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Female owners versus female managers: Who is better at introducing innovations?

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KIEL WORKING PAPER



Dirk Dohse, Rajeev K. Goel, and Michael A. Nelson



ABSTRACT

FEMALE OWNERS VERSUS FEMALE MANAGERS: WHO IS BETTER AT INTRODUCING INNOVATIONS?

Dirk Dohse, Rajeev K. Goel, and Michael A. Nelson

This paper uses firm-level survey responses across more than 100 emerging and developing countries to examine whether female managers or female owners of firms were better at bringing innovations to the market. Employing a range of firm-specific and country-specific controls, the econometric results show that female owners of firms, rather than female managers, were more likely to introduce innovations. As expected, innovations resulted from firms engaging in R&D. Larger and older firms reinforced these tendencies; however, sole proprietorships had the opposite effect. The presence of an informal sector and finance availability constraints actually spurred innovation. Finally, the economy-wide effects of greater economic freedom and stronger patent protections were positive, while greater economic prosperity somewhat led to complacency.

Keywords: innovation; female; owners; managers; patent protection; R&D; firm size; sole proprietorship **JEL classification:** O32; O33; O57; J16

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1. Introduction

Innovation is key to growth and prosperity in modern societies. Governments around the world spend billions of dollars to promote innovation, in order to boost their country's or region's competitiveness. Yet, an important aspect of innovation is under-researched and hence, not well understood: innovation research has a narrow understanding of where innovation takes place and who participates in innovation activity (Fagerberg et al. (2005)). While in recent years, there has been increasing recognition and focus on gender aspects in innovations, this research area is still in relative infancy (see a nice recent compilation by Link (2017)).

In general, the literature presents innovation as taking place in processes, corporations and innovations systems, and does not give the innovator a specific role. While the entrepreneur is in the limelight in entrepreneurship research, the characteristics of the innovator in innovation research is nearly invisible (Brännback et al. (2012)). It is, thus, not surprising that the gender perspective to innovation is underresearched, and it is only recently that the concept of gender and innovation has gained wider interest among scholars of economics and management.

Our paper contributes to the growing literature on the role of women in the introduction of innovation. The main research question is as follows: Are female agents more likely to innovate at the firm level through the introduction of new product/services relative to their male counterparts? Our approach is original / innovative in two respects:

- (i) We make use of a unique cross-country database to investigate firm-level innovation in developing and emerging economies.
- (ii) We consider two different roles of female agents (female top manager versus female owner) in introducing firm-level innovation.

The majority of empirical research on gender and innovation is focused on (single) industrialized countries, neglecting the fact that developing and emerging countries play an increasingly important role in global innovation, and might differ substantially from industrialized countries in terms of female participation in innovation. The current paper makes use of a unique database that contains cross-country information from more than 100 emerging and developing countries and from thousands of firms that enables us to consider many relevant aspects at the firm level. The present study can also be tied to organizational economics, especially the internal organization of the firm (see Burns and Stalker (1961) and Coriat and Weinstein (2002)). Coriat and Weinstein (2002) make the distinction between institutional and organizational dimension of innovation. While our study considers both dimensions, the key contribution is with regard to consideration of the gender aspects under the organizational dimension.

Women are underrepresented in ownership and managerial positions due to several factors including, (i) their traditional focus on humanities that favor areas that not readily entrepreneurial in the traditional senses; (ii) a lack of networking, peer support or mentoring opportunities; (iii) financing obstacles; and (iv) different time horizons across which they are maximizing their objectives, especially given breaks during child-bearing years. While owners have the ultimate control over resources and long-term directions of firms, day-to-day operations and short-term decisions are in the hands of managers.



Whereas some of these gender constraints have been recognized and researched in different contexts (for examples see Link (2017)), the relative influence of females in certain aspects is less clear. In this regard, the present study's comparison of female owners versus female managers of firms should provide some novel insights. In addition to contributing to the literature, the findings have obvious value for the design of policies that seek to promote innovation, economic growth and foster equal opportunities across gender.

2. Background and model

2.1 Background

There are several strands of the literature that can be tied to gender aspects in innovation. One strand of the literature documents gender disparities in a host of scientific indicators: Women's representation in science and engineering professions (and, more general, in R&D) has not met their gains in earning science and engineering degrees, and they lag behind men in tenure, promotion and productivity (Gaughan (2005)). An influential study on gender innovation and research productivity disparities in the European Union (Busolt and Kugele (2009)) finds that women are considerably under-represented in research and innovation: In 2003, 18% of researchers but only 8 % of inventors in Europe were female. Busolt and Kugele's results confirm findings of earlier studies by Greif (2005) and Naldi and Parenti (2002). The obvious gender gap in research productivity is aggravated by the fact that more advanced and more achievement oriented national innovation systems (e.g. Germany, Austria, the Netherlands) are less willing to accept efficiency losses and thus tend to keep the percentage of female researchers lower than the European average. According to the authors, a likely interpretation for the lower female research productivity is the fact that women have not acquired parity with men in the opportunities for doing research (Busolt and Kugele (2009)). These include lack of funding, laboratory space and time allowance, but also lack of recognition and influence. Women thus often remain in 'the outer circle' of the scientific community (Zuckerman et al., (1991)). ¹

The role of innovation and gender has been conceptualized by Blake and Hanson (2005) for the United States. De Tienne and Chandler (2007) found that men and women were fundamentally different in processing opportunity identification. However, the authors did not find any differences in the innovativeness of the opportunities identified. Using data on researchers at German research institutes, Goel et al. (2015) found that prior record of researchers' patenting and (internal) institutional leadership promoted tendencies towards entrepreneurship among male researchers, but not among females. Further, unlike male scientists, doctoral degrees and preference for open access of research results did not significantly affect attitudes of female researchers.

There is, however, not only a gender gap in *research activity* and in *research productivity*, but there is evidence for a clear *gender gap at every stage of commercialization*. "Women are less likely to disclose then are men, less likely to patent, and less likely to engage in entrepreneurial activity, such as starting a company or serving on a scientific advisory board" (Stephan and El-Ganainy (2007, p.486)). This may be partly due to the fact that women

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¹ This interpretation is backed by the prominent "Study on the Status of Women Faculty in Science at Massachusetts Institute of Technology", which documents pervasive gender inequalities in access to the strategic resources of the Institute (http://web.mit.edu/fnl/women/women.html).



are underrepresented in the types of positions from which faculty typically apply for patents or launch entrepreneurial activity, but that is not the sole explanation.

While there is ample evidence that women patent less than men in comparable positions, a recent study from Spain (Muñoz and Graña (2016)) focusses on the effects of gender on the *quality of patents*. The main finding of this study is that the quality of the patent is higher when the inventor team includes both, male and female presence.

A substantial and increasing number of studies deals with gender and entrepreneurship and indicates that the phenomenon of entrepreneurship is gendered (Link (2017), Minniti (2009)). Women tend to start their business in services rather than in manufacturing, and female start-ups tend to be smaller, less risky and less growth-oriented than male start-ups.

An interesting, yet unresolved, question is whether female ownership and female management style has an impact on firm-level innovation. A recent study by Dezsö and Ross (2012) uses panel data on the top management teams of the S&P 1,500 firms to investigate whether female representation in top management improves firm performance. They find a positive impact of female representation, "but only to the extent that a firm's strategy is focused on innovation, in which context the informational and social benefits of gender diversity and the behaviors associated with women in management are likely to be especially important for managerial task performance" (Dezsö and Ross (2012, p.1072)). They argue that empowering and participatory leadership styles increase intrinsic motivation and creativity as well as knowledge sharing, which, in turn, stimulates the generation of new ideas. More cooperative, nurturing, and collaborative managerial behavior that stimulates innovation is assumed to be typical of feminine management style (Dezsö and Ross (2012, p. 1077)). In the same vein, Abrahamsson (2002) argues that breaking up the traditional gender order, which is a system built on segregation and hierarchy, facilitates organizational change and gives way to creativity and innovation at the firm level.

The view that feminine management style is automatically more "cooperative and nurturing" is, however, not undisputed. Mukhtar (2002) analyses differences in male and female management characteristics based on a survey among 30,000 randomly chosen members of small business organizations in the U.K. She finds marked differences in the managerial styles of female and male owner-managers, however, these differences are contrary to a priori expectations. "In contrast to our expected findings, female owner-managers are found to be more autocratic, less consultative, less willing to allow employees to make independent decisions and more reluctant to delegate authority to others", (Mukhtar (2002, p. 305)).

Overall, gender differences in innovation introductions by firms and the specific role of female managers or female owners in the introduction of firm innovations are not well-understood as yet. The current paper will contribute to closing this gap in the literature.



2.2 Model

Based on the above consideration and to address the main question posed in the introduction, our estimated model takes the following general form (with subscripts i and j, respectively, denoting a firm and a country):

(1)
$$Y_{ij} = \beta_1 X_i + \beta_2 Z_i + \beta_3 K_j + u_{ij}$$

where Y_{ij} denotes innovative outcome in firm i in country j, X_i denotes our main explanatory variables at the firm level ($female_manager$ versus $female_owner$, respectively), Z_i denotes a set of firm-level control variables (including R&D, firm size, firm age, ownership structure, threat of informal economy and financial constraints) and K_i denotes a set of country level controls (including GDP, economic freedom and patent protection).

The dependent variable (Innovation) is a binary variable that takes the value of 1 if the firm (respondent) introduced a new product or service in the last three years. The main explanatory variables of interest are whether the top manager of the firm is a female (female_manager) or whether the firm is at least fifty percent owned by a female (female_owner). The formal analysis will enable us to test whether female owners of female managers of firms are better at introducing innovations to the marketplace.

This investigation is couched in the overall framework of innovative behavior of firms, borrowing from the literature, given constraints of the underlying surveys. Specifically, the controls include firm characteristics (age, size and ownership), economic prosperity, R&D capability, country's institutional setup (economic freedom, protection of patent rights), and perceived business obstacles from informal markets and raising finance.

Other things being the same, greater economic freedom, research capability, stronger patent protection would make innovation more likely, while the effects of other controls could go either way. For instance, barriers could retard innovation, although innovate might be perceived as a way to circumvent barriers. Likewise, firms' size, longevity, and ownership structure (whether sole proprietorship or not) might promote innovation or make innovation less likely. These questions would be resolved in analysis, especially if the findings are robust across alternate model setups.

3. Data, Estimation and Results

3.1 Data

The primary source of data for this study comes from surveys conducted by the World Bank under the Enterprise Surveys (www.entreprisesurveys.org), where numerous large and small businesses across nations are periodically surveyed to provide insights on a range of issues. Our data set is drawn for surveys conducted between 2010 and 2016, and focused on emerging and developing countries. Given the scale and scope of exercise, only a few nations are surveyed in a given year, with a handful of nations surveyed more than once. Thus, the nature of the available information precludes any time series analysis.²

² While the underlying survey has a wealth of detailed information, we are nevertheless constrained by the type and depth of questions asked, especially since the survey was not conducted with this research in mind.



The information from the survey data is supplemented by macro, countrywide variables from established sources. Complete details about the data, including variable definitions, summary statistics and sources are provided in Table 1. The Appendix provides a list of countries in the analysis, and Table 2 provides the correlation matrix of key variables in the study.

In our sample across more than 100 nations, about a third of the firms introduced a new product or service in the past three years (Table 1).

About fifteen percent of firms had a female as the top manager, and a similar percentage of firms were majority-owned by a female (although, the correlation between *female_manager* and *female_owner* is about 0.52 (Appendix)). Further, the average age of the firms surveyed was 20 years, a fifth of them spent on R&D and about a third were sole proprietorships.

Innovation was negatively correlated with both <code>female_manager</code> and <code>female_owner</code>, with the former correlation being larger in magnitude and statistically significant. The formal estimation strategy to test the strength of these relations is outlined next.

3.2 Estimation

Given the binary nature of our dependent variable, we employ the logistic regression (or Logit), and taking into account the multilevel nature of our independent variables we use country-level clustered standard errors.³ Given Logit estimation, the resulting coefficients can be used to inform probabilities of an event occurring given assumptions on the values of the explanatory variables in the model. Subsequently, the marginal effects in relevant instances are reported in Section 3.3.3.

3.3 Results

3.3.1 Female managers and innovation

The correlation between innovation and female manager is negative and statistically significant (Table 2). Investigating the impact of female management on innovation in Table 3 we find that although the variable female_manager has a negative sign in all model specifications it is never significant at the 10%-level, meaning that female top managers are not different from male top managers in introducing innovation. In other words, there is little evidence that female top managers are either more likely or less likely to innovate via the introduction of new products of services at their establishment relative to their male counterparts.

The results with regard to firm characteristics show that larger and older firms tend to introduce more innovations, while ownership structure has no significant influence. As expected, greater research capability increased the odds of innovation introductions. Own research is not only important to generate own innovations but also better empowers firms to benefit from the spillovers of others' research.

Economic freedom patent protection have no significant impact, whereas the two perceived barriers (i.e., the threat of informal competitors (*informal*) and obstacles in obtaining finance (*finance*)) in fact might have promoted innovation introductions as firms likely viewed innovation as a means to leave informal competitors

³ We thus take into account that errors – which, in principal, are assumed to be i.i.d. – may have arbitrary correlation across firms within a given country.



behind as well as to make themselves more attractive to potential lenders. Finally, greater economic prosperity (*GDP*) lowered innovation introductions as in a growing economy firms were likely to be more content with the status quo. This negative sign on *GDP* was statistically significant in all the models in Table 3.

3.3.2 Female owners and innovation

Turning to the other main explanatory variable, <code>female_owner</code>, the resulting coefficient is positive and significant in all the models in Table 4. Female majority owners, unlike female managers, increased the likelihood of innovation introductions. A possible interpretation is that female owners feel more empowered than managers to take innovation introduction decisions or the reward structure that is more direct for owners, relative to managers, makes them more innovation friendly. This striking contrast between the innovation behaviors of female managers versus female owners seems like a new revelation. Further, with regard to women breaking the glass ceiling, the results imply that, at least with regard to innovation, it matters which ceiling is broken!

The results with respect to the control variables are remarkably similar to Table 3, except for the fact that stronger patent protection seems to promote innovation introductions, which we consider a plausible result. Again, larger and older firms favored innovation introductions, while sole proprietors did not.

3.3.3 Marginal effects

Keeping in mind that the dependent variable used is binary and the estimation method is logit, it seems instructive to discuss the relative magnitudes of marginal effects. The parameter estimate for the *female_owner* variable in Model 4.1 implies that the probability of innovation by be female owner is 36.5% when all the other control variables in the model are evaluated at their sample mean values. For male owners, the corresponding probability is about 2.5 percentage points less (34.1%). For the other four models presented in Table 4 the gender differences are somewhat higher, ranging from 2.9 percentage points (Model 4.4) to a 4.1 percentage points (Model 4.5).⁴ These differences do not seem to be sensitive when values of the control variables different than the mean are used in the calculations.

3.3.4 Additional considerations: Sole proprietorships with female owners or managers

To obtain additional insights into the effect of the organizational structure of firms on innovation, in Table 5 we consider whether the behavior of female managers and female owners was different in sole proprietorships. Accordingly, the interaction terms of *female_manager* and *female_owner*, respectively, with *soleproprietor* were added to variants of Models 3.1-3.2 and 4.1-4.2 from the earlier tables.

Overall, as in Tables 3 and 4, female owners were more likely to introduce innovations (Models 5.3-5.4), while the impact of female managers was statistically insignificant (Models 5.1-5.2).

While interaction with sole proprietorship does not change the results for female managers (they remain insignificant), it leads to an interesting change in the results for female owners. As can be seen from Models 5.3 and 5.4 in Table 5, the positive effect of female owners towards innovation introductions does not transfer to female owners in sole proprietorships. In other words: Female owners push innovation, but they need

⁴ The relatively low statistical significance of *female_manager* in Table 3 did not necessitate a similar numerical exercise in that case.



company/partners to develop their innovation-enhancing potential. This finding fits nicely with findings from the prior literature (e.g. Dezsö and Ross 2012), suggesting that women in teams are better in promoting innovation than women on their own. In view of the financial constraints and other restriction that female sole proprietors – in particular in emerging and developing countries – face, we consider this a remarkable and highly plausible result.

The results for the control variables support our earlier findings.

4. Conclusions

This paper provides a unique look at possible differential incentives of female managers versus female owners of firms in terms of their impacts on introduction of innovations to the market. In addition to importance for technology policy, this work potentially adds to several strands of the literature, including economics of technological change, organizational economics and the economics of gender.

Specifically, we use firm-level survey responses conducted over the 2010-16 time period across more than 100 emerging and developing countries to examine whether female managers or female owners of firms were better at bringing innovations to the market. The use of more than 66,000 usable survey responses in our data across numerous nations enables us to provide some unique insights.

Our paper is the first that-we are aware of that disentangles the roles of female manager and female owner.⁵ Moreover, the majority of empirical research on gender and innovation is focused on (single) industrialized countries, neglecting the fact that developing and emerging countries play an increasingly important role in global innovation and might differ substantially from industrialized countries in terms of female participation in innovation.

Employing a range of firm-specific and country-specific controls, our results show that female owners of firms, rather than female managers, are more likely to introduce innovations. However, the positive effect of female owners towards innovation introductions does not transfer to female owners in sole proprietorships. In other words: Female owners push innovation, but they need company/partners to develop their innovationenhancing potential.

In other results, as expected, innovations resulted from firms engaging in R&D. Larger and older firms reinforced these tendencies. The presence of an informal sector and finance availability constraints actually spurred innovation, as innovations are perceived to potentially overcome these barriers, 6, 7 while greater economic prosperity somewhat led to complacency.

⁵ Other studies either look either at female managers or at female owners, or they put both in one basket like Mukhtar (2002) who investigates "owner managers", (also see Lee-Gosselin and Grisé (1990)).

⁶ We also considered the effects of greater competition (via the number of competitors) and found the effect on innovation introductions to be positive with female managers - the supply-push theory of innovation. However, the number of usable observations in this case was about a-tenth of the overall sample, and insufficient to conduct a meaningful analysis in the case of female owners. Additional details are available upon request.

Goel et al. (2016) examine the effects of alternate innovation dimensions on entrepreneurship in the formal and informal sectors using aggregate data for about 50 nations.



Several potential policy recommendations follow from this research. First, efforts to empower women to break the glass ceiling might consider the type of ceiling that is broken. In the context of innovation, it seems that female ownership of business, rather than female management, would be more likely to promote technological change. Second, ownership structure matters: female owners push innovation, but they need company/partners to develop their innovation-enhancing potential.

Finally, the implications of market structure (and consequently tie to the Schumpeterian hypothesis) suggest some challenges for policymaking. On the one hand, we find that older and larger firms were more likely to introduce innovations, while on the other hand, sole proprietorships were less likely to do so. So lenient antitrust treatment of large firms on their greater propensity to innovate might have to be periodically revisited as the ownership structure (but not the overall size) of the firm changes. This realization seems to be new both in the academic and policy contexts.



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[finance]

[*EF*]

[soleproprietor]

(1=yes, 0=no) [R&D]

one year (in logs), [GDP]

protection [patent_prot]

obstacle, (1=yes, 0=no) [informal]

Table 1



(14.653)

0.372

(0.483)

0.213 (0.410)

0.235

(0.424)

0.231

(0.422)

10.006

(7.706)

57.114 (7.791)

3.266

(0.792)

[1]

[1]

[1]

[1]

[2]

[3]

[4]

Variable definitions, summary statistics and data sources					
	Mean				
Variable	(standard deviation)	Source			
Establishment introduced new products/services over last 3 years, (1=yes,	0.376	[1]			
0=no) [Innovation]	(0.484)				
Top manager is female, (1=yes, 0=no) [female_manager]	0.150	[1]			
	(0.357)				
At least 50% of establishment ownership by women, (1=yes, 0=no)	0.142	[1]			
[female_owner]	(0.349)				
Establishment size category measured by full-time equivalent workers, (0 =	1.712	[1]			
< 5 workers, 1 = 5-9 workers, 2 = 20-99 workers, 3 = > 100 workers)	(0.785)				
[firmsize]					
Age of the establishment (years) [firmage]	20.529	[1]			
1	1				

Notes: Statistics pertain to observations used in the analysis. Sources:

Establishment legal status is sole proprietorship, (1=yes, 0=no)

Establishment spent on R&D (excl. market research) during last fiscal year,

Practices of competitors in informal sector is a major or very severe

Access to finance is a major or very severe obstacle, (1=yes, 0=no)

GDP per capita (thousands) in PPP (constant 2011 international \$), lagged

Economic Freedom Index, (0 – 100, higher values imply more freedom)

Index of patent protection, 2005, higher values imply stronger patent

http://www.heritage.org/index/explore?view=by-region-country-year (accessed August, 2017).

^{[1].} Enterprise Surveys (http://www.enterprisesurveys.org), The World Bank. Data were taken for all available years between 2006 and 2016 were the survey was conducted the Enterprise Surveys Global Methodology. Accessed July, 2017. The list of countries included in the data set and survey years can be found in the Appendix.

^{[2].} World Development Indicators, The World Bank (accessed July, 2017).

^{[3].} Heritage Foundation Index of Economic Freedom, overall score.

^{[4].} Park, W.G., 2008, International patent protection: 1960–2005, Research Policy, 37, 761-766.





Table 2 **Correlation matrix of key variables**

	Innovation	female_manager	female_owner
Innovation	1.000		
female_manager	-0.0228 [*]	1.000	
female_owner	-0.0006	0.5177*	1.000



Table 3 Female management and innovation						
						(
3.1	3.2	3.3	3.4	3.5		
-0.041 (0.4)	-0.018 (0.2)	-0.012 (0.2)	-0.009 (0.1)	-0.004 (0.0)		
		0.169**		0.133**		
(7.9)	(4.7)	(5.4)	(5.2)	(3.8)		
0.009 ^{**} (3.8)	0.007 ^{**} (4.2)	0.006 ^{**} (3.8)	0.006 ^{**} (3.9)	0.005 ^{**} (3.4)		
-0.117 (1.4)	-0.035 (0.5)	-0.053 (0.8)	-0.040 (0.6)	-0.073 (1.2)		
	1.798 ^{**} (24.3)	1.784 ^{**} (26.3)	1.783 ^{**} (24.8)	1.738 ^{**} (24.4)		
		0.329 ^{**} (5.3)				
			0.210 ^{**} (4.1)			
Country-level control variables						
-0.031 ^{**} (3.3)	-0.033** (4.1)	-0.030 ^{**} (4.0)	-0.030 ^{**} (4.3)	-0.043** (3.8)		
	0.007			0.147		
				0.147 (1.6)		
174.8**	927.3**	951.2**	857.9**	828.7**		
66,887	62,946	62,243	64,575	53,179		
	-0.041 (0.4) 0.317** (7.9) 0.009** (3.8) -0.117 (1.4) -0.031** (3.3)	(Dependent variate 3.1 3.2 -0.041 -0.018 (0.4) (0.2) 0.317** 0.155** (7.9) (4.7) 0.009** 0.007** (3.8) (4.2) -0.117 -0.035 (1.4) (0.5) 1.798** (24.3)	(Dependent variable: Innovation) 3.1 3.2 3.3 -0.041 -0.018 -0.012 (0.4) (0.2) (0.2) 0.317** 0.155** 0.169** (7.9) (4.7) (5.4) 0.009** 0.007** (3.8) -0.117 -0.035 -0.053 (1.4) 1.798** (24.3) 1.784** (24.3) (26.3) Country-level control variables -0.031** -0.033** -0.033** -0.030** (3.3) (4.1) 0.007 (1.0) 174.8** 927.3** 951.2**	Country-level control variables Coun		

Notes: Variable definitions are provided in Table 1. All models are estimated via logistic regression and include a constant term. The numbers in parentheses are (absolute value) z-statistics based on country-level clustered standard errors.

* denotes statistical significance at the 10% level, and ** denotes significance at the 5% level (or better).



		Table 4			
	Female o	wnership and	dinnovation		
(Dependent variable: <i>Innovation</i>)					
Model →	4.1	4.2	4.3	4.4	4.5
Firm ownership at least 50% female [female_owner]	0.107 [*] (1.7)	0.140** (2.8)	0.135 ^{**} (2.4)	0.128 ^{**} (2.4)	0.178 ^{**} (3.3)
Firm size [firmsize]	0.267 ^{**} (5.4)	0.147 ^{**} (3.7)	0.155 ^{**} (4.2)	0.154 ^{**} (4.1)	0.130 ^{**} (3.1)
Age of the establishment (years) [firmage]	0.005 ^{**} (2.7)	0.005 ^{**} (3.3)	0.004 ^{**} (2.3)	0.004 ^{**} (2.6)	0.002 [*] (1.7)
Legal status of firm is sole proprietorship [soleproprietor]	-0.107 (1.3)	-0.002 (0.0)	-0.044 (0.6)	-0.021 (0.3)	-0.040 (0.6)
Firms spent on research and development [R&D]		1.715 ^{**} (26.5)	1.711** (26.8)	1.709 ^{**} (25.0)	1.622 ^{**} (26.3)
Informal sector an obstacle [informal]			0.286 ^{**} (3.5)		
Access to finance is an obstacle [finance]				0.196 ^{**} (3.2)	
	Cour	ntry-level control	variables		
Lagged GDP per capita, PPP [GDP]	-0.057 ^{**} (4.7)	-0.061** (4.2)	-0.052** (4.4)	-0.049** (4.3)	-0.073 ^{**} (4.3)
Economic Freedom [<i>EF</i>]		0.020 (1.6)			
Patent protection [patent_prot]	_				0.160 ^{**} (2.1)
LR χ ²	68.3**	958.8**	920.3**	804.5**	809.4**
Observations	50,445	47,815	47,699	49,517	38,551



Table 5 **Additional considerations:** Female managers or female owners in sole proprietorships

(Dependent variable: Innovation)

Model →	5.1	5.2	5.3	5.4
female_manager	0.011 (0.1)	0.002 (0.0)		
female_manager X soleproprietor	-0.141 (1.0)	-0.053 (0.4)		
female_owner			0.189 ^{**} (2.4)	0.184 ^{**} (2.4)
female_owner X soleproprietor			-0.177 (1.3)	-0.093 (0.8)
firmsize	0.330 ^{**} (8.8)	0.159 ^{**} (4.9)	0.281** (5.6)	0.146 ^{**} (3.6)
firmage	0.009** (3.9)	0.007** (4.2)	0.005** (2.8)	0.005 ^{**} (3.2)
R&D		1.800** (24.2)		1.714** (26.3)

Country-level control variables

GDP	-0.029	-0.032	-0.056	-0.061
	(3.4)	(4.0)	(4.7)	(4.3)
EF		0.007		0.020
		(1.0)		(1.6)
$LR \chi^2$	176.8**	948.8**	69.8**	976.4 ^{**}
Observations	66,887	62,946	50,445	47,815

Notes: See Table 3.



Appendix

Countries included in the data set

Afghanistan (2014), Albania (2013), Antigua and Barbuda (2010), Argentina (2010), Armenia (2013), Azerbaijan (2013), Bahamas (2010), Bangladesh (2013), Barbados (2010), Belarus (2013), Belize (2010), Benin (2016), Bhutan (2015), Bolivia (2010), Bosnia and Herzegovina (2013), Bulgaria (2013), Burundi (2014), Cambodia (2016), Cameroon (2016), Central African Republic (2011), Chile (2010), China (2012), Colombia (2010), Congo, Dem. Rep. (2013), Costa Rica (2010), Côte d'Ivoire (2016), Croatia (2013), Czech Republic (2013), Djibouti (2013), Dominica (2010), Dominican Republic (2010, 2016), Ecuador (2010), Egypt, Arab Rep. (2013), El Salvador (2010, 2016), Estonia (2013), Ethiopia (2011, 2015), Georgia (2013), Ghana (2013), Grenada (2010), Guatemala (2010), Guinea (2016), Guyana (2010), Honduras (2010), Hungary (2013), India (2014), Indonesia (2015), Israel (2013), Jamaica (2010), Jordan (2013), Kazakhstan (2013), Kenya (2013), Kosovo (2013), Kyrgyz Republic (2013), Lao PDR (2016), Latvia (2013), Lebanon (2013), Lesotho (2016), Lithuania (2013), Macedonia, FYR (2013), Malawi (2014), Malaysia (2015), Mali (2016), Mauritania (2014), Mexico (2010), Moldova (2013), Mongolia (2013), Montenegro (2013), Morocco (2013), Myanmar (2014, 2016), Namibia (2014), Nepal (2013), Nicaragua (2010), Nigeria (2014), Pakistan (2013), Panama (2010), Papua New Guinea (2015), Paraguay (2010), Peru (2010), Philippines (2015), Poland (2013), Romania (2013), Russian Federation (2012), Rwanda (2011), Senegal (2014), Serbia (2013), Slovak Republic (2013), Slovenia (2013), Solomon Islands (2015), South Sudan (2014), Sri Lanka (2011), St. Kitts and Nevis (2010), St. Lucia (2010), St. Vincent and the Grenadines (2010), Sudan (2014), Suriname (2010), Swaziland (2016), Tajikistan (2013), Tanzania (2013), Thailand (2016), Timor-Leste (2015), Togo (2016), Trinidad and Tobago (2010), Tunisia (2013), Turkey (2013), Uganda (2013), Ukraine (2013), Uruguay (2010), Uzbekistan (2013), Venezuela, R.B. (2010), Vietnam (2015), West Bank and Gaza (2013), Yemen (2013), Zambia (2013), Zimbabwe (2011, 2016).

Note: N = 119 (5 countries surveyed twice)