

Freedom of Connection – Freedom of Expression:
The Changing Legal and Regulatory Ecology Shaping the Internet

by

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Preface

As stated in its Constitution, UNESCO is dedicated to “Promoting the free flow of ideas by word and image”. Part of this mission, therefore, is to promote freedom of expression and freedom of the press through sensitization and monitoring activities, as a central element in building strong democracies, contributing to good governance, promoting civic participation and the rule of law, and encouraging human development and security. Media independence and pluralism are fostered by the Organization, providing advisory services on media legislation and sensitizing governments and parliamentarians, as well as civil society and relevant professional associations. However, UNESCO recognizes that the principle of freedom of expression must apply not only to traditional media, but also to the Internet. Providing an unprecedented volume of resources for information and knowledge, the Internet opens up new opportunities for expression and participation and holds enormous potential for development.

This comprehensive research publication examines the changing legal and regulatory ecology that has shaped the Internet over the years. The research was supported by UNESCO within the framework of the follow-up process to the World Summit on the Information Society, and as part of UNESCO’s activities relating to the Internet Governance Forum. The principle aim was to provide a reference tool that can inform and stimulate the current debate on the global trends that have shaped freedom of expression on the Internet. The report explores the various legal and policy mechanisms that are crucial for the free flow of information, providing guidance for policy-makers and other relevant users, for the creation of environments conducive to the freedom of expression.

As this publication makes clear, freedom of expression is not just a by-product of technical change: it must be protected by legal and regulatory measures that balance a variety of potentially conflicting values and interests in a complex global ecology of choices. The impetus that this report provides for the prioritization of research in this field encourages further scrutiny of the multifaceted issues that govern the conditions for freedom of expression on the Internet. The findings of this research point to the need to better track a wider array of global legal and regulatory trends, and whether individual researchers, students or policy makers, it is my hope that this publication proves to be a useful and informative resource for all readers.

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Executive Summary

Over the first decade of the 21st Century, the Internet and its convergence with mobile communications has enabled greater access to information and communication resources. In 2010, nearly 2 billion people worldwide – over one-quarter of the world's population – use the Internet. However, during the same period, defenders of digital rights have raised growing concerns over how legal and regulatory trends might be constraining online freedom of expression. Anecdotal accounts of the arrests of bloggers, the filtering of content, and the disconnection of users have sparked these concerns. However, they are reinforced by more systematic studies that provide empirical evidence of encroachments on freedom of expression, such as through the increased use of content filtering.

This report provides a new perspective on the social and political dynamics behind these threats to expression. It develops a conceptual framework on the 'ecology of freedom of expression' for discussing the broad context of policy and practice that should be taken into consideration in discussions of this issue. This framework structures an original synthesis of empirical research and case studies of selected technical, legal and regulatory trends. These include developments in six inter-related arenas that focus on:

1. technical initiatives, related to connection and disconnection, such as content filtering;
2. digital rights, including those tied directly to freedom of expression and censorship, but also indirectly, through freedom of information, and privacy and data protection;
3. industrial policy and regulation, including copyright and intellectual property, industrial strategies, and ICTs for development;
4. users, such as focused on fraud, child protection, decency, libel and control of hate speech;
5. network policy and practices, including standards, such as around identity, and regulation of Internet Service Providers; and
6. security, ranging from controlling spam and viruses to protecting national security.

By placing developments in these arenas into a broad ecology of choices, it is more apparent how freedom can be eroded unintentionally as various actors strategically pursue a more diverse array of objectives. The findings reinforce the significance of concerns over freedom of expression and connection, while acknowledging countervailing trends and the open future of technology, policy and practice. Freedom of expression is not an inevitable outcome of technological innovation. It can be diminished or reinforced by the design of technologies, policies and practices – sometimes far removed from freedom of expression. This synthesis points out the need to focus systematic research on this wider ecology shaping the future of expression in the digital age.

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Introduction

Legal and Regulatory Trends Shaping Freedom of Expression

The continuing reinvention and worldwide diffusion of the Internet has made it an increasingly central medium of expression of the 21st century, challenging the role of more traditional mass media, including radio, television, and newspapers. In 2010, nearly 2 billion people worldwide – over one-quarter of the world's population – use the Internet.ⁱ This could have major societal implications, as the use of the Internet has the potential to reshape global access to information, communication, services, and technologies (Dutton 1999, 2004). Enduring issues, ranging from freedom of the press to the balance of world information flows in all sectors, and from the media to the sciences, will be tied to the Internet as a 'network of networks' – an interface between individuals and the news, information, stories, research, cultures and entertainment flowing worldwide (Baer et al 2009).

The increasing centrality of the Internet has countervailing implications. On the one hand, the global diffusion of the Internet, along with a continuing stream of innovations, such as the ease with which users can create as well as consume text and video, are making the Internet increasingly pivotal to the communicative power of individuals, groups and institutions with access to networks and the skills to use them effectively (Dutton 2005; Castells 2009).

On the other hand, this very shift in communicative power has spawned greater efforts to restrict and control the use of the Internet for information and communication on political, moral, cultural, security, and other grounds. It is leading also to legal and regulatory initiatives to mitigate risks associated with this new medium, ranging from risks to children to privacy to intellectual property rights, to national security, which might more indirectly, and often unintentionally, enhance or curtail freedom of expression. In some cases, limits on expression are intentional, but often unintended, such when regulatory instruments, that might have been appropriate for newspapers, broadcasting or the press, are used inappropriately to control the Internet.ⁱⁱ

As a consequence, defenders of freedom of expression have raised growing concerns over how legal and regulatory trends might be constraining freedom of expression at the very time that the Internet has become more widely recognized as a major medium for fostering global communication. These concerns are reinforced by surveys that provide evidence of encroachments on freedom of expression, such as through the filtering of Internet content. At the same time, despite Internet censorship and filtering, this network of networks continues to bring more information to increasing numbers of individuals around the world, particularly as mobile communication extends its reach to vast numbers of individuals without access to more traditional communication resources. However, technological innovation will not necessarily enhance freedom of expression. It is not a technologically determined outcome or an inherent consequence of Internet use. This report argues that it can be diminished unless freedom of expression is explicitly and systematically addressed by policy and practice.

This report provides a preliminary view of the evidence behind these concerns, and how they can be addressed through more systematic research, and new frameworks for discussion of policy and practice. It is not a definitive treatment of the wideranging issues it addresses, but an effort to begin an original overview and synthesis of legal and regulatory trends that could reshape freedom of expression in the digital age of networked societies.ⁱⁱⁱ In doing so, it offers a framework that places developments within a broad ecology of actors, objectives, and strategies for shaping the role of the Internet and Web in local and global communication, based on a critical review of existing research, legal and regulatory documentation, news coverage, and expert opinion. The findings reinforce the significance of these concerns, while acknowledging countervailing trends and the open future of freedom of expression. Based on these findings, the report points toward a need to more systematically monitor a wide range of legal and regulatory developments that directly—and indirectly—shape the future of free expression on the Internet in local and global contexts.

This synthesis suggests a need for further research to systematically monitor these developments in ways that are trusted and able to inform debate about policy and practice. The value of the Internet to political and democratic institutions and processes will depend on such efforts to track worldwide freedom of expression on the Internet.

Freedom of Expression in a Network Society

Representatives of global institutions and national governments around the world have endorsed freedom of expression as a basic human right. While most often associated with freedom of the press and the First Amendment in the US, freedom of expression is not simply an American value. It has been upheld as a basic human right for decades by a number of international organizations, having been endorsed since 1948 in the United Nations' Universal Declaration of Human Rights.^{iv}

In 2009, speaking to college students in Shanghai, China, on his first Asian trip as President of the United States, Barack Obama made this point. He cited freedom of expression, along with religion, as a universal human right, saying:

'... freedoms of expression, and worship, of access to information and political participation – we believe they are universal rights. They should be available to all people, including ethnic and religious minorities, whether they are in the United States, China or any nation.'^v

This position was reinforced and extended by US Secretary of State, Hilary Rodham Clinton (2010) in linking freedom of expression in the 21st Century with the right of people to connect. She evoked the First Amendment to the US Constitution, and Franklin Roosevelt's 'Four Freedoms' speech of 1941 to discuss freedom of expression on the Internet and extend this to what she called the freedom to connect, defined as the 'idea that governments should

not prevent people from connecting to the [I]nternet, to websites, or to each other'. She spoke of a need for 'freedom of assembly in cyber space'. This reflects a similar commitment expressed years ago by Viviane Reding (2007), Commissioner for Information Society and Media in the European Commission, in saying: 'Freedom of expression is one of the most fundamental rights of our European democracies' ... but that 'without freedom of information, freedom of expression often remains meaningless'. These recent developments reinforce the commitment of international institutions, such as UNESCO, which 'promotes freedom of expression and freedom of the press as a basic human right'.^{vi}

The logic underlying the defense of these values is two-fold. One is that the free flow of ideas is critical to democratic processes and institutions, such as the ability of citizens to vote in an informed way and to hold their governments and other public institutions accountable. A second is based on the priority placed on the autonomy of the individual in relation to larger collectives, a principle that varies cross-culturally, underpinning many debates over the relative weight given to individuals versus communities or other collectivities. For example, a focus on individual autonomy might support the role of the individual in choosing what to filter. In contrast, a focus on the collective could support a greater role for state filtering to protect shared values.

Clearly, freedoms of expression and connection to the Internet are not absolute in any cultural setting and this applies equally, whether considering expression online or offline. Cross-nationally and cross-culturally, the relative priority accorded freedom of expression in relation to many other goals and objectives, such as national security or personal privacy, is one of the critical issues tied to global governance of the Internet and related information and communication technologies (ICTs).

Box 0.1. Three Dimensions of Freedom Online.^a

Freedom House identifies three aspects of freedom on the Internet, which can be mapped into our two categories, although all overlap and are interrelated:

1. Obstacles to access, including restrictions imposed by governmental policy or economic conditions, such as a lack of infrastructure;
2. Restrictions on the rights of users, such as (un)lawful disconnection; and
3. Limits to content, such as through self- or government-censorship, when self-censorship includes that imposed by the Internet industry.

^a Adapted from Freedom House (2009).

21st century conceptions of freedom of expression entail at least two general dimensions tied to the Information Age of networked communication (Klang and Murray 2005: 1). The first focuses on access to the means for expression. In the age of digital networking, this increasingly translates into access to the Internet – one critical aspect of connection, and related ICTs, as they are becoming a primary interface between individuals and the world (Dutton 1999;

Baer et al 2009). For this reason, the global diffusion of the Internet has become a critical issue for those supporting worldwide freedom of expression.^{vii}

The second focuses on the rights of individuals and groups to use various media, from association to mass communication in order to support political processes and institutions, such as elections, but also in all areas of life. This is most often associated with freedom of the press and the freedom to associate with others, but increasingly, freedom of expression is being extended to the requirement of rights to use the Internet and ICTs for obtaining information and organizing politically, particularly as individual Internet users increasingly take on many roles formerly played by the press.

The Internet as a worldwide ‘network of networks’ could enable people to inform and educate themselves, express their views, and participate in civil society and democratic processes to an extent never before possible. New forms of information and participation like Internet-based newspapers, blogs, or social networking sites are challenging more traditional media by proposing new forms of communication, such as by enabling users to share, generate and even co-create or co-produce information (Table 1). In such ways, the Internet has complemented more traditional forms of one-to-many broadcast communication by many-to-many and many-to-one networks of communication, as illustrated by the work of Global Voices (Box 2). Such initiatives over the Internet are expected to enhance the diversity of available information and facilitate access to ‘user-generated content’ (UGC) in ways that empower citizens, and become a tool for ensuring greater transparency and openness.

Table 1. Forms of Communication Enabled by the Web^a

| Web-enabled | Illustrations |
|--|--|
| Web 1.0. Sharing Information | Hypertextual links on the Web, enabling the global sharing of documents, text, video, etc. |
| Web 2.0. User-generated content (UGC) | Blogging, micro-blogging (e.g., Twitter), User comments, ratings, polling, etc. |
| Web 3.0. Co-creation, co-production of information | Wiki-based contributions (e.g., Wikipedia), collaboration software (e.g., Google Docs) |

^aAdapted from Dutton (2009).

Box 0.2. Global Voices: Complementing and Extending Traditional Media.

Global Voices is a collaboration, claiming more than 200 bloggers around the world, that works on translations and reports from blogs and citizen media outlets. They place an emphasis on giving voice to people and views that are not ordinarily heard on international mainstream media and therefore not likely to reach a broad audience. The Global Voices team also has an Advocacy website and network designed to help people express opinions online in countries where their voices are restricted by state censorship.

See: <http://globalvoicesonline.org>

However, this potential for the Internet to enhance freedom of expression is not universally welcomed. For example, some worry that the Internet could undermine traditional media practices and institutions by eroding standards of broadcasting, undermining local and national media outlets and productions, or undermining the business models supporting the media, such as advertising or the sale or sharing of copyrighted material. In other cases there are concerns about particular information or content that might be disseminated online, perhaps on the basis of national security, or on political or moral grounds, such as in the case of WikiLeaks (see Box 0.3) distributing documents on the war in Afghanistan, which might have jeopardized the lives of informants identified in leaked documents (Waters 2010).

Box 0.3. WikiLeaks and the War in Afghanistan

The Website entitled WikiLeaks is dedicated to providing access to information by protecting ‘whistleblowers, journalists and activists who have sensitive material to communicate to the public’.^a The site leads with a quote from *Times Magazine* that the site ‘... could become as important a journalistic tool as the Freedom of Information Act.’ It was founded and led by Julian Assange, based in Reykjavik, Iceland, on the notion that ‘principled leaking’ of key documents can support greater public accountability, invoking the spirit of Daniel Ellsberg and the Pentagon Papers. The site was supported primarily by individual volunteers, but the release of notable documents led to some funding through donations (Khatchadourian 2010).

In 2010, the site became a focus of debate over its posting of an ‘Afgan War Diary, 2004-2010’ on 25 July, which included over 91,000 reports on a dedicated Web page. WikiLeaks argued that ‘some 15,000 reports from the total archive as part of a harm minimization process demanded by our source’^b, but this did not prevent the release of information deemed sensitive by governments, the press, and civil liberties advocates, such as the identities of some informants. Even before this moment, there have been efforts to censor the site, such as in Australia, where the government included WikiLeaks pages in its censorship list (Singel 2009).

^a From ‘about page’ of WikiLeaks: <http://wikileaks.org/wiki/WikiLeaks:About>

^b http://wikileaks.org/wiki/Afghan_War_Diary,_2004-2010

The use of Internet filtering (Box 0.4) and other forms of restricting full access to the Internet has led to a number of efforts to track and monitor its prevalence, namely work done by Freedom House (2009), as well as academic research, such as the OpenNet Initiative, one of the most prominent projects (Box 0.5).

Box 0.4. Internet Filtering.

Governments, Internet Service Providers, Internet access providers, companies, parents, or individuals can install software that restricts content to users. This software can be installed on an individual personal computer, but may also be installed 'upstream' on a home, company or ISP network server. In some cases, it is installed at a national 'backbone' level. A filter can screen particular words, e-mail addresses, Web sites or other addresses and be used for example, if the installer wishes to prevent users within its borders from seeing particular content or a particular site. This software is sometimes called 'content-control' or 'Web filtering' software. When used by governments, it is often branded as 'censorship', particularly if aimed at political speech. But in the case of Internet Service Providers (ISPs), where filters are used for example to combat SPAM, it can be viewed as an essential service to users. In the household, parents might use a filter as a means of 'child protection'. These examples underscore the need to assess the social and political context in which filtering is conducted.

Box 0.5. The OpenNet Initiative.

The OpenNet Initiative seeks to discover and report on the Internet filtering practices of countries that may be filtering Internet content for social (moral), political or security purposes. Their research team has employed creative mechanisms to obtain empirical evidence about what content is filtered in different countries, such as by making similar requests for Web pages from computers located within different nations. In addition to the study of Internet filtering, the project seeks to understand their outcomes and unintended consequences. The team does comparative assessments across countries, and writes regional overviews as well as country profiles on censorship and filtering to inform public policy makers and civil society advocates. OpenNet is a collaborative partnership of academic institutions, which includes the Citizen Lab at the Munk Centre for International Studies, University of Toronto; the Berkman Center for Internet & Society at Harvard University; and the Advanced Network Research Group at the Cambridge Security Programme, University of Cambridge.

See: Deibert et al (2008, 2010) and <http://opennet.net/>

Many different actors can restrict freedom of expression online. Individuals decide what to read, and what to delete or filter, such as by installing spam filters on their personal computer. Parents, corporate IT departments, and many other actors have a role in deciding what content is available to users in different social contexts. However, studies of censorship and filtering and freedom of expression, generally, are most often concerned with governmental censorship. Governments can directly, or indirectly (through formal and informal agreements with Internet Service Providers), restrict freedom of expression by regulating access to the Internet or to particular Internet content. Many civil society advocates of freedom of expression are

concerned that state-supported restrictions on Internet access and information are increasing and thereby threatening freedom of expression online.

While the decisions of many different actors are online freedom of expression, most are not focused on regulating speech. In fact, most actors are focused on other goals and objectives. It is in the pursuit of these diverse objectives that their actions can expand or limit citizens' enjoyment of freedom of expression. In some cases, the pursuit of particular goals can enhance freedom of expression. For example, the push towards economic progress by developing countries has been a major impetus behind the worldwide diffusion of the Internet, as it has become a central infrastructure for local and global economic transactions and trade. In other cases, the pursuit of different goals can lead directly or indirectly to restrictions of freedom of expression, through laws and regulations governing privacy and liability online. A person's exercise of free expression could, for instance, harm others by divulging private information or tarnishing the reputation of an individual or a company. These examples raise complicated and unresolved questions about legal and regulatory trends in related areas that might have more or less direct implications on freedom of expression on the Internet. This complex and evolving ecology of law and policy is the focus of this report.

Outline of this Report

This report provides a synthesis of many of the key trends in law and regulation that might be reshaping – for better or worse – freedom of expression around the world. It begins by providing a brief overview of previous literature and research on freedom of expression, which identifies key limitations of work in this area. The review leads us to introduce a framework for considering the many areas of policy and practice that need to be considered, which we call an evolving 'ecology of freedom of expression'. This framework provides a structure for discussing a broader array of policy choices than are normally considered in discussions of freedom of expression, and creates an outline of areas that are described in the following sections of the report, ranging from access to the Internet to concerns over privacy and surveillance.

This introduction has explained the focus of our report. The following sections begin with a critical perspective on the literature on freedom of expression, arguing that it has not been sufficiently examined from a broad social science perspective, partly due to the politically sensitive features of this topic. The next section provides a framework for discussing the broader context of freedom of expression, what we call an 'ecology of freedom of expression'. The report then moves into a discussion of the key elements of this ecology, beginning with an overview of one of the most positive developments, the worldwide diffusion of access to the Internet. This discussion looks at some of the legal and regulatory underpinnings of the widespread diffusion of the Internet that enables its potential as a means for empowering individuals and groups across the world. This is followed by an overview of countervailing technical developments designed to filter the Internet – to disconnect users. This discussion introduces some of the principal technologies used to control

access to the Internet and its content. These introductions to the rights to freedom of expression and the technologies of connection and disconnection identify the basic instruments of law and regulation that make content controls practically feasible. In short, new technology is enabling the exercise of worldwide freedom of expression, but also providing governments with new forms of censorship and new ways to disconnect people from information and communication resources.

The next section provides a meta-analysis of evidence regarding worldwide practice. This shows that a sizeable group of nations are limiting freedom of expression for a variety of reasons, ranging from national security to moral concerns.

This analysis is followed by a discussion of four sets of developments that are shaping freedom of expression online. They are legal and regulatory efforts to protect other rights, such as community standards of decency, equality, freedom of information, and privacy and data protection. This is followed by discussion of moves to stimulate and protect economic development and industrial goals, including the protection of intellectual property, and technology-led industrial and development strategies. This is followed by discussion of how users are regulated, mainly by laws that apply offline and online to protect children and other individuals from harm. This is followed by a description of developments in Internet governance and regulation, focusing on competing models for regulating the Internet. Finally, we look at the area of security, a prime motivation behind some governmental efforts to filter.

The report concludes with a discussion of the value of the ecology of freedom of expression as a framework for study and policy deliberation, and of the need for further research to refine and extend this preliminary analysis, ending with a set of recommendations for research, policy and practice.

1. Internet Freedom: A Perspective on the Research

The Literature

This report provides a synthesis of existing research and literature on freedom of expression in the digital age. It is not based on new data gathering, but aims at pulling data and research together in new ways and identifying areas for further research. We therefore provide only a brief overview of the existing literature, which is then woven throughout this report. However, it is important to present a broad sense of the literature in this field and indicate why it led us to propose a reconsideration and expansion of empirical research in this area, and also underline why we recommend the re-focusing of research on the larger ecology of freedom of expression on the Internet.

The literature in this field includes outstanding work that is theoretically and empirically innovative and significant. For example, the 1980 report of the McBride Commission (Box 1.1) has had a major impact on debate over global communication and remains relevant to discussions of the Internet and mobile

communications. As the Internet promises to reconfigure global information flows, it will be important to revisit many aspects of the McBride Commission in the coming years.

Box 1.1. The MacBride Commission and Report

Sean MacBride, a Noble Peace Prize laureate from Ireland, presided over the International Commission for the Study of Communication Problems. This commission was established in 1977 by UNESCO, and reported in 1980 with the publication of *Many Voices One World* (ICCP 1980), which came to be known as the MacBride Report. This report became a major reference for advocacy of a 'New World Information and Communication Order' (NWICO). The Commission raised concern over the uneven international flow of news and information worldwide, which was protected by the advocacy of a free press. In calling for a new world information order, the report challenged conventional wisdom concerning the free flow of information in order to reduce or eliminate 'situations of political, economic and cultural dominance and dependence' on producers in the most developed nations (Ibid, p. 43). Despite an expressed commitment by the Commission to the principle of freedom of expression, the NWICO came to be viewed as an argument against the operation of the free market in global communication, and a threat to a press free of governmental oversight and control.

More contemporary research, such as that focused on Internet filtering, particularly that by the 'OpenNet Initiative', has developed creative approaches to gathering empirical data on the extent and nature of content filtering in a growing number of nations (Box 0.5, above). In addition, a number of NGOs, for instance, Freedom House (FH) and Reporters without Borders, have invested heavily in monitoring governmental efforts to restrict freedom of expression (Freedom House 2009; Reporters without Borders 2010). Studies such as these provide an empirical basis for informing debate and further research.

Limitations of Advocacy and Research

However, these studies and reports remain exceptional cases in a literature that has important limitations taken as a whole. Generally, with notable exceptions, such as those identified above, the significance of the issues tied to freedom of expression has not been well matched by systematic programs of independent, disinterested, research. In contrast, it has been generally:

- under-researched in light of early and continuing risks to freedom of expression;
- composed primarily of normative policy advocacy rather than empirically-anchored description and synthesis;
- focused most often on single issues, such as freedom of expression, child protection, or copyright, rather than on the tradeoffs among these often conflicting values and interests;

- limited to single indicators of trends in selected countries, such as the prominence of filtering in the countries most actively involved, rather than multiple indicators across systematic samples of countries;
- North American and European-centric in perspective, with freedom of expression being viewed as a particularly American priority, given the press freedoms tied to the First Amendment to the US Constitution;
- not attentive to addressing the issues raised by the proliferation of some content on the Web that would be legally actionable in an earlier era, such as mass sharing of copyrighted materials, which undermines systematic debate of appropriate remedies; and
- focused too narrowly on policies designed to protect or constrain freedom of expression, when the relevant legal and regulatory environment is much broader.

A number of factors have undermined the limitations of research in this area. One is a technologically-deterministic optimism about the impossibility of controlling expression on the net. Another is the relatively recent advent of truly global communication networks and services, particularly the worldwide diffusion of the Internet and mobile communications. Most discussion over the past decades focused on national policies and the press and mass media, and were more local and national in their focus, reach and governance. In comparison, the Internet is a far more recent phenomenon, still reaching only a quarter of the world's population by 2009, and only beginning to be the focus of debate over governance.^{viii}

Another factor has been the depth of controversy surrounding discussions of global media and information flows, epitomized by the divisions created by the MacBride Commission and its report (see Box 1.1). The global significance of international news agencies and the press and mass media, along with the emergence of new media, created a division between advocates of freedom of expression, such as representatives of the press in the most developed nations, versus advocates of efforts to balance the global flow of information, such as by redressing inequities between the developed North and the developing South. Critics have called into question basic assumptions about the primacy of freedom of the press, for example, questioning whether these principles undermined the development of a more diverse media landscape, such as by enabling greater dominance of global media firms or the dominance of Western media messages – creating a new era of cultural 'media imperialism' (Herman and McChesney 2001).

At times, debate between the advocates of the free flow of information and communication clashed with advocates of what came to be called the New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO) in ways that made disinterested academic research difficult to marshal. This polarized opposing ideological positions between advocates of freedom of expression and those focused on balancing world information flows. Each camp sought support for its own position in what at times became an ideologically fraught, and correspondingly less academically reasoned debate.

Nevertheless, the MacBride report acknowledged the importance of freedom of expression, properly balanced with the laws and cultural and political-administrative traditions of nations, arguing that:

‘It is widely recognized that freedom must be reconciled with an obligation to obey the law and must not be exploited to injure the freedom of others; also that the exercise of freedom has a counterpart which is the need to exercise it with responsibility, which in the field of communication means primarily a concern for truth and the legitimate use of the power it conveys. We need to ask moreover, on what grounds a claim for freedom is being made. The freedom of a citizen or social groups to have access to communication, both as recipients and contributors, cannot be compared to the freedom of an investor to derive profit from the media. One protects a fundamental human right; the other permits the commercialization of a social need. Yet when all these reservations are made, the principle of freedom of expression is one that admits of no exceptions, and that is applicable to people all over the world by virtue of their human dignity.’ (ICCP 1980: 18).

The skepticism of the McBride Report is useful to revisit in the 21st Century, in noting that: ‘... as technology advances, the essential consideration at every stage should be that its progress is put at the service of better understanding between peoples and the furtherance of democratization within countries and not be used to reinforce vested interests of established powers.’ (ICCP 1980: 80). In fact, we would go further in arguing that while freedom of expression should be viewed as a fundamental right, it needs to be seen in the larger context of competing values and interests. Equality and diversity of expression are a subset of a wider range of values and interests critical to understanding the key values that support freedom of expression and also those that are putting it at greater risk as we head into the second decade of the 21st Century. That is why it is necessary to look at the wider, developing ecology that is reshaping freedom of expression in the network society, but without deflecting attention from protecting this core value.

2. The Ecology of Freedom of Expression

Freedom of Expression: Foundations in Human Rights

The principle of Freedom of Expression is based on internationally recognized laws and standards for human rights (Box 2.1), such as the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR). Other regional human rights instruments address the issues of freedom of expression and privacy such as in the African Charter on Human and People’s Rights.^{ix} Additionally, national or regional conventions are implemented to transfer these principles into national law and ensure freedoms and rights for residents and citizens.

Across Europe, the most relevant basis for freedom of expression and free speech comes from the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (ECHR), along with the EU’s Charter of Fundamental

Human Rights. While the ECHR guarantees everyone the freedom to hold opinions and to get and pass on information and ideas, it also allows a number of qualifications, stating that these rights:

‘...may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interests of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary.’^x

Box 2.1. International Guidelines on Freedom of Expression.

Internationally Recognized Standards for Human Rights:

- Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR);
- International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR);
- International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR).

Other Regional Human Rights Conventions:

- European Convention, implemented by the European Court of Human Rights;
- Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union^{xi};
- American Convention, implemented by the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and Inter-American Commission; and the
- African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, under the Organization for African Union, and implemented by the African Commission on Human and People’s Rights.

In the United States, Freedom of Expression is enshrined in the First Amendment to the US Constitution as part of the Bill of Rights, and upheld in more absolute terms relative to most other nations and regions. The rights include freedom of assembly, freedom of the press, freedom of religion and freedom of speech such that:

‘Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof; or abridging the freedom of speech, or of the press; or the right of the people peaceably to assemble, and to petition the government for a redress of grievances.’^{xii}

The African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights differs from the protection afforded by other treaties as it does not explicitly include a right to hold opinions, but simply the right to receive information and to express and spread their opinions within the bounds of the law.^{xiii} In addition, within the charter, freedom of expression is subject to the general restriction, which

requires the individual to exercise protected freedoms ‘with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest.’^{xiv}

Formal constitutional or legal guarantees provide protection for freedom of expression in much of Asia. Examples include Article 35 of the Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, Article 19 of the Indian Constitution, and Article 19 of the Constitution of Pakistan. Similar guarantees exist in the constitutions of most other Asian countries, with notable exceptions, such as the Union of Myanmar (Burma) and the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK).

The Ecology of Games: A Perspective on the Larger Context

The primary theme of this report is that it is helpful to broaden the context in which ‘freedom of expression’ is conceptualized. Not only does the pursuit of other values shape freedom of expression, but also the pursuit of freedom of expression can serve a variety of other values and interests, from democratizing communication to reinforcing vested interests, as highlighted by the controversies surrounding the NWICO. A framework of value for this purpose is based on the concept of an ‘ecology of games’.

The idea of an ‘ecology of games’ (EoG) was introduced in local community studies within the political sciences during the 1950s (Long 1958). The concept was used to focus on a key weakness of dominant elite and pluralist perspectives on community power, arguing that few actors sought to control communities *per se*. Instead, actors sought to achieve a wide array of more specific objectives, from making their neighbourhood safer to enhancing the quality of schools to being elected to office. That is, there exists a ecology of actors, each pursuing particular objectives, and each making choices in the pursuit of those objectives that shape the development of a community. Community development, from this perspective, is a largely unplanned process driven by the unanticipated interactions of multiple players or stakeholders within overlapping ‘games’. The unfolding history of such separate but interdependent games is then driving the evolution of local communities.

The Ecology of Freedom of Expression

This perspective has since been refined and developed in applications to the study of information and communication technologies and policies.^{xv} It could provide a new perspective on the study of freedom of expression, by viewing these freedoms as the outcome of a ecology of choices made not only about freedom of expression, but also a variety of other objectives. Table 2 provides a list of some of the goals pursued by key actors along with the strategies they might pursue in accomplishing these goals. As Table 2 suggests, some actors, such as from civil society, are explicitly seeking to achieve greater freedom of expression, but others are focused on censoring expression, such as through the use of Internet filtering, the censorship of news and mass media, or the efforts to silence journalists or bloggers. More indirectly, some actors are focused on quite different goals, such as protecting children from

harmful content, or protecting their own reputation, and might well seek to prevent people from posting information or seek damages from others who publish harmful information.

Table 2 illustrates how the wide range of separate but interrelated goals being pursued by a variety of actors, employing an array of strategies, might influence the state of freedom of expression on the Internet. The focus of actors is often not on freedom of expression, but on other values and interests, such as the stability of a regime, the vitality of an economy, or the safety of children. In some nations, such as those with state media organizations, the media are more heavily controlled, such as to ensure that existing regimes are supported by news and public affairs reporting. In such environments, the Internet is often the only place in which non-popular opinions can be communicated, leading the Internet to be perceived – rightly or wrongly – as a threat to the stability of a regime.

Table 2. The Ecology of Freedom of Expression on the Internet

| Categories | Objectives Defining Choices in Games |
|----------------------------------|---|
| Digital Rights | Access – Freedom of Connection |
| | Freedom of Expression |
| | Censorship |
| | Equality, e.g., Media Literacy and Skills |
| | Freedom of Information (FOI) |
| | Privacy and Data Protection |
| Industrial Policy and Regulation | Intellectual Property Rights (IPR): Copyright |
| | IPR: Patents |
| | Competition |
| | Technology-led industrial strategies |
| | ICT for Development |
| User-Centric | Child Protection |
| | Decency: Pornography |
| | Libel: Defamation |
| | Hate Speech |
| | Fraud |
| Internet-centric | Internet Governance and Regulation |
| | Domain Names and Numbers |
| | Standard Setting: Identity |
| | Net Neutrality |
| | Licensing, Regulation of Internet Service Providers |
| Security | Secrecy, Confidentiality |
| | Security against malware, such as spam and viruses |
| | Counter-Radicalisation |
| | National Security, Counter-Terrorism |

Although many governments have allowed the Internet to remain relatively free of content controls – in practice, if not always in law – growing numbers of states are threatened by its potential for political mobilization, but also for

other potential consequences, to ideals such as child safety, personal privacy, creativity, or security. For such reasons, more governments have expanded methods to regulate, control, shape, and monitor Internet messages and related digital content. As the Internet has become more central to communication, the more it has been a focus of the strategies of multiple actors in achieving their various goals.

The following sections of this report will develop some of the key goals, actors, and strategies enumerated in Table 2. This is not intended to be exhaustive or detailed survey, but sufficient to show how laws and regulations in many of these areas are indeed involved in the larger ecology that is shaping freedom of expression on the Internet. As said decades ago, by the MacBride Commission (ICCP 1980: 93), the new technologies:

‘offer considerable potential for diversifying messages and further democratizing communication. However, realizing or rejecting this potential depends, of course, on the economic, social and political choices that must be made.’

This conceptual framework seeks to identify the many political choices that are being made about law and regulation in ways that will realize or restrict the expressive potential of the Internet.

3. Connecting to the Internet: Reshaping Access

Law and Regulation Underpinning Internet Diffusion

Legal and regulatory initiatives have underpinned increasing worldwide access to the Internet and the information, communication and services that it enables. The Internet’s worldwide diffusion has not been the inevitable outcome of the technology, but of a series of technological innovations shaped by policy and practice.


For example, the Internet was developed early on as the ARPANet (Advanced Research Projects Agency Network), supported by funding from the US Department of Defense. However, it was developed within universities and research institutions primarily as a tool for scientists to share computing resources, not as a tool for national defense.^{xvi} It was born therefore in a culture of relatively free, open and trusted communication. This did not mean that abuses of this freedom did not occur. There were problems even early on within universities of individuals, such as a disgruntled student sending hate mail, but such problems were relatively easy to deal with by institutions that could identify the offending student or staff in due course and take remedial actions, such as suspending their network privileges. Similar practices applied to the Internet today would be less feasible and more controversial as this platform has become more central to all forms of communication and information access.

Second, well before the commercial development of the Internet, governments recognized that computer-based communication systems, such as videotext in the late-1970s, and ‘multi-media computers’, were significantly different from the traditional media of broadcasting, telecommunication and print (Pool 1983). The regulatory regimes developed for the traditional media did not apply well to the ‘new media’. Moreover, as new media were widely viewed as key to the future of communication, nations wanted to foster innovation in this area as a driver of new industry and economic development. The unique features of new media and the industrial policy goals associated with them led many governments to avoid regulation and not control content on new media, and later on the Internet. In fact, efforts to encourage new media developments extended to not taxing online purchases, and public investment in pilot projects.^{xvii} An exception is the parallel rise of policy on privacy and data protection, such as with the European Commission’s Data Protection Directive of 1995. While this directive pre-dated widespread understanding of its potential to conflict aspects of new Internet applications, such as social media, privacy and data protection pursued as a separate set of goals and objectives in a broader ecology of games.

Access to Technologies of the Internet

One of the most positive developments shaping the role of the Internet in opening up a new channel of expression has been its continuing pace of worldwide innovation and diffusion. By 2009, over one-quarter (26 percent) of the world’s population had access to the Internet, growing from less than ten percent (6 percent) in 2000 (Figure 1). This corresponds to over 1.7B users by 2009 (Figure 1).


Figure 1 Worldwide Internet Diffusion of the Internet: Number of Users and Proportion of Users by World Population.



Source: Internet World Stats - www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm. Sep 2009.

And diffusion has reached almost every region of the world, with the exception of Africa, which has remained comparatively low in levels of Internet access – below 10 percent (Figure 2). In general, Internet diffusion remains varied by region on at least two major dimensions, which might be called ‘throw weight’ and ‘penetration’.

Figure 2 Regional Diffusion of the Internet: Number of Users and Proportion of Users by World Regions.



Source: Internet World Stats - www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm. Penetration rates are based on a world population of 6,767,805,208 and 1,733,993,741 estimated Internet users for September 30, 2009.

Figure 2 lists major regions in order of the proportion of the population that use the Internet – their levels of penetration in 2009. As shown in Figure 2, Africa has the lowest level of Internet use at about 7 percent, followed by Asia, the Middle East, Latin America and the Caribbean, Europe, Oceania and Australia, and finally North America, which has the highest proportion of its population online at nearly three-quarters (72 percent) of the population. There is a substantial gap between Europe, with just over one-half of the population online, and North America, as well as Oceania and Australia, a region closer to 60 percent. However, even in Africa, with the lowest level of penetration, the arrival of submarine fiber optic links, and the diffusion of mobile communication promise to enhance Internet access in the coming years. Also, by 2009, mobile communication reached over 4B users worldwide, and is converging rapidly with Internet communication in ways that will help diminish, but by no means erase, the divide across regions of the world.

Figure 2 also shows that while penetration rates are low in Asia, less than 20 percent, its Internet users make up the largest proportion of the total number


of Internet users online; accounting for 43 percent of the global Internet user population. By 2010, there were more Internet users in China than there were people (on or off the Internet) in the United States. Asia is clearly developing the greatest throw-weight online of any region in the world.

Figures 3-5 vividly illustrate the rise of Asian countries in the world's Internet population. For example, Figure 3 shows that North America reached a plateau in diffusion since 2002. Europe may be hitting a plateau since 2008, but the number of Internet users in Asia continues to climb. The leveling of diffusion in North America and Oceania/Australia is even more obvious when looking at the percentage of Internet users over time (Figure 4).

The impact of these global shifts in Internet adoption is best summarized by Figure 5, which shows North America declining from the largest plurality of the Internet population to falling below Europe and Asia. That said, Europe is also declining in its presence online, relative to Asia (Figure 5).

Finally, while the growth in Internet penetration appears gradual on a global scale, compared for example to that of mobile telephony, content continues to expand at a fast pace (Figure 6). The number of active Web sites took off after 2006 and appears to remain in a steady phase of growth, creating a virtuous cycle of more content generating more use and more content.


Figure 3. Total Number of Internet Users within Regions.



Source: Internet World Stats - www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm. Sep 2009.


These figures dramatically illustrate a global shift in the centre of the Internet's gravity. Asia is becoming the dominant presence on the Internet, constituting a very large proportion of the world Internet population, and is therefore becoming more significant to considerations of freedom of expression and connection than might be judged only on the basis of penetration rates.

Figure 4. Percentage of Internet Users within Regions.



Source: Internet World Stats - www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm. Sep 2009.


Figure 5. Percentage of Worldwide Internet



Population.

Source: Internet World Stats - www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm. Sep 2009.

Figure 6. Percentage of Worldwide Internet Usage by Number of Active Websites Worldwide.



The global diffusion of the Internet is most often viewed as a story of technological innovations, but a variety of legal and regulatory choices have underpinned this history in critical ways. Perhaps most significant were decisions taken in the 1970s in the US in the context of the computer inquiries undertaken by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC), which culminated in computer-based communication services being largely unregulated. Liberalization of computer-based data processing and communication services enabled the development of innovative service provision outside AT&T and companies formed through its divestiture in 1984.

There were many subsequent attempts to regulate data communication, largely to protect the telecommunication firms, such as by legally prohibiting voice communication over computer-based networks. The diffusion of 'Voice over IP' services, such as the beta version of Skype, launched in 2003, has been possible because they are not legally prohibited in many nations.^{xviii} That said, in many countries, such as where incumbent telecommunication providers have monopolies, VoIP services, such as Skype, have been blocked. This is a common practice in many African countries and other developing nations that have depended on the general revenues generated by telephone companies, but with a cost to economic development more generally.^{xix} Many other legal and regulatory incentives have buttressed the development of the Internet, such as initiatives in many countries not to tax online purchases, creating a financial incentive to shop online. Many rapidly developing nations have been convinced of the value of liberalizing telecommunications in ways that support the Internet, such as China, which has used the Internet as a means to support the economic development of key regions (Qiu 2009).

In such ways, government policies have incentivised the development and diffusion of the Internet throughout its history as a means for enhancing technological innovation in communication and information technology and

services. This is an element of industrial policy in that it supports the development of not only new information industries and businesses, but also enables innovation in all other sectors of society, from large industrial firms and agricultural enterprises, to the household, who find more efficient ways to use information and to communicate in everyday life and work. Economic development is supported by the use of ICTs, not only by their production (Baer 1996). The potential threat is from over-regulation that might undermine the vitality of the Internet and its global diffusion.

4. Technologies of Disconnection

The best empirical work which examines government filtering and website blocking suggests that these practices have increased since 2002, when filtering first began to be tracked by this project (Deibert et al 2008, 2010). These trends are supported by related research by organizations focused on freedom of expression, including Freedom House (2009) and Reporters without Borders (2010).

Filtering

In parallel with advances in technology underpinning greater access to the Internet and mobile communication technologies have been innovations in technological approaches to controlling the flow of information over these networks. This has been driven by the need to maintain and improve the quality and security of services, such as by screening out spam e-mail and viruses, but also by efforts to block unwanted content as judged by individuals, parents, NGOs, corporations or governments. Regulation of Internet control is enabled by these technological approaches, which can be implemented at several different levels (Box 4.1). Filtering technology is a two-edge sword in that it can be used for diverse purposes, and therefore tied closely to legal, political and cultural determinations of its appropriate application. We briefly review some of the key tools in this section, as they are the means for implementing aspects of many legal and regulatory initiatives that we turn to in the remaining sections of this report.

As information and communication flows online, it may use several Internet related protocols and services and pass through various points in the Internet network as well as the end user's device. As a result, filtering methods can be applied at various points throughout the network (Box 4.1). Most concern is focused on state- or government-sponsored or enforced filtering, but even state-filtering can be implemented at different levels and by various parties acting on behalf of the state: individuals, institutions, service providers, or directly by government. Generally, those concerned over the civil liberties of Internet users want filtering decisions to be made at the lowest possible level – as close as possible to the individual user.

Box 4.1. The Locus of Filtering Technologies.

The most common points at which various approaches to filtering can be applied include:

- Internet Service Providers: ISPs are often mandated, encouraged, or incentivised to filter illegal or immoral content, or prevent search results from specified Websites, by a regulator or other agency authorized by a government with jurisdiction over their activities. They also routinely filter spam and attempt to prevent infection by malware for reasons of stability and user protection.
- Gateways to the Internet Backbone: State-directed implementation of national content filtering schemes and blocking technologies may be carried out at the backbone level, often with filtering systems set up at links to the Internet backbone, such as international gateways in order to eliminate access to content throughout an entire country.
- Institutions: Companies, schools, libraries and households can filter on the basis of their own criteria or on behalf of state authorities
- Individual Computers: filtering software can be installed on individual computers, such as a personal computer, that restricts the ability to access certain sites or use certain applications
- Users: actions taken against users who engage in unlawful file sharing of music, malicious hacking, fraud, etc.

Adapted from: Zittrain (2006) and Callanan et al (2009).

Most forms of filtering require some inspection of the content of a message, which could be derived from the identity of the source, header information on an e-mail, for example, or the actual content of the message, such as the words, strings of words or images in the message or on the Web site. Increasingly this involves what is called 'deep packet inspection' (Box 4.2).

Box 4.2. Deep Packet Inspection

Deep packet inspection is the use of computer systems that can inspect packets sent over networks using the Internet Protocol suite in ways that enable a third party, not the sender or receiver, to identify particular aspects of the communication. Inspection is done by a 'middle-man' -- not an endpoint of a communication, using the actual content of the message. For example, ISPs can apply this technology for the lawful intercept of messages on public networks to determine if customers are using the network for unlawful purposes or purposes that violate their user agreements. Governments in North America, Asia and Africa use DPI for various purposes such as surveillance (Nelson 2006) and censorship (Wagner 2009). Deep Packet Inspection can serve as a 'one for all' solution to monitor or regulate traffic and communication elements: e.g. the interception and logging of Internet traffic, enforcement of copyright, prioritizing limited bandwidth, tracking users'

behavior. DPI thus can serve interests of many stakeholders:

- government agencies and content providers, who are interested in the monitoring and filtering of information flows (political control)
- network operating staff, who have to deal with malware and bandwidth-hungry applications (technological efficiency),
- vertically integrated ISPs that want to create additional revenues or protect them, e.g. through preventing the Internet from cannibalizing their telephone- or video-on-demand revenues (economic interests).

See: Ralf Bendrath: DPI as an Integrated Technology of Control – Potential and Reality <http://dpi.priv.gc.ca/index.php/essays/dpi-as-an-integrated-technology-of-control-%E2%80%93-potential-and-reality/>

There are also a number of approaches to filtering, such as blocking an IP address, a DNS name, a URI, or keywords (Box 4.3). Each involves somewhat different technical methods. Keyword filtering requires more advanced techniques to be well targeted, but it is being used by a growing number of countries.

Box 4.3. Approaches to Blocking.

- IP blocking, by screening a particular IP addresses;
- Blocking or manipulating, DNS, information which involves falsifying the response that is returned by a DNS server;
- URI blocking, which screens out specific resources from a specific Web site; and
- Keyword blocking, which denies access to websites based on the words found in pages or URIs, or blocks searches involving blacklisted terms. Advances are enabling increasingly dynamic, real-time analysis of content, but it not yet in wide use.

Filtering methods often use some kind of blacklist (or ‘allow’ lists) that are configured to pass traffic by default except if it contains certain content, names, or keywords which are on the list. Filters are also often adjusted as information is passed on from law enforcement investigations or consumer complaints. If blocking takes place within a certain network, such as within a company, the network administrator is often the person who manually defines the filtering. In contrast, many email filters or virus scanners often use pre-defined criteria to filter the content without local human intervention.

Many contemporary filtering techniques are blunt instruments, often leading to some level of over- or under-blocking. For example, it is almost impossible to block only the content aimed for without unintentionally blocking related material.

Counter-measures for Filtering

Many technologically savvy users can find alternative methods to access blocked content. However, for most people, blocking is an effective means for preventing access. Nevertheless, as filtering or blocking content does not erase the original content, some users can still access the content by using other connections for which access has not been blocked, creating a cat and mouse game between actors seeking to gain or block access to particular content. The fact that websites are not removed, but blocked, can mean that, for example in the case of child protection, the content has not been destroyed, but it has been made invisible for most non tech-savvy users.

The Arrest of Journalists and Bloggers

Control is not limited to filtering or censorship. Recent years have seen an increase in a wide variety of threats to freedom on the Internet, e.g. an increase in arrests of bloggers and Internet users. The Committee to Protect Journalists found that in 2008, there were, for the first time, more jailed 'cyber-dissidents', such as bloggers, than traditional media journalists.^{xx} The arrest or detention of content producers, such as journalists or bloggers, or users, such as those who are accessing or consuming unlawful or otherwise targeted material is one of the most traditional forms of content control. In doing so, surveillance and monitoring methods are often used to identify users or producers (see Boxes 4.4, 4.5 and 4.6).

Box 4.4. A Twitter-Based Arrest in the USA.

During the Group of 20 summit in Pittsburg, Pennsylvania, in October 2009, close to 200 arrests were made during demonstrations involving up to 5,000 protesters. One arrest made at a Pittsburg motel, not on the streets, by Pennsylvania State Police was of a 41 year old New York social worker, named Elliot Madison, for being part of a group that posted messages on Twitter that were designed to help protesters at the G-20 summit 'avoid apprehension after a lawful order to disperse'. He was found with computers and police scanners while using the micro-blogging service Twitter. According to available accounts, FBI agents later executed a search warrant at his home in Jackson Heights, Queens, New York, for 'evidence of federal anti-rioting law violations'.

Source: Moynihan (2009) and Valetk (2009).

Box 4.5. Twitter in the Iranian 2009 Election Protests.

In the midst of protests surrounding the contested 2009 election results in Iran, the Internet, and Twitter, in particular, was claimed to have played an important role in organizing and supporting the protests on the streets of Tehran. Overall, there is little doubt that Twitter and videos posted on the Web played a significant role in providing a means for individuals in Iran to communicate with one another, but most often via the world outside Iran. The main role of Twitter was as a tool for the Iranian Diaspora to relay protest news to the international media, which in turn became a significant factor in

shaping and informing developments on the ground.^{xxi}

That said, English language Twitterers from the Iranian diaspora became bridges between events in Iran and the 24-hour English news cycle, which followed Twitter feeds during this period. A few weeks before the election 'Iran Twitter Revolution' CNN appointed its own 'Twitter Correspondent'. Andrew Sullivan coined the term 'twitter revolution' two days after the election and played a key role in promoting the 'Tweeting for Iran' campaign. Later the State Department also fueled the attention surrounding Twitter by asking Twitter to postpone their routine maintenance as there was a Twitter revolution going on in Iran.

Although Twitter might not have played a critical role in shaping the flow of information into Iran or being used as a tool by the opposition to organize themselves during the unrest, the episode introduced Twitter to many individuals inside Iran and as a result there are many more users of Twitter inside Iran after than before the protests. Even so, "Citizen Journalist" videos played an important role. The more foreign media activities were restricted, the more these citizen videos filled the void. BBC Persian TV relied on these videos mainly for its coverage of Iran. Satellite TV stations like BBC Persian and Voice of America played an important role in informing and effectively organizing people. Email was also very effective due to its low bandwidth and features making content easy to share. Most significant were human networks (there are videos of people on YouTube shouting in Tehran metro promoting the upcoming protest gatherings). In Iran there was an alignment of old and new media, forming a cycle of technically-enabled users publishing news online and uploading video footage, outside media picking up these materials and sending them back to Iran for a larger audience, which users further disseminated through their own networks.

The counter measures used by the Iranian government to break this cycle were quite effective. On important protest days, Iranian authorities effectively pulled the plug on the Internet, introducing 60-70% packet loss into the network and closing all the major ports used by circumvention tools, making it nearly impossible for ordinary users to do anything online. On normal and non-critical days, Iran appeared to be doing deep packet inspection. On the satellite TV front, authorities have managed to jam the signals of political Persian Satellite TV stations, forcing them to shut down or move to less popular satellite platforms. Due to heavy jamming on BBC Persian TV, HotBird and NileSat decided to stop broadcasting BBC Persian as the jamming was interfering with other channels. All of these were in addition to offline methods of shutting down, banning, arresting, and intimidating protestors.

Box 4.6. Freedom of Expression in Vietnam^{xxii}

Dozens of dissident activists, bloggers and writers active online have been arrested by the Vietnamese government, most often for writing commentary, such as on Sino-Vietnamese relations.^{xxiii} The International PEN, Amnesty International, Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development, Reporters

Without Borders, Human Rights Watch and the World Organization Against Torture have all reported severe restrictions on Internet freedom in Vietnam, with the Committee to Protect Journalists (CPJ) naming Vietnam as one of the 10 worst countries to be a blogger.^{xxiv}

On its official website, the Vietnam Ministry of Information and Communications (MIC) listed as its main functions to include: “manage all types of press... including electronic and information on the [I]nternet”.^{xxv} As official media has been restricted under the Communist Party, many have gone to the Internet to discuss controversial issues more freely (Pham 2009), leading to crackdowns, utilizing Article 88 “Propaganda Against the State” and Article 258 “Abusing democratic freedoms to infringe upon the State interests” under the Vietnamese Penal Code.

In October 2009, eight Vietnamese bloggers received jail sentences, which ranged from two to six years. They were accused of disseminating anti-government propaganda under article 88 of the Vietnamese penal code.^{xxvi}

Alternatives to Filtering

There a number of ways to deny access or censor particular types of content other than content filtering. These include:

- Denial of service attacks, which produce the same end result as other technical blocking techniques—blocking access to certain websites—although only temporarily, and more often used by actors seeking to disrupt services;
- Restricting access to domains or the Internet, such as by installing high barriers (costs, personal requirements) to register a domain or even to get Internet access;
- Search Result Removals, as search engine providers can filter web content by excluding unwanted websites from search results. By using blacklists, parsing content and keywords of web pages search engines are able to hinder access, without blocking a certain page, by not listing them in the search results. This method makes circumventing the denial of access more difficult if search engines do not always provide transparency about their filtering; and
- Take-down of Websites, by removing illegal sites from servers, is one of the most effective ways of regulating content. To do so, regulators need to have direct access to content hosts, or the legal jurisdiction over the content hosts, or an ability to force ISPs to take down particular sites. In several countries, where authorities have control of domain name servers, officials can deregister a domain that is hosting restricted content (Deibert et al 2008).

Influencing the content that users consume or produce does not necessarily involve filtering technology. Content can be influenced by introducing rules, or laws, or by instilling social norms among content producers. This can be

enforced by the threat of legal action, but also by social pressure for commitment.

One creative approach to addressing some content concerns, such as that which is politically contentious, is to enter the conversation. This is an approach that is most in tune with the spirit of free expression, but only if it is transparent. For example, the US State Department has initiated an effort to respond to what they view as misinformation and inaccurate accounts of US policy and actions on Arab language blog and Websites by commenting on the Arab language blogs, and explicitly identifying themselves as representatives of the US State Department. In many respects, this is a modern form of public diplomacy, adapted to the Web 2.0 technologies of the Internet and in keeping with open access to more diverse sources of information.

However, some regimes have increasingly resorted to guiding or influencing online discussion without being transparent, such as through the clandestine use of paid pro-government commentators or the financing of entire websites and blogs (Karlekar and Cook 2009). Freedom House (2009) pins this offense on the Chinese government for employing '50 Cent Party' commentators; Russia for using Kremlin-affiliated 'content providers', and Tunisia for using similar approaches to 'subvert online conversations'.

Some civil libertarians have been critical of governmental publications or 'propaganda' aimed at countering particular political movements or views, or trying to guide online opinion, such as through pro-government websites, online commentators, and propaganda. This is of course an online analogy to long-held efforts of governments to provide information over the mass media, such as the Voice of America (VOA) in the US, which has moved from radio and television broadcasting to become a multimedia source of news and information about the US. Arguably, governmental provision of information is entirely in keeping with principles of freedom of expression, as long as it is transparent and not overwhelming alternative sources of information.

As this section argues, the control of information on the Internet and Web is feasible. It is not impossible to censor. There are many tools available and in development. The key issues around the control of information concern political and cultural choices about who should control what content in which ways, and for what purposes, with what level of transparency. This leads us to a consideration of the legal frameworks and motivations behind such goals as censorship, copyright issues or child protection through the use of these tools. The next section begins this discussion by focusing on law and policy supporting freedom of expression.

5. National Practices and Trends Worldwide

International trends can be tracked on at least two different levels. One concerns the actual practices of censorship, such as Internet filtering. The

other concerns perceptions of the public. Do individuals believe they are more or less free to express their opinions?

Internet Filtering and Censorship

In the early years of the 21st century, an increasing number of governments have taken steps to block or regulate Internet access or content. This increase can be seen most clearly in the work of Freedom House (2009), based on their Global Index of Internet Freedom (Box 5.1) and the OpenNet Initiative. The OpenNet Initiative reports on only a few governments documented to be blocking online content in 2002, while by 2007, they estimated that at least 40 countries used methods to do so (Deibert et al 2008). Thus, national regulation of the Internet is taking place despite ambiguity over appropriate policy and uncertainty over its implementation, and risks to freedom of expression (Deibert et al 2008; Freedom House 2009).

Box 5.1. The Index of Global Freedom (IGIF)

Freedom House is an independent nongovernmental organization, which focuses on uncovering efforts to restrict transmission of news and politically relevant communications, while acknowledging that some restrictions on harmful content may be legitimate. It measures restrictions from both government and non-state actors. The key components of the index are access to technology as well as free flow of information and content. Each country gets scores from 0 (the most free) to 100 (the least free), which serves as a basis for an Internet freedom status designation of Free (0-30 points), Partly Free (31-60 points), or Not Free (61-100). The approach considers various factors that could affect levels of Internet freedom, including dynamics within each country, both in terms of changing methods of restriction as well as changes over time. Their 2009 report on freedom on the Internet provides an overview on strategies and trends, such as the 'outsourcing of censorship' to private companies and the use of surveillance by state actors. The index covers both more repressive countries such as China and Iran and more liberal democratic nations such as India and the United Kingdom, finding some degree of Internet censorship and control in all 15 nations studied.

See: Freedom House (2009) and online see:

<http://www.freedomhouse.org/uploads/specialreports/NetFreedom2009/FOTN%20Overview%20Essay.pdf>

European Digital Rights website^{xxvii} provides an overview on filtering tendencies and country cases. Studies by the OpenNet Initiative offer some of the most extensive surveys of Internet filtering (Deibert and others 2008, 2010), along with country by country overviews. Our own meta-analysis of existing surveys illustrates that many nations are likely to exercise some level of censorship, but that only a minority exhibit pervasive levels of censorship (Table 4).^{xxviii}

It is often thought that content control systems are only established in undemocratic countries or by authoritarian regimes, when content control legislation has become more prevalent around the world. Australia, Canada, China, Finland, France, Germany, Japan, Kyrgyzstan, Saudi Arabia, the UK, the US and Uzbekistan are just a few countries who have implemented national filtering systems or have presented legislation to approve filtering practices. Content control is not simply a practice of regimes with a particular political system, or in a particular region or cultural category. In democratic societies, issues of copyright infringement, hate speech, defamation, privacy protection, and child protection are at times a basis for Internet filtering or other content control. In most jurisdictions, Internet service providers need a legitimate basis prior to monitoring or filtering any kind of content, as they are otherwise in breach of national protections or international conventions to which their country is party. For example, EuroISPA claims that any restriction of an individual's fundamental rights should only be taken following a prior judicial ruling.^{xxix}

Table 4. Meta-Analysis of International Surveys of Filtering.

| Country | OpenNet Evidence of Filtering Levels | | | | | | | | Freedom House | Overall Rating |
|------------|--------------------------------------|------|--------|------|----------|------|---------|------|---------------|----------------|
| | Political | | Social | | Security | | Overall | | | |
| | 2007 | 2009 | 2007 | 2009 | 2007 | 2009 | 2007 | 2009 | | |
| Armenia | - | M | - | L | - | L | - | M | - | Medium |
| Australia | - | NE | - | M | - | NE | - | M | - | Medium |
| Azerbaijan | L | L | NE | L | NE | NE | L | L | - | Low |
| Bahrain | M | - | L | - | NE | - | M | - | - | Medium |
| Belarus | NE | L | NE | L | NE | L | NE | L | - | Low |
| Brazil | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Low | Low |
| China | H | H | M | M | H | H | H | H | High | High |
| Cuba | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | High | High |
| Egypt | - | NE | - | NE | - | NE | - | NE | Medium | Medium |
| Ethiopia | M | - | L | - | L | - | M | - | - | Medium |
| Estonia | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Low | Low |
| France | - | NE | - | NE | - | NE | - | NE | - | NE |
| Georgia | - | L | - | NE | - | L | - | L | Medium | Medium |
| Germany | - | NE | - | NE | - | NE | - | NE | - | NE |
| India | NE | - | NE | - | NE | - | L | - | Medium | Medium |
| Iran | H | H | H | H | M | M | H | H | High | High |
| Italy | - | NE | - | L | - | NE | - | L | - | Low |
| Jordan | L | - | NE | - | NE | - | L | - | - | Low |
| Kazakhstan | NE | L | NE | L | NE | NE | NE | L | - | Low |
| Kenya | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Medium | Medium |
| Kyrgyzstan | - | L | - | L | - | NE | - | L | - | Low |
| Libya | M | - | NE | - | NE | - | M | - | - | Medium |
| Malaysia | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Medium | Medium |
| Moldova | - | L | - | NE | - | NE | - | L | - | Low |
| Morocco | NE | - | NE | - | L | - | L | - | - | Low |
| Myanmar | H | H | M | M | M | M | H | H | - | High |

| | | | | | | | | | | |
|----------------|----|----|----|----|----|----|---|----|--------|---------|
| Oman | NE | - | H | - | NE | - | H | - | - | High |
| Pakistan | L | NE | M | M | H | M | H | M | - | Medium* |
| Russia | - | L | - | L | - | NE | - | NE | Medium | Medium |
| Saudi Arabia | M | - | H | - | L | - | H | - | - | High |
| Singapore | NE | - | L | - | NE | - | L | - | - | Low |
| S. Africa | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | - | Low | Low |
| S. Korea | NE | NE | L | M | H | H | H | H | - | High |
| Sudan | NE | - | H | - | NE | - | H | - | - | High |
| Syria | H | - | L | - | L | - | H | - | - | High |
| Tajikistan | L | L | NE | NE | NE | NE | L | L | - | Low |
| Thailand | L | - | M | - | NE | - | M | - | - | Medium |
| Tunisia | H | - | H | - | L | - | H | - | High | High |
| Turkey | - | L | - | L | - | NE | - | L | Medium | Medium |
| Turkmenistan | - | H | - | L | - | L | - | H | - | High |
| UAE | L | - | H | - | L | - | H | - | - | High |
| Ukraine | - | NE | - | NE | - | NE | - | NE | - | NE |
| United Kingdom | - | NE | - | NE | - | NE | - | NE | Low | Low |
| USA | - | NE | - | NE | - | NE | - | NE | - | NE |
| Uzbekistan | M | H | L | L | NE | L | M | H | - | High* |
| Vietnam | H | - | L | - | NE | - | H | - | - | High |
| Yemen | L | - | H | - | L | - | H | - | - | High |

Key: Collapsed ratings from different studies into one more general rating:

For OpenNet:

NE = no clear evidence, including 'suspected filtering';

Low = evidence of selective filtering;

Medium = 'substantial filtering';

High = 'evidence of pervasive filtering' (Faris and Villeneuve 2008: Table 1.5). Overall = highest level of filtering across categories.

For Freedom House Ratings:

Low = 10-26, rated 'Free';

Medium = 27-55, rated 'Partly Free';

High = over 55, rated 'Not Free' (Freedom House 2009: p. 20).

A '-' indicates that the country was not covered by the respective study / in the respective year.

'*' indicates that the rating for the respective country has changed from 2007 to 2009.

Of the states examined by previous studies (Table 4), those with the most extensive filtering practices are China, Cuba, Myanmar (Burma), Oman, South Korea, Sudan, Syria, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, United Arab Emirates, Uzbekistan, Vietnam, and Yemen. These nations fall primarily in three regions: East Asia, the Middle East and North Africa, and Central Asia. Nevertheless, there is great diversity in filtering practices within these regions. In the Asia-Pacific region, much has been written about the 'Great Firewall of China', and there is widespread agreement that China has one of the most sophisticated and pervasive filtering systems for Internet censorship.^{xxx} Vietnam follows many similar practices. Myanmar (Burma) famously shut down the Internet in the fall of 2007, during disturbances. In South Korea, the

Internet is generally free, except in the area of national security, where there are tight controls. Pakistan and Sri Lanka restrict politically sensitive sites.

Filtering in North America and Western Europe is mostly targeted at child sexual abuse images or hate speech and propaganda (Zittrain and Palfrey 2007). In Central and Eastern Europe there is high regional diversity with some states being quite open and others taking steps to block access (Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Turkmenistan). In the Middle East and North Africa, the blocking of websites is fairly extensive, especially in Syria and Iran. Filtering and monitoring is often through government-owned ISPs. On the African continent, the lack of access to the Internet is the greatest obstacle to expression. In addition, while the Internet is only now beginning to play a major role due to financial and infrastructural constraints, Gambia and Ethiopia have already started to block sites and restrict access. In the Americas and Western Europe, no significant restrictions were reported in the studies used for the meta-analysis, though some pornographic or hate-speech content was blocked in specific cases, such as for child protection. Cuba is a notable exception in the region with severe restrictions on access.

Public Opinion: Beliefs and Attitudes Concerning Internet Freedom


There is a need to continue efforts to track trends in Internet censorship and filtering, but also to more broadly assess the outcome of this evolving ecology. This relates to work on how to gauge citizen experiences with respect to freedom of expression overtime and across national and regional jurisdictions. Can we measure freedom of expression in more meaningful ways? Will it be possible to compare and contrast these indicators so that the world can monitor shifts in freedom of expression? For example, this collaborative project has already launched early work on the development of a World Internet Policy Project (WIP2), which intends to monitor policy changes shaping the Internet worldwide. In such ways, the project aims to efficiently tap the wisdom of the wider Internet community for critical case studies, emerging legal initiatives and regulatory trends that need to be a focus of those concerned with the freedom of expression generally, and online, in particular.

Separately, the BBC has conducted a global Internet survey that addresses questions relevant to these concerns (Figures 7 and 8). Most interestingly, their global survey shows that attitudes and beliefs about freedom of expression do not have straightforward associations with actual practice. Those who use the Internet, even in nations that have reputations and practices of monitoring and censorship, feel better able to express themselves, but some users in nations with more liberal democratic traditions, such as in France and Germany, feel restraints on expressing themselves (Figure 7). However, across the range of world cultures tapped by this survey, there was widespread support for the freedom – maybe even the right – to connect (Figure 8).

Figure 7 shows the percentage of people who strongly or somewhat agreed that the Internet is a safe place to express their opinions. This question was

only asked to people who declared that they used the Internet in the last six months. Egypt, India and Kenya appear to have the highest percentages of people who strongly or somewhat agree that the Internet is a safe place to express their opinions. Those who agree the least are people in Germany and France, followed by citizens in highly filtered countries such as China and South Korea.

Figure 7. The Internet is a Safe Place to Express my Opinions.^a




^a Source: BBC (2010): 15. Percentage of Internet users responding 'strongly agree' or 'somewhat agree' with the statement: The Internet is a safe place to express my opinions'.

At first, some of these figures may seem surprising but it important to note that there are several particularities that need to be highlighted in the BBC Internet study. First, samples were not weighted though they ranged in numbers from 507 (Brazil) to 2,162 (Pakistan). Secondly, samples in some cases represented national populations and in other cases only represented urban populations (Brazil, China, Egypt, Turkey). Methodology would also vary across countries between face-to-face and phone interviews, though the methodology chosen within a country remained consistent. The sample frame also showed a few discrepancies. In most cases, people interviewed were 18 years old or older. However, there were a few exceptions, notably in France and Turkey where the age frame was 15+, and in Germany 16+. People surveyed in South Korea were 19 years old or more. The reason for these sample inconsistencies was not indicated in the study. On their own, these incongruities may not make much difference, but together they can produce somewhat misleading and skewed results.

Still, certain data from the BBC survey may be hinting at some important dynamics found in particular countries, such as France and Germany where fewer users agreed that the Internet was a safe place to express users' opinions. Recent legislation such as France's Hadopi (also known as the three strikes law) and Germany's Data Retention Law as well as Internet filter law, might explain a little why there seems to belittle faith in the Internet being a safe place to express one's opinions, though we do not have any data to confirm this assumption. In contrast, a more recent Internet penetration growth might explain why there's a more optimistic perspective in countries such as Egypt and Kenya.

Figure 8. Access to the Internet Should be a Fundamental Right of All People.^a



a

Source: BBC (2010): 17. Percent who 'strongly agree' or 'somewhat agree' to the statement: 'Access to the Internet should be a fundamental right of all people.'

When looking at Figure 8, again the same problems with samples applied. However, the graph indicates that in all countries except in Pakistan, the majority (even an overwhelming majority) of people interviewed, users and non-users, agreed that access to the Internet should be a fundamental right of all people. In Pakistan, only 46% of the surveyed population sample agreed to this statement. Yet, this country also had one of the highest response rates in the "don't know/not applicable" category (23%). Pakistan also had a sample size that was double the average sample size in the study. This might explain why numbers may appear lower.

The BBC survey also asked users a question related to what they thought was the most valued aspect of the Internet. On average, 'finding information of all sorts' resulted as being the most important characteristic (46%) amongst other choices such as 'interacting with people' (32%) and 'source of

entertainment' (12%). Therefore, there might be a relationship between people believing that access to the Internet should be a fundamental right for everyone and that its most valued aspect is finding information.

What this graph does not show is which countries have the highest percent of respondents who strongly disagreed that the Internet should be a fundamental right of all people. Japan had the highest percentage rate at 13% followed by Pakistan and Kenya at 11%. However what may be surprising is that, amongst the 26 countries polled, the USA (11%) and Canada (10%) are among the top five countries where people most strongly disagreed that access to the Internet was a fundamental right of all people. These findings illustrate the complex relationships between government policies and public beliefs and attitudes, an area in need of further research.

6. Legal and Regulatory Protections of Digital Rights

Content blocking and filtering have a wide range of objectives. It can focus on security issues, namely in preventing the spread of spam and viruses. It can be anchored in political concerns, such as countering radical political movements, or it can be used to protect the moral standards of a religious community, by filtering pornography, for example. It can also be socially driven, to prevent hate speech for instance. Most countries use some mix of existing media, telecommunications, national security, and Internet-specific law and regulation to protect or to restrict the publishing of, and access to, online information. It is important to remember that regulation often targets a particular type of action rather than a specific communication medium, addressing illegal acts regardless if committed online or offline, such as defamation or fraud.

Controlling the Internet is a fundamental aspect of 'Internet politics' (Seltzer 2008) and most countries have viewed some level of censorship as a legitimate means to protect a nation's interest, such as in online child protection (Hills 2006). However, the degree and legitimate targets of online censorship can vary from comprehensive to more permissive and targeted levels, depending on the actor, the content being censored and the national context in which it finds itself.

The transparency and implementation of government policy are a key problem. Often, it is not known to what extent access to Internet material is blocked. Countries such as China, Cuba and Iran are often accused of such practices. However, others such as the USA, France and Germany have also censored online content (Klung 2006). The need for empirical studies of online filtering is a symptom of the general lack of transparency overall. In contrast, censorship of print or broadcast material in most nations is often more publicly identified and debated.

Some governments take responsibility for monitoring online content by directly monitoring users. But an increasing number of countries, including China and Britain, have enlisted private stakeholders such as search engines and ISPs

to operate as proxies (Kreimer 2006). In some cases, ISPs are strongly encouraged to adopt filtering systems (Brown 2007). In other cases, service providers simply choose to offer filtering services themselves, even if they are not directed to do so by a governmental or regulatory authority (Palfrey 2006).

Table 3. Digital Rights Goals, Stakeholders and Strategies in the Ecology

| <i>Goals - Games</i> | <i>Main Stakeholders</i> | <i>Strategies - Objectives</i> |
|--------------------------------|---|--|
| Access – Freedom of Connection | Internet business and industries; governments; civil society advocates; producers and consumers of information and communication services | Develop infrastructures and services; media literacy and skills development; provide public access facilities; and reduce costs to access |
| Freedom of Expression | Civil society and human rights advocates; the press and media organizations | Challenge practices, laws and regulations that impinge free expression |
| Censorship | Governments and regulatory authorities; ISPs; political and interests groups; human rights advocates | Practice Internet filtering; take down Web sites; arrest bloggers; and impose other legal restrictions |
| Equality | Advocates of a New World Information and Communication Order (NWICO); press and media organizations; developed and developing nations | Efforts to rebalance news coverage; redress inequities; decentralize production of news and information; and diminish the dominance of global media outlets, and inequalities in production or consumption |
| Freedom of Information (FOI) | Civil Society; politicians; NGOs; citizen groups | Develop laws and policies promoting access to government and other public information (eg. encouraging the use of the Web to make information more accessible) |
| Privacy and Data Protection | Courts; data protection commissioners; law enforcement; government agencies; users and citizens | Make efforts to protect personal information from unauthorized disclosure; and avoid unwarranted surveillance |

Imposing indirect liability on private companies or threatening them with other legal issues has generated fears that industry-regulation, driven by government policy, will lead to over-zealous censorship online and therefore will decrease or limit access to copyrighted material (Wei 2008). In any case, a narrow governmental focus on law or direct regulation cannot deliver a comprehensive picture of the extent of limitations imposed on freedom of expression online.

Freedom of access and freedom of expression are two goals and objectives within a larger ecology of evolving 'digital rights' (Table 3).

Censorship: Internet Filtering

The use of filtering software has increased, becoming a common response to perceived problems with online content such as pornography, violence and hate. But in some cases, filtering is used for less obvious content if judged as a threat to established norms (Rosenberg 2001). Countries differ in their focus on censoring online material, as well as in their means to target and block content, and in choosing measures to involve citizens on these choices (Bambauer 2008).

Public accountability depends on transparency; knowing what is being filtered, by whom, with what purpose and to what extent. Transparency is one of a number of mechanisms that might enable the public to be more active participants in the decision-making process involved in the use of online filtering systems (Bambauer 2008, McIntyre and Scott 2008). The need for greater transparency and accountability was illustrated by the unintended consequences that arose in a case in the UK. The Internet Watch Foundation (IWF) placed a Wikipedia article on its blacklist, at the same time that the open access encyclopedia included an image 'potentially in breach' of the UK Protection of Children Act (Box 6.1).

Box 6.1. Blacklisting of a Wikipedia Image: an Unintended Consequence of Cleanfeed.

On December 5th, 2008, the Internet Watch foundation (IWF) deemed an image from The Scorpions' 1976 album cover 'Virgin Killer', appearing in a Wikipedia article about the album, to be a "potentially illegally indecent image of a child under the age of 18." As a result, the IWF added both the Wikipedia article and the description page of the image to its Internet blacklist. While the legitimacy of this decision has been questioned in its own right, the decision quickly became even more controversial due to the unintended consequences that arose from conflicting interaction between two blocking systems: British Telecom's Cleanfeed technology and Wikipedia's vandalism blacklist.

Cleanfeed is a sophisticated content blocking system designed by British Telecom (BT) to block users' access to any pages identified on the IWF blacklist. It is activated on BT retail customers' accounts, and on request to customers of smaller ISPs that resell BT's wholesale service. When a web browser attempts to retrieve a specific web resource, the Cleanfeed system

checks the hosting server against a list of IP addresses suspected of hosting pages on the blacklist. If no match is found, the request is completed without interference. However if a match is found, traffic is routed through a small number of proxies that verify the specific page request against the current IWF blacklist. If a match is found the user is met with a standard '404 page not found error' and no information is provided to indicate that the page has been blocked. As a result of this single Wikipedia page being listed on the IWF blacklist, all normal traffic to Wikipedia from ISPs using the Cleanfeed system was rerouted through a small number of proxies.

Wikipedia allows users to anonymously edit most articles on its site. Anonymous users are identified through their IP addresses. In cases of vandalism or repeated violation of the rules, these IP addresses are used to selectively block users from continuing to edit the site. Because BT's Cleanfeed system did not forward the user's original IP address when routing traffic through a proxy server, it became impossible for Wikipedia to uniquely distinguish users. Consequently, the proxy IP addresses were blocked from Wikipedia and therefore the majority of British users were unable to edit Wikipedia pages.

On December 9th, the IWF rescinded its decision about the blacklisted Wikipedia page, stating that in examining "the contextual issues involved in this specific case and, in light of the length of time the image has existed and its wide availability, the decision has been taken to remove this webpage from our list".^{xxxix}

Filtering objectives and responsibilities differ across countries. In Australia, for example, a blacklist is generated by the Australian Communications and Media Authority. In the future, it is expected to become mandatory for all Internet service providers to comply with the list.^{xxxix} In the UK, a blacklist is generated by the Internet Watch Foundation, an independent and self-regulatory body, and is made available to all ISPs. The nation's largest ISP, British Telecom (BT), uses this list in conjunction with its Cleanfeed servers to discreetly block all URLs from the list (Box 6.1). The National High Tech Crime Centre of the Danish National Police and Save the Children Denmark are also generating a blacklist, while in Finland blocking is initially based on a list of Internet domains supplied by the Finnish police.^{xxxix} The European Commission is currently discussing a directive for combating 'the sexual abuse and sexual exploitation of children as well as child pornography', which includes applying mandatory blocking.^{xxxix}

Box 6.2. Blocking YouTube and MySpace in Turkey.

In November 2007, Turkey enacted the Turkish Law No. 5651, or the *Regulation of Publication on the Internet and Suppression of Crimes committed by means of Such Publication*. Since then, thousands of websites have been blocked in Turkey. The exact number is unclear but has been said to range from around 1300 officially^{xxxv} to over 6000 websites unofficially.^{xxxvi} Since May 2009, the Telecommunications Communication Presidency (TIB) has decided to no longer publish any precise statistics related to website

blocking based on Law No 5651. This has further reduced transparency in the matter. Some cases of blocking have been court ordered, but most are administrative orders issued by the TIB. Numerous web sites have been blocked because they were considered obscene or including alleged content of child abuse, sexual exploitation, gambling, or prostitution. Other sites have been blocked in Turkey to protect intellectual property. Access to websites such as Youtube, MySpace and the Pirate Bay has been repeatedly blocked ever since Turkish Law No. 5651 was approved.

Equality: Access to Skills and Technologies

Previously, skills and infrastructures necessary to produce and disseminate content for many media, such as the press, radio and television, were highly centralized. The potential of the Internet and the advances of related technologies such as video, Web 2.0 applications and mobile devices have enabled a more decentralized production of content. However, access to the Internet does not automatically translate into its use for the production of new content. Most users are primarily consumers of Internet services, rather than producers of original content. The potential of the Internet, like other ICTs, to 'reconfigure access', is not always realized.

This is one reason why many nations are aggressively pursuing initiatives designed to enhance the proficiency and literacy of Internet users. This could not only enable more people to benefit from the treasure troves of information online, but also allow them to contribute original and local content to the world wide web. The McBride Commission might have recognized the long-term potential of the new technologies to reconfigure global information flows, but this potential has never before been as technically feasible as it is today. The interest and ability to produce online content are necessary conditions, and aims of media literacy programs.

In contrast to the mass media of film and television, the Internet has a greater potential to transform the geography of production and consumption, enabling a more decentralized production and more diverse flows of content around the world. However, it could also further centralize content production, given the concentration of media skills in major centres, such as Los Angeles and London. Research on the geography of content production and consumption is in its early stages, but it is a clear priority of research on the Internet.^{xxxvii} The key question is whether or not the Internet is enabling a more diverse and decentralized production of content, and will users take advantage of this potential? Increasingly, as access becomes more widespread, debate will turn back to the themes that gripped mass media studies around worldwide information flows, such as those highlighted by the McBride Commission.

Freedom of Information

The principle of 'freedom of information' was recognized by the United Nations in 1946, under the adopted Resolution 59(1), which stated that:

Freedom of information is a fundamental human right and...the touchstone of all the freedoms to which the UN is consecrated.^{xxxviii}

Since then, all three main regional human rights systems (The Organization of American States, the Council of Europe and the African Union) as well as international bodies, such as the Inter-American Court of Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights, have recognized the importance of the right to information albeit with limitations, such as access to any government information (Boxes 2.1 and 6.3). For example, governments would not be expected to divulge much of the information disclosed by WikiLeaks on the Afghan war, deemed to be a risk to individuals or national security. Nevertheless, principles of the right of freedom of expression include: maximum disclosure, obligation to publish, promotion of open government, and processes to facilitate access, balanced by considerations such as national security and privacy, for example (Mendel 2008).

There are more than 70 countries around the world that have implemented laws to protect citizens' right to access various kinds of information (Burgman et al. 2008) The Internet has helped many of these countries to provide their citizens access to information related to public bodies, such as parliamentary committees, judicial proceedings, and constitutional decisions as well as related laws and regulations. Indices such as the Index of Online Access to Judicial Information prepared by CEJA-JSCA (Justice Studies Centre of the Americas) report on the type and amount of judicial information made available online by all countries in North and South America. This leads to greater transparency and accountability on the behalf of governments. When there is a lack of public information online, questions of censorship and filtering arise. In theory, freedom of information and freedom of expression are only limited by a country's laws, especially those related to privacy. But in practice, they are also affected by a much broader ecology of technical, legal and regulatory issues tied to the cultural, political and economic contexts of states (Hamilton 2004).

Box 6.3. International Recognition of the Right to Information

Recognition of the right to information is found in articles pertaining to freedom of expression in international treaties such as the American Convention on Human Rights (Article 13) and the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Article 10). More recently, the significance of the right to information was explicitly recognized in other international agreements such as in Article 9 of the African Charter on Human and People's Rights, and further supported with details on how this right should be protected in formal statements made by the African Commission on Human and Peoples' Rights (in the Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression in Africa 2002) as well as the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights (in the Inter-American Declaration of Principles on Freedom of Expression (2000).

Sources: ECHR (1950), *ACHR* (1969), ACHPR (1981), IACHR (2000), ACHPR (2002), IACHR (2009).

Privacy and Data Protection

Privacy advocates are increasingly concerned about users' rights to privacy and freedom of expression online, as some see these rights being infringed by government monitoring and surveillance (Brown and Korff 2009). At the same time, citizens and private stakeholders, such as search engine companies have been the focus of an increasing number of issues over the protection of privacy and data (Tene 2007). For example, individuals with webcams and video cameras are becoming a major instrument for watching other individuals. Instead of the Orwellian Big Brother surveillance of citizens by governments, many see a threat in an equally Orwellian 'Little Sister' surveillance of citizens by other citizens (RAE 2007).

It is difficult to develop a coherent global privacy rights framework with Internet data increasingly flowing around the world and passing through multiple jurisdictions, each with its own data privacy regulations. Conflicting requirements, differing policy definitions and motivations make the clarification and protection of privacy rights even more difficult (Wafa 2009).

In some respects, privacy is a technical challenge requiring more technologically advanced safeguards to protect privacy online (LalBhasin 2006). However there are other, more subtle problems in defining personal data on the Internet. For example, the clear delineation of which online content is legitimately public (perhaps a publicly accessible blog post), and what is legitimately private varies over time and across individuals. This is confounded by the development of more refined categories of access. Content is no longer simply private or public, as some information is open to one's family, friends, or anyone else online. It is possible that individuals will have a growing number of mechanisms to help them define more precisely the availability of their personal data on the Internet. Although this will not solve all problems, as some individuals do not understand or use these provisions.

The boundaries between privacy and data protection, on one hand, and freedom of expression on the other, are difficult to establish. They have not been resolved and thoroughly debated by many jurisdictions. This can exacerbate the difficulties in protecting freedom of expression online (Erdos 2009). In the EU, attempts have been made to protect freedom of expression within the Data Protection Directive and the Charter of Fundamental Rights; although not within the Council of Europe, where ECHR articles 8 and 10 are balanced by the courts.

An example of the potential conflict that could arise from issues on freedom of expression and privacy emerged in a situation involving Google executives in Italy (Box 6.4). In this case, Google executives were charged with violating the privacy of a child featured in a YouTube video. Holding service providers accountable for all user-generated content that might violate the privacy of an

individual, could in turn have a major impact on any large or small user-generated content provider. This case has engendered much debate over Internet freedom and openness, especially in English and Italian speaking media. According to Matt Sucherman (2010), Google VP and Deputy General Counsel for Europe, Middle East and Africa, the Italian court's decision attacked 'the very principles of freedom on which the Internet is built'. Many stressed that the entire Internet was now at risk if "safe harbours" for online service providers were to be threatened in certain jurisdictions (O'Brien 2010).

Box. 6.4. The Google Video Case in Italy

In 2006, a video showing a young autistic person being bullied by his classmates in Turin, was posted on Google Video in Italy. The video had been online for a few months before Google was formally notified and then duly took the video down. Nonetheless, after much media attention in Italy, Google was prosecuted for defamation and invasion of privacy. Defamation charges were quickly dropped. However, in February 2010, three of the four accused Google executives were found guilty of invasion of privacy under Section 13 of the Italian Privacy law. Many experts are confident that the ruling will be overturned in Italy, if not in a EU court, where Italian law must comply. Yet, Robertson claims that confusion would still persist in EU courts, as the Google Italy case also discloses flaws in EU law (Robertson 2010). Safe harbour provisions for ISPs, found in the E-commerce Directive in EU law, do not apply to issues related to its Electronic Privacy and Communications Directive. Robertson argues that safe harbour provisions should be completely included or eliminated from both the E-commerce and the Electronic Privacy and Communications Directives (2010). He notes that definitions of 'notice and takedown' in safe harbour provisions are unclear in EU law and prompts legislative change at the EU level.

Other experts have argued that the Italy Google case has little to do with freedom of expression, but is rather a concerning case for personal data and privacy issues online (Calo 2010, and Rotenberg 2010). The reasoning for the conviction is apparently grounded on Google Video not fulfilling its notice obligations under Section 13 of the Italian Privacy Code. It was accused of profiting from the presence of ads placed on the Google Video website, by processing personal data it obtained from its users. Yet 'making profit based on relative harm of a person involved' is a violation of Section 167 and not Section 13 of the Italian Privacy Code (Berlingieri 2010).

Berlingieri (2010) argues that confusion was created around the case because the conviction relied on the combination of two articles that were considered related as a 'matter of fact' by the judge. According to Berlingieri, it is unclear why Section 13 was used since it was not mentioned in the indictment. (Section 13 is found in Section 161, and not 167 of the code). Charges related to infringement of privacy and "unlawful processing of data" should be based on Section 167, a section that does not include the use of 'prior notice'.

Ensuring freedom online should not be seen in competition with other goals, such as improving online security and privacy, as in the Chinese case with Google (see section 10 below). Ideally, the broader ecology should be considered in ways that could yield approaches which mutually reinforce a diversity of objectives (Reding 2009). Better solutions or guidelines must be found to balance these Internet rights without undermining fundamental rights.

7. Economic Development and Industrial Strategies

Technology-led Industrial Strategies

Business, industrial and economic development goals have been one of the most significant sets of drivers behind the diffusion of the Internet (Table 5). In developed and rapidly developing countries alike, the Internet is a key infrastructure to support local and international trade and commerce. Financial incentives have led some policy-makers to downgrade traditional political risks in order to build not only the physical but also the softer infrastructures of the Internet, such as supporting computer proficiency and skills. However, economic development objectives have not been uniformly viewed as supporting the vitality of the Internet. For example, efforts to protect copyright and patents have underpinned threats to disconnect users.

Table 5. Industrial Goals, Stakeholders and Strategies in the Ecology

| <i>Goals - Games</i> | <i>Main Stakeholders</i> | <i>Strategies - Objectives</i> |
|--|---|---|
| Technology-led industrial strategies | National and regional governments; information and communication industries, firms; users and producers | Develop Internet infrastructures; provide services across all sectors; support take-up by users. |
| Protection of Intellectual Property Rights (IPR): Enforcement of Copyright | Music, film and audio-visual industries; WIPO; national governments; users | Implement digital rights management systems; enforce copyright provisions online; counter Creative Commons initiatives; support bandwidth or speed reduction for offenders; cut off access to major offenders; support deep packet inspection by ISPs |
| Enforcement of Patents | Software and services developers; national patent offices and agencies | Protection of basic concepts such as 'one-click ordering' or a 'system for exchanging information with friends' that encourages patent trolls; chilling effect on |

| | | |
|---------------------|---|--|
| | | innovation and openness |
| Competition | Government and industry; business enterprises: producers of computer equipment; related services | Efforts to ensure more competition, less concentration of ownership of infrastructures and content |
| ICT for Development | Representatives of developing nations, NGOs, Civil Society, ICT industries, such as mobile sector | Develop initiatives that foster the diffusion of ICTs in developing nations in ways that support production and use, both enabling economic development. |

Intellectual Property Rights: Copyright and Patents

The underlying end-to-end architecture of the Internet has made copyright enforcement more difficult. It has supported the creation of open and peer-to-peer (P2P) networks for file sharing. This has led to widespread attempts to strengthen and protect copyrights and intellectual property rights generally.^{xxxix} The introduction of a three strikes policy in France (Box 7.1), and the Digital Economy Bill in Britain (Box 7.2) are examples of these efforts (Brown 2010).

Box 7.1. The Three Strikes or Graduated Response Law in France.

The graduated response law adopted by the French legislature aimed at enforcing copyright by giving the courts the ability to disconnect Internet users if guilty of unlawful peer-to-peer, file-sharing of copyrighted material. Users who fail to have secure Internet connections, and whose computers are used by individuals other than the owner, to unlawfully share copyrighted material, are also subject to penalties. This measure has been contested primarily on due process grounds, as early versions of the legislation did not involve the courts. Later versions have introduced streamlined judicial proceedings to overcome these objections.

Box 7.2. UK Digital Economy Bill and Copyright Protection.

In 2009, a Digital Economy Bill was introduced in Britain containing a number of measures designed to protect existing creative industries, particularly the music and film industries. It proposed measures that would pressure ISPs to monitor users in order to identify those who are engaging in unlawful file sharing and create the mechanisms to disconnect those users from the Internet. Opponents argued that it was an effort to protect old business models that were not longer viable in the digital economy. Proponents argued that anything else would support unlawful theft of intellectual property.

The legal protection given to Digital Rights Management (DRM) technology and digital copyrighted material have raised many questions in regards to legal and regulatory issues about intellectual property rights in the digital age. Though numerous European and Asian-Pacific countries have not ratified the World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO) Internet Treaties (WCT/WPPT) and therefore have no obligation to comply with WIPO copyright rules, they still have developed substantial digital copyright provisions (Gasser 2005).

Many point to legislation on intellectual property such as the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) as jeopardizing well established fair use rights and the ability to freely exchange scientific research (EFF 2008). There are efforts to redress a balance, led both by pressure groups, such as the Pirate Party (Box 7.3) and in some cases by regulators themselves. In Europe, Giuseppe Mazzioti (2008) suggests that Article 10 of the European Commission of Human Rights (ECHR) may be a basis to compel reconsideration of the EU Copyright Law for electronic material. In other parts of the world, such as in developing countries of the Asian Pacific region, revisions of the TRIPS agreement and a civil campaign for an Access to Knowledge Treaty have been put forth in efforts to safeguard the public's right to free participation and enjoyment of cultural life and scientific advancement (Wang 2006).

Box 7.3. The Pirate Party.

The formation of the 'Pirate Party' is an innovative political outcome stemming from concerns over Internet regulation. The first Pirate Party was the Swedish Piratpartiet, founded on January 1st, 2006. Inspired by this Swedish initiative, other Pirate Parties have sprung up with growing success in at least 33 countries as of 2009. During the European Parliamentary elections of that same year, the Swedish Pirate Party received 7.13% of the vote. On September 27, 2009, the German Pirate Party received 2.0% in the German federal election.

These party factions cooperate through PP International. According to their Web site, their main interests are:

1. Ending excessive online surveillance, profiling, tracking and monitoring on individuals performed by government and big businesses.
2. Ensuring that all members of society have real freedom of speech and real freedom to enjoy and participate in humanity's shared culture.
3. Reforming copyright and patent laws to legalize non-commercial file sharing and reduce the excessive extent of copyright protection, as well as preventing the use of patents to stifle innovation or manipulate prices.

See: The UK Pirate Party Web site: <http://www.pirateparty.org.uk/>

In South America, the Argentine Congress has resisted introducing new legislation that would strengthen penalties for criminal violation of intellectual

property rights (Aguerre and Mastrini 2009). The Brazilian government has made even stronger moves in taking what they call a first step in protecting user rights and fostering new creativity. In 2009, it presented a draft for a new Copyright Bill that would legalize music mashups as well as copies of copyrighted material for private use (Felitti 2009). Measures such as the Free and Open Source Software Policy (FOSS), were initiated by the South African government in order to lower barriers for adopting ICTs and improve the right and access to knowledge. These are among a number of initiatives implemented to overcome DRM and copyright provisions which impede access to digital and online material (Schonwetter et al 2009).

ICT for Development

Efforts to diffuse ICTs to developing nations have been primarily led by economic development strategies. The outcome of expanding connections has been very positive for freedom of expression across the developing world. Among the many expectations bestowed upon the Internet and new technologies, is the hope to support economic development. This includes the eradication of poverty and assisting marginalized communities. However, the push for Information and Communication Technologies for Development (ICTD or ICT4D) only began to find place on international agendas during the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) in Geneva 2003 and Tunis 2005 (Abida 2009). Since then, organizations such as the ITU, UNESCO and the UNDP as well as the Commission on Science and Technology for Development (CSTD) and the Global Alliance for ICTD (GAID) have continued to support discussion of this issue.

These groups have brought greater awareness to the matter; there is much debate about the financial sustainability of ICT4D projects and their status in relation to more general issues of Internet governance (Unwin 2009). For example, at the WSIS, many ICT4D advocates viewed discussions of Internet governance as an issue for the developed nations.

ICT4D focuses on the management of innovative development projects in effort to support equity and social justice (Gurumurthy 2009). While mobile penetration rates have more than doubled over the last five years in developing countries and the Internet has continued to expand globally (see Section 3 of this report), it is estimated that four out of five inhabitants from developing countries still remain offline (ITU 2010). Given this continuing gap, ICTD projects and policies have often been criticized for poor design of information content and weak communication and implementation strategies (Parmer 2009). It is difficult to establish a strong link between the investment in these technologies and the well-being of rural users, or find any evidence of the reduction of information poverty, as well as any other potential indicators of impact (Casapulla et al., 2001; Keniston, 2002; Ynalvez et al 2010). Furthermore, the multidisciplinary approach to ICTD research has so far failed to properly bridge knowledge and expertise from both the computer and social sciences (Best 2009).

If notions of an information society are not to simply remain an idealistic vision

of the potential of ICTs, a minimum of trust, based on transparency respect and accountability, must be reinforced by the numerous stakeholders who are suppose to build it (Abida 2009).

8. Regulating Users: Offline and Online

There is a common perception that the Internet is a ‘Wild West’ or lawless and unregulated territory. This ignores the fact that laws in the offline world apply to the online world. It is illegal to criminally deceive someone in order to make personal financial gain offline or online. However, the perceived lack of regulation persists because we often focus on regulating the Internet rather than its users. However, the user behaviour is very much a focus of law and regulation in every nation. The problem is often one of managing law enforcement and reconciling cross-national differences in laws and sanctions, which are indeed a serious problem. Harvard law professor Jonathan Zittrain (2003) underlines that jurisdiction built upon the movement of information traveling through bits has proven too costly for governments to routinely recognize it. However, the rule of offline laws and regulations in the online world can be illustrated by examples of child protection, decency, libel, hate speech, and fraud on the Internet (Table 6).

Table 6. User-Centric Goals, Stakeholders and Strategies in the Ecology

| <i>Goals - Games</i> | <i>Main Stakeholders</i> | <i>Strategies - Objectives</i> |
|---------------------------|---|---|
| Child Protection | Civil Society; NGOs; governments; parents; police. | Take-down of sites; rating and filtering of content; prosecution of offenders |
| Decency: Pornography | Producers of pornographic films and content; commercial and public service content regulators in nations and regions; the public and consumers. | Enabling or blocking production distribution and consumption of material judged immoral by local standards of decency. |
| Libel: Defamation | Individuals, groups, or firms that are subjects of defamatory claims; the courts; the press and media; bloggers; ISPs | Moving to courts and jurisdictions with lenient libel laws (libel tourism); making it easier or more difficult to bring libel actions |
| Prevention of Hate Speech | Governments; NGOs; civil society; individuals; religious and political groups. | Identification of perpetrators, legal restrictions, restricting search, packet inspection |
| Fraud | Fraudulent sellers and buyers; police; consumers. | Efforts to detect and prevent or catch fraudulent sellers and users of the Internet |

| | |
|--|------------------|
| | (e.g., phishing) |
|--|------------------|

Child Protection

In many countries, there is a growing concern over the intersection between child protection and freedom of expression. Regulatory responses to these concerns generally differ based on whether the targeted actions are legal or not and potentially inappropriate or harmful.

In attempting to combat activity that is clearly illegal, many countries have expressed a revulsion against the production, dissemination, and access of child sexual abuse images. They argue that the elimination of these images is a justified limitation to freedom of expression. Despite this agreement however, regulatory responses vary, with many countries still without legislation that specifically addresses child sexual abuse images (ICMEC, 2008). Even within countries with strong domestic legislation, the challenge of dealing with images hosted on foreign servers is a subject of debate. Should Internet content be controlled by law enforcement agencies or should it rather be a responsibility undertaken by ISPs and search engines? If so, should this occur with or without government support and mandates (Edwards, 2009)? For example, in 2010, the UK’s Office of Government Commerce instructed public agencies to only work with Internet service firms that agreed to block websites on the Internet Watch Foundation’s (IWF) list of 500-800 child abuse sites (O’Neill 2010).

Once discussion of child protection moves beyond preventing what is clearly illegal towards what is potentially inappropriate for some users, tensions between rights becomes greater. In countries as diverse as Denmark, South Korea, the United States and Afghanistan, schools and libraries are required to use filtering software to protect children who use their systems. While the ability for consenting adults to opt out of the use of such filters varies between countries, such censorship falls primarily upon disadvantaged people who must use these public facilities to access the Internet (Silenced Report 2003).

Many countries have often used child protection rhetoric to justify laws or regulations that permit filtering or censoring the Internet, such as the Children's Internet Protection Act (CIPA) in the United States, the Clean Feed proposal in Australia and the Green Dam in China (Hull 2008, Maurushat and Watt 2009, OpenNet Initiative 2009).^{xi} Experts argue however that regulation may not be the most efficient solution and parents, teachers, childcare workers and children education should be the main reference point to dealing seriously with online child protection issues (Thierer 2007).

How can the Internet’s infrastructure be employed to create an environment where government regulation can be efficient without also being an unreasonable burden (Preston 2007)? The Memorandum of Montevideo promotes a set of standards for Latin American countries that seeks a balance between guaranteed rights for children, and protecting them from online risks.

No matter where governments decide to limit freedom of expression rights in the name of child protection, it is important that such regulation be transparent, focuses on specific potential risks, and is measured by its effectiveness. In doing so, governments can employ tools to protect the most vulnerable while lessening risks that their efforts be perceived as tools of a broader repression of speech (Hills, Powell and Nash, 2010).

Libel for Defamation

Most nations' courts seek to protect the reputations of individuals and companies from irresponsible accusations of libel. However, restrictions on spoken or written expression that are meant to prevent defamation vary widely. In Asia, governments have enacted laws, which deter acts of online defamation and frequently incur serious sanctions such as imprisonment. These measures are often seen as stifling freedom of expression and freedom of the press on the Internet.^{xli} In the US, Australia and UK, libel cases for online defamation have tested the limits of legal jurisdiction in the online world. Britain is widely perceived to have some of the greatest restrictions on the publication of defamatory information, and is said to have spawned libel tourism in the country (Box 8.1).

Box 8.1. Libel Tourism.

As the Internet makes nearly any publication globally accessible, those who feel defamed online can, under the right circumstances, file a lawsuit against a publisher or author in the country the plaintiff is likely to obtain a more favorable ruling. In 2009, the British government planned a reduced cap on the amounts paid to those who successfully sued for defamation, which according to ex Justice Secretary, Jack Straw, was attracting 'liability tourists' to Britain (Mulholland 2009). The ex Secretary reportedly said that the abuse of existing liability laws was having a 'chilling effect' on the press by raising the threat of libel suits.

Brenner (2007) has questioned whether online defamation should be subject to prosecution at all, since information flows in an uninhibited way on the Internet. Not only do debates on the limits of legal jurisdiction in the borderless world of the Internet arise, but so do questions on who is ultimately made responsible for online defamation, especially when Internet defamers can remain more easily anonymous and ISPs as well as online content providers are often protected by laws such as the US Communications Decency Act of 1996, which states that "*no provider or user of an interactive computer service shall be treated as the publisher or speaker of any information provided by another information content provider (47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1))*".^{xliii} The ambiguous definition of service providers was originally a measure taken to avoid censorship by online actors, afraid of being held liable for online defamation. However, this has allowed for the loose interpretation of the law, and in turn means that cases of online defamation involving large Internet companies are usually quickly dismissed. Lone individuals often remain the only ones left needing to defend themselves in online libel cases.

Therefore, liability relating to material online is limited in the fact that:

- Each country can interpret legal jurisdiction according to its own laws.
- Many countries have yet to address issues of online defamation in their legal system.
- New online defamation laws sometimes seem to be a pretext to censor and/or filter freedom of expression and freedom of the press online.
- Ambiguous laws often do not clearly state nor determine the legal liability, role and responsibility of various online actors who could be accused of online defamation (i.e., ISPs, online content providers and producers, bloggers, and journalists).

The ecology of online laws and regulations should indeed assure the right of freedom of expression online as well as individual protection against online defamation. However, it should also hold all stakeholders of the online world responsible for maintaining a healthy and open flow of free information on the Internet.

Hate Speech

As much as the Internet is a mechanism for spreading democracy it is also a breeding ground for hate speech by groups who have used it to promote their cause (Tsesis 2001). While most people tend to agree that this is a negative consequence of the Internet, some think that inappropriate regulation of online hate speech can lead to the suppression of the right to freedom of expression. Others believe that prohibiting hate speech altogether may actually aid to further proliferate its discourse in society (Cammaerts 2009). Moreover, active censorship usually tends to backfire in a democracy, especially when filtering and online monitoring are used (Timofeeva 2002). So how can a balance be found between both in order to avoid online censorship (Kakungulu-Mayambala 2008)?

There are two major approaches to this issue. The first is to encourage free and open exchange of ideas online (mainly a US approach). The second is to directly block hate speech on the Internet, which has been the approach adopted by Germany, amongst other countries (Timofeeva 2002). It is difficult and highly unlikely that an international consensus will be found on how to deal with this problem. Some suggest establishing an ombudsman bureau and using exposure as an effective means to reduce hate speech online (Cammaerts 2009). Others argue that the solution lies in public education and the teaching of tolerance and acceptance of diverse values (Timofeeva 2002).

9. Internet-centric Controls and Strategies

Concepts of Internet governance most often evoke discussion of what has been called 'Internet-centric' controls and strategies (Dutton and Peltu 2007).

These include the regulation of domain names, standard setting, licensing of ISPs and Internet-centric policies, such as over 'Net Neutrality' (Table 7). We refer to them as *Internet-centric* to bring attention to many other policy areas that also govern the Internet, such as user-focused policies, and that have been discussed in other parts of this report. Many of these Internet-centric policies have major implications for freedom of expression.

Table 7. Internet-Centric Goals, Stakeholders and Strategies in the Ecology

| <i>Goals - Games</i> | <i>Main Stakeholders</i> | <i>Strategies - Objectives</i> |
|--|---|---|
| Domain Names and Numbers | Individuals; firms and organizations using the Web; ICANN; name Registries; the Internet Governance Forum (IGF) | Enable or prevent domain names to protect personal identities, businesses or online traffic, such as new top-level domains, (eg. dotXXX). |
| Internet and Web Standards: Identity | W3C; IGF; national and Regional Governments | Create standards that prevent or protect the anonymity of users. |
| Net Neutrality | National telecommunication regulators; the Internet Industry; advocates of end-to-end Networks | Using regulation to protect end-to-end principles of service provisions over the Internet. |
| Licensing and Regulation of Internet Service Providers | ISPs; national governments and regulators; ICANN; users and content providers. | Keep ISPs close to, or at arms length from, governmental or commercial pressures, to control their independence. |

Internet Governance and Regulation

Information Infrastructure is an initiative set out by the US government in 1993 as a new telecommunication policy for the Information Age. Since then, numerous international forums, summits and meetings have taken place in efforts to find an effective way to regulate the Internet (Berleur 2008). From self-regulation to government intervention, the Internet community has suggested a variety of different approaches to regulation, but many believe they have failed to govern it effectively (Kesan and Gallo 2006).

The Internet Corporation of Assigned Domain Names and Numbers (ICANN) has played a fundamental role in shaping the technical infrastructure of the Internet and has subsequently taken on much responsibility for its governance in some fairly specific areas. However, there are many who question the legitimacy of ICANN's role (von Bernstorff 2003) and others who refute numerous ideas that associated Internet governance with ICANN (April 2006). The influence of ICANN specifically, and the 'West' in general, have been an

enduring issue in the World Summit on the Information Society (WSIS) and the IGF.

The Working Group on Internet Governance (WGIG), which was established as a follow-on from WSIS, defined Internet governance around a multi-stakeholder approach to developing 'shared principles, norms, rules, decision-making procedures, and programs that shape the evolution and use of the Internet' (WGIG 2005: 4).

The Internet's architecture has never been an object of national regulation and has remained open to international consensus. ICANN has been responsible for the management of IP address space allocation, protocol identifier assignment, top-level domain name system management, and root server system management functions. This organization refers the associated technical work to IANA or the W3C, which functions as the main international standards organization for the Internet. ICANN, IANA, and the W3C operate at an international level to introduce Internet-wide principles. The challenges facing Internet governance are in part due to the uncertain legitimacy of existing bodies, such as ICANN, and the degree to which these institutions focus on only one of many areas of policy and regulation shaping the future of the Internet.

However, these actors have established a set of principles to guide their work -- openness, interoperability and neutrality – which have gained legitimacy in debates over many areas of Internet regulation and governance (Dutton and Peltu 2007). This can, if permitted, support an environment where users can express themselves freely without fearing control or censorship by monitoring bodies. The neutral character of the Internet is a key element in maintaining a free and open approach to Internet-based communication, speech and expression. Thus, the Internet as an infrastructure, which enables an almost real-time upload of recordings and documents, has become an object of international policy.

Specific technical matters can have an influence on policy-making and present implications on freedom of expression and the openness of the Internet. Matters related to Internet address space (eg: the transition from IPv4 to IPv6, the scarce resource of IP addresses, address hijacking, the sometimes unstable change of protocols) or the Domain Name System is by nature regulating the Internet and access to it. Limitations to American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) or the exclusion of non-Latin letters in using top-level-domains can be seen as a constraint to freedom of expression. Innovations aimed at addressing these limitations are currently being developed (Box 9.1).

Box 9.1. Emergence of Internationalized Top Level Domains (IDNs).

ICANN has introduced internationalized country-code top level domain names, which will enable the introduction of a limited number of IDNs for country code top level domains (ccTLDs). Thus, it will be the first time that users can obtain a domain name with the entire string in characters based on

their native language. The process will be available to all countries and territories where the official language is based on scripts other than the Latin (extended) script. The first non-Latin top-level domains were added to the DNS root zone in May 2010.

See: <http://icann.org/en/topics/idn/>

Regulatory Models for a ‘Technology of Freedom’

Many scholars have viewed new media as inherently free – namely the so-called ‘technologies of freedom’ (Pool 1983) – given the shift from:

- only a few to a burgeoning number of content producers;
- local and national systems to global networks;
- real time to asynchronous communication; and
- control of access and content shifting into the hands of users, who are also producers.

Finding an appropriate regulatory model for the Internet has been difficult. In the past and still today, old models do not apply. Yet the search for a new model was not a priority before, given that it was not regarded as a serious threat to existing broadcasting and print media, as well as to telecommunications. The dot-com bubble that sank many new Internet companies between 1998 and 2000 vindicated this position for many.

However, the growing diffusion of the Internet since 2000 has led to the Internet being viewed as the future of information and communication technologies. It is perceived as a technology that has disrupted traditional media and their business models in ways that threaten their business strategies and the regulatory regimes that govern them. This new position in which the Internet finds itself leads to initiatives aimed at Internet governance and regulation, such as in establishment of the Internet Governance Forum (Box 9.2), which is a set of factors in the ecology of freedom of expression. Notwithstanding these recent developments, access to the Internet has been the major engine behind this technology of freedom, and the freedom of connection.

Box 9.2. The Internet Governance Forum (IGF).

The IGF was one of the most tangible and significant outcomes of the World Summits on the Information Society (WSIS) in 2003 and 2005, organized by the UN and International Telecommunication Union (ITU). The WSIS pioneered a new kind of global politics in which the role of civil society has become more formally acknowledged within a multi-stakeholder approach to policy, broadening governance beyond the domain of governments to include business, non-State, and civil society actors in a form of multilateralism.

The Working Groups on Internet Governance (WGIG) was set up after the first WSIS phase in Geneva, to explore the roles and responsibilities of

Internet governance stakeholders and to identify key issues for both developing and developed countries. The IGF was formed after the second Summit in Tunis, as specified in the WSIS (2005) 'Tunis Agenda for the Information Society' that took account of recommendations by the WGIG (2005). The IGF inherited values favoring: a multi-stakeholder approach; a broad view of the social, economic and cultural impacts of the Internet compared to a previously narrow focus on technical issues through bodies such as the influential Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN); and an emphasis on the link between Internet governance and development strategies to meet the goals of the UN's Millennium Development Goals. Since the formation of the IGF, many nations have sought to develop national IGFs to develop more consensus and organization at the national level.

Protective Regulation: Net Neutrality

Net Neutrality is one of the more technical aspects of Internet regulation that has been viewed as a potential threat to freedom of expression online. There is not a single definition for Net Neutrality but it usually means that ISPs do not discriminate users through access fees, nor do they favour a type of content or content provider over another, or charge content providers for sending information to consumers over their broadband cables (Hogendorn 2007). As digital media evolves with the creation of new technology, the need for bandwidth has made the Net Neutrality debate more prominent (Bailey 2008). It is attractive to many in its approach to better manage existing bandwidth as demands begin to exceed supply, rather than simply expanding available bandwidth.

Net Neutrality has often been viewed as a North American issue, though regulatory policy in Europe and elsewhere would indicate otherwise (Marsden 2009). The Internet is increasingly being threatened by privatization (Nunziato 2008) and Net Neutrality has become linked with approaches to vertical integration between content and conduit (Wu and Yoo 2007). This has many people worried that ISPs will incur discriminatory actions and online content will therefore not be accessible to everyone in the same way, possibly creating a two- or multi-tiered Internet.

Some ISPs have already employed discriminatory practices such as throttling to ensure that high bandwidth users do not slow down overall Internet traffic. This has distanced them from concepts of net neutrality. Part of the debate is determining what consists of good and bad discrimination (Wu and Yoo 2007). What kind of policy or set of laws should governments adopt in order to ensure fair access to broadband Internet? Cheng et al have argued that Net Neutrality regulation will incentivize ISPs to invest in broadband infrastructure at a more socially optimal level. Often ISPs under or over invest in infrastructure capacity when there is a lack of regulation (Cheng et al. 2007). Atkinson and Weiser recommend that policymakers promote more market entries by new broadband providers and adopt policies that boost the size of best-efforts broadband connections (Atkinson and Weiser 2006). In contrast,

Marsden (2007) suggests a “light-touch regulatory regime involving reporting requirements and co-regulation, with as far as it is possible, market-based solutions”.

Licensing and Regulation of Internet Service Providers

ICANN has been the key institution delegating various rights and responsibilities to organizations for the assignment of domain names and numbers around the world. This provides the basis of a growing industry of Internet domain name registries, similar to Nominet UK, or Afilias. Additionally, a growing array of business enterprises are licensed within countries to provide an array of Internet services, ranging from e-mail to search, such as Google or Yahoo! do. The licensing of businesses and the allocation of responsibilities are becoming some of the key elements of the ecology of Internet freedom, as governments can intervene in various ways to pressure businesses to conform to national law and policy. The threat of license loss is a mechanism that an increasing number of countries use to transfer regulatory burdens, such as monitoring Internet use, to service providers, as proposed by the Digital Economy Bill (Box 7.3).

10. Security

Security concerns are perhaps the primary motivation of many governments in seeking to gain better control of the Internet. These include the ability to identify Internet users, protect consumer by minimizing spam, to reducing criminal activities and stopping national security breaches. Security concerns range widely from, a user keeping his own personal computer free of viruses, to national security agencies monitoring individuals they suspect of espionage or terrorist activities. This area has been the subject of extensive discussion. This section will only seek to illustrate the many ways in which the goals and objectives of stakeholders in the security realm can be understood within conceptions of the larger ecology of expression.

Table 9. Security Goals, Stakeholders and Strategies in the Ecology

| <i>Goals - Games</i> | <i>Main Stakeholders</i> | <i>Strategies - Objectives</i> |
|--|--|---|
| Secrecy, Confidentiality | Government; parliamentarians; the press; bloggers and information providers. | Super-injunctions to prevent news coverage of parliamentary proceedings; intranets and firewalls to prevent public access to corporate or public information deemed confidential. |
| Security against malware, such as spam and viruses | Virus writers; users; Internet equipment and service providers; government and | Creation of identity systems and software to detect |

| | | |
|--------------------------------------|--|--|
| that disable computers | law enforcement. | and remove viruses; efforts to track and charge producers of malware |
| Counter-Radicalisation | Political, religious groups and individuals; law enforcement; foreign affairs agencies; community leaders; parents | Efforts to discover individuals and contexts subject to radical ideas; open dialogue; expose to countervailing information and ideas |
| National Security, Counter-Terrorism | Law enforcement; national security agencies; ISPs; Internet users; business and travel firms and services | Efforts to prevent or detect efforts to breach security of computers, locations, or services |

Governments worldwide are seeking to balance online freedom of expression with many other objectives. National security is a critical goal for most in an ecology that ties national security interests to those of advocates of freedom of expression. Companies seeking to do global online business find themselves forced to understand how to comply with local and national laws, regulations, and customs that vary across jurisdictions. In doing so, defending, sacrificing or adapting principles related to freedom of expression are one aspect of business decisions with multiple legal, commercial, and ethical concerns.

Two recent cases have highlighted the ecology of games that is shaping the strategies of nation states and some of the Internet's largest commercial interests: Google in China, and Blackberry in the Middle East.

Google and China

In 2010, Google has continued to be the world's most popular Internet search company, maintaining offices in dozens of countries and offering search results in over 100 languages. The corporation has been clear on issues of freedom of expression: Google's stated mission is 'to organize the world's information and make it universally accessible and useful'.^{xliii} Nevertheless, Google faces requests to remove or restrict information from many countries, including Brazil, Germany, India and the US, and seeks to comply fully or partially.^{xliiv} From time to time, Google's decisions have stirred controversy. The most notable example of this, and one that illustrates the ecology of games in freedom of expression online, involved Google's relationship with China.

Until 2006, Google had no headquarters housing employees in China. However it provided a Chinese language version of Google.com that was easily accessible to users in China. In 2002, China began blocking access within the country to Google's servers. As Google explained in its testimony

to the US House of Representatives Committee on International Relations:

[Google] faced a choice at that point: hold fast to our commitment to free speech (and risk a long-term cut-off from our Chinese users), or compromise our principles by entering the Chinese market directly and subjecting ourselves to Chinese laws and regulations. We stood by our principles, which turned out to be a good choice, as access to Google.com was largely restored within about two weeks.^{xlv}

However, Google faced more problems over the next three years when access was sporadically blocked or slowed. It became clear that the Chinese government was filtering search results. Google users found requests were often denied or redirected to other search engines operating within China and were subject to strict censorship requirements.

Facing such difficulties, and losing market share to their major competitor, Baidu, Google decided in early 2006 to reverse their stance against self-censorship. They opened offices in China and began operating Google.cn. In doing so, they committed to respecting the content restrictions imposed by Chinese law and regulations, as they do in other countries in which they operated. Google argued that their decision that censored access was better than no access at all, yet many accused Google of putting their business interests ahead of their commitment to freedom of expression.

Google continued to auto-censor results on Google.cn until January of 2010 when the search engine announced that the company, along with at least 20 other large corporations, had faced sophisticated cyber-attacks originating from within China (Box 10.1). These attacks led to the theft of intellectual property for Google and the unauthorized access to the e-mail of dozens of human rights activists. Consequently, Google announced that it would stop censoring its search results on Google.cn and operate an unfiltered search engine, even if this meant closing its offices in China.^{xlvi}

Box 10.1. Google and China, 2010.

On January 12th, 2010, Google announced that it would stop censoring its Chinese search engine, Google.cn, after claiming to be victim of a targeted attack originating in China. Google cited that the goal of the attackers was to access Gmail accounts of Chinese human right activists. This was not the first incident in which commercial Internet firms were believed to have been targeted. In 2005, Amnesty International claimed that the Chinese government had employed user e-mail account information provided by Yahoo, to sentence Chinese journalist, Shi Tao, to 10 years of prison. However, at the time of publishing, only two Gmail accounts had appeared to be accessed and limited information (such as subject lines, time and date) rather than actual e-mail content were retrieved. The search engine also declared that dozens of Gmail users based outside of China, who were human right activists, had their accounts routinely accessed by third parties, likely by phishing scams or malware placed on the users' computers

(Drummond 2010).

Google originally launched the Chinese version of its search engine in 2006 and had agreed to censor certain search results, such as the Tibetan independence movement, the Falun Gong and the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989, in order to comply with government terms and rules. The search engine had been criticized by human rights and Internet advocates for adhering to China's restrictions on freedom of expression. Google argued at the time that, even though filtering 'severely compromised' its mission, not providing any information at all to a fifth of the world's population was far more severe (McLaughlin 2006).

Even if Google.cn had been filtering to comply with Chinese regulations, up until this recent announcement, Google.com had not been subjected to the same type of censorship as other Chinese search engines and websites and was fairly accessible to Chinese users (Canaves 2010).^{xlvii} Though Google is using human rights issues as a rationale to stop filtering search results in China, there were speculations about underlying motives for this announcement. Some have argued that this unprecedented decision by a global search engine-based corporation was a move by Google to improve its reputation in the West, especially amongst the European community where concerns over privacy issues are growing (Morozov 2010).^{xlviii}

Reaction to Google's announcement was mixed. The US Congress announced an investigation into the cyber-attacks. US Secretary of State, Hillary Clinton presented a well publicized speech about Internet freedom and made reference to Google's announcement by requesting transparency from the Chinese government and highlighted that the United States and China had "different views" on the freedom of information online.^{xlix}

The Chinese media responded by accusing Google and the US government of trying to use the Internet to impose Western values worldwide. Links between Google's commercial decision and the politics of freedom of expression were boldly presented by China's *People's Daily Online* as a move that politicized a commercial decision.ⁱ

In March 2010, Google stopped censoring its search service. From then, users visiting Google.cn were redirected to Google.com.hk, where Google offers uncensored search results delivered via servers housed in Hong Kong in simplified Chinese. As China's content restrictions do not apply to services in Hong Kong, Google felt that this solution was consistent with Chinese law. China appeared to accept this remedy.

Google's announcement highlighted some of the other players in this ecology of games. For example, while moving its search services, Google announced its intention to continue R&D work in China and also maintain a sales presence in the country.ⁱⁱ In doing so, Google is drawing a link between their contribution to the Chinese economy as an employer and their ability to operate with minimal restriction, thereby adding their employees to the ecology of games. The role of Google's employees in this ecology is also

highlighted by Google's statement that 'these decisions have been driven and implemented by our executives in the United States, and that none of our employees in China can, or should, be held responsible for them'.^{lii}

Privacy versus National Security: Blackberry

Canadian company Research in Motion (RIM), the makers of the Blackberry, has faced pressures from governments around the world to allow access to information sent and received from their popular Blackberry devices. Government representatives in the United Arab Emirates, Saudi Arabia, Indonesia, India, and Bahrain have argued that RIM's encryption of Blackberry messages posed national security threats and that the routing of data to RIM's offshore servers put control over data beyond the scope of national regulators and law enforcement. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates have threatened a shut down of Blackberry services within their respective national borders if RIM could not find a technical solution that would enable security services to monitor Blackberry communications.

The pressure on RIM in their decisions to allow monitoring of communication are complicated by several factors. A major selling point of the Blackberry has been its encryption, which is designed to makes its messenger service more difficult for anyone, including RIM, to monitor. Market pressures, however, seem to be pushing RIM towards technical monitoring, with stock shares falling as governments have threatened shut-downs, and rising on news of technical solutions for monitoring.^{liii} RIM is also dependent on service providers in other nations to provide cellular access for their Blackberry devices. In cases where service providers are more tightly controlled by government agencies, governmental pressures on these providers can put them at odds with RIM.

Pressure to provide government access to cryptography keys is not a recent development, nor is it isolated to the regions currently placing pressure on RIM. Proponents of strong cryptography point out that such access is fundamentally flawed because of its dependence on key escrow. Key escrow involves providing a third party with the keys to decrypt encrypted information so that the third party can access the information when necessary, such as over concerns related to national security. However, by introducing a third party into the encryption relationship, the protection of the cryptography becomes a greater social and political, rather than technological challenge.

Processes, regulations, laws, and reviews must be put in place, followed, and trusted in order for the security of the information to remain in tact. Key escrow systems have traditionally met with stiff resistance and technological failure, such as attempts to introduce the Clipper Chip (Box 10.2).

Box 10.2. The Clipper Chip.

The Clipper Chip initiative was launched by the US government in 1993. This would provide chips that encrypted communications with a secret algorithm developed by the National Security Administration. As part of the initiative, all

Clipper chips contained a cryptographic key that was also provided to the US government under a key escrow system. This enabled greater privacy of communication for individuals, balanced by processes for protecting national security. Critics claimed that the system opened citizens to the possibility of unauthorized government surveillance. While the US government initially stated that the use of the Clipper chip would be voluntary, critics saw its introduction as the first step toward outlawing other forms of cryptography, which has been a concern of national security agencies.^{iv} However, controversy over the chip, and the development of effective public alternatives, eventually derailed the Clipper chip initiative, leading the US government to stop pressing for its adoption.

Secrecy and Confidentiality

In direct contrast to freedom of information concerns, there remain areas of public processes that are judged by many to be better served by maintaining secrecy, or confidentiality. For example, the confidentiality of jury deliberations is protected. In such cases, openness might jeopardize the fairness or justice of a proceeding. Like privacy, the need for secrecy or confidentiality, if justified, can counter freedom of information. In cases where data is confidential or sensitive, security breaches can be a major threat that needs to be balanced with countervailing calls for sharing or opening government data. This is one of many motivations behind efforts to better identify users, discussed below, such as in cases when it would be possible to identify the individual that posted or e-mailed information that was to be kept confidential.

Security against Malware

Individual users concerned about malware, such as spam or viruses, normally want to filter spammers and malicious hackers seeking to install viruses on their computer. They also might want better information about who is e-mailing them, or asking them to establish a connection within a social networking site. This is another motivation for identifying the person sending an e-mail or requesting a link: Is the requester who he or she says they are? Some people want to know to whom they are speaking in certain situations. However, there are solutions to identifying 'badware' by obtaining information, for example, about requests that ask users to install software on their computer (Box 10.2).

Box 10.2. Stop Badware.

One project, called StopBadware, seeks to use many web techniques to monitor those who might distribute malicious software. If a user is asked to download a programme on their computer, for example, StopBadware would inform the user about the software, such as how long it has been in use, and how many computers have installed it. A very new piece of software that is installed on few computers would be a higher risk, enabling users to make a more informed decision without knowing the exact identity of the provider. The

project seeks to provide other services, such as a clearinghouse function, creating a place to report suspicious or bad software or services.

Source: <http://stopbadware.org/>

Increasingly, good and bad actors online have an interest in monitoring the use of the Internet to identify malware providers or to be aware of spammers. Assuming that actions are monitored and that online behavior is traced and tracked, user communities can keep people from accessing or posting particular content. In many countries monitoring is permitted in controlled circumstances by law enforcement and intelligence agencies through a variety of methods (Box 10.3).

Box 10.3. Methods of Monitoring Internet and Web Traffic.

- Intercepting communication transmission via a telecommunications system (such as a computer) and divulging information to a third party, on account of national security, the prevention or detention of serious crime, or the economic safeguarding of a state.^{lv}
- Logging, recording, retaining, and giving access to information about visited websites, e-mails sent and received or applications used.^{lvi}

Source: Brown (2008).

National Security: Counter-Radicalization and Terrorism

Internet use in terrorist activities ranging from efforts to radicalize youth to managing radical interests, has created the most recent and serious motivation behind efforts to monitor the Internet and identify users (Box 10.4). The actions required to better survey speech online and distinguish who says what to whom are not in themselves a threat to most users of the Internet. They nevertheless can have a chilling effect on the completely legitimate use of Internet.

Box 10.4. Online Identities: Part of a Bigger Picture

The issues surrounding identities online are complex and critically important, yet they need to be addressed in relation to the larger ecology of issues in which they are embedded. Changes in the ways identity is handled on the Internet can have unintended consequences, such as jeopardizing the Internet's value as a new space for democratic expression and accountability. Inevitably, a number of working groups and conferences have been organized to address these issues.^{lvii} The problem is that no single level or standard of identity is appropriate for all activities. For example, freedom of expression often requires anonymity, yet many other activities and services have no need for user identification. While not everyone agrees in creating what some have called the 'accountability versus anonymity' debate, it is an important issue to address.^{lviii} Often there is only a need to authenticate that a person has a right to the service, such as being over a certain age. Therefore online identity systems must support this broad range and not require a level of identification

greater than required by a particular service. One European advisory board on identification made the following recommendation:

The EC, together with the Member States and industrial stake-holders, must give high priority to the development of a common EU framework for identity and authentication management that ensures compliance with the legal framework on personal data protection and privacy and allows for the full spectrum of activities from public administration or banking with strong authentication when required, through to simple web activities carried out in anonymity ' (RISEPTIS 2009: 31).

Some within the technical community might want a one-size-fits-all system for identifying users because it is easier to design and implement. However, in real life, there are many different levels of authentication and identification required, depending on the circumstances. Online, the idea of one technically driven standard would be problematic.

Summary and Conclusion


The Ecology Shaping Freedom of Expression

Internet stakeholders ranging from government and regulatory bodies to ISPs and civil society advocates, are increasingly addressing issues tied to freedom of expression online. This report has highlighted the multiplicity of policy issues shaping online freedom of expression around the world. For example, the control of spam and viruses is one well accepted rationale for Internet service providers to justify the monitoring of online traffic in order to protect users. However, many other areas such as libel, defamation and intellectual property protection, are providing reasons for greater control of online content in ways that fundamentally affect multiple actors, ranging from users, webmasters and bloggers to ISPs. They also have more general repercussions for those prosecuted under these laws in ways that can disproportionately constrain freedom of expression.

Censorship of the Internet, as evidenced by national filtering of online content, appears to be more widely acceptable, even within states with liberal democratic traditions. Concerns over issues such as child protection, online decency and fraud have over-ridden matters over freedom of expression. This is not to say that such considerations are not important to address in the digital age. Yet our research indicates that disproportionate reliance on disconnecting users or filtering content could seriously undermine essential aspects of freedom of expression, unless the larger ecology of policies and regulations are taken into account in balancing conflicting objectives. Protecting certain human rights or freedoms often has a direct and immediate impact on other rights and freedoms. Thus, the preservation of one freedom can limit another. Balancing these conflicting values and interests is only likely to be resolved through negotiation and legal-regulatory analyses. This will probably vary cross-nationally, if not locally. Resolution of these balancing issues requires a broad view of the larger ecology of policies and regulations shaping freedom of expression (Figure 9).

Freedom of expression and the right to communicate are, in many ways, being redefined by the development and access to new technologies. Modern progress on the Internet challenges, yet also enables freedom of expression. Today we see the emergence of two types of filtering variously applied in different nations and regions of the world: 1) filtering for the protection of other citizen values, such as privacy or child protection, and 2) filtering to impose a particular political or moral regime, such as entailed in governmental surveillance or political repression. In essence, while these intentions are not always explicit or distinguishable, there could be a more contingent perspective developing around online content controls, based on the motivations underlying the activity. This in itself is a potentially major shift from a more blanket rejection of censorship in the era of the mass media and the early years of the Internet.

Figure 9. The Ecology of Freedom of Connection and Expression.



It is critical that more international bodies and scholars be concerned with these topics. The benefits of open, free expression, and freedom of connection are immense. There are many ways to mitigate the risks of an

open society. This report has introduced a new and broader conceptual framework for discussing the legal and regulatory trends that are shaping online freedom of expression around the world – when fundamental freedoms are increasingly tied to the Internet. It is our hope that such a conceptual framework will focus more attention on: 1) identifying and clarifying the diversity of associated actors, goals and strategies that affect freedom of expression and connection; 2) facilitating more comprehensive and coherent discussion and debate on the ecology of legal and regulatory choices affecting freedom of expression on the Internet; and 3) establishing areas in which empirical research could inform debates over policy and practice.

Recommendations for Research, Policy and Practice

This review and synthesis of previous research and related literature provides a basis for recommendations related to research, policy and practice. UNESCO and its constituencies should consider the following:

Continue Efforts to Support the World Wide Diffusion of the Internet

One of the most positive developments in supporting freedom of expression has been the role of the Internet in enabling greater worldwide access to information. The Internet and Web have allowed individuals to network locally, nationally, and internationally in ways that can create new forms of democratic accountability (Dutton 2009). Many nations have not yet achieved high levels of adoption, such as in many nations in Asia, but have nonetheless seen the migration of a large number of individuals to the online world. The growing numbers of people online make the Internet an important information and communication resource in these countries.

Nevertheless, continued efforts to support the development of the Internet through new infrastructure, such as the deployment of undersea fiber optic cables in East Africa, or the increase of multi-media awareness and proficiency in schools, should be nurtured. In his first speech since his period as Prime Minister of Britain, Gordon Brown spoke from the capital of Uganda, saying: ‘... I truly believe that the rapid expansion of [I]nternet access in Africa could transform how Africa trades, learns and holds political power accountable.’^{lix} This vision requires worldwide attention to balancing the conflicting values surrounding access in ways that protect freedom of expression and connection.

Other endeavors, which support the growth of a multi-lingual Internet, such as the development and translation of relevant content in local languages, can also foster the sharing of ideas and dialogue across nations, helping to support freedom of expression online. If everyone is to enjoy the right to freedom of expression, it is important that the Internet’s ability to advance free and open speech is recognized and that measures are taken to make the Internet as accessible as possible to all.

Recognize the Internet as a New Arena for the Defense of Democratic Values

The Internet is becoming more central across the world for shaping access to treasures of information and expertise, but at the risk of endangering values like privacy, personal reputations, and freedom of expression. Debate over fundamental human values will increasingly focus on the Internet as much as on traditional media and face-to-face modes of communication. This is not a temporary phenomenon, but the beginning of recognizing that communication will be increasingly reliant upon an online platform at all levels for numerous media, from the hyper-local to the global.

Renew and Inform Debate over Appropriate Regulatory Models

Despite common appeals to freedom of expression around the world, there is continuing uncertainty over what constitutes the most appropriate regulatory model to govern information networks and related ICTs. This has been an ongoing debate since the 1970s, when visions of the future of computing began to undermine old paradigms of mass media. The Internet's distinct structure has since raised many questions and challenges for existing regulatory models, designed for common carriers and traditional media. As the Internet has become more global with satellite communication and trans-continental fibre networks, more central and increasingly inseparable to the media landscape, the application of old regulatory frameworks to the Internet seems to have continued without sufficient discussion of its likely implications. Moreover, the regulation of this distributed 'network of networks' has been made increasingly feasible through the development of tools and strategies for filtering and censorship, as reviewed in previous sections of this report.

The question therefore remains: Should the Internet be regulated as if it were a newspaper, broadcaster, or a common carrier network? Or should it follow a new regulatory framework, which could well be the most sensible way forward (de Sola Pool 1983; Dutton 1999; Vries 2005)? Some have viewed content on the Internet as impossible or inappropriate to regulate, a position well developed and most influenced by Ithiel de Sola Pool (1983) in his discussion on videotext. Impossible because control over content production and consumption on the Internet was thought to be inherently distributed and incapable of being centrally controlled or censored. Inappropriate, because computers were thought to become newspapers of the future and should therefore enjoy the same freedom as the press.

In line with this thesis, many Americans have later argued that a strict interpretation of the US First Amendment should be extended to the Internet. American courts have supported this view, arguing that factors such as a broadcaster's pervasive nature, which justified broadcast regulation, were 'not present in cyberspace' (US Supreme Court 1997). On the basis of these rationales, many nations, even those without policies or traditions in line with the First Amendment, have limited governmental regulation of the Internet, making it one of the most open media for free expression. Further discussions and informed debate are needed to develop a suitable regulatory model for

the Internet to ensure the protection and advancement of an open and free culture online (Steven 2000, Balkin 2004).

Strengthen and Clarify International Mechanisms for Internet Governance

Many factors confront a global network, such as the Internet, that are not as critical to older national and local networks. For example, uncertainty over questions of governance and regulation as well as cross-border issues, have made it particularly difficult to effectively protect freedom of speech in the information society (Graux 2009). New technologies make information and cultural production valuable commodities in a global market in ways that could create restrictions on freedom of expression (Balkin 2008). In particular, the protection of copyright can place new constraints on freedom of expression as discussed earlier in this report. In other instances, controversy over the jurisdictional authority of existing Internet governing bodies, such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers (ICANN) have led to nations asserting more sovereign claims in areas of domain registration and in Internet governance generally. Furthermore, international variations in governing norms on free expression online have prevented ICANN and the IGF from taking stronger positions to protecting freedom of expression on the Internet (Nunziato 2003).

The rise of national Internet governance and regulatory initiatives could be a response to the failure of international institutions to play a more effective role. However, the Internet is not limited by political boundaries and national governance could therefore create disjointedness on the Internet, possibly undermining its free and open nature that helped create the vitality behind its worldwide diffusion. This is why there is a need for a stronger multi-stakeholder framework for Internet governance at the international level. Freedom of expression right holders should be particularly involved in the Internet governance process in order to preserve the right to free speech and connectivity online. The creation of a special international taskforce for freedom of expression should thus be considered in order to support and represent these stakeholders in Internet governance.

Better Monitor World Wide Internet Filtering

The OpenNet Initiative and other research groups have conducted groundbreaking research, which focuses on monitoring the filtering and blocking of websites overtime and across jurisdictions. However, many countries have not yet been studied, and the sustainability of this research is unclear, particularly if expanded to a larger proportion of countries. More resources should be devoted to the global monitoring of Internet filtering and censorship. This is a necessary condition to have more informed debate over the practice and impact of filtering technologies and policies.

Understand Shifting Public Attitudes and Expectations

Many factors are shaping the experience of individuals and nations with respect to freedom of expression and connection. People are sensing greater

freedom of expression, even in nations with aggressive filtering practices. This is possibly due to the Internet opening up a new channel for communication. Technical and historical outcomes from the Internet will be experienced at the individual level around the world. Therefore, more research needs to be done to tap into cross-national and longitudinal comparisons of attitudes, beliefs and actions about freedom of expression. Do people believe that they have more or less freedom of expression online? What is the basis of their attitudes and beliefs? What does freedom of expression actually mean to them? The World Internet Policy Project (WIP2) has already presented work along these lines and the topic has recently been broached in a 2010 BBC global survey. These empirical efforts should be critically assessed and refined in such ways that these efforts can be continued and supported.

Monitor and Document the Diffusion of Legal and Regulatory Initiatives

Work is needed to monitor and document more systematically the legal challenges that test freedom of expression online in various jurisdictions, as well as the legal and regulatory initiatives that are creating these issues. This will help in better understand the obstacles people face in freely expressing their opinions online and how legal and regulatory frameworks should be shaped in order to encourage a free and open Internet. The scope of this effort should be as broad as the wide ecology of freedom of expression sketched in this report.

Support Collaboration between Academia and Civil Society

Effort could be usefully devoted to building more partnerships with international civil society organizations, such as Global Voices, Freedom House, and Privacy International to ensure the regular amassing of claims about restrictions on freedom of expression. Transparency and open debate should be fostered to ensure democratic accountability in shaping policies and practices. However, these forms of advocacy need to be complemented by more independent research that is equally transparent and accountable to the international community. In the process of research for this report, the authors found relatively few efforts undertaken to conduct high-quality research in this area. Priority should be placed on establishing collaborations between academics and civil society organizations to further enable the development of this research.

Cultivate Citizen Consultation and Decision-Making

All actors involved in the control of content in the digital age should explore how citizens can more actively participate in the decision-making processes tied to the use and misuse of filtering systems online (as noted by Bambauer 2008, McIntyre and Scott 2008). User-generated content processes can be employed to provide feedback on inappropriate material but also on questionable filtering practices. For example, panic buttons on some sites permit children to report situations in which they are frightened by an interaction online. Should people be able to report situations in which they believe their access to information is being blocked or otherwise infringed?

Citizen consultations on such issues as well as the use of user-generated tools would better enable users to voice their opinions and participate in processes shaping of the future of the Internet.

Dissemination of Good Practice

The right to freedom of expression is often tempered by the prohibition of certain actions or content, for example hate mail or video and music mashes. Organizations like the UNESCO should facilitate efforts to develop a set of guidelines or principles, which might support good practice in the regulation of freedom of expression and connection. In other words, if such regulation is to occur, we should identify certain core principles that can minimize harm, such as the transparency of practices, the establishment of an independent regulatory body or the introduction of rights of appeal for blacklisted sites.

Promoting Balanced versus Absolute Positions in the Global Arena

It is important to explore and promote discussion on a balance between freedom of expression and other core rights in the online world, such as intellectual property, privacy or child protection. There is variation across nations and cultures in the priority placed on different values and interests. An acceptable balance, locally and globally, is not only important in principle, but is also pragmatically significant to the future vitality of the Internet. On issues where there is most international agreement (for example in prevention of child abuse and blocking the dissemination of child pornography), work should be shared with stakeholders to support and explore the best solutions in addressing these issues whilst minimizing restriction on freedom of expression.

Tracking the Technologies of Filtering and Disconnection

The technologies underpinning content filtering and surveillance of users in support of disconnection are advancing. It may be that better tools could enable freedom of expression by more precisely filtering content judged unacceptable by local or national standards. In the early development of filtering technologies, blunt tools for filtering were likely to block entire sources of information, such as a newspaper or website. More sophisticated tools could block only targeted material. For example, if a symbol like the swastika is illegal to publish in Germany, should filtering technology be able to specifically identify text with this symbol, filter the symbol, and not block all content from the offending source? Historically, filtering mostly meant either over-blocking sites which are not meant to be filtered or under-blocking them, by missing sites that were intended to be blocked (Deibert 2008). More accurate filters could enable better communication to occur and allow nations to be more secure and national values to be respected. Alternatively, more sophisticated filtering technologies could encourage greater use of filtering in a wider array of areas. Regardless of the impact of these technologies, it is important to track their development as a means to inform and stimulate debate about their use.

Driving Corporate Social Responsibility

Related to this is the need to support and promote responsible behaviour amongst non-state actors, in particular in the business industry. Given that many of the biggest technology companies play a significant role in providing Internet services in countries where freedom of expression is limited, UNESCO should consider ways to encourage these corporations to act in a socially responsible manner, without requiring them to act illegally. The Global Network Initiative is one such effort that seeks to provide a set of guiding principles for its members. Many corporations such as Yahoo! and Google have already signed up (<http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/index.php>) . Alternatively, a smaller scale option might be to work with industry bodies (such as EuroISPA) to discuss, promote and reward responsible behaviour within Internet related sectors.

Identifying and Stimulating Debate on Key Issues

Given its international status, UNESCO is well-placed to host and shape debate around some of the tougher challenges in confronting freedom of speech online. One of the most divisive topics is the proper extent of balancing intellectual property rights of digital material with complementary and competing rights. This is clearly an issue on which UNESCO already has significant expertise and where it is well-placed to bring together stakeholders from creative industries, performer or artists' groups, as well as user groups to consider how measures are currently promoting or limiting freedom of expression online.

Broadening Involvement with Internet Governance and Regulation

Internet governance and regulation is at times dismissed as marginal or irrelevant to maintaining and enhancing the role of the Internet in society, because it is identified with a few Internet-centric areas, such as the assignment of domain names. However, the potential significance of Internet governance and regulation – if properly conceptualized – is great. It not only concerns Internet-centric issues, such as ICANN, but also issues concerning the behaviour of users, for instance with respect to fraud, and broad telecommunication and regulatory issues that shape Internet use, such as copyright.

All stakeholders in the Internet should encourage the Internet Governance Forum to broadly define Internet governance in order to include the full range of issues shaping the design and use of the Internet and its societal implications. Simultaneously, all stakeholders should increase the priority they place on Internet governance and regulatory processes. Internet governance and regulation will progressively shape information and communication access in all arenas around the world. This is no time for complacency or nation-centric activities, but rather for a great focus on global governance.

Fostering Further Research

This report was based on a critical review of existing research, with the aim of placing the discussion of freedom of expression into a broader and more realistic framework that can guide further policy-relevant research. The authors hope that this framework, along with the full report, will form a basis for soliciting the views of a wider community of legal scholars, rights advocates, and researchers. Additional investigation, augmented by these discussions, should be fostered in ways that stimulate and inform debate on one of the most critical issues of the digital age.

There is first a need to continue and extend existing efforts to monitor the many and varied trends in law, regulation and opinions highlighted in this report. This synthesis offers a snapshot at a specific point in time, which although it draws on historical trends, illustrates that the evolving nature of these legal and regulatory landscapes is fast paced. It is essential that the legal and regulatory ecology of the Internet be tracked in a more systematically global, rigorous and sustained manner.

More generally, it is important to place Internet freedom of expression and connection in a broader context of allied values and interests, such as privacy and diversity. The framework of this report is offered as a first step for the development of a broader foundation for the study of Internet freedom – one that can stimulate and inform debate over Internet governance and regulation shaping freedom of expression and connection.

Appendix 1. Glossary

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| ARPAnet | The first packet switching network, and the preliminary version of the Internet, invented by the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) of the US Department of Defense. |
| ASCII | The American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) is a character-encoding scheme based on the order of the English alphabet. Its numerical codes represent text in computers and communication equipment and have been used by most modern schemes for character encoding. |
| blog | A website, usually maintained by a person with regular entries of commentary, descriptions of happenings, or graphics or video. The ability of readers to leave comments in an interactive format is an important part of many blogs. |
| clean feed | The name given to privately administered content filtering systems on an ISP level in the UK and Canada. It is also the name of a proposed mandatory Australian content filtering system. They are mandated by governments and try to block access to web pages containing (child-) pornography and are located outside of the country operating the filtering system. |
| Committee to Protect Journalists | A NGO based in New York which promotes freedom of the press and defends the rights of journalists. It was founded in 1981 by a group of U.S. foreign correspondents in response to harassment from authoritarian governments. |
| computer virus | A code that copies itself in ways that could harm a computer system, such as by slowing its operation |
| Denial of service | A denial-of-service attack aims to make a computer resource unreachable. Usually this is done by saturating the target machine with a huge amount of communications requests, such that it cannot respond to legitimate traffic, or responds so slowly as to be rendered effectively unavailable. |
| Deep Packet Inspection | The use of computer systems that can inspect packets sent over networks using Internet Protocol in ways that enable a third party, not the sender or |

receiver, to identify particular aspects of the communication (see box 5.3).

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| Digital Rights Management | A generic term for access control technologies, which aim to control access and can be used by e.g. publishers, copyright holders and companies trying to enforce limited usage of digital content. Sometimes it is also called Digital Restrictions Management. |
| Domain Name System | Translates the commonly used alphabetic version of a domain name into its numerical IP address. |
| Dot-com bubble | A speculative bubble between 1995–2000 (with a climax on March 10, 2000 with the NASDAQ peaking at 5132.52) during which equity values in stock markets rose rapidly in the more recent Internet sector and related fields. |
| End-to-end-principle | The central design principles of the Internet, which is implemented in the design of the underlying methods and protocols. It says that communications protocol operations should be defined to occur at the end-points of a communications system, or as close as possible to the resource being controlled. |
| File sharing | The practice of distributing or providing access to digitally stored information (i.e. computer programs, audio, video, documents) to other users. |
| Freedom House | international monitoring and advocacy of press freedom www.freedomhouse.org |
| Freedom of Expression | The right to freedom of expression (freedom of speech) is recognized as a human right under Article 19 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and recognized: Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers. |
| Freedom of Information | The right to freedom of information refers to the protection of the right to freedom of expression by protecting the right to seek and receive any information; it can also refer to the Freedom of Information Act, which is |

the legal right, subject to certain exclusions, of the public, to access and correct public records. With regards to the Internet and information technology Freedom of information may also concern censorship, i.e. the ability to access digital content on the Internet.

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| Global Network of Societies Project | The Global Network of Societies (GNS) Project joins an international group of researchers to explore the relationships between networks and societies around the world. It takes as its initial position the hypothesis that the Internet is indeed being used in ways that are transforming societies, but in ways that are shaped by the diversity of world cultures - the sets of beliefs and values that underpin the strategic and non-strategic use of ICTs by individuals, organizations and networks.(http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/?id=46) |
| Global Voices | A citizen media network http://globalvoicesonline.org/ |
| Green dam | A content-control software developed under a directive from the Chinese Ministry of Industry and Information Technology, it is mandatory to have either the software, or its setup files accompanied on a compact disc or pre-installed on all new computers sold in China. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Green_Dam_-_cite_note-2 |
| IANA | An organization that oversees IP address, Top-level domain and Internet protocol code-point allocations. |
| ICANN | A California-based non-profit corporation charged with the responsibility to assign names and numbers to keep the Internet secure, stable and interoperable. |
| ICT | A generic name for the technologies involved in communicating with computers and digital media. |
| IGF | Supports the UN Secretary-General in carrying out the mandate from the WSIS to convene a forum for multistakeholder policy dialogue. |
| Information age | The period from the last quarter of the 20th century when information became more easily accessible through computers and computer networks. |
| Information society | A society connected by complex communication networks that quickly develops and exchanges information. |

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| Index of Global Freedom | Invented by Freedom House, measures restrictions from both government and non-state actors. The key components are access to technology as well as free flow of information and content. (see box 6.2) |
| Internet backbone | Refers to the principal data routes in the Internet between large, strategically interconnected networks and core routers, which are hosted by commercial, government, academic and other high-capacity network centers, the Internet exchange points and Network access points. |
| Internet Filtering | A government, an Internet Service Provider, a company or a parent can install software, either on a personal computer at home or on a server in an organization that restricts content to users. A filter can screen particular words, e-mail addresses, Web sites or other addresses and be used for example, if a country wishes to prevent users within its borders from seeing a particular news site online. (see box 1.3) |
| Internet Governance | The development and application by Governments, the private sector and civil society of shared principles and rules that shape the evolution and use of the Internet. |
| Internet Protocol | Standards used for communicating data across a packet-switched internetwork using the Internet Protocol Suite, also referred to as TCP/IP. |
| Internet Watch Foundation | A NGO based in the United Kingdom, which offers an online service for the public to report content on the Internet that is considered to be "potentially illegal". |
| Internet server | A computer configured to be left on and constantly connected to the Internet. Any Internet user in the world can access Web sites accessible on, or linked to, the server. |
| IPv4 | The fourth revision in the development of IP, and the first protocol to be widely deployed. See IPv6. |
| IPv6 | IP version 6, the next generation version of IP. It increases the address space from 32 to 128 bits, providing for a vast number of networks and systems. |

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| ISP | Internet Service Provider. Companies that offer customers access to the Internet. |
| ITU | International Telecommunication Union. UN body coordinating international telecommunications standards and policy. |
| Libel Tourism | People, who feel defamed by a (digital available) publication can, in the right circumstances, bring a lawsuit against a publisher or author to the country in which the complainant it is likely to obtain a more favorable ruling. (see Box 7.4) |
| MacBride Commission | A commission, which was established in 1977 by UNESCO, and reported in 1980 with the publication of <i>Many Voices One World</i> (ICCP 1980), which came to be known as the MacBride Report. This became a major reference for advocacy of a 'New World Information and Communication Order' (NWICO).(see Box 2.1) |
| Malware | Software designed to damage computers or computer systems, such as by installing a computer virus. |
| Media literacy | The ability to access, analyze, evaluate, and produce communication and information in a variety of forms and means (http://www.unesco.org/education/educprog/lwf/doc/portfolio/definitions.htm). |
| P2P | A peer-to-peer distributed network architecture built up by participants by providing resources (such as processing power or network bandwidth) to other network participants, without the need for central nodes, such as servers or stable hosts. |
| RSS | A variety of web feed formats used to publish frequently updated works (e.g. news headlines). An RSS feed includes text and metadata such as publishing dates and authorship. |
| Skype | A software application that allows users to make voice calls instant messaging, file transfer and video conferencing over the Internet. |

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| Social network service | A web-based service that provides tools to build social networks or social relations among people. A social network service basically contains a profile or representation of each user, his/her social links, and a variety of additional services (e.g. facebook). |
| Spam | Bulk unwanted e-mail that may contain malware. |
| Top Level Domain | The highest level of domain names in the DNS. |
| Twitter | A free social networking and micro blogging service that enables users to send and read messages known as tweets. |
| User generated content | Any kind of media content, which is publicly available and produced by end-users. |
| Voice over IP | A variety of transmission technologies for delivery of voice communications over the Internet or other packet-switched networks. |
| Web 1.0 | Communication enabled by the web focusing on sharing Information (hypertextual links on the Web, enabling the global sharing of documents, text, video, etc.) (see table 1) |
| Web 2.0 | Communication enabled by the web focusing on user generated content (Blogging, micro-blogging (e.g., Twitter), user comments, ratings, polling, etc.) (see table 1) |
| Web 3.0 | Communication enabled by the web focusing on co-creation, co-production of information (see table 1) |
| WGIG | Working Group on Internet Governance. It was a UN multistakeholder working group set up after the 2003 WSIS to agree on the future of Internet governance. |
| WIPO | World Intellectual Property Organization |
| WSIS | World Summit on the Information Society. It was a pair of UN-sponsored conferences about information, |

communication and the information society. Held in 2003 in Geneva and in 2005 in Tunis.

Web server

See Internet Server

Appendix 2. Abbreviations and Acronyms

| | |
|-----------|---|
| ARPAnet | Advanced Research Projects Agency Network |
| AT&T | American Telephone & Telegraph Corporation |
| ccTLD | Country Code Top-Level Domain |
| CEJA-JSAC | Justice Studies Centre of the Americas |
| CIPA | Children Internet Protection Act |
| CPJ | Committee to Protect Journalists |
| CSTD | Commission on Science and Technology for Development |
| DMCA | Digital Millennium Copyright Act |
| DNS | Domain Name Service |
| DPI | Deep Packet Inspection |
| DRM | Digital Rights Management |
| ECHR | The European Convention on Human Rights (formally the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms) |
| EoG | Ecology of Games |
| EuroISPA | European Association of European Internet Services Providers |
| FCC | Federal Communications Commission |
| FH | Freedom House |
| FoE | Freedom of Expression |
| FoI | Freedom of Information |
| FOSS | Free and Open Source Software Policy |
| GAID | Global Alliance for ICT for Development |
| IANA | The Internet Assigned Numbers Authority |
| ICANN | Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers |
| ICCPR | International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights |

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| ICESCR | International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights |
| ICT | Information and Communication Technologies |
| ICTD | ICT for Development, also ICT4D |
| IGF | Internet Governance Forum |
| IGIF | Index of Global Internet Freedom |
| IPR | Intellectual Property Rights |
| IPv4 | Internet Protocol version 4 |
| IPv6 | Internet Protocol version 6 |
| ISP | Internet Service Provider |
| ITU | International Telecommunication Union |
| IWF | Internet Watch Foundation |
| MIC | Vietnam Ministry of Information and Communication |
| NGO | Non-governmental organization |
| NWICO | New World Information and Communication Order |
| P2P | Peer-to-Peer |
| RSS | Really Simple Syndication |
| SNS | Social Network Service |
| SPAM | Unwanted and unsolicited electronic communication |
| TLD | Top Level Domains |
| TRIPS | Trade-related Aspects of Intellectual Property Rights |
| UDHR | Universal Declaration of Human Rights |
| UGC | User-Generated Content |
| UNESCO | United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization |
| URL | Uniform Resource Locator |
| VoA | Voice of America |

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| VoIP | Voice over IP |
| W3C | World Wide Web Consortium |
| WCT | WIPO Copyright Treaty |
| Web | World Wide Web |
| WGIG | Working Group on Internet Governance |
| WIP | World Internet Project |
| WIP2 | World Internet Policy Project |
| WIPO | World Intellectual Property Organization |
| WPFC | World Press Freedom Committee (merged with FH in 2009) |
| WPPT | WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty |
| WSIS | World Summit on the Information Society |

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End Notes

- ⁱ Current worldwide statistics on usage at: <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm>
- ⁱⁱ David Erdos (personal communication, 24-4-10) sees a need for a new ecology of law for the Internet to address this transfer of old media regulation to the new media of the Internet.
- ⁱⁱⁱ The concept of a network society has been developed by Manuel Castells (2000, 1996), building on earlier conceptions of an information society, based on work by Daniel Bell (1974) and others.
- ^{iv} Article 19 states: 'Everyone has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any media and regardless of frontiers.' See: <http://www.un.org/en/documents/udhr/>
- ^v See: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/asia-pacific/8361471.stm>
- ^{vi} See: http://portal.unesco.org/ci/en/ev.php-URL_ID=2493&URL_DO=DO_TOPIC&URL_SECTION=201.html
- ^{vii} Exactly how this is realized is a matter of debate. At one extreme, this could be translated into a fundamental right for everyone on the planet to have particular technologies. Therefore, how a right to connection is translated into policy and practice is itself a major policy issue.
- ^{viii} Based on World Internet Statistics at: <http://www.internetworldstats.com/stats.htm>
- ^{ix} See: <http://www.globalnetworkinitiative.org/principles/index.php> and <http://www.article19.org/pdfs/publications/1993-handbook.pdf>
- ^x Article 10 see: <http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Treaties/Html/005.htm>
- ^{xi} See the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union (2000/C 364/01) at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/charter/default_en.htm
- ^{xii} First Amendment see: <http://www.law.cornell.edu/constitution/constitution.billofrights.html>
- ^{xiii} African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights see: <http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/instree/z1afchar.htm>
- ^{xiv} African Charter on Human and Peoples' Article 7: 'The rights and freedoms of each individual shall be exercised with due regard to the rights of others, collective security, morality and common interest.'
- ^{xv} See, for example, the use of the ecology of games in studies of telecommunication policy and the development of the Internet (Dutton 1992; Dutton 2008; and Dutton et al 2008).
- ^{xvi} The idea that the ARPANet was primarily focused on military and defense needs is one of the most common misconceptions surrounding the history of the Internet. See Dutton (2008).
- ^{xvii} In the USA, in the late 1990s, the Department of Commerce through the National Telecommunication and Information Administration (NTIA), sponsored a Telecommunication and Information Infrastructure Assistance Program (TIIAP). This provided matching grants to help foster the development and use new telecommunications technologies.
- ^{xviii} See: http://about.skype.com/2003/08/skype_beta_launched.html
- ^{xix} See: (Siliencted Report, GISW 2009 Report). NEED FULL CITATION
- ^{xx} See: <http://www.cpi.org/>
- ^{xxi} The Web Ecology Project^{xxi} did an analysis of all the tweets about the Iranian election, such as those with the 'Iranelection' hash tag and found a standard power law distribution pattern, with 10% of individuals contributing most of the content. Tweets in Farsi were far more limited than Tweets in English, and only a minority of Tweets originated from Iran. Only 10-12 of the top 100 Twitterers originated in Iran. Most Tweets were sent by the Iranian diaspora, who were getting news in Farsi from different sources and tweeting or retweeting them in English.

^{xxii} Based on extensive journalistic coverage of Vietnam, including: “Another Blogger Charged with “Subversion” faces Death Penalty”. Reporters Without Borders. December 23, 2009. <http://www.rsf.org/Blogger-and-activist-faces.html> (Accessed on January 15, 2010); ; Ministry of Information and Communications of the Socialist Republic of Vietnam (MIC). <http://www.mic.gov.vn/en/menu/introduction/2/index.mic> (Accessed on January 16, 2010); Nga Pham. “Vietnam releases detained blogger”. BBC News. September 14, 2009. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/8253832.stm> (Accessed on January 16, 2010); “Vietnamese activist convicted of subversion”, The Associated Press. December 28, 2009. <http://www.cbc.ca/world/story/2009/12/27/activist-subversion-vietnam.html> (Accessed on January 16, 2010); “Vietnam-Bloggers and writers arrested: where’s freedom of expression?”Asian Forum for Human Rights and Development. September 17, 2009. http://www.forum-asia.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2314&Itemid=32 (Accessed on January 15, 2010); “WiPC 2009 Resolution: Viet Nam”. International Pen. October 2009. <http://www.internationalpen.org.uk/go/committees-and-networks/writers-in-prison/wipc-2009-resolution-viet-nam> (Accessed on January 16, 2010).

^{xxiii} The Communist Party of Vietnam has sought to minimize criticism about its relations with China.

^{xxiv} “10 Worst Countries to be a Blogger”. Special Reports, Committee to Protect Journalists, April 30, 2009. <http://cpj.org/reports/2009/04/10-worst-countries-to-be-a-blogger.php> (Accessed on January 16, 2010).

^{xxv} <http://www.mic.gov.vn/en/menu/introduction/2/index.mic>

^{xxvi} Amongst the eight activists sentenced, were well-known novelist and journalist Nguyen XuanNghia as well as student and Internet writer, Ngo Quynh. Earlier, three bloggers, Nguyen Ngoc NhuQuynh, Bui ThanhHieu and Pham Doan Trang were arrested for national security reasons. In December 2009, well-known human rights lawyer Le Cong Dinh, the young pro-democratic blogger Nguyen TienTrung and former army officer Tran Anh Kim were accused of “incitement of subversion” under Article 79 of the Penal Code, which carries sentences that include the death penalty. Mr. Kim was convicted to serve for five-and-a-half years in prison in December 2009. Le Cong Dinh and Nguyen TienTrung were awaiting trials in January 2010. Other well-reported cases include that of a blogger, Nguyen Van Hai (penname Dieu Cay), who received two-and-a-half years of imprisonment in 2008 for tax evasion.

^{xxvii} <http://www.edri.org/issues/freedom/access>

^{xxviii} This only covers countries observed by these studies. There are other countries that have been cited for strict censorship regimes, such as North Korea, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea (DPRK), by other observers, such as Reporters without Borders. See: <http://en.rsf.org/web-2-0-versus-control-2-0-18-03-2010,36697>

^{xxix} See: http://www.euroispa.org/files/091016_euroispa_telecom_review_am_138.pdf

^{xxx} A website was available that enabled users to ‘[t]est any website and see real-time if it’s censored in China’. However, the site now notes that: ‘Because of the ever stricter measures of censorship China imposes on the Internet, the team ... at present can no longer vouch for the reliability of its test tool.’ See: <http://www.greatfirewallofchina.org/>

^{xxxi} <http://www.iwf.org.uk/media/news.archive-2008.251.htm>

^{xxxii} According to Electronic Frontiers Australia: “The Australian Federal Government has announced that it will introduce “mandatory ISP-level filtering of Refused Classification (RC) rated content.” What this means is that Australian Internet Service Providers (ISPs) will now have to filter the Internet to block access to websites that would be “Refused Classification” under Australia’s classification laws.” (http://wiki.efa.org.au/learn_more/)

^{xxxiii} P 16, http://www.aconite.com/sites/default/files/Internet_blocking_and_Democracy.pdf

^{xxxiv} See: <http://www.edri.org/edrigram/number7.19/draft-framework-decision-child-exploitation>

^{xxxv} Reporters Without Borders: <http://www.rsf.org/Prosecutors-violate-online-free.html>

^{xxxvi} Turkey blocked YouTube twice in 2007 and is currently blocking other websites, see: <http://www.edri.org/edriagram/number7.19/turkey-blocks-foreign-websites>

^{xxxvii} See: <http://www.oii.ox.ac.uk/research/project.cfm?id=46>

^{xxxviii} 14 December 1946.

^{xxxix} See the Pirate Bay trial, which was a joint criminal and civil prosecution in Sweden of four individuals charged for promoting the copyright infringement of others with The Pirate Bay site. The accused were all found guilty and sentenced to serve one year in prison and pay a fine of 30 million Swedish krona (app. €2.7 million or USD 3.5 million). http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Pirate_bay

^{xl} Deibert et al (2008).

^{xli} OpenNetInitiative: Asia <http://opennet.net/research/regions/asia>

^{xlii} See 47 U.S.C. § 230(c)(1). (<http://www.techlawjournal.com/courts/zeran/47usc230.htm>)

^{xliii} See Google's principles or philosophy at: <http://www.google.com/corporate/tenthings.html>

^{xliv} <http://www.google.com/governmentrequests/>

^{xlv} <http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2006/02/testimony-internet-in-china.html>

^{xlvi} <http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/01/new-approach-to-china.html>

^{xlvii} Rebecca MacKinnon, ex-foreign correspondent in China for CNN and current fellow at the Open Society Institute, said that while working in China, Google.cn tended to present search results that were less filtered than its Chinese competitor Baidu (Mackinnon 2010).

^{xlviii} As reported by many business and political experts, Google has more interest in preserving its markets outside rather than in China, where it is only the second most popular search engine after Baidu, but holds only a third of the Chinese market share (Anderson 2010).

^{xlix} <http://www.state.gov/secretary/rm/2010/01/135519.htm>

^l <http://english.people.com.cn/90001/90780/91344/6873383.html>

^{li} <http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/03/new-approach-to-china-update.html>

^{lii} <http://googleblog.blogspot.com/2010/03/new-approach-to-china-update.html>

^{liii} For example, RIM shares fell on July 27th and 28th, 2010, when the UAE threatened a shutdown, and rose on August 10th, 2010 when RIM announced they would be moving servers into Saudi Arabia to provide a technical monitoring solution.

^{liv} In 1994, FBI Director, Louis Freeh, responded to a question in a press conference by saying that if Clipper failed to gain public support, and FBI wiretaps were shut out by non-government-controlled cryptography, his office would have no choice but to seek legislative relief. Later, in the aftermath of the Oklahoma City tragedy, Mr. Freeh testified before the Senate Judiciary Committee that public availability of strong cryptography must be curtailed by the government. See: <http://www.philzimmermann.com/EN/essays/WhyIWrotePGP.html>.

^{lv} See: <http://security.homeoffice.gov.uk/ripa/interception/>

^{lvi} The European Directive 2006/24/EC on 'the retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks' requires member states to make sure their communications providers retain, for a period of between 6 months and 2 years, data that helps identifying the source of a communication, the destination of a communication, the date, time and duration of a communication, the type of communication, the communication device, and the location of mobile communication equipment 'for the purpose of the investigation, detection and prosecution of serious crime, as defined by each Member State in its national law'. See Directive 2006/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 March 2006 on the

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retention of data generated or processed in connection with the provision of publicly available electronic communications services or of public communications networks and amending Directive 2002/58/EC: <http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2006:105:0054:0063:EN:PDF>

^{lvii} The OII has held two workshops around identity management, including those reported by Rundle (2007) and Rundle and Dopatka (2009).

^{lviii} For example, this debate arose in the deliberations of RISEPTIS (2009), but also in a committee focused on privacy and data protection (RAE 2007).

^{lix} Reported by BBC News, 24 July 2010. See: <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-10750077>