





# Working Papers

Paper 78, November 2013

## Explaining the Rise of Diaspora Institutions

Alan Gamlen, Michael Cummings, Paul M. Vaaler and Laura Rossouw



This paper is published as part of the Oxford Diasporas Programme ([www.migration.ox.ac.uk/odp](http://www.migration.ox.ac.uk/odp)) by the International Migration Institute (IMI), Oxford Department of International Development (QEH), University of Oxford, 3 Mansfield Road, Oxford OX1 3TB, UK ([www.imi.ox.ac.uk](http://www.imi.ox.ac.uk)). IMI does not have an institutional view and does not aim to present one. The views expressed in this document are those of its independent author.

# The IMI Working Papers Series

The International Migration Institute (IMI) has been publishing working papers since its foundation in 2006. The series presents current research in the field of international migration. The papers in this series:

- analyse migration as part of broader global change
- contribute to new theoretical approaches
- advance understanding of the multi-level forces driving migration

## Abstract

Why do states establish and empower diaspora engagement institutions? Origin-state institutions dedicated to emigrants and their descendants have been largely overlooked in mainstream political studies, perhaps because they fall in the grey area between domestic politics and international relations. Now, diaspora institutions are found in over half of all United Nations member states, yet we have little theory and broad-sample statistical evidence to guide our understanding about when they are more likely to emerge and increase in importance. In response, we identify and then investigate empirical support for three theoretically-grounded perspectives on diaspora institution emergence and importance: instrumentally rational states tapping resources of emigrants and their descendants; value-rational states embracing lost members of the nation-state; institutionally-converging states governing diasporas consistent with global norms. We document support for these alternative perspectives in regression and related analyses modelling diaspora institution emergence and importance in 144 states observed from 1990-2010. Tapping perspective estimations exhibit better overall model fit compared to estimations based on other perspectives. Estimations combining perspectives exhibit the best model fit. Individual terms exhibiting signs contrary to prediction suggest new directions for theoretical and empirical research from different perspectives. We advance international relations research by identifying, distinguishing and testing alternative perspectives explaining diaspora institution emergence and importance. We also advance international relations practice and policy with evidence-guided insight on near-term trends in institution emergence and importance.

**Keywords:** emigrants; origin state-diaspora relations; diaspora engagement; institutions; global governance

**Author:** Alan Gamlen, School of Geography, Environment and Earth Sciences, Victoria University of Wellington, [alan.gamlen@vuw.ac.nz](mailto:alan.gamlen@vuw.ac.nz); Michael Cummings, Department of Strategic Management, & Entrepreneurship, Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota, [cummings@umn.edu](mailto:cummings@umn.edu); Paul M. Vaalerb, Department of Strategic Management, & Entrepreneurship, Carlson School of Management, University of Minnesota, [vaal0001@umn.edu](mailto:vaal0001@umn.edu); and Laura Rossouw, Department of Economics, University of Stellenbosch, [laura.rossouw@gmail.com](mailto:laura.rossouw@gmail.com)

We thank Sahana Ghosh, Froilan Malit, Iain Kirkpatrick, and Sam Norman for assistance with data collection. We thank Gurneeta Vasudeva Singh, Alexandra Délano, Francesco Ragazzi, Sonia Plaza, Carlos Vargas-Silva and Philip Morrison for comments on earlier drafts. We gratefully acknowledge support from the Paekakariki Institute in Wellington. We are very grateful to Peter Schatzer and Noëlle Darbellay of the International Organization for Migration for generously facilitating interviews in connection with this research. All errors are ours.

# Contents

<b>1</b>	<b>Introduction .....</b>	<b>4</b>
<b>2</b>	<b>Alternative perspectives on diaspora institution emergence and importance.....</b>	<b>6</b>
2.1	Tapping perspective.....	6
2.2	Embracing perspective.....	8
2.3	Governing perspective .....	9
<b>3</b>	<b>Empirically analysing diaspora institution emergence and importance .....</b>	<b>11</b>
3.1	Model terms and measures.....	12
3.2	Estimation strategy, data sources, and sampling .....	15
<b>4</b>	<b>Empirical results .....</b>	<b>16</b>
4.1	Descriptive statistics and preliminary analyses.....	16
4.2	Regression Results.....	20
<b>5</b>	<b>Concluding discussion .....</b>	<b>24</b>
5.1	Central findings .....	24
5.2	Implications for research, practice and public policy.....	25
5.3	Limitations and future research.....	26
	<b>References .....</b>	<b>28</b>

# 1 Introduction

Migration research to date has focused more on immigration policies made by migrants' destination states than emigration policies made by migrants' states of birth or ancestral origin. That imbalance merits adjustment given recent changes in official attitudes toward emigrants and their descendants in the 'diaspora.'<sup>1</sup> In many origin states around the world, diaspora members once disdained as victims, deserters or traitors are now more likely to be feted as national heroes in events such as diaspora congresses, and in holidays to celebrate their contributions to the 'homeland.'<sup>2</sup> Emigrants and their descendants are courted in campaigns to encourage more financial remittances, investments, and 'roots tourism.' They are granted new categories of extra-territorial citizenship and voting rights, sometimes with dedicated representatives in origin-state legislatures. These and other policy initiatives to promote solidarity with, concern for and accountability to emigrants are becoming an increasingly visible element of the political landscape, not only in migrants' states of origin but also in international affairs.<sup>3</sup>

To support and coordinate these initiatives, a growing number of origin states have established formal diaspora engagement institutions (diaspora institutions) of various kinds, ranging state-funded quasi-governmental organisations, to councils, committees and units within origin-state legislatures and executive bodies, to fully-functioning diaspora political departments, some with ministerial-level importance.<sup>4</sup> Even 10 years ago, a meeting of all the world's diaspora officials and policy makers might have drawn few attendees, but last June 2013, the world's first 'Diaspora Ministerial Conference' in Geneva, convened by the International Organization for Migration (IOM), drew 548 high-level government participants from 143 states, along with 40 representatives from various migration-focused international organisations. Diaspora institutions are now found in more than half the member states of the United Nations, and their establishment is increasingly recommended by migration-focused international organisations.<sup>5</sup> Diaspora institutions are not an entirely new phenomenon – for example, institutions mediating relationships between Mexican governments and emigrants in the US stretch back as far as the mid-19th century.<sup>6</sup> But their recent spread globally, and their increasing importance to origin-state political and economic development is new and shows no signs of waning in the near term.

In this context it is surprising that diaspora institutions have been largely overlooked by the mainstream research in political science and international relations. To the extent that diaspora engagement policies have attracted research attention, it has mainly been limited to single case studies with little comparative and even less statistically robust analysis. The fact that diaspora institutions have arisen only recently may explain part of the research gap, but intellectual location of the topic may also play a role. Diaspora studies more generally lie in a grey zone between domestic and international politics. Even so, we think diaspora institutions merit closer research attention in substantial part because they blur the line between the domestic and the international.<sup>7</sup> These institutions extend domestic politics beyond national borders, extraterritorially projecting state power to shape the identity of emigrants and their descendants. Diaspora institutions also spatially reconfigure states so that they

---

1 'Diaspora' is a hotly contested term, but put simply refers to "an imagined community dispersed from a professed homeland" (Vertovec 2009, 5). We use 'diaspora' more or less synonymously with 'emigrants and their descendants'. For a detailed analysis of the term, its significance, and the fast-growing field of diaspora studies, see for example Cohen, 2008, or refer to recent issues of the *Diaspora* journal.

2 E.g. Durand 2004. See also Shain and Barth, 2003 for an extended review of diasporas' involvement in international relations.

3 See Barry 2006; Gamlen 2008.

4 See Agunias and Newland 2012.


5 E.g. de Haas 2006; Ionescu 2006; Finch, Andrew and Latorre 2010; Fullilove and Flutter 2004.

6 E.g. Smith 2003; Cano and Delano 2007.

7 E.g. see Varadarajan 2010; Koslowski 2004.

no longer fit a territorially-discrete ‘modernist geopolitical’ model of political organisation.<sup>8</sup> Diaspora institutions help modify the perception of emigrants and their descendants into a category of belonging defined by, rather than in opposition to, the origin state. In these and other ways, diaspora institutions are transforming relationships among power, place and identity central to the study of international relations and politics more broadly.

**Figure 1: Annual Count of Diaspora Institutions Globally, 1980-2012<sup>9</sup>**



Our study provides an initial guide for studying the emergence and importance of diaspora institutions. We identify and distinguish three prominent theoretical perspectives explaining whether, how and why origin states establish diaspora institutions. One perspective discussed in existing case-study literature on the topic highlights state interests in tapping the resources of emigrants and their descendants. Another perspective highlights constitutive ideas of citizenship and statehood that shape states’ interests in embracing ‘their’ diasporas no matter how wealthy or influential emigrants and their descendants may be. A third perspective, less well-articulated to date, highlights the role of evolving norms in the area of global migration governance,<sup>10</sup> specifically around governing diasporas as part of international cooperation over migration management.<sup>11</sup> We ground these three perspectives in broader international relations theories and relevant previous studies. These perspectives imply certain

<sup>8</sup> Agnew 2003; also see Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003.

<sup>9</sup> Figure 1 illustrates growth in diaspora institutions globally from 1980-2012. The x-axis is years and the y-axis is the count of origin-state diaspora institutions. Grey-shaded bars represent diaspora institution types based on six ordered levels of importance to the origin state: 1) Quango, which is an origin state-sanctioned quasi-governmental national organisation; 2) Legislative Body, which is an organisation located within the legislative branch of the origin-state government ; 3) Sub-Ministry, which is an organisation under the purview of an origin-state ministry; 4) Executive Body, which is an organisation with an official reporting directly to the origin-state head of the executive branch of government; 5) Hybrid Ministry, which is a government ministry-based organisation in the origin state with purview over diaspora engagement and other governmental issues; and 6) Full Ministry, which is an origin-state government ministry devoted exclusively to diaspora engagement issues. If an origin state has established two types of institutions (i.e., both a legislative body and a full diaspora ministry), each type is counted separately.

<sup>10</sup> E.g. see Betts 2011.

<sup>11</sup> We use the term ‘governing’ to connote both the emergence of certain substantive global norms, such as origin-state voting rights for diaspora members, and procedural global norms such as how origin states communicate with diaspora members. This procedural connotation of the term follows Ragazzi (2009), who describes “governing diasporas” as alternative modes of governmentality. Gamlen & Marsh (2011) describes the inevitable overlap between these two meanings.

individual measures explaining diaspora emergence and importance, thus also defining testable hypotheses and comparisons of model fit with empirical data.

We do so with a unique dataset of diaspora institutions and determinants for 144 states observed from 1990-2010. Regression and related analyses yield several insights. Models based on the tapping perspective yield more individual terms with predicted signs and better overall model fit compared to models based on embracing and governing perspectives. Models combining determinants of diaspora institution emergence and importance yield the most individual terms with predicted signs and the best overall model fit, thus suggesting the complementary rather than mutually exclusive nature of these perspectives. Thus, reliance on any one individual perspectives to explain the rise of institutions mediating relations between origin states and their diasporas will likely lead to overly-narrow research and related practice and policy-making insights. International relations research on diaspora institution emergence and importance benefits at this still early stage of inquiry from an eclectic approach combining perspectives grounded in rationalist, constructivist and institutional state theories.

Our study advances international relations research, practice and policy-making. For researchers we identify, distinguish theoretically and document broad-sample statistical evidence for prominent perspectives explaining why origin states establish diaspora institutions and why some origin states give them greater political importance. We develop data, sampling and estimation methods for researchers to follow in translating diaspora institution concepts and constructs into measurable indicators for hypothesis testing and estimable models for comparison of broader fit with data analysed from different individual and combinatorial perspectives. These advances also matter for practice and policy assessment. Origin-state ministers and officials, representatives from emigrant groups, consultants, and others can use our perspectives to guide discussions about the purpose of a particular diaspora engagement policy and its fit with a particular type of diaspora institution. They can use our evidence to explain the recent emergence of such institutions by neighbouring origin states and infer the near-term likelihood of their upgrade in political importance. International organisations can use our perspectives and methods to more precisely monitor recent world-wide growth and near-term trajectory of diaspora institutions. In these ways and others, we illuminate pathways for future work in this grey area.

## **2 Alternative perspectives on diaspora institution emergence and importance**

We find no single dominant explanation for diaspora institution emergence and importance. Instead, we characterise the field as having several alternative explanations with distinctive grounding in international relations theories. We consolidate these explanations into three broad but distinctive perspectives. Diaspora institutions emerge and assume some level of political importance in origin states based on tapping, embracing and governing motivations to engage diasporas. In this section, we elaborate on the theoretical grounding for these three perspectives and highlight factors from each perspective for subsequent empirical study. In the next section, we translate these highlighted factors into measurable proxies, to be included in statistical models amenable to estimation, hypothesis testing and broader model fit comparisons.

### **2.1 Tapping perspective**

Rationalist theories underpin the conventional tapping perspective on state-diaspora relations and the emergence of diaspora institutions. The neorealist strand of rationalism tends to see international

relations as an anarchic power struggle among rationally acting states.<sup>12</sup> From this perspective, states may reach out to emigrants and their descendants to assist with the struggle. Diaspora communities may harbour loyalists willing to fight or advocate for their homeland in times of conflict or competition,<sup>13</sup> or to mediate reconciliation talks and reconstruction debates.<sup>14</sup> Such long-distance loyalties are a potentially powerful resource for origin states. For example, Cyprus<sup>15</sup> and Armenia<sup>16</sup> have courted informal EU and USA-based diasporas to help win foreign favour in their respective territorial disputes – just two examples of a wider pattern of ethnic lobbying in global capitals, often encouraged by the origin state, in what Yossi Shain calls ‘multicultural foreign policy’.<sup>17</sup> Meanwhile, Eritrea has levied a controversial ‘healing tax’ its diaspora, ostensibly justified by the ravages of conflict with Ethiopia.<sup>18</sup>

For neorealists, then, diaspora institutions emerge and grow in importance as auxiliaries to other diplomatic and consular initiatives engaging diasporas so that they may ‘tap’ these valuable resources more effectively. From this perspective, diaspora institution emergence and importance is inversely related to origin-state capacity to tap resources abroad using other diplomatic and consular services. Stronger (weaker) services mean diaspora institutions are less (more) likely to emerge and or assume higher political importance in the origin state.

Neoliberals also accept the rationalist premise that states are unitary, rational actors, but they hold more optimism than neorealists in the potential for inter-state cooperation and multilateral institutional constraints to mitigate international anarchy.<sup>19</sup> From this perspective, origin states also have incentives to tap diasporas but less as foreign policy auxiliaries and more as agents of economic cooperation and development. Here, origin states facilitate ‘win-win-win’ outcomes. Diaspora engagement to encourage emigrant remittances is illustrative. By ‘managing’ emigration and its impacts through diaspora institutions, origin states win by relieving local unemployment pressures whilst offsetting ‘brain drain’ with emigrant remittances of money, technology and ideas vital to economic development.<sup>20</sup> Diaspora institutions may also help emigrants themselves to win, preparing them to migrate for better wages and living standards, looking out for their welfare abroad, and empowering them at home.<sup>21</sup> Engagement policies and diaspora institutions can also help create a win for destination states, by helping to manage international recruitment through legitimate channels, assist migrants to access support services in the destination society, and if necessary facilitate their timely return.

For neoliberal theorists, such win-win-win benefits are not automatic, but the product of adroit engagement policy planning and diaspora institutional design. Diaspora institutions in the Philippines and Bangladesh, for example, are actively involved in the management of temporary labour export from their shores,<sup>22</sup> while New Zealand, South Africa, Chile and many other states have established networks and databases of skilled, affluent and influential expatriates so that they are not entirely ‘lost’ from the

---

12 Smith 2000, 381.

13 E.g. Anderson 1992; Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Huntington 2004; Demetriou 2003; Demmers 2007; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003a.

14 E.g. Orjuela 2008; Nielsen and Riddle 2009.

15 E.g. Demetriou 2003.

16 E.g. Shain 2002.

17 Shain 1995.

18 E.g. Koser 2003.

19 Smith 2000, 381.

20 E.g. see Stark 1985; Basu, 2005; Kindleberger 1965; Ratha 2003; Appleyard 1989; Barry 2006; Bauböck 2003; Bhagwati 2003; Iskander 2010a; Itzigsohn 2000; LeBlang, 2010; Levitt and de la Dehesa, 2003; Østergaard-Nielsen 2003b; Portes, Guarnizo and Landolt 1999; Kuznetsov and Sabel, 2006; Kapur 2001; Shain 1999; Taylor 1999; Vaaler 2011.

21 E.g. see de Haas and van Rooij 2010.

22 E.g. Solomon 2009.

labour force.<sup>23</sup> From this optimistic neoliberal perspective, diaspora institutions are more (less) likely to emerge and assume greater importance when alternative sources of origin-state economic development are less (more) readily available –when, for example, origin-state citizens are poorer and or foreign direct investment is low.

Like neoliberals, neostructuralists highlight economic development drivers for diaspora engagement, but their analyses are more pessimistic. Rather than a win-win-win, emigration is part of an exploitative core-to-periphery relationship. Poor origin states export migrants at the bidding of capitalist-country elites who seek new sources of cheap, pliable labour in destination states.<sup>24</sup> From this perspective, origin-state attempts to tap diasporas are unlikely to overcome deep structural asymmetries in the global economy. There is little leverage to strike some mutually-beneficial ‘grand bargain’ with destination states. Engagement policies and diaspora institutions are, at best, expressions of origin-state dependence on remittances and other flows from developed economies, and reflect futile efforts to mitigate some small part of the economic inequality that characterises such dependence. With support from the UNDP’s ‘Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals’ (TOKTEN) programme, various states in the Caribbean, Southern Europe, and Asia have tried to mitigate ‘brain drain’ by attracting professional emigrants back as short-term consultants on development issues.<sup>25</sup> Many more states have copied Mexico’s famous remittance-capture initiatives, such as the *Tres por Uno* (‘Three for One’) scheme where local, state and federal governments ‘match’ diaspora remittances with public contributions to development projects. From the neostructuralist perspective, diaspora engagement institutions are more (less) likely to emerge as emigrant skill levels increase (decrease), as origin-state capacity to extract emigrant income and wealth increases (decreases), and as origin-state dependence on diaspora remittances increases (decreases).

## 2.2 Embracing perspective

Since at least the 1990s, constructivism has provided alternative theoretical grounding for understanding issues in international relations otherwise given to rationalist interpretation. Whereas rationalists highlight state interests, constructivists highlight how those interests are shaped by constitutive ideas and identities – including nationality, ethnicity, race, religion and (sometimes) sexuality.<sup>26</sup> In constructivist-inspired accounts of diaspora institution emergence and importance, origin-state interests in ‘their’ diasporas are shaped by underlying ideas about nation-states and their capacity to extend beyond territorial boundaries. Constructivist thinking informs studies treating diaspora engagement policies as aimed at ‘embracing’ lost compatriots and imbuing nation-states with extra-territorial reach.

In existing research on state-diaspora relations, a common constructivist approach explaining diaspora engagement efforts emphasises ‘long-distance’ ethnic nationalism.<sup>27</sup> Studies coming from this perspective highlight ‘ethnic’ models of citizenship where inclusion is defined by shared race, language, religion, history and culture.<sup>28</sup> To them, diaspora institutions may support ‘transovereign’<sup>29</sup> nationalism often associated with right-wing politics in the origin state,<sup>30</sup> or with the efforts of authoritarian rulers

---

23 E.g. Kuznetsov 2006.

24 E.g. Basch, Schiller and Szanton-Blanc 1994; Dickinson and Bailey 2007.

25 E.g. Logan 1990.

26 E.g. Checkel 1998; Katzenstein, Keohane and Krasner 1998.

27 E.g. Glick Schiller and Fouron 2002; Koser 2003.

28 Brubaker 1992.

29 Csörgő and Goldgeier, 2004.

30 Joppke 2005.



to shore up weak domestic authority by projecting strength abroad.<sup>31</sup> Classic cases include Hungary's Status Laws, rejected as ethnonationalist antagonism by neighbouring Balkans states,<sup>32</sup> and the historical efforts of North African states including Morocco to monitor and crack down on dissident exiles.<sup>33</sup> From this perspective, diaspora institutions are more (less) likely to emerge and assume greater importance where origin states are led by right-wing (left-wing) governments, or under more (less) autocratic regimes.

Constructivists often hold that diaspora institutions project national identity beyond borders, but disagree about the nature of such identity. Some argue that diaspora engagement policies and institutions reunite an ethnic or racial community which precedes and underpins the state,<sup>34</sup> but others hold that such institutions recognize an ethnically diverse national community brought into being by the state, and bound to it by political obligations that endure even when members move abroad.<sup>35</sup> Instead of ties based on 'blood and the nation,' engagement policies and institutions promote civic virtue in formerly marginalised emigrants,<sup>36</sup> symbolise origin-state commitment to human rights,<sup>37</sup> and address sometimes strident demands from the diaspora to be heard.<sup>38</sup> For example, although the politics of transborder citizenship in Germany and Korea are often seen as expressions of classic ethnic nationalism, in fact they have reached out to legally and politically – not ethnically - defined diasporas.<sup>39</sup> Similarly, Rather than nationalism per se, diaspora institutions may facilitate 'transnationalism.' From this perspective, diaspora institutions are more likely to feature where the origin-state regime is more democratic, and emigrants have channels for expressing views on origin-state policies and politics – overseas voting rights, for example.

## 2.3 Governing perspective

While constructivism highlights origin-state factors for indicators regarding when diaspora institutions may emerge and grow in importance, other institutional theories highlight factors shared by surrounding states as indicators of some forming global consensus about how best to 'govern' diasporas. Institutional theorists trace norm formation, adoption and internalization,<sup>40</sup> and analyse coercive, mimetic and normative processes by which ideas diffuse.<sup>41</sup> Such approaches seek to explain not variation but rather growing organisational uniformity in the modern world. World society theory, for example, seeks to explain the global diffusion of organisational forms associated with the nation-state, through adherence to expert advice and interstate expectations. It argues that state behaviour – including states' notional adoption of bounded identities and goal-directed action – is socially scripted, especially where states depend on former colonial powers and international organisations for various forms of aid and advice.<sup>42</sup>

Existing studies of state-diaspora relations have not to date highlighted the international diffusion of norms.<sup>43</sup> This may follow from the absence of any 'World Migration Organisation' to govern cross-border flows of people analogous to the World Trade Organization regulating global trade

---

31 Brand 2006.

32 E.g. see Warner 2003-2004.

33 Brand 2006.

34 Glick Schiller and Fouron 2002.

35 E.g. Brubaker and Kim 2011; Waterbury 2011.

36 Rhodes and Harutyunyan 2010.

37 Levitt and de la Dehesa 2003; King and Melvin 1999.

38 Smith 2003.

39 Brubaker and Kim 2011.

40 Finnemore and Sikkink 1998.

41 DiMaggio and Powell 1983.

42 Meyer, Boli, Thomas and Ramirez 1997; Meyer and Jepperson 2000; Meyer 2010.

43 For an important exception see Delano forthcoming.

or the International Monetary Fund governing international finance. Such absence for migration issues presents no inherent problem within a neoliberal world, where decentralised global governance is preferred to centralized government. But the lack of international cooperation over international migration is a widely recognised concern, as migration is an area where interdependence among states is particularly pronounced. In this context, influential international organisations, political actors, and experts are increasingly seeking ways to facilitate cooperation and responsibility-sharing in the area of migration, in lieu of centralized multilateral coordination.<sup>44</sup>

Origin-state diaspora institutions are increasingly seen as a critical building block in that process. A traditional obstacle to international cooperation over migration has been that migration policy falls mainly to destination states, where migration is most immediate. They have found themselves without institutional counterparts in origin states where, until recently, no one was tasked with managing people who had technically left the national population. This governance gap is closing as origin states evolve diaspora institutions. These institutions form both a gathering venue for diaspora-related activities within origin states, and a contact point for international counterparts seeking dialogue on migration. In this way they give origin-states a seat at the table, enabling them to exercise notional authority over otherwise ‘lost’ emigrants, and recoup some resources while also shouldering some of the burden for managing international labour migration.<sup>45</sup> Because it helps states to share responsibility for migration, this so-called “diaspora model”<sup>46</sup> of migration management is now seen as a form of ‘best practice’ in global migration governance,<sup>47</sup> along with mobility partnerships,<sup>48</sup> regional consultative processes,<sup>49</sup> and circular or temporary labour migration agreements between states.<sup>50</sup>

Various international actors facilitate the diffusion of this model by linking the issue of migration to the global development agenda - one of the few areas of global governance where widespread consensus exists, and therefore a powerful vehicle for mobilizing the international community. This helps explain why Kofi Annan’s United Nations administration (1997-2006) chose development as a justification for promoting more international involvement in national migration policies.<sup>51</sup> Seeing opportunities to further the interests of their constituencies, diaspora groups, international organisations and think tanks have since joined the migration-policy bandwagon, enthusiastically promoting diaspora engagement as a route to ‘migration for development’ – a phrase that has become a buzz,<sup>52</sup> a mantra,<sup>53</sup> even a superstition<sup>54</sup> among international migration policy makers.

Many powerful international actors have become advocates for diaspora engagement and the creation of diaspora institutions, including the World Bank,<sup>55</sup> the International Organization for Migration,<sup>56</sup> and USAID.<sup>57</sup> But the adoption of diaspora institutions has not been a one-way process of transfer from wealthy nation-states or international organisations to diaspora institution in poor nation-

---

44 See Gamlen and Marsh 2011; Gamlen 2013; Larner 2007; Mullings 2011; Pellerin and Mullings 2013; Ragazzi 2009.

45 Chander 2001.

46 Bhagwati 2003.

47 See Iskander 2010a.

48 Kunz and Maisenbacher 2013.

49 Thouez and Channac 2006; von Koppenfels 2001.

50 Agunias 2006.

51 Jenny 2008; Skeldon 2008.

52 Vammen and Brønden 2012.

53 Kapur 2003.

54 Hansen 2012.

55 E.g. see Kuznetsov and Sabel 2006.

56 E.g. see Ionescu 2006; Agunias and Newland 2012.

57 E.g., see USAID 2013

states. Instead it has been an iterative process of co-creation<sup>58</sup> and adaptation; instead, policy models have mutated recursively as they pass back and forth through geographically and culturally linked networks of international actors.<sup>59</sup>

First movers with diaspora institutions include Mexico and the Philippines. Norms governing their treatment of emigrants have been held up as models for other developing countries to follow.<sup>60</sup> International organisations like the Global Forum on Migration and Development, the UN High-Level Dialogue on Migration and Development, and International Organization for Migration's Diaspora Ministerial Conference create fora for sharing best practices on migration governance. The diffusion process is undeniable. For example, fully a fifth of all poverty reduction strategies published by developing states from 2000-2008 call for "engaging expatriate communities."<sup>61</sup> These and other signs indicate that, to some substantial extent, norms around diaspora engagement have become 'governmental.'<sup>62</sup>

This theoretical perspective suggests that diaspora institution emergence and importance is more (less) likely when mimetic, coercive and or normative processes are more (less) pronounced: when states with geographic proximity adopt or upgrade diaspora institutions; when states with similar cultural or colonial heritage do the same; when states participating in similar economic or political blocs do the same; when states engage a similar mix of international political actors and organisations for advice.

### **3 Empirically analysing diaspora institution emergence and importance**

Recall that one aim of this study is to identify alternative perspectives explaining diaspora institution emergence and importance in origin states, to ground such perspectives in international relations theory, and to highlight key factors driving diaspora institution emergence and importance according to each perspective. The foregoing section indicates progress toward that end. We identified three prominent perspectives – tapping, embracing and governing – and elaborated on their respective grounding in rationalist, constructivist and institutional theories of state action.

We also identify specific factors highlighted in each perspective. For the tapping perspective, we highlight terms related to the diplomatic and economic development policy of the origin state and note their probable impact on the likelihood of diaspora institution emergence and importance: the size of the origin-state diplomatic corps (-); the skill (+) of and current remittances from (+) the diaspora; foreign direct investment to and origin-state wealth (-); and the existence of non-resident taxation policies (+). For the embracing perspective, we highlight factors related to origin-state identity and need to project authority: the democratic nature (+ but decreasingly so) and right-wing orientation (+) the origin-state government; and the extent of voting rights in origin-state affairs accorded to diaspora members (+). For the governing perspective, we highlight factors related to origin-state legitimacy needs with regional neighbours and global leaders setting standards for the treatment of diasporas: the prevalence of diaspora institutions in neighbouring countries (+) and in countries sharing the origin

---

58 Iskander 2010.

59 Peck 2011.

60 E.g. Iskander 2010.

61 United Nations Secretary-General 2010, 10.

62 Gamlen and Marsh 2011; Gamlen 2013; Larner 2007; Mullings 2011; Pellerin and Mullings 2013; Ragazzi 2009.

state's colonial heritage (+); dependence on global leading states for foreign aid (+); and the origin state's level of involvement in various migration-related organisations (+).

Identification of these specific factors and their predicted impact on diaspora institution emergence and importance contributes to a second aim of this study: constructing statistical models of diaspora institution emergence and importance for hypothesis testing and assessment of broader model fit. The rest of this section summarizes methods for such testing and assessment.

### 3.1 Model terms and measures

The factors we identified from our analysis of tapping, embracing and governing perspectives on diaspora institution emergence and importance can be incorporated into a larger statistical model taking the general form below:

$$DI_{ijt} = \alpha + \sum_{m=1}^{m=q} \beta_m Perspective_{ijt} + \sum_{c=1}^{c=3} \lambda_c Common_{ijt} + \sum_{r=1}^{r=5} \chi_r Regions_j + \sum_{d=1990}^{d=2010} \gamma_d Year_s_t + \varepsilon_{ijt} \quad (1)$$

In (1), the dependent variable, DI, takes one of two forms: 1) a 0-1 binary term representing diaspora institution emergence taking the value of 0 if there is no diaspora institution in origin state *i* within geographic region *j* during year *t*; and 1 if there is at least one diaspora institution of any type; and 2) a 0-6 ordered term representing diaspora institution political importance again taking the value of 0 if there is no diaspora institution in origin state *i* within geographic region *j* during year *t* and 1-6 depending on which of six types of diaspora institution are found according to a hierarchical typology outlined below:<sup>63</sup>

1. *Quasi-governmental Organisation* (Quango): a state-sanctioned organisation that is part-funded or led by the private-sector (e.g. New Zealand's Kiwi Expats Association established in 2001);
2. *Legislative Body*: an organisation housed within the legislative branch of government, often to represent migrant groups (e.g. the High Council of Malians founded in 1993);
3. *Sub-ministry*: a formal office housed within a wider government ministry (e.g. the Irish Abroad Unit established in 2006 and since 2008 housed within the consular division of Ireland's Department of Foreign Affairs);
4. *Executive Body*: an organisation housed within the office of the head of the executive branch of government (e.g. the Presidential Office for Mexicans Abroad established temporarily in 2000);
5. *Hybrid Ministry*: a ministerial portfolio that is split between responsibility for diaspora affairs and some other cabinet duty or duties (e.g. Algeria's Ministry of National Solidarity, Family and the National Community Abroad established in 1996); and
6. *Full Ministry*: a full, single ministerial portfolio dedicated to the diaspora (e.g. the Ministry of Overseas Indian Affairs established in 2004).

---

<sup>63</sup> Our classification system modifies the one proposed by Agunias and Newland 2012. Most origin states have one such institution, but a few have up to 3 (e.g., France and Poland). In such cases our index counts the institution of greatest importance.

**Table 1: Variables, expected signs and data sources for analyses of diaspora institution emergence and importance, 1990-2010\***

Perspectives, Theories, Assumptions		Variable Name	Variable Description (for origin state <i>i</i> in year <i>t-1</i> )	E( <i>b</i> )	Data Sources
<i>Dep- vars</i>		<i>Diaspora Institution Emergence</i>	0-1 dummy indicating whether origin state has a diaspora engagement institution		Authors' estimates
		<i>Diaspora Institution Importance</i>	0-6 ordinal scale for origin-state diaspora engagement institution importance		Authors' estimates based on Agunis, & Newland., 2012
<i>Common Control Variables</i>		<i>Population Density</i>	Origin-state population/area (km <sup>2</sup> )		WDI
		<i>Diaspora Size</i>	Size of diaspora (% of population)		GBM
		<i>Diaspora Concentration</i>	Herfindahl index of diaspora location across destination states (higher values indicate diaspora members located in fewer destination states)		GBM
		<i>Geographic Regions</i>	0-1 dummies indicating origin state's membership in one of six geographic regions		WDI
<i>Tapping Perspective: Rationalist Theory</i>	<i>Diaspora Institutions Emerge and Grow in Importance With Diplomacy and Economic Development Needs of Origin State</i>	<i>Diplomatic Exchange</i>	Count of states with which origin state has diplomatic relations	-	Bayer, 2006
		<i>Diaspora Skill</i>	Percentage of origin-state diaspora with post-secondary education	+	Docquier, & Marfouk, 2006
		<i>Foreign Investment</i>	Origin state's net inward foreign direct investment (% of GDP)	-	WDI
		<i>Diaspora Remittances</i>	Total annual remittances to origin state (% of GDP)	+	WDI
		<i>Wealth</i>	Origin-state per-capita GDP (US\$, thousands)	-	WDI
		<i>Nonresident Taxation</i>	0-1 dummy indicating if origin state taxes nonresident citizens	+	Authors' estimates
<i>Embracing Perspective: Constructivist Theory</i>	<i>Diaspora Institutions Emerge and Grow in Importance With Identity and Authority Needs of Origin State</i>	<i>Voting Index</i>	0-5 ordinal index indicating extra-territorial voting rights	+	IDEA, 2008
		<i>Right-Wing Executive</i>	0-1 dummy indicating if origin state is led by right-wing executive	+	Keefer, 2010
		<i>Polity</i>	-10-10 ordinal scale for origin-state political openness, calculated by subtracting autocracy score from democracy score (ordinal)	+	Polity IV Project, 2012
		<i>Polity<sup>2</sup></i>	Squared value of <i>Polity</i>	-	Polity IV Project, 2012
<i>Governing Perspective: Institutional Theory</i>	<i>Diaspora Institutions Emerge and Grow in Importance With Global Legitimacy Needs of Origin State</i>	<i>Geographic Proximity</i>	Distance-weighted measure of neighboring states' diaspora institutions	+	Adapted from Mayer, & Zignago, 2011
		<i>Colonial Heritage</i>	Percentage of colonial peers with diaspora engagement institutions	+	Adapted from Klerman et al, 2011
		<i>UIA Index</i>	0-100 point ordinal scale related to membership in int'l migration organizations	+	UIA, 2012
		<i>Aid Dependence</i>	Foreign aid (% of GDP)	+	WDI

\* WDI=World Development Indicators (World Bank, 2012a). GBM=Global Bilateral Migration Database (World Bank, 2012b).

In (1), we include specific terms identified in the previous section and others commonly used to explain diaspora institution emergence and importance no matter the theoretical perspective used to study such phenomena. Summary information about measurement, predicted impact on diaspora institution emergence and importance, and data sources is presented in Table 1. One set of terms in (1) is common to all explanations of diaspora emergence and importance (Common). It includes five 0-1 binary terms to account for unique but unspecified geographic regional effects  $j$  (Regions<sup>64</sup>) (omitting the Europe and Central Asia region), and 20 additional 0-1 binary terms for time-period (year) effects  $t$  (Years) running from 1990-2010 (omitting 1990). It also includes three terms varying by origin state  $i$  and lagged by one year,  $t-1$ . They include (with expected sign): Population Density (+), Diaspora Size (+) and Diaspora Concentration (-). Previous literature highlights incentives for small and often densely populated island states in the Pacific<sup>65</sup> and the Caribbean<sup>66</sup> to engage their diasporas, so we control for greater population density in the origin state. On the other hand, the need for coordination of diaspora engagement policies through and institution is likely greater with more diffuse settlement in more destination states. We also control for diaspora size, as it indicates a larger constituency to be served by a diaspora institution.

The consistency with prediction of other right-hand side terms in (1) varies with theoretical perspective. When estimating diaspora institution emergence and importance based on the tapping perspective, we include (with expected sign): Diplomatic Exchange (-); Foreign Investment (-), Wealth (-), Diaspora Skill (+), Diaspora Remittances (+), and Nonresident Taxation (+). When estimating diaspora institution emergence and importance based on the embracing perspective, we include: Voting Index (+), Right-Wing Executive (+), Polity (+) and Polity2 (-). When estimating diaspora institution emergence and importance based on the governing perspective, we include: Geographic Proximity<sup>67</sup> (+), Colonial Heritage<sup>68</sup> (+), UIA Index<sup>69</sup> (+) and Aid Dependence (+). Our empirical strategy is to systematically append each set of Perspective terms – separately and then in combination – to estimations of diaspora emergence and importance measures of DI. We can compare observed signs and significance of individual terms to predicted signs to understand how well tapping, embracing and

---

<sup>64</sup> The six regions are: East Asia and the Pacific; Europe and Central Asia; Latin America and the Caribbean; Middle East and North Africa; South Asia; and Sub-Saharan Africa

<sup>65</sup> Bertram 2006.

<sup>66</sup> Glick Schiller and Fouron 1999; Laguerre 1998.

<sup>67</sup> *Geographic Proximity* is measured as the weighted average of the lagged dependent variable for all units except unit  $i=1$  [the focal country] according to the following equation:

$$Geographic\ Proximity_{ijt} = \sum_{i=2}^n \frac{y_{i,t-1}}{(Distance\ weight_i)}$$

Here,  $n$  is the number of countries in the sample and  $y$  is the dependent variable ( $DI$ ). Lagged values of  $y$  are weighted by their geographical distance from the observation unit and summed. The Distance weight is calculated as the distance from the observation country to country  $i$ , divided by the sum of the distance from the observation country to all other countries in the sample. A country that is closer to the observation country will have a *smaller* distance-weighted discount, resulting in a larger contribution to the *Geographic Proximity* measure.

<sup>68</sup> *Colonial Heritage* is measured as the score of country  $i$  in year  $t$  according to the following equation:  $CH_{it} = \frac{\sum_1^{N^k(DI=1)}}{N^k}$ , where  $N^k$  is the number of countries with colonial heritage  $k$ , excluding the focal country. It can be summarized as the percentage of countries that share colonial heritage with the focal country that have any type of diaspora institution in a given year.

<sup>69</sup> *UIA Index* is an additive index based on a country's level of involvement with more than 50 migration-related organisations tracked by the Union of International Associations. Examples include the League of Nations High Commission for Refugees and the International Organization for Migration. The index is calculated as follows: two points for full membership in one of these organisations; and one point for partial membership in the same organisation. Although the theoretical maximum of the scale is over 100 points, no country scores over 32 points in any given year (corresponding to full membership in 16 different migration-related organisations or partial membership in 32 such organisations).

governing perspectives explain diaspora emergence and importance individually and in combination with terms from other perspectives.

We can also compare broader model fit statistics generated by each set of terms to gain a holistic sense of explanatory power provided by tapping, embracing and governing perspectives. We use two indicators of model fit to evaluate the relative explanatory power of our theoretical perspectives: 1) McFadden’s adjusted pseudo-R<sup>2</sup> (MAPR2)<sup>70</sup> and 2) Akaike Information Criterion (AIC).<sup>71</sup> Higher MAPR2 indicates better model fit with observed trends of diaspora institution emergence and importance. The MAPR2 measure penalizes the addition of terms if they do not add sufficiently to model fit, which is particularly important when comparing specifications like ours with a different number of terms in each model.<sup>72</sup> The AIC measure assesses model fit based on the concept of ‘information loss’ from exclusion of additional parameters with lower AIC measures indicating better fit.<sup>73</sup> Like MAPR2 estimates, the AIC measure penalizes the addition of terms not sufficiently reducing information loss.

### 3.2 Estimation strategy, data sources, and sampling

Because the DI dependent variable is categorical and ordinal rather than continuous, we use non-linear probit regression estimators.<sup>74</sup> When DI measures diaspora institution emergence as 0-1 dummy, we use a standard cross-sectional probit and panel probit estimators. When DI measures diaspora importance as a 0-6 ordinal index, we use a cross-sectional ordered probit estimator. In addition, we use a non-parametric locally-weighted scatterplot smoothed (lowess) estimator to gain additional illustrative insight on relationships between DI and various terms. To generate these lowess graphs, we use the 0-1 dummy value of DI. A bivariate regression of DI on a given term in (1) is estimated for each observation and surrounding observations weighted according to a tri-cubic function.<sup>75</sup> Weighted regression estimates for each observation are then connected and plotted yielding a lowess trend line. We implement these alternative estimations using Stata Version 12.<sup>76</sup>

We initially sample from all United Nations member states with information on whether and what type of diaspora institution an origin state has, and when it was established.<sup>77</sup> We obtain data for

---

<sup>70</sup> McFadden 1973. Mathematically, McFadden’s adjusted pseudo-R<sup>2</sup> can be summarized in the following equation:

$$\text{Pseudo } R_{adj}^2 = 1 - \frac{\ln \hat{L}(M_{full}) - k}{\ln \hat{L}(M_{intercept})}$$

Here,  $\ln \hat{L}(M_{full})$  is the estimated log likelihood for a model with all parameters,  $k$ , where  $\ln \hat{L}(M_{intercept})$  is the estimated log likelihood for the same model with an intercept only.

<sup>71</sup> Akaike 1974. Mathematically, AIC can be summarized in the following equation:  $AIC = 2k - 2 \ln(\hat{L})$ . Here  $k$  is the number of parameters and  $\ln(\hat{L})$  is the estimated log likelihood. Let  $AIC_{minimum}$  be the ‘best’ (minimal information loss) model in a class of models. Then the likelihood that another model  $i$  in the same class also minimizes information loss is given by:  $e^{\frac{(AIC_{minimum} - AIC_i)}{2}}$ . The rule of thumb for comparisons of AIC values is that in relation to the best-fitting model, models with AIC scores less than 2 points higher have substantial support—there is a moderate likelihood that they are also the information-loss minimizing model. Models with AIC scores between 4 and 7 points higher have considerably less support (i.e., more confidence in the best-fitting model), and models more than 10 points higher than the lowest-scoring model have essentially zero likelihood of being the best-fitting model in a particular set of models (Burnham and Anderson 2004).

<sup>72</sup> Long and Freese 2006.

<sup>73</sup> Wagenmakers and Farrell 2004.

<sup>74</sup> Another possible estimator is the Cox proportional hazards model (Cox 1978), which can be used to model longitudinal data with a single binary event. However, such an estimator assumes that these institutions are established as an ‘event’; that they are never disbanded and exist forever. In contrast, our probit approach allows for states to disband diaspora institutions or change institution types.

<sup>75</sup> Cleveland 1979.

<sup>76</sup> StataCorp 2011. We use the bivariate cross-sectional probit (‘probit’), panel probit (‘xtprobit’) and cross-sectional ordinal probit (‘oprobit’) estimators.

<sup>77</sup> An initial source for these data is Agunias and Newland (2012), who provide survey data on diaspora engagement institutions in 56 states during a single period. We went further, examining all UN member states and discovering additional

right-hand side terms in (1) from various sources including the World Bank's World Development Indicators (e.g., Foreign Direct Investment), Database of Political Institutions (e.g., Right-Wing Executive), and other data sources listed in Table 1. The final dataset comprises 2377 observations for 144 states observed from 1990-2010.<sup>78</sup>

## 4 Empirical results

### 4.1 Descriptive statistics and preliminary analyses

Table 2 reports descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for all terms in (1). The mean value for DI emergence is 0.28 meaning that only about 30% of our sample includes some type of diaspora institution present in a given year.<sup>79</sup> As Figure 1 illustrates, the dominant forms of diaspora institution are those associated with legislative bodies or sub-ministries scoring three and two respectively when DI is measuring institution importance. Thus, the mean for DI as diaspora institution importance rises to 0.89. Other right-hand side terms in (1) generally follow intuition. For example, average Diaspora Size is 6.91 with two thirds of all countries sampled having only a negligible percentage of their population living abroad (e.g., Mongolia) to about 14% living abroad (e.g., Lebanon). Diaspora Remittances averages 3.74 with values for developing countries like Haiti and Moldova exceeding 30% of GDP in later years. These values comport with other observed trends in diaspora populations and remittances reported in recent research.<sup>80</sup>

Pairwise correlations in Table 2 present preliminary evidence consistent with many of our predictions. DI as diaspora institution emergence and importance is correlated as predicted with all three common terms in (1): Population Density (+), Diaspora Size (+) and Diaspora Density (-). Predicted correlations of DI with terms linked to each perspective vary in consistency. Three of four governing perspective variables exhibit the predicted sign: Geographic Proximity (+), Colonial Heritage (+) and UIA Index (+). Terms associated with embracing and tapping perspectives exhibit less consistency with predicted correlations. Indeed, certain tapping perspective terms exhibit contrary signs –for example, Foreign Investment exhibits a positive rather than the predicted negative sign.

---

diaspora institutions in some 40 states, which we included in our data for analysis. We also discovered the date of each diaspora institution's establishment, and based on that, created a longitudinal record of diaspora institution emergence and importance over time. We also modified their system of classifying institution type, and reclassified a number of institutions.

78 The 144 states represented in our sample include by region: East Asia and the Pacific: Australia, Cambodia, China, Fiji, Indonesia, Japan, Republic of Korea, Laos, Malaysia, Mongolia, New Zealand, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Solomon Islands, Thailand, and Vietnam; Europe and Central Asia: Albania, Armenia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyz Republic, Latvia, Lithuania, Macedonia, Moldova, Netherlands, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russian Federation, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Turkey, Ukraine, and United Kingdom; Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay, and Venezuela; Middle East and North Africa: Algeria, Djibouti, Egypt, Arab Rep., Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Lebanon, Libya, Morocco, Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, and Yemen; South Asia: Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka; and Sub-Saharan Africa: Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic, Chad, Comoros, Congo, Cote d'Ivoire, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Tanzania, Togo, Uganda, Zambia, and Zimbabwe.

79 Note, however, that by our final year of analysis, greater than 50% of states in our sample have established some form of institution.

80 E.g., Vaaler 2011.




**Table 2: Descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations for terms analysing diaspora institution emergence and importance, 1990-2010<sup>a</sup>**

Variable Name	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19
1 <i>Diaspora Institution Importance</i>																			
2 <i>Diaspora Institution Emergence</i>	0.88																		
3 <i>Population Density</i>	0.15	0.08																	
4 <i>Diaspora Size</i>	0.11	0.18	0.01																
5 <i>Diaspora Concentration</i>	-0.09	-0.10	0.00	0.16															
6 <i>Diplomatic Exchange</i>	0.15	0.19	0.18	-0.30	-0.38														
7 <i>Diaspora Skill</i>	-0.15	-0.17	0.04	-0.14	-0.10	0.12													
8 <i>Foreign Investment</i>	0.05	0.08	-0.03	0.25	-0.05	-0.04	0.13												
9 <i>Diaspora Remittances</i>	0.07	0.02	0.08	0.36	0.19	-0.26	-0.03	0.13											
10 <i>Wealth</i>	-0.05	0.02	0.16	-0.02	-0.25	0.54	0.05	0.05	-0.23										
11 <i>Nonresident Taxation</i>	0.16	0.18	0.07	-0.07	0.02	0.21	-0.03	0.01	-0.03	0.12									
12 <i>Voting Index</i>	0.12	0.19	-0.12	0.15	-0.20	0.24	-0.07	0.09	-0.08	0.36	0.02								
13 <i>Right-Wing Executive</i>	-0.06	0.00	0.08	-0.01	0.14	0.14	0.01	-0.03	-0.09	0.26	0.00	0.00							
14 <i>Polity</i>	0.03	0.14	0.18	0.10	-0.03	0.21	0.00	0.08	-0.06	0.45	0.10	0.21	0.33						
15 <i>Polity<sup>2</sup></i>	0.01	0.12	0.16	0.10	-0.18	0.35	0.02	0.10	-0.17	0.63	0.13	0.22	0.25	0.58					
16 <i>Geographic Proximity</i>	0.38	0.37	0.06	0.19	-0.17	0.23	0.03	0.24	0.10	0.21	0.03	0.29	-0.04	0.14	0.16				
17 <i>Colonial Heritage</i>	0.26	0.29	-0.04	0.13	-0.06	0.08	0.12	0.22	0.11	0.06	-0.03	0.12	-0.05	0.05	0.05	0.77			
18 <i>UIA Index</i>	0.18	0.25	0.12	-0.02	-0.28	0.51	-0.03	0.16	-0.08	0.56	0.13	0.33	0.16	0.35	0.36	0.54	0.34		
19 <i>Aid Dependence</i>	-0.10	-0.11	-0.10	0.06	0.10	-0.29	-0.21	-0.08	0.13	-0.17	-0.06	-0.15	-0.11	-0.10	-0.20	-0.09	-0.04	-0.15	
<u>Means (Standard Deviations)</u>																			
Gross Sample:	0.89	0.28	104.00	6.91	0.31	55.10	0.37	3.34	3.74	5.50	0.06	1.25	0.22	3.97	54.40	0.20	23.70	6.25	0.06
N=2377 obs, 144 states	(1.61)	(0.45)	(134.00)	(7.56)	(0.20)	(36.10)	(0.15)	(5.11)	(7.10)	(8.57)	(0.27)	(1.58)	(0.42)	(6.22)	(33.40)	(0.13)	(17.50)	(5.77)	(0.18)

- a. Correlations greater than 0.026 or less than -0.026 are significant at 10% level ( $p < 0.10$ ). Correlations greater than 0.033 or less than -0.033 are significant at 5% level ( $p < 0.05$ ). Correlations greater than 0.047 or less than -0.047 are significant at 1% level ( $p < 0.01$ ).

We gain additional insight on these correlations from review of lowess analyses presented in Figures 2-4. Figures 2c-d, for example, suggest that the positive signs on pairwise correlations of Foreign Investment and Remittances with DI result from curvilinearities: positive trends at lower levels of both eventually give way to a negative trend. In the case of Foreign Investment, this trend matches our predication, but in the case of Remittances, it contradicts a key expectation in the literature.


**FIGURES 2A-F: Locally-weighted scatter-plot smooth (lowess) plots for terms associated with tapping perspective**



Figures 2A-F illustrate lowess results for diaspora institution emergence and each of six variables included in models based on the tapping perspective. Since diaspora institution emergence is a 0-1 dummy, the smoothed dependent variable is transformed into logits.

Lowess results for terms related to the embracing perspective generally follow prediction: overseas voting rights and origin-state democracy (to a point) are positively related to the likelihood of diaspora institution emergence, while the partisan orientation of the origin-state government exhibits no observable impact on emergence.


**FIGURES 3A-D: Locally-weighted scatter-plot smooth (lowess) plots for terms associated with embracing perspective**



Figures 3A-D illustrate lowess results for diaspora institution emergence and each of four terms included in models based on the embracing perspective. Since diaspora institution emergence is a 0-1 dummy, the smoothed dependent variable is transformed into logits.

Terms related to the governing perspective are also interesting. Geographic proximity to states with diaspora institutions increases the likelihood of diaspora institution presence in the focal origin state at any level, while the emergence of such institutions in other states with the same colonial heritage increases the likelihood of emergence in the focal origin state at lower and middle levels but not the highest levels. An increasing UIA Index also exhibits curvilinearities: the lowest and highest levels of focal origin-state mention in these sources decrease the likelihood of diaspora institution emergence, but at mid-range index levels the likelihood is greater. Even dependence on foreign aid exhibits some non-linearities related to diaspora institution emergence. Negligible to low foreign aid dependence increases the likelihood of diaspora institution emergence as predicted, but then the relationship turns negative.

**FIGURES 4A-D: Locally-weighted scatter-plot smooth (lowess) plots for terms associated with governing perspective**



Figures 4A-D illustrate lowess results for diaspora institution emergence and each of four terms included in models based on the governing perspective. Since diaspora institution emergence is a 0-1 dummy, the smoothed dependent variable is transformed into logits.

## 4.2 Regression Results

Results from multiple regression analyses permit better tests of predicted relationships and help us assess broader model fit with diaspora institution emergence and importance. Table 3 reports results from probit estimation of models based on tapping, embracing and governing perspective terms. Columns 1-9 report individual perspective results. Columns 10-13 report results after combination of terms from all three perspectives.

Considered individually, terms from the tapping model yield the lowest AIC scores indicative of the best model fit. For example, the AIC score for tapping perspective model fit after cross-sectional probit estimation in Column 1 (2104) is lower than its embracing perspective and governing perspective counterparts in Columns 4 (2416) and 7 (2437). However, the lowest overall AIC score after cross-sectional probit estimation comes from combining terms from all three perspectives in Column 10 (2377). The pattern of model fit indicators is similar for cross-sectional ordered probit and panel probit results in Table 3. They are also consistent with the pattern of MAPR2 fit indicators. Together they direct more research attention to explanations of diaspora institution emergence and importance based on tapping perspective terms alone. But perhaps more importantly, they suggest that model terms from all three perspectives may be combined with some complementarity rather than redundancy.

**TABLE 3: Regression results analysing diaspora institution emergence and importance, 1990-2010**

ESTIMATORS →	(1)	(2)	(3)	(4)	(5)	(6)	(7)	(8)	(9)	(10)	(11)	(12)
Variables ↓	PROB TAP	OPROB TAP	XTPROB TAP	PROB EMB	OPROB EMB	XTPROB EMB	PROB GOV	OPROB GOV	XTPROB GOV	PROB All 3	OPROB All 3	XTPROB All 3
<i>Population Density</i>	0.001** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.012** (0.003)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.014** (0.003)	0.001** (0.000)	0.001** (0.000)	0.008** (0.002)	0.001** (0.000)	0.002** (0.000)	0.008 (0.005)
<i>Diaspora Size</i>	0.050** (0.005)	0.037** (0.005)	0.239** (0.043)	0.019** (0.004)	0.014** (0.004)	0.145** (0.050)	0.025** (0.004)	0.017** (0.004)	0.291** (0.047)	0.051** (0.005)	0.036** (0.005)	0.186* (0.077)
<i>Diaspora Concentration</i>	-1.290** (0.217)	-0.970** (0.182)	-13.895** (2.324)	-0.626** (0.183)	-0.742** (0.169)	-8.019** (2.271)	-0.613** (0.176)	-0.654** (0.164)	-10.140** (2.722)	-1.156** (0.227)	-1.381** (0.198)	-6.289* (2.558)
<i>Diplomatic Exchange</i>	0.010** (0.001)	0.005** (0.001)	0.034** (0.013)							0.009** (0.001)	0.006** (0.001)	0.045** (0.017)
<i>Diaspora Skill</i>	-2.712** (0.252)	-0.002 (0.002)	-19.455** (3.371)							-2.855** (0.266)	-2.477** (0.227)	-11.629** (2.905)
<i>Foreign Investment</i>	-0.007 (0.007)	-0.019** (0.006)	0.020 (0.035)							-0.010 (0.007)	-0.010 (0.007)	0.004 (0.032)
<i>Diaspora Remittances</i>	-0.034** (0.007)	-0.019** (0.006)	-0.251** (0.055)							-0.038** (0.008)	-0.029** (0.007)	-0.142+ (0.078)
<i>Wealth</i>	-0.047** (0.005)	-0.055** (0.005)	-0.099** (0.046)							-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)	-0.000** (0.000)
<i>Nonresident Taxation</i>	1.226** (0.135)	1.163** (0.113)	12.882** (1.404)							1.248** (0.140)	1.132** (0.116)	3.679+ (2.031)
<i>Voting Index</i>				0.080** (0.021)	0.068** (0.019)	0.572* (0.254)				0.105** (0.023)	0.074** (0.020)	0.520* (0.206)
<i>Right-Wing Executive</i>				-0.094 (0.078)	-0.200** (0.073)	-0.626 (0.592)				0.074 (0.090)	-0.106 (0.080)	-0.774 (0.577)
<i>Polity</i>				0.037** (0.008)	0.031** (0.007)	0.342** (0.096)				0.053** (0.009)	0.046** (0.008)	0.289** (0.081)
<i>Polity<sup>2</sup></i>				-0.002 (0.001)	-0.004** (0.001)	-0.027* (0.013)				0.001 (0.002)	-0.002 (0.001)	-0.017 (0.015)
<i>Geographic Proximity</i>							0.860 (0.648)	1.724** (0.586)	11.948* (5.557)	-1.881** (0.693)	-0.381 (0.604)	5.254 (5.044)
<i>Colonial Heritage</i>							-0.003 (0.003)	-0.009** (0.002)	0.020 (0.025)	0.007* (0.003)	-0.002 (0.003)	0.014 (0.020)
<i>UIA Index</i>							0.016* (0.007)	0.000 (0.006)	-0.008 (0.068)	0.016+ (0.009)	0.005 (0.008)	0.021 (0.067)
<i>Aid Dependence</i>							-0.907** (0.301)	-0.938** (0.293)	1.833 (1.776)	-1.041** (0.330)	-1.301** (0.331)	-0.796 (1.929)
Constant	0.857** (0.235)	-- --	9.436** (2.878)	-0.268 (0.172)	-- --	-0.119 (2.392)	-0.538+ (0.299)	-- --	-7.873** (2.629)	1.097** (0.401)	-- --	1.860 (3.497)
N (Countries)	2377 (144)	2377 (144)	2377 (144)	2377 (144)	2377 (144)	2377 (144)	2377 (144)	2377 (144)	2377 (144)	2377 (144)	2377 (144)	2377 (144)
AIC	2105	4240	594	2417	4440	625	2437	4451	615	2006	4039	622
MAPR <sup>2</sup>	0.282	0.158	--	0.171	0.116	--	0.164	0.114	--	0.322	0.201	--

Table 3 reports coefficients (standard errors) from probit regression estimations of diaspora emergence and importance likelihoods on variables linked to tapping, embracing and governing perspectives. PROB (XTPROB) indicates cross-sectional binary (panel) probit estimator where the dependent variable is a 0-1 diaspora institutional emergence dummy (0 = no diaspora institution, 1 = some diaspora institution). OPROB indicates cross-sectional ordinal probit estimator where the dependent variable is a 0-6 index of diaspora institutional importance (see Figure 1 for explanation of index values). TAP indicates model variables based on tapping perspective. EMB indicates model based on embracing perspective. GOV indicates model variables based on governing perspective. Region and year dummies are included in all estimations but not reported here. Unreported results are available from the authors on request. \*\* p<0.01, \* p<0.05, + p<0.1

We next turn to individual terms in (1) and their consistency with predicted signs and significance. Starting with Column 1 and running across Table 3, we see that common control terms enter with the predicted sign, nearly always at 1% levels of statistical significance. More densely populated origin states, origin states with larger diasporas, and origin states with more widely dispersed (not concentrated) diasporas are more likely to see diaspora institutions emerge and increase in importance.

Columns 1-3 of Table 3 report results where tapping perspective terms alone are added to common terms to explain diaspora institution emergence and importance. Origin state Wealth enters with the predicted negative sign and Non-Resident Taxation enters with the predicted positive sign. All three are significant at the 1% level. Holding other terms in Column 1 at their mean values, changing the value of Non-Resident Taxation from 0 (no origin-state non-resident taxation policy) to 1 (origin-state taxation policy) increases the likelihood of diaspora institution emergence for a state in a given year by 0.45 or 45 percentage points.

However, analysis of the tapping models also yields results that are mixed or even contrary to predictions. Foreign Investment exhibits the predicted negative sign in Columns 1-2 with significance at the 1% level when estimated with cross-sectional ordered probit for diaspora institution importance in Column 2. But the sign changes to positive (not negative) and insignificance when re-estimated with panel probit in Column 3. Diplomatic Exchange enters positively in Columns 1-3, the opposite of our prediction based on the tapping perspective, and suggests that formal diaspora institutions complement rather than substitute for other means of diaspora engagement.

The negative sign on Diaspora Skill also contradicts prediction. States are less likely to establish or upgrade the importance of diaspora institutions as their diasporas become better educated. These findings challenge popular research and public policy assumptions that states engage their diasporas to tap into the economic vitality of the best and brightest abroad and mitigate ‘brain drain’. On the other hand, these findings are consistent with the conventional notion that states establish diaspora institutions in order to export surplus low-skilled labour migrants – thus easing unemployment pressures – and to safeguard the resulting remittance flows.

However, the consistent negative sign on Diaspora Remittances controverts this almost universally held assumption that states engage diasporas because they are dependent on remittances. Our results show that, contrary to the common wisdom, as migrant remittance flows increase proportional to an origin state’s total economic activity, that state is less – not more – likely to establish and empower a formal institution dedicated to emigrants and their descendants. This contradicts not only our prediction, but a central tenet of existing research on state-diaspora relations: remittance dependence is not, after all, a sure explanation of diaspora institution establishment and importance. These surprising results prompt questions, and perhaps, revision of key assumptions about the origins of diaspora institutions associated with what we call the ‘tapping’ perspective.

Results based on the inclusion of common and embracing perspective terms alone appear in Columns 4-6 of Table 3. Voting Index and Polity enter with the predicted positive signs significant at the 1% level in all three columns. Polity2 enters with the predicted negative sign in all three columns, though lacking statistical significance at commonly-accepted levels in the cross-sectional probit estimation in Column 4. So largely consistent with embracing perspective logic, diaspora institution emergence and importance increases with more open origin-state polities (though decreasingly so) and better diaspora access to such polities. That said, the practical impact of such factors on diaspora

institution emergence and importance proves practically insubstantial. For example, holding other terms in Column 4 at their mean values, a one unit increase in Voting Index increases the likelihood of diaspora institution emergence by a mere 0.25 percentage points. A one unit increase in Polity increases the same likelihood by only 0.01 percentage points.

But then there is the contrary negative sign on Right-Wing Executive, significant in the cross-sectional ordered probit estimation of Column 5. Our prediction of a positive sign followed embracing perspective logic that origin states led by right-wing parties are more likely to cultivate extra-territorial nationalism and thus more likely to establish or raise the importance of existing diaspora institutions supporting such policy. An opposite negative sign, significant when explaining the likelihood of diaspora institutions with greater importance, may prompt re-thinking about how we operationalize that embracing perspective logic. Our estimation treats origin-state governments as ‘right-wing’ based on such a designation in the Database of Political Institutions. If we re-define ‘right-wing’ more broadly to include both right-wing and centrist-oriented origin-state governments, then Right-Wing Executive enters with a positive sign, at times significant at 1% levels.

But maybe the basic logic is flawed, at least in many developing countries where recent years have often seen classic left- versus right-wing policy priorities reverse themselves.<sup>81</sup> Perhaps our results reflect broader centrist and left-wing populist initiatives taken in many developing countries of the late 1990s and 2000s as part of a response to perceived shortcomings of reforms associated with the Washington Consensus. If so, then projects by populist governments to ‘re-ethnicize’ emigrants with the help of higher-profile diaspora institutions<sup>82</sup> become acts of origin-state political sovereignty and defiance to international regimes not unlike more conventional embracing perspective logic linking the same actions to right-wing governments. These empirical relationships and possible explanations merit closer study in diaspora institution research based on the embracing perspective.

Results based on the inclusion of common and governing perspective terms alone appear in Columns 7-9 of Table 3. They are mixed. Geographic Proximity enters positively in all three columns and is significant at the 1% level in the cross-sectional ordered probit estimation of Column 8 and the panel probit estimation of Column 9. UIA Index enters positively and significantly at the 1% level in the cross-sectional probit estimation of Column 7, but then loses significance and flips sign in Columns 8-9. In any case, the practical impact on diaspora institution emergence is vanishingly small. Holding other terms at their means in Column 7, a one-point index increase increases the likelihood of diaspora institution emergence by only 0.01 percentage points.

Colonial Heritage and Aid Dependence exhibit negative signs sometimes at commonly-accepted levels of significance in Columns 7-9. After controlling for diaspora emergence in neighboring states, pressures to follow other states based on historical ties to some ‘mother’ country in Europe or elsewhere apparently matter little. The anomalous sign on Aid Dependence also prompts deeper investigation. Lowess analyses in Figure 4d suggest that origin states with nil to small amounts of government-to-government assistance from abroad are more likely to follow emerging global norms and establish a diaspora institution. These origin states may resemble many emerging-market economies (e.g., South Africa) rather than less-developed countries (e.g., Rwanda) where foreign assistance is more substantial and its impact on diaspora institution emergence reversed. Such interpretation means a review of governing perspective logic to understand better how certain regional

---

81 Tavits and Letki 2009.

82 Contra Joppke 2005.

and global norms and norm-convergence pressure might interact with origin-state economic and political characteristics.

Columns 10-12 of Table 3 report results from combining terms from all three perspectives. Here we find better overall model fit as indicated by (lower) AIC and (higher) MPA2 measures compared to other fit indicators where terms from only one perspective are estimated similarly. Recall that these indicators penalize the inclusion of additional but ill-fitting model terms.<sup>83</sup> Estimates for individual terms in Columns 10-12 vary little in terms of sign and significance compared to their counterparts in previous columns. Together, they confirm an earlier conjecture that these different perspectives yield additive, perhaps complementary insight on diaspora institution emergence and importance.

## 5 Concluding discussion

### 5.1 Central findings

This research set out to explain why states engage their diasporas, and specifically why they are more likely to establish and attribute greater importance to the institutions tasked with such engagement. To that end, we began by defining three complementary explanatory frameworks grounded in relevant theoretical and case study literature. The tapping framework depicted instrumentally rational states pursuing material interests by engaging diasporas as strategic assets in conflict and diplomacy, and harnessing their finances, networks and skills to promote ‘migration for development’. The embracing framework portrayed value-rational states fortifying their constitutive identities and values by re-incorporating ‘lost’ members of the nation-state. In addition to these relatively widespread theoretical perspectives, we developed a third framework called governing. This approach draws on institutional theories, treating diaspora institutions as models of international migration-management, diffused through international pressures, expectations and advice. We know of no previous research that reviews, synthesises, develops and applies core international relations theories to the issue of state-diaspora relations in this way.

A second aim of our study was to operationalize these perspectives so that we might gain empirical insight on determinants of diaspora institution emergence and importance based on broad-sample statistical study. Previous empirical research on motivations for and institutions facilitating diaspora engagement typically came in the form of case study narratives and or descriptive statistics. While important for initial insight, such evidence may have only limited generalizability and perceived rigor. Both limitations undermine the development of evidence-guided insight to inform practice and public policy. We met this second aim by using alternative statistical approaches to analyse determinants of diaspora institution emergence and importance in a panel comprised of 144 origin states observed from 1990-2010. The breadth and depth of this data set was unprecedented. We included new and novel variables for study –for example, a UIA Index to measure origin-state membership and adherence to norms guiding diaspora treatment in a growing number of international migration organisations, and a Voting Index to measure origin-state openness to extra-territorial voting. We obtained insight on diaspora institution emergence and importance using multiple estimators: cross-sectional and ordered probit estimators; a panel probit estimator; and non-parametric lowess analyses.

---

<sup>83</sup> We obtain similar results with an alternative Bayesian Information Criterion of model fit (Schwartz 1978) incorporating arguably stronger penalties for inclusion of additional ill-fitting model terms.



The analysis yielded some important results. First, by way of context, we note that more than half all United Nations member states now have some kind of formal diaspora institution, and that diaspora initiatives are widely recommended by experts in migration policy as an approach to multilateral migration management in lieu of centralized global migration governance. Diaspora institutions have become a ‘normal’, but nonetheless overlooked, form of international organisation. Second, our tapping model accounts for more of this activity than our embracing or governing models, but not as well as a model combining all three approaches. As expected following existing literature, state interests matter when explaining state-diaspora relations, but we emphasize that studies must also account for the domestic and international norms that shape state action. Finally, although we found support for some conventional explanations of diaspora institution and emergence, we also found that several crucial factors associated with the dominant tapping and embracing explanations do not matter in the ways predicted by existing studies. These surprising results are worth emphasizing.

Specifically, our evidence challenges the all but universally held assumptions that states formally engage their diasporas to compensate for weak formal diplomatic resources, to safeguard remittance flows, to offset brain drain, to further right-wing nationalism, to bolster an autocratic regime, or to meet aid donor expectations of ‘self-help’. Our indicators of remittance-dependence, brain drain, right-wing government orientation, autocracy and aid dependence were all significant in the opposite direction than the stylised facts suggest. These results suggest shortcomings in prevailing understandings of why states engage their diasporas by establishing dedicated institutions.

The positive (not negative) sign on Diplomatic Exchange challenges a tapping perspective assumption that diaspora institutions can substitute for insufficient diplomatic capacity in origin states. Diaspora institutions may instead serve as complements – for example, if the capacity to implement diaspora policy depends on the existence of a strong diplomatic infrastructure. Similarly, the negative (not positive) sign on Right-Wing Executive challenges the embracing perspective assumption that partisan and sometimes authoritarian right-wing parties are more likely engage emigrants abroad and establish diaspora institutions for that purpose to define their origin-state identity and authority. It may be just as likely if not more so in centrist and left-wing populist governments of the developing world reaching out to emigrants as part of their own defiance against policies imposed on them by elites in industrialised democracies.

The negative (not positive) sign on Aid Dependence challenges the governing perspective assumption that origin states are under more pressure to conform with global norms of diaspora engagement when they are also more beholden to wealthier countries for government-to-government financial assistance. That assumption requires more nuance accounting for the interaction of origin-state financial need and, perhaps, institutional development. The negative (not positive) sign on Diaspora Skill challenges the conventional notion that diaspora engagement institutions are ‘brain gain’ initiatives, while the negative (not positive) sign on Diaspora Remittances undermines the notion that states engage diasporas to safeguard their remittance flows. With each challenging result, we find the opportunity to review, re-think and revise the conventional perspectives for future research on diaspora institution emergence and importance.

## 5.2 Implications for research, practice and public policy

Our theoretical and empirical contributions have wider implications for international relations research, practice and public policy. We noted the grounding of the tapping perspective in rationalist and the embracing perspective in constructivist theories of international relations. Development of research on diaspora institution emergence and importance to date has largely relied on these perspectives and

theories. We think that limiting. To understand and appreciate the recent proliferation and to some substantial extent, standardization of such institutions we also need to account for the diffusion of migration management ‘best practices’ through international organisations and networks of peer states. Doing so reveals that efforts to engage emigrants and their descendants are not just rationally determined by origin-state interests and values, but also socially-determined by global norms about how best to manage migration for mutually-beneficial development, and how best to respect emigrant human rights in destination states, all in the absence of any centralized global migration governance framework. Future study of diaspora institution emergence and importance should acknowledge and incorporate this governing perspective grounded in institutional theory. In this study, we demonstrate for researchers how that governing perspective can be integrated into a broad-sample statistical study using alternative analytical approaches and models.

We also see implications for diaspora engagement practice and public policy. Professionals working in international migration organisations and state officials charged with overseeing diaspora initiatives abroad may look to our empirical analyses and results for clues regarding where diaspora institutions are more likely to emerge or rise in importance in the near term. Simple origin-state policy initiatives touching on nonresident taxation may well signal near-term institution emergence or institution upgrade from sub- to full-ministry status. Other ‘clues’ could mislead international organisation workers and state officials. Think, for example, of trends indicating a better-educated diaspora or a partisan shift in origin-state government from left- to right-wing parties. Our study suggests which determinants of diaspora institution emergence and importance are more reliable and merit greater weight in decisions that lead to the allocation of scarce time and attention by diaspora management professionals and public policy officials.

### 5.3 Limitations and future research

As with any empirical study of political phenomena, ours has certain limitations. One is that we pool concepts and constructs at different levels (individual, collective, and state) and locations (domestic, foreign, and transnational) to develop our three perspectives on diaspora institution emergence and importance. Doing so may give rise to criticism that our study treats states as unitary actors. Though sympathetic, we think this criticism unwarranted. Rather than assuming states are monolithic, we see them as multilayered, often uncoordinated with other players in the specific issue area of diaspora engagement. Coordination is indicated by the emergence and upgrade of diaspora institutions. Our study seeks to explain the determinants of such coordinating institutions, rather than assume such coordination.

Our perspectives and our empirical models assume not only association between certain factors and diaspora institution emergence and importance, but also causation running from such factors to such emergence and importance. We took care to explain what those causal links were in theory –for example, it was the pre-existing tendency of right-wing governments to assert authority at home, that would cause them to create a new diaspora institution or upgrade the status of an existing institution so that the government might embrace their diaspora. We defined such terms conservatively, and collected data on such terms from well-vetted data sources –think of how we defined the Right-Wing Executive term in (1) based on data from the Database of Political Institutions. We lagged such terms in statistical models to give purportedly causal factors temporal precedence. We used alternative cross-sectional and panel estimators specifically tailored to assessing emergence and importance.

Yet, our results are still vulnerable to omitted variables and or variable relationships that may run in the opposite direction from diaspora institution emergence and importance to factors we treated

as causal. Future research should address these possibilities first by developing theories to explain which variables are more likely to have been omitted, how reverse causation arises. Then, follow-on empirical study might test for such omissions and reversals with, say, dynamic panel estimators designed for limited dependent variables related to institution emergence and importance.

We identify at least two additional directions for further research in this area. First, we advocate research to refine and develop the theory, data and methods we introduce here to explain why states engage their diasporas. For example, as mentioned we would like to see further studies digging deeper into the diffusion of diaspora policy models. We would also like to see longer and more detailed time-series across a fuller range of diaspora policy types and explanatory variables, dyadic rather than state-level policy data, and more detailed analyses of sub-groups of diaspora institutions. Second, we hope that this study will facilitate future research not only on the drivers of policy, but also on the impacts of diaspora engagement. For example, by introducing valid and reliable measures, we hope to enable research on how engagement moderates international flows such as remittances, investments, and technology transfers - which are often thought as the primary targets of diaspora engagement in the first place. For example, do diaspora initiatives increase remittances in terms of simple dollar values or as a percentage of origin-state GDP? Do they moderate the impact of remittances in policy areas such as education and healthcare outcomes, and new business funding and founding rates – and if so, how? Given the proliferation of diaspora engagement policy recommendations that we have highlighted in this study, and the relative shortage of rigorous policy evaluations, such research is urgently needed.

## References

- Agnew, John. A. 2003. *Geopolitics: Re-visioning World Politics*. London: Routledge.
- Agunias, Doreen. R. 2006. *From a Zero-Sum to a Win-Win Scenario: Literature Review on Circular Migration*. Washington DC: Migration Policy Institute.
- Agunias, Doreen. R., and Newland, Kathleen. 2012. *Developing a Road Map for Engaging Diasporas in Development: A Handbook for Policymakers and Practitioners in Home and Host Countries*. Washington DC: International Organization for Migration/Migration Policy Institute.
- Akaike, Hirotugu. 1974. A New Look at the Statistical Model Identification. *Transactions on Automatic Control* 19(6):716–23.
- Anderson, Benedict. 1992. *Long-Distance Nationalism, World Capitalism and the Rise of Identity Politics: The Wertheim Lecture*. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Centre for Asian Studies.
- Appleyard, Reginald. 1989. Migration and Development: Myths and Reality. *International Migration Review* 23(3):486–99.
- Barry, Kim. 2006. Home and Away: The Construction of Citizenship in an Emigration Context. *New York University Law Review* 81(1):11–59.
- Basch, Linda. G., Schiller, Nina. G., and Szanton Blanc, Christina. 1994. *Nations Unbound: Transnational Projects, Postcolonial Predicaments, and Deterritorialized Nation-States*. Amsterdam, The Netherlands: Gordon and Breach.
- Basu, Paul. 2005. Roots Tourism as Return Movement: Semantics and the Scottish Diaspora. In Marjorie Harper (Ed.), *Emigrant Homecomings: The Return Movement of Emigrants, 1600-2000*, 131–150. Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press.
- Bauböck, Ranier. 2003. Towards a Political Theory of Migrant Transnationalism. *International Migration Review* 37(3):700-723.
- Bayer, Reşat. 2006. *Diplomatic Exchange Dataset, v2006.1*. Istanbul, Turkey: Koç University. Available electronically on June 1, 2013 at <http://correlatesofwar.org>.
- Bertram, Geoff. 2006. Introduction: The MIRAB Model in the Twenty-First Century. *Asia Pacific Viewpoint* 47(1):1–13.
- Betts, Alexander. 2011. Introduction. In Alexander Betts (Ed.), *Global Migration Governance*, 1–31. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Bhagwati, Jagdish. 2003. Borders Beyond Control. *Foreign Affairs* 82(1):98–104.
- Brand, Laurie. A. 2006. *Citizens Abroad: Emigration and the State in the Middle East and North Africa*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Brubaker, Rogers. 1992. *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany*. Cambridge, MA; London, UK: Harvard University Press.
- Brubaker, Rogers., and Kim, Jaeun. 2011. Transborder Membership Politics in Germany and Korea. *European Journal of Sociology* 52(01):21–75.
- Burnham, Kenneth. P., and Anderson, David. R. 2004. Multimodel Inference: Understanding AIC and BIC in Model Selection. *Sociological Methods and Research* 33(2):261–304.
- Cano, Gustavo., and Delano, Alexandra. 2007. The Mexican Government and Organised Mexican Immigrants in the United States: A Historical Analysis of Political Transnationalism (1848-2005). *Journal of Ethnic and Migration Studies* 33(5):695-725.
- Chander, Anupam. 2001. Diaspora Bonds. *New York University Law Review* 76:1005–99.
- Checkel, Jeffrey. 1998. The Constructivist Turn in International Relations Theory. *World Politics*, 50(2):324–348.

- Cleveland, William S. 1979. Robust locally-weighted regression and smoothing scatterplots. *Journal of the American Statistical Association* 74: 829-836.
- Cohen, Robin. 2008. *Global diasporas: An Introduction*. London & New York: Routledge.
- Collier, Paul., and Hoeffler, Anke. 2004. Greed and Grievance in Civil War. *Oxford Economic Papers* 56(4):563–595.
- Cox, David R (1972). Regression Models and Life-Tables. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society, Series B* 34 (2): 187–220.
- Csergő, Zsuzsa., and Goldgeier, James. M. 2004. Nationalist Strategies and European Integration, *Perspectives on Politics* 1:21-37.
- de Haas, Hein. 2006. *Engaging Diasporas: How Governments and Development Agencies Can Support Diaspora Involvement in the Development Of Origin Countries*. Report for Oxfam Novib. Oxford, UK: International Migration Institute, University of Oxford.
- de Haas, Hein., and van Rooij, Aleida. 2010. Migration as Emancipation? The Impact of Internal and International Migration on the Position of Women Left Behind in Rural Morocco, *Oxford Development Studies* 38(1):43-62.
- Delano, Alexandra. 2011. *The Diffusion of Diaspora Engagement: A Latin-American Agenda*. Working Paper. New York, NY: The New School.
- Demetriou, Madaline. 2003. Priming the Diaspora: Cyprus and the Overseas Greek Cypriots. In Eva Østergaard-Nielsen (Ed.), *International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations*, 185–208. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Demmers, Jolle. 2007. New Wars and Diasporas: Suggestions For Research and Policy, *Journal of Peace, Conflict and Development* 11:1–26.
- Dickinson, Jen., and Bailey, Adrian. J. 2007. (Re)Membering Diaspora: Uneven Geographies Of Indian Dual Citizenship. *Political Geography* 26(7):757–74.
- DiMaggio, Paul., and Powell, Walter. 1983. The Iron Cage Revisited: Institutional Isomorphism and Collective Rationality in Organisational Fields. *American Sociological Review* 48(2):147-160.
- Docquier, Frederic, and Marfouk, Abdeslam. 2006. *International Migration By Educational Attainment (1990-2000) - Release 1.1*, in Caglar Ozden and Maurice Schiff (Eds.), *International Migration, Remittances and Development*, New York, NY: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Durand, Jorge. 2004. *From Traitors to Heroes: 100 Years of Mexican Migration Policies*. Migration Information Source, Feature Story. Washington, DC: Migration Policy Institute. Available electronically on June 1, 2013 at <http://www.migrationinformation.org/feature/display.cfm?ID=203>
- Finch, Tim., Andrew, Holly., and Latorre, Maria. 2010. *Global Brit: Making the Most Of the British Diaspora*. London, UK: Institute for Public Policy Research.
- Finnemore, Martha., and Sikkink, Kathryn. 1998. International Norm Dynamics and Political Change. *International Organisation* 52(4):887–917.
- Fullilove, Michael., and Flutter, Chloe. 2004. *Diaspora: The World Wide Web of Australians*. New South Wales, Australia: Lowy Institute for International Policy, Longueville Media.
- Gamlen, Alan. 2008. The Emigration State and the Modern Geopolitical Imagination. *Political Geography* 27(8):840–56.
- Gamlen, Alan. 2013. Creating and Destroying Diaspora Strategies: New Zealand’s Emigration Policies Re-Examined. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 38(2):238-53.
- Gamlen, Alan., and Marsh, Katherine. 2011. Introduction: Modes of Governing Global Migration. In Alan Gamlen & Katherine Marsh (Eds.), *Migration and Global Governance*. Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar.

- Glick Schiller, Nina., and Fouron, Georges. 1999. *Terrains Of Blood and Nation: Haitian Transnational Social Fields*. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22(2):340–66.
- Glick Schiller, Nina., and Fouron, Georges. 2002. *Long Distance Nationalism Defined*. In Joan Vincent (Ed.), *The Anthropology of Politics*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Hansen, Peter. 2012. *Revisiting the Remittance Mantra: A Study of Migration-Development Policy Formation in Tanzania*. *International Migration* 50(3):77–91.
- Huntington, Samuel. P. 2004. *Who Are We? The Challenges to America's National Identity*. New York, NY: Simon & Schuster.
- IDEA. 2008. *Voting From Abroad: The International IDEA Handbook*. Stockholm, Sweden: International Institute for Democracy and Electoral Assistance.
- Ionescu, Dina. 2006. *Engaging Diasporas As Development Partners For Home and Destination Countries: Challenges For Policymakers*. Geneva, Switzerland: International Organization for Migration.
- Iskander, Natasha. 2010. *Creative State: Forty Years of Migration and Development Policy in Morocco and Mexico*. New York, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Itzigsohn, Jose. 2000. *Immigrants and the Boundaries of Citizenship: The Institutions of Immigrants' Political Transnationalism*. *International Migration Review* 34(4):1126–54.
- Jenny, Rolf. 2008. *Towards a Multilateral Framework for International Migration. Making Globalisation Work for Developing Countries*. Research Seminar of the Global Economic Governance Programme. Oxford, UK: University of Oxford.
- Joppke, Christian. 2005. *Selecting by Origin: Ethnic Migration in the Liberal State*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Kapur, Devesh. 2001. *Diasporas and Technology Transfer*. *Journal of Human Development* 2(2):265–86.
- Kapur, Devesh. 2003. *Remittances: The New Development Mantra*. Paper Prepared for the G-24 Technical Group Meeting. Geneva, Switzerland: United Nations Center for Trade and Development.
- Katzenstein, Peter., Keohane, Robert., and Krasner, Stephen. 1998. *International Organisation and the Study of World Politics*. *International Organisation* 52(4):645–85.
- Keefer, Philip. 2010. *Database Of Political Institutions: Changes and Variable Definitions*. Development Research Group. Washington, DC: World Bank.
- Kindleberger, Charles. P. 1965. *Emigration and Economic Growth*. *Banca Nazionale Del Lavoro Quarterly Review* 28:235–54.
- King, Charles. E., and Melvin, Neil. 1999. *Nations Abroad: Diaspora Politics and International Relations in the Former Soviet Union*. Boulder, CO: Westview Press.
- Klerman, Daniel M., Mahoney, Paul G., Spamann, Holger, and Weinstein, Mark I. 2011. *Legal Origin or Colonial History?* *Journal of Legal Analysis* 3(2): 379-409.
- Koser, Khalid. 2003. *Long-Distance Nationalism and the Responsible State: The Case of Eritrea*. In Eva Østergaard-Nielsen (Ed.), *International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations*, 171–184. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Koslowski, Rey (Ed.). 2004. *International Migration and the Globalization of Domestic Politics*. London: Routledge.
- Kunz, Rahel., and Maisenbacher, Julia. 2013. *Beyond Conditionality Versus Cooperation: Power and Resistance in the Case of EU Mobility Partnerships and Swiss Migration Partnerships*. *Migration Studies* 1(2):196-220.

- Kuznetsov, Yevgeny (Ed). 2006. *Diaspora Networks and the International Migration of Skills*. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
- Kuznetsov, Yevgeny., and Sabel, Charles. 2006. International Migration of Talent, Diaspora Networks, and Development: Overview Of Main Issues. In Yevgeny Kunetsov (Ed.), *Diaspora Networks and the International Migration of Skills*, 3–20. Washington, D.C.: The World Bank.
- Laguerre, Michael. S. 1998. *Diasporic Citizenship: Haitian Americans in Transnational America*, Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Larner, Wendy. 2007. Expatriate Experts and Globalising Governmentalities: The New Zealand Diaspora Strategy. *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 32(3):331-45.
- Leblang, David. 2010. *Harnessing the Diaspora: Dual Citizenship, Migrant Remittances and Return*. Working Paper. Charlottesville, VA: University of Virginia. Available electronically on June 1, 2013 at: [https://bc.sas.upenn.edu/system/files/Leblang\\_10.07.11.pdf](https://bc.sas.upenn.edu/system/files/Leblang_10.07.11.pdf).
- Levitt, Peggy., and De la Dehesa, Rafel. 2003. Transnational Migration and the Redefinition of the State: Variations and Explanations. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 26(4):587–611.
- Logan, Bernard. 1990. An Assessment of the Potential Application of the Transfer of Knowledge Through Expatriate Nationals (TOKTEN) Programme in Sub-Saharan Africa. *Applied Geography* 10(3):223-236.
- Long, J., and Freese, Jeremy. 2006. *Regression Models for Categorical Dependent Variables Using Stata*. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP.
- McFadden, Daniel. 1973. Conditional Logit Analysis of Qualitative Choice Behavior. In Paul Zarembka (Ed.) *Frontiers in Econometrics*, 105–42. New York, NY: Academic Press.
- Mayer, Thierry, and Zignago, Soledad. 2011. Notes on CEPII's Distances Measures: The GeoDist Database. CEPII Document de Travail No 2011-25 December. Paris, France: Centre d'Etudes Prospectives et d'Informations Internationales.
- Meyer, John. W. 2010. World Society, Institutional Theories, and the Actor. *Annual Review of Sociology*, 36(1):1–20.
- Meyer, John. W., Boli, John., Thomas, George., and Ramirez, Francisco. 1997. World Society and the Nation-State. *American Journal of Sociology* 103(1):144-81.
- Meyer, John. W., and Jepperson, Ronald. 2000. The 'Actors' of Modern Society: The Cultural Construction of Social Agency. *Sociological Theory* 18(1):100-20.
- Mullings, Beverly. 2011. Diaspora Strategies, Skilled Migrants and Human Capital Enhancement in Jamaica. *Global Networks-a Journal of Transnational Affairs* 11(1):24–42.
- Nielsen, T. and Riddle, L. 2009. Investing in Peace: The Motivational Dynamics of Diaspora Investment in Post-Conflict Economies, *Journal of Business Ethics* 89(4):435-48.
- Orjuela, Camilla. 2008. Distant Warriors, Distant Peace Workers? Multiple Diaspora Roles in Sri Lanka's Violent Conflict. *Global Networks* 8(4):373–504.
- Østergaard-Nielsen, Eva. 2003a. Turkey and the 'Euro Turks:' Overseas Nationals as an Ambiguous Asset. In Eva Østergaard-Nielsen (Ed.), *International Migration and Sending Countries: Perceptions, Policies and Transnational Relations*, 77–98. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Østergaard-Nielsen, Eva. 2003b. The Politics of Migrants' Transnational Political Practices. *International Migration Review* 37(3):760–86.
- Peck, Jamie. 2011. Progress in Human Geography, Geographies of Policy: Progress in Human Geography 35(6):773–97.
- Pellerin, Helene., and Mullings, Beverly. 2013. The 'Diaspora Option,' Migration and the Changing Political Economy of Development. *Review of International Political Economy* 20(1):89–120.

- Polity IV Project. 2012. Political Regime Characteristics and Transitions, 1800-2011. Available electronically on June 1, 2013 at <http://www.systemicpeace.org/inscr/inscr.htm>
- Portes, Alejandro., Guarnizo, Luis., and Landolt, Patricia. 1999. The Study of Transnationalism: Pitfalls and Promise of an Emergent Research Field. *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 22(2):217-37.
- Ragazzi, Francesco. 2009. Governing Diasporas. *International Political Sociology* 3(4):378–97.
- Ratha, Dilip. 2003. Workers' Remittances: An Important and Stable Source of External Development Finance. *Global Development Finance*, 157–175.
- Rhodes, Sybil., and Harutyunyan, Arus. 2010. Extending Citizenship to Emigrants: Democratic Contestation and a New Global Norm. *International Political Science Review* 31(4):470–93.
- Schwartz, Gideon E. 1978. Estimating the dimension of a model. *Annals of Statistics* 6(2): 461–464.
- Shain, Yossi. 1999. *Marketing the American Creed Abroad: Diasporas in the US and Their Homelands*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Shain, Yossi. 2002. The Role of Diasporas in Conflict Perpetuation or Resolution. *SAIS Review* 22(2):115-144.
- Shain, Yossi., and Barth, Aharon. 2003. Diasporas and International Relations Theory. *International Organisation* 57(3):449–479.
- Singer, J. David, Bremer, Stuart., and Stuckey, John. 1972. National Material Capabilities (v4.0) from Capability Distribution, Uncertainty, and Major Power War, 1820-1965. In Bruce Russett (Ed.) *Peace, War, and Numbers*, 19-48. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.
- Skeldon, Ronald. 2008. International Migration as a Tool in Development Policy: A Passing Phase? *Population and Development Review* 34:1-18.
- Smith, Robert. C. 2003. Migrant Membership as an Instituted Process: Transnationalization, the State and the Extra-Territorial Conduct of Mexican Politics. *International Migration Review* 37(3):297–343.
- Smith, Steve. 2000. The Discipline of International Relations: Still an American Social Science? *The British Journal of Politics and International Relations* 2(3):374–402.
- Solomon, Scott. State-led Migration, Democratic Legitimacy, and Deterritorialization: The Philippines' Labour Export Model. *European Journal of East Asian Studies* 28(2):275-300.
- Stark, Oded., and Bloom, David. 1985. The New Economics Of Labor Migration. *American Economic Review* 75(2):173–178.
- StataCorp. 2011. *Stata Statistical Software: Release 12*. College Station, TX: StataCorp LP.
- Tavits, Margit, and Letki, Natalia. 2009. When Left Is Right: Party Ideology and Policy in Post-Communist Europe. *American Political Science Review* 103(4): 555-569.
- Taylor, Edward. J. 1999. The New Economics of Labour Migration and the Role of Remittances in the Migration Process. *International Migration* 37(1):63–88.
- Thouez, Colleen., and Channac, Frederique. 2006. Shaping International Migration Policy: The Role of Regional Consultative Processes. *West European Politics* 29(2):370–387.
- UIA. 2012. *Yearbook Of International Organisations 1990–2012*. Brussels, Belgium: Union of International Associations.
- United Nations Secretary-General. 2010. *International Migration and Development: Report of the Secretary-General, Sixty-Fifth Session, Item 22 (C) of the Provisional Agenda, Globalization and Interdependence*. United Nations General Assembly. New York, NY: United Nations.
- USAID. 2013. *USAID Partnership Opportunities: Diaspora*. Available online at <http://www.usaid.gov/partnership-opportunities/diaspora-engagement>, last viewed 10 Oct. 2013.



- Vaaler, Paul M. 2011. Immigrant Remittances and the Venture Investment Environment of Developing Countries. *Journal of International Business Studies* 42(9): 1121-1149.
- Vammen, Ida. M., and Brønden, Brigitte. M. 2012. Donor-Country Responses to the Migration-Development Buzz: From Ambiguous Concepts to Ambitious Policies? *International Migration* 50(3):26-42.
- Varadarajan, Latha. 2010 *The Domestic Abroad: Diasporas in International Relations*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Vertovec, Steven. 2009. Cosmopolitanism in Attitude, Practice and Competence. MMG Working Paper 09-08. Max Planck Institute for the Study of Religious and Ethnic Diversity, Göttingen.
- von Koppenfels, Amanda. K. 2001. Informal but Effective: Regional Consultative Processes as a Tool in Managing Migration. *International Migration* 39(6):61-84.
- Wagenmakers, Eric-Jan., and Farrell, Simon. 2004. AIC Model Selection Using Akaike Weights. *Psychonomic Bulletin & Review* 11(1):192-196.
- Warner, Elizabeth. 2003-2004. Unilateral Preferences Granted to Foreign National Minorities by a Kin-State: A Case Study of Hungary's "Status Law". *Georgetown Journal of International Law* 35: 379-432.
- Waterbury, Myra. A. 2011. *Between State and Nation: Diaspora Politics and Kin-State Nationalism in Hungary*. Basingstoke, UK: Palgrave Macmillan.
- World Bank. 2012a. *World Development Indicators*. Washington, DC: World Bank Group.
- World Bank. 2012b. *Global Bilateral Migration Database*. Washington, DC: World Bank Group. And Özden, Caglar, Parsons, Christopher, Schiff, Maurice, & Walmsley, Terrie L. 2011. Where on Earth is Everybody? The Evolution of Global Bilateral Migration, 1960-2000. *World Bank Economic Review* 25(1):12-56