Evaluating the Impact of Average Cost Based Contracts on the Industrial Sector in the European Emission Trading Scheme

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Background on the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS)

- Cap and Trade System;
- EU Member States target: reduction by 8% from 1990 emission level by the end of the first Kyoto commitment period 2008 2012;
- Two Phases: (2005-2007) and (2008-2012);
- The extension of the EU-ETS is currently in discussion;
- Free Allowances (this will apparently be reviewed in the updated version of the EU-ETS)

Backside Effects of the Application of the EU-ETS

- Allowance price volatility (between 30 €/ton and less than 1 €/ton);
- "Windfall" profits of power companies;
- Concern of competitiveness;
- Over-allocation of emission permits of the first Phase;
- Intense discussions about allowance allocation methods (auctioning or grandfathering?)

Outline (1)

1. Introduction

• Impacts of the European Emission Trading Scheme (EU-ETS) on Industrial Sectors

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2. General Assumptions

- Exogenous and Endogenous Capacity;
- Common Model Assumptions



Exogenous Capacity

3. Reference Model

- Reference Model;
- Complementarity Conditions Form of the Reference Model;
- Main Results of the Reference Model

4. Accommodating Large Electricity Consumers by Special Contracts

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- Single Average Cost Pricing Model;
- Nodal Average Cost Pricing Model;
- Results Comparison

Outline (3)

Endogenous Capacity

5. Investment Problem

- New Assumptions;
- Reference Model;
- Complementarity Conditions Form of the Reference Model;
- Results of the Reference Model

6. Special Contracts

- Case I: Single Average Cost Pricing Model;
- Case I: Nodal Average Cost Pricing Model;
- Results Comparison
- Case II: Single Average Cost Pricing Model;
- Case II: Nodal Average Cost Pricing Model;
- Results Comparison

7. Conclusion

8. Appendix

Impacts of the EU-ETS on Industrial Sectors

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Impacts of the EU-ETS on Industrial Sectors

The application of the EU-ETS affects the industries' cost structure in two ways:

- **Oirect** (Abatement costs and Allowance Price)
- **2** Indirect (Higher Electricity Price)

The combination of these two factors may endanger industrial competitiveness on international markets. This would imply:

- Reduced industrial activity;
- 2 Leakage

Introduction

General Assumptions Exogenous Capacity Endogenous Capacity Appendix

Impacts of the EU-ETS on Industrial Sectors

Some Evidences

- ...in the steel sector, the integrated production route is expected to be impacted in its competitiveness. In some cases, production might be relocated to other areas....
- ..the cost for a typical European cement production process will increase by 36.5%...By far the largest share of the cost increase is from direct emissions (93%).
- In the Electric Arc Furnaces (EAF) steel process, *electricity can account for between 50-85 per cent of total energy inputs...The global CO*₂ *emissions from EAF process therefore depend on the fuel used to produce electricity.*

See McKinsey and Ecofys (2006) and Reinaud J. (2005).

Introduction

General Assumptions Exogenous Capacity Endogenous Capacity Appendix

Impacts of the EU-ETS on Industrial Sectors

Possible solutions

For these reasons, industrial consumers demand:

- Special regulations to avoid the pass through of allowance prices in the marginal costs of energy;
- Special contracts whereby they can buy electricity at the average production costs.

NOTE:

- We focus our attention on the second point;
- However, "other solutions" are also discussed like border tax adjustments

Exogenous and Endogenous Capacity Model Common Assumptions

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Model Analyzed

We consider two main problems:

- Exogenous Capacity (Fixed capacity)
- 2 Endogenous Capacity (With Investments)

Model Common Assumptions

Market Studied

All the models studied are applied to a prototype market of Northwestern Europe¹.



¹Data source: Energy Research Centre of the Netherlands

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Exogenous and Endogenous Capacity Model Common Assumptions

Model Assumptions (1)

Models common assumptions:

- i = 7 active nodes;
- *f* = 9 electricity generating companies;
- *m* = 8 technologies adopted to produce electricity (hydro, wind, nuclear, lignite, coal, CCGT, natural gas and oil based plants);
- c = 2 market segments (large industries (1) and small consumers (2));
- t = 2 periods with different durations (off-peak (s) and peak (w));
- *I* = 28 transmission lines;
- Stepwise marginal cost curves are used to represent generators' supply functions.

Exogenous and Endogenous Capacity Model Common Assumptions

Model Assumptions (2) Consumers' electricity demand

We know that:

- Large industries are more price elastic than small consumers. They may relocate their production activities outside European countries;
- Large industries' demand is constant over the year;

To account for the first assumption, we set the following reference demand elasticities:

- Small consumers: 0.1
- Large industries: $\mathbf{1}^*$

* Taken from a slide of Newbery: there is an almost complete lack of information of demand response of large industrial consumers

Exogenous and Endogenous Capacity Model Common Assumptions

Model Assumptions (3)

Fuel costs

	Cost	
	€/MWh €/GJ	
Coal	8	2.22
Natural gas	15	4.15

Plant operational costs

MWh	Plant operational cost	Efficiency
Coal	19.51	0.41
CCGT	35.74	0.50

References:

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Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Exogenous Capacity

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Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Setup

- Generation capacities are fixed;
- Large industrial consumers are allowed to conclude long-term contracts at "average cost";
- The "average cost" is determined as the average of variable and capacity charges of the capacity allocated to these contracts as well as transmission costs computed in a zonal price system;
- **9** The power sector operates as a bubble as far as the EU-ETS is concerned

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Principle Behavioral Assumptions and Issues

Behavioral Assumptions

• Generation companies choose how to allocate their capacity to the large industries/rest segments of the market;

Issues

• Average cost pricing introduces non convexities in the models and hence possibly an absence or a multiplicity of solution

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Summary of the Models Analyzed

		Pricing System	Emission Constraint	Transmission Constraint
Reference Case	Households	Short-run marginal cost	Included	Included
	Industry	Short-run marginal cost	Included	Included
Single Average Cost Model	Households	Short-run marginal cost	Included	Included
	Industry	Average Cost	Included	Included
Nodal Average Cost Model	Households	Short-run marginal cost	Included	Included
	Industry	Average Cost	Included	Not Included

Emission cap E of the power sector: 397 Mio/ton^2 .

²Source: Own computations based on data provided by CITL $\langle \Box \rangle$ $\langle \Box \rangle$ $\langle \Box \rangle$ $\langle \Xi \rangle$ $\langle \Xi \rangle$ $\langle \Xi \rangle$ $\langle \Xi \rangle$

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Reference Scenario Model

Electricity companies' maximization problem

Each electricity generating company f maximizes its profit:

$$\max. \sum_{t,i} p_i^t \cdot g_{f,i}^t \cdot hour^t +$$
(1)

$$-\sum_{t,i,m} cost_{f,i,m} \cdot gp_{f,i,m}^t \cdot hour^t +$$

$$+\lambda \cdot (NAP_f - \sum_{t,i,m} gp_{f,i,m}^t \cdot em_m \cdot hour^t)$$

accounting for the following constraints:

Generation balance

$$\sum_{m} g p_{f,i,m}^t - g_{f,i}^t \ge 0 \qquad (\eta_{f,i}^t)$$
(2)

• Generation capacity constraint

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Reference Scenario Model

Consumers' surplus maximization problem

Industry

$$max. \qquad \sum_{t=s,w} [hour^{t} \cdot \int_{0}^{d_{i}^{t,1}} P_{i}^{t,1}(\epsilon) \cdot d\epsilon - hour^{t} \cdot p_{i}^{t} \cdot d_{i}^{t,1}] \qquad (4)$$

$$d_i^{s,1} - d_i^{w,1} = 0 (5)$$

Households

max.
$$hour^t \cdot \int_0^{d_i^{t,2}} P_i^{t,2}(\epsilon) \cdot d\epsilon - hour^t \cdot p_i^t \cdot d_i^{t,2}$$
 (6)

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Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Reference Scenario Model

Global Constraints

Market Balance

$$\sum_{f,i} g_{f,i}^{t} - \sum_{i} d_{i}^{t,1} - \sum_{i} d_{i}^{t,2} = 0 \quad (p^{t})$$
(7)

Electricity Price

$$p_{i}^{t} = p^{t} + \sum_{l} (-\mu_{l}^{t,+} + \mu_{l}^{t,-}) \cdot PTDF_{l,i} \quad (p_{i}^{t})$$
(8)

• Transmission Constraint

$$Linecap_{l} \mp (\sum_{i} PTDF_{l,i} \cdot (\sum_{f} g_{f,i}^{t} - d_{i}^{t,1} - d_{i}^{t,2})) \ge 0 \quad (\mu_{l}^{t,\pm})$$
(9)

• Emission Constraint

$$E - \sum_{t,f,i,m} gp_{f,i,m}^t \cdot em_m \cdot hour^t \ge 0 \quad (\lambda)$$
(10)

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Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Complementarity Conditions Form of the Reference Model

• Generators' conditions

$$0 \leq -\boldsymbol{p}_i^t + \eta_{f,i}^t \perp \boldsymbol{g}_{f,i}^t \geq 0 \tag{11}$$

$$0 \leq cost_{f,i,m} + em_m \cdot \lambda + \nu_{f,i,m}^t - \eta_{f,i}^t \bot gp_{f,i,m}^t \ge 0$$
(12)

$$0 \leq Cap_{f,i,m} - gp_{f,i,m}^t \perp \nu_{f,i,m}^t \geq 0$$
(13)

$$0 \leq \sum_{m} g p_{f,i,m}^t - g_{f,i}^t \perp \eta_{f,i}^t \geq 0$$
(14)

Industry and Households' conditions

$$0 \le p_i^s - \alpha_i - a_i^{s,1} + b_i^{s,1} \cdot d_i^{s,1} \cdot \perp d_i^{s,1} \ge 0$$
(15)

$$0 \le p_i^{w} + \alpha_i - a_i^{w,1} + b_i^{w,1} \cdot d_i^{w,1} \cdot \perp d_i^{w,1} \ge 0$$
(16)

$$0 \le d_i^{s,1} - d_i^{w,1} \perp \alpha_i \ge 0 \tag{17}$$

$$0 \le p_i^t - a_i^{t,2} + b_i^{t,2} \cdot d_i^{t,2} \cdot \perp d_i^{t,2} \ge 0$$
(18)

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Complementarity Conditions Form of the Reference Model

Market balance equilibrium

$$0 \le \sum_{f,i} g_{f,i}^{t} - \sum_{i} d_{i}^{t,1} - \sum_{i} d_{i}^{t,2} \bot \ phub^{t} \ge 0$$
(19)

Electricity prices

$$0 \le p_i^t - phub^t - \sum_m (-\mu_l^{t,+} + \mu_l^{t,-}) \cdot PTDF_{l,i} \perp p_i^t \ge 0$$
(20)

• Transmission constraints

$$0 \leq Linecap_{l} \mp (\sum_{i} PTDF_{l,i} \cdot (\sum_{f} g_{f,i}^{t} - d_{i}^{t,1} - d_{i}^{t,2})) \perp \mu_{l}^{t,\pm} \geq 0$$
(21)

Emission constraint

$$0 \le E - \sum_{t,f,i,m} g_{f,i,m}^t \cdot em_m \cdot hour_i^t \perp \lambda \ge 0$$
(22)

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Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Main Results

With our input data, the introduction of the ETS in Europe causes:

- A global increase of electricity prices;
- A global decrease of the industrial electricity consumption;
- Emission Allowance price: 26.65 €/ton

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Reference Case with and without ETS

Demand Comparison (Industrial Sector)

• Relative Changes in Industrial Consumers' Hourly Demand

MW	Without ETS	With ETS	Relative Changes
Germany	32,723	25,107	-23.3%
France	24,893	24,912	0.07%
Merchtem	3,615	3,528	-2.4%
Gramme	2,013	1,963	-2.5%
Krimpen	2,742	2,595	-5.3%
Maastricht	947	886	-6.4%
Zwolle	1,825	1,612	-11.7%
Total	68,758	60,603	-12%

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Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Reference Case with and without ETS

Electricity Price Comparison

• Electricity Price Changes in Summer

€/MWh	Without ETS	With ETS	Relative change
Germany	19.51*	44.94	130%
France	4.50**	5.10	13%
Merchtem	35.62	47.13	32%
Gramme	19.51	27.81	43%
Krimpen	35.62	47.13	32%
Maastricht	35.62	47.13	32%
Zwolle	30.71	46.23	51%

* Short-run marginal cost of coal plants

** Short-run marginal cost of nuclear plants

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Reference Case with and without ETS

Electricity Price Comparison

Under the EU-ETS, electricity prices increase in summer because:

- Power producers partially shift from coal technologies to CCGT power stations at the observed values of *CO*₂ price;
- Under the EU-ETS, the utilization of CCGT increases (from 2,916 MW (without EU-ETS) to 3,966 MW (with EU-ETS)), while coal technologies produce less (from 20,771 MW (without EU-ETS) to 8,770 MW (with EU-ETS));
- CCGT installations emit less than coal fuel based technologies, but they are more expensive;
- CCGT technologies, together with the pass through of the allowance price, set the electricity price at a higher level than the coal based plants, operating without the ETS

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Reference Case with and without ETS

Electricity Price Comparison

• Electricity Price Changes in Winter

€/MWh	Without ETS	With ETS	Relative change
Germany	52.21	47.33	-9%
France	48.01	47.33	-1%
Merchtem	57.23	47.33	-17%
Gramme	53.50	47.33	-12%
Krimpen	55.15	47.33	-14%
Maastricht	54.34	47.33	-13%
Zwolle	54.06	47.33	-12%

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Reference Case with and without ETS

Electricity Price Comparison

Under the EU-ETS, electricity prices decrease in winter because:

- Electricity demand decreases;
- Low-efficiency natural gas plants and oil based stations are shut down and are substituted by CCGT;

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Reference Case with and without ETS

Electricity Price Comparison

In accordance with our input data:

- **()** Old natural gas based plants are the last technology in merit order;
- A natural gas based station, in average, has a variable cost of 55.08 €/MWh;
- **③** The average variable cost of a CCGT plant is $35.74 \in /MWh$;
- The emission opportunity cost associated with a CCGT station is 11.51 $€/MWh^3$;
- Ounder the EU-ETS, a CCGT power plant totally cost 47.25 €/MWh, that is almost the price given by the model

The EU-ETS makes CCGT less expensive than low-efficiency natural gas plants and this explains why power producers abandon natural gas and oil based plants in favor of CCGT technologies

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Characteristics of the Industrial Sectors

Electricity-intensive consumers demand special electricity services:

- The bulk of their demand is long-run and with very high load;
- O They are also able to finance the construction and operation of large generation units.

As a consequence one can consider:

- Market splitting and price discrimination between households and industrial consumers;
- Application of the average cost pricing to industrial sector.

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Single Average Cost Pricing Model

Industrial consumers constitute a power purchase consortium that buys power from plants located in different nodes of the network. The total average cost accounts for two components:

1. Average Production Cost (*pprod*¹)

It is the price paid by industries to generators. It is constant throughout the year:

$$pprod^{1} = \frac{\sum_{t} hour^{t}(\sum_{f,i,m} (gp_{f,i,m}^{t,1} \cdot (cost_{f,i,m} + em_{m} \cdot \lambda)))}{\sum_{t,i} d_{i}^{t,1} \cdot hour^{t}} + \frac{\sum_{f,i,m} FC_{f,i,m} \cdot G_{f,i,m}^{1}}{\sum_{t,i} d_{i}^{t,1} \cdot hour^{t}}$$

where $G_{f,i,m}^1$ is the installed capacity dedicated to industrial consumer and $FC_{f,i,m}$ the associated annual fixed costs

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Single Average Cost Pricing Model

2. Average Transmission Cost (*ptrans*¹)

It corresponds to the transmission charges that industrial consumers have to pay to the Transmission System Operator (TSO)

$$ptrans^{1} = \frac{\sum_{t} hour_{t}(\sum_{l,i} PTDF_{l,i} \cdot (\sum_{f} g_{f,i}^{t,1} - d_{i}^{t,1}) \cdot (-\mu_{l}^{t,+} + \mu_{l}^{t,-}))}{\sum_{t,i} d_{i}^{t,1} \cdot hour^{t}}$$

3. Total Average Price (p^1)

It is given by the sum of the production and the transmission average costs. It corresponds to the global electricity price faced by industrial consumers:

$$p^1 = pprod^1 + ptrans^1$$

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Single Average Cost Price Model

Electricity companies' maximization problem

Each electricity generating company f maximizes its profit:

max.
$$pprod^1 \cdot \sum_{t,i} g_{f,i}^{t,1} \cdot hour^t + \sum_{t,i} p_i^{t,2} \cdot g_{f,i}^{t,2} \cdot hour^t +$$
(23)

$$-\sum_{t,i,m} cost_{f,i,m} \cdot gp_{f,i,m}^{t,1} \cdot hour^t - \sum_{t,i,m} cost_{f,i,m} \cdot gp_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot hour^t +$$

$$+\lambda \cdot (\mathsf{NAP}_f - (\sum_{t,i,m} \mathsf{gp}_{f,i,m}^{t,1} \cdot \mathsf{em}_m \cdot \mathsf{hour}^t + \sum_{t,i,m} \mathsf{gp}_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot \mathsf{em}_m \cdot \mathsf{hour}^t))$$

subject to:

$$\sum_{m} g p_{f,i,m}^{t,1} - g_{f,i}^{t,1} \ge 0 \quad (\eta_{f,i}^{t,1})$$
(24)

$$\sum_{m} g p_{f,i,m}^{t,2} - g_{f,i}^{t,2} \ge 0 \quad (\eta_{f,i}^{t,2})$$
(25)

$$G_{f,i,m}^{1} - g p_{f,i,m}^{t,1} \ge 0 \quad (\nu_{f,i,m}^{t,1})$$
(26)

$$G_{f,i,m}^2 - g p_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \ge 0 \quad (\nu_{f,i,m}^{t,2})$$
(27)

$$Cap_{f,i,m} - G^{1}_{f,i,m} - G^{2}_{f,i,m} \ge 0 \qquad \left(\gamma_{\underline{f},i,m}\right)_{\overline{G}} \xrightarrow{}_{i < \underline{z}} \xrightarrow{}_{i < \underline{z}} \left(2\underline{\underline{s}}\right)_{34/149}$$

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Single Average Cost Price Model

Consumers' surplus maximization problem

Industrial consumers

max.
$$hour^t \cdot \int_0^{d_i^{t,1}} P_i^{t,1}(\epsilon) \cdot d\epsilon - hour^t \cdot p^1 \cdot d_i^{t,1} \quad (d_i^{t,1})$$
 (29)

Small consumers

max.
$$hour^t \cdot \int_0^{d_i^{t,2}} P_i^{t,2}(\epsilon) \cdot d\epsilon - hour^t \cdot p_i^{t,2} \cdot d_i^{t,2} \quad (d_i^{t,2})$$
(30)

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Single Average Cost Price Model Global Constraints (1)

Market Balance for Small Consumers

$$\sum_{f,i} g_{f,i}^{t,2} - \sum_{i} d_{i}^{t,2} = 0 \quad (phub^{t,2})$$
(31)

Marginal Electricity Prices (Small Consumers)

$$p_{i}^{t,2} = phub^{t,2} + \left(\sum_{l} \left(-\mu_{l}^{t,+} + \mu_{l}^{t,-}\right) \cdot PTDF_{l,i}\right) \quad (p_{i}^{t,2})$$
(32)

Market Balance for Industrial Consumers

$$\sum_{f,i} g_{f,i}^{t,1} - \sum_{i} d_{i}^{t,1} = 0 \quad (\beta^{t,1})$$
(33)

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Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Single Average Cost Price Model Global Constraints (2)

• Transmission Constraints

$$Linecap_{l} \mp \left(\sum_{i} PTDF_{l,i} \cdot \left(\sum_{f,i} g_{f,i}^{t,1} + \sum_{f,i} g_{f,i}^{t,2} - d_{i}^{t,1} - d_{i}^{t,2}\right)\right) \ge 0 \quad (\mu_{l}^{t,+}) \quad (34)$$

• Emission Constraint

$$E - \left(\sum_{t,f,i,m} em_m \cdot gp_{f,i,m}^{t,1} \cdot hour^t + \sum_{t,f,i,m} em_m \cdot gp_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot hour^t\right) \ge 0 \quad (\lambda) \quad (35)$$

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Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Complementarity Conditions Form of the Single Average Cost Price Model Small Consumers

Small consumers (as before except for (43))

$$0 \le \eta_{f,i}^{t,2} - p_i^{t,2} \perp g_{f,i}^{t,2} \ge 0 \tag{36}$$

$$0 \le cost_{f,i,m} + \lambda \cdot em_m + \nu_{f,i,m}^{t,2} - \eta_{f,i}^{t,2} \perp gp_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \ge 0$$
(37)

$$0 \le \sum_{m} g p_{f,i,m}^{t,2} - g_{f,i}^{t,2} \perp \eta_{f,i}^{t,2} \ge 0$$
(38)

$$0 \le G_{f,i,m}^2 - g p_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \perp \nu_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \ge 0$$
(39)

$$0 \le \sum_{f,i} g_{f,i}^{t,2} - \sum_{i} d_{i}^{t,2} \perp phub^{t,2} \ge 0$$
(40)

$$0 \le \rho_i^{t,2} - a_i^{t,2} + b_i^{t,2} \cdot d_i^{t,2} \perp d_i^{t,2} \ge 0$$
(41)

$$0 \le p_i^{t,2} - phub^{t,2} - (\sum_{l} (-\mu_l^{t,+} + \mu_l^{t,-}) \cdot PTDF_{l,i}) \perp p_i^{t,2} \ge 0$$
(42)

$$0 \le \gamma_{f,i,m} - \sum_{t} \nu_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot proportion^{t} \perp G_{f,i,m}^{2} \ge 0$$
(43)

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Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Complementarity Conditions Form of the Single Average Cost Price Model $_{\mbox{Industrial Consumers (1)}}$

• Industrial consumers

The following is similar to the small consumers' problem and intended to guarantee production efficiency (merit order) when demand results from a price p^1 :

$$0 \le \eta_{f,i}^{t,1} - \beta^{t,1} - (\sum_{l} (-\mu_{l}^{t,+} + \mu_{l}^{t,-}) \cdot PTDF_{l,i}) \bot g_{f,i}^{t,1} \ge 0$$
(44)

$$0 \le cost_{f,i,m} + \lambda \cdot em_m + \nu_{f,i,m}^{t,1} - \eta_{f,i}^{t,1} \perp gp_{f,i,m}^{t,1} \ge 0$$
(45)

$$0 \le \sum_{m} g p_{f,i,m}^{t,1} - g_{f,i}^{t,1} \perp \eta_{f,i}^{t,1} \ge 0$$
(46)

$$0 \le G_{f,i,m}^1 - g \rho_{f,i,m}^{t,1} \perp \nu_{f,i,m}^{t,1} \ge 0$$
(47)

$$0 \le \sum_{f,i} g_{f,i}^{t,1} - \sum_{i} d_{i}^{t,1} \perp \beta^{t,1} \ge 0$$
(48)

$$0 \le p^{1} - a_{i}^{t,1} + b_{i}^{t,1} \cdot d_{i}^{t,1} \perp d_{i}^{t,1} \ge 0$$
(49)

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Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Complementarity Conditions Form of the Single Average Cost Price Model Industrial Consumers (2)

The following (except (54)) computes the price p^1 as an average cost:

$$0 \leq pprod^{1} - \frac{\sum_{t} hour^{t}(\sum_{f,i,m} (gp_{f,i,m}^{t,1} \cdot (cost_{f,i,m} + em_{m} \cdot \lambda)))}{\sum_{t,i} d_{i}^{t,1} \cdot hour^{t}} - \frac{\sum_{f,i,m} FC_{f,i,m} \cdot G_{f,i,m}^{1}}{\sum_{t,i} d_{i}^{t,1} \cdot hour^{t}} \perp pprod^{1} \geq 0$$
(50)

$$0 \leq ptrans^{1} - \frac{\sum_{t} hour^{t}(\sum_{l,i} PTDF_{l,i} \cdot inj_{i}^{t} \cdot (-\mu_{l}^{t,+} + \mu_{l}^{t,-}))}{\sum_{t,i} d_{i}^{t,1} \cdot hour^{t}} \perp ptrans^{1} \geq 0$$
(51)

$$0 \le inj_i^t - \sum_f g_{f,i}^{t,1} + d_i^{t,1} \bot inj_i^1 \ge 0$$
(52)

$$0 \le p^1 - pprod^1 - ptrans^1 \perp p^1 \ge 0$$
(53)

$$0 \leq \gamma_{f,i,m} - \sum_{t} \nu_{f,i,m}^{t,1} \cdot \textit{proportion}^t \perp \ \textit{G}_{f,i,m}^1 \geq 0 \quad \text{and} \quad \textbf{f}_{f,i,m} \leq 0 \quad \textbf{f}_{f,i,m} \leq 0$$

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Complementarity Conditions of the Single Average Cost Price Model Global Constraints

• Transmission constraints (similar, but not identical to the reference model)

$$0 \leq Linecap_{l} \mp (\sum_{i} PTDF_{l,i} \cdot (\sum_{f} g_{f,i}^{t,1} + \sum_{f} g_{f,i}^{t,2} - d_{i}^{t,1} - d_{i}^{t,2})) \perp \mu_{l}^{t,+} \geq 0$$
(55)

• Global capacity constraint

$$0 \le Cap_{f,i,m} - G_{f,i,m}^1 - G_{f,i,m}^2 \perp \gamma_{f,i,m} \ge 0$$
(56)

• Emission constraint (similar, but not identical to the reference model)

$$0 \leq E - (\sum_{t,f,i,m} em_m \cdot gp_{f,i,m}^{t,1} \cdot hour^t + \sum_{t,f,i,m} em_m \cdot gp_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot hour^t) \perp \lambda \geq 0$$
(57)

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Complementarity Conditions Form of the Single Average Cost Price Model Capacity allocation mechanism

Capacity allocation mechanism

$$0 \leq \gamma_{f,i,m} - \sum_{t} \nu_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot proportion^{t} \perp G_{f,i,m}^{2} \geq 0 \quad (43)$$
$$0 \leq \gamma_{f,i,m} - \sum_{t} \nu_{f,i,m}^{t,1} \cdot proportion^{t} \perp G_{f,i,m}^{1} \geq 0 \quad (54)$$
$$0 \leq Cap_{f,i,m} - G_{f,i,m}^{1} - G_{f,i,m}^{2} \perp \gamma_{f,i,m} \geq 0 \quad (56)$$

These three relations equalize the marginal value of the capacity allocated by a firm to the two segments of the market

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Results of the Single Average Cost Pricing Model

Single Average Cost Price

• Single Average Cost Price

Cost components	€/MWh
Fuel	10.62
Transmission	-2.81*
Emission	9.98
Fixed costs	17.59
Average cost price	35.37

Emission allowance price: 40.22e/ton**.

* Transmission costs are negative because they are given by the sum of negative values. These negative values are influenced both by the PTDF signs and by flow directions (France export to Germany and Belgium which in its turn deliver power to the Netherlands).

** (To be compared with 26.65 €/ton in the reference model)

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Results of the Single Average Cost Pricing Model

Electricity Price Comparison (Small Consumers)

• Relative changes in small consumers' electricity prices (Summer)

SUMMER						
€/MWh	Relative changes					
Germany	44.94	53.12	18%			
France	5.10	4.50	-12%			
Merchtem	47.13	57.89	23%			
Gramme	27.81	38.17	37%			
Krimpen	47.13	54.29	15%			
Maastricht	47.13	52.36	11%			
Zwolle	46.23	53.00	15%			

• Relative changes in small consumers' electricity prices (Winter)

WINTER							
€/MWh Reference Case Single average cost Relative char							
Germany	47.33	73.88	56%				
France	47.33	57.89	22%				
Merchtem	47.33	97.03	105%				
Gramme	47.33	80.85	71%				
Krimpen	47.33	87.66	85%				
Maastricht	47.33	84.10	78%				
Zwolle	47.33	82.63	75%				

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Results of the Single Average Cost Pricing Model

Demand Comparison (Industrial Consumers)

• Comparison of the Industrial Consumers' Hourly Demand

MW	Reference case	Single average cost	Relative changes
Germany	25,107	33,089	32%
France	24,912	20,672	-17%
Merchtem	3,528	4,805	36%
Gramme	1,963	2,065	5%
Krimpen	2,595	3,535	36%
Maastricht	886	1,207	36%
Zwolle	1,612	2,166	34%
Total	60,603	67,539	11%

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Results of the Single Average Cost Pricing Model

Demand Comparison (Small Consumers)

• Comparison of the Small Consumers' Hourly Demand (Summer)

SUMMER						
MW Reference Case Single average cost Relative						
Germany	18,746	18,358	-2.1%			
France	22,096	22,127	0.1%			
Merchtem	1,287	1,251	-2.7%			
Gramme	577	563	-2.5%			
Krimpen	2,897	2,845	-1.8%			
Maastricht	690	681	-1.3%			
Zwolle	1,151	1,131	-1.7%			
Total	47,444	46,955	-1%			

Comparison of the Small Consumers' Hourly Demand (Winter)

WINTER					
MW	Reference case	Relative changes			
Germany	47,940	44,699	-7%		
France	44,542	43,344	-3%		
Merchtem	4,496	3,927	-13%		
Gramme	1,924	1,760	-9%		
Krimpen	7,332	6,579	-10%		
Maastricht	1,777	1,610	-9%		
Zwolle	2,977	2,710	-9%		
Total	110,988	104,629	-6%		

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Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Results of the Single Average Cost Pricing Model

Demand Comparison (Global Annual Demand)

• Comparison of the Consumers' Global Annual Demand

GLOBAL ANNUAL DEMAND						
MWh	Relative changes					
Germany	489,951,121	546,134,302	11.5%			
France	493,129,840	451,810,460	-8.4%			
Merchtem	53,803,596	62,747,254	16.6%			
Gramme	27,136,277	27,359,393	0.8%			
Krimpen	64,187,582	69,418,178	8.1%			
Maastricht	17,750,349	19,911,214	12.2%			
Zwolle	30,820,955	34,601,307	12.3%			
Total	1,176,779,721	1,211,982,108	3.0%			

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Results of the Single Average Cost Pricing Model

Capacity Dedicated to Industrial Consumers

• Capacity Dedicated to Industrial Consumers (with respect to the total installed capacity)

	Hydro	Wind	Nuclear	Lignite	Coal	CCGT
Germany	100%	73%	63%	65%	0%	28%
France	64%	100%	49%	0%	0%	0%
Merchtem		100%	65%		66%	53%
Gramme	100%	100%	80%		0%	0%
Krimpen		100%	100%		0%	78%
Maastricht		100%				0%
Zwolle		100%			0%	43%
Total	72%	75%	54%	64%	3%	28%

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Results of the Single Average Cost Pricing Model Summary

The comparison with respect to the reference case shows that:

- Single average cost price is lower than marginal cost prices found in the reference case. This holds for all nodes except for France⁴;
- Industries globally increase their electricity consumption by 11% (p.a.);
- Small consumers face higher electricity prices especially in winter, when oil and natural gas based plants in addition with emission allowance set their power prices;
- Image: Emission allowance price is very high 40.22 €/ton;
- Industries require more electricity than in the reference case. This makes the consumers' global demand increasing and then power producers exploit all the available capacity. This explains why emission allowances are so expensive

⁴Their summer marginal electricity price was very low: only 5.10 €/MWh → 4 ≥ → 4 ≥ → 5 ≥ → 0 0 0

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Nodal Average Cost Pricing Model

This model differs from the previous one by the fact that:

- Industrial consumers buy electricity through special contracts with local generators;
- Industries are then supplied only with electricity produced at the node where they are located;
- Electricity intensive industrial users do not have to pay transmission costs;
- Electricity average cost prices differ per node in accordance with the technology employed to generate power.

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Nodal Average Cost Pricing Model

The average cost price varies with the node. The obtained prices p_i^1 are functions of the variable cost components (fuel and emission) and of the fixed charges.

$$\rho_i^1 = \frac{\sum_t hour^t (\sum_{f,m} (gp_{f,i,m}^{t,1} \cdot (cost_{f,i,m} + em_m \cdot \lambda)))}{\sum_t d_i^{t,1} \cdot hour^t} + \frac{\sum_{f,m} FC_{f,m,i} \cdot G_{f,i,m}^1}{\sum_t d_i^{t,1} \cdot hour^t}$$

where $G_{f,i,m}^{f}$ is the installed capacity dedicated to industrial consumers and $FC_{f,m,i}$ are the corresponding annual fixed costs

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Pricing Model

Nodal Average Cost Price

Nodal Average Cost Prices

€/MWh	Fuel	Emission	Fixed	Average cost price
Germany	9.54	15.15	17.63	42.32
France	4.44	0.00	13.48	17.92
Merchtem	21.36	7.22	10.20	38.78
Gramme	14.77	4.41	11.53	30.70
Krimpen	30.39	11.11	10.90	52.40
Maastricht	34.57	12.93	10.84	58.34
Zwolle	35.62	13.33	8.53	57.47

Emission Allowance Price: 30.85e/ton*

* (To be compared with 26.65 \in /ton (reference model) and 40.22 \in /ton (single average cost model))

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Pricing Model

Electricity Price Comparison (Industrial Consumers)

• Relative Changes in Industrial Electricity Prices

	% Reference*	% Single**
Germany	-8%	20%
France	-21%	-49%
Merchtem	-18%	10%
Gramme	-14%	-13%
Krimpen	11%	48%
Maastricht	24%	65%
Zwolle	23%	63%

 \ast Relative changes of nodal average cost prices with respect to the average of those of the reference case

** Relative changes of nodal average cost prices with respect to those of the single average cost price model

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Pricing Model

Electricity Price Comparison (Small Consumers)

• Relative Changes in Small Consumers' Electricity Prices (Summer)

SUMMER						
€/MWh Single average cost Nodal average cost Relative c						
Germany	53.12	48.95	-8%			
France	4.50	48.95	988%			
Merchtem	57.89	48.95	-15%			
Gramme	38.17	48.95	28%			
Krimpen	54.29	48.95	-10%			
Maastricht	52.36	48.95	-7%			
Zwolle	53.00	48.95	-8%			

• Relative Changes in Small Consumers' Electricity Prices (Winter)

WINTER							
€/MWh	€/MWh Single average cost Nodal average cost Relative char						
Germany	73.88	61.20	-17%				
France	57.89	70.43	22%				
Merchtem	97.03	90.08	-7%				
Gramme	80.85	72.00	-11%				
Krimpen	87.66	64.97	-26%				
Maastricht	84.10	48.95	-42%				
Zwolle	82.63	58.89	-29%				

The huge increase of French small consumers' price in summer explains the drop in their electricity demand. 🕨 🗧 🕨 🛓 📮 🖉 🔍 🔍 (~

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Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Pricing Model

Demand Comparison (Industrial Consumers (1))

• Comparison of the Industrial Consumers' Demand

MW	Reference case	Single Average cost	Nodal Average cost
Germany	25,107	33,089	27,935
France	24,912	20,672	28,755
Merchtem	3,528	4,805	4,438
Gramme	1,963	2,065	2,281
Krimpen	2,595	3,535	2,186
Maastricht	886	1,207	586
Zwolle	1,612	2,166	1,093
Total	60,603	67,539	67,273

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Pricing Model

Demand Comparison (Industrial Consumers (2))

• Relative Changes in Industrial Consumers' Hourly Demand

	% Reference*	% Single**
Germany	11%	-16%
France	15%	39%
Merchtem	26%	-8%
Gramme	16%	10%
Krimpen	-16%	-38%
Maastricht	-34%	-51%
Zwolle	-32%	-50%
Total	11%	-0.4%

 \ast Relative changes in industrial demand given by the comparison between the reference and the nodal average cost cases

** Relative changes in industrial demand given by the comparison between the single and the nodal average cost pricing cases

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Pricing Model

Demand Comparison (Small Consumers)

• Comparison of the Small Consumers' Hourly Demand (Summer)

SUMMER						
MW	Single average cost	Nodal average cost	Relative changes			
Germany	18,358	18,555	1%			
France	22,127	19,868	-10%			
Merchtem	1,251	1,281	2%			
Gramme	563	547	-3%			
Krimpen	2,845	2,884	1%			
Maastricht	681	687	1%			
Zwolle	1,131	1,143	1%			
Total	46,955	44,966	-4%			

• Comparison of the Small Consumers' Hourly Demand (Winter)

WINTER					
MW	Single average cost	Nodal average cost	Relative changes		
Germany	44,699	46,247	3%		
France	43,344	41,921	-3%		
Merchtem	3,927	4,007	2%		
Gramme	1,760	1,803	2%		
Krimpen	6,579	7,003	6%		
Maastricht	1,610	1,770	10%		
Zwolle	2,710	2,890	7%		
Total	104,629	105,639	1%		

Globally, small consumers' demand decreases in summer. This is mainly due to the cut of 10% of the French small consumers demand

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Pricing Model

Demand Comparison (Global Annual Demand (1))

• Comparison of the Global Annual Demand

GLOBAL ANNUAL DEMAND				
MWh	Reference case	Single average cost	Nodal average cost	
Germany	489,951,121	546,134,302	507,606,506	
France	493,129,840	451,810,460	505,855,053	
Merchtem	53,803,596	62,747,254	59,972,043	
Gramme	27,136,277	27,359,393	29,330,033	
Krimpen	64,187,582	69,418,178	59,338,313	
Maastricht	17,750,349	19,911,214	15,074,774	
Zwolle	30,820,955	34,601,307	25,917,735	
Total	1,176,779,721	1,211,982,108	1,203,094,458	

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Pricing Model

Demand Comparison (Global Annual Demand (2))

• Relative Changes in Global Annual Demand

	% Reference*	% Single**
Germany	4%	-7%
France	3%	12%
Merchtem	11%	-4%
Gramme	8%	7%
Krimpen	-8%	-15%
Maastricht	-15%	-24%
Zwolle	-16%	-25%
Total	2%	-1%

 \ast Relative changes in industrial demand given by the comparison between the reference and the nodal average cost cases

** Relative changes in industrial demand given by the comparison between the single and the nodal average cost pricing cases

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Pricing Model

Capacity Dedicated to Industrial Consumers

• Capacity Dedicated to Industrial Consumers (with respect to the total installed capacity)

	Hydro	Wind	Nuclear	Lignite	Coal	CCGT
Germany	51%	56%	69%	55%	18%	0%
France	7%	0%	62%	0%	0%	0%
Merchtem		0%	98%		0%	93%
Gramme	77%	35%	68%		0%	63%
Krimpen		26%	100%		0%	41%
Maastricht		17%				19%
Zwolle		0%			0%	23%
Total	16%	53%	66%	55%	11%	18%

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Pricing Model Summary

- Industrial consumers require almost an identical amount of electricity in the two average cost pricing scenarios;
- O The global annual demand is higher than in the reference case (+2% increase) and lower than in single average cost case (-1% decrease). This explains why in the nodal average cost case emission allowance price is higher than in the reference model, but lower than in single average cost scenario

The combination of these effects explains why emission allowance price falls to 30.85 \in /ton

Reference Scenario Complementarity Conditions Form Main Results of the Reference Case (Exogenous Capacity) Accommodating Industrial Consumers

Main Results

The application of these special pricing policies seems to have a general positive effect on industries. In fact:

- Industrial electricity prices tend to decrease with respect to the reference case;
- Industrial electricity demand generally increases with respect to the reference case: this is the desired effect;
- Industries have access to base-load capacity characterized by low emission factor;
- The fuel mix on which countries base their electricity production is a key factor in meeting the ETS target;
- Allowance prices are quite high in both approaches: 40.22 €/ton and 30.85
 €/ton respectively in the single and the nodal average cost pricing models.

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Endogenous Capacity

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Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

New Assumptions (1)

Setup

- Generation capacities are endogenous;
- One way of the second secon
- New power installations are supposed to be available in the second phase of the EU-ETS;
- Sew and old installations have an identical cost structure;
- In Sew emission cap: 358 Mio/ton. p.a⁵

⁵Source: Own computation based on data reported on

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Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Setup

- Reference case: only power companies invest and apply identical marginal cost price to both consumer groups;
- CASE I: only power companies invest, but they charge average cost to industries;
- CASE II: power companies and industrial consumers invest. Industries buy at the marginal cost from generators (requirement of non discrimination)

Assumptions Reference Model Case I

New Assumptions (3)

	Pricing System	Emission Constraint	Transmission Constraint	Investment
Reference Case	Short-run marginal cost (both consumer groups)	Included	Included	Electricity generating companies invest
CASE I Single Average Cost Model	Short-run marginal cost (small consumers) Single average cost price (industrial consumers)	Included	Included	Electricity generating companies invest
CASE I Nodal Average Cost Model	Short-run marginal cost (small consumers) Nodal average cost price (industrial consumers)	Included	Included	Electricity generating companies invest
CASE II Single Average Cost Model	Short-run marginal cost (small and industrial consumers) Single average cost price (industrial self-production)	Included	Included	Electricity generating companies and industrial consumers invest
CASE II Nodal Average Cost Model	Short-run marginal cost (small and industrial consumers) Nodal average cost price (industrial self-production)	Included	Included	Electricity generating companies and industrial consumers invest

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Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

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Reference Model Assumptions of the Reference Model

Assumptions of the reference model

- Electricity generating companies supply both industrial and small consumers and apply identical marginal cost based prices to both market segments;
- No market segmentation;
- No capacity split;
- I Electricity generating companies are the only ones to invest

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

The investment policy adopted by electricity generating companies is as follows:

- Without EU-ETS, power producers expand their capacity and build new nuclear (in France), lignite (in Germany) and coal (in the other nodes) stations;
- The inception of the EU-ETS pushes power companies to invest in clean technologies, namely in wind and nuclear;
- There are no investments in CCGT technologies. Without EU-ETS, power companies prefer building new coal stations since they are cheaper; while the inception of carbon regulation encourages investments in nuclear. Moreover, according to our data, CCGT are quite expensive

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Main Results Comparison with the former reference case

Like in the former reference case, the inception of the EU-ETS results in:

- An increase in consumers' electricity prices;
- A global decrease of the industrial electricity consumption

BUT

With respect to the former reference case, one has:

- A global decrease of electricity prices;
- A global increase of the industrial electricity consumption due to the reduced electricity price and the expansion of the production park;
- Although consumers' demand increases, emission allowance price is lower than before (21.24 €/ton) because power producers invest in clean technologies;
- This holds for both consumer groups

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Reference Case with and without ETS

Demand Comparison (Industrial Sector)

• Relative Changes in Industrial Consumers' Hourly Demand

MW	Without ETS	With ETS	Relative Changes
Germany	39,389	27,916	-29%
France	27,754	27,754	0%
Merchtem	5,103	4,050	-21%
Gramme	2,425	2,223	-8%
Krimpen	3,754	2,745	-27%
Maastricht	1,282	952	-26%
Zwolle	2,380	1,738	-27%
Total	82,087	67,378	-18%

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Reference Case with and without ETS

Demand Comparison (Small Consumers)

• Relative Changes in Small Consumers' Hourly Demand (Summer)

SUMMER					
MW	Without ETS	With ETS	Relative Changes		
Germany	20,024	18,991	-5%		
France	22,127	22,127	0%		
Merchtem	1,344	1,311	-3%		
Gramme	589	587	0%		
Krimpen	3,028	2,915	-4%		
Maastricht	721	695	-4%		
Zwolle	1,209	1,160	-4%		
Total	49,042	47,784	-3%		

• Relative Changes in Small Consumers' Hourly Demand (Winter)

WINTER					
MW	Without ETS	With ETS	Relative Changes		
Germany	49,355	48,235	-2%		
France	45,866	45,866	0%		
Merchtem	4,629	4,523	-2%		
Gramme	1,981	1,943	-2%		
Krimpen	7,549	7,359	-3%		
Maastricht	1,829	1,788	-2%		
Zwolle	3,065	2,994	-2%		
Total	114,275	112,707	-1%		

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Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Reference Case with and without ETS

Electricity Price Comparison

• Electricity Price Changes in Summer

SUMMER						
€/MWh	Without ETS	With ETS	Relative Changes			
Germany	18.00	39.78	121%			
France	4.50*	4.50*	0%			
Merchtem	29.49	39.78	35%			
Gramme	19.51	20.49	5%			
Krimpen	29.49	44.80	52%			
Maastricht	29.49	44.80	52%			
Zwolle	26.20	43.15	65%			

• Electricity Price Changes in Winter

WINTER			
€/MWh	Without ETS	With ETS	Relative Changes
Germany	35.74	44.92	26%
France	35.66	35.66	0%
Merchtem	35.70	44.98	26%
Gramme	35.69	43.44	22%
Krimpen	35.71	45.89	29%
Maastricht	35.71	44.80	25%
Zwolle	35.72	45.20	27%

* Short-run marginal cost of nuclear plant

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Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Reference Case with and without EU-ETS Investments Without and With EU-ETS

Investment Without EU-ETS

MW	Nuclear	Lignite	Coal	Total
Germany		19,584		19,584
France	16,604			16,604
Merchtem			3,293	3,293
Gramme				0
Krimpen			3,166	3,166
Maastricht			1,471	1,471
Zwolle				0
Total	16,604	19,584	7,929	44,117

Investment With EU-ETS

MW	France	Merchtem	Total
Wind		2,596	2,596
Nuclear	26,642		26,642
Total	26,642	2,596	29,238

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Assumptions of the Case I

We modify the reference case and suppose:

- Market segmentation between industrial and small consumers;
- ② Capacity splitting between industrial and small consumers;
- Application of average cost based prices (single and nodal) to industrial consumers;
- Application of short-run marginal cost prices to small consumers;
- Old and new installations have identical cost structures

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Single Average Cost Price Model Single Average Cost Price

• Single Average Cost Price

Cost components	€/MWh
Fuel	6.63
Transmission	-4.48*
Emission	5.41
Fixed costs	20.50
Average cost price	28.06

* Transmission costs are negative because they are given by the sum of negative values. These negative values are influenced both by the PTDF signs and by flow directions (France export to Germany and Belgium which in its turn deliver power to the Netherlands).

Allowance price is 26.55 €/ton

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Single Average Cost Price Model

Electricity Price Comparison (Small Consumers)

• Relative Changes in Small Consumers' Electricity Prices (Summer)

SUMMER					
€/MWh	Relative change				
Germany	39.78	44.85	13%		
France	4.50	4.50	0%		
Merchtem	39.78	38.29	-4%		
Gramme	20.49	38.29	87%		
Krimpen	44.80	47.09	5%		
Maastricht	44.80	47.09	5%		
Zwolle	43.15	46.08	7%		

• Relative Changes in Small Consumers' Electricity Prices (Winter)

WINTER						
€/MWh Reference case Single Average cost Relative ch						
Germany	44.92	47.80	6%			
France	35.66	35.66	0%			
Merchtem	44.98	47.09	5%			
Gramme	43.44	47.09	8%			
Krimpen	45.89	67.71	48%			
Maastricht	44.80	55.83	25%			
Zwolle	45.20	58.19	29%			

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Single Average Cost Price Model

Demand Comparison (Industrial Consumers)

• Relative Changes in Industrial Consumers' Hourly Demand

MW	Reference case	Single Average cost	Relative Change
Germany	27,916	38,506	38%
France	27,754	24,057	-13%
Merchtem	4,050	5,591	38%
Gramme	2,223	2,403	8%
Krimpen	2,745	4,114	50%
Maastricht	952	1,405	48%
Zwolle	1,738	2,520	45%
Total	67,378	78,597	17%

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Single Average Cost Price Model

Demand Comparison (Small Consumers)

• Relative Changes in Small Consumers' Hourly Demand (Summer)

SUMMER						
MW Reference case Single Average cost Relative Cha						
Germany	18,991	18,750	-1.3%			
France	22,127	22,127	0.0%			
Merchtem	1,311	1,316	0.4%			
Gramme	587	562	-4.2%			
Krimpen	2,915	2,898	-0.6%			
Maastricht	695	691	-0.6%			
Zwolle	1,160	1,151	-0.7%			
Total	47,784	47,494	-0.6%			

• Relative Changes in Small Consumers' Hourly Demand (Winter)

WINTER						
MW	MW Reference case Single Average cost Relativ					
Germany	48,235	47,883	-1%			
France	45,866	45,866	0%			
Merchtem	4,523	4,499	-1%			
Gramme	1,943	1,925	-1%			
Krimpen	7,359	6,952	-6%			
Maastricht	1,788	1,738	-3%			
Zwolle	2,994	2,895	-3%			
Total	112,707	111,757	-1%			

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Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Single Average Cost Price Model

Existing Capacity Dedicated to Industrial Consumers

• Existing capacity dedicated to industrial consumers

	Hydro	Wind	Nuclear	Lignite	Coal	CCGT
Germany	73%	54%	51%	51%	21%	0%
France	32%	100%	41%	0%	0%	0%
Merchtem		72%	47%		0%	0%
Gramme	100%	100%	50%		0%	0%
Krimpen		100%	52%		37%	27%
Maastricht		100%				27%
Zwolle		100%			75%	0%
Total	41%	57%	44%	51%	18%	6%

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Single Average Cost Price Model ${\sf Investments}$ under the EU-ETS

• Investments for Small Consumers

MW	Germany	France	Merchtem	Total
Wind	4,697		295	4,992
Nuclear		6,252		6,252
Total	4,697	6,252	295	11,243

• Investments for Industrial Consumers

MW	Germany	France	Merchtem	Gramme	Krimpen	Total
Wind	6,446		5,022	36		11,504
Nuclear		14,879				14,879
CCGT					14	14
Total	6,446	14,879	5,022	36	14	26,397

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Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Single Average Cost Price Model Summary

With respect to the investment reference case:

- Industrial consumers increase their electricity consumption since electricity becomes cheaper;
- Single average cost pricing system damages small consumers: their electricity prices slightly increase implying a reduction of their electricity consumption;
- Semission allowance price is higher since the global market demand rises;
- Investments in new capacity (namely wind and nuclear) are globally higher than in the reference case

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Price Model

Nodal Average Cost Price

• Nodal Average Cost Price

€/MWh	Fuel	Emission	Fixed	Average cost price
Germany	9.42	10.22	19.94	39.58
France	4.44		13.48	17.92
Merchtem	1.15		34.50	35.65
Gramme	3.69		18.19	21.88
Krimpen	21.47	13.55	15.26	50.28
Maastricht	29.02	7.74	23.03	59.79
Zwolle	25.73	13.48	17.11	56.32

Emission Allowance Price: 21.99 €/ton

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Price Model

Electricity Price Comparison (Industrial Consumers)

• Relative Changes in Industrial Consumers' Electricity Prices

	% Reference*	% Single**
Germany	-6%	41%
France	3%	-36%
Merchtem	-15%	27%
Gramme	-27%	-22%
Krimpen	11%	79%
Maastricht	33%	113%
Zwolle	28%	101%

 \ast Relative changes of nodal average cost prices with respect to the average of those of reference case

** Relative changes of nodal average cost prices with respect to those of the single average cost price

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Price Model

Electricity Price Comparison (Small Consumers)

• Relative Changes in Small Consumers' Electricity Prices (Summer)

SUMMER				
€/MWh	Single Average Cost	Nodal Average Cost	Relative Changes	
Germany	44.85	40.49	-10%	
France	4.50	4.50	0%	
Merchtem	38.29	39.68	4%	
Gramme	38.29	29.70	-22%	
Krimpen	47.09	45.12	-4%	
Maastricht	47.09	39.17	-17%	
Zwolle	46.08	41.68	-10%	

• Relative Changes in Small Consumers' Electricity Prices (Winter)

WINTER						
€/MWh	Single Average Cost Nodal Average Cost Relative Chang					
Germany	47.80	45.83	-4%			
France	35.66	35.66	0%			
Merchtem	47.09	45.12	-4%			
Gramme	47.09	45.12	-4%			
Krimpen	67.71	45.24	-33%			
Maastricht	55.83	45.12	-19%			
Zwolle	58.19	45.27	-22%			

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Price Model

Demand Comparison (Industrial Consumers)

• Comparison of Industrial Consumers' Hourly Demand

MW	Reference case	Single Average cost	Nodal Average cost
Germany	27,916	38,506	29,965
France	27,754	24,057	28,755
Merchtem	4,050	5,591	4,774
Gramme	2,223	2,403	2,689
Krimpen	2,745	4,114	2,354
Maastricht	952	1,405	547
Zwolle	1,738	2,520	1,149
Total	67,378	78,597	70,234

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Price Model

Demand Comparison (Industrial Consumers)

• Relative Changes in Industrial Consumers' Hourly Demand

	% Reference*	% Single*
Germany	7%	-22%
France	4%	20%
Merchtem	18%	-15%
Gramme	21%	12%
Krimpen	-14%	-43%
Maastricht	-43%	-61%
Zwolle	-34%	-54%
Total	4%	-11%

 \ast Relative changes in industrial demand given by the comparison between the reference and the nodal average cost cases

** Relative changes in industrial demand given by the comparison between the single and the nodal average cost pricing cases

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Price Model

Electricity Demand Comparison (Small Consumers)

• Relative Changes in Small Consumers' Hourly Demand (Summer)

MW	Single Average cost	Nodal Average cost	Relative changes
Germany	18,750	18,957	1.1%
France	22,127	22,127	0.0%
Merchtem	1,316	1,311	-0.3%
Gramme	562	574	2.1%
Krimpen	2,898	2,912	0.5%
Maastricht	691	704	2.0%
Zwolle	1,151	1,164	1.1%
Total	47,494	47,750	0.5%

• Relative Changes in Small Consumers' Hourly Demand (Winter)

MW	Single Average cost	Nodal Average cost	Relative changes
Germany	47,883	48,123	0.5%
France	45,866	45,866	0.0%
Merchtem	4,499	4,521	0.5%
Gramme	1,925	1,935	0.5%
Krimpen	6,952	7,371	6.0%
Maastricht	1,738	1,787	2.8%
Zwolle	2,895	2,993	3.4%
Total	111,757	112,596	0.8%

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Price Model

Capacity Dedicated to Industrial Consumers

• Capacity dedicated to industrial consumers

	Hydro	Wind	Nuclear	Lignite	Coal	CCGT
Germany	77%	98%	66%	40%	30%	0%
France	7%	0%	60%	0%	0%	0%
Merchtem		66%	59%		0%	0%
Gramme	100%	100%	100%		0%	0%
Krimpen		100%	100%		38%	16%
Maastricht		100%				15%
Zwolle		100%			100%	12%
Total	21%	98%	63%	40%	25%	6%

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Price Model Investment under the EU-ETS

• Investments for Small Consumers

MW	France	Merchtem	Total
Wind		821	821
Nuclear	26,680		26,680
Total	26,680	821	27,501

• Investments for Industrial Consumers

MW	France	Merchtem	Gramme	Total
Wind		3,540	451	3,991
Nuclear	990			990
Total	990	3,540	451	4,981

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Price Model Summary

- Industrial demand is higher with respect to the reference investment case, but lower with regard to the single average cost case;
- e Electricity prices and consumption of the retail sector is aligned with those of the reference investment case and lower (price) and higher (consumption) in comparison with the single average cost model (small consumers profit from this policy);
- Emission allowance price is 21.99 €/ton;
- Investments in new capacity are lower than in the single average cost pricing scenario: this obliges electricity generating companies to exploit more already existing capacity;
- Global consumers' annual demand is lower than in the single average investment case, but higher than in the reference investment case: this explains the allowance price trend (21.24 €/ton (reference), 26.55 €/ton (single) and 21.99 €/ton (nodal))

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Assumptions of the Case II

We modify the Reference Case and suppose:

- Electricity generating companies supply both industrial and small consumers and apply nodal marginal cost prices;
- 2 Both electricity and industries may invest in new installations;
- Industrial consumers face average cost based prices (single and nodal) when they vertically integrate electricity production;
- Old and new installations have identical cost structures

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Single Average Cost Price Model Summary

- Industries do not invest and buy electricity from power producers at the marginal cost price;
- Power producers build new wind and nuclear plants for both consumer segments;
- Emission constraint is binding and allowances price is 21.34 €/ton. This is slightly higher than in the reference case (21.24 €/ton) because there is a marginal increase in industrial demand. Small consumers require almost the same amount of electricity

We compare the results of this investment case II with those of the reference investment scenario

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Single Average Cost Price Model Industrial Consumers' Electricity Prices

• Industrial Consumers' Electricity Prices (Marginal Prices)

Nodes	€/MWh
Germany	41.98
France	17.39
Merchtem	41.93
Gramme	30.62
Krimpen	45.04
Maastricht	44.84
Zwolle	43.94

These price are similar (but in average lower) to the average of those of the reference investment case

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Single Average Cost Price Model

Small Consumers' Electricity Prices

• Small Consumers' Electricity Prices

€/MWh	Summer	Winter
Germany	39.88	44.96
France	4.50	35.66
Merchtem	39.88	44.84
Gramme	20.59	44.84
Krimpen	44.84	45.33
Maastricht	44.84	44.84
Zwolle	43.21	44.99

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Single Average Cost Price Model

Industrial consumers' Hourly Demand

With respect to the reference investment case, there is a slight increase of the industrial electricity demand

• Hourly Industrial Demand (MW)

Nodes	MW
Germany	28,187
France	28,999
Merchtem	4,098
Gramme	2,285
Krimpen	2,769
Maastricht	951
Zwolle	1,750
Total	69,039

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Single Average Cost Price Model

Electricity Demand (Small consumers)

• Small Consumers' Hourly Demand

MW	Summer	Winter	
Germany	18,986	48,229	
France	22,127	45,866	
Merchtem	1,310	4,525	
Gramme	587	1,936	
Krimpen	2,914	7,370	
Maastricht	694	1,788	
Zwolle	1,160	2,995	
Total	47,779	112,709	

Small consumers' demand is almost identical to that of the reference investment case

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Single Average Cost Price Model

• New capacity built by power companies for small consumers

MW	France	Merchtem	Total
Wind		1	1
Nuclear	4,441		4,441
Total	4,441	1	4,442

New capacity built by power companies for industrial consumers

MW	France	Merchtem	Total
Wind		2,995	2,995
Nuclear	23,444		23,444
Total	23,444	2,995	26,439

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Price Model Summary

- Results are closed to those of the reference investment case and those of the nodal average cost model with fixed capacity;
- Electricity prices and demands of industrial and small consumers are identical to those of the former single average case;
- Again, industries do not invest and buy electricity from power companies at the marginal cost;
- Power producers invest in nuclear and in wind power stations. The total MW of new capacity built are identical to those of the former single investment case, but they are subdivided in a different way between small and industrial consumers;
- Emission allowance price is still 21.34 €/ton

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Price Model

Industrial Consumers' Electricity Prices

• Industrial Consumers' Electricity Prices (Marginal Prices)

Nodes	€/MWh
Germany	41.98
France	17.39
Merchtem	41.93
Gramme	30.62
Krimpen	45.04
Maastricht	44.84
Zwolle	43.94

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Price Model

Small Consumers' Electricity Prices

• Small Consumers' Electricity Prices

€/MWh	Summer	Winter
Germany	39.88	44.96
France	4.50	35.66
Merchtem	39.88	44.84
Gramme	20.59	44.84
Krimpen	44.84	45.33
Maastricht	44.84	44.84
Zwolle	43.21	44.99

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Price Model

Industrial Consumers' Hourly Demand

Industrial Consumers' Hourly Demand

Nodes	MW
Germany	28,187
France	28,999
Merchtem	4,098
Gramme	2,285
Krimpen	2,769
Maastricht	951
Zwolle	1,750
Total	69,039

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Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Price Model

Small Consumers' Hourly Demand

Small Consumers' Hourly Demand

MW	Summer	Winter
Germany	18,986	48,229
France	22,127	45,866
Merchtem	1,310	4,525
Gramme	587	1,936
Krimpen	2,914	7,370
Maastricht	694	1,788
Zwolle	1,160	2,995
Total	47,779	112,709

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Results of the Nodal Average Cost Price Model

New capacity built by power companies for small consumers

MW	France
Nuclear	11,379

New capacity built by power companies for industrial consumers

MW	France	Merchtem	Total
Wind		2,996	2,996
Nuclear	16,505		16,505
Total	16,505	2,996	19,502

Assumptions Reference Model Case I Case II

Conclusions

We can conclude that:

- The introduction of the average cost based contract partially relieves industries from the additional burdens caused by the EU-ETS;
- Investments in new generating capacity increase the efficiency of the market as highlighted by the reduced emission allowance prices.

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Appendix: Endogenous Capacity Models

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Reference Investment Model

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Reference Model

Electricity companies' maximization problem

Each electricity generating company f maximizes its profit:

$$max. \quad \sum_{t,i} p_i^t \cdot g_{f,i}^t \cdot hour^t - \sum_{t,i,m} cost_{f,i,m} \cdot gpc_{f,i,m}^t \cdot hour^t$$
(58)

$$-\sum_{t,i,m} \textit{fuel}_{f,i,m} \cdot \textit{gpi}_{f,i,m}^t \cdot \textit{hour}^t - \sum_{i,m} \textit{FC}_{-annual}_{f,i,m} \cdot \textit{investment}_{f,i,m}$$

$$+\lambda \cdot (NAP_f - \sum_{t,i,m} gpc_{f,i,m}^t \cdot em_m \cdot hour^t - \sum_{t,i,m} gpi_{f,i,m}^t \cdot em_m \cdot hour^t)$$

subject to:

Generation balance

$$\sum_{m} gpc_{f,i,m}^{t} + \sum_{m} gpi_{f,i,m}^{t} - g_{f,i}^{t} \ge 0 \qquad (\eta_{f,i}^{t})$$
(59)

Capacity and investment constraints

$$Cap_{f,i,m} - gpc_{f,i,m}^{t} \ge 0 \qquad (\nu c_{f,i,m}^{t}) \tag{60}$$

investment_{f,i,m} - gpi_{f,i,m}^{t} \ge 0 \qquad (\nu_{f,i,m}^{t}) \qquad (61)
$$\mathbb{E} \circ \mathbb{E} \circ \mathbb{E}$$

Reference Model

Consumers' surplus maximization problem

Industry

max.
$$\sum_{t=s,w} \left[hour^{t} \cdot \int_{0}^{d_{i}^{t,1}} P_{i}^{t,1}(\epsilon) \cdot d\epsilon - hour^{t} \cdot p_{i}^{t} \cdot d_{i}^{t,1} \right]$$
(62)
$$d_{i}^{s,1} - d_{i}^{w,1} = 0 \quad (\alpha_{i})$$
(63)

Households

max.
$$hour^{t} \cdot \int_{0}^{d_{i}^{t,2}} P_{i}^{t,2}(\epsilon) \cdot d\epsilon - hour^{t} \cdot p_{i}^{t} \cdot d_{i}^{t,2}$$
 (64)

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Reference Model Global Constraints

Market Balance

$$\sum_{f,i} g_{f,i}^{t} - \sum_{i} d_{i}^{t,1} - \sum_{i} d_{i}^{t,2} \ge 0 \quad (phub^{t})$$
(65)

• Electricity Prices

$$\rho_{i}^{t} = \rho^{t} + \sum_{l} (-\mu_{l}^{t,+} + \mu_{l}^{t,-}) \cdot PTDF_{l,i} \quad (\rho_{i}^{t})$$
(66)

• Transmission Constraint

$$Linecap_{l} \mp \left(\sum_{i} PTDF_{l,i} \cdot \left(\sum_{f} g_{f,i}^{t} - d_{i}^{t,1} - d_{i}^{t,2}\right)\right) = 0 \quad (\mu_{l}^{t,\pm})$$
(67)

• Emission Constraint

$$E - \sum_{t,f,i,m} gpc_{f,i,m}^{t} \cdot em_{m} \cdot hour^{t} - \sum_{t,f,i,m} gpi_{f,i,m}^{t} \cdot em_{m} \cdot hour^{t} \ge 0 \quad (\lambda) \quad (68)$$

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Complementarity Conditions Form of the Reference Case

• Generators' conditions

This model is similar (but not identical) to the generators' one with fixed capacity $\label{eq:generators}$

$$0 \leq -\boldsymbol{\rho}_i^t + \eta_{f,i}^t \perp \boldsymbol{g}_{f,i}^t \geq 0 \tag{69}$$

$$0 \leq cost_{f,i,m} + em_m \cdot \lambda + \nu_{f,i,m}^t - \eta_{f,i}^t \perp gp_{f,i,m}^t \geq 0$$
(70)

$$0 \leq cost_{f,i,m} + em_m \cdot \lambda + \nu c_{f,i,m}^t - \eta_{f,i}^t \perp gpc_{f,i,m}^t \geq 0$$
(71)

$$0 \leq fuel_{f,i,m} + em_m \cdot \lambda + \nu i_{f,i,m}^t - \eta_{f,i}^t \bot gpi_{f,i,m}^t \geq 0$$
(72)

$$0 \leq Cap_{f,i,m} - gpc_{f,i,m}^t \perp \nu c_{f,i,m}^t \geq 0$$
(73)

$$0 \leq investment_{f,i,m} - gpi_{f,i,m}^{t} \perp \nu i_{f,i,m}^{t} \geq 0$$
(74)

$$0 \leq \sum_{m} gpc_{f,i,m}^{t} + \sum_{m} gpi_{f,i,m}^{t} - g_{f,i}^{t} \perp \eta_{f,i}^{t} \geq 0$$
(75)

$$0 \leq FC_hour_{f,i,m} - \sum_{t} \nu i_{f,i,m}^{t} \cdot proportion^{t} \bot \text{ investment}_{f,i,m} \geq 0$$
(76)

Complementarity Conditions Form of the Reference Case

• Industry and Households' conditions (as in the former reference model)

$$0 \le p_i^s - \alpha_i - a_i^{s,1} + b_i^{s,1} \cdot d_i^{s,1} \cdot \perp d_i^{s,1} \ge 0$$
(77)

$$0 \le p_i^w + \alpha_i - a_i^{w,1} + b_i^{w,1} \cdot d_i^{w,1} \cdot \perp d_i^{w,1} \ge 0$$
(78)

$$0 \le d_i^{s,1} - d_i^{w,1} \perp \alpha_i \ge 0 \tag{79}$$

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$$0 \le p_i^t - a_i^{t,2} + b_i^{t,2} \cdot d_i^{t,2} \perp d_i^{t,2} \ge 0$$
(80)

Complementarity Conditions Form of the Reference Model

Market balance equilibrium (as in the former reference model)

$$0 \le \sum_{f,i} g_{f,i}^{t} - \sum_{i} d_{i}^{t,1} - \sum_{i} d_{i}^{t,2} \bot \ phub^{t} \ge 0$$
(81)

• Electricity prices (as in the former reference model)

$$0 \le p_{i}^{t} - phub^{t} - \sum_{m} (-\mu_{l}^{t,+} + \mu_{l}^{t,-}) \cdot PTDF_{l,i} \perp p_{i}^{t} \ge 0$$
(82)

• Transmission constraints (as in the former reference model)

$$0 \leq Linecap_{l} \mp (\sum_{i} PTDF_{l,i} \cdot (\sum_{f} g_{f,i}^{t} - d_{i}^{t,1} - d_{i}^{t,2})) \perp \mu_{l}^{t,\pm} \geq 0$$
(83)

• Emission constraint (similar, but not identical to the former reference model)

$$0 \leq E - \sum_{t,f,i,m} gc_{f,i,m}^{t} \cdot em_{m} \cdot hour_{i}^{t} - \sum_{t,f,i,m} gi_{f,i,m}^{t} \cdot em_{m} \cdot hour_{i}^{t} \perp \lambda \geq 0$$
(84)

Single Investment Case I

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Single Average Cost Case Model

Single Average Cost Price Formulation

1. Average production cost (*pprod*¹)

$$pprod^{1} = \frac{\left(\sum_{f,i,m} (gpc_{f,i,m}^{1} \cdot (cost_{f,i,m} + em_{m} \cdot \lambda) \cdot 8760)\right)}{\sum_{i} d_{i}^{1} \cdot 8760} + \frac{\left(\sum_{f,i,m} (gpi_{f,i,m}^{1} \cdot (fuel_{f,i,m} + em_{m} \cdot \lambda) \cdot 8760)\right)}{\sum_{i} d_{i}^{1} \cdot 8760} + \frac{\sum_{f,i,m} FC_annual_{f,i,m} \cdot G_{f,i,m}^{1}}{\sum_{i} d_{i}^{1} \cdot 8760} + \frac{\sum_{f,i,m} FC_annual_{f,i,m} \cdot investment_{f,i,m}^{1}}{\sum_{i} d_{i}^{1} \cdot 8760}$$

2. Average transmission cost (ptrans¹) $ptrans^{1} = \frac{\left(\sum_{l,i} PTDF_{l,i} \cdot \left(\sum_{f} g_{f,i}^{1} - d_{i}^{1}\right) \cdot 8760 \cdot \sum_{t} \left(\left(-\mu_{l}^{t,+} + \mu_{l}^{t,-}\right) \cdot proportion^{t}\right)\right)}{\sum_{i} d_{i}^{1} \cdot 8760}$

Single Average Cost Case Model

Electricity companies' maximization problem (1)

i.m

Each electricity generating company f maximizes its profit:

$$max. \ pprod^{1} \cdot \sum_{i} g_{f,i}^{1} \cdot 8760 + \sum_{t,i} p_{i}^{t,2} \cdot g_{f,i}^{t,2} \cdot hour^{t}$$
(85)
$$-\sum_{i,m} cost_{f,i,m} \cdot gpc_{f,i,m}^{1} \cdot 8760 - \sum_{i,m} fuel_{f,i,m} \cdot gpi_{f,i,m}^{1} \cdot 8760$$

$$-\sum_{t,i,m} cost_{f,i,m} \cdot gpc_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot hour^{t} - \sum_{t,i,m} fuel_{f,i,m} \cdot gpi_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot hour^{t}$$

$$+\lambda \cdot (NAP_{f} - \sum_{i,m} gpc_{f,i,m}^{1} \cdot em_{m} \cdot 8760 - \sum_{i,m} gpi_{f,i,m}^{1} \cdot em_{m} \cdot 8760$$

$$-\sum_{t,i,m} gpc_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot em_{m} \cdot hour^{t} - \sum_{t,i,m} gpi_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot em_{m} \cdot hour^{t})$$

$$-\sum FC_{-annual_{f,i,m}} \cdot investment_{f,i,m}^{1} - \sum FC_{-annual_{f,i,m}} \cdot investment_{f,i,m}^{2}$$

i.m

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Single Average Cost Case Model

Electricity companies' maximization problem (2)

subject to:

$$\sum_{m} gpc_{f,i,m}^{1} + \sum_{m} gpi_{f,i,m}^{1} - g_{f,i}^{1} \ge 0 \quad (\eta_{f,i}^{1})$$
(86)

$$\sum_{m} gpc_{f,i,m}^{t,2} + \sum_{m} gpi_{f,i,m}^{t,2} - g_{f,i}^{t,2} \ge 0 \quad (\eta_{f,i}^{t,2})$$
(87)

$$G_{f,i,m}^{1} - gpc_{f,i,m}^{1} \ge 0 \quad (\nu c_{f,i,m}^{1})$$
(88)

investment¹_{f,i,m} -
$$gpi^{1}_{f,i,m} \ge 0$$
 ($\nu i^{1}_{f,i,m}$) (89)

$$G_{f,i,m}^2 - g p_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \ge 0 \quad (\nu c_{f,i,m}^{t,2})$$
(90)

$$investment_{f,i,m}^{2} - gpi_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \ge 0 \quad (\nu i_{f,i,m}^{t,2})$$
(91)

$$Cap_{f,i,m} - G_{f,i,m}^1 - G_{f,i,m}^2 \ge 0 \quad (\nu_{f,i,m})$$
(92)

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Single Average Cost Case Model

Consumers' surplus maximization problem

• Industrial consumers

max. 8760
$$\cdot \int_0^{d_i^1} P_i^1(\epsilon) \cdot d\epsilon - p^1 \cdot d_i^1 \cdot 8760$$
 (93)

Small consumers

max.
$$hour^{t} \cdot \int_{0}^{d_{i}^{t,2}} P_{i}^{t,2}(\epsilon) \cdot d\epsilon - hour^{t} \cdot p_{i}^{t,2} \cdot d_{i}^{t,2}$$
 (94)

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Single Average Cost Case Model Global Constraints (1)

Market Balance for Small Consumers

$$\sum_{f,i} g_{f,i}^{t,2} - \sum_{i} d_{i}^{t,2} = 0 \quad (phub^{t,2})$$
(95)

Market Balance for Industrial Consumers

$$\sum_{f,i} g_{f,i}^{1} - \sum_{i} d_{i}^{1} = 0 \quad (\beta^{1})$$
(96)

• Electricity Price for Small Consumers

$$p_{i}^{t,2} = phub^{t,2} + \left(\sum_{l} \left(-\mu_{l}^{t,+} + \mu_{l}^{t,-}\right) \cdot PTDF_{l,i}\right) \qquad (p_{i}^{t,2})$$
(97)

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Single Average Cost Case Model Global Constraints (2)

• Transmission Constraints

$$Linecap_{l} \mp \left(\sum_{i} PTDF_{l,i} \cdot \left(\sum_{f} g_{f,i}^{1} + \sum_{f} g_{f,i}^{t,2} - d_{i}^{1} - d_{i}^{t,2}\right)\right) \ge 0 \quad (\mu_{l}^{t,\pm}) \quad (98)$$

• Emission Constraint

$$E - \left(\sum_{f,i,m} em_m \cdot gpc_{f,i,m}^1 \cdot 8760 + \sum_{f,i,m} em_m \cdot gpi_{f,i,m}^1 \cdot 8760 + \right)$$

$$+ \sum_{t,f,i,m} em_m \cdot gpc_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot hour^t + \sum_{t,f,i,m} em_m \cdot gpi_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot hour^t \geq 0 \quad (\lambda)$$

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Complementarity Conditions Form of the Single Case I Small Consumers (1)

• Small consumers

$$0 \le \eta_{f,i}^{t,2} - p_i^{t,2} \perp g_{f,i}^{t,2} \ge 0$$
(100)

$$0 \leq cost_{f,i,m} + \lambda \cdot em_m + \nu c_{f,i,m}^{t,2} - \eta_{f,i}^{t,2} \perp gpc_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \geq 0$$
(101)

$$0 \le fuel_{f,i,m} + \lambda \cdot em_m + \nu i_{f,i,m}^{t,2} - \eta_{f,i}^{t,2} \perp gpi_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \ge 0$$
(102)

$$0 \leq \sum_{m} gpc_{f,i,m}^{t,2} + \sum_{m} gpi_{f,i,m}^{t,2} - g_{f,i}^{t,2} \perp \eta_{f,i}^{t,2} \geq 0$$
(103)

$$0 \le G_{f,i,m}^2 - gpc_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \perp \nu c_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \ge 0$$
(104)

$$0 \le investment_{f,i,m}^2 - gpi_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \perp \nu i_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \ge 0$$
(105)

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Complementarity Conditions Form of the Single Case I Small Consumers (2)

$$0 \le \sum_{f,i} g_{f,i}^{t,2} - \sum_{i} d_{i}^{t,2} \perp phub^{t,2} \ge 0$$
 (106)

$$0 \le p_i^{t,2} - a_i^{t,2} + b_i^{t,2} \cdot d_i^{t,2} \perp d_i^{t,2} \ge 0$$
(107)

$$0 \le p_i^{t,2} - phub^{t,2} - (\sum_{l} (-\mu_l^{t,+} + \mu_l^{t,-}) \cdot PTDF_{l,i}) \perp p_i^{t,2} \ge 0$$
(108)

$$0 \leq v_{f,i,m} - \sum_{t} v c_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot proportion^{t} \perp G_{f,i,m}^{2} \geq 0$$
(109)

$$0 \leq FC_hour_{f,i,m} - \sum_{t} \nu i_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot proportion^{t} \bot \text{ investment}_{f,i,m}^{2} \geq 0$$
 (110)

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Complementarity Conditions Form of the Single Case I $_{\mbox{\sc ndustrial Consumers}\ (1)}$

• Industrial consumers

$$0 \le \eta_{f,i}^{1} - \beta^{1} - (\sum_{t,l} \text{ proportion}^{t} \cdot (-\mu_{l}^{t,+} + \mu_{l}^{t,-}) \cdot \text{PTDF}_{l,i}) \perp g_{f,i}^{1} \ge 0 \quad (111)$$

$$0 \leq cost_{f,i,m} + \lambda \cdot em_m + \nu c_{f,i,m}^1 - \eta_{f,i}^1 \perp gpc_{f,i,m}^1 \geq 0$$
(112)

$$0 \leq fuel_{f,i,m} + \lambda \cdot em_m + \nu i_{f,i,m}^1 - \eta_{f,i}^1 \perp gp i_{f,i,m}^1 \geq 0$$
(113)

$$0 \leq \sum_{m} gpc_{f,i,m}^{1} + \sum_{m} gpi_{f,i,m}^{1} - g_{f,i}^{1} \perp \eta_{f,i}^{1} \geq 0$$
(114)

$$0 \le G_{f,i,m}^1 - gpc_{f,i,m}^1 \perp \nu c_{f,i,m}^1 \ge 0$$
(115)

$$0 \leq investment_{f,i,m}^{1} - gpi_{f,i,m}^{1} \perp \nu i_{f,i,m}^{1} \geq 0$$
(116)

$$0 \le \sum_{f,i} g_{f,i}^{1} - \sum_{i} d_{i}^{1} \perp \beta^{1} \ge 0$$
(117)

$$0 \leq p^{1} - a_{i}^{1} + b_{i}^{1} \cdot d_{i}^{1} \perp d_{i}^{1} \geq 0$$

$$(118)$$

$$(118)$$

Complementarity Conditions Form of the Single Case I Industrial Consumers (2)

$$0 \leq pprod^{1} - \frac{\left(\sum_{f,i,m} (gpc_{f,i,m}^{t,1} \cdot (cost_{f,i,m} + em_{m} \cdot \lambda) \cdot 8760)\right)}{\sum_{i} d_{i}^{1} \cdot 8760}$$
(119)
$$- \frac{\left(\sum_{f,i,m} (gpi_{f,i,m}^{1} \cdot (fuel_{f,i,m} + em_{m} \cdot \lambda) \cdot 8760)\right)}{\sum_{i} d_{i}^{1} \cdot 8760}$$
$$- \frac{\sum_{f,i,m} FC_{-annual_{f,i,m}} \cdot G_{f,i,m}^{1}}{\sum_{i} d_{i}^{1} \cdot 8760}$$
$$- \frac{\sum_{f,i,m} FC_{-annual_{f,i,m}} \cdot investment_{f,i,m}^{1}}{\sum_{i} d_{i}^{1} \cdot 8760} \perp pprod^{1} \geq 0$$

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Complementarity Conditions Form of the Single Case I Industrial Consumers (3)

$$0 \leq ptrans^{1} - \frac{\left(\sum_{l,i} PTDF_{l,i} \cdot inj_{i} \cdot 8760 \cdot \left(-\mu_{l}^{t,+} + \mu_{l}^{t,-}\right) \cdot proportion^{t}\right)}{\sum_{i} d_{i}^{1} \cdot 8760} \perp ptrans^{1} \geq 0$$
(120)

$$0 \le inj_i - \sum_{f} g_{f,i}^1 + d_i^1 \bot inj_i^1 \ge 0$$
 (121)

$$0 \le p^1 - pprod^1 - ptrans^1 \perp p^1 \ge 0$$
 (122)

$$0 \leq FC_hour_{f,i,m} - \nu i_{f,i,m}^{1} \bot \text{ investment}_{f,i,m}^{1} \geq 0$$
(123)

$$0 \le v_{f,i,m} - vc_{f,i,m}^{1} \perp G_{f,i,m}^{1} \ge 0$$
(124)

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Complementarity Conditions Form of the Single Case I Global Constraints (2)

• Transmission Constraints

$$0 \leq Linecap_{l} \mp (\sum_{i} PTDF_{l,i} \cdot (\sum_{f} g_{f,i}^{1} + \sum_{f} g_{f,i}^{t,2} - d_{i}^{1} - d_{i}^{t,2})) \perp \mu_{l}^{t,+} \geq 0$$
(125)

Global Capacity Constraint

$$0 \le Cap_{f,i,m} - G_{f,i,m}^1 - G_{f,i,m}^2 \bot \nu_{f,i,m} \ge 0$$
(126)

• Emission Constraint

$$0 \leq E - \left(\sum_{f,i,m} em_m \cdot gpc_{f,i,m}^1 \cdot 8760 + \sum_{f,i,m} em_m \cdot gpi_{f,i,m}^1 \cdot 8760 + \right)$$

$$\sum_{t,f,i,m} em_m \cdot gpc_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot hour^t + \sum_{t,f,i,m} em_m \cdot gpi_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot hour^t) \perp \lambda \geq 0$$
(127)

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Nodal Investment Case I

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Nodal Average Cost Case Model Nodal Average Cost Price Formulation

The nodal version of the investment Case I is similar to the correspondent single average cost case. We present only the modified formulas:

• Nodal Average Cost Price

$$p_{i}^{1} = \frac{\left(\sum_{f,m} (gpc_{f,i,m}^{1} \cdot (cost_{f,i,m} + em_{m} \cdot \lambda) \cdot 8760)\right)}{d_{i}^{1} \cdot 8760} + \frac{\left(\sum_{f,m} (gpi_{f,i,m}^{1} \cdot (fuel_{f,i,m} + em_{m} \cdot \lambda) \cdot 8760)\right)}{d_{i}^{1} \cdot 8760} + \frac{\sum_{f,m} FC_{f,m,i} \cdot investment_{f,i,m}^{1}}{d_{i}^{1} \cdot 8760} + \frac{\sum_{f,m} FC_{f,m,i} \cdot G_{f,i,m}^{1}}{d_{i}^{1} \cdot 8760}$$

Nodal Average Cost Case Model Nodal Average Cost Price Model

> It is similar to the single average cost pricing model already presented. One has a nodal balance instead of a market balance for the industrial sector as stated by the following equation:

$$\sum_{f} g_{f,i}^{1} - d_{i}^{1} = 0 \quad (\beta_{i}^{1})$$
(128)

Single Investment Case II

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Single Average Cost Case Model Definitions

Specifications

- Industries may buy electricity from power companies paying a marginal price gen.p_i¹ in order to cover an amount d_i¹ of their demand;
- Industries may self-produce electricity at the average cost *ind.p*¹ in order to satisfy the proportion *ind.d*¹ of their demand;
- All variable defining the industrial consumers' optimization problem have the suffix "ind";
- The set "*ii*" used for the variables of industrial problem indicates the node where industries invest in new capacity

Single Average Cost Case Model

Electricity companies' maximization problem

Each electricity generating company f maximizes its profit:

$$\max \sum_{i} gen.p_{i}^{1} \cdot g_{f,i}^{1} \cdot 8760 + \sum_{t,i} p_{i}^{t,2} \cdot g_{f,i}^{t,2} \cdot hour^{t}$$
(129)
$$-\sum_{i,m} cost_{f,i,m} \cdot gpc_{f,i,m}^{1} \cdot 8760 - \sum_{i,m} fuel_{f,i,m} \cdot gpl_{f,i,m}^{1} \cdot 8760$$

$$-\sum_{t,i,m} cost_{f,i,m} \cdot gpc_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot hour^{t} - \sum_{t,i,m} fuel_{f,i,m} \cdot gpl_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot hour^{t}$$

$$+\lambda \cdot (NAP_{f} - \sum_{i,m} gpc_{f,i,m}^{1} \cdot em_{m} \cdot 8760 - \sum_{i,m} gpl_{f,i,m}^{1} \cdot em_{m} \cdot 8760$$

$$-\sum_{t,i,m} gpc_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot em_{m} \cdot hour^{t} - \sum_{t,i,m} gpl_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot em_{m} \cdot 8760$$

$$-\sum_{t,i,m} gpc_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot em_{m} \cdot hour^{t} - \sum_{t,i,m} gpl_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot em_{m} \cdot hour^{t})$$

$$-\sum_{i,m} FC_{-annual_{f,i,m}} \cdot investment_{f,i,m}^{1} - \sum_{i,m} FC_{-annual_{f,i,m}} \cdot investment_{f,i,m}^{2} = 1000$$

Single Average Cost Case Model

Electricity companies' maximization problem (2)

subject to:

$$\sum_{m} gpc_{f,i,m}^{1} + \sum_{m} gpi_{f,i,m}^{1} - g_{f,i}^{1} \ge 0 \quad (\eta_{f,i}^{1})$$
(130)

$$\sum_{m} gpc_{f,i,m}^{t,2} + \sum_{m} gpi_{f,i,m}^{t,2} - g_{f,i}^{t,2} \ge 0 \quad (\eta_{f,i}^{t,2})$$
(131)

$$G_{f,i,m}^{1} - gpc_{f,i,m}^{1} \ge 0 \quad (\nu c_{f,i,m}^{1})$$
(132)

investment¹_{f,i,m} -
$$gpi^{1}_{f,i,m} \ge 0$$
 ($\nu i^{1}_{f,i,m}$) (133)

$$G_{f,i,m}^2 - g p_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \ge 0 \quad (\nu c_{f,i,m}^{t,2})$$
(134)

$$investment_{f,i,m}^{2} - gpi_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \ge 0 \quad (\nu i_{f,i,m}^{t,2})$$
(135)

$$Cap_{f,i,m} - G_{f,i,m}^1 - G_{f,i,m}^2 \ge 0 \quad (\nu_{f,i,m})$$
(136)

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Single Average Cost Case Model Single Average Cost Price

This is the single average cost price faced by industries when they self-produce electricity

• Average Production Cost

$$ind.pprod^{1} = \frac{8760 \cdot \left(\sum_{i,ii,m} (ind.gp_{i,ii,m}^{1} \cdot (fuel_{i,ii,m} + em_{m} \cdot \lambda))\right)}{\sum_{i} ind.d_{i}^{1} \cdot 8760} + \frac{\sum_{i,ii,m} FC_annual_{i,ii,m} \cdot ind.investment_{i,ii,m}^{1}}{\sum_{i} ind.d_{i}^{1} \cdot 8760}$$

Average Transmission Cost

 $ind.ptrans^{1} = \frac{\left(\sum_{l,ii} PTDF_{l,ii} \cdot (ind.inj_{ii} \cdot 8760) \cdot \left(\sum_{t} (-\mu_{l}^{t,+} + \mu_{l}^{t,-}) \cdot proportion^{t})\right)\right)}{\sum_{i} ind.d_{i}^{1} \cdot 8760}$

Single Average Cost Price

 $ind.p^1 = ind.pprod^1 + ind.ptrans^1$

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Single Average Cost Case Model

Industrial consumers' optimization problem

• Industrial consumers' optimization problem

$$max. \sum_{t,ii} 8760 \cdot ind.pprod^{1} \cdot ind.g_{i,ii}^{1} - \sum_{ii,m} fuel_{i,ii,m} \cdot ind.g_{i,ii,m}^{1} \cdot 8760 \quad (137)$$
$$- \sum_{ii,m} ind.g_{i,ii,m}^{1} \cdot em_{m} \cdot \lambda \cdot 8760 - \sum_{ii,m} FC_annual_{i,ii,m} \cdot ind.investment_{i,ii,m}^{1}$$

subject to:

$$\sum_{m} ind.gp_{i,ii,m}^{1} - ind.g_{i,ii}^{1} \ge 0 \quad (ind.\eta_{i,ii}^{1})$$
(138)

$$\textit{ind.investment}_{i,ii,m}^{1} - \textit{ind.gp}_{i,ii,m}^{1} \ge 0 \quad (\textit{ind.}\nu_{i,ii,m}^{1}) \tag{139}$$

Single Average Cost Case Model

Consumers' surplus optimization problem (1)

• Small consumers:

max.
$$hour^{t} \cdot \int_{0}^{d_{i}^{t,2}} P_{i}^{t,2}(\epsilon) \cdot d\epsilon - hour^{t} \cdot p_{i}^{t,2} \cdot d_{i}^{t,2}$$
 (140)

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Single Average Cost Case Model

Consumers' surplus optimization problem (2)

• Industrial consumers:

max. 8760
$$\cdot \int_0^{tot.d_i^1} P_i^1(\epsilon) \cdot d\epsilon - 8760 \cdot tot.p_i^1 \cdot tot.d_i^1 \quad (tot.d_i^1) \quad (141)$$

where

$$tot.d_i^1 = ind.d_i^1 + d_i^1$$
 (142)

$$tot.p_i^1 - ind.p^1 = 0$$
 (143)

$$tot.p_i^1 - gen.p_i^1 = 0$$
 (144)

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Single Average Cost Case Model Global constraints (1)

Market balance equilibrium for small consumers (supplied by power producers)

$$\sum_{f,i} g_{f,i}^{t,2} - \sum_{i} d_{i}^{t,2} = 0 \quad (phub^{t,2})$$
(145)

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Small consumers' electricity prices (set by power producers)

$$p_{i}^{t,2} = phub^{t,2} + \left(\sum_{l} (-\mu_{l}^{t,+} + \mu_{l}^{t,-}) \cdot PTDF_{l,i}\right)$$
(146)

Single Average Cost Case Model Global constraints (3)

Market balance equilibrium for industrial consumers (supplied by power producers)

$$\sum_{f,i} g_{f,i}^{1} - \sum_{i} d_{i}^{1} = 0 \quad (gen.phub^{1})$$
(147)

• Industrial consumers' electricity prices (set by power producers)

$$gen.p_i^1 = gen.phub^1 + \left(\sum_{t,l} proportion^t \cdot \left(-\mu_l^{t,+} + \mu_l^{t,-}\right) \cdot PTDF_{l,i}\right)$$
(148)

• Market balance equilibrium (industrial self-production)

$$\sum_{ii,i} ind.g_{ii,i}^{1} - \sum_{i} ind.d_{i}^{1} = 0 \quad (ind.\beta^{1})$$
(149)

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Single Average Cost Case Model Global constraints (3)

• Transmission constraints

$$Linecap_{l} \mp \left(\sum_{i} PTDF_{l,i} \cdot \left(\sum_{f} g_{f,i}^{1} + \sum_{ii} ind.g_{ii,i}^{1} + \sum_{f} g_{f,i}^{t,2} + -d_{i}^{1} - ind.d_{i}^{1} - d_{i}^{t,2}\right)\right) \ge 0 \quad (\mu_{l}^{t,\pm})$$
(150)

Emission constraint

$$E - \left(\sum_{f,i,m} em_{m} \cdot gpc_{f,i,m}^{1} \cdot 8760 + \sum_{f,i,m} em_{m} \cdot gpi_{f,i,m}^{1} \cdot 8760 + \right)$$

$$\sum_{t,f,i,m} em_{m} \cdot gpc_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot hour^{t} + \sum_{t,f,i,m} em_{m} \cdot gpi_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot hour^{t} + \sum_{i,i,m} em_{m} \cdot ind.gp_{i,ii,m}^{1} \cdot 8760 \geq 0 \quad (\lambda)$$

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Complementarity Conditions Form of the Single Case II Specification

Specification

- Complementarity conditions of small consumers' problem in investment Case I and II are identical. We omit to report them;
- The same reasoning holds for power companies. One has just to replace the average cost based cost with the marginal one;
- We focus our attention on industrial consumers' problem and global constraints

Complementarity Conditions Form of the Single Case II

Industrial Consumers' Optimization Problem (1)

Industries self-produce electricity

$$0 \leq -ind.\beta^{1} - (\sum_{t,l} (-\mu_{l}^{t,+} + \mu_{l}^{t,-}) \cdot \textit{proportion}_{t} \cdot \textit{PTDF}_{l,i}) + ind.\eta_{l,ii}^{1} \perp \textit{ind.g}_{i,ii}^{1} \geq 0$$

$$0 \leq fuel_{i,ii,m} + \lambda \cdot em_m + ind.\nu_{i,ii,m}^1 - ind.\eta_{i,ii}^1 \perp ind.gp_{i,ii,m}^1 \geq 0$$
(153)

$$0 \leq \textit{ind.investment}_{i,ii,m}^{1} - \textit{ind.gp}_{i,ii,m}^{1} \perp \textit{ind.}\nu_{i,ii,m}^{1} \geq 0 \tag{154}$$

$$0 \leq \sum_{m} \textit{ind.gp}_{i,ii,m}^1 - \textit{ind.g}_{i,ii}^1 \perp \textit{ind.}\eta_{i,ii}^1 \geq 0 \tag{155}$$

$$0 \leq \sum_{ii} ind.g_{i,ii}^{1} - \sum_{i} ind.d_{i}^{1} \perp ind.\beta^{1} \geq 0$$
(156)

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Complementarity Conditions Form of the Single Case II

Industrial Consumers' Optimization Problem (2)

• Single Average Cost Price

$$0 \leq ind.pprod^{1} - \frac{\left(\sum_{i,ii,m} (8760 \cdot ind.gp_{i,ii,m}^{1} \cdot (fuel_{i,ii,m} + em_{m} \cdot \lambda))\right)}{\sum_{i} ind.d_{i}^{1} \cdot 8760} \quad (157)$$

$$- \frac{\sum_{m} FC_annual_{i,ii,m} \cdot ind.investment_{i,ii,m}^{1})}{ind.d_{i}^{1} \cdot 8760} \perp \sum_{i} ind.pprod^{1} \geq 0$$

$$0 \leq ind.ptrans^{1} - \frac{\left(\sum_{t,l,ii} (-\mu_{l}^{t,+} + \mu_{l}^{t,-}) \cdot proportion^{t} \cdot PTDF_{l,ii} \cdot ind.inj_{ii}^{1}\right) \cdot 8760}{\sum_{i} ind.d_{i}^{1} \cdot 8760} \quad (158)$$

$$\perp ind.ptrans^{1} \geq 0 \quad (158)$$

$$\perp ind.ptrans^{1} \geq 0$$

$$0 \leq ind.p^{1} - ind.pprod^{1} - ind.ptrans^{1} \perp ind.p_{i}^{1} \geq 0$$

$$ind.inj_{ii}^{1} = \sum_{i} ind.g_{i,ii}^{1} - ind.d_{ii}^{1} \quad (159)$$

$$0 \leq FC_hour_i, ii, m - ind.\nu_{i,ii,m}^{1} \perp ind.investment_{i,ii,m}^{1} \geq 0$$

$$(160)$$

Complementarity Conditions Form of the Single Case II Industrial Demand

• Global Industrial Demand

$$0 \leq tot.d_i^1 - ind.d_i^1 - d_i^1 \perp tot.p_i^1 \geq 0$$
(161)

$$0 \leq tot.p_i^1 - a_i^1 + b_i^1 \cdot tot.d_i^1 \perp tot.d_i^1 \geq 0$$

$$(162)$$

$$0 \leq tot.p_i^1 - ind.p^1 \perp ind.d_i^1 \geq 0$$
(163)

$$0 \leq tot.p_i^1 - p_i^1 \perp d_i^1 \geq 0 \tag{164}$$

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Complementarity Conditions Form of the Single Case II Global Constraints

• Transmission Constraints

$$0 \leq Linecap_{l} \mp \left(\sum_{i} PTDF_{l,i} \cdot \left(\sum_{f} g_{f,i}^{1} + \sum_{ii} ind.g_{i,ii}^{1} + \sum_{f} g_{f,i}^{t,2} - d_{i}^{1} - ind.d_{i}^{1} - d_{i}^{t,2}\right) \perp \mu_{l}^{t,\pm} \geq 0$$
(165)

• Emission Constraint

$$0 \leq E - \left(\sum_{f,i,m} em_{m} \cdot gpc_{f,i,m}^{1} \cdot 8760 + \sum_{f,i,m} em_{m} \cdot gpi_{f,i,m}^{1} \cdot 8760 + \right)$$

$$\sum_{t,f,i,m} em_{m} \cdot gpc_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot hour^{t} + \sum_{t,f,i,m} em_{m} \cdot gpi_{f,i,m}^{t,2} \cdot hour^{t} + \sum_{i,ii,m} em_{m} \cdot ind.gp_{i,ii,m}^{1} \cdot 8760 + \lambda \geq 0$$
(166)

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Nodal Investment Case II

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Nodal Average Cost Case Model Nodal Average Cost Price Formulation

This nodal average cost scenario is similar to the single investment Case II model. We show only the changed conditions:

• Nodal Average Cost Price

$$ind.p_i^1 = \frac{\left(\sum_m (ind.gp_{i,m}^1 \cdot (fuel_{i,m} + em_m \cdot \lambda))\right)}{ind.d_i^1 \cdot 8760} + \frac{\sum_m FC_annual_{i,m} \cdot ind.investment_{i,m}^1}{ind.d_i^1 \cdot 8760}$$

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Nodal Average Cost Case Model

Industrial Consumers' Optimization Problem

• Industrial consumers' optimization problem

$$max. \sum_{m} 8760 \cdot p_{i}^{1} \cdot gp_{i,m}^{1} - \sum_{m} fuel_{i,m} \cdot ind.gp_{i,m}^{1} \cdot 8760$$
(167)
$$- \sum_{m} gp_{i,m}^{1} \cdot em_{m} \cdot 8760 - \sum_{ii,m} FC_annual_{i,m} \cdot ind.investment_{i,m}^{1}$$

subject to:

$$ind.investment_{i,m}^1 - ind.gp_{i,m}^1 \ge 0 \quad (ind.\nu_{i,m}^1)$$
 (168)

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Nodal Average Cost Case Model

Consumers' surplus optimization problem

• Industrial consumers:

max. 8760
$$\cdot \int_0^{tot.d_i^1} P_i^1(\epsilon) \cdot d\epsilon - 8760 \cdot tot.p_i^1 \cdot tot.d_i^1 \quad (tot.d_i^1) \quad (169)$$

where

$$tot.d_{i}^{1} = ind.d_{i}^{1} + d_{i}^{1}$$
(170)

$$tot.p_i^1 - ind.p_i^1 = 0$$
 (171)

$$tot.p_{i}^{1} - gen.p_{i}^{1} = 0 (172)$$

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Nodal Average Cost Case Model Global Constraints

• Market balance equilibrium (industrial self-production)

$$\sum_{m} ind.gp_{i,m}^{1} - ind.d_{i}^{1} = 0 \quad (ind.\beta_{i}^{1})$$
(173)

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• Transmission constraints

$$Linecap_{l} \mp \left(\sum_{i} PTDF_{l,i} \cdot \left(\sum_{f} g_{f,i}^{1} + \sum_{f} g_{f,i}^{t,2} - d_{i}^{t,1} - d_{i}^{t,2}\right)\right) \ge 0 \quad (\mu_{l}^{t,\pm})$$
(174)