

# *Evaluating Migrant Integration: Political Attitudes Across Generations in Europe*<sup>1</sup>

Rahsaan Maxwell

*University of Massachusetts, Amherst*

This article engages debates about migrant integration by analyzing political trust and satisfaction in 24 European countries. The evidence suggests that first-generation migrants have the most positive attitudes, while native-origin and second-generation migrant-origin individuals have similar political trust and satisfaction scores. To explain these outcomes, I focus on the importance of subjective integration factors related to the stages of migration. I claim that first-generation migrants, who have gone through the disruptive process of changing countries, will have lower expectations and be more likely to have positive evaluations of the host society. In comparison, native-origin and second-generation migrant-origin individuals have been raised in the same society and are likely to share perspectives toward that society's political institutions.

Across Europe, migrant political attitudes have been under close scrutiny in recent years. In many countries, natives are nervous about whether migrants and their children feel allegiance to the host country or to the homeland. These fears have been heightened by high-profile instances of terrorism and urban unrest among migrant communities across Europe (Garton Ash, 2005). As European societies look to the future, one of the most pressing concerns is ensuring that migrants are committed to the mainstream political community (Sackmann, Peters, and Faist, 2003).

This article engages the debate about migrant integration by analyzing political attitudes among first-generation migrants, second-generation

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migrant-origin individuals, and native-origin individuals in 24 European countries.<sup>2</sup> I examine trust in Parliament and satisfaction with the national government as a way of exploring whether individuals feel government authority is legitimate and responsive to their needs. These attitudes are not the only measure of integration as one might also analyze citizenship acquisition, voting behavior, political representation, or various economic and cultural outcomes.<sup>3</sup> However, for the purposes of this article, analyzing political trust and political satisfaction allows me to assess the conditions under which alienation or attachment to mainstream institutions may occur, which is a central element of contemporary debates about migrant integration (Joppke, 2007a,b).

The evidence in this paper suggests significant variation in political attitudes across migrant generations in Europe. First-generation migrants have the most positive attitudes, while native-origin and second-generation migrant-origin individuals have similar political trust and satisfaction scores. To explain these outcomes, I focus on the importance of subjective integration factors related to the stages of migration. I claim that first-generation migrants, who have gone through the disruptive process of changing countries, will have lower expectations and be more likely to have positive evaluations of the host society. In comparison, native-origin and second-generation migrant-origin individuals have been raised in the same society and are likely to share perspectives toward that society's political institutions.

In the next section, I review existing explanations for migrant integration. I then present my argument in greater detail along with the theoretical framework for this discussion. Third, I discuss the data and measures used to analyze political attitudes in Europe. Fourth, I present data on political attitudes in 24 European countries and demonstrate that existing literature cannot account for political trust and satisfaction levels among migrants and migrant-origin individuals. The sixth section develops my argument about how generational status affects evaluations and the last section concludes.

<sup>2</sup>First-generation migrants are individuals born abroad with both parents also born abroad, second-generation migrant-origin individuals are individuals with at least one parent born abroad, and native-origin individuals have both parents born in the country of residence. For more details, *see* the section on Data and Measures.

<sup>3</sup>For a general overview of political integration, *see* Hochschild and Mollenkopf (2009). For an overview of economic and social integration, *see* Alba and Nee (2003) or Kasinitz, Mollenkopf, and Waters (2004).

## *EXISTING LITERATURE*

The literature on migrant integration covers a wide range of indicators and geographic contexts. The three main perspectives focus on the prospects for successful integration over time, the barriers that prevent certain ethnic minority migrants from achieving successful integration, and the structural conditions in the host country environment that shape integration. These explanations are not mutually exclusive because they highlight different aspects of the integration process and may be more or less relevant depending on the specific outcome and geographic location in question.

### *Integration Over Time*

There is a well-established literature that analyzes migrant integration as a process that develops over time and across generations. This literature first developed in the United States to account for the integration of late 19th-century and early 20th-century migrants from Europe. Researchers noticed that migrants often faced initial integration difficulties but that over time and across generations their life outcomes converged with natives'. The key mechanisms that facilitated this process were the acquisition of citizenship and the gradual adoption of host society language, culture, and customs that allowed migrants to participate in mainstream life (Park, Burgess, and McKenzie, 1925; Gordon, 1964). Recent research has extended the argument to account for post-World War II migrants to the United States and Western Europe. These authors acknowledge that newer migrants face different circumstances than earlier migrants but claim that with enough time in the host country they will successfully integrate (Perlmann and Waldinger, 1997; Alba and Nee, 2003; Joppke and Morawska, 2003).

### *Barriers to Integration*

Another group of arguments analyzes the barriers that may impede integration progress. This is often called "segmented assimilation" literature because of its focus on multiple possible pathways for integration and assimilation. In particular, this literature has highlighted the issues of blocked social mobility, ethnic and racial discrimination, and continuing effects of homeland political repression.

Much of the literature on how integration outcomes improve over time assumes that migrants can access greater economic opportunities as they became part of the host society. Recent scholarship argues that economic changes such as de-industrialization and a dwindling supply of upwardly mobile working class jobs have reduced the opportunities for low-skill migrants to access social mobility. In this environment, migrants without high-level educational qualifications may be vulnerable to prolonged integration difficulties and eventual alienation (Portes and Zhou, 1993; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001; Gans, 2007).

Another significant barrier to integration is racial and ethnic discrimination. Discrimination was a problem for migrants in the early 20th century but their white European origins allowed them to assimilate and eventually blend in with natives. In comparison, contemporary non-white migrants in Europe may face intense racialization and discrimination even after living in the host country for several generations. This discrimination creates numerous social, economic, and political problems for integration and may eventually lead non-whites to become disillusioned with mainstream society (Waters, 1999; Portes, Fernández-Kelly, and Haller, 2005).

Finally, another branch of literature argues that migrants from countries with high levels of political repression may face unique integration challenges. Migrants who were socialized under conditions of severe political repression may be less familiar with democratic norms and may be uncomfortable participating in the host society civic sphere. In addition, these migrants may be predisposed to distrust politicians and may have exceptionally negative attitudes toward government (Bueker, 2005; Ramakrishnan, 2005). On the other hand, migrants from politically repressive societies may be more likely to prize the democratic freedoms they did not enjoy at home. These migrants may then have higher levels of participation and more positive attitudes in the host society (DeSipio, 1996; de la Garza, Falcon, and Chris Garcia, 1996).

### *Host Society Environment*

The previous two groups of arguments focused on individual-level variables but a third branch of literature emphasizes geographic variation in integration outcomes. In particular, this literature focuses on the laws governing migrants' access to citizenship and natives' attitudes toward migrants.

Individual-level arguments emphasize the importance of citizenship and participation in mainstream institutions for promoting integration.

However, when migrant integration is compared cross-nationally, there can be significant differences in access to full legal rights. In some countries (*e.g.*, Britain and Portugal) all individuals born in the country are eligible for citizenship as well as first-generation migrants who have lived in the host society for a certain number of years. In other countries (*e.g.*, Austria and Denmark) it is extremely difficult for migrant-origin individuals without ethnic roots in the country to access citizenship, even if born in the host society. These differences have ramifications for integration because in countries where it is easier to access citizenship migrants will be more likely to participate in politics and advance their interests in mainstream civic society (Brubaker, 1992; Soysal, 1994; Safran, 1997).

Another strand of literature analyzes variation in natives' attitudes toward migrants as an important predictor of integration patterns. According to this literature, anti-immigrant and xenophobic sentiments make integration more difficult because they can be used to justify discrimination or support for far-right wing political parties that pursue anti-immigrant policies (Fetzer, 2000; Joppke, 2005; Paskeviciute and Anderson, 2008). In addition, variation in historical traditions and natives' attitudes toward diversity shape the extent to which migrants are viewed as legitimate actors in mainstream society which affects the extent to which migrants feel a part of the host society (Koopmans *et al.*, 2005; Banting and Kymlicka, 2006).

### *AN ALTERNATIVE FRAMEWORK: SUBJECTIVE INTEGRATION FACTORS AND GENERATIONAL STATUS*

The existing literature on migrant integration covers a wide range of explanations but it primarily focuses on "objective" outcomes such as socioeconomic status, political participation, or political representation (Bleich, 2008). In this article I examine attitudes toward government which is a "subjective" form of integration that I claim needs a different set of explanations. To account for these subjective attitudes, I start by arguing that migrants' and migrant-origin individuals' political trust and government satisfaction are shaped by their evaluation of the host society. In particular, I claim that individuals with more positive evaluations of the host society will have higher levels of political trust and satisfaction. This builds on political behavior literature which has demonstrated similar patterns among the general population (Almond and Verba, 1963; Citrin

and Green, 1986; Lawrence, 1987; Mishler and Rose, 2001; Keele, 2007).

I then expand on the general political behavior research by examining how migrants' evaluations are shaped by generational status. I claim that first-generation migrants will be more likely than native-origin and second-generation migrant-origin individuals to have positive evaluations of the host society because of their expectations. In addition, I argue that second-generation migrant-origin individuals have grown up in the same environment as migrant-origin individuals and are likely to share the same evaluations of the host society.

Many first-generation migrants have undergone conscious sacrifices and may be prepared to accept difficult circumstances as the price for moving to their chosen host society. This does not ignore the fact that migrants often feel disappointment and frustration at the difficulties of living in a foreign society. However, migrants' dissatisfaction with the homeland prompted the move, so even difficult circumstances in the host society are likely to be viewed in a more positive light (Kao and Tienda, 1995; de la Garza, Falcon, and Chris Garcia, 1996; Escobar, 2006).

On the other hand, second-generation migrant-origin individuals who were born in the host society are more likely to share natives' educational and cultural experiences and therefore their evaluations. This does not assume that second-generation and native-origin individuals have the same perspective on all aspects of the host society. Second-generation individuals often suffer from stigmatization and discrimination and feel trapped between societies as they are not fully accepted in the host country but not fully part of the homeland (Gans, 1992; Waters, 1999; Portes and Rumbaut, 2001). However, while second-generation migrant-origin individuals are likely to be more sensitive than native-origin individuals to issues of discrimination, I argue that because both groups were born and raised in the same country they are likely to share overall evaluations of the political institutions.<sup>4</sup>

<sup>4</sup>One important caveat is that these dynamics are not likely to apply in circumstances where the government is engaged in openly discriminatory behavior (*e.g.*, Nazi Germany, pre-Civil Rights United States, or apartheid South Africa). Although discrimination exists in contemporary Europe and may divide different groups' perception of society, the evidence here suggests that those attitudinal differences do not apply to formal government institutions.

These claims about the subjective nature of political attitude formation offer a new perspective on migrant integration. They agree with existing literature that variation in geographic context can be important for shaping objective integration outcomes (e.g. citizenship laws and naturalization rates). However, in this article I argue that the mechanisms underlying attitude formation are similar across space. In addition, they do not imply that the objective measures of citizenship, language acquisition, or socioeconomic status cited by the literature are unimportant for migrants' integration. Existing literature offers insight into many of the more formal aspects of migrant incorporation (e.g., naturalization rates, voting behavior, or organizational dynamics). Instead, I focus on the less-explored subjective nature of attitudes. In doing so, I highlight the ways in which integration outcomes can be mixed across indicators. This draws on a growing body of research which suggests that successful socioeconomic and cultural integration does not always lead to positive political or attitudinal integration (Dancygier and Saunders, 2006; Ireland, 2008; Schmitter Heisler, 2007; Maxwell, 2008b,c). More specifically, my argument builds on the insight that subjective expectations facilitate different interpretations of objectively similar integration outcomes (Maxwell, 2008a).

### *DATA AND MEASURES*

The data in this article come from the European Social Survey (ESS). I pool data from the ESS round 1 (conducted in 2002 and 2003), round 2 (conducted in 2004 and 2005), and round 3 (conducted in 2006 and 2007). The ESS is useful because it is the only survey with a wide range of questions on social and political attitudes as well as significant samples of foreign-born respondents across a wide range of European countries. The 24 countries included in the survey are Austria, Belgium, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, the Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Ukraine, and the United Kingdom. The data are weighted to account for varying population sizes across countries and to account for unequal sample inclusion probabilities among respondents across countries (Ganninger, 2007).

To identify first-generation migrants, I select respondents who were born abroad with both parents who were also born abroad. By selecting

foreign-born respondents with parents born abroad I am able to omit respondents who were born abroad in one of their country's colonies or during travel or short-term relocation for their parents. I am also able to omit "ethnic natives" who were born abroad due to wars, forced population movements, and border re-alignments. To identify second-generation migrant-origin individuals, I select respondents who were born in the country of residence with at least one parent born abroad. Native-origin individuals are respondents born in the country of residence with both parents born in the country as well. These definitions produce samples of 8,132 first-generation migrants, 9,436 second-generation migrant-origin individuals, and 104,570 native-origin individuals.

For the dependent variable, I use two questions about political attitudes. One asks about trust in the country's Parliament and the second asks about satisfaction with the national government. To measure general evaluations of the host society I use three measures about satisfaction in the present state of the economy, the state of education, and the way democracy works.

I use several measures to evaluate the literature on integration over time. "Duration" is a measure of how long respondents have been living in the host country and "Citizen" is a measure of citizenship status. To measure language adaptation, the variable "Language" codes responses to a question about the language spoken most often at home.<sup>5</sup>

To assess the literature on barriers to integration I include three measures of socioeconomic status, one for education, another for unemployment status, and a third variable "Comfort" which measures responses to a question about household finances and financial security. Six variables measure possible barriers to integration in Europe. "Sex" measures whether men and women face different integration challenges. "Western" is a dummy variable for whether migrants are from Western or Non-Western countries. "Ethnic minority" is a dummy variable that measures responses to a question about whether individuals are members of an ethnic minority group in their country. "Discrimination" is a dummy

<sup>5</sup>An alternate measure of linguistic adaptation would be fluency in the host country language but unfortunately this is not available from the ESS. The existing measure cannot distinguish between individuals who are fluent in the host country language but speak another language at home for personal or family reasons and individuals who speak a minority language at home because they have poor fluency in the host country language. However, it does provide a rough gauge of the extent to which individuals have adopted host country linguistic practices.



variable that measures responses to a question about whether individuals are members of a group that is discriminated against in their country. Finally, two dummy variables for “Muslim” and “Christian” assess the importance of religious affiliation. Islam is currently the most stigmatized religion in Europe, so one could hypothesize that Muslims face more barriers to integration than non-Muslims (Bleich, 2009). Christianity is the most common religion in Europe and therefore Christian migrants might face fewer integration obstacles.<sup>6</sup>

To measure the homeland political context, I include a variable for the level of democracy in the country of birth. These values are calculated using scores from the Polity IV data set which measures levels of democracy across different regimes. Finally, I include a dummy variable “Colonial” for whether or not respondents are from a country (or have a parent with origins in a country) that was a former colony of their European host society. This is included to measure whether or not migrants from former colonies carry an additional stigma that affects their political attitudes.

To evaluate the arguments about the host country environment I include two variables measuring natives’ attitudes toward immigrants. “Immigrant-Allow” is an index of native-origin individuals’ responses to three questions about whether more or fewer immigrants should be allowed if they are the same race/ethnicity as the majority, a different race/ethnicity from the majority, or from poorer countries outside of Europe.<sup>7</sup> “Immigrant-Like” is an index of native-origin individuals’ responses to three questions about whether immigration is good or bad for the country’s economy, whether the country’s cultural life is undermined or enriched by immigrants, and whether immigrants make the country a better or worse place to live.<sup>8</sup> Individual scores were used to calculate a country and a sub-national regional mean for each variable.<sup>9</sup> To gauge the

<sup>6</sup>Dummy variables for other religions (*e.g.*, Buddhism, Judaism, and Sikhism) are not included as they cause less of a political controversy and seem less relevant for debates around integration in contemporary Europe. However, alternative models were run which included such variables and the general results were the same.

<sup>7</sup>The Cronbach’s alpha for these three items is 0.89, which suggests that they are a reliable scale.

<sup>8</sup>The Cronbach’s alpha for these three items is 0.83, which suggests that they are a reliable scale.

<sup>9</sup>In addition to country of residence, each respondent is classified according to their sub-national region of residence. There are 271 sub-national regions included in the ESS. For more information, *see* <http://ess.nsd.uib.no/>.

importance of country-level variation in access to citizenship, I include a variable that measures the percentage of first-generation migrants and migrant-origin individuals in each country with host country citizenship. I include country-level controls for annual growth in per capita GDP (as a measure of government performance) and percentage of first- and second-generation migrants from Africa, Asia, or Latin America (to control for cross-national differences in the composition of migrant populations). Finally, to examine whether migrant and migrant-origin individuals' attitudes vary according to native-origin individuals' attitudes, I include a control variable for the mean political trust and satisfaction scores for native-origin individuals across countries and sub-national regions. Full details on all the coding can be found in the Appendix.

### *POLITICAL ATTITUDE RESULTS*

Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the main variables. The first two rows are for the dependent variables and indicate that first-generation migrants have the most positive attitudes, followed by native-origin

**TABLE 1**  
DESCRIPTIVE STATISTICS

	First Generation	Second Generation	Native	Overall	Min.	Max
Trust Parliament	5.14 (2.50)	4.51 (2.49)	4.64 (2.45)	4.66 (2.46)	0	10
Government Satisfaction	5.07 (2.47)	4.26 (2.42)	4.33 (2.37)	4.37 (2.39)	0	10
Satisfy Eco	5.33 (2.50)	4.68 (2.48)	4.75 (2.43)	4.78 (2.45)	0	10
Satisfy Edu	5.91 (2.46)	5.34 (2.39)	5.58 (2.32)	5.58 (2.34)	0	10
Satisfy Dem	6.02 (2.52)	5.31 (2.52)	5.35 (2.40)	5.39 (2.42)	0	10
Duration	3.01 (1.18)	–	–	4.84 (0.61)	0	5
Citizen	0.47 (0.50)	0.93 (0.26)	1.00 (0.06)	0.96 (0.20)	0	1
Language	0.39 (0.49)	0.10 (0.30)	0.02 (0.16)	0.05 (0.23)	0	1
Education	12.08 (4.49)	12.25 (3.78)	11.83 (4.03)	11.88 (4.04)	0	56
Unemployed	0.07 (0.25)	0.06 (0.24)	0.04 (0.21)	0.05 (0.21)	0	1
Comfort	1.83 (0.91)	1.93 (0.91)	2.01 (0.85)	2.00 (0.86)	0	1
Sex	0.55 (0.50)	0.53 (0.50)	0.53 (0.50)	0.53 (0.50)	0	1
Western	0.70 (0.46)	0.84 (0.37)	–	–	0	1
Ethnic Minority	0.28 (0.45)	0.10 (0.30)	0.02 (0.13)	0.04 (0.20)	0	1
Discrimination (0.29)	0.17 (0.37) 0.05 (0.21)	0.10 0.06 (0.23)	0	1		
Christian	0.50 (0.50)	0.50 (0.50)	0.62 (0.47)	0.60 (0.49)	0	1
Muslim	0.12 (0.32)	0.03 (0.18)	0.00 (0.04)	0.01 (0.11)	0	1
Democracy	2.92 (7.00)	9.38 (1.26)	9.60 (1.55)	9.15 (2.84)	–10	10
Colonial	0.11 (0.32)	–	–	–	0	1
Immigrant-Allow	5.28 (2.28)	4.92 (2.40)	4.57 (2.34)	4.64 (2.35)	0	9
Immigrant-Like	17.49 (6.45)	15.20 (6.59)	14.48 (6.29)	14.73 (6.37)	0	30

Note: Values are expressed as mean (SD).

individuals, and then second-generation respondents. However, the gaps between second-generation migrant-origin individuals and native-origin individuals are much smaller than the gaps between first-generation migrants and native-origin individuals. For trust in Parliament the first-generation mean is 0.50 points higher than native-origin individuals while the native-origin mean is only 0.13 points higher than second-generation migrant-origin individuals. Similarly, for government satisfaction the first-generation mean is 0.74 points higher than native-origin individuals while the native-origin mean is only 0.07 points higher than second-generation migrant-origin individuals.<sup>10</sup> This suggests that first-generation migrants are the most positive group while native-origin and second-generation migrant-origin individuals have similar attitudes.

### *COMPETING EXPLANATIONS FOR MIGRANT POLITICAL ATTITUDES*

An initial review of the outcomes in Table 1 suggests that the existing literature may not be sufficient for explaining political trust and satisfaction outcomes across generations in Europe. If the literature on integration over time were correct then we would expect second-generation migrant-origin individuals to have more positive attitudes than first-generation migrants, but that is not the case. Much of the literature on barriers to integration emphasizes how second-generation individuals will have worse outcomes than native-origin individuals, but according to the political attitude data in Table 1 that is not the case. The results in Table 1 do not directly address the issue of variation across geographic contexts but if

<sup>10</sup>The gaps between first-generation migrants and second-generation migrant-origin individuals and between second-generation migrant-origin individuals and native-origin individuals are all statistically significant at  $p < 0.05$  or less. However, while the gaps between first- and second-generation individuals and the gaps between first-generation and native-origin individuals remain statistically significant with various controls, the gaps between second-generation migrant-origin individuals and native-origin individuals are no longer statistically significant with the addition of controls for residence in East versus West Europe and Discrimination. This is because Estonia has a sizeable second-generation population (just over 7% of the total ESS second-generation population) with Russian origins who face considerable discrimination difficulties. To a lesser extent, similar dynamics exist among Russian-origin second-generation populations in Finland and Ukraine. When these groups are excluded the rest of the second-generation and native-origin populations have political trust and satisfaction scores that are almost identical.

TABLE 2  
MULTI-LEVEL MIXED-EFFECTS MAXIMUM LIKELIHOOD ESTIMATES OF POLITICAL ATTITUDES

	Trust in Parliament			Government Satisfaction		
	First Generation	Second Generation	Native	First Generation	Second Generation	Native
Satisfy Eco	0.158*** (0.014)	0.190*** (0.012)	0.195*** (0.004)	0.384*** (0.011)	0.366*** (0.010)	0.390*** (0.003)
Satisfy Edu	0.129*** (0.013)	0.090*** (0.011)	0.082*** (0.003)	0.103*** (0.010)	0.082*** (0.009)	0.080*** (0.003)
Satisfy Dem	0.323*** (0.013)	0.339*** (0.011)	0.354*** (0.003)	0.338*** (0.011)	0.353*** (0.010)	0.355*** (0.003)
Duration	-0.028 (0.028)	-	-	-0.059* (0.053)	-	-
Citizen	0.020 (0.064)	0.009 (0.101)	0.075 (0.164)	0.048 (0.052)	-0.154 (0.085)	-0.313* (0.139)
Language	0.143* (0.062)	0.126 (0.094)	0.089 (0.046)	0.138** (0.050)	0.150 (0.079)	0.021 (0.039)
Education	0.023*** (0.006)	0.040*** (0.006)	0.043*** (0.002)	-0.020*** (0.005)	-0.025*** (0.005)	-0.015*** (0.012)
Unemployed	0.004 (0.107)	0.174 (0.097)	0.046 (0.032)	-0.012 (0.087)	0.126 (0.082)	0.023 (0.027)
Comfort	-0.007 (0.034)	0.073* (0.030)	0.081*** (0.009)	-0.050 (0.028)	0.045 (0.026)	0.005 (0.008)
Sex	-0.132* (0.052)	-0.038 (0.045)	-0.063*** (0.013)	0.017 (0.042)	0.134*** (0.038)	0.056*** (0.011)
Western	0.049 (0.076)	-0.114 (0.077)	-	-0.018 (0.061)	0.009 (0.065)	-
Ethnic Minority	0.004 (0.067)	-0.060 (0.088)	-0.086 (0.054)	-0.043 (0.054)	0.068 (0.075)	0.003 (0.045)
Discrimination	-0.185* (0.076)	-0.151 (0.081)	-0.196*** (0.032)	-0.202** (0.061)	-0.208** (0.069)	-0.195*** (0.027)
Christian	0.183** (0.058)	0.187*** (0.049)	0.200*** (0.015)	0.146** (0.047)	0.084* (0.042)	0.127*** (0.012)
Muslim	0.083 (0.097)	-0.132 (0.142)	0.943*** (0.216)	0.108 (0.077)	0.001 (0.120)	0.243 (0.181)
Democracy	-0.011* (0.005)	-0.023 (0.066)	-0.115 (0.073)	-0.008* (0.004)	-0.059 (0.086)	-0.079 (0.086)
Colonial	-0.034 (0.104)	-	-	0.146 (0.085)	-	-
% Citizen	-0.005 (0.004)	-0.009 (0.101)	0.000 (0.005)	0.048 (0.052)	0.005 (0.006)	0.004 (0.006)
GDP Growth	-0.006 (0.019)	-0.034* (0.017)	-0.079*** (0.076)	0.037* (0.018)	0.007 (0.016)	-0.008 (0.005)
% Non-Euro	0.006 (0.003)	0.001 (0.003)	0.000 (0.003)	0.000 (0.004)	0.003 (0.004)	0.001 (0.004)
Native Imm-Allow	0.194 (0.218)	0.095 (0.185)	0.134 (0.145)	-0.024 (0.225)	-0.096 (0.217)	-0.011 (0.177)
Native Imm-Like	-0.165 (0.085)	-0.085 (0.075)	-0.094 (0.067)	0.036 (0.092)	0.041 (0.093)	-0.015 (0.083)
Native Region Imm-Allow	-0.027 (0.163)	0.045 (0.130)	-0.028 (0.043)	-0.111 (0.132)	0.018 (0.118)	-0.009 (0.042)
Native Region Imm-Like	0.106 (0.060)	0.011 (0.045)	-0.005 (0.017)	0.012 (0.044)	-0.041 (0.039)	-0.049** (0.016)

TABLE 2 (CONTINUED)

	Trust in Parliament			Government Satisfaction		
	First Generation	Second Generation	Native	First Generation	Second Generation	Native
Native	0.191	0.006	-0.233**	-	-	-
Parl Trust	(0.157)	(0.129)	(0.105)			
Native Gov Sat	-	-	-	0.032	0.111	-0.108
				(0.165)	(0.150)	(0.124)
Native Region	0.185	0.300**	0.574***	-	-	-
Parl Trust	(0.122)	(0.093)	(0.034)			
Native Region	-	-	-	0.158	0.079	0.383***
Gov Sat				(0.108)	(0.089)	(0.035)
Constant	-0.182	0.062	1.20	-0.551	-0.016	0.694
	(0.780)	(0.799)	(0.817)	(0.972)	(1.03)	(0.979)
SD of Country int.	0.038	0.050	0.082	0.102	0.116	0.121
	(0.021)	(0.021)	(0.024)	(0.037)	(0.038)	(0.036)
SD of Region int.	0.019	0.002	0.007	0.008	0.010	0.012
	(0.017)	(0.009)	(0.002)	(0.012)	(0.010)	(0.002)
SD of residuals	4.07	3.94	3.76	2.68	2.81	2.66
	(0.074)	(0.063)	(0.018)	(0.049)	(0.045)	(0.013)
No. of observ.	6153	7925	90,322	6236	7914	90,116
No. of countries	24	24	24	24	24	24
No. of regions	255	267	274	254	267	274
Wald $\chi^2$ (d.f.)	2234.79	3182.59	33415.76	5439.10	6328.93	70519.20
	(26)	(24)	(23)	(26)	(24)	(23)

Notes: Each cell gives the estimated coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

\* $p < 0.05$ , \*\* $p < 0.01$ , \*\*\* $p < 0.001$ .

these arguments could account for political attitudes in Europe we would expect first-generation migrants to be disproportionately present in hospitable environments. Therefore, to more closely examine the determinants of political attitudes, Table 2 presents results for multi-level mixed-effects maximum likelihood models with respondents clustered by country and region.<sup>11</sup> Six models are presented with results for first-generation migrants, second-generation migrant-origin individuals, and native-origin individuals, across each dependent variable.

For the most part, the variables testing arguments about integration over time are not statistically significant. The only one that is statistically significant for both dependent variables is “Language.” However, that is only the case for first-generation migrants. In addition, the positive direction suggests that first-generation migrants who primarily speak a foreign language at home will have higher levels of trust and satisfaction, which runs counter to the literature on integration over time.

<sup>11</sup>All control variables were estimated as fixed effects with the country and regional intercepts set as random effects. The variance-covariance parameters were distinctly estimated and set to “unstructured” with the xtmixed command in Stata 10.1.

The variables on barriers to integration are more likely to be significant, although sometimes in contradictory directions. “Christian” is statistically significant in each of the six models (albeit not uniformly at  $p < 0.001$ ) and suggests that Christians are more likely than non-Christians to have high levels of trust and satisfaction. The variable “Discrimination” further supports the notion that minority group and stigmatized individuals face barriers to integration that reduce trust and satisfaction. However, the variable for level of democracy in the home country is significant in both models for first-generation migrants but suggests that higher levels of democracy in the home country are associated with lower levels of trust and satisfaction, which runs counter to the literature on barriers to integration. Moreover, two of the variables for potential barriers to integration are significant in different directions across the two dependent variables. “Education” is statistically significant at  $p < 0.001$  in all six models, although the direction is positive for trust in Parliament and negative for government satisfaction.<sup>12</sup> Similarly, the variable “Sex” indicates that men are generally more likely to trust Parliament while women are more likely to be satisfied in the government’s performance.<sup>13</sup>

Most of the variables testing arguments about the host society context are not statistically significant. The variables for natives’ levels of trust and satisfaction across countries and regions are significant in the models for native-origin individuals, which is to be expected. Otherwise, there is very little to suggest a systematic relationship across the dependent variables between host society context and migrant origin individuals’ political attitudes.

Finally, the three variables for general evaluations of the host society economy, educational system, and democracy are statistically significant at  $p < 0.001$  for each of the subgroups and each dependent variable. This supports my argument about the importance of general evaluations although a more detailed analysis is required to examine how this operates across generations and in interaction with the other independent variables.

<sup>12</sup>These findings might appear contradictory but are consistent with other studies which have found mixed effects of education (and socioeconomic resources more generally) on trust and government satisfaction. One explanation is that education can make individuals more comfortable engaging with politics and more trusting but it can also make them more critical and less likely to feel satisfied (Inglehart, 2003).

<sup>13</sup>Existing research into gender effects finds mixed results in which women sometimes have higher levels of trust and satisfaction in comparison with men and at other times the outcomes are reversed. Moreover, the gender differences in political attitudes tend to be rather small (Hahn, 1998:111–118; Mariën, 2008).

**TABLE 3**  
**CHANGE IN PREDICTED TRUST AND SATISFACTION SCORES AS STATISTICALLY SIGNIFICANT CONTROL**  
**VARIABLES MOVE FROM MINIMUM TO MAXIMUM VALUES**

	First Generation		Second Generation		Native Origin	
	ParlTr	GovSat	ParlTr	GovSat	ParlTr	GovSat
SatisfyEco	4.17	6.23	4.43	5.86	4.57	6.18
SatisfyEdu	3.76	4.46	3.10	3.70	3.39	4.23
SatisfyDem	5.05	6.05	5.16	5.88	5.34	6.08
Duration	–	–1.14	–	–	–	–
Citizen	–	–	–	–	–	–0.53
Language	0.50	0.59	–	–	–	–
Education	0.81	–0.10	1.71	0.28	1.95	0.91
Comfort	–	–	2.11	–	2.16	–
Sex	–0.26	–	–	–0.02	–0.27	–0.18
Discrimination	–0.51	–0.73	–	–0.79	–0.74	–0.97
Christian	0.04	0.12	0.27	0.28	0.18	0.22
Muslim	–	–	–	–	0.80	–
Democracy	–0.12	–0.36	–	–	–	–
GDP Growth	–	–2.10	–1.96	–	–1.68	–
Native Region Imm-Like	–	–	–	–	–	0.52
Native Parl Trust	–	–	–	–	3.56	–
Native Region Parl Trust	–	–	4.46	–	4.84	–
Native Region Gov Sat	–	–	–	–	–	5.18

The results in Table 2 suggest that several of the variables identified by existing literature are statistically significant predictors of political trust and satisfaction, albeit with predictions that do not always support the literature. To determine which variables have the strongest substantive effects, Table 3 presents the change in predicted values for political trust and satisfaction across minimum and maximum values for the statistically significant variables in each model.<sup>14</sup> For the most part these calculations suggest that control variables for evaluation of the society have the largest effects. For example, first-generation migrants' predicted scores for trust in Parliament increase by 5.05 points as "SatisfyDem" moves from its minimum to maximum values, by 4.17 points for "SatisfyEco," and by 3.76 points for "SatisfyEdu." In comparison, all the other variables are associated with changes of less than 1 point. There are similar gaps in the changes associated with evaluation variables and other control variables for first-generation migrants' predicted government satisfaction scores.

Among second-generation migrant-origin individuals the only variable in Table 3 that comes close to having the same effect as the

<sup>14</sup>These scores are calculated from the models in Table 2. Separate calculations were carried out for each control variable with all other variables set to their mean and dummy variables set to zero.

evaluation variables is the measure of native-origin individuals' trust in Parliament across sub-national regions. This suggests that second-generation individuals may have attitudes which are in sync with those of native-origin individuals living in the same region, which supports my argument about the two groups that have been raised in the same society sharing perspectives on that society's political institutions. Among native-origin individuals the only variables that come close to having the same effect as the evaluation variables are the measures for average native trust and satisfaction scores across countries and sub-national regions.<sup>15</sup> In short, Table 3 suggests that the control variables for general evaluations of the host society's economy, education, and democracy produce the largest effects on political attitudes among all three groups.

Yet, it is possible that explanations identified by the literature on objective integration factors have small effects on political attitudes when analyzed in isolation but have larger effects when considered in combination with other variables. Therefore, Figures I and II examine how interactions among different control variables shape political attitudes among first-generation migrants and second-generation migrant-origin individuals. For both figures, the  $y$ -axis plots predicted scores on the dependent variables and the  $x$ -axis plots levels of general evaluations of society. In Figure I, the solid black lines are for respondents with high levels of education and dashed black lines are for respondents with low levels of education. In Figure II, solid black lines are for respondents with fewer barriers to integration and dashed black lines are for respondents with more barriers to integration.<sup>16</sup> The results in both figures indicate that predicted trust and satisfaction scores have much larger changes across evaluations of society (roughly 4–5 points) than across levels of education or barriers to integration (for the most part less than 1 point each). This is further evidence that evaluations of society have the largest effects on political trust and satisfaction.<sup>17</sup>


<sup>15</sup>This is to be expected as the calculations are for native-origin individuals' attitudes. However, in alternate models which omit the control variables for native-origin means across countries and sub-national regions, the estimates and effects of the general evaluation variables are consistent with the results presented in Tables 2 and 3.

<sup>16</sup>For more details on the exact parameters used for these simulations *see* the notes below each figure. Each simulation was calculated from the full models in Table 2 with all other variables set to their mean and dummy variables set to zero.

<sup>17</sup>In the interest of parsimony, Figures I and II only include calculations for migrants and migrant-origin individuals but the results for native-origin individuals are similar.



**Figure I. Predicted trust and satisfaction scores according to general evaluations of society and education.**




Note: The Y-axis plots predicted scores for the trust and satisfaction-dependent variables. The X-axis plots levels of general evaluations of society according to responses to “SatisfyEco” “SatisfyEdu,” and “SatisfyDem.” “Low Sat” is calculated with all three evaluations set to <4, “Med Sat” is with all three evaluations >3 and <7, and “High Sat” is with all three evaluations >6. Solid black lines are for respondents with high levels of education (defined as more than 17 years of full time education) and dashed black lines are for respondents with low levels of education (defined as fewer than 10 years of full time education)

### *GENERATIONAL STATUS SHAPES EVALUATIONS*

The group distributions for satisfaction in the country’s democracy, educational system, and economy provide further evidence that these subjective evaluations may account for political attitude variation across generations. The descriptive statistics in Table 1 indicate that first-generation migrants have the most positive evaluations while second-generation migrant-origin individuals have evaluations that are similar to those of native-origin individuals. This corresponds with outcomes on the dependent variables and suggests that evaluations of the host society may help explain generational differences in political trust and satisfaction.

Yet, it is possible that the evaluations are merely intervening variables that capture substantive differences on the explanations cited by the existing literature. In particular, first-generation migrants may have

**Figure II.** Predicted trust and satisfaction scores according to general evaluations of society and barriers to integration.



Note: The Y-axis plots predicted scores for the trust and satisfaction-dependent variables. The X-axis plots levels of general evaluations of society according to responses to "SatisfyEco" "SatisfyEdu," and "SatisfyDem." "Low Sat" is calculated with all three evaluations set to <4, "Med Sat" is with all three evaluations >3 and <7, and "High Sat" is with all three evaluations >6. Solid black lines are for respondents with fewer barriers to integration (defined as Christian and not a member of a discriminated-against group) and dashed black lines are for respondents with more barriers to integration (defined as non-Christian and a member of a discriminated-against group)

more positive evaluations of the host society because they have more positive outcomes on the potential barriers to integration. However, a review of the statistics in Table 1 indicates that first-generation migrants are more likely than second-generation migrant-origin individuals and native-origin individuals to speak a foreign language at home, to be unemployed, to have financial difficulties, to identify as an ethnic minority, to identify as a member of a discriminated-against group, and to be Muslim. This suggests that generational variations in evaluations of the host society are not necessarily related to objective integration outcomes.

Instead, I argue that evaluations of the host society are shaped by subjective factors related to migration status. To support this claim, Table 4 presents cross-tabulations from the ESS on evaluations of society according to generation and the respondents' employment status, educational outcomes, financial comfort, and expectations of discrimination. As one would expect, mean evaluation scores are more negative among

the unemployed, less educated, those in financial difficulties, and members of discriminated-against groups. However, among respondents within the same “objective” integration category, first-generation migrants are consistently more positive in their evaluations of the host society while second-generation migrant-origin and native-origin individuals have similar evaluations.<sup>18</sup> The ESS data do not allow us to directly determine that these positive tendencies among first-generation migrants are the result of lower expectations due to the difficulties of having migrated to a new society. However, the results suggest that generational differences in political trust and satisfaction are strongly linked with generational differences in subjective evaluations of the host society.<sup>19</sup>

The ESS data also suggest that second-generation migrant-origin individuals and native-origin individuals have similar evaluation scores which may very well account for their similar political trust and satisfaction scores. Figure III provides further evidence for the common attitudes among these two groups by plotting the mean political trust response for native-origin individuals and second-generation migrant-origin individuals across regions.<sup>20</sup> The bars plot mean attitude responses for native-origin individuals in each region while the line is for second-generation mean responses. Table 2 suggests that native-origin sub-national Parliament trust scores were an important predictor of second-generation migrant-origin trust scores and Figure III shows that the two groups’ mean responses track pretty closely as they rise and fall together across regions.<sup>21</sup> As with

<sup>18</sup>Across the 24 outcomes in Table 4, first-generation mean scores are generally 0.60–1.0 points higher than those of the other groups. Second-generation migrant-origin and native-origin means are generally within 0.20 points of each other and alternate between which group is slightly more positive than the other.

<sup>19</sup>Another possibility is that these results are picking up age effects as opposed to migration-status effects. For example, older individuals may have higher levels of political trust and satisfaction than younger individuals and if first-generation migrants tend to be older than the other groups this could explain their more positive attitudes. However, while first-generation migrants have an older age distribution than second-generation migrant-origin individuals in the ESS, native-origin individuals have an older age distribution than first-generation migrants. In addition, older individuals have higher levels of government satisfaction but there are no age effects for satisfaction in Parliament. Moreover, older individuals are less likely to feel satisfied in the economy, educational system, and democracy.

<sup>20</sup>The  $y$ -axis plots results for each region listed alphabetically within each country are also listed alphabetically according to the two-letter abbreviations.

<sup>21</sup>The graph in Figure III excludes the 18 (out of 276) regions in which second-generation migrant-origin individuals had fewer than 10 residents.

**TABLE 4**  
**MEAN EVALUATIONS OF SOCIETY ACROSS “OBJECTIVE” INTEGRATION OUTCOMES AND GENERATION**

	Unemployed			Not Unemployed		
	Eco	Educ.	Dem	Eco	Educ.	Dem
First Generation	4.55	5.94	5.80	5.38	5.91	6.03
Second Generation	3.54	5.07	4.48	4.75	5.36	5.37
Native	3.67	5.17	4.46	4.80	5.60	5.40
	Low Education (<10 years)			High Education (>17 years)		
	Eco	Educ.	Dem	Eco	Educ.	Dem
First Generation	5.15	6.20	6.00	5.87	5.87	6.40
Second Generation	4.40	5.65	5.32	5.26	5.36	5.76
Native	4.35	5.54	5.15	5.33	5.55	5.84
	Financially Very Difficult			Financially Very Comfortable		
	Eco	Educ.	Dem	Eco	Educ.	Dem
First Generation	3.72	5.09	4.79	6.40	6.28	6.75
Second Generation	2.69	4.48	3.90	5.83	5.77	6.18
Native	2.75	4.61	3.89	5.85	5.99	6.14
	Discriminated Against			Not Discriminated Against		
	Eco	Educ.	Dem	Eco	Educ.	Dem
First Generation	4.65	5.56	5.39	5.46	5.98	6.14
Second Generation	4.18	4.73	4.44	4.73	5.41	5.41
Native	4.08	4.98	4.41	4.78	5.61	5.40

Note: “SatisfyEco,” “SatisfyEduc,” and “SatisfyDem” are all coded on a scale from 0 (extremely dissatisfied) to 10 (extremely satisfied).


first-generation migrants, the ESS does not allow us to directly determine that second-generation migrant-origin individuals have similar attitudes as native-origin individuals because they share similar experiences. However it is likely that their common environment can account for the numerous pieces of evidence presented in this article suggesting that the two subgroups are distinct from first-generation migrants and have similar attitudes, regardless of whatever economic and ethnic differences may exist.

## CONCLUSION

Political trust and satisfaction in government are key aspects of integration that indicate whether migrants are attached to mainstream political institutions. This issue is especially relevant in Europe, where societies are currently debating the best ways to ensure migrant attachment to mainstream institutions in light of fears about alienation and failed integration.

On balance, my findings are optimistic. Results from the ESS indicate that first-generation migrants in Europe have higher levels of political trust and satisfaction than natives. In addition, second-generation

**Figure III.** Native-origin and second-generation migrant-origin individuals' mean trust in Parliament scores across sub-national regions.



Note: Trust in Parliament is coded from 0 (No trust at all) to 10 (Complete trust)

migrant-origin individuals have political trust and satisfaction scores that are similar to those of native-origin individuals. To account for these outcomes, I have argued for the importance of generational status and subjective evaluations of the integration process. Existing research has documented the dynamics of first-generation migrants being more optimistic and positive than natives because they self-consciously chose to move to the new environment in hopes of improving their lives (de la Garza, Falcon, and Chris Garcia, 1996; Waters, 1999; Maxwell, 2008a,b,c, Forthcoming). This article builds those insights into an argument about how generational differences in subjective evaluations shape political trust and satisfaction in Europe.<sup>22</sup>

<sup>22</sup>Reverse causality is one issue that remains unaddressed. It is possible that individuals are satisfied with the economy, education, and democracy because they have high levels of political trust and satisfaction, rather than the other way round. The best way to distinguish between these two possibilities would be to use an instrumental variable which is correlated with one of the variables and not the other. Unfortunately, there are no such suitable instruments in the ESS. However, this does not change the substantive message of the article which demonstrates that subjective political evaluations vary across generations and do not necessarily coincide with objective integration outcomes.

This article portrays an optimistic vision of migrant integration in Europe. This may appear at odds with existing reports of how second-generation migrant-origin individuals (especially those with non-Western origins) have more negative attitudes than native-origin individuals because of stigmatization and discrimination (Gans, 1992; Waters, 1999; Crul and Heering, 2008). Yet, the data presented in this article do not directly oppose those studies but instead nuance their findings.

First, while much of the current second-generation integration debate in Europe focuses on the problems for people with non-Western-origins, the ESS data show that second-generation political attitudes are more negative and expectations of discrimination are higher among those with European origins (most notably among Russian-origin individuals in Estonia and Finland). There is still reason to believe that the race, religion, and ethnicity-based discrimination which non-Western individuals tend to face will be a difficult and long-lasting problem but these results raise the importance of extending the integration discussion to Eastern Europe.<sup>23</sup> In addition, although second-generation migrant-origin individuals in the ESS are more likely than native-origin individuals to expect discrimination, this article suggests that those differences are not transferred into attitudes toward mainstream political institutions. This suggests that future debates about migrant integration should pay attention to the possibilities for divergence between objective and subjective outcomes and the ways in which positive political attitudes can coexist with other integration difficulties.

<sup>23</sup>It is important to note that Western-origin and non-Western-origin individuals highlighted different forms of discrimination. The measure used in this paper asked whether respondents were members of a group discriminated against in the host country but there were follow-up questions in the ESS which asked why respondents felt they were discriminated against. Western-origin individuals were most likely to mention nationality or language as the source of discrimination whereas non-Western origin individuals mentioned race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, and language. Although second-generation Western-origin individuals had higher percentages who felt they suffered from some form of discrimination, the racial and ethnic concerns expressed by non-Western migrants may prove more long-lasting. Nonetheless, when these more detailed discrimination categories were included in the analysis for this paper, the basic finding about the importance of societal evaluations remained the same.

## APPENDIX

*Variables from the European Social Survey*

**Political trust:** “How much trust do you have in the country’s Parliament?”

Coded from 0 – No trust at all to 10 – complete trust.

**Satisfaction in government performance:** “How satisfied are you with the national government?”

Coded from 0 – Extremely dissatisfied to 10 – extremely satisfied.

**Satisfy Dem:** “How satisfied are you with the way democracy works in the country?”

Coded from 0 – Extremely dissatisfied to 10 – extremely satisfied.

**Satisfy Edu:** “How satisfied are you with the state of education in the country nowadays?”

Coded from 0 – Extremely dissatisfied to 10 – extremely satisfied.

**Satisfy Econ:** “How satisfied are you with the present state of economy in the country?”

Coded from 0 – Extremely dissatisfied to 10 – extremely satisfied.

**Duration:** “How long ago did you first come to live in [country]?”

Coded 0 (within last year), 1 (1–5 years ago), 2 (6–10 years ago), 3 (11–20 years ago), 4 (more than 20 years ago), 5 (born in country).

**Citizen:** 0 – Not a citizen, 1 – Citizen.

**Language:** 0 – Primarily speak the host country language at home, 1 – Primarily speak other language at home.

**Sex:** 0 – Male, 1 – Female.

**Christian:** 0 – Not a Christian, 1 – A practicing Christian.

**Muslim:** 0 – Not a Muslim, 1 – A practicing Muslim.

**Western:** 0 – Either born in Africa, Asia, or Latin America or with at least one parent born in Africa, Asia, or Latin America. 1 – Either both in Europe, North America, Australia or New Zealand, or with both parents born in Europe, North America, Australia, or New Zealand.

**Discrimination:** “Are you a member of a group discriminated against in this country.”

Coded 0 – No, 1 – Yes.

**Ethnic Minority:** “Do you belong to an ethnic minority group in this country.”

Coded 0 – No, 1 – Yes.

**Education:** Years of full-time education completed.

**Unemployed:** 1 – Either “unemployed and actively looking for a job” or “unemployed and not actively looking for a job.” 0 – All other responses.

**Comfort:** “How do you feel about your household’s income nowadays?” Coded 0 (Very difficult on present income), 1 (Difficult on present income), 2 (Coping on present income), and 3 (Living comfortably on present income).

**Discrimination:** “Would you describe yourself as being a member of a group that is discriminated against in this country?”  
0 – No, 1 – Yes.

**Democracy:** This variable uses data from the Polity IV project to measure the level of democracy in the respondents’ country of birth. For second-generation migrants the value was set to the current Polity score for the European host society. For first-generation migrants, the value was calculated according to the average Polity score during the time period of arrival (based on responses to the question about time of arrival and whether respondents were interviewed during ESS1, ESS2, or ESS3).

**Colonial:** 0 – No colonial connection to the host country, 1 – Either born or with at least one parent who was born in a country with a former colonial connection to the host country.

**Immigrant Allow:** An index variable of responses to:

“Should the country allow many/few immigrants of the same race/ethnic group as the majority?”

“Should the country allow many/few immigrants of a different race/ethnic group from the majority?”

“Should the country allow many/few immigrants from poorer countries outside of Europe?”

Each question is coded 0 – Allow none, 1 – Allow a few, 2 – Allow some, 3 – Allow many to come and live here.

**Immigrant Like:** An index variable of responses to:

“Would you say it is generally bad or good for country’s economy that people come to live here from other countries?”

“Would you say that the country’s cultural life is generally undermined or enriched by people coming to live here from other countries?”

“Is the country made a better or worse place to live by people coming to live here from other countries?”

Each question is coded from 0 – most negative to 10 – most positive.



**% Citizen:** The percent of first- and second-generation migrants in each country who are citizens of the host country.

**GDP Growth:** Annual percentage growth rate of GDP per capita in 2002 (for ESS Round 1), 2004 (for ESS Round 2), and 2006 (for ESS Round 3). Source: World Bank Development Indicators.

**% Non-Euro:** The percent of first- and second-generation migrants in each country from Africa, Asia, or Latin America, and the Caribbean.

**Native Parl:** The average score in each country for natives' responses to the Trust in Parliament question.

**Native Sat:** The average score in each country for natives' responses to the government satisfaction question.

**Native Region Parl:** The average score in each sub-national region for natives' responses to the Trust in Parliament question.

**Native Region Sat:** The average score in each sub-national region for natives' responses to the government satisfaction question.

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