlapping five minute intervals, the fraction of calls having response time longer than 250ms must not exceed 0.01%. This definition of the failures to be predicted is equivalent to a required four-nines interval service availability. Hence the failures that are predicted by the HSMM failure predictor belong to the class of performance failures.

The setup from which data has been collected is depicted in Figure 2. A call tracker kept trace of request response times and logged each request that showed a response time exceeding 250ms. Furthermore, the call tracker provided information in five-minute intervals whether call availability dropped below 99.99%. More specifically, the exact time of failure has been determined to be the first failed request that caused interval availability to drop below the threshold.




Figure 2: Experimental setup. Call response times have been tracked from outside the system in order to identify failures.

We had access to data collected at 200 non-consecutive days spanning a period of 273 days. The entire dataset consists of error logs with a total of 26,991,314 log records including 1,560 failures of two types: The first type (885 instances) relates to GPRS and the second (675

instances) to SMS and MOC services. In this study, only the first failure type has been investigated.

3 Data Preprocessing

3.1 Creating Machine Processable Logfiles

Traditionally, logfiles were intended to be read by humans in order to support fault diagnosis and root cause analysis after a system had failed. They are not well-suited for machine processing. An (anonymized) example log record consisting of three lines in the error log is shown in Figure 3.

```
2004/04/09-19:26:13.634089-29846-00010-LIB.ABC.USER-AGOMP#020200034000060|
020101044430000|000000000000-020234f43301e000-2.0.1|020200003200060
2004/04/09-19:26:13.634089-29846-00010-LIB.ABC.USER-NOT: src=ERROR.APPLICATION
sev=SEVERITY_MINOR id=020d02222083730a
2004/04/09-19:26:13.634089-29846-00010-LIB.ABC.USER-unknown nature of address
value specified
```

Figure 3: Anonymized error log record from the telecommunication system. The record consists of three log lines.

In order to simplify machine processing, we applied the transformations described in the following paragraphs.

Eliminating logfile rotation. Logfile rotation denotes a technique to switch to a new logfile when the current logfile has reached a size limit, time span limit, or both. In the telecommunication system logging was organized in a ring-buffer fashion consisting of n logfiles. Data has been reorganized to form one large chronologically ordered logfile.

Identifying borders between messages. While error messages “travel” through various modules and architectural levels of the system, more and more information is accumulated until the resulting log-record is written to the logfile. This often leads to situations where the original error message is quoted several times within one log record and one log record spans several lines in the file. We eliminated duplicated information and assigned each piece to a fixed column in the log such that each line corresponds to exactly one log record. This also involved the usage of a unique field delimiter.

Converting time. Timestamps in the original logfiles were tailored to humans and had the form 2004/04/09-19:26:13.634089 stating that the log message occurred at 7:26pm and 13.634089 seconds on 04/09/2004. In order to enable, e.g., computation of the time interval between two error messages we transformed each timestamp into real-valued UTC, which roughly relates to seconds since Jan. 1st, 1970. This also involved the issue of timezone information.

3.2 Assigning IDs to Error Messages

Many error analysis tools including the HSMM failure predictor rely on an integer number to characterize the type of each error message. However, in our case such an identifier was not available. This section describes the algorithm we used to assign an ID to each error message in the log.

The type of an error report is only implicitly given by a natural language sentence describing the event. In this section, we propose a method to automatically assign error IDs to messages on the basis of Levenshtein’s edit distance. Note that the error ID is meant to characterize *what* has happened, which corresponds to the *type* of an error message in contrast to the message *source*, as has been discussed in [6].

Removal of numbers. Assume that the following message occurs in the error log

```
process 1534: end of buffer reached
```

The situation that exactly process with number 1534 reaches the end of a buffer will occur rather rarely. Furthermore, the process number relates to the source rather than the type of the message. Hence, all numbers and log-record specific data such as IP addresses, etc. are replaced by placeholders. For example, the message shown above is translated into:

```
process xx: end of buffer reached
```

In order not to lose the information, a copy of the original message is kept.

Number assignment. Since a 100% complete replacement of all record-specific data is infeasible (there were even typos in the error messages) error IDs are assigned on the basis of Levenshtein’s edit distance [7] expressing dissimilarity of messages. After number removal, Levenshtein distance is computed between all pairs of log messages appearing in the log. By applying a threshold on dissimilarity, similar messages receive the same integer number — the error ID.

Applying this algorithm to the telecommunication data resulted in an immense reduction of the number of message types: While in the original dataset there were 1,695,160 different log-messages, the number of message types could be reduced to 1,435 (see Table 1)

Applying a simple threshold might seem too simplistic to make a decision which messages are grouped together. However, experiments have shown that this is not the case. Figure 4 provides a plot where the gray value of each point indicates Levenshtein distance of the corresponding message pair for a selection of messages. In the plot all messages that are assigned the same error ID are arranged next

Data	No of msgs	Reduction in %
Original	1,695,160	n/a
Without numbers	12,533	99.26%
Levenshtein	1,435	88.55% / 99.92%

Table 1: Number of different log messages in the original data, after substitution of numbers by placeholders, and after clustering by the Levenshtein distance metric.

to each other. Except for a few blocks in the middle of the plot, dark steps only occur along the main descending diagonal and the rest of the plot is rather light-colored. This indicates that strong similarity is only present among messages with the same ID and not between other message types. In addition to the plot, we have manually checked a selection of a few tens of messages. Hence using a fixed threshold is a simple yet robust approach. Nevertheless, as is the case for any grouping algorithm it may assign the same ID to two error message that should be kept separate. For example, if process 1534 was a crucial singleton process in the system (like the “init” process in the Linux kernel, which always has process ID one) the number would be an important piece of information that should not be eliminated. However, in our case the significant reduction in the number of messages outweighs such effects. Note that Levenshtein distances have to be computed only once for any pair of messages.




Figure 4: Levenshtein similarity plot for a subset of message types. Points represent Levenshtein distance between one pair of error messages (dark color indicates small distance).

3.3 Tupling

In [8], the authors note that repetitive log records occurring more or less at the same time are frequently multiple reports of the same fault. Tsao and Siewiorek introduced a procedure called *tupling*, which basically refers to grouping of error events that occur within some time interval or that refer to the same location [9]. Current research aims at quantifying temporal and spatial tupling. For example,

in [10] the authors introduce a correlation measure for this purpose.

We adopt the tupling method of [9]. However, equating the location reported in an error message with the true location of the fault only works for systems with strong fault containment regions. Since this assumption does not hold for the telecommunication system under consideration, spatial tupling is not considered any further, here. The basic idea of tupling is that all errors showing an inter-arrival time less than a threshold ε are grouped.¹ Grouping can lead to two problems:

1. Error messages might be combined that refer to several (unrelated) faults. This is called a *collision*.
2. If an inter-arrival time $> \varepsilon$ occurs within the error pattern of one single fault, this pattern is divided into more than one tuple. This effect is called *truncation*.

Both the number of collisions and truncations depend on ε . If ε is large, truncation happens rarely and collision will occur very likely. If ε is small the effect is vice versa. To find an optimal ε , the authors suggest to plot the number of tuples over ε . This should yield an L-shaped curve: If ε equals zero, the number of tuples equals the number of error events in the logfile. While ε is increased, the number drops quickly. When the optimal value for ε is reached, the curve flattens suddenly. Our data supports this claim: Figure 5 shows the plot for a subset of one million log records. The graph shows a clear change point and a value of $\varepsilon = 0.015s$ has been chosen.




Figure 5: Effect of tupling window size ε : the graph shows the resulting number of tuples depending on ε for one million log records.

3.4 Extracting Sequences

Two types of data sets are needed to train the HSMM-based failure predictor: a set of failure-related error sequences and a set of non-failure-related sequences. In order to decide whether a sequence is a failure sequence

¹In [9], there is a second, larger threshold to add later events if they are similar, but this is not considered, here

or not, the failure log, which has been written by the call tracker, has been analyzed, to extract timestamps and types of failure occurrences. In this last step of data pre-processing both types of sequences are extracted from the data set.

Three parameters are involved in sequence extraction:

1. *Lead-time*. In order to predict failures before a failure occurs, extracted failure sequences preceded the time of failure occurrence by time Δt_l . In the experiments we used a value of five minutes.
2. *Data window size*. The length of each sequence is determined by a maximum time Δt_d . In the experiments we used sequences of five minute length.
3. *Margins for non-failure sequences*. The set of non-failure sequences should be extracted from the log at times when the system is fault-free. However, whether a system really is fault-free is hard to tell. Therefore, we applied a “ban period” of size Δt_m before and after a failure. By visual inspection (length of bursts of failures, etc.), we determined Δt_m to be 20 minutes.

Non-failure sequences have been generated using overlapping time windows, which simulates the case that failure prediction is performed each time an error occurs, and a random selection has been used to reduce the size of the training data set.

4 Failure Sequence Clustering

The term *failure mechanism*, as used in this paper, denotes a principle chain of actions or conditions that leads to a system failure. It is assumed that in complex computer systems such as the telecommunication system various failure mechanisms can lead to the same failure. Different failure mechanisms can show completely different behavior in the error event logs, which makes it very difficult for the learning algorithm to extract the inherent “principle” of failure behavior in a given training data set. The idea of clustering failure-related error sequences (which for brevity reasons from now on will be called “failure sequences”) is to group similar sequences and train a separate HSMM for each group. Failure sequence clustering aims at grouping failure sequences according to their similarity — however, there is no “natural” distance metric such as Euclidean norm for error event sequences. We use sequence likelihoods from small HSMMs for this purpose. The approach is inspired by [11] but yields separate specialized models instead of one mixture model.




Figure 6: Matrix of logarithmic sequence likelihoods. Each element (i, j) in the matrix is logarithmic sequence likelihood $\log [P(F^i|M^j)]$ for sequence F^i and model M^j .

4.1 Obtaining the Dissimilarity Matrix

Most clustering algorithms require as their input data a matrix of dissimilarities among data points (D). In our case, each data point is a failure sequence F^i and hence $D(i, j)$ denotes the dissimilarity between failure sequence F^i and F^j .

As first step a small HSMM M^i is trained separately for each failure sequence F^i . The objective of the training algorithm is to adjust the HSMM parameters (e.g., transition probabilities and observation probability distributions) to the training sequence, i.e., the HSMM is tuned such that it assigns a high sequence likelihood to the training sequence.

In order to compute $D(i, j)$ the sequence likelihood $P(F^i|M^j)$ is computed for each sequence F^i using each model M^j . Sequence likelihood is used as a similarity score $\in [0, 1]$. Since model M^j has been trained with sequence F^j , it assigns a high sequence likelihood to sequences F^i that are similar to F^j , and a lower sequence likelihood to sequences F^i that are less similar to F^j . In order to avoid numeric instabilities, the logarithm of the likelihood (log-likelihood) is used (see Figure 6).

The resulting matrix is not yet a dissimilarity matrix, since first, values are ≤ 0 and second, sequence likelihoods are not symmetric: $P(F^i|M^j) \neq P(F^j|M^i)$. This is solved by taking the arithmetic mean of both likelihoods and using the absolute value. Hence $D(i, j)$ is defined as:

$$D(i, j) = \left| \frac{\log [P(F^i|M^j)] + \log [P(F^j|M^i)]}{2} \right| \quad (1)$$

Still, matrix D is not a proper dissimilarity matrix since a proper metric requires that $D(i, j) = 0$, if $F^i = F^j$. There is no solution to this problem since from $D(j, j) = 0$ follows that $P(F^j|M^j) = 1$. However, if M^j would assign a probability of one to F^j it would assign a probability of zero to all other sequences $F^i \neq F^j$, which would be useless for clustering. Nev-

ertheless, $D(j, j)$ is close to zero since it denotes log-sequence likelihood for the sequence, model M^j has been trained with.

In order to achieve a good measure of similarity among sequences models should not be overfitted to their training sequences. Furthermore, one model needs to be trained for each failure sequence in the training data set. Therefore, models M^i have only a few states and are ergodic (have the structure of a clique). An example is shown in Figure 7. In order to further avoid too specific models, exponential distributions for inter-error durations and a uniform background distribution have been used. Background distributions add some small probability to




Figure 7: Topology of HSMMs used for computation of the dissimilarity matrix. Observation symbol probabilities are omitted.

all HMM observation probabilities following a (data independent) distribution such as uniform.

4.2 Grouping Failure Sequences

In order to group similar failure sequences, a clustering algorithm has been applied to the dissimilarity matrix. Due to the fact that the number of groups cannot be determined upfront and can vary greatly, we applied hierarchical clustering methods (both agglomerative and divisive, c.f., e.g., [12]). The actual number of groups has been determined by visual inspection of banner plots.

4.3 Analysis of Sequence Clustering

The failure sequence clustering approach implies several parameters such as the number of states of the HSMMs, or the clustering method used. This section explores their influence on sequence clustering (not on failure prediction accuracy, which is investigated in Section 6). In order to do so many combinations of parameters have been analyzed, but only key results can be presented here. In order to support clarity of the plots, a data excerpt from five successive days including 40 failure sequences has been used.

We explored one divisive algorithm (DIANA), and four agglomerative approaches (AGNES) using single linkage, average linkage, complete linkage and Ward's procedure (c.f. [12]) Figure 8 shows banner plots for all methods using a dissimilarity matrix that has been generated using

a HSMM with 20 states and a uniform background distribution with a weighting factor of 0.25. Banner plots connect data points (sequences) by a bar of length to the level of distance metric where the two points are merged / divided. Single linkage clustering (second row, left) shows




Figure 8: Clustering of 40 failure sequences using five different clustering methods: agglomerative clustering (“agnes”) using average, complete, and single linkage, agglomerative clustering using Ward’s method and divisive clustering (“diana”).

the typical chaining effect, which does not result in a good separation of failure sequences yielding an agglomerative coefficient of only 0.45. Complete linkage (first row, right) performs better resulting in a clear separation of two groups and an agglomerative coefficient of 0.72. Not surprisingly, average linkage (first row, left) resembles some mixture of single and complete linkage clustering. Divisive clustering (bottom row, left) divides data into three groups at the beginning but does not look consistent since groups are split up further rather quickly. The resulting agglomerative coefficient is 0.69. Finally, agglomerative clustering using Ward’s method (second row, right) results in the clearest separation achieving an agglomerative coefficient of 0.85. The results are roughly the same if other parameter settings are considered.

In order to investigate the impact of the number of states N of the HSMMs, we performed several experiments ranging from five to 50 states. We found that failure grouping only works well if the number of states is roughly above \sqrt{L} where L denotes the average length of the sequences. This might be explained by the fact that there are roughly N^2 transitions in the model.

We also investigated the effect of background distri-




Figure 9: After clustering similar failure sequences, filtering is applied to remove failure unrelated errors from training sequences. Times of failure occurrence are indicated by ▼.

butions and found that some background distribution is necessary (otherwise, each model only recognizes exactly the sequence it has been trained with). However, the actual strength (or weight) of the background distribution has only small impact as long as it stays in a reasonable range (if the weighting factor for background distributions gets too large, the “chaining-effect” can be observed and the agglomerative coefficient is decreasing).

5 Filtering the Noise

The objective of the previous clustering step was to group failure sequences that are traces of the same failure mechanism. Hence it can be expected that failure sequences of one group are more or less similar. However, experiments have shown that this is not always the case. The reason for this is that error logfiles contain noise (unrelated events), which results mainly from parallelism within the system. Hence we applied some filtering to eliminate noise and to mine the events in the sequences that make up the true pattern.

The filtering mechanism is based on the notion that within a certain time window prior to failure, indicative events occur more frequently within failure sequences of the same failure mechanism than within all other sequences. The precise definition of “more frequently” is based on the χ^2 test of goodness of fit.

The filtering process is depicted in the blow-up of Figure 9 and performs the following steps:

1. Prior probabilities are estimated for each symbol. Priors express the “general” probability that a given symbol occurs.
2. All failure sequences of one group (which are similar and are expected to represent one failure mechanism), are aligned such that the failure occurs at time $t = 0$. In the figure, sequences F^1 , F^2 , and F^4 are aligned and the dashed line indicates time of failure occurrence.




Figure 10: The three different sequence sets that can be used to compute symbol prior probabilities.

3. Time windows are defined that reach backwards in time. The length of the time window is fixed and time windows may overlap. Time windows are indicated by shaded vertical bars in the figure.
4. The test is performed for each time window separately, taking into account all error events that have occurred within the time window in all failure sequences of the group.
5. Only error events that occur significantly more frequently in the time window than their prior probability stay in the set of training sequences. All other error events within the time window are removed.
6. Filtering rules are stored for each time window specifying error symbols that pass the filter. The filter rules are used later for online failure prediction in order to filter new sequences that occur during run-time.

More formally, each error e_i that occurs in failure sequences of the same cluster within a time window $(t - \Delta t, t]$ prior to failure is checked for significant deviation from the prior \hat{p}_i^0 by a test variable known from χ -grams, which are a non-squared version of the testing variable of the χ^2 goodness of fit test (see, e.g., [13]). The testing variable X_i is defined as the non-squared standardized difference:

$$X_i = \frac{n_i - n\hat{p}_i^0}{\sqrt{n\hat{p}_i^0}}, \quad (2)$$

where n_i denotes the number of occurrences of error e_i and n is the total number of errors in the time window. An analysis reveals that all X_i have an expected value of zero and variance of one, hence they can all be compared to one threshold c : Filtering eliminates all errors e_i from the sequences within the time window, for which $X_i < c$. For online prediction, the sequence under investigation is filtered the same way before sequence likelihood is computed.

Three variants regarding the computation of priors \hat{p}_i^0 exist (see Figure 10):

1. \hat{p}_i^0 are estimated from all training sequences (failure and non-failure). X_i compares the frequency of oc-

currence of error e_i to the frequency of occurrence within the entire training data.

2. \hat{p}_i^0 are estimated from all *failure* sequences (irrespective of the groups obtained from clustering). X_i compares the frequency of occurrence of error e_i to all failure sequences (irrespective of the group).
3. \hat{p}_i^0 are estimated separately for each group of failure sequences from all errors within the group (over all time windows). For each error e_i the testing variable X_i compares the occurrence within one time window to the entire group of failure sequences.

Experiments have been performed on the dataset used previously for clustering analysis and six non-overlapping filtering time windows of length 50 seconds have been analyzed. Figure 11 plots the average number of symbols in one group of failure sequences after filtering out all errors with $X_i < c$ for various values of c .




Figure 11: Mean sequence length depending on threshold c for three different priors.

Regarding the prior computed from all sequences (solid line), all symbols pass the filter for very small thresholds. At some value of c the length of sequences starts dropping quickly until some point where sequence lengths stabilize for some range of c . With further increasing c average sequence length drops again until finally not a single symbol passes filtering. Similar to the tupling heuristic by [8], we consider a threshold at the beginning of the middle plateau to best distinguish between “signal” and noise. Other priors do not show this behavior, hence we used priors estimated from all sequences (first prior).

6 Results

As stated before, the overall objective was to predict failures of the telecommunication system as accurate as possible. The metric used to measure accuracy of predictions is the so-called *F-measure*, which is the harmonic mean of precision and recall. *Precision* is the relative number

of correctly predicted failures to the total number of predictions, and *recall* is the relative number of correctly predicted failures to the total number of failures. A definition and comprehensive analysis can be found in Chapter 8.2 of [5]. The HSMM prediction method involves a customizable threshold determining whether a failure warning is issued very easily (at a low level of confidence in the prediction) or only if it is rather sure that a failure is imminent, which affects the trade-off between precision and recall.² In this paper we only report maximum achievable F-measure.

Applying the full chain of data preparation as described in Sections 3 to 5 yields a failure prediction F-measure of 0.66. A comparative study has shown that this result is significantly more accurate than best-known error-based prediction approaches (see Chapter 9.9 of [5]). In order to determine the effect of clustering and filtering, we have conducted experiments based on ungrouped (unclustered) data as well as on unfiltered data. Unfortunately, experiments with neither filtering nor grouping were not feasible. All experiments have been performed with the same HSMM setup (i.e., number of states, model topology, etc.). Results unveil that data preparation plays a significant role in achieving accurate failure predictions (see Table 2).

Method	Max. F-Measure	rel. Quality
Optimal results	0.66	100%
Without grouping	0.5097	77%
Without filtering	0.3601	55%

Table 2: Failure prediction accuracy expressed as maximum F-measure from data with full data preparation, without failure sequence grouping (clustering) and without noise filtering.

7 Conclusions

It is common perception today that logfiles, and in particular error logs, are a fruitful source of information both for analysis after failure and for proactive fault handling which frequently builds on the anticipation of upcoming failures. However, in order to get (machine) access to the information contained in logs, the data needs to be put into shape and valuable pieces of information need to be picked from the vast amount of data. This paper described the process we used to prepare error logs of a commercial telecommunication system for a hidden semi-Markov failure predictor.

The preparation process consists of three major steps and involved the following new concepts: (a) an algorithm to automatically assign integer error IDs to error messages, (b) a clustering algorithm for error sequences,

²In fact, either precision or recall can be increased to 100% at the cost of the other.

and (c) a statistical filtering algorithm to reduce noise in the sequences. We conducted experiments to assess the effect of sequence clustering and noise filtering. The results unveiled that elaborate data preparation is a very important step to achieve good prediction accuracy.

In addition to failure prediction the proposed techniques might also be helpful to speed up the process of diagnosis: For example, if root causes have been identified for each failure group in a reference data set, identification of the most similar reference sequence would allow a first assignment of potential root causes for a failure that has occurred during runtime.

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