

Fast Generation of Prime Numbers and Secure Public-Key Cryptographic Parameters*

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Abstract. A very efficient recursive algorithm for generating nearly random provable primes is presented. The expected time for generating a prime is only slightly greater than the expected time required for generating a pseudoprime of the same size that passes the Miller–Rabin test for only one base. Therefore our algorithm is even faster than algorithms presently used for generating only pseudoprimes because several Miller–Rabin tests with independent bases must be applied for achieving a sufficient confidence level. Heuristic arguments suggest that the generated primes are close to uniformly distributed over the set of primes in the specified interval.

Security constraints on the prime parameters of certain cryptographic systems are discussed, and in particular a detailed analysis of the iterated encryption attack on the RSA public-key cryptosystem is presented. The prime-generation algorithm can easily be modified to generate nearly random primes or RSA-moduli that satisfy these security constraints. Further results described in this paper include an analysis of the optimal upper bound for trial division in the Miller–Rabin test as well as an analysis of the distribution of the number of bits of the smaller prime factor of a random k -bit RSA-modulus, given a security bound on the size of the two primes.

Key words. Public-key cryptography, Prime numbers, Primality proof, Miller–Rabin test, RSA cryptosystem, Number theory.

1. Introduction

A variety of cryptographic systems, including public-key distribution systems [28], [45], [58], public-key cryptosystems [30], [36], [47], [79], digital signature schemes [30], [79], [80], [82], [90], and identification protocols [32], [39], and a

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large number of variations of some of these systems have recently been proposed. The security of most public-key schemes is based on the (conjectured) difficulty of certain number-theoretic problems such as the factorization of large integers or the discrete logarithm problem in some finite group, and their public and/or private parameters include one or several large prime numbers.

This paper reviews previous approaches to the generation of cryptographic primes and its main purpose is to present a new algorithm for generating prime numbers and secure public-key parameters. This algorithm has the properties that it yields provable primes (as opposed to only probable primes or pseudoprimes), that the primes can be expected to be chosen at random with sufficiently uniform distribution from the set of primes in a specified interval and, more importantly, that it is faster than all previous methods for generating even only pseudoprimes for cryptographic applications. More precisely, the algorithm is less than 40% slower than an optimal algorithm for generating a strong pseudoprime that passes the Miller–Rabin test for only one base, and this number can be reduced to less than 5% when some deviations from the uniform distribution can be tolerated. Moreover, the algorithm is easily modified to generate primes that satisfy certain important cryptographic security constraints, without increasing the expected running time and without causing significant further deviation of the distribution from the uniform distribution over all primes in a given interval satisfying these conditions. A further goal of the paper is to present several new theoretical results on the RSA public-key cryptosystem.

A large prime number can in principle be generated by repeatedly choosing an integer n at random from the specified interval and testing n for primality. The simplest primality test is to divide the given number n by all primes less than or equal to \sqrt{n} , but this approach is completely infeasible when the length of n exceeds 15–20 decimal digits. Several sophisticated general-purposes algorithms for testing primality exist [20], [64] (see also [49]). According to [66], the current record in primality testing is held by Morain [65] who proved the primality of a 1505-digit number of a general form using massive parallel computational resources.

The history of theoretical results on primality testing is long. Pratt [75] showed that the primes are recognizable in nondeterministic polynomial time, Miller [62] proved that the Riemann hypothesis for Dirichlet L-functions implied that the primes were recognizable in deterministic polynomial time. Adleman *et al.* [2] showed that the primes were recognizable in deterministic time $O((\log n)^{c \log \log \log n})$ for some constant c , and finally Adleman and Huang proved in a seminal report [1] that the primes were recognizable in random polynomial time. A significant step toward this result was achieved by Goldwasser and Kilian [35]. It is interesting to note that the primality tests used in practice [20], [64] appear to have superpolynomial running times and that the algorithm of [1] is superior only for very large numbers that are by far out of reach for presently available computational resources.

Special-purpose primality tests exist for numbers of certain special forms (for instance, for Mersenne numbers which are of the form $2^q - 1$ where q is a

prime [48]), but these primes can not generally be used in cryptography for security reasons. For instance, Mersenne prime factors of a given integer can be found easily.

In most present implementations of public-key cryptographic systems the primes are generated by application of a probabilistic compositeness test [62], [76], [85]. The most popular such test is the so-called Miller–Rabin test [76]. Let n be an integer to be tested and let $n - 1 = 2^u v$ with v odd. The integer n passes the test for the base b if and only if either

$$b^v \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$$

or

$$b^{2^i v} \equiv -1 \pmod{n}$$

for some i satisfying $0 \leq i < u$. It can be shown that every composite number n can pass this test for at most one-quarter of the bases b in the interval $[1, \dots, n - 1]$. Hence the probability that a composite integer is not detected by t applications of the Miller–Rabin test with independent randomly chosen bases is at most $(\frac{1}{4})^t$ [63]. In fact, much stronger results can be proved because for most composite integers the fraction of bases satisfying the above conditions is much smaller than one-quarter. Let $p_{k,t}$ denote the probability that, when odd k -bit integers are selected at random until one of them passes t consecutive independent Miller–Rabin tests, this integer is prime. Note as an aside that it does not follow from the described bound that $p_{k,t} \leq (\frac{1}{4})^t$ [11] because $p_{k,t}$ depends on the density of primes. However, Kim and Pomerance [43] and Damgård *et al.* [23] proved much stronger bounds on $p_{k,t}$. For instance, $p_{256,6} \leq 2^{-52}$ [23]. While for large enough t the error probability $p_{k,t}$ can be made sufficiently small for all practical purposes, the primality of an integer cannot be proved by a feasible number of such compositeness tests. However, such a proof would follow from the unproven extended Riemann hypothesis (see [62]). Alford, Granville, and Pomerance (see [38]) proved that for every given finite set of bases composite numbers exist that pass the Miller–Rabin test for these bases. Bleichenbacher [13] exhibits a 55-digit composite number which passes the test for all bases ≤ 100 . One of the results proved in [14] is that the Miller–Rabin test for the bases 2, 3, 5, 7, 11, 13, and 23 is a correct primality test for numbers $\leq 10^{16}$. Jaeschke [42] has also derived correctness bounds for the Miller–Rabin test when applied for several bases.

In this paper we consider the problem of generating random primes together with a *certificate of primality*. Our results draw on Pocklington's [69], on Pratt's [75], and on Bach's [4] work: the certificate for a prime p contains a partial factorization of $p - 1$. However, in contrast to Bach's algorithm [4] for generating (truly) random factored integers, our algorithm does not make use of a general primality test. Of course, if such a general primality test were sufficiently fast, it could be used in our context directly for generating primes, without a detour to generating random partially factored numbers first. In other words, avoiding the use of such a test while nevertheless obtaining provable primes is one of the goals of this paper.

The generation of provable primes has previously been considered [22], [68], [83], but the major advantages of our algorithm are that it is faster and that the diversity of primes that can be generated is much larger. Heuristic arguments suggest that a generated prime is close to uniformly distributed over a specified interval where only a small fraction of the primes is excluded for efficiency reasons. Moreover, our algorithm can, at no extra computational cost, be modified to generate a prime p that satisfies certain cryptographic security constraints.

The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes some number-theoretic results. The proposed algorithm for generating primes as well as a simplified version of it are described in Section 3. The running time analysis for these algorithms as well as for generating pseudoprimes is presented in Section 4, where the optimal bound for trial division in these algorithms is derived. Cryptographic security constraints on primes and RSA-moduli are discussed in Section 5. The probability distributions of the relative size of the prime factors of large "random" integers are discussed in Appendix 1. Appendix 2 provides a detailed analysis of the iterated-encryption attack against the RSA cryptosystem [79]. An asymptotic theorem of possible independent interest about the distribution of the size of the smaller prime factor of a random integer of a given size, known to be the product of exactly two primes, is analyzed in Appendix 3.

2. Number-Theoretic Preliminaries

Throughout this paper Z_n^* denotes the multiplicative group modulo n , $ord_n(x)$ denotes the order of x in Z_n^* , i.e., the smallest positive integer t satisfying $x^t \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$, and $\varphi(n)$ denotes Euler's totient function, i.e., the number of positive integers smaller than and relatively prime to n , with the exception $\varphi(1) = 1$. The greatest common divisor of a and b is denoted by (a, b) and the cardinality of a finite set S is denoted by $\#S$. All logarithms are to the natural base e . A basic fact about multiplicative orders is that, for every $x \in Z_m^*$,

$$n|m \Rightarrow ord_n(x) | ord_m(x). \quad (1)$$

The following lemma, which is a key fact used in our algorithm, is a special case of a theorem due to Pocklington [69] (see also [16] or [48]).

Lemma 1. *Let $n = 2RF + 1$ where the prime factorization of F is $F = q_1^{\beta_1} q_2^{\beta_2} \cdots q_r^{\beta_r}$. If there is an integer a satisfying*

$$a^{n-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{n}$$

and

$$(a^{(n-1)/q_j} - 1, n) = 1$$

for $j = 1, \dots, r$, then each prime factor p of n is of the form $p = mF + 1$ for some integer $m \geq 1$. Moreover, if $F > \sqrt{n}$, or if F is odd and $F > R$, then n is prime.

Proof. Let p be any prime dividing n . From the first and second condition on a it follows that $\text{ord}_p(a)$ divides $n - 1$ and that $\text{ord}_p(a)$ does not divide $(n - 1)/q_j$ for $j = 1, \dots, r$, respectively. Therefore $\text{ord}_p(a)$ is a multiple of $q_j^{\beta_j}$ for $j = 1, \dots, r$, hence also of F , and thus so is $p - 1$. The last claim of the lemma follows from the fact that at most one prime factor of a number can be greater than its square root and that when F is odd, the smallest possible prime factor of n is $2F + 1$; hence n can be composite only if $n \geq (2F + 1)^2$, which contradicts $F > R$. \square

The following lemma allows us to prove the primality of an integer n even when the factored part is only greater than $\sqrt[3]{n}$ rather than \sqrt{n} . It is pointed out that this lemma can be used to speed up the prime-generation algorithm described in the following section at the expense of somewhat distorting the uniformity of the distribution of the generated primes.

Lemma 2. *Let n , R , F , and a be as in Lemma (1) and let $x \geq 0$ and y be defined by $2R = xF + y$ and $0 \leq y < F$. If $F \geq \sqrt[3]{n}$ and if $y^2 - 4x$ is neither 0 nor a perfect square, then n is prime.*

Proof. According to Lemma 1 every prime factor of n is at least $F + 1$. Therefore, because $n \leq F^3$, n can have at most two prime factors. Assume n is composite, i.e., $n = (m_1F + 1)(m_2F + 1) = m_1m_2F^2 + (m_1 + m_2)F + 1$ for some $m_1 \geq m_2$. Hence $2R = m_1m_2F + m_1 + m_2$. Since $m_1m_2 < F$ and the choice $\langle m_1, m_2 \rangle = \langle F - 1, 1 \rangle$ violates $n \leq F^3$, it follows that $m_1 + m_2 < F$ and hence that $x = m_1m_2$ and $y = m_1 + m_2$. Substituting m_2 by $y - m_1$ in $x = m_1m_2$ gives $m_1^2 - ym_1 + x = 0$, which has a solution for m_1 in integers if and only if $y^2 - 4x$ is a perfect square or 0. \square

To show that a large integer is not a perfect square it suffices to find a small prime modulo where the number is a quadratic nonresidue. Quadratic residuosity can be tested by computing the Legendre symbol. The expected number of Legendre symbol computations for proving that a given integer is not a square is on the order of 2. The problem of proving a number is not a perfect square was considered in [19]. For related results and more references we refer to [9]. Results that are similar to this lemma are described in [17] and [22], but the proofs appear to be more complicated. Note that Lemmas 1 and 2 can easily be generalized to allow a to be different for each q_j [16], but we will only make use of the special case because Lemma 4 demonstrates that, in our application, virtually every base a is successful in proving a number prime by application of Lemma 1.

A few basic facts about Euler's φ -function are

$$\frac{\varphi(n)}{n} = \prod_{p|n} \left(1 - \frac{1}{p}\right) \geq 1 - \sum_{p|n} \frac{1}{p}, \quad (2)$$

where the product and summation are over all (distinct) prime divisors of n ,

$$\varphi(ab) \geq \varphi(a)\varphi(b) \tag{3}$$

with equality if and only if $(a, b) = 1$, and

$$\sum_{d|n} \varphi(d) = n. \tag{4}$$

The group Z_p^* is cyclic for every prime p and hence

$$\#\{x \in Z_p^* : \text{ord}_p(x) = d\} = \varphi(d) \tag{5}$$

for every divisor d of $p - 1$.

Lemma 3. *Let p be a prime and let d be a divisor of $p - 1$. Then*

$$\#\{x \in Z_p^* : d | \text{ord}_p(x)\} \geq \frac{\varphi(d)}{d} (p - 1)$$

with equality if and only if $(d, (p - 1)/d) = 1$.

Proof. Using (5), (3), and (4) we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \#\{x \in Z_p^* : d | \text{ord}_p(x)\} &= \sum_{d' : d|d'(p-1)} \varphi(d') = \sum_{k : k|(p-1)/d} \varphi(kd) \\ &\geq \sum_{k : k|(p-1)/d} \varphi(k)\varphi(d) = \varphi(d) \sum_{k : k|(p-1)/d} \varphi(k) \\ &= \varphi(d) \frac{p - 1}{d}. \end{aligned}$$

The inequality holds with equality if and only if $(d, (p - 1)/d) = 1$. □

Remark. The proof demonstrates that Lemma 3 holds for any cyclic group when $\text{ord}_p(x)$ and $p - 1$ are replaced by the order of x in the group and the order of the group, respectively, but this generalization is not used in the paper.

The following lemma demonstrates that if n is prime, then virtually every base a can successfully be used in Lemma 1 to prove this fact, provided that all the q_j 's are sufficiently large (which will always be the case in our application).

Lemma 4. *Let $p = 2RF + 1$ be a prime with $F = \prod_{j=1}^r q_j^{\beta_j}$, $F > R$, and $(2R, F) = 1$, where q_1, \dots, q_r are distinct primes. Then the probability that a randomly selected base $a \in Z_p^*$ is successful in proving the primality of p by Lemma one is equal to $\varphi(F)/F$ which is at least $1 - \sum_{j=1}^r 1/q_j$.*

Proof. $a^{p-1} \equiv 1 \pmod{p}$ is satisfied for every $a \in Z_p^*$. If $(2R, F) = 1$, then the two statements $F | \text{ord}_p(a)$ and

$$a^{(p-1)/q_j} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{p}$$

for $1 \leq j \leq r$ are equivalent. Application of Lemma 3 with $d = F$ and of (2) completes the proof. \square

3. A Recursive Algorithm for Generating Nearly Random Primes

A very efficient algorithm for generating provable primes with approximately uniform distribution over the set of primes in a given interval is described in this section. For efficiency reasons, a small fraction of the primes p in the interval are excluded, namely, those of the form $p = 2ap' + 1$ for a small a and with p' prime. A simplified version of the algorithm which is straightforward to implement is given in Section 3.4. Readers interested only in this simplified version can skip much of Sections 3.1–3.3. In Section 5 we describe how the algorithms can be modified to generate nearly random primes satisfying certain security constraints.

3.1. Outline of the Algorithm

Lemma 1 suggests constructing a large prime by choosing some primes q_1, \dots, q_r , computing $F = \prod_{i=1}^r q_i^{\beta_i}$ for some exponents β_1, \dots, β_r , and repeatedly choosing integers $R < F$ at random until $n = 2RF + 1$ can be proved to be prime by Lemma 1 for an appropriate choice of the base a . Lemma 4 shows that if n is prime, then finding such a base is easy. On the other hand, if n is composite, then virtually every base a will satisfy $a^{n-1} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{n}$ and hence be a witness for the compositeness of n , unless n is of a very special form (see [11] and [18]). (Of course, in a reasonable implementation, n is first tested for small prime divisors before applying a modular exponentiation.)

Instead of choosing F and R sufficiently large at the beginning, the described construction approach can also be applied repeatedly by using some generated primes as factors of a larger F , thereby constructing larger and larger primes [83]. However, one major problem with this approach is that it is difficult to control the diversity of reachable primes and that this might endanger the security of a cryptosystem. For instance, factoring the product of two such primes could be significantly easier than solving a general instance of the factoring problem. Moreover, the algorithm of [83] is less efficient than our algorithm.

The goal of our algorithm, although it is based on the above construction, is that the primes be selected randomly with reasonably uniform distribution from the set of primes in a given interval. This goal is achieved by generating sufficiently many of the largest prime factors q_1, q_2, \dots of $(n-1)/2$ (only one or two are needed in most cases), each of appropriate size as described below.

These prime factors are generated by recursive application of the algorithm. Depending on whether Lemma 1 or Lemma 2 is used for the primality proof of n , the factored part of $n - 1$ must exceed \sqrt{n} or $\sqrt[3]{n}$, respectively.

In order to assure that the generated prime n is chosen (almost) at random despite the fact that $n - 1$ is constructed in part from known prime factors, the sizes of these prime factors must be chosen according to the appropriate probability distributions. The distributions of the sizes of the largest prime factors of a randomly selected large integer¹ has been investigated in [44]. For instance, the probability that the relative size² of the largest prime factor is at most α is for $\frac{1}{2} \leq \alpha \leq 1$ given by $1 + \log \alpha$ (see Appendix 1).³ For example, the probability that the largest prime factor of an integer is smaller than its square root is $1 + \log(\frac{1}{2}) = 1 - \log 2 = 0.307$, and the probability that the length of the largest prime factor exceeds 95% of the length of the integer is only $-\log 0.95 = 0.051$.

The distributions of the sizes of the prime factors of a large random integer as well as a simple algorithm due to Bach [6] for sampling according to these distributions are discussed in Appendix 1. Note that one would actually have to use the *conditional* distribution of the relative sizes of the prime factors of an integer x , given that $2x + 1$ is prime. However, strong heuristic arguments for showing that this condition does not change the asymptotic distribution are given in [56]. Further results supporting the idea that when p is prime, the factorization pattern of $p - 1$ does not differ greatly from that of a “random” number can be found in [10], [31], [33], [34], [40], [41], [46], [72], [74], and [89].

3.2. Description of Procedure RandomPrime

A listing of PROCEDURE RandomPrime is shown in Fig. 1. It is intended to serve as a guideline rather than a blueprint for an implementation, and some additional hints for an actual implementation are given below and in Section 3.3. A simplified and easy-to-implement version of the algorithm for which the diversity of the generated primes is somewhat reduced is described in Section 3.4.

We use a Pascal-like notation, where keywords are in capital letters. The same variable and constant names are used somewhat differently in the text and in the listing, but we believe that this should cause no confusion. Names with subscripts in the text are used in the listing by incorporating the subscript into

¹ Of course, it is impossible to generate random integers with uniform distribution. This imprecise wording should here and below be understood as meaning to choose an integer at random from the interval $[1, N]$, or $[cN, N]$ for some $c < 1$, where N goes to infinity.

² We define the relative size of an integer a with respect to an integer b as $\log a / \log b$ which is independent of the base to which the logarithms are computed. For instance, the square root of an integer has relative size $\frac{1}{2}$.

³ Throughout the paper, \log denotes the natural logarithm (base e) unless a different base is specified.

```

PROCEDURE RandomPrime(P1,P2: LongInt; VAR p: LongInt);

CONST c_int = 1.2; rmax = 10; P0 = 10000000;

TYPE PFactorList = ARRAY [1..rmax] OF LongInt;
     RelSizeList = ARRAY [1..rmax] OF REAL;
VAR   a,n,P,Q,F,I1,I2: LongInt;
      i,g,r: INTEGER; success: BOOLEAN;
      sl: RelSizeList; pfl: PFactorList;
FUNCTION Sqrt(a: LongInt): LongInt;
FUNCTION Exponentiate(a: LongInt; e: REAL): LongInt;
FUNCTION Random(a,b: LongInt): LongInt;
FUNCTION PrimeTest(a: LongInt): BOOLEAN;
FUNCTION TrialDivision(a,b: LongInt): BOOLEAN;
FUNCTION g_opt(a: LongInt): LongInt;
PROCEDURE GenerateSizeList(VAR rsl: RelSizeList; VAR r: INTEGER);
FUNCTION CheckLemma1(u,v: LongInt; L: PFactorList; r: INTEGER): BOOLEAN;

BEGIN
  IF P2 <= P0 THEN BEGIN
    REPEAT
      n := Random(P1,P2);
    UNTIL PrimeTest(n);
    p := n; END;
  ELSE BEGIN
    GenerateSizeList(sl,r);
    P := Sqrt((P1-1)*(P2-1)) DIV 2;
    F := 1; g := g_opt(P);
    FOR i := 1 TO r DO BEGIN
      Q := Exponentiate(P,sl[i]);
      RandomPrime(Q/c_int,Q*c_int,pfl[i]);
      F := F*pfl[i];
    END;
    I1 := (P1-1) DIV (2*F); I2 := (P2-1) DIV (2*F);
    success := FALSE;
    WHILE NOT(success) DO BEGIN
      n := 2 * Random(I1,I2) * F + 1;
      a := Random(2,P);
      IF TrialDivision(n,g) THEN success := CheckLemma1(n,a,pfl,r);
    END;
    p := n;
  END;
END.

```

Fig. 1. Sketch of a listing of procedure RandomPrime in a Pascal-like notation. The function and procedure implementations are discussed in the text.

the name (e.g., P_1 in the text corresponds to P1 in Fig. 1). The functions `Sqrt`, `Exponentiate`, `Random`, `PrimeTest`, `TrialDivision`, `g_opt` and `CheckLemma1` and procedure `GenerateSizeList` are described in the following. The listing of Fig. 1 shows only the function and procedure declarations, without implementations.

A variable of the type `LongInt` can represent integers of the size needed in a cryptographic context (e.g., up to 1024 bits). Such a type is often implemented (if no special-purpose hardware is available) by an array of integers whose first component contains the number d of active (nonzero) array components and whose first d components represent the integer in some fixed base (e.g., base 2^{16}). A set of procedures implementing the basic arithmetic operations for integers of the type `LongInt` are assumed to be available, but the calls to these procedures are not shown explicitly in Fig. 1. Instead, the usual notation for integer operations ($+$, $-$, $*$, `DIV`) is used. Moreover, for the sake of simplicity, we allow numbers of the types `INTEGER` and `LongInt` to be multiplied and divided by `REAL` numbers.

FUNCTION `Sqrt(a: LongInt)`: `LongInt` returns the square root of a (this is equivalent to a in the function declaration), rounded to the nearest integer or, in a more efficient implementation, some integer approximation of the square root of a depending only on the most significant bits and the length of a .
FUNCTION `Exponentiate(a: LongInt; e: REAL)`: `LongInt` returns the largest integer not greater than a^e , or a good approximation of this number.
FUNCTION `Random(a,b: LongInt)`: `LongInt` selects an integer at random from the interval $[a, b]$ with uniform distribution.

FUNCTION `PrimeTest(a: LongInt)`: `BOOLEAN` returns the value `TRUE` if and only if a is a prime. It must be efficient only for relatively small integers and can, for instance, be implemented as trial division up to the square root of the tested number. This procedure is needed to end the recursion in the procedure `RandomPrime` when the primes to be generated are sufficiently small.

FUNCTION `TrialDivision(a,b: LongInt)`: `BOOLEAN` returns the value `TRUE` if and only if a is not divisible by a prime smaller or equal to b . This procedure requires a list of small primes, e.g., the primes smaller than $2^{16} = 65536$.

FUNCTION `g_opt(a: LongInt)`: `LongInt` returns the optimal trial division bound (see Section 4) which minimizes the total time for detecting the compositeness of an integer. This bound depends both on the size of the integer to be tested as well as on the particular implementation of long-integer arithmetic.

PROCEDURE `GenerateSizeList(VAR rsl: RelSizeList; VAR r: INTEGER)` generates an ordered list of relative sizes of prime factors of an integer according to the procedure described in Appendix 1, where the number of prime factors is returned in the variable r . Typically, the list consists of one to three elements consists of one or two elements. Examples of such lists are $[0.68]$, $[0.42, 0.35]$, and $[0.32, 0.14, 0.09]$. Without the modifications discussed in Section 3.3, the probability that the list consists of only one element (i.e., $r = 1$) is $\log 2 = 0.693$. The probabilities that $r = 2$, $r = 3$, $r = 4$, and $r = 5$ are approximately 25.8%, 4.4%, 0.45%, and 0.035%, respectively.

FUNCTION CheckLemma1(n, a : LongInt, L : PFactorList; r : INTEGER): **BOOLEAN** takes as input two integers n and a and a list $L = [q_1, \dots, q_r]$ of prime factors of $n - 1$, where the length of the list is given by the parameter r . It returns the value **TRUE** if and only if the two conditions of Lemma 1 are satisfied, which proves that n is prime. When $r = 1$ (i.e., $L = [q_1]$), the consecutive computation of $a^{(n-1)/q_1}$ and a^{n-1} corresponds to only one full modular exponentiation. When $r > 1$ and n is prime, then procedure CheckLemma1 requires slightly more than a full modular exponentiation for proving the primality of n . We refer to Section 4 for a running time analysis of procedure CheckLemma1.

For given P_1 and P_2 , **PROCEDURE** RandomPrime($P1, P2$: LongInt; **VAR** p : LongInt) generates and returns a prime number p in the interval $[P_1, P_2]$ (for example, the interval $[2^{511}, 2^{512} - 1]$ of 512-bit integers). When P_2 is smaller than a given constant P_0 (e.g., $P_0 = 10^7$), then the prime p can be generated by selecting integers at random from $[P_1, P_2]$ until a prime is found, which is checked by using the function PrimeTest (i.e., for instance by trial division up to its square root). This part of procedure RandomPrime is needed to end the recursion described below.

When $P_2 > P_0$, the construction approach described in Section 3.1 is used. Let $P = \sqrt{(P_1 - 1)(P_2 - 1)/2}$ be the (approximate) geometric midpoint of the interval $[(P_1 - 1)/2, (P_2 - 1)/2]$. The number of primes in F is equal to the parameter r returned by procedure GenerateSizeList, and the relative sizes s_1, \dots, s_r of q_1, \dots, q_r are chosen according to the list of relative sizes returned by procedure GenerateSizeList in the variable $s1$. For each of these primes q_i with relative size $s_i = s1[i]$, the actual approximate size $Q \approx P^{s_i}$ is computed by the statement $Q := \text{Exponentiate}(P, s1[i])$. Here Q is taken as the geometric midpoint of an interval $[Q/c_{int}, Q \cdot c_{int}]$ where $c_{int} > 1$ is a small constant (e.g., $c_{int} = 1.2$). Then a prime is selected (approximately) at random from this interval by recursive application of procedure RandomPrime.

After $F = \prod_{i=1}^r q_i$ is generated, integers R are chosen at random with uniform distribution from the interval $[I_1, I_2]$, where $I_1 = (P_1 - 1)/(2F)$ and $I_2 = (P_2 - 1)/(2F)$, until $n = 2RF + 1$ is prime. Candidates n are tested first by trial division up to a bound determined by procedure g_opt and then by procedure CheckLemma1 which checks whether the conditions of Lemma 1 for primality of n are satisfied.

3.3. Implementation Issues and Further Comments

The described implementation of RandomPrime assumes that the spread P_2/P_1 of the interval $[P_1, P_2]$ is reasonably small (e.g., less than 2). If a prime should be selected uniformly from a larger interval, it is advisable to cut the interval into subintervals of reasonable spread, to select one of the intervals at random according to the corresponding probability distribution, and to use procedure RandomPrime to generate a prime in the selected interval.

A problem with procedure RandomPrime as described above is that when the relative size $1 - \sum_{i=1}^r s_i$ of R is too small, then the interval $[I_1, I_2]$ may be too

small to contain an R for which $2RF + 1$ is prime. An endless execution of the WHILE loop can be prevented, for example, by restricting the number of iterations. Furthermore, it must be avoided with high probability that the interval $[I_1, I_2]$ contains no prime factor because in this case F (or at least the smallest prime factor of F) would have to be regenerated. Allowing F to be rejected with nonnegligible probability would increase the running time of the algorithm significantly, in particular because the rejection could happen at several levels of the recursion. We therefore recommend two modifications to procedure `RandomPrime` which are not described in Fig. 1.

1. The output of procedure `GenerateSizeList` should only be accepted if the sum of the relative sizes, $1 - \sum_{i=1}^r s_i$, is less than a given bound. We suggest using the bound $1 - C_1/(\log_2 P + C_2)$ for $C_1 \approx 10$ and $C_2 \approx 50$. This modification reduces the diversity of reachable primes slightly; however, this can be tolerated in applications. In particular, primes p for which $(p - 1)/2$ is the product of a small R and a prime or the product of a small R and two primes of similar size, cannot be reached. These unreachable primes include the primes often referred to as *safe* primes, an attribute not justified sufficiently in the author's opinion because no indications exist that these primes lead to the most difficult factoring instances. It is even conceivable, though not likely, that the so-called safe primes form a small class of primes that are actually insecure. Discarding these special primes distorts the uniformity of the distribution slightly, but has essentially no influence on the security of a cryptographic scheme.
2. It is further recommended letting the interval constant c_{int} depend on P_2 , increasing when P_2 decreases, to ensure that the spread of the intervals passed to procedure `RandomPrime` is always sufficiently large to guarantee that, for the largest possible value $1 - C_1/(\log_2 P + C_2)$ for the sum $1 - \sum_{i=1}^r s_i$ of relative sizes (as described above), the expected number of R 's resulting in a prime $2RF + 1$ is sufficiently large. We suggest the choice $c_{int} = 1 + C_3/(\log_2 Q + C_4)$ for $C_3 \approx 20$ and $C_4 \approx 10$.

Several ways to speed up procedure `RandomPrime` by allowing slight further deviations from the uniform distribution are described in Section 4.4. Finally, it should be mentioned that the efficiency of the code of Fig. 1 can of course be improved in several ways (known to a good programmer and depending on the available processor and memory size) at the expense of possibly making it more complicated.

3.4. A Simplified Version of the Algorithm

The above description of the algorithm for generating primes appears to be quite complicated. The reason is that we have paid much attention to the probability distribution of the generated primes. In a practical implementation one might not care very much about details of the distribution as long as it is reasonably close to uniform and the diversity of primes is sufficiently large. In this section we describe a simplified, easy-to-implement version of the algorithm

for generating k -bit primes. For the sake of simplicity procedure `FastPrime` in Fig. 2 is (like Fig. 1) syntactically not completely correct (for instance, integer numbers are multiplied by real numbers).

The functions `Random`, `TrialDivision`, and `PrimeTest` are identical to those described in Section 3.2. The function `Power2` computes powers of 2. The trial division bound g is set equal to some constant c_opt times k^2 , where the optimal value for c_opt can be determined experimentally.

The major simplification in procedure `FastPrime` compared with procedure `RandomPrime` is the fact that F consists of only one prime factor q , which is

```

PROCEDURE FastPrime(k: INTEGER; VAR p: LongInt);

CONST c_opt = 0.1; P0 = 10000000; margin = 20;

VAR a,n,q,I,R: LongInt;
    i,g: INTEGER;
    success: BOOLEAN;
    relative_size: REAL;

FUNCTION Power2(k: INTEGER): LongInt;
FUNCTION Random(a,b: LongInt): LongInt;
FUNCTION PrimeTest(a: LongInt): BOOLEAN;
FUNCTION TrialDivision(a,b: LongInt): BOOLEAN;
FUNCTION GenerateRelativeSize(): REAL;
FUNCTION CheckLemmal(n,a,q: LongInt): BOOLEAN;

BEGIN
  IF P2 <= P0 THEN BEGIN
    REPEAT n := Random(Power2(k-1),Power2(k)-1) UNTIL PrimeTest(n);
    p := n; END;
  ELSE BEGIN
    g := c_opt * k * k;
    REPEAT
      relative_size := GenerateRelativeSize()
    UNTIL k * relative_size < k - margin;
    FastPrime(TRUNC(relative_size * k),q);
    END;
    success := FALSE; I := Power2(k-1) DIV q;
    WHILE NOT(success) DO BEGIN
      R := Random(I,2*I);
      n := 2 * Random(I,2*I) * q + 1;
      a := Random(2,n-1);
      IF TrialDivision(n,g) THEN success := CheckLemmal(n,a,q);
    END;
    p := n;
  END;
END.

```

Fig. 2. Sketch of the listing of the procedure `FastPrime` for generating a k -bit prime p , which is a simplified version of the procedure `RandomPrime`.

greater than the square root of the generated prime. The data types `PFactorList` and `RelSizeList` are therefore no longer needed. Procedure `CheckLemma1` is simplified accordingly: it checks whether the conditions of Lemma 1 are satisfied, for $r = 1$ and $F = q$. The function `GenerateRelativeSize` selects a relative size from the interval $[0.5, 1]$ according to the conditional probability distribution of the relative size x of the largest prime factor of a large random integer, given that it is at least $\frac{1}{2}$. The cumulative distribution is $(1 + \log_2 x)$ for $0.5 \leq x \leq 1$, ranging from 0 to 1 in this interval. The probability density is hence $1/(x \log 2)$. A precompiled table of this distribution can be used in an implementation.

The constant margin determines the minimal number of bits of the integer R . The interval from which R is selected should be sufficiently large to ensure that it contains at least some successful R 's (see also Section 3.3).

For one level of the recursion the above modifications reduce the diversity of the generated prime only by 30%–40%. When accumulated over the several levels of recursion needed to generate a prime, the total diversity of reachable primes is on the order of roughly 10% of all primes.

4. Running Time Analysis for Generating Probable Versus Provable Primes

4.1. *Efficient Generation of Pseudoprimes and the Optimal Trial-Division Bound*

Consider the problem of randomly selecting a k -bit strong pseudoprime for one base, i.e., a k -bit integer n that passes the Miller–Rabin test for some base b . Before being used in a cryptographic application such an integer n would be tested for several other bases in order to achieve a sufficient level of confidence in the primality of n . In a reasonable implementation, a selected odd candidate n is tested for small prime divisors below a certain bound g before the first Miller–Rabin test involving a computationally expensive full modular exponentiation is invoked. This can be done either by sequentially dividing by $3, 5, 7, 11, 13, \dots$ up to the greatest prime $\leq g$ or by computing greatest common divisors of n and certain products of several of the small primes. This defines an optimization problem for g : when too few small primes are tested, then an exponentiation is required in too many cases, but when too many small primes are tested, then the trial division step dominates the expected running time.

Let g_{opt} be the trial division bound that minimizes the expected running time for generating a pseudoprime. Of course, g_{opt} depends on the size of the integers and on the particular implementation of long-integer arithmetic. However, it can be shown that, almost independently of the implementation, for all sufficiently large k (including the cases of interest in cryptography), $g_{opt}(k) \approx t_{exp}(k)/t_{div}(k)$ where $t_{exp}(k)$ and $t_{div}(k)$ are the times required for a full k -bit modular exponentiation and for ruling out one small prime as divisor of a k -bit integer, respectively. All the running times analyzed in this section are functions

of the number k of bits of the integers, but for ease of notation the variable k vs often omitted.

Let $\pi(x)$ denote the number of primes less than or equal to x . It is well known that the density of primes among the integers on the order of x is approximately $1/\log x$ and that $\pi(x) \sim x/\log x$. The probability that a randomly selected odd k -bit integer is prime is thus approximately $2/(k \log 2) = 2.89/k$.

Let Y be a positive integer-valued random variable. The expected value of Y is defined by $E[Y] = \sum_{y=1}^{\infty} y \cdot P[Y = y]$ and it is easy to verify that

$$E[Y] = \sum_{y=1}^{\infty} P[Y \geq y]. \quad (6)$$

A random odd integer has no prime factor smaller than or equal to g with probability

$$d(g) \triangleq \prod_{3 \leq p \leq g} \left(1 - \frac{1}{p}\right),$$

where here and in the following the variable p indicates that the product (or summation) is only over *primes* in the specified range. The term $d(g)$ is very well approximated by

$$d(g) \approx \frac{2e^{-\gamma}}{\log g},$$

where $\gamma \approx 0.5772$ is Euler's constant [77] giving $2e^{-\gamma} = 1.123$.

When a random odd integer is tested for compositeness by dividing it by all primes less than or equal to g , starting with 3, then the expected number of divisions that must be performed is, according to (6), given by

$$e(g) \triangleq 1 + \sum_{3 \leq p \leq g} d(p) = \alpha(g) \frac{g}{\log^2 g},$$

where $\alpha(g)$ is defined by the above equation and depends only slightly on g ; it ranges from 1.87 to 1.40 when g ranges from 100 to 10^6 .

A random composite integer n that fails to be detected by trial division by primes $\leq g$ is detected with overwhelming probability by the first Miller-Rabin test which requires one full exponentiation. The expected time required for detecting the compositeness of an odd integer is hence

$$E[t_c] = e(g)t_{div} + d(g)t_{exp}. \quad (7)$$

On the other hand, when the selected integer is prime, the time required to establish it as a pseudoprime (for one base) is

$$t_p = (\pi(g) - 1)t_{div} + t_{exp}. \quad (8)$$

When a sequence of independent random experiments is performed, where each experiment has a success probability ρ , then the expected number of trials required for one success is $1/\rho$. Hence the expected number of composite integers that need to be tested and discarded before a prime is found is well approximated by $k \cdot \log 2/2 = 0.347k$. The total expected time for finding a pseudoprime is thus

$$E[t_{pp}] \approx \left(\frac{\log 2}{2} \right) \cdot k \cdot E[t_c] + t_p. \quad (9)$$

In the following we determine which choice for the parameter g minimizes $E[t_{pp}]$. The time t_p depends only slightly on g and, furthermore, t_p is negligible in (9) for large k . Hence we can almost equivalently determine g_{opt} minimizing $E[t_c]$ given in (7). Assume that the parameter g is increased to include the next larger prime $q > g$. When the integer n to be tested contains a prime $\leq g$, this modification has no effect on the running time. In what follows we therefore only consider the case where n contains no prime $\leq g$. Thus one extra division by the additional prime needs to be performed. The probability that an exponentiation can be saved is equal to the probability that a number is divisible by the extra prime, which is $1/q \approx 1/g$. The expected running time is minimized when the increase and decrease in expected running time are in balance, i.e., when $t_{div} = (1/g)t_{exp}$. Hence we have

$$g_{opt} = \frac{t_{exp}}{t_{div}}. \quad (10)$$

For this choice we can now express the expected running time $E[t_c]$ as a function of only t_{exp} :

$$E[t_c] = \left(\frac{e(g)}{g} + d(g) \right) t_{exp} \approx \left(\frac{2e^{-\gamma}}{\log g} + \frac{\alpha(g)}{\log^2 g} \right) t_{exp},$$

where $g = g_{opt} = t_{exp}/t_{div}$. For reasonably large k we thus have

$$\begin{aligned} E[t_{pp}(k)] &\approx \left(\frac{2e^{-\gamma}}{\log g(k)} + \frac{\alpha(g(k))}{\log^2 g(k)} \right) \frac{\log 2}{2} k t_{exp}(k) \\ &\approx \left(0.39 + \frac{0.55}{\log g(k)} \right) \frac{k}{\log g(k)} t_{exp}(k), \end{aligned} \quad (11)$$

where $g(k) = g_{opt}(k) = t_{exp}(k)/t_{div}(k)$. We have assumed $\alpha(g(k)) = 1.6$ and have neglected $t_p(k)$.

Let us find realistic figures for $E[t_{pp}]$ for integers of 100 and 200 decimal digits, i.e., for $k = 332$ and $k = 664$, respectively. For the somewhat arbitrary but realistic values $g_{opt}(332) = 1000$ and $g_{opt}(664) = 4000$ we obtain $E[t_{pp}(332)] \approx 22.5 \cdot t_{exp}(332)$ and $E[t_{pp}(664)] \approx 36.5 \cdot t_{exp}(664)$. Note that the ratio $E[t_{pp}]/t_{exp}$ increases when a better implementation of exponentiation is used (for instance when exponentiation is performed on special-purpose hardware).

4.2. Analysis of Procedure CheckLemma1

Procedure CheckLemma1 takes the list $L = [q_1, \dots, q_r]$ of prime factors of $n - 1$ as a parameter, where the sizes s_1, \dots, s_r of q_1, \dots, q_r relative to $n - 1$ are generated by procedure GenerateSizeList as described in Section 3.2 and Appendix 1. When n is composite, CheckLemma1 performs, with overwhelming probability, a computation corresponding to only one full exponentiation. Only when n is prime and $r > 1$ does the computation for proving this fact require some additional steps.

Verification of the conditions of Lemma 1 requires the computation of $a^{(n-1)/q_i}$ for $i = 1, \dots, r$ as well as $a^{(n-1)}$. We have $s_1 > 0.5$ with probability $\log 2 \approx 70\%$, in which case the list contains only one prime factor q_1 and the consecutive computation of $a^{(n-1)/q_1}$ and $a^{(n-1)}$ corresponds to one full modular exponentiation. When $r = 2$, i.e., $s_2 < s_1 < 0.5$ but $s_2 > 1 - s_1 - s_2$ (which happens with probability $\approx 25.8\%$), then the conditions of Lemma 1 can be checked by computing consecutively $A = a^{(n-1)/q_1 q_2}$, $B = A^{q_1} = a^{(n-1)/q_2}$, $C = B^{q_2} = a^{(n-1)}$, and $D = A^{q_2} = a^{(n-1)/q_1}$, where computing the first three terms is equivalent to one full exponentiation and where computing the last term corresponds to s_2 times a full exponentiation. For the general case $r > 2$ it is straightforward to arrange the computation of $a^{(n-1)/q_i}$ for $i = 1, \dots, r$ and $a^{(n-1)}$ as a sequence of steps corresponding to $1 + \sum_{i=2}^r (i-1)s_i$ times a full modular exponentiation. Careful analysis shows that when n is prime, the procedure CheckLemma1 requires an expected number $E[1 + \sum_{i=2}^r (i-1)s_i] < 1.17$ full modular exponentiations.

4.3. Running Time Analysis for Procedure RandomPrime

We now consider the expected running time $E[t_{RP}(k)]$ of procedure RandomPrime described in the previous section. $E[t_{RP}(k)]$ is the sum of the expected time for generating the integer $F = \prod_{i=1}^r q_i$ and the expected time for generating a prime $p = 2RF + 1$ by random choices of R . The second step is computationally virtually equivalent to the generation of a pseudoprime with a negligible additional expected 0.17 full exponentiations (see Section 4.2) required for the primality proof.

Hence the expected time for finding a suitable R is almost exactly equal to $E[t_{pp}(k)]$. Under the simplifying but for this analysis admissible assumption that at each level of the recursion of RandomPrime, F consists of a single prime factor of relative size δ , $E[t_{RP}(k)]$ can be approximated by

$$\begin{aligned} E[t_{RP}(k)] &\approx E[t_{RP}(\delta k)] + E[t_{pp}(k)] \\ &\approx \sum_{i=0}^{\infty} E[t_{pp}(\delta^i k)] \\ &\approx \frac{1}{1 - \delta^{3.585}} E[t_{pp}(k)], \end{aligned}$$

where the term $1/(1 - \delta^{3.585})$ is obtained for the Karatsuba–Ofman implementation of long-integer arithmetic (see Section 4.5) with $E[t_{pp}(k)] = O(k^{3.585}/\log k)$, neglecting the $1/\log k$ factor. The average of $\alpha^{3.585}$, where α is distributed according to $F_1(x)$ (see Appendix 1), is approximately 0.26. When $\delta^{3.585}$ in the above expression is replaced by the average of $\alpha^{3.585}$, i.e., by 0.26, we obtain

$$E[t_{RP}(k)] \approx 1.35 \cdot E[t_{pp}(k)].$$

Simulations have suggested that this approximation is quite accurate [25], [86], i.e., that the expected running time of `RandomPrime` is less than 40% greater than the time required for generating a pseudoprime. For a straightforward (as opposed to Karatsuba–Ofman) implementation of long-integer arithmetic, the factor is smaller than 1.4.

Of course, the above running time analysis assumes that all the procedures within `RandomPrime` are implemented efficiently.

4.4. *Speeding up Procedure RandomPrime*

Procedure `RandomPrime` can be sped up in various ways. In order to speed up the trial divisions when F is generated and candidates $2RF + 1$ are tested for several R , the remainders of F modulo the small primes can be stored such that, for every choice of R , only the remainders of R (rather than of n) modulo the small primes need to be computed. However, because most of the time is consumed by the exponentiations and not by the trial divisions, the achievable improvement is limited.

The uniform distribution is usually not of crucial importance and therefore the following modifications can speed up procedure `RandomPrime`. These modifications do not seem to endanger the security of a system, but it should be pointed out that because the primes are generated recursively, deviations from the uniform distribution are amplified at each level of the recursion.

1. A significant speedup can be achieved by using Lemma 2 for the primality proof (instead of Lemma 1), which requires only that the factored part F of $p - 1$ be greater than $\sqrt[3]{p}$. In particular, when the relative size s_1 of q_1 is, for instance, restricted to being in the range $[\frac{1}{3}, \frac{1}{2}]$, then $E[t_{RP}(k)]$ is only about 5% greater than $E[t_{pp}(k)]$.
2. It was pointed out by Mihalescu [61] that instead of generating R 's at random until $2RF + 1$ is prime, it is somewhat more efficient to search for the prime in an appropriate interval of the arithmetic progression $1, 2F + 1, 4F + 1, \dots$. Note, however, that searching primes in an arithmetic progression has the effect that the probability that a certain prime is selected is proportional to the length of the interval of composite numbers preceding it in the progression, and that these intervals can vary significantly in length. It appears reasonable in applications to tolerate the resulting distortion of the uniform distribution.

4.5. Asymptotic Running Time Analysis

We now investigate the asymptotic running time of our algorithm. Let $M(k, l)$ denote the time required for multiplying a k -bit integer with an l -bit integer. A straightforward implementation of integer multiplication has running time $M(k, l) = O(kl)$. In contrast, a sophisticated but not practical algorithm due to Schönhage and Strassen [81] (see also pp. 270–274 of [3]) has an asymptotic running time $M(k, k) = O(k \cdot \log k \cdot \log \log k)$ for multiplying two k -bit integers. This is only slightly better than for FFT-based methods which, in contrast to the Schönhage–Strassen algorithm, are practical. However, in practical implementations for cryptographic purposes where the numbers have at most a few hundred decimal digits, it is preferable to use the asymptotically slower recursive algorithm of Karatsuba and Ofman (see pp. 62–64 of [3]) which multiplies two k -bit integers in time $O(k^{1.585})$.

Modular reduction can be implemented by a multiplication with the inverse of the modulus rounded to sufficient precision. Hence, based on the asymptotically fastest algorithm, we have

$$t_{exp}(k) = O(k \cdot M(k, k)) = O(k^2 \cdot \log k \cdot \log \log k).$$

We further have $t_{div}(k) = O(k \cdot \log(g(k)))$ which for the choice $g(k) = O(k \log \log k)$ is $t_{div}(k) = O(k \log k)$. Using (7) and (9) we thus obtain

$$E[t_{pp}(k)] = O(k^3 \log \log k),$$

whereas for an implementation based on the Karatsuba–Ofman algorithm we obtain

$$E[t_{pp}(k)] = O\left(\frac{k^{3.585}}{\log k}\right).$$

A straightforward implementation of integer arithmetic would result in $E[t_{pp}(k)] = O(k^4 / \log k)$. We refer to [8] and [11] for further analyses of prime-generation algorithms.

5. Security Constraints for Public-Key Cryptographic Parameters

The security of many cryptographic systems is based on the conjectured difficulty of solving a certain number-theoretic problem. For each of these problems some special-purpose algorithms exist that can efficiently solve certain special instances. It depends on the density of such special instances and on the security policy whether it is necessary to *guarantee*, by an appropriate design of the system parameters, that a certain special-purpose algorithm is infeasible, or whether it is sufficiently secure to choose the parameters at random, relying on the probability of picking a bad set of parameters being very small.

Choosing system parameters to create the most difficult instance for some special-purpose algorithm has often been proposed. For example, it is suggested in [78] choosing primes p for the RSA system of the form $2ap' + 1$ with $p' = 2bp'' + 1$ where p' and p'' are also primes and a and b are very small integers (e.g., $a = b = 1$), or it is suggested choosing primes p such that $p + 1$ contains a very large prime factor [37], [67]. However, it is conceivable (though not likely) that special-purpose algorithms exist for efficiently solving instances in such a severely restricted parameter space, while the general problem may still be computationally intractable. Therefore, it is important to balance reasonably between the diversity of the parameters and the feasibility of all the known special-purpose algorithms for solving the problem on which a system's security is resting.

Systems based on discrete logarithms and on factoring are discussed in Sections 5.1 and 5.2, respectively. The iterated encryption attack on the RSA system is analyzed in Appendix 2 and this analysis implies that the iterated encryption attack can easily be thwarted by a simple modification in procedure RandomPrime (see Section 5.2). Choosing both primes in the RSA system of the same length in bits is often suggested. In Section 5.3 and in Appendix 3 we investigate the implications of such a restriction by analyzing the distribution of the relative size of the smaller prime in a random RSA modulus, given a security bound on the size of the primes.

5.1. Systems Based on Discrete Logarithms Modulo p

The security of many cryptographic systems and protocols is based on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm problem in a finite group. Most proposals are based on the multiplicative group of $GF(p)$ or a subgroup thereof, i.e., on computations modulo a large publicly known prime p (e.g., [15], [28], [30], [39], [80], and [90]). The fastest known general algorithm for computing discrete logarithms modulo p is based on the number-field sieve and has asymptotic running time $O(e^{c(\log p)^{1/3}(\log \log p)^{2/3}})$ for some small constant c . At present the fastest implementations of discrete logarithm algorithms (see [21]) have larger asymptotic running times (both exponents $\frac{1}{3}$ and $\frac{2}{3}$ in the above formula must be replaced by $\frac{1}{2}$). Computing discrete logarithms modulo a prime seems at present to be infeasible for primes of more than 120 digits. We refer to [59] and [51] for a discussion of discrete logarithm algorithms and to [57] for treatment of the question whether breaking the Diffie–Hellman protocol is equivalent to computing discrete logarithms in the underlying group.

The fastest generic discrete logarithm algorithms applicable for any finite group have running times on the order of the square root of the group order. Other groups than those discussed above, most prominently elliptic curves [60], have been proposed for use in cryptography. Many of these groups generally have the advantage that no discrete logarithm algorithm is known that is faster than the best generic algorithm.

The running time of the algorithm of Pohlig and Hellman [70] is on the order of the square root of the largest prime factor of $p - 1$ and hence it is a

necessary condition for security that $p - 1$ contains at least one sufficiently large prime factor q_1 . The probability that a randomly selected integer has no prime factor greater than its sixth, eighth, or tenth root is $F_1(\frac{1}{6}) = 1.96 \cdot 10^{-5}$, $F_1(\frac{1}{8}) = 3.23 \cdot 10^{-8}$, or $F_1(\frac{1}{10}) = 2.8 \cdot 10^{-11}$, respectively (see [44]). A heuristic justification is given in [56] for the conjecture that integers of the form $(p - 1)/2$, where p is a prime, have the same distribution of the sizes of prime factors as random integers. Note that, for instance, with probability $3 \cdot 10^{-8}$, the largest prime factor of a 512-bit prime, reduced by 1, has at most 64 bits and that the Pohlig–Hellman algorithm appears to be feasible in this case.

While it is not necessary that $p - 1$ contains an extremely large prime factor, it appears nevertheless advisable for systems based on the discrete logarithm in Z_p^* to choose p of the form $p = 2Rq + 1$ where the relative size of q is at least $\frac{1}{2}$, or even higher (e.g., 0.9). Choosing $R = 1$ is often suggested. This choice creates the most difficult instances for the Pohlig–Hellman algorithm, but may on the other hand be vulnerable against another (yet undiscovered) special-purpose discrete-logarithm algorithm. Note that for q of size as small as $\log q = O((\log p)^c)$ for $c > \frac{1}{3}$, the number-field sieve is faster than the Pohlig–Hellman algorithm.

We do not recommend choosing q as small as indicated above and we do not seriously object against using primes of the form $p = 2q + 1$. However, there are arguments suggesting choosing $R > 1$, for example, having 10–20 or more decimal digits, or even choosing p of the form $2Rq_1q_2 + 1$ for two sufficiently large primes q_1 and q_2 that are kept secret such that factoring the group order is difficult. While for a fixed choice of R (e.g., $R = 1$) an expected number $(\log p)/2$ of primes q must be generated until $2Rq + 1$ is prime, allowing R to be picked from a certain interval has the further advantage that only one prime q must be generated because R can be varied until $2Rq + 1$ is a prime.

In discrete-logarithm-based systems it is usually recommended choosing as the base b a generator of the group. However, for the multiplicative group modulo p with small R and $F = q_1$, it is almost equivalent from a security point of view [70] to require only that q divides $\text{ord}_p(b)$. The algorithm of Section 3 for generating primes can easily be adapted to generate a prime with nearly uniform distribution over the set of primes p in a given interval for which $p - 1$ has a prime factor q of at least a certain specified size. The base a used in Lemma 1 for proving the primality of p satisfies $q \mid \text{ord}_p(a)$ and can thus be used as the base in discrete-logarithm-based systems. Furthermore, when R is small and hence its factorization is easily obtained, the base a can be proved to be primitive (if it is) by checking that in addition to the conditions of Lemma 1, for every prime factor s of R ,

$$a^{(n-1)/s} \not\equiv 0 \pmod{p}.$$

These additional checks can be performed very efficiently. According to Lemma 3, a random a is primitive with probability $\varphi(p - 1)/(p - 1)$ which is close to $1/2$ when R contains no very small prime factors, and slightly smaller if it does.

It is straightforward to modify procedure `RandomPrime` to generate a prime and a generator for the group satisfying the constraints for the Schnorr scheme [80] or the NIST proposal for a digital signature standard (DSS) [90].

5.2. Systems Based on Factoring

Another collection of systems is based on the difficulty of factoring a composite modulus [32], [47], [79], [82]. The largest size of integers of general form that can presently be factored using massively parallel computation have on the order of 130 decimal digits [50]. These factoring records are achieved using variations of the quadratic sieve algorithm (e.g., see [53]), but the asymptotically fastest factoring algorithm is the number-field sieve described in [52]. We refer to [51] and [73] for a discussion of factoring algorithms.

Many special-purpose factoring algorithms exist. Lenstra's elliptic curve algorithm [54] is successful in finding "small" factors having (at present) up to 40 decimal digits [29]. Pollard's algorithm [71] finds factors p for which $p - 1$ has only relatively small prime factors. This algorithm was generalized by Williams [87], [88] to primes for which $p + 1$ has no large prime factor and by Bach and Shallit [7] to primes for which any cyclotomic polynomial evaluated at p has no large prime factor, i.e., for which either $p - 1$, $p + 1$, $p^2 \pm p + 1$, $p^4 + p^3 + p^2 + p + 1$, etc., has no large prime factor.

It is therefore often recommended (e.g., [12] and [37]) generating primes for which it is guaranteed that some of these expressions, in particular $p - 1$ and $p + 1$, each contains at least one large prime factor. However, it should be pointed out that in view of the elliptic curve factoring algorithm [54] these conditions make little sense. For every fixed choice of elliptic curve parameters a and b , it is roughly equally probable that (for instance) $p + 1$ is smooth with respect to a certain bound and that the order of the corresponding elliptic curve $E_p(a, b)$ is smooth with respect to the same bound (see also [61]). The fact that the order of the elliptic curve cannot be given explicitly as an algebraic expression in p has no impact on the validity of this observation.

However, a nonsmoothness condition on $p - 1$ is justified for a different reason. One way of deciphering ciphertexts in the RSA public-key cryptosystem [79] without factoring the modulus is by iterated encryption [84]. In Appendix 2 a detailed analysis of this attack is given, and Theorem 6 states sufficient nonrestrictive conditions on p and q that allow us provably to foil this attack for any fixed given public exponent e . These conditions can be satisfied at no extra computational cost by a simple modification in procedure `RandomPrime`.

Let the primes p'_i and q'_i be generated at the first level of the recursion and the primes p''_{ij} and q''_{ij} at the second level. Note that the conditions on a required by Theorem 6 to ensure that decryption by iterated encryption is infeasible are satisfied automatically when $F_{p'_1}, \dots, F_{p'_r}, F_{q'_1}, \dots, F_{q'_s}$ are pairwise relatively prime and when the public encryption exponent e is used as the parameter a in procedure `CheckLemma1` at the second level of the recursion, i.e., for proving the primality of the p''_{ij} and q''_{ij} . Hence the conditions of

Theorem 6 can be satisfied simply by controlling the choice of the parameter a and by avoiding the repeated use of primes.

5.3. Generating Random Secure RSA Moduli

Implementing the RSA system with a modulus $m = pq$ for two primes p and q with equally many bits (e.g., 512 bits) is usually recommended. For a given size of the modulus this choice results in the most difficult instances for the elliptic curve factoring algorithm and also makes an implementation more symmetric when Chinese remaindering is used for decryption. On the other hand, choosing both prime factors of equal length entails a possibly unnecessary, though not severe, restriction on the diversity of moduli that can be generated. Although we do not strongly recommend choosing primes that differ strongly in size, we nevertheless investigate the problem of choosing an RSA modulus $m = pq$ (with $p < q$) at random from the set of integers in a given interval $[cN, N]$ (with $0 < c < 1$) that are the product of two distinct primes and satisfy certain security constraints.

Given the present knowledge of attacks against the RSA system, the following appears to be a reasonable set of security constraints:

1. p as well as q must be greater than a given bound $L = N^\gamma$ for some γ (e.g., $\gamma > 0.4$).
2. $p - 1$ and $q - 1$ must contain distinct large prime factors p'_1 and q'_1 , respectively, with $p'_1 \geq L'$ and $q'_1 \geq L'$ for a given bound $L' = N^{\gamma'}$ for some $\gamma' < \gamma$ (e.g., $\gamma' > 0.3$).

These two conditions with the somewhat arbitrary numbers 0.4 and 0.3 are only mildly restrictive and imply that $p'_1 > \sqrt{p - 1}$ and $q'_1 > \sqrt{q - 1}$ and hence that only one prime factor p'_1 of $p - 1$ and one prime factor q'_1 of $q - 1$ must be generated. Moreover, since the factored parts $F_{p'_1}$ of p'_1 and $F_{q'_1}$ of q'_1 are greater than $\sqrt{p'_1 - 1}$ and $\sqrt{q'_1 - 1}$, respectively, the lower bound $\text{lcm}(F_{p'_1}, \dots, F_{p'_1}, F_{q'_1}, \dots, F_{q'_1}) = \text{lcm}(F_{p'_1}, F_{q'_1})$ of Theorem 6 is greater than $N^{1/4}$ when $(F_{p'_1}, F_{q'_1}) = 1$.

Theorem 7 states that when m is chosen at random from the set of integers $\in [cN, N]$ (for some fixed c) that are the product of exactly two primes, both $\geq N^\gamma$, then the probability that the smaller prime factor p is greater than N^α is, asymptotically, given by

$$1 - \frac{\log(1 - \alpha) - \log \alpha}{\log(1 - \gamma) - \log \gamma}, \quad (12)$$

which ranges from 0 to 1 when α ranges from γ to $\frac{1}{2}$. The density of the distribution on the interval $[\gamma, \frac{1}{2}]$ is thus

$$\frac{1}{\alpha(1 - \alpha)(\log(1 - \gamma) - \log \gamma)}. \quad (13)$$

It follows from (13), that for $\gamma > 0.4$, the relative size of p is close to uniformly distributed over the interval $[\gamma, \frac{1}{2}]$, with sizes in the range of γ being slightly more probable than sizes in the range of $\frac{1}{2}$.

The above conditions can be satisfied by making appropriate use of (12) for selecting an interval for the smaller prime p , and by restricting the size of the largest prime factors of $p - 1$ and $q - 1$. When p is generated, the interval for the prime q is $[N_1/p, N_2/p]$, where $[N_1, N_2]$ is the specified interval for m .

Note that selecting p at random from the primes in the interval $[N^\gamma, N^{1/2}]$ would result in an entirely different distribution. In particular, the size of p would with very high probability be very close to $\frac{1}{2}$, which is in sharp contrast to the above analysis.

6. Concluding Remarks

A fast algorithm for generating prime numbers for cryptographic applications has been presented. An important issue in the generation of cryptographic parameters is the tradeoff between security constraints that must be placed on the parameters of a cryptosystem and the diversity of the parameters, i.e., the probability distribution according to which they are selected. We have provided a detailed analysis of this tradeoff for the major cryptographic systems based on large prime numbers.

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Appendix 1. On the Relative Size of the Prime Factors of Large Integers

Let the *relative size* of an integer a with respect to an integer b be defined as $\log a / \log b$, which is independent of the base of the logarithms. Let $p_i(n)$ denote the i th largest prime factor of the integer n and let $\omega_i(N, x)$ be the number of positive integers less than or equal to N for which the i th largest prime factor is at most N^x , i.e., let

$$\omega_i(N, x) = \#\{n: 1 \leq n \leq N, p_i(n) \leq N^x\}.$$

Knuth and Trabb Pardo [44] showed that

$$\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \frac{\omega_i(N, x)}{N} = F_i(x),$$

where the functions $F_i(x)$ are, for $i \geq 1$, defined by the integral equations

$$F_i(x) = 1 - \int_x^1 \left(F_i\left(\frac{1}{1-t}\right) - F_{i-1}\left(\frac{1}{1-t}\right) \right) \frac{dt}{t}$$

with the convention that $F_0(x) = 0$ for all x and $F_i(x) = 1$ for $x \geq 1$, for $i \geq 1$. For example, if $\frac{1}{2} \leq x \leq 1$ we have $t/(1-t) \geq 1$ for all $t \geq x$ and hence

$$F_1(x) = 1 - \int_x^1 \frac{dt}{t} = 1 + \log x$$

for $\frac{1}{2} \leq x \leq 1$. It follows, for instance, that the probability that a randomly selected large integer⁴ has a prime factor greater than its square root is $1 - F_1(\frac{1}{2}) = \log 2 = 0.693$. The functions $F_1(x)$, $F_2(x)$, and $F_3(x)$ are tabulated in [44]. A few more values of F_1 are $F_1(\frac{1}{4}) = 0.00491$, $F_1(\frac{1}{3}) = 0.0486$, and $F_1(0.4) = 0.130$. The function $x \mapsto F_1(1/x)$ is also known as the rho-function studied by Dickman [27]. A good algorithm for computing the Dickman rho-function is described in [24].

Consider the following process, suggested to the author by Eric Bach [5] (see also [6]), for generating real-valued random variables s_1, s_2, \dots . We make use of auxiliary random variables u_1, u_2, \dots . First, u_1 is chosen uniformly from the interval $[0, 1]$, then u_2 is chosen uniformly from $[0, 1 - u_1]$, then u_3 is chosen uniformly from $[0, 1 - u_1 - u_2]$, and so on. The numbers u_1, u_2, \dots are maintained in a list ordered in decreasing order. The elements of the ordered list are the numbers s_1, s_2, \dots . Although this is a conceptually infinite process, it can be stopped after the first r elements in the ordered list, s_1, \dots, s_r , are known to be fixed. After the generation of u_1, \dots, u_d , the values s_1, \dots, s_r are fixed as soon as

$$s_r > 1 - \sum_{i=1}^d u_i,$$

because this implies that u_{d+1}, u_{d+2}, \dots will be inserted into the list after s_r .

However, we need the somewhat stronger condition

$$s_r > 1 - \sum_{i=1}^r s_i \tag{14}$$

to ensure that R (which is of relative size $1 - \sum_{i=1}^r s_i$) cannot contain a prime factor greater than q_r . If it did, the distribution of the relative sizes of the prime factors of $(n-1)/2$ would differ from that of a random integer of the same size, which may be undesirable. Condition (14) can result in a larger value for r but does not change the distribution of s_1, s_2, \dots . The procedure described for generating s_1, \dots, s_r satisfying (14) is used in procedure `RandomPrime` described in Section 3, where it is called `GenerateSizeList`.

⁴ See footnote 1 in Section 3.1.

It is not difficult to see that the cumulative distributions G_1, G_2, \dots of s_1, s_2, \dots , where $G_i(x) = \text{Prob}[s_i \leq x]$ for $i \geq 1$, satisfy the following integral equations:

$$G_i(x) = \int_0^x \left(G_i\left(\frac{x}{1-t}\right) + G_{i-1}\left(\frac{x}{1-t}\right) \right) dt$$

with the convention that $G_0(x) = 0$ for all x and $G_i(x) = 1$ for $x \geq 1$, for $i \geq 1$. Using the variable substitution $y := x/(1-t)$ it can be shown that $G_i(x) = F_i(x)$ for $i \geq 1$. Thus the random variables s_1, s_2, \dots generated according to the process described are distributed according to F_1, F_2, \dots subject to the conditions $s_{i+1} \leq s_i$ for $i \geq 1$ and $\sum_{i=1}^\infty s_i = 1$. Therefore, when this process is stopped after s_1, \dots, s_r have been generated, then s_1, \dots, s_r are distributed according to the asymptotic joint distribution of the relative sizes of the r largest prime factors of an integer chosen uniformly from $[1, N]$ (or, equivalently, from $[cN, N]$ for a fixed interval spread $c < 1$), for N going to infinity.

Appendix 2. The Iterated-Encryption Attack Against the RSA System

The encryption transformation of the RSA system is defined by

$$y \equiv x^e \pmod{m},$$

where x, y, e , and m are the plaintext, ciphertext, public encryption exponent, and public modulus, respectively. Because this transformation is known publicly, it can be iterated without knowledge of the secret key, resulting in $(x^e)^e = x^{e^2}$, $(x^{e^2})^e = x^{e^3}, \dots$. This sequence is periodic and will ultimately result in the plaintext. Iterated t -fold encryption in an RSA cryptosystem reveals the plaintext x if and only if

$$x^{(e^t)} \equiv x \pmod{m}$$

for some $u \leq t$, i.e., if and only if

$$e^u \equiv 1 \pmod{\text{ord}_m(x)}$$

for some $u \leq t$. Hence the minimal number of encryptions needed to recover the plaintext is $\text{ord}_{\text{ord}_m(x)}(e)$; for security reasons it is required that this number of large for virtually all x . The following lemma is needed to prove Theorem 6, which states nonrestrictive sufficient conditions for foiling the iterated encryption attack.

Lemma 5. *Let $m = pq$ be an RSA modulus where $p - 1 = 2R_p F_p$ and $q - 1 = 2R_q F_q$ and where the prime factorizations of F_p and F_q are $F_p = \prod_{i=1}^r p_i^{\alpha_i}$ and $F_q = \prod_{i=1}^s q_i^{\beta_i}$, respectively. Then the fraction f of plaintexts $x \in Z_m^*$ for which $\text{ord}_m(x)$ is at least $\text{lcm}(F_p, F_q)$ satisfies*

$$f \geq \frac{\varphi(F_p)}{F_p} \cdot \frac{\varphi(F_q)}{F_q} \geq 1 - \sum_{i=1}^r \frac{1}{p_i} + \sum_{i=1}^s \frac{1}{q_i}.$$

Proof. Lemma 3 states that

$$\#\{x \in Z_p^* : F_p | \text{ord}_p(x)\} \geq (p-1) \frac{\varphi(F_p)}{F_p}$$

and

$$\#\{x \in Z_q^* : F_q | \text{ord}_q(x)\} \geq (q-1) \frac{\varphi(F_q)}{F_q}.$$

For $x \in Z_m^*$ the conditions $F_p | \text{ord}_p(x)$ and $F_q | \text{ord}_q(x)$ together with (1) imply that $\text{lcm}(F_p, F_q)$ divides $\text{ord}_m(x)$. Because $Z_m^* = Z_p^* \times Z_q^*$ we have

$$\#\{x \in Z_m^* : \text{lcm}(F_p, F_q) | \text{ord}_m(x)\} \geq (p-1)(q-1) \frac{\varphi(F_p)}{F_p} \cdot \frac{\varphi(F_q)}{F_q}.$$

The last inequality of the theorem follows from (2). \square

Theorem 6. Let $m = pq$ be an RSA modulus as in Lemma 5 where $p_i' - 1 = 2R_{p_i'} F_{p_i'}$ for $1 \leq i \leq r$ and $q_i' - 1 = 2R_{q_i'} F_{q_i'}$ for $1 \leq i \leq s$ and where the prime factorizations of $F_{p_i'}$ and $F_{q_i'}$ are $F_{p_i'} = \prod_{j=1}^{i'} p_{ij}^{\alpha_{ij}}$ for $1 \leq i \leq r$ and $F_{q_i'} = \prod_{j=1}^{s_i} q_{ij}^{\beta_{ij}}$ for $1 \leq i \leq s$. For every integer a relatively prime to $(p-1)(q-1)$ and satisfying

$$a^{(p_i'-1)/p_{ij}^{\alpha_{ij}}} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{p_i'}$$

for $1 \leq i \leq r$ and $1 \leq j \leq r$, as well as

$$a^{(q_i'-1)/q_{ij}^{\beta_{ij}}} \not\equiv 1 \pmod{q_i'}$$

for $1 \leq i \leq s$ and $1 \leq j \leq s_i$, the fraction of plaintexts $x \in Z_m^*$ for which $\text{ord}_{\text{ord}_m(x)}(a)$ is not a multiple of $\text{lcm}(F_{p_1'}, \dots, F_{p_r'}, F_{q_1'}, \dots, F_{q_s'})$ is at most $\sum_{i=1}^r 1/p_i' + \sum_{i=1}^s 1/q_i'$.

Proof. Similar arguments as used in the proof of Lemma 1 allow it to be shown that the first condition on a implies $F_{p_i'} | \text{ord}_{p_i'}(a)$ for $1 \leq i \leq r$. Hence $F_{p_i'} | \text{ord}_{p_i^{\alpha_{ij}}}(a)$ and also $F_{p_i'} | \text{ord}_{F_{p_i'}}(a)$ for $1 \leq i \leq r$. Thus $\text{lcm}(F_{p_1'}, \dots, F_{p_r'})$ divides $\text{ord}_{F_p}(a)$. Similarly $\text{lcm}(F_{q_1'}, \dots, F_{q_s'}) | \text{ord}_{F_q}(a)$ is obtained. It follows from (1) that $\text{lcm}(F_{p_1'}, \dots, F_{p_r'}, F_{q_1'}, \dots, F_{q_s'})$ divides $\text{ord}_{\text{lcm}(F_p, F_q)}(a)$. According to Lemma 5 the condition $\text{lcm}(F_p, F_q) | \text{ord}_m(x)$ is satisfied for at least a fraction $1 - \sum_{i=1}^r 1/p_i' + \sum_{i=1}^s 1/q_i'$ of the $x \in Z_m^*$. This together with (1) implies that $\text{ord}_{\text{lcm}(F_p, F_q)}(a) | \text{ord}_{\text{ord}_m(x)}(a)$ and hence that $\text{lcm}(F_{p_1'}, \dots, F_{p_r'}, F_{q_1'}, \dots, F_{q_s'})$ divides $\text{ord}_{\text{ord}_m(x)}(a)$, as was to be shown. \square

Theorem 6 illustrates that, in order to prevent decipherability by iterated encryption, the condition, suggested by Rivest [78] and others, that $p' - 1$ (where p' is the largest prime factor of $p - 1$) must also have a very large prime factor p'' , is unnecessary.

When procedure RandomPrime is used to generate p and q , the primes p_i' and q_i' are generated on the first level, and the primes p_{ij}'' and q_{ij}'' are generated

on the second level of the recursion. Note that the conditions on a required by Theorem 6 to ensure that decryption by iterated encryption is infeasible, are satisfied automatically when $F_{p'_1}, \dots, F_{p'_r}, F_{q'_1}, \dots, F_{q'_s}$ are pairwise relatively prime and when the public encryption exponent e is used as the parameter a in procedure CheckLemma1 at the second level of the recursion, i.e., for proving the primality of the p''_{ij} and q''_{ij} . Hence the conditions of Theorem 6 can be satisfied at no extra computational cost, simply by controlling the choice of the parameter a and by avoiding the repeated use of primes.

Similar conditions (based on the factorization of $p + 1$ and $q + 1$ rather than $p - 1$ and $q - 1$) for preventing feasible decryption by iterated encryption can be derived for the elliptic-curve public-key cryptosystem of [47] whose security is also based on the difficulty of factoring.

Appendix 3. The Size of the Prime Factors of a Random RSA Modulus

In the following we investigate the probability distribution of the relative size of the smaller prime factor of an integer chosen an random from all integers $\leq N$ that are the product of two primes.

Let $\tau_2(N, \gamma)$ be the number of integers $\leq N$ that are the product of exactly two distinct primes, both greater or equal to N^γ , where γ is fixed with $0 < \gamma < \frac{1}{2}$:

$$\tau_2(N, \gamma) = \#\{m: 1 \leq m \leq N, m = pq, N^\gamma \leq p < q\}.$$

Here and below p and q refer to primes. The following theorem was stated in [56] as a conjecture. It was pointed out to the author by Eric Bach [5] that it can be proved along the lines of the heuristic arguments given in [56] for its justification, by carefully estimating the error terms.

Theorem 7. For $0 < \gamma < \frac{1}{2}$,

$$\lim_{N \rightarrow \infty} \gamma_2(N, \gamma) \frac{\log N}{N} = \log(1 - \gamma) - \log \gamma.$$

Remark. The theorem also holds if $\tau_2(N, \gamma)$ is defined similarly, but for intervals $[cN, N]$ with arbitrary fixed positive spread $c < 1$, when the denominator N is replaced by $(1 - c)N$.

Proof. It is easy to verify that

$$\#\left\{q: p < q \leq \frac{N}{p}\right\} = \pi\left(\frac{N}{p}\right) - \pi(p).$$

We thus have

$$\begin{aligned} \tau_2(N, \gamma) &= \sum_{N^\gamma \leq p < \sqrt{N}} \#\left\{q: p < q \leq \frac{N}{p}\right\} \\ &= \sum_{N^\gamma \leq p < \sqrt{N}} \gamma \left(\frac{N}{p}\right) - \sum_{N^\gamma \leq p < \sqrt{N}} \pi(p). \end{aligned} \tag{15}$$

The second sum is smaller than $\sum_{p < \sqrt{N}} \pi(p)$ which is upper bounded by

$$\sum_{p < \sqrt{N}} \pi(p) < (\pi(\sqrt{N}))^2 = O\left(\frac{N}{\log^2 N}\right). \quad (16)$$

For p in the range of interest, N/p increases without bound as N goes to infinity. Therefore

$$\sum_{N^\gamma \leq p < \sqrt{N}} \pi\left(\frac{N}{p}\right) \sim \sum_{N^\gamma \leq p < \sqrt{N}} \frac{N/p}{\log(N/p)}.$$

Replacing this sum by a Stieltjes integral and using (15) and (16) we obtain

$$\frac{\tau_2(N, \gamma)}{N} \sim \int_{N^\gamma}^{\sqrt{N}} \frac{d\pi(x)}{x \log(N/x)} + O\left(\frac{1}{\log^2 N}\right). \quad (17)$$

Using $\pi(x) = \int_2^x dt/(\log t) + \epsilon(x)$ where $\epsilon(x) = O(x/\log^2 x)$ (see [26]), we obtain

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{N^\gamma}^{\sqrt{N}} \frac{d\pi(x)}{x \log(N/x)} &= \int_{N^\gamma}^{\sqrt{N}} \frac{dx}{x \log x \log(N/x)} \\ &+ \int_{N^\gamma}^{\sqrt{N}} \frac{d\epsilon(x)}{x \log(N/x)}. \end{aligned} \quad (18)$$

The first integral can be computed by using the variable substitution $y = (\log x)/(\log N)$, with $dy = dx/(x \log N)$, which gives

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{N^\gamma}^{\sqrt{N}} \frac{dx}{x \log x \log(N/x)} &= \frac{1}{\log N} \int_\gamma^{1/2} \frac{dy}{y(1-y)} \\ &= \frac{\log(1-\gamma) - \log \gamma}{\log N}. \end{aligned} \quad (19)$$

Using the rule for integration by parts,

$$\int g(x) df(x) = f(x)g(x) - \int f(x) dg(x),$$

for $f(x) = \epsilon(x)$ and $g(x) = 1/(x \log(N/x))$, allows us to transform the second integral in (18):

$$\begin{aligned} \int_{N^\gamma}^{\sqrt{N}} \frac{d\epsilon(x)}{x \log(N/x)} &= \left[\frac{\epsilon(x)}{x \log(N/x)} \right]_{N^\gamma}^{\sqrt{N}} \\ &+ \int_{N^\gamma}^{\sqrt{N}} \epsilon(x) \frac{1 + \log(N/x)}{x^2 \log^2(N/x)} dx. \end{aligned} \quad (20)$$

We now make use of the bound $\epsilon(x) = O(x/\log^2 x)$ which shows that the first term on the right-hand side of (20) is $O(1/\log^3 N)$. In order to show that the second term is $O(1/\log^2 N)$, note that the function to be integrated is $O(1/(x \log^2 x \log N))$ which for $N^\gamma \leq x \leq \sqrt{N}$ is also $O(1/(x \log^3 N))$, and that $\int_{\sqrt{N}}^{\sqrt{N} N^\gamma} dx/x = O(\log N)$. The proof of the theorem is completed by combining (17)–(20). \square

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