Explaining Metropolitan Political Polarization: Political Segregation in New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles

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Abstract

This paper explores municipal-level political segregation in the Chicago, Los Angeles, and New York City metropolitan areas. Using precinct-level returns from the 2000 presidential election, it examines and compares political spatial clustering in America's three largest metropolises using both Moran's I values and spatial lag models. I discover that, under four out of five metrics, New York City is more politically segregated than Chicago and Los Angeles. I then assess whether the racial composition and institution structures of the three metropolitan areas help to explain differences in municipal political polarization. I find that institutional fragmentation appears to have greater predictive power than race for these three cases.

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1 Introduction

Metropolitan public political fragmentation, marked by sharp intra-regional electoral and policy polarization, has been an increasingly common feature of the U.S. political landscape since the 1950s and the onset of mass suburbanization. Researchers have attributed scores of problems to these regional cleavages, including inequities in municipal resources, unfettered suburban sprawl, the spatial mismatch in employment opportunities, and even municipal segregation (e.g. Rusk 1993, 1999; Bollens 1997; Orfield 1997, 2002; Pastor et al. 2000; Dreier et al. 2001; Oliver 2001; Frug 2002; Weir et al. 2005). Metropolitan polarization has had a particularly deleterious impact on blacks and Latinos, who are disproportionately clustered in the struggling urban cores disadvantaged by these divisions (Wilson 1987; Massey and Denton 1993; Suro and Singer 2002).

Given its importance in shaping the conditions of Americas metropolitan areas, we know relatively little about what drives regional polarization. While some studies take metropolitan fragmentation as a given (e.g. Peterson 1981), there is, in fact, significant variation in regional political polarization. Take, for example, the Milwaukee and St. Louis metropolitan areas. In the 2008 presidential election, 65.4 percent of voters in St. Louis central counties (including the city of St. Louis and inner suburbs) supported Barack Obama; in the metropolitan area's most exurban counties, a still substantial 50.9 percent of voters endorsed Obama, representing a gap of 14.5 percentage points between city and exurban voters. Conversely, the gap in Milwaukee—a superficially demographically and economically similar metropolitan area—was over twice as large, at 31.3 percentage points: 68.2 percent of central county voters supported Obama, compared to 36.8 percent of exurban voters. Similarly disparate central county/exurb gaps in 2008 presidential preferences were posted in places such as Grand Rapids (only a 2.8 percentage point gap), Seattle (13.3 percentage points), Baltimore (21.8 percentage points), and Charlotte (24.7 percentage points). This paper thus seeks to examine the forces underpinning such variability in metropolitan political polarization.

This paper proceeds as follows. First, I define political polarization, arguing that political segregation provides a useful measure of this phenomenon. Second, I outline my research design—including the selection of my three cases, New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles—and describe my theoretical expectations. Third, I turn to methods and data: using 2000 presidential returns from the Federal Elections Project, I produce maps, calculate Moran's I values, and estimate spatial lag models in an effort to determine which areas exhibit the highest levels of political segregation. Fourth, I use racial composition and institutional structure to preliminarily explain why New York City appears to exhibit higher levels of political segregation than Chicago and Los Angeles; I find that institutional fragmentation seems to have greater explanatory power than racial demographics for these cases.

2 Defining Metropolitan Political Polarization

For the purposes of this paper, I take metropolitan political polarization to simply mean sharp divisions in electoral and policy preferences between different regional municipal mass publics. The classic example highlighted in a wide array of regionalist literature (Orfield 1997, 2002; Pastor et al. 2000; Dreier et al. 2001; Weir et al. 2005)—and the polarization outlined in my introduction—describes urban-suburban hostility, with a left-leaning city surrounded by conservative suburbs. Increasing economic and racial heterogeneity in suburban communities (Frey 2001), however, suggest that we might begin to observe similarly stark divisions among suburban municipalities. For example, looking at the Chicago metropolitan area, the struggling town of Elgin has very different political interests than the thriving exurban community of Naperville.

It is obviously more difficult to quantify this type of political polarization; while under the first definition of polarization—which looks at differences between cities and suburbs—I can simply compare mass public preferences in urban and suburban communities, the second definition does not provide such a clear measure. One way of thinking about this second type of metropolitan political polarization is to consider it political segregation. In other words, we would regard regions in which we observe clustering by political affiliation as polarized, and consequently less apt to work together in a variety of policy arenas.

3 Research Design

In an effort to explore the causes of metropolitan political segregation, this paper examines variations in spatial clustering in the New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles metropolitan areas. These metropolises are optimal for both theoretical and methodological purposes. Theoretically, they vary along two key dimensions which I argue below are potential drivers of metropolitan political polarization: institutional fragmentation and race.[1] Methodologically, as America's three largest metropolitan areas, each contains a sufficient number of municipalities to conduct statistical analyses.

3.1 Institutional Fragmentation

Beginning with Peterson's (1981) seminal study of urban politics, much of the research on the causes of metropolitan polarization has emphasized institutional explanations. For example, a number of scholars have identified municipal institutional fragmentation (i.e., having a large number of municipalities in a metropolitan area) as a potential source of metropolitan polarization; a larger number of municipalities allows for better sorting by individual preference (Peterson 1981; Burns 1994; Kruse 2005), which we might expect to lead to greater political segregation and polarization. Indeed, if individuals choose their municipal residences according to the bundle of services these communities provide (e.g. Peterson 1981), politically like-minded individuals will sort into the same communities as a consequence of their similar policy preferences. Given this prior research, I suggest Hypothesis A: regions with higher numbers of municipalities should exhibit greater levels of political segregation.

3.2 Race

In this paper, I evaluate the impact of four mutually exclusive hypothesis:[2]

[1] These two variables certainly do not represent an exhaustive list of the potential predictors of metropolitan political polarization. In other research, for example, I explore the role of material interests in predicting metropolitan political segregation. Due to space constraints, I limit my inquiries in this paper to these two variables.

[2] As a consequence of New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles' relatively high levels of racial diversity, these cases may not provide sufficient variation in racial composition to evaluate Hypotheses 1 and 4.

1. Metropolitan areas with higher proportions of blacks and Latinos will be more polarized than their non-black and Latino counterparts.
2. Metropolitan areas with higher proportions of blacks will be more polarized than their Latino counterparts.
3. Metropolitan areas with higher proportions of Latinos will be more polarized than their black counterparts.
4. Metropolitan areas with higher proportions of blacks and Latinos will be less polarized than their non-black and Latino counterparts.

Save for Hypothesis 4, previous research provides some empirical support for the propositions described in these three theories. For example, we know that racial segregation produces greater political divergence between cities and their suburbs, with more Democratic cities surrounded by conservative suburbs (Dreier et al. 2001; Weir et al. 2005). Both blacks and Latinos—predominantly Democratic voters—tend to be disproportionately clustered in urban (or inner core suburban), high-poverty communities largely separated from wealthier suburban areas (Jargowsky 2003). Thus, it is possible that Hypothesis 1 is correct: metropolitan areas with higher proportions of blacks and Latinos may indeed be more likely to polarize.

Differences between Latino and black residential patterns may, however, render Hypothesis 2 a more plausible theory. While still heavily segregated, Latinos are (and have historically been) less residentially clustered than African-Americans. In 2000, the Latino-White Dissimilarity Index was .509, as compared to the Black-White measure of .640 (Iceland and Weinberg 2002). Interpreted intuitively, these indices mean that, across metropolitan areas, 64 percent of African-Americans would need to move from their neighborhood in order to be residentially integrated, as compared to 50.9 percent of Latinos. Greater Latino integration across metropolitan areas could theoretically create more concern and visibility for Latino issues, which might in turn spur municipalities without a large number of Latinos to more closely politically align with their more Latino counterparts.[3]

As Hypothesis 3 suggests, the converse might also be true. Latino dispersion across the nations metropolitan areas has been accompanied by a surge in anti-immigrant ordinances (e.g. FIRM 2010; Hopkins 2010). This hostility towards Latinos might spur non-Latino communities to see their political interests as decidedly distinct from those of their Latino counterparts, consequently creating higher levels of political polarization in Latino metropolitan areas than in black regions, where the minority presence has typically been much more longstanding. Such a finding would be in line with a wealth of sociological evidence suggesting that recent and rapid demographic changes produce greater hostility than the long-term presence of a minority group (Massey and Denton 1993; Green et al. 1998; Ellen 2000; Hopkins 2010).

4 Data and Methods

My central dependent variable of interest—political segregation—is calculated using 2000 precinct-level presidential returns from the Federal Elections Project (Lublin and Voss

[3]Note that this prediction relies on the accuracy of contact theory. This assumption will be challenged in hypothesis 3.

2007). These data represent the most recent election year at such a low level of aggregation. Since—as I outlined above—I am ultimately interested in municipal-level segregation, I then aggregate these data to the U.S. Census classification most closely approximating municipality. In the New York City and Chicago metropolitan areas, this was a minor civil division (MCD); the Los Angeles data, conversely, was aggregated to the place level.[4] I measure metropolitan area using the U.S. Census designation Metropolitan Statistical Area.

Methodologically, I evaluate political segregation in three different ways. First, I produce maps that allow for the visual inspection of spatial clustering. Second, I calculate univariate Moran's I coefficients to offer a numerical measure of political segregation. These values estimate levels of spatial autocorrelation.

Third, I estimate two spatial lag models, one using queen's contiguity weighting, the other using an inverse distance metric of 20 miles; these allow me to quantify the extent to which neighboring municipalities' political affiliations are related to one another. The dependent variable in these models is the proportion of a municipality that voted Democratic in the 2000 presidential election. In addition to the spatial lag, which—as a measure of spatial clustering—is my primary independent variable of interest, I include several controls standard in political science voting analyses: the percent of a municipality that is black, the percent Hispanic, municipal median household income (which is logged for data analysis), and municipal population (which, again, is logged for data analysis). All of these variables are calculated using data from the 2000 U.S. Decennial Census. Since racial minorities tend to vote for the Democratic party, I suspect that the coefficients on percent black and percent Hispanic will be positive. Similarly, larger cities tend be more heavily Democratic, again suggesting a positive coefficient on population. Richer voters, however, tend to vote for the Republican party,[5] indicating an expected negative coefficient on median household income.

5 Results

5.1 Maps

Figures 1-3 illustrate the proportion of a municipality that voted for the Democratic candidate in the 2000 presidential election in New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles, respectively. The darkest blue municipalities are the most heavily Democratic, with 80-100 percent of votes in those municipalities favoring the Democratic candidate. Light blue regions are only slightly less Democratic, with 60-80 percent of the votes opting for the Democratic party. Conversely, the darkest red areas are heavily Republican, with under 20 percent of voters endorsing the Democratic candidate. Bright red areas are slightly less

[4] This is obviously an imperfect measure of municipal governments, the ultimate value of interest. While in New York, New Jersey, and Pennsylvania (the states included in the New York City metropolitan statistical area) MCDs correspond with local governments, this is not the case in Illinois and Indiana (two of the three states included in the Chicago metropolitan statistical area). Indeed, particularly in Indiana, there are several cases of two or three municipalities included in one MCD. More broadly, state heterogeneity in town and incorporated place definitions (U.S. Department of Commerce 1994) is a thorny issue for national-level projects like this one, and a potential source of error in the results

[5] Gelman's (2008) analysis suggests that, depending upon the wealth of the state, this might not always be the case. Still, broader political science research indicates that, in general, richer areas tend to be more Republican, "latte liberals" notwithstanding.

Republican, with 20-40 percent of the vote share going to the Democrats. Political pundits might label the purple areas as "swing districts;" in these areas, between 40-60 percent of the vote share was Democratic.



Figure 1: 2000 Municipal Proportion Democrat in the New York City Metropolitan Statistical Area

These maps seemingly demonstrate that New York City, Los Angeles, and Chicago all exhibit high levels of political segregation. Indeed, in all three regions, the central city and surrounding municipalities appear to be heavily Democratic, while some suburban communities (e.g, the western parts of the New York and Chicago metropolitan areas, and the souther portion of the Los Angeles region) are strongly Republican. While preliminarily New York City seems to evince the highest levels of spatial clustering, more quantitative evidence is clearly need to more firmly compare political segregation in these three metropolises.

5.2 Moran's I

Moran's I offers a more statistical quantification of spatial segregation by estimating the correlation between an observation X and X's neighbors. As with standard correlation measures, it can take any value between -1 and 1, with -1 indicating perfectly negative spatial autocorrelation (dissimilar neighbors) and 1 revealing perfect spatial autocorrelation (similar neighbors). Table 1 displays Moran's I values for the proportion of a municipality that is Democratic for New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles; p-values, calculated using 999 simulations, are included in parentheses.

Because Moran's I values depend upon the how neighboring units are defined, I use two different weight matrices to test my results' sensitivity to different weighting scheme; the first is a queen's contiguity matrix, while the second uses inverse distance weighting with



Figure 2: 2000 Municipal Proportion Democrat in the Chicago Metropolitan Statistical Area



Figure 3: 2000 Municipal Proportion Democrat in the Los Angeles Metropolitan Statistical Area

a distance of 20 miles selected. Queen's contiguity weighting simply labels all bordering

	New York City	Chicago	Los Angeles
Queen's Contiguity	.613 (.001)	.537 (.001)	.603 (.001)
Inverse Distance (20 miles)	.249 (.001)	.332 (.001)	.206 (.001)

Table 1: Spatial Clustering of % Democrat at the Municipal Level in New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles. This table displays Moran's I coefficients for the % Democrat (measured at the municipal level). P-values are in parentheses and calculated with 999 simulations.

polygons as neighbors. The selection of distances for inverse distance weighting, however, is somewhat more complex and arbitrary; I opted for twenty miles largely because it seemed like a plausible definition of a municipal neighbor. Indeed, in these large metropolitan areas, 20 miles should, on average, represent areas that are between 30-45 minute drives from one another; consequently, under tis weighting scheme, neighboring municipalities are the areas most likely to be in the daily orbits of citizens as they travel to grocery stores, schools, and jobs.

As with the maps, the Moran's I values for municipal Democratic vote share illustrate extremely high levels of spatial autocorrelation. Indeed, spatial clustering by political affiliation is higher than that by race, ethnicity, and income in all three areas under both weighting schemes (a full table containing all spatial autocorrelation values is located in the appendix). However, it is less clear from these values which city experiences the greatest spatial autocorrelation in Democratic vote share; while under the queen's contiguity weighting, New York City has the highest level of spatial correlation at .613 (compared with .537 in Chicago and .603 in Los Angeles), the inverse distance scheme reveals Chicago to be the most spatially clustered by political affiliation, with a value of .332 (compared with .249 in New York City and .206 in Los Angeles). I therefore use a third method, spatial lag models, to assess the extent to which neighboring municipalities shape a particular observation's political affiliation.

5.3 Spatial Lag Models

Spatial autoregressive models allow researchers to calculate consistent parameter estimates while accounting for spatial autocorrelation in the residuals.[6] For my project, I selected a spatial lag model, rather than a spatial error model, for several reasons. First, spatial lag models tend to be better equipped to deal with cases in which migration or diffusion processes explain the influence of nearby values on each observation; these two phenomena could plausibly explain high levels of spatial clustering by political affiliation. Conversely, spatial error models address spatial mismatch and missing variable problems, which are not particularly pertinent to my data set. Second, when I estimated OLS models with all of my independent variables save the spatial lag (full OLS results are available in the appendix), the robust Lagrange Multiplier test for spatial dependence indicates that, for all three cities, the spatial lag model would be the most statistically appropriate estimation technique.[7]

[6] When I estimated these models—without the spatial lag—in an OLS framework, all of my models' residuals exhibited extremely high levels of spatial autocorrelation. The results of these OLS models as well as the Moran's I values of the residuals are included in the appendix.

[7] The Lagrange Multiplier test evaluates spatial lag and spatial error model validity. Under this test, the best model is that corresponding with the highest statistic value.

Tables 2 and 3 display the results of spatial lag models, with Table 1 illustrating coefficients calculated under queen's contiguity weighting, and Table 2's results measured with inverse distance weighting (as with the Moran's I calculations, I used a distance metric of 20 miles). All of the control variables—the percentages black and Hispanic, population, and median household income—are in their expected directions (except for the population coefficient in Los Angeles), and the high R^2 values suggest that my models are explaining a large portion of the variance in municipal Democratic vote share. Moreover, while the Chicago model still exhibits fairly high levels of spatial autocorrelation in the residuals, these results are a dramatic improvement from the OLS residuals (see appendix); it is important to remember, however, that spatial autocorrelation in the residuals could introduce error into my model estimates. My Chicago estimates, in particular, will therefore need to be interpreted cautiously.

The independent variable of interest—the spatial lag—estimates the extent to which neighbors' political affiliations shape observations' Democratic vote shares. A positive coefficient would suggest that more Democratic neighbors are linked with more Democratic observations. Unsurprisingly, given my earlier map results and Moran's I values, all of the spatial lag coefficients are positive and statistically significant using both queen's contiguity and inverse distance weighting. Thus, all three metropolitan areas exhibit high degrees of municipal political segregation, with highly Democratic municipalities very likely to be surrounded by similarly Democratic places. These results, however, offer further clarity on which metropolitan area experiences the greatest political spatial clustering: New York City has the highest spatial lag values under both inverse distance and queen's contiguity weighting. Thus, it appears as though New York City exhibits the highest levels of political segregation at the municipal level. Indeed, these results are consistent with my visual inspection of the maps as well as queen's contiguity Moran's I values, meaning that in four out of five of my empirical tests, the New York City metropolitan area experienced that highest levels of political segregation.

	NYC	Chicago	Los Angeles
Spatial Lag	.434 (.056)***	.384 (.054)***	.388 (.062)***
% Black	.415 (.033)***	.478 (.050)***	.507 (.137)***
%Hispanic	.208 (.034)***	.064 (.056)	.182 (.054)***
Pop. (Log)	.028 (.006)***	.0377 (.007)***	-.048 (.022)**
Med. HH Inc. (Log)	-.129 (.024)***	-.190 (.046)***	-.323 (.093)***
Constant	.757 (.116)***	.995 (.209)***	2.480***
	Adj. $R^2 = .757$	Adj. $R^2 = .731$	Adj. $R^2 = .689$
	$n = 432$	$n = 206$	$n = 118$
Residual Corr.	Moran's $I = .018$	Moran's $I = .167$	Moran's $I = .122$
	$p = .262$	$p = .001$	$p = .030$

*$p < .10$,**$p < .05$, ***$p < .01$

Table 2: Spatial lag models with queen's contiguity weighting. Predicting Municipal 2000 Democratic Vote Share in NYC, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Spatial lag coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

The differences between Chicago and Los Angeles, on the other hand, appear to be consistent, but less substantial. While the maps provide little clear information about variations in political segregation between Chicago and Los Angeles, in the queen's contiguity

	NYC	Chicago	Los Angeles
Spatial Lag	.735 (.056)***	.582 (.080)***	.599 (.081)***
% Black	.467 (.032)***	.494 (.050)***	.551 (.133)***
%Hispanic	.231 (.034)***	.101 (.057)*	.231 (.051)***
Pop. (Log)	.020 (.006)***	.031 (.008)***	-.059 (.022)***
Med. HH Inc. (Log)	-.212 (.024)***	-.195 (.047)***	-.426 (.093)***
Constant	1.024 (.116)***	.958 (.213)***	2.480***
	Adj. $R^2 = .748$	Adj. $R^2 = .720$	Adj. $R^2 = .689$
	$n = 432$	$n = 206$	$n = 118$
Residual Corr.	Moran's $I = .024$	Moran's $I = .2812$	Moran's $I = .0928$
	$p = .262$	$p = .001$	$p = .004$

$^*p < .10$, $^{**}p < .05$, $^{***}p < .01$

Table 3: Spatial lag models with inverse distance weighting (20 miles). Predicting Municipal 2000 Democratic Vote Share in NYC, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Spatial lag coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.

Moran's I and both spatial lag models, Los Angeles appears to be slightly more spatially segregated than Chicago. Based on the spatial lag coefficients, however, the difference between Los Angeles and Chicago does not appear to be as substantial as that between New York and the other two metropolitan areas. The central task, then, of the subsequent section is to explain why New York City appears to exhibit much higher levels of municipal political segregation than its big city peers.

6 Hypothesis Testing

Does racial composition or institutional fragmentation better explain New York City's greater metropolitan political segregation? Table 4 presents demographic and institutional data on each of the three metropolitan areas under study. I display the proportion black, Hispanic, and a measure of institutional configuration; for New York City and Chicago, I include the number of minor civil divisions in the metropolitan area, while for Los Angeles, I show the number of places.

MSA	%Black	%Hispanic	Number of MCDs/Places
New York City	16.0%	18.2%	433 (MCD)
Chicago	18.3	16.4	206 (MCD)
Los Angeles	7.23	40.3	120 (Place)

Table 4: Racial Composition and Institutional Fragmentation in the New York, Chicago, and Los Angeles Metropolitan Areas

A quick look reveals that the most striking difference between New York and the other two cities is its high level of institutional fragmentation. Indeed, while its racial composition differs dramatically from that of LA (LA has a much higher percentage of Hispanics, and a lower proportion of blacks), New York is remarkably similar to Chicago in its proportions black and Latino. Thus, it appears as though, in America's three largest metropolitan areas, Hypothesis A accurately describes the drivers of political segregation: institutional fragmentation seemingly allows residents to better sort by political preferences, thereby creating higher levels of political segregation.

Conversely, these data offer little support for any of the four racial hypotheses. While these metropolitan areas are racially too diverse to allow me to adequately assess Hypothesis 1 (black and Latino communities are more polarized than white metropolitan areas) and Hypothesis 4 (black and Latino communities are less polarized than white metropolitan areas), they do not provide any evidence that black and Latino metropolises polarize differently (Hypotheses 2 and 3).

7 Limits of this Study

First, perhaps the most obvious limit of this research is generalizability stemming from my case selection. America's three largest metropolitan areas are markedly different from their smaller metropolitan peers, both in their racial compositions and the number of municipalities located within their borders. Thus, it is certainly possible that racial factors play an important role in driving political polarization in smaller metropolitan areas, suggesting the importance of including a larger number of metropolises in future analyses.

Moreover, I only used one election year, 2000, in this analysis. It is possible that different electoral contexts might elicit different outcomes in levels of political segregation. I plan in future research to address this problem by examining metropolitan political polarization historically over the course of many elections. This research course has the added benefit of allowing me to determine the mechanism behind political segregation; it is unclear from this cross-sectional study whether homophily—like individuals cluster in certain parts of the metropolitan area because they like living near those who share their political views—or diffusion—like individuals move to neighboring municipalities, thereby creating spatial clusters—is driving political segregation.

Second, as with all geographic analyses, this project faces the Modifiable Areal Unit Problem (MAUP). Briefly, MAUP refers to the sensitivity of statistical estimates to the geographic unit under study. It is, in fact, eminently possible that if I had used precincts as my level of analysis, or if metropolitan areas were defined differently, that I might have obtained different results. However, I feel somewhat more confident in my research design since I had strong theoretical reasons for selecting the municipality as the unit of analysis, rather than, say census tract or county. That said, while the U.S. Census offers the best available definition of metropolitan area, it is possible that border effects are biasing my results, especially in Los Angeles, where the places are oddly shaped, resulting in some communities having few, if any, neighbors.

Third, as I addressed in my methods section, state heterogeneity in how the U.S. Census measures municipality could potentially bias my results. Since census places and minor civil divisions do capture different things, it is at least possible that differences in political segregation between these three metropolitan areas could simply be an artifact of the way the U.S. Census measures municipalities in different states. While my results represent the best methodological choice given the available data, these problems do militate in favor of including additional cases and conducting qualitative research to ensure that my statistical results match what is actually occurring.

Finally, as I noted earlier, racial composition and institutional fragmentation are certainly not an exhaustive list of every plausible driver of metropolitan polarization. Future studies must take into account other factors, such as metropolitan wealth and employment patterns (Reich 1992; Salins 1993; Pastor et al. 2000; Gainsborough 2001). Indeed, in my own research in progress, I am incorporating economic linkages between the metropolitan area as a potential explanatory variable.

8 Conclusion

This paper assesses political segregation in America's three largest metropolitan areas: New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles. Using multiple metrics, it finds that New York City appears to exhibit higher levels of political segregation than its metropolitan peers. It suggests that institutional fragmentation might be driving these different levels of political segregation, although it cautions that racial composition might matter if a wider array of metropolitan cases were included. While there is much further research to be done—including incorporating a larger number of metropolitan areas, election years, and explanatory variables—this paper nonetheless represents a first step at addressing what drives political segregation, a phenomenon with important policy consequences.

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Appendix

	NYC Mean (SD)	Chicago Mean (SD)	Los Angeles Mean (SD)
% Democrat	.504 (.128)	.427 (.117)	.560 (.181)
% Black	.057 (.119)	.040 (.104)	.044 (.341)
%Hispanic	.087 (.114)	.068 (.091)	.341 (.169)
Pop. (Log)	4.023 (.624)	3.936 (.815)	4.629 (.478)
Med. HH Inc. (Log)	4.813 (.151)	4.761 (.108)	4.736 (.169)

Table 5: Summary Statistics. Means with standard deviation in parentheses.

	New York City	Chicago	Los Angeles
% Democrat			
Queen's Contiguity	.613 (.001)	.537 (.001)	.603 (.001)
Inverse Distance (20 miles)	.249 (.001)	.332 (.001)	.206 (.001)
% Black			
Queen's Contiguity	.360 (.001)	.361 (.001)	.478 (.001)
Inverse Distance (20 miles)	.051 (.002)	.196 (.001)	.077 (.130)
% Hispanic			
Queen's Contiguity	.495 (.001)	.248 (.001)	.542 (.001)
Inverse Distance (20 miles)	.090 (.001)	.128 (.001)	.076 (.004)
Med. HH Inc. (Log)			
Queen's Contiguity	.492 (.001)	.390 (.001)	.387 (.001)
Inverse Distance (20 miles)	.165 (.001)	.285 (.001)	.118 (.001)
Population (Log)			
Queen's Contiguity	.428 (.001)	.738 (.001)	.045 (.186)
Inverse Distance (20 miles)	.243 (.001)	.600 (.001)	.034 (.034)

Table 6: Spatial Clustering at the Municipal Level in New York City, Chicago, and Los Angeles. This table displays Moran's I coefficients for key independent and dependent variables. P-values are in parentheses and calculated with 999 simulations.

	NYC	Chicago	Los Angeles
% Black	.512 (.037)***	.568 (.055)***	.681 (.154)***
%Hispanic	.346 (.039)***	.085 (.064)	.273 (.060)***
Pop. (Log)	.046 (.007)***	.054 (.008)***	-.057 (.025)**
Med. HH Inc. (Log)	-.122 (.028)***	-.169 (.052)***	-.375 (.107)***
Constant	.847 (.136)***	.991 (.241)***	2.480 (.580)***
	Adj. $R^2 = .660$	Adj. $R^2 = .645$	Adj. $R^2 = .592$
	$n = 432$	$n = 206$	$n = 118$
Residual Corr.	Moran's $I = .378$	Moran's $I = .428$	Moran's $I = .440$
	$p = .001$	$p = .001$	$p = .001$

*$p < .10$,**$p < .05$, ***$p < .01$

Table 7: OLS Models. Predicting Municipal 2000 Democratic Vote Share in NYC, Chicago, and Los Angeles. OLS coefficients with standard errors in parentheses.