

Experts, Activists, and Democratic Politics: Are Electorates Self-Educating?

This book addresses opinion leadership in democratic politics as a process whereby individuals send and receive information through their informally based networks of political communication. The analyses are based on a series of small group experiments, conducted by the authors, which build on accumulated evidence from more than seventy years of survey data regarding political communication among interdependent actors. The various experimental designs provide an opportunity to assess the nature of the communication process, both in terms of increasing citizen expertise as well as in terms of communicating political biases.

T.K. Ahn is a professor of political science at Seoul National University. His work has been published in a number of journals, including the *American Journal of Political Science*, the *Journal of Politics*, *Political Psychology*, the *Journal of Public Economics*, the *Journal of Public Economic Theory*, and the *Journal of Economy Psychology*. He has received the Paul Lazarsfeld Award from the American Political Science Association for the best paper on political communication. He received his PhD from Indiana University, Bloomington.

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> "Against the onslaught of declarations that modern political life is isolated and anomic, this sparkling analysis of networks and experiments shows how networks of ideas and individuals connect our political activities. Ahn, Huckfeldt, and Ryan weave together network surveys and small group experiments to show how political ideas may spread in daily life as well as what structures enhance or restrict that spread. In the end, they present a very compelling vision of modern political life that encompasses politics in the current century, as well as the last half of the twentieth."

> > - Michael Ward, Duke University

"This book reveals the ways in which pundits, partisans, and political activists are central to forming public opinion and to the resilience of democracy. These biased opinion leaders garner expertise in issues that interest them, and their views are channeled to citizens with little incentive to gather their own information. Anyone seeking to explain public opinion, opinion leaders, partisan bias, political activism, or political communication is going to have to tackle this book. Disputing its findings will be a herculean task. The authors marshal observational data, laboratory experiments, agent-based models, network analysis, and statistical simulations to support their central theoretical claims. The book is an excellent model of social science, using diverse methods to answer well-defined questions."

- Rick K. Wilson, Rice University



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Experts, Activists, and Democratic Politics

Are Electorates Self-Educating?

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Dedicated to
John Sprague
and
the memory of
Elinor Ostrom





Contents

List of figures	page xiii
List of tables	xiv
Origins and acknowledgments	xvi
Experts, activists, and self-educating electorates Ahn, Huckfeldt, and Ryan	I
High hopes and realistic concerns	3
Political expertise in the corridors of everyday life	5
The civic capacity of voters and electorates	6
Expertise, knowledge, and self-educating electorates	9
Contextual constraints on network construction	10
Consequences of network diversity	10
Limitations on influence	II
Individual, aggregate, and dynamic implications	Ι2
Expertise, motivation, and communication	14
Sources and consequences of motivation	15
Implications and conclusion	18
2 The imperatives of interdependence	20
Ahn, Huckfeldt, and Ryan	
Moving beyond individual observations	22
Opinion leadership, interdependence, and density depende	nce 23
Interdependence and structures of indeterminacy	26
Networks at the intersection between demand and supply	27
Interdependence and political complexity	29
Observational strategies for studying interdependent actor	s 31
Path-breaking contributions	32
Network surveys	33
A roadmap for the analysis	35
The small group experiments	37
	ix



X		Contents
	An outline of the experimental studies	39
	Summary and implications	40
3	Experts, activists, and the social communication of political	
	expertise	44
	Ahn, Huckfeldt, Mendez, Osborn, and Ryan	
	I. Recognizing expertise: do citizens know it when they see it?	45
	II. Discussion as delegation: aggregate implications	63
4	Unanimity, discord, and opportunities for opinion leadership <i>Ahn</i> , <i>Huckfeldt</i> , <i>Mendez</i> , <i>and Ryan</i>	68
	I. The role of opinion variance within communication networks	69
	II. Opinion leaders and controversy – moths and flames	77
5	Informational asymmetries among voters Ahn, Huckfeldt, and Ryan	90
	Social communication and information costs	91
	Sources and consequences of uncertainty	92
	Experimental design	93
	The underlying spatial voting model	94
	Obtaining information on candidates' positions	95
	Summary of procedure	97
	The cost and value of individually obtained information	98
	Criteria for selecting informants	100
	The reliability of expert advice	102
	Coping with advice from suspect sources Cross-pressures and the implications for correct voting	103 108
	The experiment and the real world	112
	Implications and conclusions	112
	Chapter 5 appendix	115
	1. Description of subjects	115
	2. Evidence regarding strategy evolution during the experiment	116
	3. Instructions to participants	117
6	Expertise and bias in political communication networks	120
	Ahn, Huckfeldt, Mayer, and Ryan	
	Experts, bias, and opinion leaders	121
	The costs of communication	122
	The experimental framework	124
	The experimental procedure	126
	Contextual contingencies operating on political centrality Who receives the most requests for information?	130
	Non-directional centrality	130
	What are the criteria that individuals use in selecting informants?	132
	Aggregate consequences of individual choice criteria	133
	Symmetric distributions	134 136
	Asymmetric preferences	137
	Asymmetric information	137
	Patterns of communication among the agents	137
	,	-) /



Contents		xi
	Dynamical implications of contextual variation	139
	How accurate is the communicated information?	140
	Implications and conclusions	141
	Chapter 6 appendix	144
	Instructions to participants	144
	2. High-cost subjects in the agent-based model	147
	3. Patterns of change across the periods	148
7	Interdependence, communication, and calculation: costs,	·
/	benefits, and opinion leadership	153
	Ahn, Huckfeldt, and Ryan	- 5 5
	The use of analytic benchmarks	154
	The value of public signals	154
	Belief update with private signals	155
	The value of private signals	158
	Conflict of interest and incentives for strategic communication	160
	Trade off between expertise and preference similarity	162
	Incentives for cross-boundary information acquisition	164
	Implications and conclusions	168
8	Partisanship and the efficacy of social communication in	
Ü	constrained environments	169
	Ryan	109
	Dyadic social communication	170
	Moving beyond the dyad: the autoregressive influence model	171
	What does it mean to vote correctly?	172
	Research design	174
	The treatment group	174
	Global benefits	175
	Partisan payoffs	175
	Timeline of the experiment	175
	Stage 1: Private information stage	176
	Stage 2: First social information stage	177
	Stage 3: Second social information stage	178
	Stage 4: Voting and payoffs	178
	The control group	179
	What have we learned?	179
	The in-party message acceptance hypothesis (H_x)	180
	The contingent benefit for the uninformed hypothesis (H ₂)	180
	The autoregressive influence hypothesis (H_3)	180
	The between-subject results	180
	The within-subjects results	185
	Implications and conclusions	189
	Chapter 8 appendix	191
	Instructions to participants	191
9	Noise, bias, and expertise: the dynamics of becoming informed <i>Huckfeldt, Pietryka, and Reilly</i>	194



xii		Contents
	Expertise, information costs, and interdependent citizens	195
	Memory constraints on the process of becoming informed	196
	The experimental design	197
	The experimental procedure	198
	Heterogeneity and bias within networks	201
	Criteria for selecting informants	201
	Network centrality in a context of limited choice	205
	Implications for bias	206
	Information, memory decay, and autoregressive processes	206
	A simple model of the process	209
	The effect of the prior	210
	The effect of updated judgments	210
	Incoming information	210
	Estimating the model	211
	Heterogeneous information and the vote	216
	Implications and conclusions	220
	Chapter 9 appendix	223
	Instructions to participants	223
10	The complex dynamics of political communication Huckfeldt, Pietryka, and Reilly	227
	Expert citizens and higher-order communication effects	228
	A DeGroot model of social influence	229
	Estimates for the model	23I
	Long-term dynamics of political communication	233
	Information, expertise, and opinion leadership	236
	The decisive effects of slowly decaying priors	237
	Incorporating the model of memory decay	238
	The effect of the prior	238
	The effect of updated judgments	238
	Incoming information	239
	Obtaining estimates for the DeGroot model	239
	Implications and conclusions	245
ΙI	Experts, activists, and democratic prospects	248
	Ahn, Huckfeldt, and Ryan	• 10
	The role of opinion leaders	249
	The perception of expertise Interdependence and the micro-macro divide	251
	•	252
	Conflict, controversy, and opinion leadership	252
	Noise, bias, and dynamic interdependence	253
	Biased messengers and correct votes Activism and expertise in a political process	254
	The problem of wrong-headed experts	255
D	. , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , , ,	256
	ferences	258
Ina	lex of key concepts and authors	273



Figures

4.1.	The simultaneity of discussion and disagreement.	page 86
5.1.	Voting, social messages, and priors.	106
5.2.	Predicted probability of a correct vote by subject information	
	level and distance between subject and informant.	112
A6.1.	Social information exchange over time.	151
7.1.	Deriving the Bayesian posterior for the probability that	
	Candidate A holds position 1, given that a subject receives a	
	signal that Candidate A holds position -1.	157
7.2.	Truthful signals sent by informants when subject-informant	
	pairs are on the same side or different sides of the midpoint.	161
7.3.	Percent of correct votes using Bayesian elimination, votes implie	d
	by the initial estimates of candidates' positions, and the actual	
	percent of correct votes.	163
8.1.	Percentage of correct votes for control and treatment groups by	y
	information level and network partisanship.	181
8.2.	Comparing the percentage of actual correct votes to the	
	percentage of initial, implied votes that were correct.	185
9.1.	Directed graphs for typical periods in an experiment.	202
9.2.	The autoregressive influence of social information.	208
9.3.	Implications of the model.	215
9.4.	The effect of prior judgment on the probability of voting for	
	Candidate B as a function of the certainty of the final judgment	t. 220
10.1.	Directed graphs for randomly chosen rounds.	232
10.2.	Convergence to equilibrium.	243

xiii



Tables

4.1.	Effects of randomly applied network fiamle generator on	
	political composition of network.	page 82
5.1.	Absolute value of difference between prior and candidate	
	position.	99
5.2.	Requests for information within dyads.	101
5.3.	Biases in communicated messages.	103
5.4.	Subject vote by priors and socially communicated information,	
	with interactions for heuristic devices.	105
5.5.	Correct votes, subject priors, and informant messages.	109
5.6.	Correct vote by subject and informant information levels and th	ie
	distance between subject and informant.	III
A5.1.	Subject demographics and political orientations.	115
A5.2.	Mean behaviors within a round regressed on the sequence	
	number for the round, for all rounds and sessions.	116
6.1.	Experimental design.	126
6.2.	Expertise, priors, and biased messages.	129
6.3.	Centrality and expertise.	131
6.4.	Factors affecting the subjects' selection of informant.	134
6.5.	Symmetrical and asymmetrical preference and	
	information distributions across groups for agent-based	
	model.	135
6.6.	Agent-based simulations of cross-group communication for	
	low- and medium-cost subjects: group transition rates with	
	implied equilibria.	138
6.7.	Agent-based simulations of noise in cross-group communication	1,
	for low- and medium-cost subjects, in contexts with	
	asymmetrically distributed preferences.	142
A6.1.		
	for all subjects: group transition rates with implied	
	equilibria.	147

xiv



List of	f tables	XV
A6.2.	Agent-based simulations of noise in cross-group communication, for low-, medium-, and high-cost subjects, in contexts with	
A6.3.	asymmetrically distributed preferences. Replicating Table 6.2A with data split between early and late	149
	periods.	150
A6.4.	Mean number of in-group and out-group requests subjects	
	received by period.	150
7.1.	Probability of Candidate A's position, contingent on value of	
	privately purchased signals.	156
7.2.	Subject information purchases by information costs for subjects	
	in the experiments in Chapters 5 and 6.	159
7.3.	Ex ante conflict of interest probability – the probability that two	
	voters will have strictly opposite candidate preference.	161
7.4.	Determining the value of private information.	167
8.1.	Subject information levels and networks.	176
8.2.	Comparing correct votes in control and treatment groups by	
	information level and network partisanship.	184
8.3.	Bias in first messages sent about global benefits provided by	
	candidates Adams and Bates by partisanship of sender and	
	receiver.	188
9.1.	Proximate effects of experimental manipulations.	203
9.2.	Final judgments by priors and messages, with messages	
	contingent on contemporaneous judgments.	207
9.3.	Estimating the dynamic model of judgment formation.	213
9.4.	Candidate vote by prior assessment, final assessment, and	
	information purchased at the last opportunity, contingent on	
	amount of initial information purchase.	218
9.5.	Predicted probabilities of voting for Candidate B by candidate	
	propensities of prior and final judgments.	219
10.1.	Subject's final judgment regarding Candidate A at each round by	
	their initial (prior) judgment as well as the information conveyed	
	by each of their informants.	230
10.2.	Unit eigenvectors for experimental periods.	235
10.3.	Final judgment regarding candidate positions by initial prior	
	judgment, immediately previous judgment, and previous (third)	
	message received from other participants, for high-information	
	and low-information subjects.	240



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The origin and path of this project reveal the magic of serendipity. Huckfeldt taught a seminar at Indiana University in the mid-1990s on interdependence and communication among citizens – a seminar in which Ahn happened to be enrolled. In spite of Huckfeldt's best efforts at convincing him to undertake a dissertation in the area, Ahn decided instead to work with their friend and colleague, Elinor Ostrom. As a consequence, Ahn also had the opportunity to work with Jimmy Walker and Roy Gardner on the experimental analysis of strategic behavior. Ten years later, Huckfeldt happened to be giving a talk at Florida State, where Ahn was a faculty member. They began a series of discussions on translating the study of network effects on political behavior into an experimental research program. Crucially, this was during the same period that John Ryan happened to arrive as a graduate student at the University of California in Davis, where he subsequently received a doctoral dissertation improvement grant from the National Science Foundation to run a series of experiments on networks and political communication. Finally, during this same period, the project also happened to benefit from a series of related discussions and collaborations with Mayer, Mendez, Osborn, Pietryka, and Reilly – all of whom we gratefully acknowledge as the coauthors of various chapters. Viewed in the rear view mirror, this all seems like a perfectly orderly process, but retrospective judgments obscure the inherently stochastic element within all our iournevs - intellectual and otherwise!

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xvi



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xvii

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