# FlowGuard: Building Robust Firewalls for Software-Defined Networks

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# Outline

#### Introduction

- Challenges for Building FW in SDN
- FlowGuard framework
  - Violation Detection Mechanism
  - Resolution Mechanism
- Conclusion

### Traditional Firewalls Vs. SDN Firewalls

Traditional FWs: all insiders are trusted

- Internal traffic is not seen and cannot be filtered by the traditional firewall
- SDN FWs: monitoring all insiders



### Challenges

#### Examining **Dynamic** Network Policy Updates

- A firewall in SDN is both
  - Packet Filter + Policy Checker
    - The **first packet** goes through the controller and is filtered by firewall
    - The subsequent packets of the flow directly match the flow policy
- Checking Indirect Security Violations
  - Indirect violation caused by
    - Dynamic packet modification
      - OpenFlow allows an action, Set-Field, which can rewrite packet header
    - Rule dependency
      - Dependency relation depends on their priority
      - Rules may overlap partially / entirely each other (inter / intra table)

### Challenges (cont'd)

#### Indirect violation scenario



### Challenges (cont'd)

#### Architecture Options

- Centralized SDN firewall
  - Firewall policy is centrally defined and enforced at the controller
  - Limitation: cannot deal with partial policy violations
- Distributed SDN firewall
  - Firewall policy is defined centrally, but propagated and enforced at each individual flow entry (ingress switch)
  - Limitation: needs a complicated revocation and repropagation mechanism to handle dynamic policy updates

# State Of The Art

#### SDN Firewall App

- Built-in firewall application in Floodlight
  - Limited to check *flow packet* violations and unable to examine *flow policy* violations
- Policy Conflict Detection and Resolution
  - VeriFlow [Khurshid'13] and NetPlumber [Kazemian'13]
    - Lack of automatic, effective and real-time violation resolution
  - Pyretic [Monsanto'13]
    - Cannot discover and resolve *indirect* security violations
  - FortNOX [Porras'12]
    - Only conducts *pairwise* conflict analysis without considering *rule dependencies* in flow tables and firewall policies



**Space Analysis** 

### Flow Path Space Analysis

- Flow tracking graph(NetPlumber [Kazemian'13])
  - Dynamic packet modification
  - Rule dependency
- Flow path space calculation
  - Incoming space
  - Outgoing space
  - Tracked space







# Space Analysis (cont'd)

### Firewall Authorization Space

- Decouple dependency relations between "allow" rules and "deny" rules in the firewall policy
  - Denied authorization space
  - Allowed authorization space





# **Violation Detection**

#### Space Comparison

- Compare Tracked Flow Space against Firewall Denied Authorization Space
  - Entire Violation
    - Denied authorization space includes whole tracked space
  - Partial Violation
    - Denied authorization space partially includes tracked space





# **Violation Resolution**

#### Automatic Violation Resolution Mechanism



# Implementation & Evaluation

- Prototype of FlowGuard
  - Floodlight V 0.90
- Evaluation Environment
  - Real-world network topology
    - Stanford backbone network [kazemian'13]
  - Mininet 2.0

#### Flow Tracking, Violation Detection and Resolution

	Flow	Dependency Breaking		Update	Flow	Packet
	Rejecting	Tagging	Rerouting	Rejecting	Removing	Blocking
Tracking	-	4.54		4.78	4.32	6.42
Detection	0.03	0.04		0.05	0.07	0.06
Resolution	0.03	4.34	1.88	3.73	3.71	2.53

Table 1: Tracking, Detection and resolution time (ms) for different resolution strategies

# Evaluation (cont'd)

#### Scalability and Performance Analysis



Figure 3: Scalability analysis.





# **Concluding Remarks**

- Identifying essential challenges for building robust firewall in SDN
- Proposing a comprehensive framework, FlowGuard, to address identified challenges
- Future Work
  - Developing Stateful SDN Firewall
  - Firewall *virtualization* using Network Function Virtualization (NFV)
  - Robust security enforcement kernels for SDN controllers

# Q & A



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