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**FRENCH
FOREIGN POLICY**

FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

FROM FASHODA TO SERAJEVO
(1898-1914)

BY

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FOREWORD

As the United States is slowly being brought to the realization that an American policy of isolation is no longer possible, the fact that European diplomacy has a fundamental effect upon our own foreign policy is becoming correspondingly evident. The result has been a greater interest in foreign politics, and a keener desire to solve the problem of international relationships. The best hope that we have of avoiding world conflicts in the future seems to be in a League of Nations, which would not only offer the means of settling disputes by other methods than that of war, but would possess the power to compel the employment of these peaceful methods. But even with a League of Nations, we must have an intelligent appreciation of the underlying causes of national antagonisms, with a view to remedying them before an acute situation arises, if we are to have an enduring peace.

When Bismarck imposed the unjust and humiliating Treaty of Frankfort upon France, the spirit of the *revanche* was born. Instead of trying to come to an agreement with the neighbor whom she had despoiled, thereby making a reconciliation possible, Germany depended upon the secret treaties of the Triple Alliance to overawe France and to maintain her own dominant position. But France could also make secret treaties. The Dual Alliance and the Triple Entente were her answer. This created the famous balance of power upon

which the peace of Europe was nicely adjusted. We now realize that neither secret treaties nor a balance of power are of any value in maintaining the world's peace. A close study of the European situation preceding the World War makes us wonder that the bitter rivalries could have been held in leash so long.

To all Americans, the rôle that France played in this critical period of the world's history is of particular interest. In the following study I have attempted to portray impartially the policy of the French foreign office, from the crisis of Fashoda to the crime of Serajevo. Before 1898, French foreign policy seemed for the most part to be merged in her colonial policy; after the murder of the Archduke Ferdinand, the foreign policy of France was inextricably mingled with the foreign policy of her allies. In the critical intervening period the policy of the Quai d'Orsay stands forth in clear outline against the cloudy background of European diplomacy.

The revolutions brought about by the World War have aided materially in such a survey by bringing to light secret documents which ordinarily would have remained hidden in the state archives for generations. The governments of the leading states of Europe have also found it to their advantage to break the customary veil of silence and publish many of their secret communications.

It has been of considerable advantage to me in making a study of this period that I was present in Paris throughout the critical Agadir Affair of 1911, and also during the year preceding the outbreak of the World War.

I am particularly indebted to Professor F. A. Ogg whose assistance has been invaluable to me at every point in the preparation of the manuscript, and to my wife for her helpful suggestions and careful reading of the proof.

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FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

FRENCH FOREIGN POLICY

CHAPTER I

FRANCE AND THE INTERNATIONAL SITUATION IN 1898

1. THE DUAL AND TRIPLE ALLIANCES

SPEAKING of the position of minister of foreign affairs, an old diplomat once remarked, "*Il ne suffit pas d'avoir de génie, l'essentiel c'est de durer.*" In the Third French Republic, where there have been fifty changes of ministry from the promulgation of the present constitution in 1875 up to the outbreak of the World War, it would seem that there would be little chance for a successful minister of foreign affairs, if durability constitutes success. Therefore the régime of M. Delcassé, which commenced on June 28, 1898, and which was destined to endure practically seven years, would be noteworthy if for no other reason than that it holds the record by a wide margin for its sojourn at the Quai d'Orsay. But still more remarkable is the fact that, though ministries rose and fell, the guidance of foreign affairs was kept in the hands of the same man until he was able to carry out the policy that he had laid out for himself upon taking the position—a policy of *rapprochement* with Great Britain.

During the four preceding years the foreign policy

of France had for the most part been under the direction of Mr. Gabriel Hanotaux, a very able diplomat, but an Anglophobe in his tendencies. When, on June 28, 1898, M. Brisson formed a new Radical cabinet, and at the suggestion of M. Joseph Reinach chose M. Theophile Delcassé as minister of foreign affairs, it would have been only natural to expect that the new foreign minister, inexperienced and following a minister of exceptional ability, would attempt to carry out the policy of his predecessor. Instead M. Delcassé elected to blaze a new trail, to make a complete *volte-face* in the foreign policy of France. While maintaining the existing alliance with Russia, he was determined to seek new friendships, and from the day he entered the foreign office he was resolved that *perfidie Albion* must be changed into the *fidus Achates* of France. The Entente Cordiale of April 8, 1904, which finally resolved itself into the Triple Entente, an understanding strong enough to resist the shock of a world war, will ever remain a monument to the success of his endeavors.

While a young man, M. Delcassé had been a member of a group of journalists associated with the "République Française," and, like other members of the staff, was an ardent disciple of that grand old man of Republican France, Léon Gambetta. In such an entourage it would have been just as impossible for the young enthusiast from the *Midi* to avoid being drawn into politics as to avoid becoming impregnated with the doctrines and beliefs of the great tribune. Perhaps it was then that he first came to consider seriously Gambetta's views on French foreign policy; but there

is no doubt that he knew that Gambetta believed that France would only recover the position that she lost in 1871, by obtaining the friendship of Russia and Great Britain. The first part of this program had been completed several years before M. Delcassé took charge of the foreign office; the second and more difficult part was to be his task, and it is not likely that France will ever forget that the glorious victory won at such cost in 1918 was due in great part to the policy which led to the Entente Cordiale, whose cornerstone was laid by M. Theophile Delcassé.

In order fully to appreciate the magnitude of the task to which M. Delcassé set himself when he took the office of foreign minister, it is essential that we take note of the situation in which France found herself at the close of the nineteenth century. In as much as the Russian Alliance was the key-note to which the whole foreign policy of France was attuned, let us first consider her position in regard to Russia.

When M. Ribot, on June 10, 1895, formally announced the Franco-Russian Alliance, he was merely giving official sanction to an arrangement which was either known or suspected in all the chancellories of Europe. The acclamation with which the French squadron was received on its visit to Cronstadt in 1891, the equally enthusiastic reception given to the Grand Duke Constantine upon his visit to France to pay his respects to President Carnot in 1892, the ovation given to the Russian squadron at Toulon in 1893, were such clear indications of a *rapprochement*, that the announcement of the *fait accompli* caused scarcely a ripple of surprise. From its inception the alliance was popular in France,

and there is little question that the French nation as a whole looked upon it as "an understanding which warranted great hopes." In plainer terms, it was the means to an end, and the end was the *revanche*—for never since the *débâcle* of 1870 was the hope absent from the hearts of the French that some day, somehow, the Treaty of Frankfort would be torn up and Alsace-Lorraine restored. The feeling that the alliance was the "dawn of a policy of reparation," that it was offensive as well as defensive in its nature, persisted until 1898, when the French gradually began to perceive that a *mariage de raison* between an autocracy and a democracy was not conducive to the vigorous progeny of a warlike spirit. In fact now that France no longer felt isolated, there was a tendency to relax, to forget the crisis of 1875, to indulge in internationalistic idealism, to banish the thought of the perpetual menace which had long lain like a black, ominous cloud athwart the eastern frontier. Socialism became rampant, the army became honeycombed with intrigue, a "Dreyfus Case" was rendered possible, the glorious soul of France itself became enervated. M. Emile Faguet declared that the Russian Alliance was the beginning of the moral and patriotic degradation of France; M. Millerand, who later was to prove himself one of the greatest ministers of war that the Third Republic has produced, arose in the Chamber and asked if France had not made "*un marché de dupes*."¹ M. Jean Jaurès summed up the sentiment of a large group when he declared that it was "a sort of seal placed upon the misfortunes of France."

¹ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 54i, p. 574.

When in 1898 the Czar announced his intention of issuing a call for an international conference for the limitation of armament and for the purpose of the maintenance of peace upon the basis of the *status quo*, France felt as though the keystone of her arch of hope had been withdrawn. Yet even with the feeling of disillusionment came the realization that the appeal for disarmament and peace must be made upon the basis of the *status quo*, if made at all, and for the great ideal of world peace France was willing to make the sacrifice of her lost provinces. As a "Times" correspondent aptly expressed it, "The Czar has sown in the teeth of a driving Gallic wind the germs of pacifism in France."² Yet even if the Russian Alliance had drawn in its wake a feeling of disillusionment, it was realized that without it France would not have been free to follow her policy of colonial expansion, which was now more than ever essential to maintain her position in the ranks of the great powers. Furthermore, by providing a counterweight to the Triple Alliance, France was enabled to draw closer to Italy, who was not entirely content with her position in the Triplice.

It was a matter of common knowledge that Italy had joined the Triple Alliance as much through fear of Austria as through hostility towards France, although France, by taking Tunis in 1881, had aroused the passionate jealousy of the Italians, who still saw the Carthage of Hannibal in the Tunis of to-day, and looked forward to a renaissance of the imperial city in all its ancient glory. With the disaster of Adowa in 1896, which brought about the final fall of Crispi,

² Fullerton, "Problems of Power," p. 31.

the principal *trouble-fête* between the two Latin nations, an opportunity was made for a Franco-Italian *rapprochement*. Three months before he became minister of foreign affairs, M. Delcassé visited Rome, and in addition to consulting with M. Barrère, French ambassador to Italy, he had interviews with the Marquis di Rudini and with the Marquis Visconti-Venosta, minister of foreign affairs, and both showed a willingness to discuss a Mediterranean policy which should be more favorable to the two countries.

"There is plenty of room for our two countries on the Mediterranean," declared M. Delcassé; "the same thing which has separated us is able to reunite us."³ The seed did not fall upon barren soil. One of the first acts of M. Delcassé after becoming foreign minister was to bring about a treaty of commerce between France and Italy.⁴ This was to prove a veritable god-send to Italy financially, and was destined to pave the way to a political arrangement a few years later. So although sixty years before M. Delcassé came into office, Mazzini had declared northern Africa to be Italy's inheritance, the Pyrenaean was enabled to outline and carry through a Mediterranean policy which recognized the interests of France in both Tunis and Morocco.

To understand Franco-German relations at this same period, it is necessary to go back to the Franco-Russian alliance. This alliance, coming so soon after Kaiser

³ Reynald, "L'Oeuvre de M. Delcassé," p. 30.

⁴ Arrangement announced by letters exchanged between M. Delcassé and the Italian ambassador M. Tornielli Nov. 21, ratified by France Feb. 2, 1899, and by Italy Feb. 11, 1899. Archives Diplomatiques, Vol. 68, p. 333.

William II had dropped his great pilot, Bismarck, necessitated very careful diplomacy on the part of the Emperor. He quickly determined to enter into more friendly relations with France, as the most feasible way to neutralize the new force which might counterbalance the weight of the Triple. In 1891 he arranged the voyage of the Empress Frederica to Paris, but this visit was ill-advised, and failed completely to promote more friendly relations between the two powers. Nevertheless the Kaiser in a personal way continued to show his neighborly intentions. In 1893 it was a letter of condolence to the widow of ex-President McMahon who had fought against Germany in 1870, the following year a similar telegram of sympathy to Madame Carnot, and thereafter every year he found occasion to impress upon the minds of the French his personal good will.⁵ At one time it seemed as though the Dreyfus Affair might embitter the relations between the two countries, but the French wisely decided to circumscribe this scandal within the borders of France.⁶

The German government also sought various opportunities to enter into political relations with France. On March 15, 1894, there was signed a convention of delimitation of territory between the Congo and Cameroons and a mapping out of spheres of influence in the region of Lake Chad.⁷ The following year Germany induced France to join with her and with Russia to force a revision of the Shimoneseki Treaty in favor of

⁵ "Kaiserreden," Klausman (ed.), pp. 37-62.

⁶ Debidour, "Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe (1878-1904)," p. 205.

⁷ Text in British and Foreign State Papers (1894), p. 974.

China, though it was made to appear in this case as though the initiative came from Russia.⁸ In January, 1896, Baron Marschall von Bieberstein suggested to M. Herbette, French ambassador in Berlin, the possibility of a Franco-German entente against Great Britain to save the independence of the South African Republics, which seemed about to be swallowed up in the maw of the British lion. Incidentally it was pointed out to France how detrimental British ambitions were to the reciprocal interests of the two powers in Africa. This conference was followed two days later by the famous Kruger telegram from the Kaiser, which provoked such hostility towards Germany throughout England that the German government, realizing that France might prove undependable in case of serious difficulties, quickly steered the imperial ship of state back into the haven of strict neutrality.⁹

The final effort made by Germany to reach a friendly understanding with France brings us to the appointment of M. Delcassé as French foreign minister. Early in 1898 it was rumored that Great Britain wished to make a loan to Portugal, with a lien upon the Portuguese colonies in Africa as security. Portugal, being in dire financial straits and fearing a quarrel with Great Britain over the award of the arbitral tribunal in the Delagoa Bay Affair, asked Germany for her protection, suggesting as compensation that she might have the right of preemption over the African colonies of Portugal. The German government authorized Count Münster, German ambassador to Paris,

⁸ Mévil, "De la Paix de Frankfort à Algésiras," p. 4.

⁹ Mévil, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

to solicit the cooperation of the French. On June 19, Count Münster handed a note to M. Hanotaux calling his attention to the danger of allowing Portugal to compromise her sovereign rights in order to procure money from Great Britain, and urged economic reprisals, or at least financial pressure. As the Meline ministry had already fallen, the whole question was turned over to M. Brisson and M. Delcassé. M. André Mévil, whose authority can hardly be questioned, says that M. Delcassé investigated, and finding the fears of Germany wholly without foundation, let the matter drop.¹⁰ However, three years later, March 20, 1902, when M. Gotteron interpolated M. Delcassé in the Senate on this subject, the Minister of Foreign Affairs denied the whole affair categorically, declaring:

“No proposition from Germany concerning the Portuguese colonies and for a decision about them with France was addressed to my predecessor in June, 1898. I add that as far as I am concerned it has been absolutely impossible for me to decline the proposals for the peremptory reason that no proposals were made to me.”¹¹

Whether definite proposals were made or not, the question did come up in some form or other,¹² and if M. Delcassé had nothing to do with it, the inference is that from the very beginning of his term of office, he was determined not to be a party to any arrangement with Germany which might tend in any way to increase the tension in the already strained relations

¹⁰ Mévil, *op. cit.*, p. 19.

¹¹ *Annales du Sénat*, Vol. 61, p. 598.

¹² See Lémonon, “L’Europe et la Politique Britannique,” pp. 152-3; also *Fortnightly Review*, March 1, 1902.

between France and Great Britain.¹³ His sails were trimmed to the steady winds from across the Channel rather than to the fitful gusts from across the Vosges.

2. FRANCO-BRITISH RELATIONS

When M. Delcassé entered upon his duties as minister of foreign affairs at the Quai d'Orsay, he is said to have remarked: "I do not wish to leave here, I do not wish to leave this armchair, until I have re-established a friendly understanding with England."¹⁴ Inasmuch as he made this purpose the framework of his whole foreign policy, it is necessary to resume briefly the relations between the two powers just before he became foreign minister. Such a summary will show the magnitude of the task which the new incumbent of the French foreign office had mapped out for himself.

Ever since M. Waddington, the French representative, had returned from the Congress of Berlin in 1878 with Tunis in his pocket, as he phrased it, Great Britain, who had been the first to suggest this as compensation, began to look askance at the colonial ambitions of France. But with men like Gambetta and Jules Ferry leading the way, the Third Republic marched steadily ahead in its colonial enterprises, and at the beginning of 1898 it had practically doubled the

¹³ Directly after this an arrangement was concluded between Great Britain and Germany regarding the Portuguese colonies (see Lémonon, op. cit., p. 186), but according to Prince Radziwell, representing the German emperor at the funeral of Felix Faure, "Nothing in this arrangement is in opposition to a *rapprochement* between my country and yours." Liberté, Feb. 26, 1899, quoted by Fullerton, op. cit., p. 55 note.

¹⁴ Bérard, "La Politique Française," Revue de Paris, July 1, 1905.

territories of France. During the period when M. Hanotaux was in charge of the French foreign office—a period when the colonial ambitions of France were especially conspicuous—Great Britain and France found themselves at odds in every part of the globe where their colonial interests were neighboring.

In Tunis, awarded to France by the kindness of Beaconsfield and Salisbury, the treaty of Kassar-Said, which established the French protectorate in 1881, recognized the validity of previous treaties entered into with European countries. Such capitulations giving these countries jurisdiction over their nationals, and granting them the most favored nation clause in all their commercial arrangements, interfered seriously with the policy of the French Colonial Office. M. Hanotaux took upon himself the task of trying to obtain the renunciation by the powers of these capitulations, and a revision of the commercial treaties to the advantage of France. By his astute and delicate handling of the situation, M. Hanotaux obtained new and satisfactory arrangements with all the powers; but Great Britain was the last to give her consent, and then only after imposing irksome conditions.

“ The situation was even less satisfactory in Morocco, which, owing to its long frontier bordering upon Algeria, the French have always considered a natural prolongation of their sphere of influence in northern Africa. At the court of the Sultan we find two Englishmen in high esteem, a Mr. MacLean, formerly an officer of the garrison at Gibraltar, and a Mr. W. B. H. Harris, correspondent of the London “Times,” both of whom had been conducting a campaign of British

propaganda based upon jealousy and hatred of France. France, although not strongly desirous at this time of destroying the power of the Sultan and of annexing Morocco, could not permit any other power to obtain preponderant interests there. For if, as Jules Ferry declared, with France possessing Algeria, Tunis is the key of her house, so with France possessing both Tunis and Algeria, Morocco is a most convenient and exposed back-door entrance. Nor was Great Britain ignorant of the special interests which France could with justice claim in Morocco. A report from Sir Henry Johnston, Consul-General at Tunis, who was exceptionally well posted on North African affairs, had in summing up the situation stated that "England ought not to oppose the extension of French interests in Morocco."

In Madagascar also we find the two powers at odds with each other. In 1896, when France wished to change her protectorate into full sovereignty, it was only after numerous arguments that she succeeded in persuading the British government to put into writing an acknowledgment of her position made orally ten years before. Even then she might have failed if she had not been able to point out her acceptance of Great Britain's high-handed action in Zanzibar in making a treaty with Germany in utter disregard of a previous treaty made with France.¹⁵ There were also disputes in the region of the Congo, in the basin of the Niger, in Ethiopia, in the Egyptian Soudan, and in the valley of the Upper Nile—in this last a dispute which was to bring the two nations to the very brink of war.

¹⁵ See E. Lavisse, "France et Angleterre," *Revue de Paris*, Feb. 1, 1899,

In the Orient we find the same antagonism. During the period of 1897-1898 France was carrying on a very active policy in the Far East, gathering in the fruits of her support of China against dismemberment by Japan—railway concessions, mining concessions, treaties of commerce, a ninety-nine year lease on the bay of Kwang-Chou-Wan. But it was only against the constant opposition of Great Britain, who was already looking with favor upon Japan as a potential ally to arrest the steady progress of Russia, the ally of France, towards the warm open seas of the east. Proceeding south to Indo-China, where France possessed a great colonial area comprising Tonkin, Annam, Cochin-China, Cambodia and Laos, we again find the two nations with rival interests. Great Britain possessed Burma and was determined that Siam, which bordered on French Indo-China, should not fall under French influence. By the Convention of London, signed in 1896, both nations agreed to respect the independence of the valley of the Menam and of Bangkok, the capital of Siam; yet in the years which followed a constant struggle went on in which each side attempted to increase its power in this region at the other's expense, especially over Yunnan, which as the only route to the upper Yangtse must be kept open to both.

Nor could the French forget their interests in Egypt, where Napoleon had raised his victorious standards, where de Lesseps had made the shorter route to India possible, and where France had shared the power with Great Britain, only to withdraw ignominiously through the inexcusable vacillation of a weak-kneed foreign minister. But even if France had withdrawn of her

own free will, she would not let Great Britain forget that she, too, had given many assurances that she had no intention of maintaining a permanent position there.

Finally there was the century-old conflict over the fishing rights granted on what was called the French shore in Newfoundland. Here the French had to contend not only with Great Britain, but also with a colonial government which was not always willing to carry out arrangements made by the mother country.¹⁶ But whether the question raised was, "Is a lobster a fish under the Treaty of Utrecht?" or whether the dispute was over a Chinese pagoda and a cemetery, the two powers were mutually engaged in a policy of "pin-pricks" that might at any moment bring them into active conflict. The Fashoda incident only too clearly showed the danger:—"France and England were face to face like birds in a cock-pit, while Europe under German leadership, was fastening their spurs, and impatient to see them fight to the death."¹⁷ Before taking up the Fashoda affair, with which our narrative proper begins—for although the roots of the affair go back to the régime of M. Hanotaux, it was M. Delcassé who was given the disagreeable task of finding a solution—a brief glance at French internal politics is essential.

Ever since 1894, when Captain Dreyfus was convicted of treason in a trial which left much to be desired from the point of view of justice, the Dreyfus affair hovered like a bird of ill omen over successive minis-

¹⁶ See Lémonon, "L'Europe et la Politique Britannique," pp. 136-169, for a very excellent discussion.

¹⁷ Fullerton, "Problems of Powers," p. 57.

tries, refusing to be driven away until the whole rotten carcass should be dragged forth and exposed to the light of publicity. Four successive ministers of war, after examining the famous *dossier*, upon whose contents Captain Dreyfus was convicted, had declared him guilty, and had opposed revision of the case. M. Meline, premier of the government preceding that of M. Brisson, swore on his honor that Dreyfus was guilty. M. Cavaignac, minister of war in the Brisson cabinet, declared in his speech announcing the policy of the government (July 7) that the door was closed upon the Dreyfus question. The murder or suicide of Col. Henry, chief witness against Dreyfus in 1894, and self confessed forger, coming at this time (August 1898), made it evident that a revision must take place in the near future, and that for some time to come the minister of foreign affairs had to count upon a war department weak and disorganized, unrespected either at home or abroad. Even in discussions on foreign affairs in the Chamber the "affair" was dragged in. M. Jules Guèsde, the Socialist, declared that the Quai d'Orsay was subject to occult influences, "that the French Republic has a king who is named Rothschild," and M. Firmin Faure asserted that the government of M. Brisson was established with one purpose,—namely to obtain the acquittal of Dreyfus, a traitor, and recommended a French policy instead of a Jewish policy.¹⁸ The Franco-Russian alliance itself was being undermined, and Russia could rightly question whether France with the Dreyfus incubus attached to its war department was a very valuable partner.

¹⁸ Annales de la Chambre, Vol, 59iv, p. 167.

So it was with the Dual Alliance weakening, with Italy jealous and disgruntled, with Germany dubiously friendly, and with Great Britain openly hostile, that France put her foreign policy into the hands of M. Delcassé, who for seven years was to guide her destinies and finally lead her into a friendly entente with Great Britain, the one power which for centuries had been her open and avowed enemy.

CHAPTER II

FASHODA

1. THE FRANCO-BRITISH AGREEMENT OF MARCH 21, 1899

THE Spanish-American War was in progress when M. Delcassé entered upon his duties as minister of foreign affairs, and he immediately conceived the idea that France as a sincere friend of both powers might be able to bring about an understanding between them. Admirals Schley and Sampson, at Santiago, had completed the destruction of Spanish sea power which Admiral Dewey had begun in Manila. Spain unable to continue the struggle, solicited the good offices of M. Jules Cambon, French ambassador at Washington, to ask for terms of peace. The United States was willing to offer reasonable terms, and on August 12, a protocol was signed by William R. Day, Secretary of State of the United States, and M. Cambon, representing Spain. As a mark of appreciation of M. Delcassé's position as mediator and M. Cambon's valuable services towards ending the war, Paris was chosen as the place where the peace terms were arranged and signed.¹ Although M. Delcassé had thus earned the right to the blessing conferred by the beatitudes upon the peacemaker, he was now to embark upon a dangerous course in which he would need all possible benedictions to escape the reefs of disaster.

¹ Johnson, "America's Foreign Relations," Vol. II, p. 264.

Ever since Lord Beaconsfield, in 1877, had given to the world that clever exhibition of *haute finance* worthy of the best traditions of his race, by purchasing on his own authority, for four million pounds, the hundred and seventy-seven thousand shares of the Suez Canal held by the Khedive, Great Britain had found herself unable to withdraw from Egypt. In the early eighties France, who had gone in as an equal partner, allowed herself to be forced out by the pusillanimity of a foreign minister. Great Britain gave notice on several occasions of her intention to withdraw, and in 1885, after the fall of Khartoum, did withdraw from the Egyptian Soudan. But from 1891 to 1894 she gave new impetus to her expansion both on the Upper Nile and in the territory between Lakes Albert Nyanza and Victoria. France countered with a treaty with the Congo Free State, August 14, 1894, opening to her influence territory north of the Bornu to the Nile.² Towards the close of 1895 the French government was apprised of the fact that Great Britain intended to crush the Mahdi and retake the Soudan.³ The dream of Cecil Rhodes for a Cape to Cairo Railroad was approaching the possibility of fulfillment. This scheme conflicted with a plan that the French had long cherished of extending their territory across the continent, and instructions to this effect had been given as far back as 1893 to M. Liotard by M. Delcassé, who was at that time Colonial Secretary. M. Liotard had been ordered

² Doc. Dip., "Afrique, Arrangements, Actes et Conventions, 1881-1898," No. 16. In reference to this convention M. Deloncle in the Chamber, Feb. 28, 1895, declared that "to-day the English dream of possessing all the upper Nile is, I believe, forever disturbed." *Annales de la Chambre, Débats Parl.*, Vol. 451, p. 761.

³ Tardieu, "France and the Alliances," p. 43.

to seek, by the Upper Ubanghi, an outlet upon the Nile for the French possessions in Central Africa.⁴ The instructions for the Marchand expedition proper were not signed till February 24, 1896, more than two years later, an inexcusable fault in an expedition of this sort.⁵ The expedition left France in June of the same year, "charged with relieving those troops which had completed their term of service and with assuring under the high direction of the government's commissioner, M. Liotard, the occupation and the defence of the regions that the Franco-Congo Convention had recognized as ours."⁶ The instructions further ordered Captain Marchand to avoid all hostilities; in fact his expedition was purposely made small in order to avoid even the appearance of aggression.

Before continuing with Captain Marchand to his encounter with General Kitchener at Fashoda, we must take note of the diplomatic sparring between the two governments. Between the time when M. Liotard first received orders to seek an outlet upon the Nile in 1893, and the setting out of the Marchand expedition in 1896, both governments gave clear expressions of their views. On March 28, 1895, Sir Edward Grey, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, stated in the House of Commons: "We have no reason to suppose that any French expedition has instructions to enter, or the intention of entering, the Nile Valley . . . because the advance of a French expedition under secret instructions right from

⁴ Lebon, "La Mission Marchand et le Cabinet Meline," *Revue de Deux Mondes*, March 15, 1900.

⁵ See Darcy, "Cent Années de Rivalité Coloniale," Chap X, for an excellent discussion of the mistakes which led to the ultimate failure of the expedition.

⁶ Doc. Dip., Haut Nil et Bahr-el-Ghazal, Nos. 3 to 7.

the other side of Africa into a territory over which our claims have been known for so long would be not merely an inconsistent and unexpected act, but it must be perfectly well known to the French government that it would be an unfriendly act and would be so viewed by England.”⁷

Neither did France allow Sir Edward Grey's statement to pass unchallenged. On April 5, M. Hanotaux, Minister of Foreign Affairs, declared in the Senate: . . . “the position taken by France is the following—the regions under discussion are under the complete sovereignty of the Sultan. They have a legitimate master, it is the Khedive. Therefore we say to the English government:

“‘You declare that by virtue of the convention of 1890 England has placed a part of these territories in its sphere of influence. Very well, let us know at least to what territories your claims apply; tell us how far this sphere of influence extends, which according to you commences on the left bank of the Nile and extends northward indefinitely . . .’”⁸

Great Britain made no reply to this request for a

⁷ Parl. Debates, Vol. 32, p. 405. That all English opinion was not identical with that expressed by Sir Edward Grey is shown by the speech made by Mr. H. Labouchere in the same debate. . . . “Why must France be ordered to keep her hands off a territory extending some thousand miles along the banks of the Nile between the lakes and the southern frontier of Egypt . . . he would like the Honorable Gentleman to tell the Committee whether in any diplomatic document it had ever been stated to France that we had any more right to this long stretch of the valley of the Nile than France herself. . . . It was perfectly true that we made some arrangement between Germany and Italy, telling Germany they might go to one part and telling Italy they might go to another part; but towards third powers, France or Russia, for instance, that did not give us any right.” Ibid., p. 416.

⁸ Annales du Sénat, Vol. 42i, p. 469.

definite delimitation of territory, for the very good reason that she could hardly claim at this time territory which still remained to be conquered. But she did better—she sent the Sirdar Kitchener to resume operations against the Mahdists and to wipe out once and for all the stain of the Gordon massacre and England's subsequent loss of the Soudan.

General Kitchener carried out his mission in a most brilliant fashion, completely annihilating the power of the Mahdi at Omdurman. Thereupon proceeding southward, he arrived with his army at Fashoda, September 19, 1898, and found Captain Marchand encamped there with his little force of eight officers and one hundred fifty Sudanese *tirailleurs*. Captain Marchand had arrived two months earlier, July 10, after a heroic journey of two years, a desperate effort rivaling the expeditions of Livingstone and Stanley. An expedition under M. de Bonchamps, which had set out from Abyssinia to meet the Marchand expedition at Fashoda, was forced to turn back owing to the inexplicable failure of M. Lagarde, French ambassador to Abyssinia, to provide it with the necessary equipment.⁹ The meeting was courteous on both sides, and the two soldiers wisely turned the question over to the Quai d'Orsay and Downing Street for settlement.¹⁰

It was the task of M. Delcassé to settle a difficult situation into which he had been brought by the pre-

⁹ See Darcy, *op. cit.*, p. 432.

¹⁰ M. Delcassé writing to M. Geoffray, French representative at London, agreed: "Il n'appartient ni au capitaine Marchand, ni au Gen. Kitchener de tirer les conséquences politiques des expéditions qu'ils ont eu à diriger." Doc. Dip., Haut Nil et Bahr-el-Ghazal, No. 3.

ceding administration. As soon as he learned that Kitchener had taken Khartoum and that an English fleet was proceeding up the Nile (September 8) he notified England of the existence of the Marchand expedition, although even at that time he did not know its exact position, declaring that it was merely an expedition of penetration, affirming no exclusive right nor prejudicing in any way respective delimitations that the governments alone could settle after an examination.¹¹ His fixed determination to maintain friendly relations is shown by the conciliatory tone of his note of September 8, to M. Geoffray:

“Whatever questions divide us in the case of Egypt, we cannot help associating ourselves in the eulogies excited by the able manner with which the Sirdar has conducted his expedition . . . and I do not doubt that the English government will look with like sentiments upon the efforts of certain of our compatriots with equal profit to the cause of civilization.”¹²

Summarizing the arguments pro and con as put forth by the Yellow and Blue Books issued by the respective governments, we find them running something like this:

Great Britain asserted that France had no right in the Bahr-el-Ghazal regions, because these regions be-

¹¹ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 7, or Parl. Papers, “Egypt, Upper Nile, 1899,” Vol. 112 (c9054) No. 7; in his speech before the Chamber of Deputies Jan. 23, 1899, M. Delcassé declared that the Marchand mission was only a continuation of plans outlined in 1893 whereby Gen. Liotard was to finish occupying territory granted to France by the Franco-Congo Convention of Aug. 14, 1894, and at all times the expedition was under Gen. Liotard’s control. Thus these plans were prepared before Grey’s speech and at time when the Egyptian Soudan had been wholly abandoned by England. *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 57i, p. 146.

¹² *Ibid.*, No. 3.

longed theoretically to the Khedive (although in fact he had lost them by the revolt of the Mahdi), and she was assisting the Khedive to recover them.

France asked by what right Great Britain spoke in the name of Egypt, and especially of the unconquered Egyptian Soudan.

Great Britain claimed that she had occupied the Equatorial Province only to defend Uganda against the Mahdist peril.

France countered by claiming possession of the Bahr-el-Gahzal to protect French possessions of Ubanghi against the same peril.

Great Britain then declared that in 1895 Sir Edward Grey had warned France that England considered the whole valley of the Nile within her sphere of influence.

To this France opposed M. Hanotaux's answer in the Senate. Furthermore she asserted that the principle of the "first occupant" established by the Act of Berlin would be nullified if a country could designate lands as belonging to it which it had not yet reached.

Great Britain then found a better argument—this country belonged to the Khalif—but Omdurman by right of conquest had given her possession of the Khalif's territory.

The French conceded this willingly, but argued that if conquest settled this point, by England's own argument France should hold the Bahr-el-Gahzal, since they had taken it from the Khalif before the battle of Omdurman.¹³

¹³ Doc. Dip., *ibid.*, especially Nos. 7 and 13; Parl. Papers "Egypt, Upper Nile, and Fashoda, 1899," Vol. 112 (c9055) Nos. 1 and 3; see Ebray, *Rev. Pol. et Parl.*, Nov. 1898, for excellent summary of the official documents.

Then M. Delcassé demanded a delimitation of the respective territories before Captain Marchand should leave, declaring that "to ask France to evacuate Fashoda preliminary to all discussion, would be in substance to formulate an ultimatum, and who then, knowing France, could have any doubt of her reply."¹⁴

This rejoinder was especially criticised in France on the ground that M. Delcassé was preparing his own humiliation by allowing any idea of an ultimatum to creep into the discussion.¹⁵ However, the reply was made early in October, when M. Delcassé was still attempting to win out for France. Had not M. Honotaux demanded precisely the same thing in 1895 in his Senate speech? When Great Britain finally declared that in her eyes the rights of Egypt to Fashoda were above all discussion, and that she was prepared to maintain her stand, M. Delcassé realized that France either had to withdraw or fight. As we have shown before, the ravages of the Dreyfus Affair upon the War Department precluded all possibility of the latter. Even Russia could not be depended upon in this crisis, if we may put full credence in the statement of Sir Thomas Barclay. He declared that when Count Muravieff first communicated the Czar's proposal for an international peace conference about a month after Marchand's arrival at Fashoda, those on the inside of French politics were inclined to believe that France was being left in the lurch. In fact Count Muravieff stated plainly to M. Delcassé that "Russia could not

¹⁴ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 22.

¹⁵ Millet "Quatre Ans de Politique Extérieure," Rev. Pol. et Parl., Oct. 1902.

be counted upon to support an attitude on the part of France which might endanger peace.”¹⁶

With humiliation on one side and disaster on the other, M. Delcassé saw a means to turn a temporary defeat into a permanent victory—*reculer pour mieux sauter*. Just as a general may retreat in order to obtain a better position to face about, M. Delcassé conceded that Fashoda was not worth a war; it could only be reached from the Congo during the rainy season, and, with Great Britain holding Egypt and the Soudan, the Bahr-el-Gahzal was of little value to France. Captain Marchand, having done all that a brave man could to uphold the honor of France, was ordered to withdraw.¹⁷

M. Delcassé realized that even if France were in a position to wage a successful war to retain this territory it would not be the victor who would profit most by the victory.¹⁸ But more important than this was his idea that France might use this temporary humiliation as a stepping-stone to an understanding with Great Britain. This was the occasion for the two great powers to find a common ground and to meet upon it loyally and fair-mindedly, to sink the question of a trading-post in central Africa into the greater one of a delimitation of the frontiers of their respective territories. Taking the Anglo-French Convention concerning the Niger, signed by M. Hanotaux, June 14,

¹⁶ Barclay, "Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences," p. 150.

¹⁷ Debidour, "Histoire Diplomatique" (1878-1904), p. 248, says: "the little force withdrew by way of Abyssinia *pour sauver la face* by not taking the same route by which it had entered."

¹⁸ Speech of April 3, 1900, *Annales du Sénat*, Vol. 56i, p. 364.

1898,¹⁹ as a basis, the whole question of central Africa might be brought up for settlement.

M. Delcassé's position was rendered the more difficult by the irreconcilable attitude assumed by a number of English statesmen. Mr. Joseph Chamberlain, Colonial Secretary, and very influential in the Salisbury cabinet, had ever maintained a bellicose attitude towards France. Speaking at Wakefield, December 8, 1898, he declared that a friendship between the two nations was impossible so long as France continued her policy of twisting the lion's tail.²⁰ An even more provocative speech had been delivered two days before by Sir Edward Monson, British ambassador at Paris, upon the occasion of the *fête* organized by the English Chamber of Commerce in Paris. He urged the French government to refrain from continuing "that policy of pin-pricks which while it can only procure an ephemeral gratification to a short-lived ministry, must inevitably perpetuate across the channel an irritation which a high-spirited nation must eventually feel to be intolerable."²¹

Fortunately for M. Delcassé's policy the Liberal opposition was now in the hands of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman, who was outspoken in his opposition to Mr. Chamberlain's bellicosity. Speaking in the House of Commons February 7, 1899, he declared: "We should regard the establishment of a hostile and suspicious spirit between the two countries as an unmitigated calamity."²² Mr. Balfour replying for the gov-

¹⁹ Doc. Dip., rel. a la Convention Franco-Anglais du 14 Juin, 1898.

²⁰ London Times, Dec. 9, 1898.

²¹ Annual Register, 1898, p. [189 ff.

²² Parl. Debates, Vol. 66, p. 91; Speaking at Hull, March 8, he was

ernment, could see no reason why the various questions between England and France should not be settled in a manner satisfactory to both nations, as every government had felt the great inconvenience of these outstanding questions.²³

In France, sentiment for the most part backed M. Delcassé in withdrawing from Fashoda, even before it was evident that he was following a *do ut des* policy. There was some hostile criticism in the press, but the prevailing sentiment seemed to be that he had made the best of a bad bargain. The popular view was aptly summed up by the expression of an artisan: "*Que ça nous fait, Egypt? Anglais c'est pas prussien.*"²⁴ When the question was raised in the Chamber, M. d'Estournelles de Constant urged that the government put an end to the misunderstandings which divided the two countries "not by a partial, ephemeral, local, miserably geographical arrangement, but by a general accord, durable as far as possible, honorable for the two countries."²⁵ M. Ribot, former minister of foreign affairs, spoke in the same vein:

"Two great countries like France and England, united by so many souvenirs and interests, ought to be in accord, not only for the benefit of each other but for the good of the whole world. Both Thiers and Gam-

much more violent in his denunciation of Chamberlain's imperialism: "We adjure this vulgar and bastard imperialism made of irritation, of provocation and aggression, this imperialism which consists in permitting ourselves tricks and clever manoeuvres against our neighbors and grabbing everything even if we have no need of it ourselves." London Times, March 9, 1899.

²³ Parl. Debates, Vol. 66, p. 91.

²⁴ Annual Register, 1898, p. [189 ff.

²⁵ Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 57i, p. 134.

betta defended such an accord on this side of the Channel and Gladstone on the other. The policy of France was not a policy of pin-pricks . . . the effort made during the past fifteen years has sufficed for her colonial ambition and she is now ready to be satisfied by working laboriously to exploit this vast domain." ²⁶

Fortified by this backing, and by a vote of confidence in his own explanation,²⁷ M. Delcassé proceeded to make a general settlement. By the Convention of March 21, 1899, a complement of Article 4 of Anglo-French Convention of June 14, 1898, Great Britain was given the territory of the Upper Nile, including Darfur and the disputed Bahr-el-Gahzal region; in fact her influence was to extend to the 15th parallel. In return, France was given the basin of Lake Chad, including Wadai, Baghirmi, and Kanem, making a homogeneous whole of Algeria, Tunis, Senegal, Dahomey and Central Soudan. Both parties were given equal commercial treatment in these regions.²⁸ The question of Egypt proper was not raised in this arrangement and was still to provide a fertile field for diplomatic cultivation.

Considering all the circumstances in the case, it must be conceded that France fared very well. But when the Convention came up for discussion in the Senate, M. de Lamarzelle objected to the arrangement on the ground that France was ceding the Bahr-el-Gahzal, in which they had established several posts at great expense and in accord with the regulations of the Treaty of Berlin of 1885, in return for unknown and unoccu-

²⁶ Ibid., p. 141.

²⁷ Ibid., p. 146.

²⁸ For text see Doc. Dip. rel. à la Convention Franco-Anglais du 14 Juin, 1898, et La Declaration Additionnelle du 21 mars, 1899.

pied territories. Furthermore, this cession was made to bring to an end difficulties with England, yet the principal causes for dispute with England still remained unsettled.²⁹

The reply of M. Delcassé was a brilliant example of his ability both to persuade and to convince. He agreed that in the case of the Niger, important concessions had been made by France, but pointed out that in return the unity of the French Soudan had been obtained. Furthermore, even if there was a great deal of sand where the Gallic cock could scratch at his ease, the Bahr-el-Gahzal offered immense marshes where the British duck could rejoice in full liberty. Finally, to bring the realities of the case before the Senators he demanded: "after M. Cecil Rhodes had pushed the British flag to the southern shores of Lake Tanganika, when in the north, successively Dongola, Berber, and Khartoum had been snatched from the Mahdists, what statesman who had not completely lost the sense of reality, what minister knowing that from Cairo in twenty days thousands of soldiers could be brought to Bahr-el-Gahzal by the Nile, whilst it would have taken the French a year to bring up a few hundred exhausted soldiers—knowing this, who would have dared to ask of the country the *useless* sacrifice of the blood and treasure by which one might have been able merely to try to dispute this territory?"³⁰ The Convention passed.

²⁹ Annales du Sénat, Vol. 54, p. 828.

³⁰ Annales du Sénat, Vol. 54, p. 830. At this time even M. Delcassé would hardly have believed it possible that this forced agreement would later be regarded by Frenchmen as the "Open Sesame of the Future," "la porte du magnifique palais de la Revanche."

Even before M. Delcassé was able to settle the Fashoda Affair another little difficulty had risen between the two powers in Arabia. Early in 1899 the Sultan granted to France the right to lease a coaling station at Bandar-Jisseh, a short distance from Muscat. The English resident at Bender-Bouchir, being apprised of the situation, demanded of the Sultan that he withdraw this concession from France. The Sultan was forced to comply, and when France refused to give it up, the Sultan declared it annulled. According to M. Delcassé, France was only asking a privilege that Great Britain already possessed, and to which France had an equal right, since both nations were bound by the same treaty of 1862. When he took up the question with the Queen's Government, it agreed, and regretted that perhaps its agents had been over zealous.³¹ According to the English version, Great Britain was perfectly willing that France should have a coaling station, but she objected to the cession of the port of Bandar-Jisseh to France, since it was capable of being made into a strong naval port in clear contradiction of the convention of 1862. Under these circumstances the Queen's Government upheld its agents in demanding the cancelation of this lease.³² Whatever the first intention of M. Delcassé may have been, he was not willing to allow it to interfere with more important plans, and France contented herself with a coal depot.

Great Britain also complained that since France had formally annexed the island of Madagascar she had

³¹ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 51ii, p. 840.

³² See statement of Mr. Brodrick, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, in House of Commons, March 8, 1899; also editorial *London Times*, March 7, 1899.

imposed higher duties upon English goods than was justified, that she tried to dissuade the natives from buying English merchandise, and that she imposed restrictions upon the commerce of Indian subjects. When in June, 1898, France issued a decree increasing the import duties upon the principal articles of British manufacture, Lord Salisbury in a note to Sir Edward Monson, July 9, 1898, made a formal protest to M. Delcassé.³³ Inasmuch as France now claimed Madagascar as a colonial possession, Great Britain rested her case upon very weak grounds. When Lord Salisbury protested again, in November, 1898, at the French intention of restricting coasting trade between Madagascar and the French ports to vessels flying the French flag, M. Delcassé was able to announce that the decree had been revoked by reason of the insufficiency of French vessels in number and tonnage for the needs of commerce.³⁴ The other questions were to lie dormant until the entente of 1904.

2. THE PEACE CONFERENCE AT THE HAGUE

Considering the military condition of France at the close of the Nineteenth Century, it was to be expected that she would welcome any concerted effect on the part of the Powers which might lead to disarmament and world peace. We have already noted that when Russia first broached the idea of a peace conference it came as a cruel awakening to those in France who saw in the Dual Alliance a means towards the *revanche*. To the great majority of the French, however, world peace

³³ Parl. Papers, "Madagascar," 1899, Vol. 109 (c9091) No. 12.

³⁴ Ibid., Nos. 30 and 32.

was an ideal towards which the Third Republic would struggle with as great enthusiasm as Louis IX entered upon the Crusades. Had not Michelet prophesied that in the Twentieth Century "*la France déclarera la Paix au monde*"? Had not Henry IV, Sully, the Abbé de St. Pierre, and Jean Jacques Rousseau formulated plans for a league of nations with world peace as its object? Had not Victor Hugo spoken in impassioned eloquence on the same subject? It is not surprising then that France was the first to accept the proposal set forth in the circular of Count Mouravieff. The Third Republic could be expected to maintain the French tradition. In the words of M. Delcassé:

"The sympathy of France was acquired for the proposition of Czar Nicholas, first, because the idea recommended itself, and it can only be hoped that an end may be put to this perfecting of armaments which, adopted by one power, forces the others either to imitate them or surpass them. France also supported the proposal because the Sovereign who submits it to the world is the head of a great nation, an ally and a friend with whom never has the accord been more complete nor the relations more confident. Finally, France is favorably disposed towards it because at diverse periods of her history, and up to the day before the war from which she emerged mutilated, she conceived and wished to execute the same magnanimous design." ³⁵

Although the Conference did not accomplish all that was originally hoped, and although it was scorned by some and ridiculed by others—a favorite epithet

³⁵ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 57i, p. 146.

directed at it was "*le monde où l'on s'ennuie*"—it did make a beginning towards the amelioration of the conduct of war on the one hand, and towards a means of settling international disputes without recourse to war on the other. To facilitate the work, three commissions were formed, the first on rules of warfare, the second on applying to maritime warfare the rules established by the Conference of Geneva, and the third on arbitration. The third and most important commission was under the presidency of M. Léon Bourgeois, the first French delegate, and both MM. d'Estournelles de Constant and Louis Renault were also members. The results of this commission were the most tangible, for they established the right of third powers to offer mediation or good offices without its being considered an unfriendly act, and they instituted a permanent court of arbitration sitting at the Hague accessible to all at all times. If this first Hague Conference did nothing more than open a way for a settlement of the Dogger Bank incident, which not only prevented war between Russia and Great Britain but ultimately led to the formation of the Triple Entente, Czar Nicholas might well feel that he was amply repaid for this bread cast upon the waters.

Even the German war lord felt the effect of the peace waves in the air, and while cruising on his yacht off Norway he met the French training-ship *Iphigénie* and, after a short visit on board, invited the officers on board the *Hohenzollern*. The Kaiser could be most amiable when it served his purpose, and to make his friendly disposition the more noticeable, he telegraphed to President Loubet, telling him how much his heart of a sailor

and a comrade was rejoiced by the gracious reception which had been accorded him.³⁶

M. Delcassé decided that the time was propitious for strengthening the Russian alliance, and hardly had the Hague Conference come to an end before he hastened to pay a visit to St. Petersburg. There is little doubt that he also wished to acquaint Count Mouravieff of his new policy towards Great Britain, though he could hardly have hoped at this early date to bring the British lion and Russian bear into the same ark of peace and friendship. He may also have attempted to minimize the effects of the reappearance of the Dreyfus Affair upon the military power of France, for it was realized only too well that Russia was beginning to lose patience at her ally's long continued washing of her soiled linen in public.³⁷ However, the toasts were, as usual, very cordial in tone, and when in October Count Mouravieff returned the visit the official note communicated to the Russian press declared: . . . "the friendship and intimacy already established between Count Mouravieff and M. Delcassé had been increased and will greatly facilitate common action in the interest of the two countries." ³⁸

The hands of M. Delcassé were much strengthened at

³⁶ Rev. Pol. et Parl., Aug. 1899.

³⁷ The following editorial from *Novie Vremia* quoted in *Ques. Dip. et Col.*, Jan. 1, 1901, is extremely pertinent: "Until these recent times the French army has been, and has been considered by the most powerful European armies as an equal, an organization formed according to all the rules of military science, possessing with excellent equipment an admirable spirit and perfect discipline. At the present time it appears to be changing its way and its destination; it seems to be turning into a political army, feeble for the enemies abroad and both tyrannical and vexatious for its own country."

³⁸ Rev. Pol. et Parl., Nov. 1899.

this time through the fact that he was now a member of the Waldeck-Rousseau ministry established for "Defence of the Republic," with a real soldier, General de Gallifet, at the head of the war department. This ministry, the beginning of the Republican *bloc*, was resolved to give justice to Dreyfus at whatever cost and to stamp out the clericalism and royalism which had become so closely interwoven with the "Affair." The Waldeck-Rousseau ministry proved to be one of the ablest and longest-lived ministries of the Third Republic, but the task which it had outlined was beyond its ability, and it was forced ultimately to resign with its work unfinished. Throughout the three years of its duration (June 22, 1899-June 7, 1902) the pressure of internal affairs was so great that M. Delcassé was allowed to proceed *carte blanche* with his foreign policy and he made the most of his opportunity.

3. FRANCE, GERMANY AND THE BOER WAR

With the Fashoda Affair settled, with Italy again brought into friendly commercial relations, with the Russian Alliance revamped, and with the great nations of the world having for the first time in the world's history come together to establish more peaceable international relations, it looked as though the year 1899 was going to bring the century to an end with the world at peace and with France well started upon her new policy of friendly understandings. It was merely the calm before the storm. With the outbreak of the Boer War Great Britain found herself still in "splendid isolation," but in an isolation such as is usually allotted to outcasts and pariahs. Public opinion

throughout Europe seemed to rise with a unanimous voice to protest against Great Britain's imperialistic policy in South Africa. M. Lavissee expressed the feeling of France when he declared "England would like to keep the benefits of having been the country of Gladstone when she has become the country of Mr. Chamberlain."³⁹ Whether her policy was defensible or not made little difference. The mere fact that two small states in South Africa would dare to take up arms against the great British Empire was bound to make their cause sympathetic. M. Delcassé saw his carefully cherished plans sinking in the quicksands of popular prejudice. French public opinion, already aroused by the outbreak of the war, was inflamed still further by reports of a possible entente between Germany and Great Britain. The London correspondent of the "Echo de Paris" declared that Herr von Bülow, while on his visit to London in November, 1899, had paid a confidential visit to Mr. Chamberlain, and in the course of his interview asked whether Great Britain could be induced to enter the Triple Alliance. Being informed that this was out of the question, he urged an entente between Germany and England. Mr. Chamberlain conceded that such an arrangement might be possible and promised to consider it.⁴⁰ Three days later, in a speech at Leicester, he added fuel to the flames. After declaring that in character the Teutonic race differs very slightly from the Anglo-Saxon, and

³⁹ *Revue de Paris*, Jan. 1, 1900.

⁴⁰ Lémonon, "L'Europe et la Politique Britannique," p. 190; Von Bülow in the revised edition of his "Imperial Germany," p. 37, states that Chamberlain made the overtures but that they were not endorsed by Lord Salisbury and intimates that even if the overtures had been official Germany could not have afforded at that time to accept them.

that the same sentiments which brought Great Britain into close sympathy with the United States might also be invoked to bring her into closer sympathy and alliance with Germany, he said that "if the union between England and America is a powerful factor in the cause of peace, a new triple alliance between the Teutonic race and the two great branches of the Anglo-Saxon race will be a still more potent influence in the history of the world. . . ." ⁴¹

The speech was not favorably received in Great Britain, Germany, or the United States; and in France it provoked a veritable outburst of condemnation — not so much for its far-fetched international readjustments, but because in the first part of his speech Mr. Chamberlain referred to a gross caricature of the Queen which had appeared in a French comic paper and declared that "these attacks upon her Majesty . . . have provoked in this country a natural indignation which will have serious consequences if our neighbors do not mind their manners."

Strong pressure was immediately brought to bear upon M. Delcassé by both politicians and the press, urging intervention or at least demanding of Great Britain that she arbitrate the case. In reply to a question raised by M. Chaumié in the Senate on March 15, 1900, M. Delcassé replied that France could not even suggest arbitration, since Lord Salisbury had already declared that the dispute did not lend itself to arbitration.⁴² Even though the President of the South

⁴¹ Annual Register, 1899, p. 226.

⁴² Lord Salisbury in his Mansion House speech Nov. 9, 1899, declared that no government would interfere in the Boer War "in the first place because we should not accept such an interference gladly;

African Republics had addressed the Powers to obtain a satisfactory peace for both parties, such action would mean recognition of their independence. When Great Britain had learned of this manoeuvre, had she not publicly declared that she would not recognize their independence, thus rendering further intervention superfluous? Realizing the French tendencies to quixotic endeavors, he ended with a strong plea that they recognize the fact that "France had not ceased to be the generous nation that the world had known, admired and sometimes abandoned, but after so many harsh experiences, France could not longer admit that her duties towards the world should make her forget her obligations towards herself."⁴³

Although M. Delcassé was publicly proclaiming a course of absolute neutrality—and there is no question that he earnestly favored such a policy—he could not show himself averse to a proposal to bring about peace if there seemed any chance of success. The Queen of Holland, imbued with the sentiments so recently promulgated at the Hague, and sympathizing keenly with the cause of the Boers, suggested to her kinsman, the Czar, that he approach the other powers and that they intervene collectively with an offer of their good offices.⁴⁴ As Count Mouravieff happened to be in Paris at that time, it was but natural that he

in the second place because I am convinced that no such idea is present in the minds of any government in the world." *Annual Register*, 1899, p. [222.

⁴³ *Annales du Sénat*, Vol. 56i, p. 172; M. Paul Deschanel in a speech at Nogent-le-Rotrou echoed these sentiments: "Quand on ne secoure pas les faibles, fussent-ils admirables et héroïques, il est à la fois puéril et imprudent de harceler les forts et surtout de les outrager. . . ." *Rev. Pol. et Parl.*, Mai, 1900.

⁴⁴ Vizetelly, "Republican France," p. 458.

should suggest to M. Delcassé that Russia, France, and Germany ought to use their good offices in the cause of peace. M. Delcassé approved the project, seeing that it was in accordance with the traditions of the French policy to assist in every effort making for peace. According to the authority of M. André Mévil, in an article appearing in the "Echo de Paris," Count Mouravieff went directly from Paris to Berlin intending to sound Count von Bülow on the subject, but no suitable opportunity arose. However in February, 1900, the Russian ambassador in Paris, again asked the cooperation of France "to intervene to prevent further shedding of blood," with the understanding that Germany should take the initiative. Again M. Delcassé gave his consent, stipulating that Russia alone should make the proposition to Germany, but with the assurance that France was ready to join in any effort at mediation. After considering several days, the Kaiser replied that "the intervention of the three powers in English affairs appeared to him a grave act, an act of long breath, and consequently he demanded that Germany, Russia and France take in advance the mutual engagement of guaranteeing the integrity of each other's territories."⁴⁵ As Russia immediately recognized that any such proposal, which postulated a recognition of the *status quo* as imposed by the Treaty of Frankfort as a basis, would be wholly unacceptable to her ally and would completely nullify the Franco-Russian Alliance, the idea was dropped. Although this version does not coincide with the explanation given by the Kaiser in his famous declarations published in the

⁴⁵ Mévil quoted in Lémonon, op. cit., p. 199.

"Daily Telegraph," October 28, 1908, in which he declared that Germany would have nothing to do with any enterprise which might be destined to hasten the downfall of England,⁴⁶ we have only to contrast these sentiments with those which he expressed to President Kruger in 1896 after the Jameson raid, to feel a little dubious over Germany's friendship towards England. If further evidence is needed, Prince von Bülow gives it. He declares that although to many it seemed that the European situation was favorable to a momentary success against England and that French assistance was assured, he realized that the deeply rooted national hatred against the German Empire among the French would have quickly ousted the momentary ill-feeling against England—Fashoda had not effaced the memory of Sedan. "Our neutral attitude during the Boer War," he says, "had its origin in weighty considerations of the national interests of the German Empire."⁴⁷

Prince von Bülow had correctly interpreted French sentiment—Fashoda had not effaced Sedan. And although such a conservative historian as M. Lavissee, writing at the close of 1899, feared that the possibility of a war between France and England seemed "the most redoubtable of those which threaten the peace of the world,"⁴⁸ M. Delcassé did not seem to entertain the same fears, and at a private dinner party at which the Russian correspondent of the "Rossia" was pres-

⁴⁶ Laloy, "La Diplomatie de Guillaume II," p. 70.

⁴⁷ Von Bülow, "Imperial Germany," p. 30.

⁴⁸ Lavissee, "Précautions contre l'Angleterre," *Revue de Paris*, Jan. 1, 1900.

ent, M. Delcassé thus expressed his views to a French deputy who brought up the question:

“ . . . You say that after finishing with the Transvaal the English will turn against us. Very frankly, I do not think so . . . the English know very well that we have no reason to make war upon them, since there is nothing we should care to take from them. My policy is neither one of menace, nor of excitement—blustering is repugnant to me. It is not worthy of a great nation which wishes to play a great rôle in the world. On the contrary I wish to put the whole world in good humor. . . .”⁴⁹

Speaking in the Senate on April 3, 1900, in reply to a question of the Count d'Aunay, M. Delcassé summed up in a clear and statesmanlike manner his policy during this trying period:

“If the points of contact between France and England are numerous, and numerous consequently the subjects of litigation, much more numerous and much stronger are the reasons for forestalling or regulating them in accordance with the mutual respect of the rights, interests and dignity of each, and among these reasons the most decisive in my eyes is that *if by mischance a conflict should break out between these two powers, it is not to the conqueror, whichever it might be, that would go to the principal benefits of the victory.*”⁵⁰

⁴⁹ Article of M. Pavlovsky in *la Rossia*, quoted *Ques. Dip. et Col.* Jan. 1, 1900.

⁵⁰ *Annales du Sénat*, Vol. 56i, p. 364.

CHAPTER III

FRENCH DIPLOMACY IN THE ORIENT

1. THE CRETAN AFFAIR

WHEN M. Delcassé entered upon his duties at the Foreign Office, one of the first problems brought to his attention was that of Crete. This, like most of the questions arising between the Ottoman Empire and the European powers, was one in which the desire to find a speedy and satisfactory solution lay wholly on the side of Europe. The long-cherished aspiration of Crete to be annexed to Greece had seemed at the dawn of fulfillment in February, 1897, when Greece seized the island in defiance of the Powers. But the Powers were relentless, and the quick defeat of the Greeks at the hands of the Turks, in the short and disastrous Greco-Turkish War, threw a pall for a time over the hopes of the Cretans.

As a temporary solution, it was decided by the four powers, France, Great Britain, Russia and Italy, whose squadrons had been blockading the island, to give the long-suffering "Island of Liars" provisional autonomy, based upon a plan submitted May 27, 1897, by M. Hanotaux.¹ In accordance with this plan, Russia, early in 1898, proposed Prince George of Greece as Governor of Crete under the sovereignty of the Sultan. France and the other Powers agreed. But, as is often the case

¹ Doc. Dip., Affaires d'Orient (Mai-Décembre, 1897), Nos. 1 and 8.

in dealings with Sublime Porte, obstructions constantly arose, and when M. Delcassé became foreign minister, in June, 1898, the affair was still under discussion. At length a commission of consuls of the four Powers, working with an executive committee of the Cretan Assembly, succeeded in drawing up a constitution for the provisional regime.² Before it could be put into effect a Mussulman uprising took place in Candia resulting in a massacre in which the British vice-consul, a British officer, and several soldiers were killed.³ Italy now took the lead and backed by the other three Powers (Germany and Austria refused to participate) demanded the complete withdrawal of Turkish forces.⁴ This time the Sultan realized that he must pay the piper, and after one final vain objection he met their demands in full. With the Turkish forces withdrawn, the Powers established their regime of autonomous government with Prince George as High Commissioner—"they had succeeded in reëstablishing peace but only by a bastard solution which in reality terminated nothing."⁵ In reality it was the last trench in the Cretans' long struggle for unification with their mother, Hellas. Let the Powers henceforth look upon their hope with *bienveillance* or not, one of their own flesh and blood, Eleutherios Venizelos, was to make it a living reality in spite of the European powers if not with their assistance.⁶

² Doc. Dip., "Affaires d'Orient, Autonomie Crétoise, Janvier-Octobre," 1898, No. 159 annexe.

³ Ibid., No. 168.

⁴ Ibid., No. 219.

⁵ Debidour, "Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe (1878-1904)," p. 238.

⁶ See Gibbons, "The New Map of Europe," Chap. XII, for an excellent sketch of the Cretan question.

2. FRANCE SETTLES WITH TURKEY

In the Cretan affair France had played only a secondary rôle, but this was sufficient to give M. Delcassé experience which proved very valuable when it came time for France to deal individually with Abdul Hamid. It must be remembered that France, in addition to her right as cosignatory of the Treaty of Berlin, to exercise a guardianship over Christians in the Ottoman Empire in concert with the other powers, possessed a special prerogative obtained by secular usage to protect all Catholics in the Sultan's dominions. In both of these categories the actions of the Turkish government had been anything but satisfactory. The Armenian vilayets were the constantly recurring scenes of new outrages, the Porte had been delaying endlessly in vesting with authority recently founded schools and hospitals, it had resisted the customs immunities established by the capitulations, and it had refused the *bérat* of investiture to the Patriarch of the United Chaldeans. To these moral grounds for complaint were now added more material ones. A French company, which had constructed certain wharves in Constantinople through a concession officially granted before work was started, was now refused possession. The alleged grounds were that the Government intended to purchase the wharves, although it was notorious that the Ottoman Treasury was wholly unable to buy them back. Another French subject was by force dispossessed of lands which he had drained and made possible of cultivation. Finally two bankers, MM. Tubini and Lorando, one a son, and the other a

grandson, of naturalized Frenchmen, could not obtain reimbursements of loans long overdue which had been made to the Porte.⁷

The case of the wharves was a violation of a contract pure and simple, and if permitted to go unchallenged the Sultan might do the same with the concessions granted to the Syrian and Libyan Railways, with the *quais* in Smyrna and Salonika, with the Ottoman Bank, in fact with all the contracts signed with French *concessionnaires*.⁸ Furthermore, as M. Delcassé indicated in his dispatch of July 17, 1900, to M. Constans, French ambassador at Constantinople, the selling back of the concession would be a serious blow to French prestige on the Bosphorus, and should only be consented to upon condition that the administration and exploitation be given to a French company.⁹ The Sultan finally agreed to buying the concession back under these conditions, but after haggling for six months over the price with no prospect of reaching a decision, M. Constans again demanded that the company be allowed to exercise the rights granted by the concession (March, 1901). He reiterated the French demands in a more forceful despatch to Tewfic Pasha, Turkish minister of foreign affairs, three months later (June 22).¹⁰

About this same time, M. Constans learned that the Ottoman government intended to refuse to pay the judgment rendered against it by the regular tribunals of the country in the Lorando-Tubini claims, and that

⁷ See Henri de Peyerimhoff, "Le Conflit Franco-Turc," *Ques. Dip. et Col.*, 15 Nov., 1901.

⁸ See speech of M. Delcassé in *Chambre* Nov. 4, 1901. *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 65iv, p. 152.

⁹ *Doc. Dip.*, "Affaires de Turquie," 1900-1901, No. 4.

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 6.

the Sultan had issued a secret *iradé* to this effect to his minister of finance.¹¹ France now decided upon more forcible measures, but before she found it necessary to employ them the Sultan suddenly became amenable and a satisfactory settlement was effected on all three questions.¹² However, the settlement proved to be merely a two days' intermission, until the Sultan could catch his breath. This time France was weary of the game, and although Turkey once more promised to concede all points, M. Constans returned to Paris.

M. Delcassé now showed that he had mastered the finesse of the Oriental methods of diplomacy. Although after the severance of diplomatic relations the Sultan hastened to settle the question of the wharves and the claims of Tubini with the parties concerned, hoping thus to get an opportunity to bargain concerning the Lorando claims, France refused to abate her demands in the slightest degree. On the contrary it was decided to settle all the difficulties at once. A new note was despatched October 26, which covered not only the original demands, but all the other outstanding questions which had long awaited solution, and a squadron was sent to obtain its endorsement.¹³ The additional demands were as follows:

1. Official recognition and authorization must be afforded to all schools, hospitals, and religious establishments under French protection.

2. Immediate firmans authorizing necessary construction and repairs upon institutions damaged in recent troubles.

¹¹ Ibid., No. 5.

¹² Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 13.

¹³ Ibid., No. 52.

3. *Bérat* of recognition of the Chaldean Patriarch to be delivered in terms acceptable to the Holy See.

A joint note was then dispatched to the Powers indicating the reasons for sending a squadron to Mitylene, and outlining the claims as just indicated "not doubting that all the European governments appreciate the moderation of our demands and the obligation in which we have found ourselves to enforce them by the means indicated. . . ." ¹⁴

The squadron under Admiral Caillard arrived at Mitylene on November 5, 1901. The same day final arrangements were made for meeting the Lorando and Tubini claims, the following day the Council of Ministers approved the other French demands and sent a note of acceptance in full. ¹⁵ Upon being informed that immediate action was being taken to carry out the conditions, M. Delcassé ordered the fleet to withdraw and notified the Powers to this effect.

This whole incident seems in itself trivial enough

¹⁴ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 53. A much more elaborate explanation to the powers was sent out through the press than appears in the Yellow Book, in which it was declared that "France sought no conquest; the measures taken were rendered necessary by the attitude of the Porte which took the patience and moderation of the cabinet for weakness, and which constantly avoided promising unreservedly the execution of the French demands. France was positively obliged to convince the Turkish government by a naval demonstration that the recognition of its claims was an unavoidable necessity. If the French minister seized the occasion for demanding at the same time that the Porte fulfill its obligations towards France especially in that which concerns the religious institutions in the Orient, that cannot be considered truly as the fact of arbitrarily making use of the situation, but rather as an act of political wisdom, because the repetition of difficult explanations with the Porte may thus be avoided in the future. Finally the government gives the clearest assurances of regarding itself as bound by the Treaty of Berlin." Vienna Corr. of Daily Telegraph, quoted Rev. Pol. et Parl., December, 1901.

¹⁵ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 65 (annex).

and would be, if it were detached from its surroundings. But to see its vital importance to France at this time, it is only necessary to balance it against the rapid extension of German influence in Turkey as shown by the granting of the concession to continue the Bagdad Railway from Konia to the Persian Gulf the year before. The "sick man" of the East was failing rapidly and the German eagle was ready to swoop and carry off the whole of Mesopotamia if the field were clear. Great Britain was clever enough to seize Koweit, the only feasible outlet for the railway on the Persian Gulf; it was imperative that France take advantage of the occasion to strengthen her position in the Near East. By increasing her prestige among the Mohammedans, France had added one more girder to the bridge which she was building across the Channel. The English respect strength above all other qualities in both individuals and in nations, and M. Delcassé intended to strengthen France. "*Ne troublez pas l'agonie de la France*" was forever discarded.

When the affair came up in the Chamber, M. Delcassé was criticised by the Socialists on the ground that France had not interfered in the Armenian massacres, yet had sent a squadron to collect some private debts. M. Denys Cochin declared that the Sultan should render an account of inundating the quais of Constantinople with blood before accounting for his arrangements with the masons who constructed them.¹⁶

¹⁶ See speeches of MM. Marcel Sembat and Denys Cochin, Nov. 4, 1901, *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 65iv, p. 148; on Jan. 20, 1902, the question was again raised, and M. Gustave Rouet scathingly denounced M. Delcassé's handling of the Turkish question, declaring the French navy could be sent to enforce monetary claims while it would lie at

In reply M. Delcassé pointed out that France could intervene in Turkey only in a question essentially French. The question of Armenia was an international one and could not be settled by France alone, and to join it with questions essentially French would have brought about delays, increased the difficulties, and in no way improved the situation of the Armenians. As soon as the powers signatory of the Treaty of Berlin were willing to take up the question, France would join with them only too gladly. Then abandoning specific instances, he indicated forcefully his ideas on French foreign policy in its broader aspects:

“In the question of foreign policy there are two schools, one which considers France as the *means* to pursue a chivalric ideal abroad; the other as an *end* which should suffice in itself. The first declare that the rupture was caused by “*une question de gros sous.*” Yet if France permitted the Porte to disregard the interests upon which the conflict directly bore, a precedent would be created for the future which would permit the same treatment to be accorded to all French enterprises. France is ready to do her part liberally, very liberally, in every way which international solidarity and humanity demands, but she cannot forget, and you will not ask her to forget the superior duty which she owes to herself.”¹⁷

anchor while a whole people were being exterminated. *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 66i, p. 75.

¹⁷ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 65iv, p. 152. See also speech of Jan. 20, 1902, *ibid.*, Vol. 66i, p. 75; the eleventh Peace Congress meeting the following summer “considering that the recovery of the debts Tubini-Lorando which had served as pretext for armed intervention by France was a matter incontestably of judicial character . . . regrets exceedingly that appeal was not made to the Arbitration Court of the Hague.” *Rev. Pol. et Parl.*, Sept. 1902.

3. FRANCE AND THE BOXER REBELLION

Simultaneously with the difficulties arising in relation to the Ottoman Empire M. Delcassé found himself involved in even more serious troubles in the Far East, for "the sick man who sits yonder at Peking upon the tottering throne of the Manchu princes, preoccupies the European chancellories just as much as he who agonizes at Constantinople upon the worm-eaten throne of the autocratic and bloody sultans."¹⁸ In fact after Russia, Germany and France had forced Japan to revise the Shimonoseki Treaty to protect the integrity of China, the Powers seem to be agreed, that in order to continue their *protection*, it would be well for each of them to have as large a sphere of influence as possible to protect. This imperialistic banquet at the expense of China finally developed into a gluttonous orgy. In the year 1898, Germany by the treaty of March 6 obtained a ninety-nine year lease of the port of Kiaochau, the inalienability of Shantung, and the right of constructing and exploiting mines and railways in this province; Russia by the treaty of March 27 received a twenty-five year lease of Port Arthur and the Liaotung Peninsula—the very territory she had refused to Japan in 1895—and also the right of connecting Port Arthur to the Trans-Manchurian Railway, thus giving her an outlet upon open water, the dream of centuries; France by the treaty of April 5 had obtained confirmation of the concession of the Yunnan railway, the inalienability of the three provinces bordering Tonkin,

¹⁸ Augier, "La France et l'Angleterre en Extrême Orient," Rev. Pol. et Parl., April 1, 1904.

namely: Yunnan, Kwang-Si and Kwang-Tung, a lease on the Bay of Kwang-Chou-Wan, the promise not to cede Hainan—another protection of Tonkin—and promise to employ a Frenchman as director-general of the posts. Two months later she obtained the right to construct a railroad ending at Pakhoi.¹⁹ Finally Great Britain who had long looked with hostile and jealous eyes at French and Russian expansion which menaced India, by the arrangement of April 4 obtained a lease on the port of Wei-hai-Wei, the right to navigate on all the rivers of the Empire, exclusion of foreign interests in the basin of the Yangste-Kiang, the opening of another port in Hun-nan, and the reservation of the position of inspector-general of Chinese customs to an Englishman.²⁰ Even Italy tried to crowd in for a place at the feast by claiming the Bay of San Mun, but in vain.

As has already been indicated France found Great Britain to be her chief opponent in the Far East as well as elsewhere. With her chief interests in Indo-China she encountered British interests in Siam, in Yunnan and even in Hong-Kong—for in order to compete with the French railway from Yunnan to Hanoi, which afforded an outlet for the entire middle Yangste Valley, Great Britain could offer the three routes to Shang-hai, Hong-Kong or Rangoon.²¹ Furthermore, by the Treaty of January 15, 1896, Great Britain had cleverly excluded France from monopolizing the direct route to the Yangtse through Yunnan. "When supping with the French, it was best to use a long spoon."

¹⁹ Debidour, "Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe (1878-1904)," p. 267.

²⁰ Debidour, *op. cit.*, p. 269.

²¹ E. Augier, *op. cit.*, *supra*.

With the constant play and interplay of these various foreign interests in the very heart of her empire, every one of which aimed ultimately at the destruction of her sovereignty, it is not surprising that the long dormant China began to be aroused from her lethargy. France found that although she had the concession of Kwang-Chou-Wan on paper, there would be difficulty in carrying out the provisions. The Viceroy of Canton showed himself especially hostile, and after a long period of negotiations the French Commander-in-Chief of the Naval Division of the Far East on June 24, 1899, seized three ports and proclaimed the cession made.²² The Tsong-li-Yamen, or Chinese foreign office, continued to resist, and at length M. Stephen Pichon, the French minister,²³ declared that he would ask for his recall if a more conciliatory attitude were not shown. The Viceroy replied by threatening to organize a rebellion to prevent the French from taking possession.²⁴ If France was to maintain her position in the Orient she could not recede, and M. Delcassé ordered two battalions from Indo-China to Kwang-Chou-Wan. Affairs were brought to a climax by the murder of two French officers at Men-tao. Demands were now made for the immediate adoption of the convention, the recall of the Viceroy, the punishment of all those implicated in the murder and reparation to the families. At length on December 25, M. Pichon

²² Doc. Dip., "Chine" (1898-99), No. 18.

²³ This is the same M. Pichon who was to serve so ably as Minister of Foreign Affairs during the Clemenceau ministry (1906-1909) and also during the recent Clemenceau ministry (1917-1920) which brought France from the gloom of internal dissensions and the fear of defeat to the most glorious victory of her history.

²⁴ Doc. Dip., op. cit., Nos. 22 and 27.

was able to declare that the demands would be met in full.²⁵

Another source of difficulty to France was her position as protector of all Catholics in the Orient, for as sentiment grew against the "foreign devils," the missionaries were the first to suffer. She had taken it upon herself to bring to justice the murderers of the Belgian missionary, M. Delbrouck, who had been butchered in an unspeakable manner, when in October came the news of the murder of M. Chanès of the Canton mission with several other Catholics at Pak-tong.²⁶ Settlement was obtained for these outrages at the same time as the ratification of the French concessions, but they gave very clear indications of a deadly hatred towards the growing influence of the foreigners.

At Shanghai, the French found themselves at odds with both the Chinese and the English. The concession of Shang-hai included an ancient Chinese cemetery surrounding the Pagoda of Ning-po. The French had refused to allow further burials there, and had given the Association of the Pagoda of Ning-po six months' time to exhume the bodies already buried. No action was taken, however, and when the French, in order to put through some streets, were forced to exhume some of these bodies a violent outbreak occurred. To settle the difficulty the Chinese authorities offered an extension of the French concession in another direction in return for the lands of the Pagoda of Ning-po. The French were willing to treat upon this basis but the British now interfered, and at the behest of Lord Salis-

²⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 48.

²⁶ *Doc. Dip.*, *op. cit.*, Nos. 72-90.

bury, the English minister at Peking protested against any extension of the French concession (December 14, 1898).²⁷ The Chinese now broke off negotiations. M. Delcassé thereupon sent a long dispatch to M. Paul Cambon, French ambassador at London, outlining the whole affair, and pointing out to the English government that in 1896 plans had been formulated and approved for the enlargement of both the French concession and the International Concession, and as Great Britain was especially interested in the latter, he could not understand English interference at this time.²⁸

Mr. Chamberlain took up the cudgels in behalf of Great Britain and in a speech made at Wolverhampton, January 18, he asserted that English action was based upon the accords of the 9th and 24th of February, 1898, between the Chinese government and the British minister, wherein assurance had been given that no further cession of territory to any foreign power would be made in any part of the Yang-tse region.²⁹ M. Delcassé thereupon called attention to the fact that the open-door policy was included in terms of the French concession, and by notes to the Chinese government of April 4 and 9 France had extended this policy to the two Kwangs and to Yunnan. He also politely pointed out that when Great Britain had wished to enlarge her possessions at Kao-Lon, opposite Hong-Kong, the French government had not protested, though it was in violation of the French entente with China.³⁰ Great Britain gave no immediate indication that she appreci-

²⁷ Ibid., especially Nos. 103, 105 and 115.

²⁸ Ibid., No. 122.

²⁹ London Times, Jan. 19, 1899; also quoted in note of M. Delcassé

³⁰ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 123.

ated the conciliatory attitude of France, but when in the following month the question arose concerning an extension of the International Concession, France used it as an effective means of barter. Lord Salisbury was now led to see the justice of the French demands and a reciprocal adjustment to the mutual advantage of the two powers was finally effected.³¹

While Europe was thus engrossed in opening up China to the advantages of Western civilization in return for certain nominal economic advantages, the current of hostility towards everything foreign was running stronger than ever. The young Emperor Kuang-Su who had lent himself to a program of reforms, was unseated by the xenophobe Empress-Dowager in September, 1898. She instituted a ruthless crusade against all who had shown any leanings towards reform and made open hostility to the foreigner the key-note of her policy.³² She found an excellent tool at her hand in the "Righteous Harmony Fists," a secret society originating in the Province of Shantung, whose avowed intent was extermination of the foreigners. The earliest indication that we have that the European powers were beginning to realize the danger of their position occurs in an identic note sent by France, the United States, Great Britain, and Germany, January 27, 1900, to the Tsong-li-Yamen demanding an imperial edict pronouncing the dissolution and prohibition of all secret societies.³³ They

³¹ Ibid., Nos. 124-148 inc.

³² This sentence is found in one of her decrees: "Let no one think of making peace, but let each strive to preserve from destruction and spoilation by the ruthless hand of the invader his ancestral home and graves." Pott, "A Sketch of Chinese History," p. 204.

³³ Doc. Dip., "Chine," 1899-1900, No. 5.

were met with evasive answers and at length the representatives of the Powers considered staging a naval demonstration. Both the United States and Great Britain refused to associate themselves in any such undertaking although both decided to send warships to protect their interests.³⁴ While the Powers debated over what measures should be taken, the rebels increased in numbers and boldness, nor was it evident that the government was making much effort to repress them. In the words of M. Pichon: “. . . the blind hostility of the government of the Empress against all strangers is manifest. She is surrounded by mandarins who are for the most part quite ignorant regarding things outside and most passionate against all that departs from Chinese traditions. Her favor is acquired by those who wish to refuse everything to the representatives of the Powers . . . the secret societies are not ignorant of this attitude and are ready to profit by it.”³⁵

On May 20, M. Pichon proposed to the diplomatic corps that a despatch be sent to the Chinese government demanding immediate repression of the disorders, and unless complied with to have forces disembarked from the war-ships.³⁶ A very interesting side-light is thrown upon the diplomatic situation at Peking from the narrative of a rather frank eye-witness. It is the 24th

³⁴ Ibid., Nos. 11-16; the United States played a generous rôle throughout this most difficult period of Chinese history, commencing with Secretary Hay's famous memorandum of Sept. 6, 1899, concerning the open door, to which all nations interested had subscribed by March 20, 1900, and ending with the voluntary return of that part of the indemnity left over after the legitimate claims had been settled. See "Foreign Relations of the United States," 1899, p. 128.

³⁵ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 22.

³⁶ Ibid., No. 29.

of May and the British legation is *en fête* in honor of Queen Victoria's birthday, " . . . the eleven Legations and the nondescripts have forgotten their cares for a brief space and have been enjoying the evening air . . . where the devil is the protocol and the political situation you will say? Not quite forgotten since the French minister attracted the attention of many all the evening by his vehement manner . . . '*les Boxeurs*,' he says, and what the French minister says is always worth listening to since he has the best intelligence corps in the world—the Catholic priests of China—at his disposal. It is Monseigneur Favier's letter (Vicar Apostolic of the Manchu capital) written but five days ago that was the subject of his impromptu oration. Monseigneur Favier wrote and demanded a force of marines for his cathedral, his people and his chattels . . . and his request has been cruelly refused by the Council of Ministers on the ground that it is absurd . . .

"The French Minister was irate . . . took a discreet look around him and then hinted that it was this legation, the British legation, which stopped the marines from coming. . . . So the Boxers, with half the governments of Europe, led by England as we know by our telegrams, seeking to minimize their importance, have already moved from their particular habitat which is Shantung into the metropolitan province of Chihli." ³⁷

Fortunately for the safety of the legations, about 450 men from the foreign war-ships were sent forward and arrived in Peking before it was cut off from the

³⁷ Weale, "Indiscreet Letters from Peking," p. 13.

world. By June 10, even America was aroused, and M. Jules Cambon, French ambassador at Washington, was able to telegraph his government that the United States which had hitherto consistently refused to participate with the European powers in any military or naval demonstration now realized the gravity of the situation, and that if a military action became necessary the American troops would join with the European forces, and would serve under the same command. The same day a relief expedition under Admiral Seymour of the British fleet started for Tientsin, but was unable to fight its way through the hosts of rebels opposing it. The Powers now realized that the legations could be saved only by quick and concerted action. In reply to a question raised in the Chamber, M. Delcassé declared that M. Pichon had been authorized to act with the representatives of the other powers; the whole force of the naval division had been placed at his orders, and other forces if necessary. The Chinese government also had been notified that it would be held responsible for all French subjects within its jurisdiction.³⁸

It is not essential to our purpose to pursue the tortuous efforts of the Chinese government to settle the affair by diplomacy, while its troops were aiding the rebels to exterminate the official representatives of the Powers in Peking. Neither have we space to describe the heroic defence made by the legations for two whole months, day and night, against an intrepid and fero-

³⁸ Speech, June 11, 1900. *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. Gliv, p. 158; on June 21, M. Delcassé declared that France would have 2500 men in China by the end of the month. *Ibid.*, p. 339.

cious foe.³⁹ The Powers for the time forgot their wrangling and jealousy and agreed to concerted action upon this basis: (1) the safety of their representatives and citizens in Peking and other parts of the Empire; (2) the maintenance of the *status quo*; (3) guarantees against future outbreaks of this kind.⁴⁰ However, when the question came up as to who should be placed in command of the allied forces, there was considerable jockeying for position. Since her ambassador, Baron von Kettler, had been murdered, Germany resolved to obtain the position, and went about securing it in a very clever manner. The Kaiser first communicated privately with the Czar on the subject⁴¹ and then informed the British ambassador at Berlin that both Russia and Japan thought that a German supreme command would be of advantage inasmuch as the German interests in the Far East were not so extensive as those of certain other powers.⁴² Lord Salisbury immediately replied that "Her Majesty's government will view with great satisfaction an arrangement by which so distinguished a soldier is placed at the head of the international forces."⁴³

This prompt acquiescence of Great Britain following that of Russia made it very difficult for the French government to find a valid excuse for refusal. The Quai d'Orsay thereupon informed the German government that as soon as Marshal von Waldersee arrived

³⁹ For a vivid and interesting account, see the narrative of M. Pichon as published in the French Yellow Book. Doc. Dip., "Chine, 1899-1900," Rapport de M. Pichon.

⁴⁰ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 107.

⁴¹ Reventlow, "Deutschlands auswärtige Politik," p. 161.

⁴² Parl. Papers, 1901, Vol. 91 (c436), No. 128.

⁴³ Ibid., No. 143.

in China "and shall have taken the eminent position due to his superior rank, General Voyron, commander of the French forces will not fail to place his relations with the Marshal upon a proper footing (*ne manquera pas d'assurer ses relations avec le Maréchal*)."⁴⁴ The United States, the only other power that was unwilling to have its troops serve under a German commander-in-chief, side-stepped the difficulty in a very neat fashion. She gave her consent *if there should be further need of joint action after his arrival*.⁴⁵ When Count von Waldersee did reach Peking, two months after the siege was raised, General Chaffee, in command of the American expeditionary forces, refused to participate in operations ordered by the German commander-in-chief, on the ground that his instructions did not permit him to engage in offensive work tending to promote rather than allay hostilities.⁴⁶

As was to be expected, the news that the French forces in China were to serve under a German general provoked an outburst of indignation in France. M. Marcel Sembat protested strenuously in the Chamber: "when the Chinese see the troops of Europe under the command of a general from the State which has shown itself most brutally aggressive towards them, will they

⁴⁴ Parl. Papers, 1901, Vol. 91 (c436) No. 215. This correspondence concerning the supreme command is not to be found in the French Yellow Books on China.

⁴⁵ "Foreign Relations of the United States," 1900, No. 1338.

⁴⁶ Carter, "Life of Lieut. Gen. Chaffee," p. 210; a little later when the Germans commenced to introduce Hun methods in the administration of that part of Peking entrusted to them—stripping the Chinese Astronomical Observatory and sending the instruments to Germany—Gen. Chaffee so frankly enunciated his opinion of these acts that friendly relations between the two generals were seriously threatened. *Ibid.*, p. 215.

not feel that Europe is making war upon them with the purpose of continuing the policy shown at Kiao-Chau? Furthermore, knowing in advance the directions given to the German troops⁴⁷—which unfortunately were being carried out only too well—why should the other troops, despatched in the name of civilization, be placed under the control of a nation which considered the Chinese beyond the pale of international law?"⁴⁸

Now that all danger was passed many fruitful causes of conflict came up between the powers. Russia suggested as a preliminary to the negotiations that the Powers evacuate Peking, and she was backed by the United States. Great Britain and Germany opposed this stoutly, France remaining non-committal. Germany then suggested that before negotiations be entered into with China, a demand should be made for the surrender of all officials connected with the uprising, and they should be punished by the powers in accordance with their crimes. The United States refused to consider this program. Neither of these views obtaining much success, France now took the lead, and M. Delcassé, after first obtaining the adhesion of

⁴⁷ The Kaiser on saying good-bye to his troops at Bremerhaven, addressed them as follows: "You know you will have to fight with a cunning, brave, well-armed savage foe. When you come to close quarters with him remember pardon must not be given, prisoners must not be taken, whoever falls in your hands is doomed. As a thousand years ago the Huns under King Etzel made a name for themselves which still renders them terrible in tradition and story, in like manner may the name 'German' in China through you be so famed that for a thousand years to come no Chinaman will dare to look askance at a German." Cf. this version found in D. J. Hill, "Impressions of the Kaiser," p. 175, with the official mutilated version given in Klausman "Kaiserreden," p. 357.

⁴⁸ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 62iv, p. 279.

Russia, outlined the following six points as a basis of their collective negotiations:

I. Punishment by the Chinese government of the principal officials considered guilty; these to be designated by the representatives of the Powers at Peking.

II. Maintenance of the embargo in the importation of arms. (M. Delcassé had made this suggestion at the beginning of the trouble and the Powers had agreed.)

III. Payment by China of equitable indemnities.

IV. Constitution at Peking of a permanent guard for the legations.

V. Dismantling of the fortifications of Taku.

VI. The military occupation of two or three points on the route from Tientsin to Peking, thus keeping a free route open to the sea.⁴⁹

Italy was the first to give her adherence (October 5, 1900) followed three days later by Austria. Great Britain and Japan followed with slight reservations—Great Britain thought there should be as many points as powers in the sixth proposal. The United States agreed tentatively until she had further information, and Germany came in last.

Hardly had the governments come to an agreement upon this basis than they were astounded to learn that Great Britain and Germany had signed a separate dual agreement on the 16th of October in London upon a threefold basis: (1) maintenance of the open door policy in China; (2) maintenance of the territorial integrity of China; (3) in case another power should make use of the complications in China to obtain territorial

⁴⁹ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 327.

advantages, "the two contracting parties reserve to themselves to come to a preliminary understanding as to the eventual steps to be taken for the protection of their own interests in China."⁵⁰

At first glance the accord seemed to be aimed clearly at France and Russia. In an analysis of the accord given by M. René Henry, he asserted that the third article directly menaced Russia, who possessed both railroads and strategic points in Manchuria, while for France "a new Fashoda was possible between the hinterland of Tonkin and the English pretensions upon the Yangtse-Kiang, the Asiatic Nile."⁵¹ Great Britain, however, hastened to disclaim any such imperialistic designs and the foreign office on October 22 issued a note to that effect.⁵² France could not help feeling somewhat wounded in her *amour-propre* by this unexpected thrust of Salisbury, and in his reply M. Delcassé instead of adhering to the sentiments laid down simply "took notice" of the arrangement. He then declared that France "has long since manifested its desire of seeing China open to the economic activity of the whole world. The quick adhesion which it gave last December to a proposal of the government of the

⁵⁰ Parl. Papers, "China," 1900, Vol. 105 (Cd365); also in Yellow Book, No. 361.

⁵¹ René Henry, "Accord Anglo-Allemand," Rev. Pol. et Parl., Jan. 1901.

⁵² "It is perfectly exact that the Anglo-German Accord is directed in no fashion against Russia, and that it will effect in no manner the Russian railway concessions in Manchuria, where Russia has already obtained the right to construct railroads. The accord in question, to the principles of which it is hoped that all the powers will subscribe, has for its object the maintenance of the integrity of China, and has no relation to the arrangements that the powers may take among themselves to construct railroads in China." Rev. Pol. et Parl., Nov., 1900, p. 435.

United States was dictated by the same feelings. Its sentiment in this regard has not changed.

“As to the integrity of China the government of the Republican affirms so much the more willingly this principle that it has made it the base, as it has said several times, of its policy in the crisis in which the common efforts of the Powers tend to find a satisfactory solution. The universal assent to this principle appears to the French government a sure guarantee of its respect. If contrary to all expectation it should fail to be maintained, France would act as circumstances required to safe-guard its interests and its treaty rights.”⁵³

Very soon France began to realize that Great Britain had been innocent of any ulterior motives in making the arrangement, that it was Germany who was following a *poudre aux yeux* policy at the expense of her Anglo-Saxon cousin. Just as Italy had joined with Austria in the Triple Alliance as a measure of self-protection against her ally, so Germany who had much larger interests in the Yangtse region, the British sphere of influence, than Great Britain had in Shantung, the German sphere of influence, found it very much to her interest to sign up her rival in a self-denying agreement.⁵⁴

⁵³ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 362.

⁵⁴ John Hay in a private letter to Henry Adams shows that he was wide-awake to the situation: “What a business this has been in China! So far we have got on by being honest and naif . . . at least we are spared the infamy of an alliance with Germany. I would rather, I think be the dupe of China than the chum of the Kaiser. . . .

“My heart is heavy about John Bull. Do you twig his attitude to Germany? When the Anglo-German pact came out, I took a day or two to find out what it meant. I soon learned from Berlin that it meant a horrible, practical joke on England. From London I found out what

While the diplomats were staging this little *entre acte* in Europe, the diplomatic corps at Peking, taking M. Pichon's six points as a basis, drew up and adopted the conditions to be imposed upon the Chinese government. In addition to the six points which were kept almost intact, it was demanded that the Chinese government send expiatory missions to Germany and Japan, and to raise expiatory monuments in the Christian cemeteries in which tombs had been profaned. It was also demanded that a ministry of foreign affairs take the place of the Tsong-li-Yamen. The indemnity was set at 450 million taels (about 337 million dollars) and France was to receive 286½ million francs (about 57 million dollars). China had neither the means nor the desire to resist, and the final protocol embodying the terms was signed by her plenipotentiaries September 7, 1901.⁵⁵

Although with the signing of the protocol, the storm raised by the Boxers had subsided, still a few echoes of thunder could be heard in the chancellories of Europe. In order that there might be a concerted and simultaneous evacuation of Shanghai there were required two and a half years' time, and fifty-four notes on the part of the Quai d'Orsay. Lord Lansdowne, the new head of the British foreign office, was to learn that according to the Wilhelmstrasse, the famous arrangement of October 16, 1900, did not include Manchuria, no matter what the opinion of Downing Street might be on the subject. Count von Bülow was new in the Chancellor-

I had suspected, but what it astounded me after all to be assured of—that *they did not know!* Germany proposed it, they saw no harm in it and signed." Thayer, "Life and Letters of John Hay," Vol. II, p. 248.

⁵⁵ Doc. Dip. (June-October, 1901), "Protocol Final."

ship, but he was old in foreign affairs, and he made a very clear distinction between China and the Chinese Empire. Lord Lansdowne did not argue, he acted, and the Anglo-Japanese Alliance of January 30, 1902, was the result. Germany was caught between the upper and nether millstone—"jealous of England and afraid of Russia she accidentally treads on British toes while blacking Russia's boots."⁵⁶

This alliance which put a sudden end to Great Britain's policy of "splendid isolation," purposed to maintain the two principles of the *status quo* and the open door, already subscribed to on several occasions by all the powers interested in China; and in addition it declared that if either country should be attacked by a *single* power while maintaining the alliance, the other would remain neutral; but if a coalition were formed the *casus foederis* intervenes and both would make war.⁵⁷ To France acting solely in her own interests, the alliance was wholly harmless—had not M. Delcassé as far back as November, 1899, before he had subscribed to the note of the United States regarding the open door, declared in the Chamber: "we must try to maintain China open to the free struggle of the intelligence and capital of the whole world."⁵⁸ For France as the ally of Russia, the answer was not so simple, for both Great Britain and Japan considered Manchuria as an integral part of the Chinese Empire, no matter what the Russian or German theories might be. The ques-

⁵⁶ An excellent summary of the causes leading up to the Anglo-Japanese Treaty is found in an article by Bushby, "The Anglo-Japanese Treaty," *Nineteenth Century*, March, 1902.

⁵⁷ *Parl. Papers, Agreement between the United Kingdom and Japan*, 1902, Vol. 130 (Cd914).

⁵⁸ *Annales du Sénat*, Vol. 61, p. 605.

tion in reality was—how closely was France willing to bind herself to Russia in the latter's imperialistic enterprises in Manchuria? Russia, in the eyes of Britain, was "creeping over Manchuria behind a foggy cloud of assurances, secretly backed by Germany, openly backed by France, and posing all the time as a friend of China."⁵⁹

M. Sembat raised the question in the Chamber (February 3, 1902), of the danger of maintaining the Russian Alliance, declaring that no longer was it possible to marry "*le grand Turk avec la République de Venise*"; for a true alliance there must be a community of interests and directing principles.⁶⁰ This was a week before the publication of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance; after its publication the Socialists were not alone in believing that France was playing a dangerous game in the Far East in sustaining Russian schemes. However, the Government was in no position to desert Russia at this time even if it so desired; its only safety lay in a bold statement of its position. On March 20, the diplomatic representatives of France and Russia communicated the following declaration to the ministers of foreign affairs of the powers signatory of the Protocol of Peking:

"The allied governments of France and Russia, having received communication of the Anglo-Japanese convention of January 30, 1902 . . . are fully satisfied at finding there the affirmation of the essential principles which they have themselves on several occasions declared to constitute and which remain the base of their

⁵⁹ H. N. G. Bushby, *op. cit.*, *supra*.

⁶⁰ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 66i, p. 491.

policy. The two governments esteem that the respect of these principles is at the same time a guarantee of their special interests in the Far East. However, they too, being obliged to envisage the case when either the aggressive action of third powers, or new troubles in China . . . might become a menace to their interest, the two allied governments reserve the right to take measures to assure their protection.”⁶¹

Once more France found herself face to face with Great Britain in a situation which at first glance held possibilities just as sinister as those of Fashoda. Fortunately for the long cherished purpose of M. Delcassé the danger was not as great as it appeared. With Edward VII on the throne, and Lord Lansdowne in the Foreign Office, it soon became evident that the desire for an understanding was mutual. The Boer War had surfeited the English people with wars of conquest, and at last it began to dawn upon even the most ardent francophobe, that the real enemy of Great Britain was Germany. The phenomenal commercial expansion of Germany, the great naval bill of 1900, the Bagdad Railway scheme, with the domination of Asia Minor as its corollary, cast no uncertain shadow of coming events. Therefore when M. Denys Cochin arose in the Chambre, and declared that the Yalu River would be a second Rubicon, and that the Franco-Russian note was a defiance to the Anglo-Japanese challenge, M. Delcassé confidently replied that the new declaration meant simply that there was a “*concours de forces*” towards a similar object, the maintenance

⁶¹ Text may be found in “Chronologie française,” Rev. Pol. et Parl., April, 1902, p. 208.

of the *status quo* and the common peace, a condition which is equally precious to all—"a house well guarded and known to be well guarded discourages temptation." ⁶²

4. FRANCO-SIAMESE RELATIONS

Before leaving the Far East we must touch briefly upon French relations with Siam, the land of the White Elephant, which borders upon French Indo-China and whose productive rice fields and magnificent forests of teak had long been a temptation to French governors of Indo-China. Great Britain, established in Burma and the Malay Peninsula, again acted as a check upon the aspirations of the French colonial party when they tended to overreach themselves. As a consequence, Siam found herself in the unfortunate position of a weak buffer state between two powerful imperialistic nations—her only safety in the equal balance of their jealous rivalry. France had signed a treaty of delimitation of frontiers with Siam, October 3, 1893, which it had been hoped would put an end to disputes between the two countries. Instead, by the maintenance of a neutral zone twenty-five kilometers wide on the right bank of the Mekong River, which became a rendezvous for bandits, and by holding possession of Chantabun, in the heart of Siamese territory as a guarantee, the hostility of the Siamese against the French was increased rather than diminished. The French soon found themselves completely eliminated from participation with other nations in the political, economic, or administrative life of the little kingdom.

⁶² *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 66ii, p. 1898.

An arrangement had been concluded in 1896 with Great Britain, in which a satisfactory delimitation of territories and of spheres of influence between France and Great Britain had been established. It remained to make a satisfactory settlement with Siam. Immediately upon coming into office M. Delcassé had taken the matter up, and in April, 1899, M. Doumer, Governor General of French Indo-China, after visiting the King of Siam at Bangkok, was enabled to make an arrangement satisfactory to both parties. The agreement settled the four outstanding questions of dispute:

1. In regard to French protégés Siam was to recognize those at present enrolled, also the Annamites, Laotians and Cambodians to the second generation, and Chinese if they wished.

2. The twenty-five kilometer zone on the right bank of the Mekong was to be considered under the civil administration of Siam, but not under its military control.

3. Siam to cede to France the provinces on the right boundary of the realm Luang-Prabang.

4. France to withdraw her garrison from Chantabun.⁶³

Hardly had M. Doumer left Bangkok before the King repudiated the whole arrangement, and when after a series of unsuccessful negotiations it was evident that no satisfactory arrangement could be arrived at, M. Delcassé broke off the *pour parlers*. Nothing further was attempted during the Boxer Rebellion, but in July, 1901, M. Delcassé despatched a new envoy, M. Klobukowski, to see if a new basis of settlement might be

⁶³ Doc. Dip., "Affaires de Siam," 1893-1902, No. 37 annexe.

reached. After another year of intermittent negotiations a new treaty was signed October 7, 1902. This treaty gave France fishing rights on the Great Lake, two provinces formerly belonging to Cambodia, namely Meluprey and Bassac, and a small piece of land north of Great Lake; in return France gave up Chantabun, took away the twenty-five kilometer zone of neutrality, and cut down considerably on the number of her protégés.⁶⁴ In explaining the treaty before the Chamber M. Delcassé declared that in signing the accord the government had been guided by two thoughts: first, to bring about more friendly relations with the Siamese; secondly, to obtain new elements of strength and new guarantees for the safety of Indo-China. No friendly relations would ever be possible so long as the French remained at Chantabun—this occupation the Siamese considered as a humiliation and a menace. Nor could the French demand that the zone of twenty-five kilometers, where the troops of neither might penetrate, should be left as the abode of brigands and malefactors of all sorts. The concessions made secured the safety of Cambodia and gave important new fishing rights on Great Lake. Already to show its friendly intentions, the Siamese government had promised to install a department of sanitation under French engineers, a bacteriological institution under French physicians, and to allow teaching of French in their schools and colleges.⁶⁵

Unfortunately for the success of the treaty, "M. Delcassé was about the only one who found the diplomatic

⁶⁴ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 79 annexe.

⁶⁵ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 63, p. 1228.

instrument which had come from his hands satisfactory.”⁶⁶ The colonial group of the Senate rose in arms against it, its organ “Questions Diplomatiques et Coloniales” conducted what it called an impartial inquest on the subject but in which most of the opinions expressed were exceedingly hostile.⁶⁷ M. René Millet, a brilliant and authoritative critic of foreign affairs, called M. Delcassé’s policy “*une politique d’abandon*.”⁶⁸

Realizing the futility of trying to carry through the treaty opposed so strenuously by public opinion, M. Delcassé let the matter drop until 1904, when on February 13, a new convention was announced. It maintained those advantages gained by the other, namely the cession of Bassac and Meluprey, and also reestablished the rights of France over that part of the realm of Luang-Prabang situated on the right bank of the Mekong. It also accorded to France the maritime district of Korat, made her participant in the large public works, and reestablished to a great extent her power of extritoriality over former inhabitants of Annam and Laos now established in Siam. In return France gave up the twenty-five kilometer zone on the west bank of the Mekong and withdrew from Chantabun. Apparently this treaty was more satisfactory, or at least it was good in comparison with the other, and when it came up for vote November 12, it passed without further discussion.⁶⁹

⁶⁶ “Histoire des Relations de la France et du Siam.” Thèse par Gabriel Mauriel, p. 41.

⁶⁷ Ques. Dip. et Col., Dec. 1, 1902.

⁶⁸ René Millet, “L’Affaire du Siam,” Rev. Pol. et Parl., Dec. 1902.

⁶⁹ Text may be found in Ques. Dip. et Col., Feb. 16, 1904. For further

When the mixed commission of delimitation made its report regarding the boundaries established by this treaty it was found that France had obtained a narrow stretch of territory, that of Dan-Sai, of little use to her but "a thorn in the side of Siam." Also with Siam's rapid progress in adapting herself to western civilization the extraterritoriality rights of the nations became more and more irksome. So it was that on March 23, 1907, the French government and the King of Siam "desirous of assuring the final regulation of all questions relative to the common frontiers of Indo-China and Siam . . . and desirous of facilitating the relations between the two countries . . . have decided to conclude a new treaty." In the articles of the treaty which followed Siam ceded to France or to the French protectorate of Cambodia, the three provinces of Battambang, Siem-rap and Sisophon, in return for which France retroceded to Siam the territories of Dan-sai and of Korat. Furthermore France modified considerably the extraterritorial rights which she formerly enjoyed in return for which Siam guaranteed that French Asiatic subjects and protégés should enjoy the same rights in the kingdom as her own nationals.⁷⁰

This treaty, although France received appreciable advantage, was drawn upon a basis of more generous compromise, and has proved more satisfactory to all concerned. It enabled the rich little kingdom in the basin of the Menam, with its American general adviser,

discussion see Francis Mury, "Nouvelle Traité avec le Siam," *ibid.*, 1 Apr., 1904; "Nouvelle Convention franco-siamois," *Rev. Pol. et Parl.*, March, 1904; also Gabriel Maurel, *op. cit.*, *supra*.

⁷⁰ An analysis of the terms of this treaty may be found in Ques. *Dip. et Col.*, Apr. 16, 1907; an excellent discussion of its terms by Robert de Caix, *ibid.*, May 16, 1907.

its British departmental directors, its French and English judicial advisers, its German railway managers, its French and Italian engineers, its Danish naval officers, all under a Siamese minister to pursue its cosmopolitan existence in peace.

CHAPTER IV

DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH ITALY AND THE POPE

1. THE FRANCO-ITALIAN *RAPPROCHEMENT*

WHEN a great nation risks a war with another great nation, to bring to fruition the dreams of freedom of an ardently patriotic but weak and oppressed neighbor, such action will surely be attributed to selfish motives. Acts inspired by such sentiments as "greater love hath no man . . ." are not the ordinary basis of international relations. Consequently it is safe to say that Napoleon III had a selfish motive in aiding Cavour. His throne needed the luster which a popular and successful war would bring, and Savoy and Nice were pearls worthy of any crown. Furthermore the sacrifice of the young and beautiful Princess Clotilde to the jaded appetite of Prince Napoleon gave evidence enough that he was not wholly a knight-errant in his motives. But whatever ulterior purposes Napoleon may have had, Villa franca assured the unity of Italy, and Magenta and Solferina sealed it with French blood.¹ Yet from that time, France found to her sorrow that she had aided in the birth of a new enemy.

¹ Cavour himself confessed that the political and military campaign following Villa franca was more advantageous to Italy than that preceding it—"how many times in the solitude of Leri did I cry out, 'Blessed be the peace of Villa franca!'" Quoted by Charles de Saint-Cyr, "Pourquoi l'Italie est notre alliée?" p. 204.

Thiers' declaration, "the gratitude of Italy will endure in proportion to its feebleness" did not become famous without grounds. Nor was Bismarck wrong when he declared that the Mediterranean could not be divided between kindred nations; especially so long as he was there and ready to play upon the strings of their mutual jealousy. Even after Bismarck had fallen, Crispi remained; "he had listened too long to the Mephistophiles of Berlin"² to change the direction of his course even if he wished. When he came to realize that Italy was merely a lever for Germany and Austria to obtain advantages for themselves, it was too late. We have clear evidences of his disillusionment just before his downfall in March, 1896. We find this note in his diary upon occasion of a visit from Von Bülow: ". . . he declared that Germany would always be on our side. I expressed some doubt of this. I said that I had indeed perceived the advantages of the alliance in Bismarck's day, but not afterwards with his successors."³ A little later, in a note to Germany, he declared: ". . . The Italian people are not yet disillusioned with regard to the alliance with Germany, but who can guarantee that they may not be so tomorrow, if things continue as they are."⁴ His words were prophetic. The disaster of Adowa dragged him down in its wake and a new era in Franco-Italian relations began.

Before the year was over the new foreign minister, the Marquis Visconti-Venosta, signed two conventions with France which did away with the regime of capitulation.

² Jacques Bainville, "Italy and the War," p. 163.

³ "Mémoires of Francesco Crispi," Vol. III, p. 335.

⁴ Ibid., p. 347.

lations in Tunis by which France had bound herself in the Treaty of Kassar-Said,⁵ and also a Maritime Convention for the one which had expired in 1886. However, in order to bring the nations back into satisfactory commercial relations, it was essential to obtain a new treaty of commerce for the one which Crispi had so rashly allowed to lapse. France was willing to receive her wayward sister back into the commercial fold, and the treaty drawn up by MM. Hanotaux and Billot, was signed by MM. Delcassé and Barrère February 2, 1899. "Italy could breathe again; the cord which was choking and threatening to strangle her, was loosed."⁶

A wedge had been driven into the Triple Entente, and M. Delcassé was determined that the fissure should be widened. The *rapprochement* begun on a commercial basis, must be carried on to a political basis. What were the differences still outstanding? The question of Tunis had been settled by the arrangement of 1896. There still remained the fear that ever haunted the Italians that France might attempt to restore the Pope; also the question of Tripoli, which had now taken the place of Tunis as a field for Italian expansion. The attitude of the Waldeck-Rousseau ministry towards the Church, as evidenced by the Law of Associations introduced in 1899, was most reassuring to the Quirinal; we shall show later how the Combes ministry laid the ghost forever. Let us first consider the question of Tripoli.

⁵ René Pinon, "L'Empire de la Méditerranée," p. 39; see also A. Billot, "La France et l'Italie," Vol. II, p. 372.

⁶ René Pinon, op. cit., p. 40; the letters exchanged by M. Delcassé and Count Tornelli and the terms of the arrangement in full may be found in Archives Diplomatiques, Vol. 68, p. 322.

Once more we are brought back to the relations between the two powers and Great Britain. Although since 1882 Italy had been a member in good standing of the Triple Alliance, she was none the less closely bound by ties of friendship to Great Britain. In fact, in her struggle to uphold her interests in the Mediterranean, Italy found her friendship with Great Britain far more useful than her alliance with Germany and Austria. In 1887, the Marquis de Rudini, Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, had said:

“ . . . Italy tenaciously wishes for the maintenance of the balance of power in Europe, and the preservation of the *status quo* in the Mediterranean especially. . . .

“An exchange of opinions took place only a few years ago with England, followed by declarations on the part of Sir James Fergusson in the English parliament; his language was strictly conformable to the facts of the case. Both Italy and England purpose to maintain peace while preserving the *status quo*. I may say, moreover, that I perceive no questions, respecting which, the views of Italy are not in accordance with those of England, seeing that their interests are identical.”⁷

In his speech at Guild Hall Lord Salisbury, November 9, 1887, was more non-committal but declared that the speech of the minister of Italy—a state with which England's sympathies were deeply bound up—indicated that its aims were identical with those of England, and its hopes to have England's sympathies on its side were not groundless. The unsatisfactory part

⁷ Quoted from Tardieu, “France and the Alliances,” p. 92.

of the reply for Italy came in the fact that Lord Salisbury associated Austria's name with Italy's—attributing to both the same ideals of peace.⁸

With Italy thus closely joined to Great Britain in ties of friendship, it is not surprising that the Treaty of March 21, 1899, between France and Great Britain, establishing a delimitation of their boundaries in Central Africa aroused both interest and fear in Italy. A mere glance at the map will show that by this arrangement the greater part of the hinterland of Tripoli thus came under French influence, the only other outlet being through the Libyan Desert, which was under British influence. The danger to Tripoli in the rapid expansion of French influence in this hinterland is clearly pointed out in a memorandum sent to Crispi by the Colonial Department in 1894: “. . . As Tripoli's prosperity depends entirely upon trade, deprived of her caravan ways which lead into Sokoto, Bornu, Baghirmi, and Wadai, Tripoli might well be compared

⁸ A complete report of the speech may be found in London Times, Nov. 10, 1887. In his book, "From Triple to Quadruple Entente" (London, 1915), Dr. E. J. Dillon says that Lord Salisbury in this speech "told his hearers that the traditional fraternity between England and Italy was about to assume more concrete forms and that England would see that the *status quo* in the Mediterranean was not upset to the prejudice of the Italian nation," but this is contradicted by the report appearing in the Times. In fact as late as 1896 Italy called her relations with England "her alliance of friendship," and Lord Lansdowne, speaking in the House of Lords, July 18, 1902, declared that there never had been an Anglo-Italian alliance. However when early in 1920 the secret treaties of Austria-Hungary were published, it was found that Great Britain had made secret agreements with both Italy and Austria in regard to the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Mediterranean, Adriatic, Aegean and Black Sea. The first Mediterranean Agreement was signed February 12, 1887, and the second, December 12 of the same year. For the text of these agreements see Pribram, "The Secret Treaties of Austria-Hungary," pp. 96 and 128.

to an empty jewel-case.”⁹ Italy’s only hope, now that she could no longer count on English support against the French—her own allies being quite uninterested in her Mediterranean aspirations—lay in making some sort of an agreement with France.

It is to the credit of M. Delcassé that he did not try to make Italy pay for the French set-back in the Sudan. He was playing for larger stakes than one or two extra oases in the Sahara Desert. Like Bismarck, after Sadowa, he realized that sometimes it pays to make a generous bargain. He had most excellent instruments at his hand to accomplish his task. M. Barrère, the French ambassador, a most energetic and able man, was eager to carry out his chief’s wishes, and his work was rendered easier by his popularity in Rome. Among the Italians both the Marquis de Rudini and the Marquis Visconti-Venosta were equally anxious to make “*la fraternité latine*” more than an empty phrase. Finally the new king, Victor Emmanuel III, who in 1896, had made a love-match with Princess Helen of Montenegro, thus drawing more closely to Russia, now cast his influence on the side of France, and “*les miasmes déposés par Crispi au fond vaseux du tonneau triplicien se sont évanouis sous le clair et loyal regard du souverain.*”¹⁰

The first tangible results were seen early in 1900. On January 24, a protocol was signed at Rome by MM. Visconti-Venosta and Barrère fixing delimitations of the French and Italian possessions on the Red Sea and the Gulf of Aden.¹¹ This was completed by another

⁹ “Memoirs of Francesco Crispi,” III, 70.

¹⁰ Charles de Saint Cyr, *op. cit.*, *supra*, p. 203.

¹¹ Archives Diplomatiques, Vol. 76, p. 44.

protocol signed July 10, 1901, in which the special commission provided for in the former arrangement gave a definite delimitation to the frontiers.¹² There still remained the more important question of Tripoli. As an evidence of increasing friendliness between the two countries, on April 10, 1901, an Italian squadron under the command of the king's uncle, anchored in the port of Toulon as a mark of respect to President Loubet, who was *en voyage* accompanied by the French fleet. The telegrams and toasts exchanged were more than cordial. In the course of the year confidential notes were exchanged between the two powers and on December 14, M. Prinetti, the Italian Minister of Foreign Affairs, speaking in the Chamber, referred to "the mutual confidence which had become the rule in the relations between the two countries." Continuing, he declared that:

" . . . This confidence is so much the better founded on our part since already some time ago, the government of the Republic has taken care to inform us that the Franco-English Convention of March 21, 1899, marked for France in regard to the countries and regions touching on the eastern frontier of her African possessions, notably the vilayet of Tripoli, a limit that she had no intention of passing, adding that neither did she have any intention of cutting the caravan routes from Tripoli to Central Africa.

"Since then the friendly relations of the two countries have become such that they have permitted the two governments to exchange explanations both clear

¹² Ibid., Vol. 84, p. 42. The text of both of these protocols may also be found in *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. 94, pp. 588-589.

and satisfactory upon their interests in the Mediterranean, and these explanations have led them to state the perfect agreement of their views upon that which is of a nature to interest their respective situations.”¹³

This speech indicated that an understanding had been reached and pointed out clearly enough the advantages to Italy. What M. Prinetti omitted to indicate was what France should receive in return. The French were just as anxious to know this as were the Italians; and M. Delcassé did not keep them long in suspense. On January 3, 1902, “*le Giornale d'Italia*” published a lengthy interview of its Paris correspondent, M. Ugo Ojetti, with M. Delcassé. The French Foreign Minister informed him that the idea of such an accord had come to him in 1898—three months before becoming minister—upon the occasion of a visit to Rome. Meeting a number of eminent Italian statesmen, among others the Marquis di Rudini and the Marquis Visconti-Venosta, he pointed out to them that of all the nations of Europe France and Italy had the fewest real causes of conflict. He then went on to show how the agreement with England had made an arrangement with Italy possible. But as every accord in politics is a bilateral contract, a *do ut des* arrange-

¹³ Text of this speech in full may be found in Ques. Dip. et Col., Jan. 15, 1902. On January 1, 1902, M. Barrère, the French ambassador, alluding to this speech, said: “. . . It indicates with an eloquent precision that the era of Franco-Italian misunderstandings upon a ground where their vital interests are at stake belongs henceforth to the past, and there now exists between the two governments a perfect concordance of views. There is no longer between France and Italy a Mediterranean question; and that is the surest guarantee that the future reserves to the two great Latin nations a long and fecund period of fraternal friendship and peace.” Ibid.; also to be found in Rev. Pol. et. Parl. Feb., 1902.

ment, and since Italy's interests were in the east and those of France in the west, the balance upon the whole northern coast of the Mediterranean was easy to strike. In reply to a query of the correspondent if he meant Morocco, he replied, "Precisely, including Morocco."¹⁴

In order that all doubts as to a *rapprochement* might be set at rest M. Delcassé followed this up by a statement in the Chamber (January 21, 1902). He declared that political relations had become so friendly that "they have permitted the two countries to exchange directly to their equal satisfaction complete explanations regarding all their interests in the Mediterranean. . . ." ¹⁵ In a subsequent statement to the Senate (March 20, 1902), he pointed out that "France and Italy realize how much they have gained in security and in liberty of moving, each in the sphere which is proper to it, and everything strengthens them in this precious conviction, that to assure to their new relations a long and fecund future, they have only to persevere in a way whereby their general policy will be put more and more in harmony with the spirit which has presided at their *rapprochement*." ¹⁶

The arrangement did not wholly escape criticism in France, even though it was everywhere realized that two very satisfactory results had been accomplished—the Triple Alliance had been weakened, and the approach to Great Britain had been made easier. The

¹⁴ Ques. Dip. et Col., Jan. 15, 1902.

¹⁵ Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 66i, p. 130.

¹⁶ Annales du Sénat, Vol. 61, p. 605. M. Barrère speaking at Rome on Jan. 1, 1920, declared that the Franco-Italian agreement of 1902 established that in case of an aggressive war either country would maintain strict neutrality, even in case one of them was obliged to declare war to defend her honor and safety. N. Y. Times, Jan. 2, 1920.

colonial party were by no means willing to consider Tripoli forever alienated from their sphere of influence. They refused to subscribe to M. Decrais' statement: "Our colonial empire is completely constituted."¹⁷ M. Etienne, one of the leaders of the colonial group, wanted to know what Italy could give in Morocco corresponding to the renunciation which France was making in regard to Tripoli.¹⁸ M. René Pinon, who is usually very sound and clear-sighted in his judgment, asked if France was not walking "like the astrologist of the fable, her eyes fixed upon her ideal of justice and peace while her rivals were digging before her steps the well in which she was to fall." Perhaps even M. Delcassé himself "built wiser than he knew."

What did Germany think of an arrangement which was aptly called "*l'oraison funèbre de la Triple Alliance*"? On January 8, 1902, Chancellor von Bülow speaking in the Reichstag regretted that a certain part of the German press seemed uneasy over the Franco-Italian arrangement. "A husband does not take offense if his wife dances a waltz innocently with another. The essential thing is that she return to him, and she will do it if she is best off with him . . . the Franco-Italian arrangements upon certain Mediterranean questions are in no way opposed to the Triple

¹⁷ On December 11, 1899, M. Decrais, Minister of the Colonies, outlined the future colonial policy of France stating that in his belief "to the period of conquest and territorial expansion . . . must succeed the still more difficult period of pacification, organization and exploitation." *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 59iv, p. 382.

¹⁸ Eug. Etienne, "L'Accord franco-italien et le Maroc," *Ques. Dip. et Col.*, Jan. 15, 1902.

Alliance.”¹⁹ The only fault with the metaphor was that Italy was not so sure that she was well off in what had only been at best a *mariage de convenance*. On the whole it was rather a dark day for the Chancellor, for not only did he have to explain the harmless flirtation of a member of the Triplice, but he was also forced to criticize M. Chamberlain publicly for a lack of diplomatic courtesy.²⁰ The same forces that were drawing France towards Italy were apparently drawing England away from Germany. Nor did Great Britain appear to regret that the two Latin states were becoming more friendly. When Sir Charles Dilke pointed out that the Anglo-Italian understanding for the maintenance of the *status quo* had been replaced by the Franco-Italian understanding,²¹ Lord Lansdowne replied: “We regard it as natural considering her geographical position and her commercial requirements that she should wish to be on terms of friendship with her French neighbor . . . we should be the last to complain if by means of such an arrangement as she has arrived at, she has improved and strengthened her international position.”²²

However, when in June, 1902, Italy did renew her allegiance to the Triple Alliance and the question was raised as to the effect of this return “after the ball was over,” M. Delcassé was able to state publicly in the

¹⁹ J. Penzler, “Fürst Bülow's Reden,” I, 241.

²⁰ Mr. Chamberlain, angered at the German press criticisms of the Boer War, had in his speech at Edinburgh, Oct. 25, 1901, invited the Germans to recall their own acts when marching on Paris. In reply Prince von Bülow said: “When a minister is obliged to justify his policy he would do well not to drag in foreign countries.”

²¹ Parl. Debates, Vol. 110, p. 703.

²² Ibid., Vol. III, p. 662.

Chamber: "The declarations made by the Italian government have permitted us to be certain that Italy's policy through its alliances is directed neither directly nor indirectly against France, in no way does it threaten us either in diplomatic form or by international military protocols and in no fashion can Italy become either the instrument or auxiliary of an aggression against our country." ²³

If M. Delcassé had been able to read Articles IX and X of the Fourth Treaty of the Triple Alliance, which Italy signed June 28, 1902, he would not have been so confident that Italy's policy was not directed against France. The Revolution of November, 1918, in Austria, which opened up the national archives, has made it possible for Professor Pribam of the University of Vienna to give to the world the texts of the various secret treaties to which Austria-Hungary was a party.

Article X of the Triple Alliance Treaty of 1902 states that "if France should make a move to extend her occupation, protectorate, or sovereignty, under any form whatsoever, in the North African territories, and that in consequence thereof Italy, in order to safeguard her position in the Mediterranean, should feel that she must herself undertake action in the said North African territories, or even have recourse to extreme measures in French territory in Europe, the state of war which would thereby ensue between Italy and France would constitute *ipso facto*, on the demand of Italy, and at the common charge of Germany and Italy the *casus foederis* . . ." The protocol attached to this treaty declares that the signatory powers would exert

²³ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 67, p. 455.

themselves *to obtain the accession of England* to the program established by Articles IX and X.

If any further proof were needed of the remarkable diplomatic insight of M. Delcassé, this evidence of Italy's real attitude gives it. If England could be drawn into the Triple Alliance, Italy's agreement with France would have been another "scrap of paper." But if France could bring England to her support, Italy would find it contrary to her interests to oppose France, and it would then become necessary to find means of releasing herself from the inconvenient bonds of the Triple Alliance. Whether M. Delcassé suspected Italy or not, if the secret treaties of the Triple Alliance were before his eyes, he could not have acted more wisely to safeguard the interests of France than by pushing forward rapidly his plan to bring about a *rapprochement* with England.

2. FRENCH RELATIONS WITH THE VATICAN

At last the two Latin nations had settled their colonial differences, and had come to a definite agreement in regard to their general foreign policy. There remained the more delicate question of the Third Republic's relations to the Vatican. As the "eldest daughter of the Church," as the avowed protector of Catholics in the Orient, how could France consistently enter into cordial relations with the government of Italy, still regarded by the Vatican as the despoiler of the papacy? To answer this question intelligently we must consider the internal politics of this period.

Ever since the Third Republic was established, the Republicans, especially those with radical tendencies,

believed that the Concordat had served its purpose.²⁴ The clarion call of Gambetta, "*le clericalism, voilà l'ennemi*," rang ever in their ears, and the Boulanger Affair only brought matters to a head. The life of the Republic itself was being threatened by a small group of Royalists aided by a larger group of Clericals. After the utter collapse of the Boulanger movement, and the impeachment of its leader, Leo XIII, "*le Fabius Cunctator de la nouvelle Rome assiégée*," as M. Hanotaux aptly designated him, diplomatically decided to accept the Third Republic as really established. His famous encyclical letter of 1892 called the attention of his adherents to this fact. From then on till the Dreyfus Affair, there was a lull in the attempts to undermine the Republic, but before this long and bitter struggle was ended, it was realized that the snake had only been scotched; now it must be killed. The Waldeck-Rousseau ministry had saved the state; it remained to safeguard it for the future. The Associations Bill of 1899, aimed especially at the Jesuits and Assumptionists, as finally promulgated in July, 1901, allowed no religious association to be formed without express authorization of the government, and also made it possible to dissolve a religious order by ministerial decree. In the hands of a broad-minded statesman like M. Waldeck-Rousseau, it safeguarded the state; in the hands of his successor, M. Combes, a vindictive anti-clerical, it meant destruction to the religious orders. The Pope protested against its promulgation as an unjust law of reprisals in opposition

²⁴ It has been said that Napoleon at St. Helena regarded the Concordat as the greatest mistake of his life.

to the principles of natural law, and pregnant with deplorable consequences, but the anti-clericals would not be called off.²⁵

Nevertheless while the government was stamping out clericalism at home, it did not forget that Gambetta, who saw the enemy in clericalism, had also maintained that clericalism was not an object of exportation. So that although M. Marcel Sembat violently arraigned the policy of the government as being absolutely incoherent—atheistic in France and clerical in China—it still maintained its policy of protecting Catholic missionaries and associations in the Orient.²⁶ Upon another occasion when M. Cassagnac cynically remarked that it was much better to be a Chinese than a French Christian, M. Waldeck-Rousseau replied that the government's attitude was that if it did not extend its protection to religious orders which had gone there at its request and relying upon its treaties, it would be renouncing its protectorate. The real interest of France demanded that not one of its hospitals, schools, or dispensaries should be abandoned.²⁷

The question of discontinuing the embassy at the Vatican was also raised by the Socialists, on the ground that France ought not strengthen the forces of an adversary which it was combatting. M. Delcassé came

²⁵ Doc. Dip., "Saint Siège," (1899-1903), No. 15 Annexe. A very excellent discussion of the attitude of the clerical party in France may be found in Mr. Fullerton's "Problems of Power," pp. 75-95.

²⁶ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 64iii, p. 803. The Pope had already made it clear that he would not sustain the historic rights of France to the Catholic protectorate of the world the day when these vexatary measures should be approved by the government. Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 3.

²⁷ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 65iv., p. 461.

out strongly against any such policy. He pointed out that even if the Church and State should separate, it was necessary to remain in communication with the head of the Church. Any other policy might weaken the Vatican, but it most certainly would not strengthen France.²⁸ The government seemed determined to confine its anti-clericalism within the borders of France. Perhaps it might have succeeded in doing so indefinitely, if the far-seeing opportunist, Leo XIII had continued to direct the policies of the Holy See. His death in July, 1903, after twenty-five years of able service in his high office was the death blow to the Clerical Party in France.²⁹ His successor, Cardinal Sarto, who entered the Vatican in August, taking the name of Pius X, was a man of different type. He visioned a renaissance of the ultramontane movement, and he was supported enthusiastically by his Francophobe Secretary of State, the Cardinal Merry del Val. Opportunity was not lacking to show his intentions.

Almost simultaneously with the publication of the first encyclical of the new Pope, Victor Emmanuel III and Queen Helen were setting out for France. Their reception was encouraging in the extreme. At the reception given in their honor at the Elysée, President Loubet saw in their visit "a striking manifestation of the close relationship, which answering equally to the sentiments and interests of the Italian people

²⁸ Ibid., Vol. 69i, p. 368.

²⁹ M. Gabriel Hanotaux thus characterized him the day after his death: "He had neither passion, nor stubbornness, nor rancor; attached to principles, he was the slave of no formula, he lent himself to combinations. He saluted nascent Republics, he listened to the complaints of uneasy democracies, he held his own with the powerful, but never cringed and never despaired." *Le Journal*, July 21, 1903.

and the French people, has been established between their governments.³⁰ The king's reply was equally cordial: "Rightly does France consider my presence in Paris as the natural result of the work of the *rap-prochement* happily accomplished between our two countries. . . ." ³¹ The Czar also in a personal letter to President Loubet complimented him upon the friendly relations which France had established with Italy and Great Britain, and saw in it a new guarantee for the maintenance of the world's peace.³² Only the adherents of the Royalist and Clerical factions were pessimistic. Count de Castellane writing in the "Gaulois" asked whether "*nos vivats salueront-ils d'avance en Victor-Emmanuel III l'héritier de la grandeur française en Orient.*" ³³ But France had no intention of turning back, and in the same month M. Briand introduced his bill for the separation of the Church and State.

It was well understood that diplomatic usage demanded that President Loubet should return Victor Emmanuel's visit. It was equally understood that "an inflexible protocol has regulated once for all questions of this sort and has closed the entrance of the Vatican to every head of a Catholic state who comes to salute the representative of the dynasty, despoiler of the papacy." ³⁴ As the Count de Castellane pointed out, not even his Apostolic Majesty, the Emperor of

³⁰ Ques. Dip. et Col., Oct. 15, 1903.

³¹ Ibid.

³² Rev. Pol. et Parl., Nov. 1903.

³³ Le Gaulois, Oct. 11, 1903.

³⁴ From the speech of Count Boni de Castellane explaining his reasons for refusing to vote the funds necessary for the return visit of President Loubet. *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 72ii, p. 1179.

Austria, although bound in the ties of a close alliance, had ever been able to visit his ally, the King of Italy, at Rome. Therefore, even if President Loubet had any intention of visiting the Vatican as well as the Quirinal, he would not have been received, and the debate on the subject showed clearly enough that the French Government had no intention of attempting to conciliate the Pope. The fact that the credits for the visit were voted 502 to 12, indicated the overwhelming sentiment of the Chamber.

As soon as the idea of a return visit was mentioned in the press, the nuncio at Paris protested on behalf of the pope, but M. Delcassé refused even to discuss the question, on the ground that any such doctrine was manifestly contrary to the inalienable independence of French policy.³⁵ On the 23d of April, President Loubet, accompanied by M. Delcassé, set out for Rome; and for the first time since the end of the fifteenth century the head of the French government entered the Holy City as a friend. The cardinal fact in the eyes of the Italians was that the President of France had visited the Quirinal without making any attempt to see the Pope. His reception became an ovation. "The two sisters have ceased pouting" said the editor of the '*Messagero*.' " "The general enthusiasm marking the festivities at Rome and Naples, and the manifestations of all Italy in honor of the French Republic, and the great reconciliation, seemed like a fault repaired, like the joy of seeing the dawn after the nightmare of a long night," wrote a French eye witness.³⁶

³⁵ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 73i, p. 103.

³⁶ Gustave Rivet, "*La France et l'Italie*," *Rev. Pol. et Parl.*, June, 1904.

The Pope could no longer repress his indignation. On April 28, while the President was still on Italian soil, a note was sent to the French ambassador accredited to the Vatican, protesting formally and explicitly against the visit, and pointing out that the offense was the greater in that the President of France was the head of a great Catholic nation towards which the Holy See had always shown the greatest consideration. At the same time a note was despatched to the other Catholic powers couched in the same language, but including in addition a sentence which did not appear in the communication to France. The sentence, which was nothing less than a threat, stated that if in spite of the act of France, the apostolic nuncio was allowed to remain in Paris, it was due to very grave motives of a special nature. M. Delcassé who had constantly endeavored to prevent a complete rupture, even in the teeth of strong Radical opposition, did not publish the note, but contented himself with a reply in which "he repulsed both the considerations developed and the form under which they were presented."³⁷

The incident might have been considered closed had not M. Jaurès published in his paper, "*L'Humanité*," May 17, the version which had been received by the other governments. When the French government compared its copy with this new version, and noted the difference in text, explanations were immediately demanded of the Vatican; and when the Secretary of

³⁷ A brief but comprehensive statement of the whole affair is found in the speech by M. Delcassé in the Chamber, May 27, 1904, in which he replies to several interpellations, *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 73i, p. 103.

State to the Pope attempted to escape replying, by demanding the question in writing, M. Delcassé ordered the French ambassador to return to Paris. The Pope had thrown down the gage of battle to the death, and France had picked it up without hesitation. Separation, which Thiers had declared would be a "*saut dans les ténèbres*," was at hand. The Concordat after a century's service was doomed. M. Combes did not intend that there should be any lingering doubts, for after the explanation of M. Delcassé, the *Président du Conseil* declared:

"... the immediate recall of our ambassador . . . indicates that we have been unwilling to tolerate the interference of the Pontifical Court in our international relations, also that we wished to finish once for all with the outworn fiction of a temporal power which has disappeared more than thirty years ago."³⁸

Two months later the last attaché remaining at the Vatican was withdrawn and diplomatic relations were officially severed. The Clerical party made one final effort to stem the tide by attempting to play upon the fears of the Colonial party. Again they used as a stalking-horse the argument that France was bound to lose her protectorate over the Catholics in the Orient.³⁹ It was a vain hope. M. Combes found this protectorate as embarrassing as it was glorious, and in a much commented upon interview given to the Parisian correspondent of the *Neue Freie Presse* of Vienna, he declared that France drew so little advan-

³⁸ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 73i, p. 109.

³⁹ The speech of the Count de Castellane in the Chamber, Oct. 21, 1904, upon the religious protectorates is an example. *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 74i, p. 55.

tage from it that he advised Austria not to allow herself to be drawn into the same adventure.⁴⁰ To continue the story would lead us far afield. The belief had become fixed that "religions organized in the service of the state was an idea of the past."⁴¹ But even if a slight loss of French prestige should ensue in the Orient, was it not more than counterbalanced by the firm foundations of friendship laid on the shores of the Mediterranean? The Humpty-Dumpty policy of Napoleon III, and the chari-vari policy of Signor Crispi were both cast into the discard. Republican France was rapidly mending her diplomatic fences with no Bismarck on the ground to interfere with the work.⁴²

⁴⁰ Quest. Dip. et Col., Sept. 1, 1904.

⁴¹ M. Paul Deschanel speaking in the Chamber, Oct. 21, 1904, gave a dispassionate and unbiased presentation of the subject as viewed by the majority. *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 74i, p. 65.

⁴² An amusing incident is told by "L'Agence Information" in regard to the Kaiser's method of showing his displeasure at the reception given by Victor Emmanuel III to President Loubet. The Franco-Italian League had planned to present a statue of Victor Hugo to the city of Rome in connection with the visit of President Loubet, and the King and Queen of Italy were to be present at the ceremony. When the Kaiser learned of the plan he informed the Italian government through his ambassador, that the statue of Goethe which he had presented to Rome three years before had not yet been unveiled. Under these circumstances he was much surprised that his ally, the King of Italy, should assist officially at the unveiling of the statue of Victor Hugo. M. Giolitti informed the King that under the circumstances he had best not participate. As a result the ceremony took place with only President Loubet present at the Villa Medici.

CHAPTER V.

THE ENTENTE CORDIALE

1. FRANCE AND THE BAGDAD RAILWAY

THE *rapprochement* with Italy was a very important link in the chain of friendships that M. Delcassé was forging to strengthen France against the ever-increasing might of the Teuton, but it was of secondary importance as compared with a *rapprochement* with Great Britain. So long as Italy remained a member of the Triple Alliance, her value as a friend must be of a negative sort. The Triplice, it is true, was rendered less dangerous as an instrument of aggression, but in a time of emergency, France still had only Russia to depend upon, and Russia's interests were in the East. Great Britain had renounced her policy of isolation when she allied herself with Japan. If she was willing to join in an alliance with a nation at the other side of the globe, whose racial characteristics, government, and aspirations were wholly at variance with her own, just because she feared that Russia was becoming too dangerous as a rival in the Far East, could she not see the advantage of joining with a nation at her very doorstep, whose interests were identical with hers, if she once realized that Germany had already become a most dangerous rival in all the seaports of the world? Colonial aspirations and ventures had ever been the bone of contention between France and England, but now France considered

her colonial empire as established, while Germany was still seeking a place in the sun. In commerce, France and England had become natural allies, while Germany had become England's most bitter rival. France had long since given up any thoughts of challenging Britain's naval supremacy; the Kaiser had declared Germany's future was on the water. That England needed France just as badly as France needed England was almost self-evident; the only question was whether the advantages to be gained were sufficient to bring about a settlement of the outstanding differences.

Although France considered her colonial empire practically established, its exact boundaries, and the delimitations of spheres of influence were in many places exceedingly vague. This was especially true in the various regions where it came in contact with the British Empire. Fashoda had shown that a settlement could be reached even under the most difficult conditions, but no government in France could live through a second Fashoda. In fact any arrangement of the future must be of such a sort that it would entirely blot out the humiliation of 1898—it must be a *quid pro quo* arrangement in which each side would make concessions of approximately equal value, so that when a basis should be finally reached, it would stand firmly upon the foundations of a fair and just compromise. Was it possible to make any such arrangement between two nations who found their fields of conflict in almost every part of the world, from Newfoundland to Morocco, from Siam to Madagascar, from Egypt to the New Hebrides?

In order to answer this question it is not necessary to consider the individual difficulties in each one of these places. As far back as 1891 M. Delcassé had with rare intuition found the real secret of a successful foreign and colonial policy, and this was his formula: "*It is in Europe that you will most surely defend your colonies.*"¹ So that in order to estimate the possibilities of a *rapprochement* it is necessary to note the changes which had taken place in Europe since 1900, when we left France still nursing her resentment at her policy of abasement, and Great Britain suspiciously watching her, mistrustful of every move.

The gradually growing hostility between Germany and Great Britain, as evidenced by the differences in the interpretation of the Anglo-German Accord of 1900 in regard to Manchuria, by the violence of Mr. Chamberlain's Edinburgh speech of October 25, 1901, and Herr von Bülow's sarcastic reply in the Reichstag, have already been shown. The Boer War was unpopular throughout Europe, but nowhere had there been such outspoken and virulent denunciation of the British policy as in the German Press.² But overshadowing these was the fear that Germany seemed about ready to strike another blow at British commercial supremacy, and in a vital spot—the short route to India.

The Bagdad Railway scheme, which had been matur-

¹ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 35i, p. 598.

² The *Kölnische Zeitung* said: "Instead of spending milliards in crushing the freedom of the Boer Republics, England should rescue the hundreds of thousands of human lives in India . . . but she has money only for the war of oppression and not for the relief of hunger and misery in India—a terrible reproach but unfortunately a true one." Quoted *London Times*, May 14, 1900.

ing in the Kaiser's brain long before his famous visit to Jerusalem in 1898, was with good reason a cause of jealousy between the two countries. As far back as 1835, the English government had undertaken a survey of Mesopotamia under Colonel Chesney, who subsequently suggested a railway through the Euphrates Valley to connect the Mediterranean with the Persian Gulf. On various other occasions official reports regarding a similar project were submitted by English commissioners, but the Suez Canal destroyed their interest. However, when in 1888 the Anatolian Railway Company, a German enterprise, obtained the concession to build a railway from Haidar-Pasha to Angora, Great Britain again became interested. In 1895 Major Law was sent to survey the whole railway situation in Asia Minor. His report was not flattering to British pride. He found that although in the beginning the railway enterprise was almost completely in English hands, only one road remained under their management, the Smyrna-Aidin line. Although he found no immediate prospect of a railway through the Euphrates Valley, he thought it would be built ultimately, and would be the inevitable mail route between the Mediterranean and the Persian Gulf.³ Germany's policy here as elsewhere was to exceed expectations. On November 27, 1899 the Sultan gave to Germany the right to extend the railway from Konia to the Persian Gulf by way of Bagdad (this was confirmed by an *iradé* more specific in its terms dated January 16, 1902) and Great Britain realized the time for action had come. Quietly and unostentatiously, she placed

³ Parl. Papers, 1896, Vol. 96 (c8019).

under her control Koweit, the best port on the Persian Gulf, and practically the only satisfactory terminus for the Bagdad Railway. She was then ready to talk business with Germany regarding financial cooperation when the proposition should be made.⁴

France was even more interested in the scheme than Great Britain. Not only was she expected to contribute mainly in financing the project, but it crossed or connected with several lines already under the control of French interests. As Germany realized that the whole plan was impossible without French cooperation, a most attractive proposition was made to the French financial interests, with a veiled threat that if it were not accepted, both the Smyrna-Cassaba and the Mersina-Adana lines would be forced to the wall by the stronger German concern. The accord signed by the French and German financial interests in Berlin, May 6, 1899, gave each party equal shares in both stock and direction, separated the Bagdad Railway Company from the Anatolian Company, and provided that France should not oppose any negotiations between the Anatolian Company and the Sultan.⁵

All these preliminary plans were made strictly *sub rosa*, and we find scarcely a mention of the project in the press of either France or England until late in 1901. In October the London "Times" quoted an interesting and enlightening statement from the Cologne "Gazette," to the effect that both French and German capital and engineers were interested in the Bagdad

⁴ One of the best documented treatises on the Bagdad Railway is "Le Chemin de Fer de Bagdad," by Abel Muratet, a thesis presented in June, 1914, and published at Aurillac (Imprimerie Moderne).

⁵ Abel Muratet, *op. cit.*, p. 56.

Railway, and that Russia was to be permitted to take some shares. As for Turkey, she would reap the greatest benefit, and it was very important that the excellent harbor of Koweit should not be alienated from her immediate sovereignty. In conclusion it was noted that English atlases show Koweit to be the property of Turkey, so it was hardly likely that the Sultan would divest himself of his rights.⁶ At approximately the same time we have a leading French review quoting from the same German newspaper as follows:

“... German and French capitalists and engineers with the cooperation of Russians, they say, have formed the plan of joining the Persian Gulf with the Mediterranean by railway. The *Deutsche Bank* representing French and German groups has obtained the concession of the construction. . . . Neither Turkey nor the railway enterprise can admit that the terminus be anywhere but at Koweit, recognized as Turkish territory.”⁷

The question was now up to the governments concerned. France, as a government, could hardly cooperate without consulting her ally, Russia, and M. Delcassé, on his visit to Russia in April, 1901, was probably not left uncertain as to Russian feelings on the subject. The “*Novoie Vremia*” pointed out that, not only would this railroad offer serious competition to the Trans-Siberian, but also touch vitally upon Russia’s economic interests and political preponderance in Central Asia. Russia’s neighbors should understand that she would never tolerate any interference

⁶ London Times, Oct. 20, 1901.

⁷ Ques. Dip. et Col., Nov. 1, 1901.

with the *status quo* in Asia Minor or Mesopotamia.⁸ French public opinion was almost equally hostile to strengthening German interests at the expense of Russia. Furthermore it was feared that instead of Germany and France each contributing forty per cent. of the capital, other powers contributing the remaining twenty per cent., France would have to do much more than her share financially while Germany would still be on an equality with France in the control.⁹ The question was brought to a head by M. Firmin Faure proposing a law, not to allow the sale of stocks or bonds for the Bagdad Railway upon French territory without passage of a special law permitting it by Parliament.¹⁰ M. Delcassé demanded to be heard, and declared that neither directly nor indirectly, had French diplomacy interfered in the affair. The Anatolian Company had got into touch with French interests and he for one thought if suitable arrangements could be made, it would be preferable for French interests to participate. However the only conditions possible would be if Russia should have full rights of entry, and if the French element would have both in construction and direction of the enterprise, rights equal to the most favored foreign element.¹¹

Even if Russia should participate, which was doubtful, there still remained the question of Great Britain

⁸ Quoted by André Chéradame, "Douze ans de Propagande"; see also the views of M. Witte, Minister of Finances, appearing in the *Messenger des Finances*, quoted in *London Times*, Jan. 15, 1902.

⁹ M. Etienne speaking in the Chamber Jan. 21, 1902, declared that France would be furnishing 80 per cent. of the capital before the road was constructed. *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 66i, p. 123.

¹⁰ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 66ii, p. 1855.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 1857.

and Koweit. France with M. Delcassé in the saddle, would have been only too glad to welcome English participation, and early in 1903 an offer was made granting thirty per cent. each to Germany, France and Great Britain, and to various other nations the other ten per cent.¹² An arrangement on this basis was almost reached,¹³ but with the "Times," "Westminster Gazette," "Daily Mail" and other influential organs opposing strenuously, M. Balfour, on April 23, 1903, declared that the enterprise as shown by the Convention of March 5, which divided shares among the three powers but reserved the directorship in German hands, placed the enterprise under German control, and "to such a convention we have never been asked to assist and we could not in any case be a party to it."¹⁴ The following month, Lord Lansdowne made it clear that Great Britain never had any idea of allowing a German railroad from Konia to the Persian Gulf but rather to substitute a line of international character, constructed under guarantees which would have secured for the commerce of all nations absolutely free and equal treatment from sea to sea.¹⁵

If Germany had been willing to guarantee France an equal share in the management, an arrangement might yet have been made, for M. Rouvier, the new Minister of Finances, had been heartily in favor of the project as a banker, and in his new position, his influence was almost decisive. Throughout the affair

¹² Abel Muratet, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

¹³ A. von Gwinner, "The Bagdad Railway and the Question of British Coöperation," *Nineteenth Century*, June, 1909.

¹⁴ *Parl. Debates*, Vol. 121, p. 221.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 1345.

Germany had also been able to count upon the cooperation of M. Constans, French ambassador at Constantinople.¹⁶ Relying upon the support of M. Rouvier, Berlin demanded both the positions of president and director of the company. This gave M. Delcassé his opportunity to withdraw all support of the government from the enterprise, for with Russia still hostile to it, and Great Britain now eyeing it askance, France could no longer afford to participate. The *rapprochement* with Great Britain was of more importance than a venture in high finance. If M. Rouvier "held the golden key which could open the paradise of Bagdad," M. Delcassé was powerful enough to prevent its use. In October the *Conseil des Ministres* refused to allow the sale of the Bagdad Railway stock on the Parisian market,¹⁷ and November 19, 1903, replying to an accusation made by M. Deschanel that French money was being engaged, M. Delcassé publicly affirmed that the government could not advise the participation of French capital, unless guarantees of full equality in direction, construction and exploitation of the line should be previously secured.¹⁸ As a matter of fact French capital did enter, but it was contrary to the expressed wishes of the government.¹⁹

¹⁶ M. Chéradame, op. cit., pp. 55-559, declares that M. Constans aided in obtaining the concession, while M. Rouvier was considered by all whom he met in the Orient as the "agent of the Deutsche Bank, and the very efficacious collaborator of the German policy in the East."

¹⁷ Victor Bérard, "Le Discours du Chancelier," *Revue de Paris*, Dec. 15, 1906.

¹⁸ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 71i, p. 605.

¹⁹ For an illuminating discussion of the diplomatic side of the question bringing it up to 1914, see A. Geraud, "The Story of the Bagdad Railway," *Nineteenth Century*, May-June, 1914.

2. THE FRANCO-BRITISH ACCORD OF APRIL 8, 1904

Once more France and Great Britain found themselves on common ground in their distrust of Germany, and with their paths leading in the same direction. Not yet was it possible to assert that they would soon meet, but powerful influences were being brought to bear, which were at least making them converge. One of the most important of these factors was the accession of Edward VII to the throne of England. Try as we may to belittle the power of the English sovereign, he does have a potent influence over foreign affairs if he proves himself to possess ability and a strong personality. His influence is to a certain extent intangible but it is there. He can advise even though his advice is not sought; he can warn, even though his warnings pass unheeded. But it is only reasonable to suppose that a ministry, whose tenure of office is often short, would be only too willing to regard the advice of one, whose interest in the country's welfare is equal to their own, and whose stable position gives him a viewpoint of vantage, as deserving of the most careful consideration.

Queen Victoria died in January, 1901, and both M. Delcassé in the Senate, and M. Waldeck-Rousseau in the Chamber, voiced the regret of the French nation. France remembered that Louis Philippe had been an honored guest of the deceased queen, and that the friendship between the two countries under his reign had become an alliance under his successors. France also remembered that in the dark period following the Franco-German War Queen Victoria had joined her in-

fluence with Alexander II to foil the plans of Bismark to crush France again. Yet in her later years, Victoria had unquestionably leaned towards Germany rather than towards France; and to those who were looking towards an era of better feeling between the two countries, the advent of King Edward gave promise of a realization of their hopes. As the Prince of Wales, he had always been very popular on the continent; and in France, even when the tide of hostility towards England was at flood, an exception was made of Prince Edward.²⁰

Another equally important factor was the change which took place in January, 1902, in the British cabinet, bringing Lord Lansdowne into Lord Salisbury's place as Minister of Foreign Affairs. Although Lord Salisbury was not exactly antagonistic to France, like M. Hanotaux he played the game of Germany unconsciously, and he was ever pessimistic regarding an understanding. His attitude was clearly expressed by his own phrase: "*C'est de l'utopie.*"²¹ With the advent of Lord Lansdowne, a change of attitude became noticeable almost immediately, and Sir Thomas Barclay declares that two months before Lord Salisbury's resignation, Lord Lansdowne had written him expressing hearty concurrence in his efforts to bring about an arbitration treaty between the two countries.²² In this connection the untiring efforts of Sir Thomas Barclay himself must not be overlooked. At a time

²⁰ Mr. E. A. Vizetelly thus characterizes the French attitude towards the Prince of Wales: "Le Prince de Galles? Oh, lui, c'est bien différent. Il nous aime. Mais vous autres, vous ne nous aimez pas." Republican France, p. 462.

²¹ Barclay, "Thirty Years Anglo-French Reminiscences," p. 210.

²² Barclay, op. cit., p. 212.

when the hostility between France and Great Britain was like a black cloud that no friendly sunbeam of mutual appreciation could pierce, Mr. Barclay employed the *argumentum ad hominem* method, and as one of the leaders of the British Chamber of Commerce in Paris, urged the advantages which the Paris Exposition gave for holding the annual meeting of the Associated Chambers of Commerce of Great Britain in Paris that year (1900). It proved to be a record meeting, and also seemed to act as an entering wedge for a steady influx of visitors from across the channel.²³

Nor was M. Delcassé the only champion of a *rap-prochement* across the Channel. M. Paul Cambon, who entered upon his duties as ambassador at the Court of St. James in November, 1898, when the Fashoda Affair, although it had passed its most dangerous phase, rendered the relations between the two nations exceedingly bitter, deserves little less credit than his chief. "If M. Delcassé and after him M. Pichon have turned the *ensemble* of French policy in the direction of England, it is M. Paul Cambon, who has arranged the details of the relations between London and Paris with a cleverness and a skill to which one cannot give too much credit."²⁴ An able coadjutor of Sir Thomas

²³ Ibid., Chap XVI; also Jaray, "La Politique Franco-Anglaise," pp. 24-25.

²⁴ Lémonon, "L'Europe et la Politique Britannique," p. 348; the London Times thus expressed its views editorially: "M. Delcassé's whole conduct of French foreign affairs has been conspicuous, at once for enlightened perception of the true interests of his own country and for moderate and courteous treatment of the claims of others. . . . He has been ably seconded by M. Cambon, whose interpretation of French policy has undoubtedly been a potent factor in bringing about that increased cordiality of relations in which all lovers of peace now rejoice." July 8, 1903.

Barclay in his efforts towards better relations, and an ardent believer in arbitration as the means of accomplishing it, was M. d'Estournelles de Constant. Finally there were men like M. Jaurès, who favored a union between democratic powers such as England, France, and Italy, because they considered "this triple union as the three first stones of the hearth of universal democracy and universal peace";²⁵ and others like M. de Pressensé, who considered that "the equilibrium of the world was supremely unstable so long as a great system of alliances—that of the Triplice—existed, and the balance would only be obtained the day that a second should be organized,"²⁶ and in the opinion of M. Pressensé the Russian Alliance did not meet the demand.

At last the stage was set, and the players were both able and willing to play their rôles. The two great nations, both democratic and liberal in their tendencies and in their government, inspired by a mutual dislike and fear of Germany, attracted by ever improving commercial relations, could not be kept longer apart. The progress was rapid and in many directions. On April 3, 1901 a convention was signed submitting to arbitration both the Waima Affair, a quarrel on the Sierra Leone frontier in which officers and soldiers on both sides had been killed,²⁷ and the Sergeant Malamine incident, the loss of a French steamboat in a trip up the Niger. In July, 1902 a satisfactory award was

²⁵ Jaray, *op. cit.*, p. 35.

²⁶ Report on Budget of Foreign Affairs, *Annales de la Chambre*, Doc. Parl., Vol. 64ii, p. 1520, Annexe No. 1196.

²⁷ Lavisse, "France et Angleterre," *Revue de Paris*, Feb. 1, 1899.

made.²⁸ Immediately following the meeting of the Association of British Chambers of Commerce in Paris, Sir Thomas Barclay commenced an intensive campaign to bring about a general arbitration treaty between the two countries, and on September 14, 1901 resolutions to this effect were passed by the British organizations.²⁹ In January, 1902, the *modus vivendi* in regard to New Foundland was renewed, and in the same month M. Delcassé refused to interfere in the Boer War by an offer of mediation although urged by a deputy in the Chamber to do so.³⁰ Nothing was to be allowed to jeopardize his policy of conciliation.

In February, 1903, we have the first public indication of the rapid trend towards a definite agreement. The "London Times" declared that towards the end of the preceding summer, M. Delcassé presented to Lord Lansdowne certain complete and business-like proposals which would have had not merely North African, but European consequences. The essential part of these proposals was that France and England should settle the Moroccan question in connection with Egypt. In compensation for French recognition of British occupation of Egypt, France was to be allowed a free hand in dealing with Moroccan territory save on the North African coast line.³¹ The governments were not yet ready, however, to concede that matters had proceeded thus far, and on March 11, in reply to a definite question on the subject by M. Deloncle, M.

²⁸ Lémonon, "L'Europe et la Politique Britannique," p. 350.

²⁹ André Tardieu, "France and the Alliances," p. 59; also Barclay, *op. cit.*, Chap. XVII.

³⁰ Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 66i, p. 80.

³¹ London Times, Feb. 2, 1903.

Delcassé replied that if he had made any such arrangement it must have been in his sleep—"ce serait en dormant." M. Ribot wittily intervened with a quotation: "*Nous l'avons, en dormant, madame échappé belle!*" and M. Delcassé allowed the matter to rest.³²

In the meantime other indications of better feeling were noted. On March 4, 1903, M. Paul Cambon was invited to speak at the annual meeting of the British Chamber of Commerce in London, and he declared that he looked in vain for any essential question which could divide England and France; on the contrary he saw great interests which could and should unite them, and it was not only to their interests to be on good terms, but to the interests of the whole world.³³

The movement suddenly received great impetus by the unexpected visit of King Edward to Paris. The king seemed to have undertaken this visit, not only against the wishes of his advisers, but even contrary to the judgment of those most anxious to bring about better relations. M. Barclay declared that he had misgivings on the expediency of the visit, and in France "embarrassments and anxiety weighed upon the public."³⁴ However, King Edward knew his Paris and his confidence was not misplaced.³⁵ If his reception was

³² Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 69ii, p. 1350. A little later in the same speech M. Deloncle maintained that it did appear as though M. Delcassé had conceived the idea of flirting with England. M. Delcassé's retort was immediate: "*ce n'est plus de mon âge.*"

³³ London Times, March 5, 1903.

³⁴ Tardieu, "France and the Alliances," p. 61.

³⁵ When to entertain him it was proposed that he be taken to the Opéra he is said to have remarked in a manner quite Parisian: "*Donnez-moi seulement une pièce au Théâtre Français, voyons, je ne suis pas le schah de Perse.*"

not enthusiastic, neither were there any signs of hostility. Even the ardent Paul Déroulède, now cooling his heels in exile at San Sebastian, seemed satisfied that France should accept the friendship of Edward VII, and he strongly discountenanced any hostile demonstrations on the part of his Nationalist followers.³⁶ The toasts between the King and President Loubet were courteous but formal, since the King wished to indicate that the visit was one of a private nature. However, when the King spoke to the members of the English Chamber of Commerce in Paris he was able to voice his true sentiments:

“... The days of conflict between the two countries are, I trust, happily over, and I hope that future historians in alluding to Anglo-French relations in the present century, may be able to record only a friendly rivalry in the commercial and industrial domain; I hope that in the future as in the past, France and England may be regarded as the champions and the pioneers of civilization and peaceful progress. . . . I trust that the friendship and admiration which we all feel for the French nation and their glorious traditions may in the near future develop into a sentiment of the warmest affection and attachment between the peoples of the two countries.”³⁷

³⁶ Although the *Patrie* and a few other Nationalist journals recalled Fashoda, the Transvaal, and even Joan of Arc, the *Petit Journal*, their most influential newspaper pointed out that at least no lost provinces constituted a barrier between France and England. The *Petit Parisien*, the journal of the working classes, and the more conservative newspapers such as the *Temps*, *Figaro*, and *Journal des Débats*, all welcomed the king in a most cordial manner.

³⁷ *London Times*, May 2, 1903.

The king's wishes were to be fulfilled in a most speedy and satisfactory manner, and well did he deserve the epithet of "*le roi pacificateur*" which the French bestowed upon him.³⁸ President Loubet returned the visit two months later, and his reception was even more cordial. This time while King Edward and President Loubet were publicly giving utterance to affectionate greetings and friendly toasts, Lord Lansdowne and M. Delcassé were privately engaged in some very important conversations. As the "Times" put it: "M. Loubet's visit must not be regarded as an isolated phenomenon, a mere complimentary effort standing alone and liable to pass as a simple incident of the hour. It is on the contrary the logical outcome of much that has gone on before, and the crown of efforts continuously made by statesmen on both sides to sweep away the differences between two great powers whose common task is to carry

³⁸ Mr. Sydney Lee in his article on King Edward VII in the Dictionary of National Biography (second supplement), is inclined to question the influence which the French attribute to King Edward in bringing about the *rapprochement*. Let M. André Tardieu, whose word may be considered final in France, state the French view: "The English King was the initiator of the *rapprochement*. He it was who both conceived and facilitated it. . . ." Op. cit., p. 60. But we can find authority just as eminent across the Channel. Sir Charles Dilke declared: "The great and sudden improvement in the relations between the English speaking world and France is largely due to the wisdom and courtesy with which the King made clear to France that there was no ground for the suspicions which prevailed." Life of Sir. Chas. Dilke, Vol. II, p. 501. Mr. Balfour is even more emphatic: "King Edward was a great monarch. He did that which no minister, no cabinet, no ambassadors, neither treaties, nor protocols, nor understandings, which no debates, no banquets, no speeches were able to perform. He by his personality alone brought home to the minds of millions on the Continent, as nothing we could have done could have brought it home to them, the friendly feelings of the country over which King Edward ruled." Parl. Debates, Vol. 17, p. 799 (5th series).

forward civilization, and to uphold the banner of constitutional liberties.''³⁹

In fact almost immediately after King Edward's visit M. Cambon brought up the question of an arbitration treaty between the two countries, using as a basis M. Delcassé's formula that arbitration should be used in settling differences based upon the judicial interpretation of conventions already existing between the two nations. Lord Lansdowne agreed that this might be a satisfactory basis for an agreement. Shortly afterwards M. Delcassé submitted a definite proposal that differences falling under the application of Article 16 of the Hague convention for the peaceful settlement of international disputes, i. e., differences of a justiciable character, and particularly those relating to difficulties in the interpretation of existing conventions, providing they did not concern the vital interest or honor of either party, should be submitted to the Permanent Court of Arbitration. The British government was willing to accept this formula and on October 14, 1903, the Treaty of Arbitration was signed.⁴⁰

Although it was recognized that such a treaty was worthless as a means of avoiding war if either side wished for an excuse, still it clearly indicated the changed attitude of the two powers, and it was noteworthy as being the first treaty of its kind among the great European nations, the only other such pact being the one between Holland and Portugal signed July 5, 1894. As M. Paul Deschanel phrased it, in the mag-

³⁹ London Times, July 8, 1903.

⁴⁰ Doc. Dip., Convention d'Arbitrage avec L'Angleterre, 1903.

nificent speech which he made in favor of the treaty when it came before the Chamber for ratification: "The recent treaty of arbitration indicates the mutual dispositions of the two countries. Thinking people of both nations are agreed that a hostile policy between the two great liberal nations, between the country of the *Habeas Corpus* and the country of the Declaration of the Rights of Man would be a crime against civilization." ⁴¹

This was but the prologue of the piece which was to follow. So long as the various colonial questions remained unsettled there could be no agreement worthy of the name. Now it was that M. Delcassé showed his greatest statesmanship. His opportunity had come and he was ready for it. He had played the game carefully, for he realized very well that the future of France was the stake. The time had come to show his cards and he laid them all on the table. It had taken almost six long years to accomplish his purpose, but the success which crowned his efforts was complete. The Accord signed on April 8, 1904, made a complete and final settlement of all the important outstanding differences between the two nations, and they had at last joined hands in the *Entente Cordiale*.⁴²

The Anglo-French agreement was composed of three distinct instruments, viz., a declaration concerning Egypt and Morocco, a declaration concerning Siam, Madagascar and the New Hebrides, and a convention concerning Newfoundland and Africa. The first was,

⁴¹ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 71i, p. 600.

⁴² For a complete account of Franco-British relations from the sixteenth century down to the present, see J. L. de Lanessan, "*Histoire de l'Entente Cordiale*," Paris, 1916.

from a diplomatic standpoint, of greatest interest. In his *Dépêche aux Ambassadeurs*, a commentary on and detailed explanation of the agreement, sent to the various ambassadors of the Republic,⁴³ M. Delcassé said: "The principal part of the arrangement just concluded relates to Morocco. Of all the questions in which the interests of France are engaged, none has an importance comparable to the Moroccan question; it is evident that from its solution depends the solidity and development of our African empire, and the future itself of our situation in the Mediterranean."

The declaration concerning Egypt and Morocco consisted of nine articles, the sum and substance of which was a recognition of the paramount interests of France in Morocco by Great Britain, in return for a like recognition by France of the preponderant interests of Great Britain in Egypt.⁴⁴ As regards Egypt, Great Britain declared that she had no intention of altering its political status, and France engaged herself neither to demand any time limit to British occupation nor to interfere in any other way. In regard to the public debt a substantial change was made in giving greater flexibility in its administration, and in the employment of the surplus remaining after the interest to the creditors had been paid. This concession was of real value to both Great Britain and Egypt, and was in no way prejudicial to the financial interests of the French and Russian investors. In other respects the conditions

⁴³ Doc. Dip., "Accords entre la France et l'Angleterre," No. 1.

⁴⁴ For text of the entire agreement see Doc. Dip., "Accords entre la France et l'Angleterre," No. 2; or Parl. Papers 1905, Vol. 103 (cd2384); for detailed discussion see René Moulin, "Une Année de Politique Extérieure," Paris, 1905, Chap. I; also Victor Bérard, "L'Affaire Marocaine," Paris, Chap. III.

remained the same—a French *savant* continued to exercise direction of the Egyptian antiquities, the French schools continued to enjoy the same liberty as formerly, all rights enjoyed by the French through treaties, conventions, and customs, including the privilege of engaging in the coasting trade between Egyptian ports, were to be respected, liberty of commerce was guaranteed for thirty years with privilege of renewal, and finally, Great Britain promised to adhere to the stipulations of the Treaty of 1888 relative to the neutrality of the Suez Canal.

In return, Great Britain agreed not to interfere with the action of France in Morocco, recognizing that it belonged to France as a nation whose dominions are coterminous for a great distance with those of Morocco to keep the peace there, and to lend its assistance in bringing about such administrative, economic, financial, and military reforms as should prove necessary. France also declared she had no intention of changing the political status of the country, and the clause insuring commercial liberty for thirty years was inserted. In order to assure the free passage of the Straits of Gibraltar, it was agreed not to erect fortifications on the coast of Morocco between Melilla and the heights of dominating the right bank of the Sebu, although this clause should not apply to the points actually held by Spain on the Moroccan shore of the Mediterranean. Provision was also made, considering the geographical position of Spain and its interests on the Moroccan coast of the Mediterranean, that France should come to an understanding with Spain and communicate this accord when made to Great Britain. The

last article provided that the two governments should afford each other their diplomatic support to secure the execution of this declaration relative to Egypt and Morocco.

This was the declaration as published, but in reality there were five more articles which were kept secret until 1911, when the crisis of Agadir brought about their publication. The first of these secret articles provided that in case either government found themselves constrained to modify their policy in respect to Egypt or Morocco, the economic, commercial, and strategical engagements as provided for in the open declaration should remain intact. The second declared that Great Britain had no *present* intention of making any changes in the capitulations or judicial organization of Egypt, but provided that if it should be considered desirable, France would not refuse to entertain such proposals, on the understanding that Great Britain would entertain similar proposals on the part of France regarding Morocco. The third article definitely specified that part of Morocco which should come under Spanish influence if the Sultan should cease to exercise authority over it. This cession was to include the territory adjacent to Melilla, Ceuta, and other *presidios* as far as, but not including, the bank of the Sebu. Spain however must undertake not to alienate the whole or a part of the territories placed under her jurisdiction. The next article provided that even if Spain declined to enter into the arrangement, it was none the less binding upon Great Britain and France; and the last was merely a reference to the terms of the repayment of the Egyptian

debt in case the other powers refused to accept the arrangements. In other words, Great Britain was willing that France should exercise a protectorate over Morocco upon three conditions: the principle of commercial liberty must be guaranteed; Spain, a weak power must control all the territory facing the Straits of Gibraltar, thus protecting Great Britain's entrance to the Mediterranean; and finally France must permit a British protectorate over Egypt whenever Great Britain deemed such a change desirable. A perfectly fair arrangement as far as Great Britain and France were concerned and even Spain's legitimate interests were safeguarded. However, Spain might prefer to be consulted in advance, the Sultan might object to even the possibility of a protectorate, and Germany might imagine that her interests were being jeopardized; so it was decided inexpedient to publish these articles with the rest of the declaration.⁴⁵

The published declaration was subject to considerable criticism in France, on the ground that although Great Britain by the arrangement practically came into possession of Egypt, France still had Morocco to acquire. As M. Paul Doumer, Chairman of the Budget Committee of the Chamber put it: "France has given a draft payable at sight and has received one which cannot be cashed till it matures."⁴⁶ Neither could France give up without regret the historic land of the Pharaoh. "Egypt! How many glorious souvenirs this name evokes in us, from Saint Louis to Richelieu, from Richelieu to Bonaparte, from Bonaparte to

⁴⁵ Text of Secret Articles: Parl. Papers, 1911, Vol. 103 (cd5969).

⁴⁶ "The Anglo-French Agreement," National Review, June, 1904.

Ferdinand de Lesseps! Egypt, this ancestress of nations which the great Mehemet Ali called 'the little sister of France' . . ."⁴⁷ But as another writer put it: "a policy is not determined by sentiments and souvenirs, but by material and brutal facts."⁴⁸ Great Britain had fought one war to obtain her claim, and had shown herself ready, if need be, to fight another to maintain it. Even M. René Millet, a consistent critic of the policy of M. Delcassé, conceded that it was not the fault of a general, if mistakes made twenty-five years ago made a retreat inevitable—"there only remained to us on the banks of the Nile a broken sword, or to be more exact a magnificent saber of wood, since it has never been of any use. . . . In exchanging this outworn object for freedom of action in Morocco we have made a good bargain. . . ."⁴⁹

The second declaration, relative to Siam, Madagascar, and the New Hebrides, was the least important of the three arrangements, and provoked the least discussion, but it was to the advantage of both nations to minister to those sore places which were so likely to produce serious troubles if they were not given treatment. The agreement concerning Siam was simply a continuation and a completion of the Declaration of January 15, 1896. France conceded to Great Britain freedom of action to the west of the valley of the Menam, and received like freedom of action in the east, thus creating the Menam Valley as a sort of buffer state

⁴⁷ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 74i, p. 242.

⁴⁸ René Goblet, "L'Arrangement Franco-Anglais," *Rev. Pol. et Parl.*, May, 1904.

⁴⁹ René Millet, "La Lutte Pacifique entre la France et l'Angleterre," *Revue de Deux Mondes*, June 15, 1904; also appears as Chap. V in his volume, "Notre Politique Extérieure, 1898-1905."

between the two spheres of influence. Both parties while putting aside any idea of annexing Siamese territory or violating existing treaties, reserved for themselves complete freedom of action in the two spheres of influence thus defined. This clause was especially timely for France, as it gave her additional leverage to force execution by Siam of the Treaty of February 14, 1904, now that Siam could count no longer upon English support. We have already shown the results of this "freedom of action" clause for France in the treaty of March 23, 1907. Great Britain profited by it later to gain a substantial rectification of frontiers to her advantage in the Malay Peninsula.⁵⁰

In regard to Madagascar, Great Britain conceded to France the right of maintaining the customs duties imposed after annexing the island in 1896, an arrangement which she had hitherto opposed. In return, France made similar concessions to Great Britain in Zanzibar. In the New Hebrides both countries agreed to prepare an arrangement to settle the difficulties arising from the lack of jurisdiction over the natives, and through the acquisition of land by French and English nationals. These islands, which had been colonized by French from New Caledonia, and by English from Australia, had been under the general control of a mixed naval commission since 1887 with very unsatisfactory results. Although the accord in this case was merely a promise to try to solve the question, it at least gave promise of better things. An arrange-

⁵⁰ Mr. H. A. Gibbons in his "New Map of Asia," Chap. V, gives a very clear picture of the dealings of the foreign powers with Siam, and the case which he presents is a severe but just arraignment of their methods.

ment was finally arrived at in February, 1906, which provided for a carefully worked out condominium giving each nation equal rights, and confirming the *status quo* in regard to all property rights definitely established in accordance with the rules laid down. The government was to consist of two high commissioners, one French, the other English, who were to have a force of police of two equal sections to carry out their orders. The mixed naval commission was retained, to be called upon in case of need to cooperate in the maintenance of order. A mixed tribunal of three judges was also provided for, each government naming one, and the King of Spain the third.⁵¹ The experiment although interesting, was not wholly successful, and came up again for readjustment in May, 1914, but was pushed into the background by the outbreak of the war.⁵²

The convention concerning Newfoundland and Africa was the one which provoked the greatest hostility in France, because by this convention France was surrendering very definite valuable rights, dating back to the Treaty of Utrecht, over a long stretch of coast, valuable both as a fishing ground, and as a training school for future entrance into the French navy and merchant marine, for certain territories in Africa whose value seemed of a very problematical sort. This question had long been a thorny one. The Treaty of

⁵¹ For a detailed description of the condominium see the article by H. Berthélémy, "Convention Franco-Anglaise relative aux Nouvelles Hébrides," *Rev. Pol. et Parl.*, Feb. 1907.

⁵² M. Robt. de Caix brings the subject up to this point in his article appearing in *Ques. Dip. et Col.*, June 16, 1914, entitled "Question des Nouvelles Hébrides."

Utrecht, 1713, confirmed by the Treaty of Paris, 1763, recognized British possession of Newfoundland, but in both cases reservation was made granting French fishermen the right to catch and dry fish along a limited stretch of coast known as the French Shore. The Treaty of Versailles, 1783, defined this territory as extending from Cape St. John to Cape Ray, and stipulated that British subjects should neither interfere with the French fishing here by their competition, nor establish drying places on the shore. After a long period of bitterness and ill-feeling between French and Canadian fishermen, a convention in 1857 gave the exclusive right to fish to the French. Newfoundland, now enjoying self-government, refused to execute the convention, and a new convention in 1885 suffered a similar fate. Two years later the Newfoundland government passed the Bait Bill prohibiting the sale of bait to foreigners. Although this was aimed at the French fishermen, it was equally destructive to the Newfoundland bait-sellers, and was repealed in 1890. The same year, since the French fishermen were now also taking lobsters, the Canadians decided that lobsters were not fish, and the French could not catch them even on the French shore. A *modus vivendi* was with difficulty arranged, and it was this temporary and unsatisfactory solution which still held.⁵³

The Convention of April 8, 1904, settled the difficulty decisively by taking away the exclusive privileges which the French possessed on the French shore, and putting the French fishermen upon an equality with the

⁵³ A very clear outline of this whole controversy is given by "A Diplomat" in the *Rev. Pol. et Parl.*, April, 1899, under the title, "*La Question de Terre Neuve.*"

British, both in taking fish and crustaceous animals. Thus although France gave up the right of drying fish, their fishing rights in the territorial waters remained intact, and the right included the catching of lobsters as well as fish. They were also guaranteed the right to obtain supplies or bait on the same conditions as the inhabitants of Newfoundland. Article III provided that any French citizens obliged either to abandon their establishments on the French shore, or to give up their occupation because of this convention, should be awarded a pecuniary indemnity. "Thus," as M. Delcassé explained in his *Dépêche aux ambassadeurs*, "in order to avoid the risk of conflicts which threatened to become serious, we only abandon in Newfoundland privileges defended with difficulty, and in no way necessary, since we preserve the essential thing, that is the right to fish in the territorial waters, and in addition we guarantee for the future the precious right of either fishing for bait or buying it freely throughout the whole extent of the French shore."

As additional compensation for the surrender of her privilege on the French shore, France received certain territorial concessions in Africa. In French West Africa the frontier between Senegambia and the British colony of Gambia, was so modified as to give to France Yarbutenda, thus allowing France an approach by water to her territories drained by the Upper Gambia which is not navigable. This concession was of considerable economic importance in the future development of Southern Senegal. Great Britain also ceded to France the group known as the *Iles de Los* commanding the city of Konakry, the flourishing capi-

tal of French Guinea. These islands although very small,⁵⁴ and worthless from a commercial viewpoint, possessed considerable strategic importance, since they provided all the necessary requirements for a strong naval base. With these islands in the hands of a foreign power, Konakry was utterly defenseless. Finally, and this arrangement was of the utmost importance to France, a rectification was made in the frontier between Nigeria and the Sudan, giving France a practicable route from the Niger to Lake Chad. The Declaration of August 5, 1890, had limited the Southern border of the French sphere of influence to a line between Say on the Niger, and Barroua on Lake Chad. The Convention of June 14, 1898, which aimed to give France a route between the two points with Linder as the central point was disastrous for France. After two years spent in exploring all possible roads between Say and Linder on the one side, and Linder and Barroua on the other, France realized that Great Britain had indeed given her "the sand and the bush and the waterless wastes." France must either obtain a rectification of the frontier or give up Linder and all hopes of a road connecting the Niger with Lake Chad.⁵⁵ The Convention of 1904, in addition to giving France a considerable increase in territory at the expense of Nigeria, gave her a practicable route between the Niger

⁵⁴ In the discussion in the Chamber, Nov. 7, 1904, M. Suchetet observed for the benefit of his colleagues, lest they might think that M. Delcassé was speaking of small continents, that the largest of the islands was less than two miles square. *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 741, p. 325.

⁵⁵ M. Eugene Etienne exposes the French side of these questions in a very able fashion in his article: "Colonial Litigations Between France and England," *National Review*, July 1, 1903.

and Lake Chad which had already been explored and proved entirely satisfactory. "Thus thanks to a mutual good will we have succeeded in settling the various questions which too long have weighed upon the relations between France and England."⁵⁶ M. Delcassé had successfully completed his great work; the *Entente Cordiale* had taken its place beside the Dual Alliance, and the weakened Triple Alliance could with difficulty maintain the European balance of power.

3. THE RATIFICATION OF THE FRANCO-BRITISH ACCORD

On the whole the arrangement was received with greater cordiality and less criticism in England than in France. When it came up for a vote in the House of Commons it passed unanimously, and Mr. Balfour voiced the general opinion when he declared that "this great instrument will be looked back upon as the beginning of a new and happier era in our international relations."⁵⁷ Sir Edward Grey declared that the important part of the agreement was the spirit of good will upon which it reposed. He also pointed out that Article 9 of the Declaration regarding Egypt and Morocco, in which the two governments agreed to afford one another their diplomatic support, in order to obtain the execution of the present declaration, was so vaguely worded that great opportunities were given to the two countries of drawing closer to each other. In conclusion, he declared that the agreement arrived at was so simple that the question might naturally be asked—why has it not been arrived at before?⁵⁸ The

⁵⁶ M. Delcassé in "Dépêche aux Ambassadors," op. cit., supra.

⁵⁷ Parl. Debates, Vol. 135 (fourth series), p. 575.

⁵⁸ Ibid., p. 516. Mr. Gibson Bowles who also believed it well that

opinion of the Press was well expressed by Dr. E. J. Dillon: "All friends of peace and civilization will hail with joy the Anglo-French Convention which has drawn the sponge over some of the most irritating subjects of dispute between the two nations of Europe whose desire for peaceful progress is strongest and most sincere." ⁵⁹

Across the Channel, although the prevailing note was one of approval, yet some voices were raised in bitter opposition. M. René Millet saw in the arrangement the last lap of what one might call the policy of liquidation, and although France might be cutting a fine figure in Europe it was at the expense of her patrimony. He preferred a policy of a Gambetta or a Ferry to that of a Delcassé.⁶⁰ The political enemies of M. Delcassé were still more harsh. In a little volume entitled "*Le conflit Franco-Allemand*," two members of the Chamber were almost abusive in their denunciations: "M. d'Estournelles de Constant is not the most dangerous of the pacifists. The most dangerous is M. Delcassé with his policy of culpable credulity, foolish illusions, and vain mirages."⁶¹ However, it remained for M. Archdeacon in the Chamber, to give the arrangement its most bitter characterization: "this is the worst treaty that France has signed since

England and France should stand together, waxed somewhat sarcastic at the provisions of the agreement: "The dispute between England and France was not how little they could concede to one another; no, it was how much belonging to somebody else they could concede to one another." *Ibid.*, p. 524.

⁵⁹ "Our Friends, Our Allies, Our Rivals," *Contemporary Review*, May, 1904.

⁶⁰ "*La Politique de Liquidation*," *Rev. Pol. et Parl.*, Nov. 1904.

⁶¹ Guibert et Ferrette, "*Le Conflit Franco-allemand en 1905*," p. 50.

the one by which Louis XV consecrated the abandonment of India and of Canada to the English.”⁶²

Happily these voices were in the minority. M. le comte de Castellane in the “Gaulois,” M. de Coubertin in the “Figaro,” M. Humbert in the “Eclair,” M. René Henry in the “République Française,” M. André Tardieu in “le Temps,” all were able to echo the sentiment of M. Ebray in the “Journal des Débats,” in declaring that “France surrenders nothing of importance but obtains most momentous concessions.”⁶³ When the Convention came up for discussion in the Chamber, although strong criticism was directed at some parts, especially that part of the agreement relating to Newfoundland, the sentiment was for the most part friendly. M. Deloncle, who regretted so keenly the loss of Egypt, conceded that the happy results were of such a nature as to make one forget the bitterness of the painful sacrifices necessary to their attainment.⁶⁴ M. Etienne, whose authority on colonial matters was unquestioned in the Chamber, discussed the arrangements at great length, and pointing out that Egypt had been lost for twenty-two years, he declared that not a single French statesman would be willing to ask of England that she withdraw from there. He considered the cession of the islands of Los a real advantage to France, and declared that the right of landing on the Gambia River, and the new delimitation of frontiers between Senegal and Nigeria, both gave great satisfaction. In conclu-

⁶² Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 74i, p. 242.

⁶³ M. G. L. Jaray gives a full summary of the sentiments expressed in England and France in his article, “L’Accord entre la France et l’Angleterre,” Ques. Dip. et Col., Nov. 16, 1904.

⁶⁴ Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 74i, p. 242.

sion, he asserted that the arrangement procured France very appreciable advantages for the present, but even greater might be hoped for the future.⁶⁵ M. de Presensé pointed out that although France had very definite rights in Newfoundland conceded by former treaties, the population had increased from some five or six thousand inhabitants to over two hundred thousand, and it was hardly possible to keep such a number "pressed in the straitjacket of the diplomacy of former centuries." As for Egypt, no magic wand would bring back the conditions of 1879, and it was hardly fitting for a great nation like France to remain in an attitude of pouting.⁶⁶ M. Denys Cochin considered it "a treaty made for peace, a *rapprochement* in which we renounce what has been called a 'policy of pin pricks' although all the pin pricks did n't come from this side of the Channel."⁶⁷ Even before M. Delcassé arose to speak in behalf of the arrangement, it was clear that it would have little difficulty in passing. His presentation of the real advantages that France would gain was clear and convincing. As the Convention concerning Newfoundland seemed to be the principal stumbling block, he was especially careful to make it clear that France still retained the right to fish there, all that she surrendered was the drying privilege on the shore, and as a matter of fact most of that in recent years had been carried on at St. Pierre and Miquelon, or in France. In 1903 only five fishing stations out of two hundred and eight had been in use on the French shore; while the population of Newfoundland had in-

⁶⁵ Ibid., p. 346.

⁶⁶ Ibid., p. 388.

⁶⁷ Ibid., p. 393.

creased forty-two times, the French fisherman had almost deserted this coast. In Egypt he showed that bond holders' interests had been carefully guarded, commercial liberty guaranteed, French schools and institutions protected, and in return for an attitude *bienveillante* in Egypt, England had given way to France in Morocco, the keystone of the French African empire. In conclusion he declared: "the convention is equally advantageous to the two nations, in that each one of them obtains satisfaction upon the points which concern them most. And it is very fortunate that it should be thus, since this arrangement instead of being a nest for quarrels, has had for its object the intent to wipe away everything which might counterbalance the superior reasons and powerful interests which command England and France to live in confidence and in good understanding." ⁶⁸

M. Delcassé had won his case, the Convention concerning Newfoundland and Africa passed 443 to 105, the agreement as a whole passing 436 to 94, although M. Delcassé accepted the *ordre du jour* of M. Paul Deschanel which looked to early negotiations with the British government regarding certain changes to be made in the clauses relating to Newfoundland. The two great democratic nations of Europe had joined hands across the Channel, the hatchet of colonial rivalry had been buried, and France was given free hand to proceed in Morocco with no further interference from Great Britain. There still remained a settlement to be made with Spain, and although France did not yet seem to realize it, a still more serious one with

⁶⁸ Ibid., p. 404.

Germany. However, these were problems for the future, a more urgent one of the present had already forced itself upon the attention of the two powers.

4. THE RUSSO-JAPANESE WAR

Dark clouds had long been gathering in the Eastern sky betokening a storm in the Orient. The Slavic Goliath was already girding up his loins to conquer the Mongolian David, when his smaller opponent had struck and had struck hard. The important question was whether the struggle would remain a duel between the two, or whether the allies of each would be drawn in. The *rapprochement* between Great Britain and France had already advanced so far, that it was evident that neither would find a *casus foederis* unless it was forced upon their attention. Besides, the entrance of one would be followed immediately by the entrance of the other, thus neutralizing their respective efforts. Another factor which tended to keep France neutral was the influence of M. Jaurès and the Socialist party, whose attitude had been consistently hostile to the Dual Alliance, in so far as it necessitated involving France in the imperialistic schemes of her ally in the Far East. M. Jaurès had made his sentiments known all over Europe in the famous letter which he wrote to M. Andrea Costa, President of the Italian Socialist Congress, in which he expressed his approval of the Triple Alliance as a "*contre-poids nécessaire à notre chauvinisme et aux fantaisies franco-russes.*"⁶⁹ In order that it might be known that his opinions had not changed, directly upon the outbreak of the Russo-

⁶⁹ Rev. Pol. et Parl., Oct. 1902.

Japanese War, he published an article in the "Revue Socialiste," urging France to do nothing which might provoke either England or Japan, and as soon as the trouble should be over, "to relax the bonds of an exclusive and imprudent alliance which has ceased to be a safeguard, if it ever has been one, and has now become a danger and a menace."⁷⁰

Under these circumstances France which as a whole still stood firmly by the alliance was somewhat dubious over the reception which Russian public opinion would give to the news of the entente with England. As might have been expected it did not provoke any enthusiasm. The "Novoie Vremia," one of the most influential organs, declared that a glacial breath had crossed the atmosphere of the Franco-Russian relations.⁷¹ However, it was very soon evident that officially Russia intended to accept the agreement. In a long interview given to M. Tardieu, as a representative of "Le Temps," M. Nelidof, Russian ambassador at Paris, declared that the happy outcome of the negotiations would provoke keen satisfaction in St.

⁷⁰ Je veux bien que la diplomatie française ne se dégage pas brutalement d'une politique où elle est étourdiment engagée. Je veux bien qu'elle continue à prêter à la Russie pour le règlement du conflit ses bons offices, mais du moins ne faisons rien qui provoque le Japon, ne faisons rien que provoque l'Angleterre, et lorsque cette tourmente sera passée nous pourrons peu à peu relâcher les liens d'une alliance exclusive et imprudente, qui a cessé d'être une sauvegarde, si elle l'a jamais été, pour devenir un danger et un menace." Rev. Socialiste, March, 1904.

M. Allard went even further. Speaking in the Chamber, January 27, 1905, he declared: "I have been astonished that any one has dared to speak again before a French parliament of an alliance or any sort of relations with a government of assassins." He was supported by M. Jaurès and other members of his party and M. Delcassé was barely able to make his protests heard. *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 75i, p. 91.

⁷¹ Rev. Pol. et Parl., June, 1904.

Petersburg. They rejoiced first because the arrangement freed France from certain difficulties, "and, then," added the ambassador smiling, "is there not a proverb which says: 'The friends of our friends become our friends'? Who knows if once more it may not be verified?"⁷²

Three years later his joking inference became an established reality, but not before the two countries came to the very brink of war over the Dogger Bank affair; and they were only saved from this catastrophe by the prompt intervention of France, who urged that the facts be determined by a Commission of Inquest in accordance with the rules of the Hague Conference. An agreement was finally signed, November 25, by Count Lamsdorff and Sir Charles Hardinge, stating that conformably to Articles IX to XIV of the Hague Convention for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes, a commission of five should be entrusted with elucidating the facts connected with the incident by means of an impartial and conscientious investigation.⁷³

A very interesting example of the tortuous ways of secret diplomacy may be cited in connection with the choosing of the commission. In accordance with Article I of the formal agreement, two of the members of the commission were to be officers of high rank in the British and Russian navies, France and the United States were each to designate one of their high naval officers, and these four together to decide upon the

⁷² André Tardieu, "Questions Diplomatiques de l'Année, 1904," p. 31.

⁷³ A clear and comprehensive account of the Dogger Bank Affair may be found in Stowell and Munro, "International Cases," Vol. I, pp. 98-106.

fifth member, but failing to agree, the choice was to be made by the Emperor of Austria. The Kaiser was very anxious that a German naval officer should be chosen for the fifth member. As such an arrangement would have been very satisfactory to Russia, and the United States would have no reason to object, it would only be necessary to secure the adhesion of France. The Kaiser, thereupon, became very prodigal of his favors towards France, but in vain, for in the very first meeting of the admirals, they decided to ask the Emperor of Austria to make a choice as was provided for in the agreement. Vice-Admiral Fournier attributes to this incident the beginning of the hostility which the Kaiser came to feel towards M. Delcassé, attributing to him the failure of his little scheme.⁷⁴

The report of the International Commission showed that Admiral Rodjestvensky was wholly unjustified in firing upon the English fishing boats, and as Russia had

⁷⁴ Vice-Admiral Fournier, who was the French member of the commission, recounts this incident in his book, "La Politique Navale," pp. 42-46. In the Willy-Nicky Correspondence further light is thrown upon the Kaiser's diplomacy during the Russo-Japanese war. In No. 13, Oct. 27, the Kaiser suggests that Germany and Russia join against England if she refuses to allow Germany to coal Russian ships. They could force France in with them because even "though Delcassé is an Anglophile *enragé* he will be wise enough to understand that the British fleet is utterly unable to save Paris. In this way a powerful combination of three of the strongest Continent Powers would be formed, to attack whom the Anglo-Japanese group would think twice before acting." In No. 14 dated Oct. 28, the Czar, after expressing his indignation at England's conduct, declares that "the only way, as you say, would be that Germany, Russia and France should at once unite upon an arrangement to abolish Anglo-Japanese arrogance and insolence. Would you like to lay down and frame the outlines of such a treaty and let me know it? As soon as accepted by us, France is bound to join her ally." The Kaiser was only too willing to proceed, but when he found that Nicholas was determined to inform France before going ahead, William decided to let the matter drop for the moment.

already expressed her regrets, it was decided that upon the payment by Russia of a suitable indemnity (£65,000) the incident might be considered closed. It can hardly be doubted that if it had not been possible for France, under the guidance of M. Delcassé, to use her influence as the true friend of both nations, a European war might have resulted, by which both Russia and France would have been crippled, and Great Britain terribly weakened. Who could understand better than Kaiser Wilhelm II the advantages of such a possibility to Germany! The *rapprochement* of France with Italy had weakened the Triple Alliance, the *entente* with Great Britain had strengthened both France and Great Britain, Germany's two greatest potential enemies, and within six months after its promulgation it had borne fruit in the settlement of the Dogger Bank Affair. It is hardly surprising that the Kaiser decided that he must strike at France, and he could best strike through M. Delcassé.⁷⁵ *Alea jacta est*, and the results were Tangier, Algeciras, Agadir and Serajevo.

⁷⁵ It was told about Berlin after the signing of the Anglo-French Convention that M. Delcassé had remarked to a group of intimate friends: "*Je viens de rouler Radolin, il ne me reste plus qu'à rouler l'empereur d'Allemagne.*" When the Kaiser heard of the remark he replied: "*Le maréchal Soult avait donné à M. Thiers, qui par la stature, mais par la stature seulement était l'égal de M. Delcassé, le plaisant, surnom de Foutriquet, et il avait coutume de dire: Foutriquet ne mourra que d'un coup de pied . . . J'en dis autant de M. Delcassé, et soyez tranquille, avant un an, de coup de pied sera donné.*" Guibert et Ferrette, op. cit., p. 83.

CHAPTER VI

EUROPEAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO

1. THE INTERNAL CONDITION OF MOROCCO

IT will be remembered that in the convention signed with Great Britain April 8, 1904, relating to Egypt and Morocco, it had been agreed that France should come to an understanding with the Spanish Government, and then communicate the arrangement to Great Britain. It was recognized that "the interests which that country derives from her geographical position, and from her territorial possessions on the Moorish coast of the Mediterranean," entitled her to special consideration.¹ In order to understand clearly the agreement entered into by France and Spain regarding Morocco, as well as the events which followed it, it seems advisable at this point to give a brief consideration of Morocco in its relation to the great Powers.

As one writer has put it, "Although but two days' journey by sea from the coast of Provence, a few hours from Gibraltar and from Cadiz, Morocco remains at the beginning of the twentieth century a political anachronism, a remnant of the Moslem middle ages."² Its government was that of a feudal state, the Sultan possessing a nominal authority over the people of the

¹ Doc. Dip., "Accords entre la France et l'Angleterre," No. 2, Art. VIII.

² Henri Lorin, "La Question du Maroc," Rev. Pol. et Parl., July, 1901.

cities, towns, and plains through the kaid appointed by him, while the mountain tribes were practically free. As the Sultan's revenues depended upon the amount of taxes raised in the districts under control, his reputation as a ruler depended to a great degree upon the success with which he protected these districts already under his sovereignty and increased their extent. An additional incentive for him to try and keep the border tribes in order was the knowledge that if he was unable to do it, the Powers were always ready to assist him in his task.

The Powers that were most interested in preserving the independence of the Shereefian Empire—through mutual jealousy rather than through any desire to respect the authority of the Sultan—were France, Great Britain, Spain, and Germany. Of these, Spain had the oldest and least dangerous claims. After four centuries of struggle she held merely a few *présidios* along the Mediterranean coast, the two principal ones being Ceuta and Melilla. France could date her interests back to 1533, when the Sultan of Fez granted to Francis I the right to navigate freely upon the shores of his states, and during the seventeenth century the influence of France in Morocco was supreme. Her supremacy in the Moorish Empire ended in 1713, when the Treaty of Utrecht gave Gibraltar to the English. Great Britain also could claim an ancient lineage in her Moroccan interests, as Charles II by his marriage to Catherine of Braganza, inherited Tangier from Portugal in 1662. It was found to be a dower of doubtful value and after twenty years' sojourn there, the English found that they would be better off without it.

Napoleon succeeded in reestablishing French influence in Morocco for a short time, but after Waterloo, English influence at the court of the Sultan reigned supreme. The French conquest of Algeria, definitely completed in 1848, only made the Sultan the more wary of his unwelcome neighbors. Last of all came the Germans, their explorers Lenz and Rohlf in the van, ready and eager to substitute their trade mark for that of the English. The Conference of Madrid in 1880 internationalized Morocco, and with the able Sultan, Mouley Hassan on the throne, the Powers had no further excuse to intervene.

Mouley Hassan's successor, Abdul Aziz, who came to the throne in 1894, was a well meaning and intelligent youth, but wholly inexperienced, and all too ready to follow any advice offered him. During the first six years of his reign, his Grand Vizier, Si Ahmed, who put him on the throne as being more docile than his elder brother, ruled both the country and the young Shereef with a rod of iron. At the death of his Vizier in 1900, Abdul Aziz, then only twenty-two years of age, came into absolute power. Si Ahmed, in order to control more easily the political situation, had taught the young Sultan that his only mission in life was to amuse himself. Now that he was ruler in fact as well as name, Abdul Aziz proceeded to carry out this program in the latest European fashion. Telephones, automobiles, moving pictures, were soon commonplaces at his capital, to the great disgust of the zealous Mohammedans, who resented keenly his apparent yielding to the cursed inventions of the Christians. The greater the innovation the more anxious he was to procure it,

and always in large quantities. Miniature railways, captive balloons, Steinway grands cost money, and while the Berbers and Moors were paying the bills, a hated Scottish adventurer, MacLean, who had become the young Sultan's chief adviser, was becoming rich and powerful.³

Even these innovations and costly luxuries might have provoked no serious difficulties if the Sultan had respected the religious fanaticism of his subjects. As a direct descendant from Mohammed, through his daughter Fatima, one of his chief duties was to compel observance of the religious laws. In fact all the tribes accept the Sultan's spiritual authority even when they disregard his temporal rule. They will pay taxes only if he is strong enough to make them, but they will rally to his call as Commander of the Faithful to carry on a *djehad*, or Holy War, with a zeal and ardor which leaves nothing to be desired.⁴ But the young Sultan seemed wholly oblivious of the hostility he was provoking among the fanatical Berbers. His first fundamental mistake was in attempting to make a change in the levy and collection of the taxes—a much needed reform it is true—but going counter to the ancient customs of

³ René Pinon in his "L'Empire de la Méditerranée," Chap. III, gives a vivid picture of the young Sultan and his surroundings. A pathetic touch is given by the young Sultan's excuse for his extravagance when it had cost him his throne. "They have accused me of buying hundreds of objects of which I had no need but how did I know . . . when I wished a piano they told me that pianos sold by the dozen and I got a dozen. Automobiles, according to my informers, were also sold by the dozen and bicycles by the hundred. The merchants leagued with my ministers have exploited me shamelessly. . . ." Interview with Abdul Aziz, quoted in Ques. Dip. et Col., Aug. 1, 1908.

⁴ For an excellent account of the religious question in Morocco see Edmond Doutté, "Le Sultanat Marocain," Rev. Pol. et Parl., Sept., 1909.

Morocco, and in direct violation of the Koran. His second was to allow English troops to seize a true believer who had taken refuge in the inviolable sanctuary of the most holy mosque of Fez, after having shot down a dog of an unbeliever, a mere Christian missionary. In a state like Morocco, where three fourths of the country is practically independent of the sovereign, and where a leader is found for every passing discontent, it was to be expected that in a case like the present, some sort of an uprising would follow. All that was needed was a leader and he quickly appeared. A certain Bu-Hamara, a false prophet claiming to be the older brother who had been dispossessed of his kingdom, started a revolt against Abdul Aziz in the autumn of 1902, an insurrection which finally provoked European intervention and came little short of starting a European conflagration.

Of the four countries particularly interested in Morocco, France had the strongest reason to desire its tranquillity. With her possessions and spheres of influence completely surrounding it, with almost a thousand miles of her Algerian frontier exposed to the depredations of its lawless tribes, well might she look with anxiety upon a serious insurrection. According to Article IV of the Treaty of Lalla-Marnia, signed in 1845, and delimiting the boundaries between Algeria and Morocco, it was recognized that no territorial limits could be established between the two countries in the desert, so a delimitation was made on a tribal, rather than a geographical basis. The unfortunate part of this method was that certain tribes handed over to the Sultan of Morocco were Algerian, and had

their abodes in territory definitely named as Algerian. Nor was there much hope of fixing a definite frontier in a country where the tribes were nomad, and as the treaty put it "*la terre ne se laboure pas.*"⁵ On various occasions attempts were made to trace an exact frontier, the policing was difficult, and the French felt that certain spots like the oasis of Figuig rightfully belonged within their sphere of influence. But nothing came of them, and M. Etienne could truthfully say: "Our policy as regards our Moroccan frontier exhibits one remarkable character—it furnishes the rare example of a common frontier between a powerful European state and a feeble Mussulman state remaining unchanged after sixty years of *voisinage.*"⁶

In point of fact, a slight change had occurred in 1900, when the French after repulsing an attack made upon a scientific expedition took possession of the oasis of Twat.⁷ To prevent or anticipate further changes, on March 18, 1901, M. Révoil, French minister at Tangier, had at the request of M. Delcassé, given a warning to the Shereefian government because of certain other attacks which had been made on French caravans in the vicinity of the Sahara oases.⁸ Less than a month later, a Frenchman, M. Pouzet of Oran, was assassinated on the Riff coast. On this occasion M. Delcassé sent an ultimatum to the Sultan and two war-ships to enforce it.⁹ This seemed to be rather strong action for the death of a single citizen, espe-

⁵ René Pinon, op. cit., Chap. IV, pt. 1.

⁶ "Notre Politique Africaine-Algerie et Maroc," Ques. Dip. et Col., June 15, '03.

⁷ René Pinon, op. cit., Chap. V.

⁸ Doc. Dip., "Affaires du Maroc" (1901-1905), No. 2 annexe.

⁹ Doc. Dip., op. cit., Nos. 6, 7.

cially since the Sultan had given no indication that he would refuse reparation. Perhaps the underlying cause was the information that the Shereefian Government intended to send a mission to London, and then have it proceed to Berlin.¹⁰ At any rate at the arrival of the war-ship, the Sultan acceded to all the demands made by the French Government, and also authorized a mission to proceed to Paris. The result of the mission to London was a memorandum of no political importance, while the one to Paris produced a protocol pertaining to the application and execution of the Treaty of 1845.

Taking as a base the maintenance of the integrity of the Shereefian Empire, and an improvement in the neighborly relations, the two governments decided to settle some of the difficulties arising from the untraceable frontier. The protocol even went so far as to allow the Sultan to establish frontier posts at the extremity of the territory of the tribes belonging to his empire, giving the tribes on the border the right to choose the government under whose authority they preferred to roam.¹¹ Commissions were to be sent by both governments to inform the tribes of the new arrangement, and in the future commissioners were to be appointed annually by each government to remain on the ground and settle the disputes which might arise.¹² In his letter explanatory of the protocol to

¹⁰ Ibid., No. 5.

¹¹ M. Victor Bérard thus characterizes this attempt: "Imagine that in a difficulty between Norway and Great Britain in regard to the North Sea, fished in by the fishermen of both countries, it was decided to establish a fixed frontier at the extremity of the waves frequented by the herrings claimed by each. . . ." "L'Affaire Marocaine," p. 74.

¹² For text see Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 20 annexe.

M. Saint René Taillandier, the new minister at Tangier, M. Delcassé declared that by this treaty France had obtained the Algerian boulevard which she had long needed.¹³ He was to learn that a boulevard of sand made a very shifting frontier.

Early in 1902 the two commissions set out to establish the frontier and to give notice to the tribes of the new arrangement. The very day the commission arrived, two French captains who happened to ride out without an escort, were shot down and stripped by mountain marauders. The Moroccan government expressed regret for the act, but confessed itself powerless. It was soon perceived that if any satisfactory solution was to be reached, French authority backed by French troops must be added to the very nominal authority exercised by the Sultan. Thereupon two new accords were signed, April 20, and May 7, 1902, at Algiers, by the chiefs of the two missions, outlining a complete program of political, economic, and military collaboration between France and Morocco.¹⁴ Unfortunately this policy of peaceful penetration, whereby France by clearly recognizing the sovereignty of the Sultan and reinforcing his authority,—the policy outlined by M. Révoil and supported by M. Delcassé—was never to be put into effect. The assassination of the English missionary, Mr. Cooper, followed by the summary execution of his murderers, aroused such excitement in the Moroccan capital that the Sultan felt it best to quit Fez. Almost immediately came news of the insurrection near Taza, under the leadership of

¹³ Doc. Dip., "Affaires du Maroc" (1901-1905), No. 21.

¹⁴ Ibid., No. 27 annexe and No. 28 annexe.

Bu-Hamara, "he who makes a Holy War in the name of God," and was known by the title "Father of the She-Ass."¹⁵ Morocco had drawn the attention of Europe.

2. THE FRANCO-SPANISH ARRANGEMENT OF OCTOBER 3, 1904

Even now if France had come out openly before the Powers, giving notice of her intention to respect the independence of Morocco while cooperating effectively with the Sultan to put down the revolt, all might have been well. But M. Delcassé realized well enough that the real solution of the question of Morocco lay first of all in Europe. Since the Conference of Madrid in 1880 had given the Maghreb an international status, only the European Powers could make a final settlement. Yet a settlement by the Powers was the one method which France was unwilling to bring about, at any rate until she had strengthened her position in Morocco economically and strategically to such an extent that her interests would be overwhelmingly superior to those of any other nation, or until she had strengthened her position in Europe by a series of understandings.

M. Delcassé attempted to pursue both of these methods simultaneously. After the arrangement made with Italy, giving France a free hand in Morocco in return for similar treatment for Italy in Tripoli, M. Delcassé turned towards Spain. Although the official documents regarding their proposals have never been published, it is not difficult to outline the negotiations. Realizing that Spain, both through her geographical

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 33.

situation and her possession of the *présidios*, had the first right to consideration, if a change were to be made in the *status quo* of Morocco, M. Delcassé suggested a partition of their respective spheres of influence, Spain taking the northern part, the ancient realm of Fez, while France should have the ancient realm of Marrakech. The negotiations started in 1901, continued throughout 1902, and then fell through. The reasons given were that the Spanish government feared lest Great Britain take umbrage at an arrangement concluded without her participation. M. Paul Cambon, French ambassador at London, shared in her misgivings.¹⁶ That very cordial relations still existed between the two governments after the definite rupture of negotiations (February 1, 1903) is shown by the speech in the Cortes, July 17, 1903, of Senor Silvela, whose government had been responsible for breaking off the negotiations. He declared that "an intimate union attaches us to our neighbor, the French Republic, and the union of our interests and our aspirations for the conservation of the *status quo* in Morocco, *as long as it can materially endure*, urges us to maintain a complete friendship and a harmony of thoughts with this country, our brother by race and united by so many bonds of interest and association."¹⁷ This speech further makes it clear that Spain realized that the *status quo* would not always endure, and that Spain

¹⁶ The nearest approach to an official account of the negotiations is in the article by M. André Tardieu, "France et Espagne," *Revue de Deux Mondes*, Dec. 1, 1912. See also: René Millet, "L'Accord Franco-Espagnol," *Rev. Pol. et Parl.*, Nov. 1904; "Notre Politique au Maroc," *ibid.*, July, 1904; E. D. Morel, "Morocco in Diplomacy," Chap. IX.

¹⁷ Quoted *Rev. Pol. et Parl.*, Aug. 1903.

must come to an agreement with France when a change was made.

Spain had been given her opportunity, there still remained Great Britain and Germany. There is no question that France would have attempted to settle the question of Morocco with Great Britain, whether an arrangement was concluded with Spain or not. It is hardly conceivable that M. Delcassé could have ever entertained the idea that the power which controlled Gibraltar, and whose trade with Morocco was considerably greater than any other power, would sit by and see any change in the *status quo* without her consent. But to treat with Spain was a far easier proposition than to treat with Great Britain, so it seems perfectly logical on his part to have attempted first to make a settlement with Spain, and to follow that by one with Great Britain. Finding that to be impossible, he turned towards Great Britain, and we have already seen with what success.

As for Germany, who also had been a signatory of the Treaty of Madrid in 1880, her sole interest in Morocco seemed to be commercial, and even in that respect her interests were far inferior to those of France and Great Britain. We have already indicated Herr von Bülow's attitude with regard to the Italian *tour de valse*, and his statement that Germany's only interest in Morocco was the maintenance of the open door. Early in 1902 in an interview with a correspondent of the "Figaro" he was even more explicit:

"Morocco touches us even less than China because our interests there are even smaller. . . . We rejoice that France and Italy, who have large and important

interests in the Mediterranean, have come to an understanding in regard to them. We do not pursue an active policy in that sea.”¹⁸

Prince Radolin, German ambassador to Paris, on the occasion of the arrival of the Moroccan embassy at Paris in June, 1901, had informed M. Delcassé that everyone recognized that France had a situation apart in Morocco.¹⁹ Although this may have represented the feelings of the German government at the time, it did not fairly represent German public opinion. In September, 1902, a leading German newspaper asked: “Why does not Germany associate herself in the work of opening Morocco to economic exploitation? . . . Seeing that quite recently Count Bülow has known how to protect in a just measure the German interests in China, we hope that in the question of Morocco Germany has not yet said her last word.”²⁰

Thus it was that the insurrection started by Bu-Hamara in the autumn of 1902, came at a most inopportune time for France. No satisfactory arrangement had been reached with Spain, an arrangement with Great Britain remained still in the offing, and Germany might be expected to look upon any interference in Moroccan affairs by a single nation as detrimental to her commercial rights. Under these circumstances it is not surprising that the Moroccan policy of France throughout 1903 was vacillating in the extreme. Starting with the apparent intention of supporting the Sultan in putting down the rebellion and of helping him out of his financial difficulties, the French govern-

¹⁸ Laloy, “La Politique de Guillaume II,” p. 121.

¹⁹ Doc. Dip., “Affaires du Maroc” (1901-1905), No. 18.

²⁰ Quoted from *Post*, *Qués. Dip. et Col.*, Sept. 15, 1902.

ment went so far as to arrange for a visit to Algeria by President Loubet.²¹ Thereupon Sidi Mohammed Guebbas, Moroccan commissioner to Algeria, arranged to have the French President met at Algiers by a special commission. But when Guebbas suggested that President Loubet give a formal assurance that France intended to guarantee the independence of Morocco, and to support the Sultan in accordance with the régime prescribed in the accords of 1902, it was found inexpedient to comply. As M. Victor Bérard sums up the situation: "the two friends, France and Maghzen, are not yet bound to each other by definite and public words, by engagements taken in the face of Europe with the knowledge and in the sight of the Powers; a third when he comes will be able to join in our *tête-à-tête*, and it is William II who will come to proclaim himself the friend, the defender and the only faithful ally of Morocco."²²

Then followed one mistake after another. M. Révoil, whose experience was almost invaluable in the critical situation, was allowed to resign. M. Jonnart, the new governor-general of Algeria, commemorated his arrival by ordering General O'Connor to bombard the *ksour* of Figuig, an error from many points of view. True enough, melinite was far more persuasive than kind words, but any possible advantage gained was destroyed by the ill-advised speech of General O'Connor, when he declared that France was not upholding the authority of the Sultan as against the Pretender.²³

²¹ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 50.

²² Bérard, "L'Affaire Marocaine," p. 90.

²³ René Pinon, "L'Empire de la Méditerranée," p. 75; see also Bérard, op. cit., p. 91.

Yet if not upholding the Sultan's authority by what right were French forces fighting on Moorish soil? Well might an English journalist just returned from the Sultan's domains assert that the whole affair was a tragi-comedy stage-managed by General O'Connor. Then he pertinently inquired how France could explain the building of a railway on Moorish territory at Beni-Ourif the southernmost oasis of the Figuig group.²⁴ Instead of improving conditions, the attack provoked a continuous guerilla warfare directed against the French by the tribes of the Southwest. While M. Delcassé was declaring that "the anarchy which now exists in the Shereefian Empire should not be attributed to the Shereef, who is in no way responsible for these acts committed for the most part by natives wholly outside the imperial authority,"²⁵ M. Jonnart was declaring that in his opinion "the responsibility of the Moroccan Government is directly engaged in these recent incidents."²⁶ That conditions were such that they could not possibly continue, is indicated by Mr. W. B. Harris, the "Times" correspondent, whose position at the Shereefian court rivaled that of the Kaid MacLean. After describing the anarchy existing in the country, the bankruptcy of the government, Mr. Harris, who had always been accused of Franco-phobe tendencies, declared that there was no other choice but this: "the intervention of France—the only Power who would undertake the task—or a state of anarchy impossible to imagine, in which the young Sultan, who never ceased

²⁴ Bensusan, "Great Britain, France and the Moorish Empire," *Con. Rev.*, Nov. 1903.

²⁵ *Doc. Dip.*, op. cit., No. 132.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, No. 125.

to desire improvement and reform, would disappear." ²⁷ And this was written at least six months before the accords between Great Britain and France were signed.

To one other cause, also, must be attributed the lack of decision evident in French policy in Morocco, and that was the opposition of the Socialist party. While both the colonial party and the Socialists believed in a policy of peaceful penetration, their ideas of what constituted *peaceful* penetration were far different. While the government wished to support the Maghzen in putting down the insurrection, M. Jaurès insisted upon making agreements with the various tribes separately. He thought that if the tribes could be shown that France had no intention of exploiting them, if by the construction of schools, hospitals, railways, reserve depots of food in case of famine, France would ameliorate their condition, the tribes would quickly appreciate the benefits of civilization.²⁸ M. Sabatier wanted to know if peaceful penetration consisted in constructing railways and then being forced to send troops to protect them and permit their functioning; or did it consist in constructing markets and hospitals on the Algerian frontier, as France had been doing for the past sixty years? Either Morocco would remain a hot-bed of anarchy, famine, and typhus, utterly lost to humanity, or it must come under the protection of France.²⁹

²⁷ W. B. Harris, "England, France and Morocco," Nat. Rev., Nov. 1903.

²⁸ For a complete exposition of the views of M. Jaurès on Moroccan policy see René Moulin, "Une Année de Politique Extérieure," Chap. II.

²⁹ Camille Sabatier, "La Pénétration Pacifique et le Maroc," Rev. Pol. et Parl., Jan. 1904.

It is evident that the Moroccan policy was subservient to the diplomatic situation in Europe. France proposed to allow Morocco to stew in its own juice, until the table in Europe had been cleared. But there was need of haste, for Europe could not endure forever a nuisance on her very door-yard. What France continued to look upon as an Algerian question, might very rapidly develop into a question for Europe. But with the signing of the Accords of April 8, 1904, with Great Britain, France might well consider that the crucial phase of the situation had been passed. It still remained to come to an agreement with Spain, also to have the Sultan recognize the validity of these engagements made without his permission or his cognizance. But these tasks might well seem insignificant compared with the one already achieved.

Spain had already refused to enter into an agreement with France regarding Morocco, lest Great Britain should take offence. Great Britain had not carried her scruples quite so far; yet as we have seen in the secret articles of the Accord of April 8, she had taken care to safeguard what she considered Spain's legitimate interests, especially since they corresponded very closely to her own. In the picturesque phrase of a French writer, "With France excluded from Tangier, the British Government becomes the only porter of the pillars of Hercules as she is already that of the Suez Canal."³⁰ The next question was whether Spain would be willing to accept an arrangement which had apportioned out her sphere of influence without inviting

³⁰ René Millet, "L'Accord Franco-Espagnol," *Rev. Pol. et Parl.*, Nov. 1904.

her into the discussion. The Spanish-American war had been a terrific blow to the prestige of Spain, and the pride of Castille and Aragon must not be trailed in the dust. When the question was raised in the Cortez strenuous opposition was raised to submitting to any such arrangement. Señor Nocedal declared that Spain alone possessed rights in Morocco, Señor Villaneuva found the Franco-English accord extremely prejudicial to Spanish interests in Morocco. Fortunately for the success of the negotiations, Señor Maura, President of the Council, was not moved by the opposition. In a lengthy speech he asserted that the idea, fostered by the press, that Spain's interests had been disregarded and her prestige lowered by the Franco-English accord was contrary to the facts. Spain must realize that Charles V. was no longer on the throne, and that the country which had performed the arduous task of conquering Algeria, must necessarily have certain interests in the country bordering its western frontier. "We have a sacred historic right but not the only one. The government is maintaining the rights of the Spanish nation and taking care to assure its future expansion. Our influence in Morocco will perhaps be increased by the present negotiations but in no case you may be convinced will it be diminished." ³¹

Señor Maura was not mis-stating his position. Spain's rights were to be maintained, and it was only after months of difficult negotiations that France was able to gain her ends. Spain had the whip-hand and she drove a hard bargain. The agreement finally reached, October 3, 1904, consisted of a short public

³¹ Ques. Dip. et Col., June 16, 1904. See also Moulin, *op. cit.*, p. 72.

declaration, and a secret convention comprising sixteen articles. The terms indicated that France was forced to pay dearly for the offers which she had made to Spain in 1901 and 1902. The public declaration was as enlightening as the utterance of a Delphic oracle. It simply stated that the two governments had fixed the extent of their rights and the guarantee of their interests in Morocco; Spain adhered to the Anglo-French Declaration of April 8, 1904; and both again maintained their attachment to the integrity of the Moorish Empire under the sovereignty of the Sultan.³² The secret convention was far from being ambiguous. In fact it attempted to settle the Moroccan question as far as France and Spain were concerned under every possible contingency. It is not essential to give in detail the clauses of the treaty, but it is very necessary to note carefully the contents of certain articles.³³

In Article I Spain again stated her adherence to the Anglo-French Declaration of April 8, 1904, but the following articles indicated that this adherence was rather to the secret part of the Anglo-French Declaration than to the clauses published, for very careful provision was made in case the integrity of Morocco under the Sultan's sovereignty should be maintained, "owing to the weakness of that government and to its continued inability to uphold law and order. . . ." By the secret arrangement Spain not only obtained the northern territory of the Riff, from the Moulouya to Larache, but also a long stretch of the Atlantic coast and its hinterland in the South, extending from her

³² Doc. Dip., "Affaires du Maroc" (1901-1905), No. 187.

³³ Text of the secret articles may be found in British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 102, p. 432.

Rio de Ora possessions as far as the Wad Sus, just south of Agadir. It was further provided that so long as the *status quo* continued, each might have certain privileges in its respective zone, but if the Sultan's sovereignty should disappear, each nation might consider the territories delimited as constituting its own sphere of influence. It was further complicated by Spain engaging herself for the period of fifteen years not to exercise her rights of action in her zone of influence *except with the consent of France*, while France had full powers to exercise her field of action in the zone ascribed to Spain, after first informing the King of Spain of the action she intended to take. Thus each nation was provided for in case Morocco should cease to be independent, and France was given the privilege of maintaining the Sultan's power even over the Spanish Zone, if she deemed this course of action best.³⁴ It would have been well if the declaration had ended here, but by Article X it was further provided that "so long as the present political status lasts, schemes for public works, railways, roads, and canals . . . shall be executed by such companies as may be formed by Frenchmen and Spaniards." It was not necessary to state that if the *status quo* changed such undertakings would be confined exclusively to the citizens of their respective countries. This was a clear violation of the open door policy. Although both France and Spain subscribed to the fourth article of the Anglo-French Accord, which maintained the principle of *commercial* liberty, they now proceeded to

³⁴ For a comprehensive survey of Franco-Spanish relations, 1902-1912, see André Tardieu, "France et Espagne," Rev. de Deux Mondes, Dec. 1, 1912.

place all further *economic* undertakings entirely in their own hands. Great Britain could not object because she had been paid her price, but how about other nations having commercial or *economic* interests there? ³⁵ Evidently they might object. The only solution was secrecy, a nation cannot object to what it does not know. However, if a secret shared is no longer a secret, a secret agreement is paradoxical; better an open covenant of fraud than a secret covenant of faith. Nemesis trails with ease the devious paths of secret diplomacy, but let us not anticipate her vengeance.

3. GERMAN ATTITUDE TO THE FRENCH POLICY IN MOROCCO

At last France could turn her undivided attention to Morocco. The diplomatic preparation had been concluded. Italy, Great Britain and Spain had been brought out, it remained to be seen whether France might profit from her investment. Conditions in Morocco seemed to be going from bad to worse. Bu-Hamara was not to have a clear field in his attempt to profit through the chaotic situation. The bandit Raisuli, one fine May morning arrived in the environs of Tangier, and stopping at one of the country villas, seized one of the notables of the foreign colony, Mr. Perdicaris, a naturalized American, and his son-in-law, Mr. Varley, a British subject, and held them for ransom.³⁶ The question was immediately raised in France whether the United States would recognize the para-

³⁵ It is essential to note the clear distinction made by France between *commercial* and *economic* liberty. Note also that these secret articles do not violate the Madrid convention if we regard the most favored nation clause as referring essentially to commerce. See Oct. 18, Madrid Convention. Martens, Recueil, 2d series, Vol. VI, p. 629.

³⁶ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 160.

mount interest of France in Morocco in accordance with the recently announced agreement with Great Britain, or would she go directly to the Sultan. The sending of a naval squadron under Admiral Chadwick looked ominous at first, remembering America's traditional method of treating with Barbary states, but at the same time the American ambassador, General Porter, asked M. Delcassé to have the French Government use its good offices in the affair.³⁷ The recognition by the United States of the new condition of affairs in Morocco was regarded as a diplomatic victory for France, but the condition which made it necessary for America to ask for her good offices pointed clearly to France the necessity for her immediate intervention. In the meantime, the Sultan, informed by both Great Britain and France that he would be held responsible for the captives, met all the demands of the bandit. These not only included a large monetary indemnity, but the displacement of certain officials, the surrender of numerous prisoners, and as a crowning indignity, the appointment of Raisuli as the governor of two villages in the vicinity of Tangier.³⁸

Following the Raisuli episode, the European inhabitants of Tangier petitioned the diplomatic corps that immediate measures be taken to safeguard their lives and their interests, and M. Saint-René Taillandier, the French minister at Tangier, informed M. Delcassé that all his colleagues, including the German representative, wanted to know what measures France intended to take to reestablish security.³⁹ France had

³⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 164.

³⁸ *Ibid.*, No. 167.

³⁹ *Doc. Dip.*, *op. cit.*, No. 178.

already notified the Maghzen of the Franco-British agreement concerning Morocco, assuring the Shereef of "the fundamental interest which France had both in the independence and sovereignty of the Moroccan Empire, which is contiguous to its African possessions," and the desire of France to aid the Shereefian Government to inaugurate the necessary reforms, under conditions favorable to the interests of both countries.⁴⁰ The Sultan, through his Minister of Foreign Affairs, had given an "implicit acceptance" to the agreement.⁴¹ As a temporary measure France sent two cruisers to Tangier, and also succeeded in securing the permission of the Sultan to put a French captain in charge of the garrison at Tangier with a view to its reorganization.⁴² France had also taken up the question of financing the Moroccan Government; for unless this were done, the country would be completely bankrupt before reforms could be introduced. On June 12, 1904, a group of French banks agreed to a loan of sixty-two and one half million francs at a five per cent. rate of interest, the bonds maturing in thirty-six years.⁴³ Finally in December, 1904, M. Taillandier was authorized to go to Fez, with a definite program of the reforms which France considered essential.⁴⁴ He had hardly received his instructions before a letter from the Shereefian Government informed him that the Sultan had given orders for the dismissal of all the military missions at Fez and at Rabat, with a view to

⁴⁰ Ibid., No. 159 annexe.

⁴¹ Ibid., No. 177.

⁴² Ibid., No. 183.

⁴³ Ibid., No. 170 and *annexes*.

⁴⁴ Ibid., No. 208.

curtailing expenses.⁴⁵ At the same time it was learned that two ministers of the government, regarded as being favorable to the French, had been dismissed. As the officers of the commissions were especially those whom France had placed at the disposal of the Sultan for the reorganization of his army, the order to dismiss them was an overt act of hostility towards France. The French minister immediately threatened a severance of diplomatic relations.⁴⁶ The threat sufficed, and His Shereefian Majesty expressed the most profound regret that his policy of retrenchment did not find favor in the eyes of the French Government, and urged that the prospective mission to Fez be despatched without delay, that His Majesty might convince the French Government of his most favorable sentiments towards it.⁴⁷ His apologies were accepted, and the mission proceeded upon its way, but the first indication had been given that sinister forces were at work undermining the successful prosecution of the new French policy in Morocco.

If France were unaware both of the extent and character of these influences, she was to receive a most sudden and rude awakening. On February 11, 1905, the French *chargé d'affaires* at Tangier sent the following despatch to M. Delcassé, as being the declarations made to him by his German colleague: "After the Franco-English accord," said Herr von Kuhlmann, "we supposed that the French Government was waiting, in order to inform us of a new situation, until the Franco-Spanish entente provided for in the arrange-

⁴⁵ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 209.

⁴⁶ Ibid., No. 213.

⁴⁷ Ibid., No. 216.

ment of April 8 should be effected. But to-day everything being definitely concluded, and the parliamentary ratifications having intervened, we perceive that we have been systematically held apart. We have consequently fixed our attitude, nor am I tracing a line of conduct on my own initiative. In presence of the contradictory interpretations of our newspapers, I believed it necessary to solicit formal instructions from my government. Thereupon Count von Bülow informed me that the Imperial Government was wholly ignorant of the accords intervening on the subject of Morocco, and did not recognize itself as bound in any manner as regards this question.”⁴⁸

Was it true that M. Delcassé had left Germany wholly ignorant of these accords, which were to give France the opportunity so long desired, of completing her North African empire? Was it possible that a man as skilled in diplomacy as M. Delcassé, would have worked so long and so patiently to gain the adherence of Italy, Spain, and Great Britain to the colonial projects of France, and deliberately ignore the one power which was ever watching, ever waiting, across the Eastern frontier, to finish the work begun at Sedan? For it was not enough to say that Germany had no political interests there, that her interests were only commercial, and these interests had been safeguarded. As a signatory of the Treaty of Madrid in 1880, and as a power which did have commercial interests there, she surely deserved to receive at least official notice of the new situation. This was very well recognized in France. As far back as November, 1902, the “*Eclair*”

⁴⁸ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 224.

published an interview with a personage closely in touch with the foreign and colonial policy of France, in which he declared: "Above all do not forget that for the solution of the Moroccan question, we must take count of three powers: Great Britain, Germany, and Spain. We shall only be able to arrive at a satisfactory result if we succeed in coming to an agreement with all three. To treat with one of the three, to the exclusion of the two others, would be the most serious fault that we could commit."⁴⁹ Surely it might be considered almost as serious to treat with two of the powers and disregard the third, especially if Germany should be the third power. Had M. Delcassé made such an inexcusable diplomatic *faux pas*? Had Germany received no *official* notification? Let us consider the evidence.

In the Yellow Books on Morocco we find that on March 25, 1904, M. Bihourd, French ambassador at Berlin, informed M. Delcassé that on March 20, the Wurtemberg Pan-Germans had urged the Imperial Government to profit by the occasion to extend its economic interests in Morocco, and if the *status quo* should not be maintained, that Germany be ready to take the western region and occupy Agadir. In the same despatch, however, M. Bihourd quotes the North German "Gazette" to the fact that "by reason of the reiterated assurance, and given *officially* by France, that she has in view neither conquest nor occupation, we may believe that the German commercial interests in Morocco are not threatened, therefore, we have no reason to envisage with malevolent eyes the Franco-

⁴⁹ Quoted in Ques. Dip. et Col., Nov. 15, 1902.

English entente in preparation.”⁵⁰ In his reply on March 27, M. Delcassé informed M. Bihourd of a conversation which he had recently had with Prince Radolin, the German ambassador to Paris. In reply to questions concerning the projected arrangement, M. Delcassé informed Prince Radolin that an entente was very possible between Great Britain and France in regard to Morocco and other questions, but France intended to maintain both the political and territorial situation unchanged, and commercial liberty would be fully respected. M. Delcassé ended with these words: “You may in your conversations with the Minister of Foreign Affairs make use of this interview.”⁵¹ Thus, two weeks before the accord with Britain was signed, M. Delcassé had authorized the regularly accredited diplomatic representative of the French Government at Berlin, to acquaint the German Government of the intended arrangement, and to promise guarantees of commercial liberty.

The next mention of the subject in the Yellow Books is a despatch from M. Bihourd, dated April 12, 1904, and summarizing the attitude of the German press on the Accords as published. A few editors thought Russia had reason to object, but from the German standpoint there was nothing in the arrangements detrimental to German interests.⁵² M. Delcassé in his next despatch to Germany wished to know if M. Bihourd had found opportunity to utilize his telegram of March 27.⁵³ This would indicate M. Delcassé’s de-

⁵⁰ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 141.

⁵¹ Ibid., No. 142.

⁵² Ibid., No. 145.

⁵³ Ibid., No. 147.

sire to be certain that Germany had received *official* notice. That Count von Bülow was not ignorant of the arrangements is indicated by his speech in the Reichstag, April 12, 1904. Replying to a question on the subject he declared that Germany had no objection to make from the viewpoint of German interests, their interests in Morocco were chiefly commercial, and it was to their advantage that peace and order reign at Morocco.⁵⁴ Two days later Herr Bebel raised the question of Germany's isolation, and Count von Reventlow wanted to know why Germany allowed other powers to take precedence in Morocco. To the first the German Chancellor replied that Germany was still allied to two great powers, in friendly alliance with five others, on friendly terms with France, and intended to remain so. To von Reventlow he sarcastically replied by a simple question. Would the Count have a great country like Germany make such a demand without being ready to enforce it, and would he be willing to plunge the country in such an adventure? At a time when the Far East was already engulfed in war he thought a policy of calm and reserve most fitting.⁵⁵

On April 18, 1904, M. Delcassé again authorized M. Bihourd to repeat to the Foreign Secretary (i. e., Baron von Richthofen) the declarations already made, assuring him that the arrangements did not interfere with the existing interests of any power,⁵⁶ and on April 27, M. Bihourd assured M. Delcassé that he had done so.⁵⁷

⁵⁴ Ibid., No. 150 (annexe) or "Fürst Bülow's Reden," Vol. II, p. 74.

⁵⁵ "Fürst Bülow's Reden," Vol. II, pp. 80 and 90.

⁵⁶ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 152.

⁵⁷ Ibid., No. 155.

Upon the signing of the accord with Spain M. Delcassé sent copies of the Declaration to the French ambassadors accredited at the various capitals including Berlin, and the very next day M. Bihourd notified M. Delcassé that he had made Baron von Richthofen acquainted with the new situation, and had assured him that commercial liberty assured by the Franco-English accord had been again guaranteed by this.⁵⁸ However, M. Delcassé went even further. On October 12, he wrote to M. Bihourd as follows: "The declarations that I have made to Prince Radolin last March, and of which I have informed you, have kept the German government in touch with our intentions in Morocco. It has had from that moment the assurance that from the point of view of commercial transactions, everyone would benefit from the new order to be established, and that commercial liberty would be vigorously and entirely respected. . . . In obtaining the adhesion of the Spanish government to the principle of commercial liberty inscribed in the Declaration of April 8, we have again augmented the guarantees which international commerce will enjoy in Morocco. You may declare this to the Baron von Richthofen with the greatest clearness."⁵⁹ Again M. Bihourd notified the German foreign secretary, and again he was assured that Germany's interest in Morocco was exclusively economic.⁶⁰

It might be well to take note at this point of the exact phraseology of M. Delcassé's despatches and the German replies. In every case M. Delcassé gave as-

⁵⁸ Ibid., Nos. 187 and 189.

⁵⁹ Ibid., No. 191.

⁶⁰ Ibid., No. 192.

surance that *commercial* liberty had been guaranteed, but in no statement, either in his diplomatic correspondence or in his speeches in the Chamber, does he mention any guarantee of *economic* liberty. Thus he is not contradicting the secret articles of either arrangement, for both of them guarantee *commercial* liberty, but neither makes any pretense of guaranteeing *economic* liberty. In fact as we have already indicated, the secret articles of the Spanish accord baldly announce that economic developments are to be confined to French and Spanish capital. From the French point of view this distinction is vital, because of what value would Morocco be to France if she took upon herself the weighty task of bringing order out of the chaos existing there—a program entailing a stupendous sacrifice of blood and treasure, as she knew to her sorrow from her experience with Algeria—unless she had as compensation, the privilege of keeping the economic development of the country in her own hands. In the German utterances the same distinction does not seem to be made. Count von Bülow in his speech of April 12, 1904, before the Reichstag, does declare that Germany's interests are above all commercial (*vor allem kommerzielle*), but in almost the same breath he speaks of their interests in the Mediterranean, and especially in Morocco, as being for the most part economic (*im wesentlichen wirtschaftlich*).⁶¹ That is, Germany not only wished her commercial interests of the present guaranteed, but also her economic interests of the future.

We have laid special stress upon the many occasions

⁶¹ "Fürst Bülow's Reden," Vol. II, p. 74.

and the various means which M. Delcassé employed to make sure that the German government was being kept in touch with the arrangements France was making in regard to Morocco, because as we shall see later, he was accused both in Germany and in France of having kept Germany entirely in the dark, and this seemed to be regarded as his principal offense. So as might have been expected, when M. Delcassé received the startling announcement from the French *chargé d'affaires* at Tangier, that the Imperial government was wholly ignorant of any accords concerning Morocco, and did not recognize itself bound in any way in this question, M. Delcassé immediately telegraphed M. Bihourd at Berlin, asking him to refresh the memory of the German foreign minister with a detailed enumeration of the facts.⁶² When M. Bihourd called at the Wilhelmstrasse, the foreign secretary was not to be seen, but the under secretary, Herr von Mühlberg replied that he knew nothing of the statement made by the German representative at Tangier, but he wondered if Herr von Kuhlmann's declarations should not be interpreted that the German government, being a stranger to the two accords, did not consider itself bound by them. M. Bihourd was forced to content himself with this interpretation; Germany was not yet quite ready to show her hand.⁶³

In the meantime M. Saint René Taillandier, the French plenipotentiary to Fez, was having great difficulty in his attempt to bring to the Sultan's attention the French program of reforms. Arriving in the

⁶² Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 225.

⁶³ Ibid., No. 226.

middle of January, 1905, he found the Sultan unexpectedly unwilling to take the responsibility of consenting to his demands without discussing them in Council, a most exceptional procedure. Not until February 22 was the first conference held, and the sittings dragged along through the month of March. While M. Saint René Taillandier was still patiently expounding his program of remedies for the evil condition of affairs into which Morocco had fallen, and informing the Sultan that the Powers particularly interested in Moroccan affairs had not only recognized in France the right, but imposed upon her the duty of effecting the necessary reforms, Kaiser Wilhelm II, cruising on the Mediterranean, disembarked at Tangier March 31, 1904 and played the rôle of a veritable *deus ex machina*. Replying to the address of welcome delivered by the Sultan's uncle, the Kaiser made clear to the world the German position on the Moroccan question:

"It is to the Sultan in his position of an independent sovereign that I am paying my visit to-day. I hope that under the sovereignty of the Sultan, a free Morocco will remain open to the peaceful rivalry of all nations, without monopoly or annexation, on the basis of absolute equality. My visit to Tangier has had as its object, to make it known that I am determined to do all that is in my power to safeguard efficaciously the interests of Germany in Morocco, since I consider the Sultan as an absolutely independent sovereign. It is with him that I wish to come to an understanding as to the proper means to safeguard these interests. As for the reforms which the Sultan intends to make, it

seems to me that it is necessary to proceed with great precaution, having regard for the religious sentiments of the population, that the public order may not be disturbed.”⁶⁴

France had settled the Moroccan question to the satisfaction of Great Britain, Spain and Italy, but not to the satisfaction of Germany. Geographically, Germany could not have the same legitimate interest in Morocco, which all three of the other powers possessed who had colonial interests on the northern coast of Africa. Politically, she had repeatedly declared her complete indifference. Commercially, her trade with Morocco was less than one-fourth of that of either Great Britain or France, and her commercial liberty had been guaranteed under the new accords. True enough, she had been a signatory of the Treaty of Madrid, but so had the United States, Belgium, Portugal, Austria, and Scandinavian states, and they found no complaint with the new Moroccan policy of France. Why then had Germany changed her Moroccan policy, since Chancellor von Bülow had publicly declared that Germany had nothing to object to in these accords? Inasmuch as Herr Bebel asked the same question in the Reichstag just two days before the Kaiser's speech at Tangier, we shall let Count von Bülow answer it: “Herr Bebel has let it be understood that our policy towards Morocco has changed since a year ago. I must first recall to him that the language and attitude of diplomats and policies change according to circumstances. I choose the moment which I consider favorable for the production of our

⁶⁴ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 234.

interests. As a matter of fact nothing has changed in the tendencies of the German policy on this point. He who looks for a *fait nouveau* will not find it in the German policy.”⁶⁵

The Chancellor was only following the trail blazed by his predecessors in German diplomacy, in bending circumstances to his ends. When Great Britain and France had signed the accords, conditions were not suitable for a protest from Germany. A year later important events had taken place both in Europe and in France which gave Germany her opportunity to strike. The *fait nouveau* was not in the German policy, but in the fact that the German policy could at last come out in the open. Going back once more to Count von Bülow's speech of April 12, 1904, we can find the clue to his whole subsequent action. Replying to the complaint of Count von Reventlow that he should not let other powers obtain greater influence in Morocco than Germany, he replied: “If you wish to create surfaces of irritation everywhere you do not cry it from the housetops. Frederic the Great has perhaps now and then played a game of chess in politics worthy of Machiavelli, but not until after he had written against Machiavelli.”⁶⁶ It remains to be seen whether von Bülow's Moroccan policy proved itself worthy of either Machiavelli or Frederic the Great.

⁶⁵ “Fürst Bülow's Reden,” Vol. II, p. 209.

⁶⁶ Ibid., II, 91.

CHAPTER VII

THE FALL OF DELCASSÉ

1. PREPARATIONS FOR THE KAISER'S VISIT TO TANGIER

VARIOUS reasons have been given for the Kaiser's *coup de théâtre* at Tangier, and also for the fact that a year was allowed to elapse between the signing of the accords between France and Great Britain and the descent at Tangier. Chancellor von Bülow, who confesses that it was in pursuance of his advice that the German Emperor gave the world warning that Germany had important interests in Morocco and intended to protect them, in a communication to Prince Radolin, German ambassador to France, dated April 11, 1905, sums up the situation somewhat as follows: Since by the Anglo-French convention it was provided that the *status quo* should be maintained, Germany made no move until the French minister at Tangier presented a program of reforms which were impossible to put into effect without upsetting the *status quo*. When M. Saint René Taillandier declared to the Maghzen that he presented this program as mandatory of the European Powers, Germany objected, since the French ambassador had most certainly not received a mandate from Germany. The German viewpoint was that this attempt of France injured the interests of all those states which had participated previously in Moroccan conferences, and

which France had neglected to consult. England and Spain could dispose of the rights of their own subjects in Morocco if they wished, but they could not pretend to dispose of the rights of Germans. Germany intervened to protect her interests, which were being disregarded without asking her consent. The importance of these interests was secondary; it was not necessary to prove that Germany had important economic interests in Morocco. If these minor interests should be abandoned without protest the world would think that similar action would be permissible where larger interests were at stake. The German situation was well summed up in a French phrase: "*Cet animal est très méchant, quand on l'attaque il se défend.*"¹

On the following day, in a despatch to the German embassies in the various capitals of Europe, von Bülow made M. Delcassé responsible for the German action and indicated that the German plan was for a new conference: "It is false that the Franco-English convention concerning Morocco has been brought to the knowledge of the German government either *verbally or by writing*. M. Delcassé, it is true, did give here and there to the Imperial ambassador some general allusions to the untenable situation in Morocco, and to the necessity for France to consider the security of her Algerian frontier. But when last summer, long after the Anglo-French convention, the German ambassador addressed to M. Delcassé a question in regard to the tenor of this convention, the foreign minister merely replied: '*Sie finden das alles im Gelb-*

¹ The original text of the German White Book on Morocco, with a French translation attached, may be found in the Archives Diplomatiques 1906, Vol. 97, p. 275 et seq.

buch.' ''² We have already given a complete enumeration of the various ways in which M. Delcassé did bring the matter to the attention of the German government; hence it is not necessary to point out the false impression conveyed by the Chancellor's statement. It may be worth while to note, however, that there is no rule in international law, nor has it been established by diplomatic usage, that a convention between two nations shall be communicated either in writing or verbally to all other nations whose interests may be touched by it. All rules established by the comity of nations will have been complied with if the communication is made in any way recognized by diplomatic usage. Surely a verbal communication by a regularly accredited ambassador would more than meet these requirements. After thus attempting to make M. Delcassé responsible for Germany's action, the Chancellor concluded by declaring that the German government did not expect to obtain special advantages by means of a particular treaty, but considered a new conference of the contracting states as the best means of bringing about a peaceful solution of the conflict of interests.³

In neither of these explanations do we find that any claim is made that France has injured German interests; the one and only reason seemed to be that France had dared to conclude conventions which might be detrimental to German interests in Morocco. In his "Imperial Germany," written several years later, Prince von Bülow gives one reason which may have

² *Ibid.*, p. 278.

³ *Arch. Dip.*, *op. cit.*, p. 279.

had some weight: "There was a fairly widespread belief in Germany that France would meet with difficulties and hindrances in Morocco which would paralyze her military, financial and political striking power in Europe; but this theory would not hold water. . . . It was much more probable that France would in course of time considerably reinforce her 'black troops,' her army of native Africans, by forming new companies and squadrons from the promising material offered by Morocco." ⁴

Unquestionably both of these reasons had some influence in bringing about German intervention, but it is just as certain that there were many other and equally important reasons which do not appear in the explanations given by the German Chancellor. Looking back over the course of French foreign policy since M. Delcassé entered the Quai d'Orsay in 1898, we find a continuous series of checks for German diplomacy. First it was the affair of the Portuguese colonies, which while M. Hanotaux was foreign minister had progressed favorably, but which came to a sudden halt when M. Delcassé took hold. Germany was checkmated again by France during the Boer War, when Russia at Germany's request, suggested that France join with them to intervene in favor of the Boers, but upon the basis of the *status quo*. France next proceeded to weaken the Triple Alliance by drawing Italy into friendly relations, and followed that up by a *rapprochement* with England. Germany's position as arbiter of Europe, which Bismarck had so cleverly planned, was being undermined by the very power

⁴ Von Bülow, "Imperial Germany," p. 95.

against which he had reinsured her so carefully. At the same time Germany saw the gap widening between herself and Great Britain. The Boer War had made the two peoples hostile; the interpretation of the Accord of October 14, 1900, in regard to Manchuria, had divided the governments. Great Britain by allying herself with Japan, neutralized still further the weight of the Triple. The Russo-Japanese War, in which Japan, the ally of Great Britain, and Russia, the ally of France, might not only destroy each other, but drag in their respective allies, had aroused new hopes of a situation which might profit Germany. The Kaiser did all in his power to encourage the Czar to fight to the end.⁵ The Dogger Bank affair seemed to be the spark needed to touch off the powder trains leading to France and Great Britain. But the newly formed *Entente Cordiale* proved itself a most vigilant fire warden, and the threatened explosion got no further than a mere flash in the pan. Germany made one more effort to profit through the war in the Far East. While urging the Czar to sign an alliance with Germany against Great Britain and Japan,—with a view to forcing France to throw over either the Russian Alliance or the Entente with England,⁶—the Kaiser at the same time informed the United States that France, Great Britain, and Russia were engineering a great plot for the dismemberment of China, declaring that he had been invited to join but had refused categorically.⁷ John Hay exploded this bubble very quickly,

⁵ See the "Willy-Nicky Correspondence" for a clear side light on William's affectionate interest in his friend Nicholas' affairs.

⁶ "Willy-Nicky Correspondence," No. 13.

⁷ W. R. Thayer, "Life of John Hay," Vol. II, 384.

and President Roosevelt interfered further with the Kaiser's plan of a *guerre à l'outrance* for Russia and Japan, by bringing the two combatants together. The Czar had spoiled the other scheme by suggesting that he first communicate the terms of the projected alliance with Germany to France.

So long as M. Delcassé was able to combat the diplomatic manoeuvres of the Wilhelmstrasse on foreign fields he was signally successful, but commencing with the year 1905 Germany brought the attack to French soil. On January 24, M. Combes worn out by his long struggle against the forces of clericalism, resigned, and M. Rouvier was asked to form the new cabinet. We have already encountered M. Rouvier in connection with the Bagdad Railway. At that time, in his anxiety to have France participate in this undertaking, he had been drawn into playing Germany's game; but as we have already shown, M. Delcassé proved himself the more powerful, and the shares of the Bagdad Railway did not appear upon the Bourse at Paris. According to M. André Mévil, even during the formation of the Rouvier cabinet the German intrigues commenced to penetrate, and M. Delcassé was warned concerning them. It was even suggested that he persuade President Loubet to try some other ministerial combination. In the newly formed Rouvier cabinet M. Delcassé was retained, but his departure from the foreign office was merely a question of time; even he could not successfully cope with the increasing hostility of Germany, without backing at home. One French senator, who has acted as secretary of the Commission of Foreign Affairs, gives it as his opinion that the

secret of Germany's attitude was that she found in France a support against the Minister of Foreign Affairs, in the person of M. Rouvier.⁸

The whole internal condition of France at this time was an urgent invitation to Germany to strike. The virus of the Dreyfus Affair had destroyed all confidence in the army; the struggle between the Church and the State had exhausted every energy of the government. Internationalism and anti-militarism were rampant. The two years' service law, which reduced the length of service in the army from three to two years, and which had been under discussion by the government for three years, passed in its final form just a fortnight before the Kaiser's visit to Tangier. General André, in his hostility towards clericalism, had made the War Office a branch of the secret service, with the Masonic Order as his chief agent for spying and making delations. M. Pelletan had completely wrecked the morale of the marine. M. Jaurès and his Socialist followers had become so strong that no government could exist without their support; M. Jaurès, who as M. Pugliesi Conti declared in the Chamber, "had recently sullied this tribune by the most abominable sacrilege against our French sentiments, he whose tardy and obsequious compliments have gone to awaken in his tomb the Gallophobe Crispi,"⁹—M. Jaurès, who

⁸ Georges Reynald, "L'Oeuvre de M. Delcassé," p. 39.

⁹ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 69, p. 210. In this same session, January 23, 1903 M. Lasies called the attention of the Chamber to a brochure distributed to the new recruits in the army by the *Fédération des bourses de travail*, an organization subventioned by the government and supported by M. Jaurès, quoting as follows: "If you do not feel yourself able to support the vexations, the insults, the imbecilities, the punishment and all the shames which await you at the

wished to found the Republic Indestructible, not merely the French Republic, but the Republic of Europe, the Republic of Humanity. M. Lucien Millevoye, in combatting these theories, asked the Socialists to remember that while they were attempting to inscribe on the conscience of the universe their law of love and peace, others were maintaining graven on the threshold of their arsenals and barracks, their law of war and iron; also that neither Attila, nor Ghengis-Khan, nor Bajazet could throw as many men upon the world as are found in a dozen corps of the German army; and that this mass of flesh and steel, with the most speedy and complete means of invasion at its disposal was at the bidding of one will, one order—one flash of lightning and there would follow the most frightful tempest that had ever devastated the universe.¹⁰

But such pleas were like voices crying in the wilderness; it seemed as though France had to be brought to the very brink of disaster before she could be made to realize the danger of her course. The one and only fault that may legitimately be found with the policy of M. Delcassé was that he did not take into consideration the internal condition of France in connection with its foreign relations. M. Combes in his struggle with the forces of clericalism, had no time left for watching over the conduct of foreign affairs. He gave M. Delcassé a free rein. But M. Delcassé placed too much confidence in the strength of his diplomatic props, and paid too little attention to the weakness of the military

barracks, desert! This is far better than to serve as amusement for the alcoholic executioners and the mad fools that take care of you in the military prisons."

¹⁰ Ibid., Vol. 69ii, p. 1311.

and naval support upon which he must depend. He could not be entirely excused when he said: "I do my own duty and presume that my colleagues do theirs." In the words of M. André Tardieu, M. Delcassé "believed that a diplomatic action was self-sufficing" . . . being aware that German opposition would be made, sooner or later, not to his Moroccan but to his general policy, he, however, did not perceive that a France half-disarmed both materially and morally was fatally condemned to yield. He willed the end without willing the means.¹¹ On the other hand with the Rouvier ministry in control, M. Delcassé did not receive the backing that he had a right to expect; his carefully planned work was being undermined from within even before it was attacked from without.

The only question in the mind of Chancellor von Bülow was, when would be the best time to strike? Obviously with France's ally undertaking a war in the Far East, it would be well to await developments in that quarter. The initial disasters to the Russian Port Arthur and Vladivostok fleets might well be retrieved. However when General Kuropatkin, early in September, lost the important battle of Liao-Yang, and was forced back upon Mukden, it was quite evident that the Japanese were superior on both land and sea. Port Arthur fell to the Japanese on January 2, 1905, and in the same month it was reported that Herr Kuhlmann had remarked to a member of the French legation at Tangier: "You are making a mistake not to come to an agreement with us. The Imperial initia-

¹¹ "France and the Alliances," p. 181.

tive is going to take a hand.”¹² On March 9 Kuropatkin was forced to withdraw from Mukden, the decisive defeat of the war on land; on March 25, Emperor William embarked for his trip on the Mediterranean, and on March 29, Chancellor von Bülow made the answer to Herr Bebel in regard to the change in German policy which we have already quoted, concluding with the statement that “if any attempt should be made to modify the international situation of Morocco or to establish any check on the open door in the country’s economic development it is our intention to see that our economic interests are not endangered.”¹³ The Kaiser’s visit to Tangier completed the first act of the Moroccan drama, with the Kaiser in the rôle of the rescuing hero, preserving the Sultan and his empire from the deep laid plots of M. Delcassé.¹⁴

2. GERMANY FORCES THE ISSUE

Germany had made her move, and it was now the turn of France. On the same day that the Kaiser spoke at Tangier, the question of the German attitude on the Moroccan question was raised in the Senate. M. Delcassé was in the more difficult position, in that

¹² Recouly, “Le Septenat de M. Delcassé,” *Rev. Pol. et Parl.*, June, 1905.

¹³ “Fürst Bülow’s Reden,” Vol. II, p. 210.

¹⁴ The Kaiser almost wrecked the whole scheme by a sudden decision not to visit Tangier. When his sudden change of mind was made known in Berlin veritable consternation reigned for a while. Finally the Chancellor telegraphed to Lisbon representing to the Emperor that the affair had already gone so far that it was impossible to recede without completely disavowing his advisers. The Kaiser hesitated no longer and carried out his program. Guibert et Ferrette, “Le Conflict Franco-allemand,” p. 184.

Germany had made no opposition to the French policy, nor was it as yet clear just what she wished. In reply to the question of M. Decrais concerning the hostile attitude of the German press, he replied: "Nothing in our Moroccan policy, nothing in our carrying out of the accords of April 8, and October 3, 1904, can explain the agitation in the press mentioned by M. Decrais." He then declared once more that in no way whatsoever had the economic interests of any third party been injured, nor would they be injured by France in putting into effect the administrative, economic, financial, and commercial reforms of which Morocco had need.¹⁵ On April 7, 1905, a despatch to the French ambassadors in St. Petersburg, Madrid, Vienna, London and Rome from M. Delcassé showed the falsity of Germany's claim that she had received no official notification.¹⁶ Another accusation raised by the German press was to the effect that M. Saint René Taillandier had asserted that France had received a mandate from Europe to impose her program of reforms upon Morocco. M. Saint René Taillandier hastened to deny this categorically, and informed M. Delcassé that he had been extremely careful to state that France founded her right to counsel the Shereefian Government on her own situation, which had been recently consecrated by accords concluded with the powers bordering on and most interested in the affairs of this country.¹⁷ M. Delcassé thereupon proceeded to acquaint Prince Radolin with this denial, and also called his attention to their conversation preceding the

¹⁵ *Annales du Senate*, Vol. 67i, p. 641.

¹⁶ *Doc. Dip.*, op. cit., No. 236.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 237.

Franco-English Accord, and the official communication of the Franco-Spanish Accord to the German government. In conclusion M. Delcassé declared that if in spite of his explanations a misunderstanding still existed he would be very willing to dissipate it.¹⁸

In the meantime on April 7, in reply to several interpellations in the Chamber, M. Delcassé repeated his assertion, that France intended to continue her task in Morocco in such a manner as to interfere with the rights of no one, and that if after these formal declarations there still remained any misunderstanding she would be only too willing to dissipate it.¹⁹ M. Delcassé had offered to discuss the matter directly with Germany in his conference with Prince Radolin, he had announced his willingness from the rostrum of the Chamber, he now authorized M. Bihourd to open the discussion in Berlin. It was all in vain. Germany was not yet ready to talk, and the *débâcle* of the Russian forces in the Far East gave her confidence in her position. Chancellor von Bülow had already suggested the idea of an international conference in his despatch to the German ambassadors,²⁰ but M. Delcassé although he suspected that Germany would adopt some such attitude, did not feel that France could afford to submit to such a conference at the command of Germany. He therefore acquainted M. Saint René Taillandier with his suspicions, and authorized him to make it clear to the Sultan that any such plan would

¹⁸ German White Book No. 6, Arch. Dip., Vol. 97, p. 281; also Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 243. It will be noted that Prince Radolin in his report of this conversation as given in the German White Book makes no reference to M. Delcassé's offer to dissipate the misunderstanding.

¹⁹ Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 75ii, p. 1570.

²⁰ See p. 172.

be inimical to the friendly relations existing between France and the Shereefian Empire.²¹

The German press continued to grow more threatening, and public opinion in France became restive. When the question again came up for discussion in the Chamber on April 19, a torrent of abuse descended upon the head of M. Delcassé for bringing France into such an *impasse*. The Socialists led in the attack, but all parties and factions joined in with them. Germany's accusations, that she had received no notice of the accords, were accepted blindly. Some found him guilty of changing the entente with Great Britain into a weapon of offence, although he had declared its chief purpose was to insure peace; others asserted he was pulling England's chestnuts out of the fire; some accused him of carrying on a personal policy without any regard for the Chamber, which was kept wholly ignorant until it was too late to interfere; others blamed him for ever bringing about the *rapprochement* with Great Britain; all united in censuring him for not taking Germany into consideration before attempting any program of reforms in Morocco. The "Journal Officiel" reporting this day's seance of the Chamber must have been very pleasant reading in Germany. Even M. Rouvier, despite his antipathy to M. Delcassé, was forced to come to his support and take the responsibility for the future policy of the government. M. Delcassé attempted no further defence; he simply reiterated that France was willing to dissipate any misunderstanding.²² He then offered

²¹ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 238.

²² Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 75ii, p. 1922.

his resignation, but President Loubet refused to accept it. It would have been better for all concerned if M. Delcassé had insisted, although it was entirely to his honor that he was unwilling to retreat under fire, even though the fire did not come wholly from the enemy's side. But it was now merely a question of time, for Germany was determined to force him out and M. Rouvier was only too willing to allow her to proceed.²³

M. Bihourd again attempted to discuss the situation with the German Foreign Secretary, going so far as to offer the text of the various conversations which M. Delcassé had held with Prince Radolin, but his offers were declined as being superfluous.²⁴ In a despatch to M. Delcassé dated April 28, at Berlin, M. Bihourd summed up the situation as follows: "The Imperial Government is in no haste to reply to the question that Your Excellency at Paris, and I at Berlin, have put to it. This silence fits in well with the policy which the Chancellor has proclaimed at the Reichstag, and the Emperor at Tangier. In adopting this attitude, it has attempted first to give abundant satisfaction to the national *amour-propre*, secondly to appease by a demand for consideration the complaints of representatives of industry and commerce, who claim to have been sacrificed by the recent treaties. . . . Direct negotiations seem impossible at this time, for the official declarations repulse them or impose upon our initia-

²³ M. André Mévil declares: "Our adversaries knew that M. Delcassé had many enemies in Parliament and that in a cabinet composed exclusively of friends of M. Rouvier he could count on little sympathy." "De Frankfort à Algéciras," p. 232.

²⁴ Doc. Dip., op cit., Nos. 245, 246.

tive conditions which could be accepted with difficulty; but the indirect way is not closed to us.

“The idea of a conference has been launched, it is still, in spite of the unfavorable reception which it has met with in the principal cabinets, stubbornly defended by the Imperial Chancellory, which, however, recommends an exchange of views between the Powers signatory of the Conference of Madrid in 1880.”²⁵ On the very day that M. Bihourd wrote that all avenues of direct approach seemed to be closed, Chancellor von Bülow was writing the following note to Prince Radolin in Paris: “Express in my name my thanks to the President of the Council (M. Rouvier) for his conciliatory declarations. I am led to believe that he understands the situation in which Germany would be placed if third powers disposed of German interests without consulting with us. . . . *I believe that I can conclude from the overtures which the President of the Council has made to your Highness* that the thought of a unilateral solution of the question under discussion or one resting upon force is as far from his mind as from that of the Emperor. . . .”²⁶

Thus while M. Delcassé was still Minister of Foreign Affairs, and was trying in a legitimate manner to find a way out of the difficulty and yet maintain the honor of France, M. Rouvier, the Prime Minister, without his knowledge, was carrying on secret negotiations with the German government. Germany could now proceed confidently towards the attainment of the two objects which she had set as her goal: the downfall of

²⁵ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 248.

²⁶ German White Book No. 8, Arch. Dip., Vol. 97, p. 284.

M. Delcassé, and a conference of the Powers to settle the Moroccan question. As instruments she chose Prince Henckel von Donnersmarck who was to proceed to Paris, and Count von Tattenbach as emissary to Fez. The former was to work against M. Delcassé, the latter to work upon the Sultan. Both were completely successful.

The mission of Prince Donnersmarck was revealed by a confidential statement made by himself during his visit to Paris, and published June 17 by the *Gaulois*. A few sentences quoted from his statement will elucidate the plan of the German Foreign Office: "If you are of the opinion that your Minister of Foreign Affairs has engaged your country in too adventurous a course, acknowledge it by dispensing with his services, and especially by giving a new direction to your foreign policy. We are not concerned with M. Delcassé's person; but his policy is a menace to Germany; and you may rest assured that we shall not wait for it to be realized. . . . Take the word of a German who has always had great sympathies for you. Give up the minister whose only aspiration is to trouble the peace of Europe; and adopt with regard to Germany a loyal and open policy. . . ." ²⁷ The strangest thing of all was that not only M. Rouvier and his friends, but all France was ready to accept this advice. In the words of a leading French publicist, "When a man puts his country in an *impasse*, the best way to get out is to throw him overboard and then take stock of the situation." ²⁸

²⁷ Quoted in Ques. Dip. et Col. July 1, '05; also André Tardieu, "France and the Alliances," p. 183.

²⁸ Millet, "Péril National," Rec. Pol. et Parl., June, 1905.

France seemed to have fallen into a blue funk. The British government appeared ready to back her in any stand she might take; King Edward made a special trip to Paris the first week in May to emphasize the solidarity of feeling, the British press was loud in its denunciation of Germany. But France wanted peace and was determined to have it at any price.²⁹ While M. Delcassé continued to refuse a conference and authorized M. Saint René Taillandier to inform the Sultan that no Powers could intervene between Morocco and France,³⁰ M. Rouvier continued to negotiate secretly with Germany with an entirely different intent. In a despatch from Herr von Bülow to Prince Radolin, dated May 22, 1905, we have conclusive proof of this fact. Replying to the statement made by the French minister at Fez that M. Delcassé would consider any attempt to communicate proposals of reforms to the signatory Powers as detrimental to the interests of France, he (von Bülow) was able to assert that declarations made by M. Rouvier authorized him to admit that the President of the Council disapproved of this mode of action.³¹

²⁹ M. Leghait, the Belgian minister to Paris in a despatch dated May 7, 1905 declared: "The presence of the King of England in Paris at a time when the atmosphere is still vibrating with the events of Tangier has a significance which deserves serious attention . . . it is evidently for the purpose of giving to France at this moment a new proof of friendship and of emphasizing under special circumstances the solidarity existing between the signatories to the understanding of April 8, 1904. . . . The King has, however, not confined himself to expressing his sentiments and views to M. Delcassé and to the French politicians, but has taken care that the court at Berlin should be informed thereof. . . ." Belgian Doc. No. 4.

³⁰ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 251.

³¹ German White Book No. 12, Arch. Dip. Vol. 97, p. 361. M. Victor Bérard thus characterizes M. Rouvier's policy: "This treason of M.

In the meantime Count Tattenbach the Imperial Envoy to Fez had arrived, and had his first interview with the Sultan, May 13. According to his reports, the Sultan claimed that he had made no concessions to the French, but had been awaiting the arrival of the German minister before reaching any decision.³² Herr Tattenbach hastily seized the opportunity to show the falseness of the French position and the advantage to Morocco of submitting the question to a conference of the Powers. On May 27, he had won his point, and the Sultan despatched a letter to M. Saint René Taillandier informing him that the Notables, whom he had summoned to consult with him regarding the program of reforms submitted by France, had advised him not to consent to any reform without first asking for an International Conference of the Powers signatory of the Conference of Madrid.³³ Germany had gained one of her objectives, it only remained to obtain the resignation of M. Delcassé.

A veritable avalanche of rumors and threats descended upon Paris. M. Barrère, French ambassador at Rome had received from the Italian government an alarming communication to the effect that France had addressed an ultimatum to the Sultan, and Germany had informed her that German troops would cross the

Rouvier (I should like to find in the French language another word; but our people, ticklish upon questions of honor and good faith, designate with the same term infidelity to friends, comrades or colleagues, and the disregard or abandon of national duty; against M. Delcassé and against the policy of France the secret intrigues of M. Rouvier were disloyal), then this treason of M. Rouvier was to give to this Minister of Finances, President of the Council, the portfolio of Foreign Affairs." "L'Affaire Marocaine," p. 412.

³² German White Book, No. 10, p. 359.

³³ Ibid., No. 14, p. 363; also Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 262.

Vosges at the same time that French troops crossed the Moroccan frontier.³⁴ The rumor was false but it served its purpose. Paris suddenly learned that Germany was arming, that movements of troops had been reported in Westphalia, in Wurtemberg, on the frontier of Baden and in the Rhine provinces, that officers of the Royal Prussian Guard had been ordered to hold themselves in readiness for immediate service. The fluctuations on the Bourse during the fourth and fifth of June gave evidences of a financial panic. The Chamber experienced the same emotions as during the crisis of Fashoda. In the words of one of its members: "It was no longer England who threatened us, but Germany, and our military and maritime situation was certainly worse than that of 1898. The army, decapitated in its staff by demagogic distrust, the corps of officers decimated by the delation of an odious and dominating sect, the arsenals in disorder, the supply stations empty, insubordination and desertion preached openly to our soldiers by agitators, whose efforts were encouraged; disorder everywhere, strength nowhere. Such was the situation."³⁵

On June 5, the German Chancellor brought matters to a climax by sending a note to all the signatory Powers of the Madrid Conference, in which it was stated that, since the Sultan had invited the signatory Powers to a conference at Tangier to discuss a system of reforms for Morocco, the Imperial Government believed that such a conference afforded the best means to introduce such reforms, and for this reason it had

³⁴ Georges Reynald, "Le Diplomatique Française," p. 41.

³⁵ Guibert et Ferrette, "Le Conflict Franco-Allemand," p. 253.

accepted the Sultan's invitation. The note also declared that the special privileges sought by France would result in a violation of the Convention of Madrid, since France intended, just as she had in Tunis, to take over the administrative machinery of the country, thus putting it under her political and economic domination.³⁶

M. Rouvier called a meeting of the Council on June 6, to determine the policy of France. In the stormy session which ensued, M. Delcassé urged that France refuse to accept the proposal for a conference. He showed that Germany's claims that she had not been informed were false; that to find in the text of the Madrid Convention, which merely related to the status of the European consulates in Morocco, the right to submit the Shereefian Empire to a European condominium was a most palpable pretext,—finally that Russia, England, Italy, Spain and the United States declared the conference useless and unnecessary,—why then, should France accept? The whole proposition was bound to fall through. If France did accept the conference called by the Sultan at Germany's behest, it would give Germany the right to take part in the affairs of North Africa, and henceforth France would be at the mercy of her bluster and caprice. "What did Germany really wish? She wished to sound the will of France, to intervene in the exercise of her rights as an independent nation, dictate her conduct, regulate her friendships, and subject her to a humiliating vasselage. To cede to-day would be to cede to-morrow, and France emerging from this humiliation

³⁶ German White Book, No. 16.

would be weaker but not less exposed.”³⁷ He assured them that Great Britain was behind them in case of an unprovoked aggression,³⁸ but that Germany would not attack, it was only a case of bluff. He was pleading before a jury which had rendered its decision. M. Rouvier insisted that to refuse meant war and they did not want war. Germany had won her second point, M. Delcassé was forced to resign, and this time it was final. “We didn’t ask for his head, they offered it to us,” said the Princess von Bülow, who received her new title as a direct result of M. Delcassé’s fall.

The satisfaction everywhere evident in France at

³⁷ Georges Reynald, “La Diplomatie Française,” p. 45; see also Debidour, “Histoire Diplomatique de l’Europe” (1904–1916), p. 22.

³⁸ There is still some question as to the exact extent to which France could count upon Great Britain, but undoubtedly some promise had been made. In fact the Accords of 1904 themselves assured France of diplomatic support (Art. 9). According to M. André Mévil, “England did not hesitate to give us the assurance that the British military forces were ready to march with us against Germany if this power came to attack us. Better still, the British government, the principle of an Anglo-French defensive co-operation once admitted, declared herself ready to sign without delay an accord which would establish definitely this co-operation. . . .” M. Mévil goes so far as to intimate that the very next day Berlin knew of this offer through the intimate relations existing between the Rouvier cabinet and Germany. Mévil, *op. cit.*, p. 282.

The *Matin* published a sensational exposé on Oct. 5, 1905, which asserted that England had given verbal notice to France that if France should be attacked she was ready to mobilize her fleet, seize the Kiel Canal, and disembark 100,000 men in Schleswig-Holstein. She was ready furthermore to put this offer in writing if France so desired. On October 13 both the Havas and Reuter agencies declared these reports to be inexact. See *London Times* Oct. 9, 1905; also *Ques. Dip. et Col.*, Oct. 16, 1905.

Editorially, the *Times* declared in regard to M. Delcassé’s statement that England was ready to support France in the event of an unexpected act of oppression directed against France: “With that statement we have no fault to find. We do not at all doubt that in such a contingency the English Government would have supported France with the hearty approval of the nation.”

the downfall of M. Delcassé is one of the most inexplicable incidents of French politics. It is not at all surprising that he was forced out by M. Rouvier, whose jealousy and hostility towards him were notorious. The surprising part of the affair is that a foreign minister who had for seven years, through four different ministries, carried on the foreign policy of France to the satisfaction of the great majority, should have been forced out individually, with not even the fall of the ministry to save the appearance of the situation, and without a single voice of protest being raised in his behalf. Germany's hand in the affair must have been evident to the veriest tyro in foreign politics! As a brilliant English writer has put it: "Any stick was good enough to beat the unfortunate M. Delcassé within his own country, any stone served for pelting him. None so poor for the time being to do reverence to the minister . . . of all the Paris newspapers, only the 'Débats' had the decency, at least, to give him one consolatory pat on the back, when he was kicked out—for kicked out he was. Every other helped in the kicking with shameless gusto. The Paris press has hardly ever before during the Third Republic been so well agreed in any one purpose as it was in rending M. Delcassé." ³⁹

Across the Rhine joy was equally great. Chancellor von Bülow was immediately made a prince by the Kaiser, and the newspapers exulted in the German victory. The Chancellor himself, writing some years later says that "the retirement of M. Delcassé proved to be no transitory triumph for us. His fall weakened

³⁹ Laurence Jerrold, "The Real France," Chap. VII.

French chauvinism and more prudent and peaceful counsels prevailed again, thereby facilitating our policy. . . ."⁴⁰ M. Delcassé found some consolation in the English press which not only eulogised his record but regretted exceedingly his departue. Even America seemed to have a far clearer perception of the exact situation than was to be found in France. John Hay writing to Henry Adams the day following M. Delcassé's resignation very cleverly depicted the situation: "I see your friend, the Kaiser, has at last taken the scalp of Delcassé. . . . He has evidently done it out of sheer wantonness, to let people know there is a God in Israel. Characteristic, his rushing to Bülow's house and making him a prince on the spot to advertise his scare. Spring-Rice turned up in London yesterday. He says he does not think the Kaiser means or wishes war with France. He merely wants to insult her publicly, by way of notifying her that if she does not want him to do it again she had better make friends with him. The situation is not, as it appears, satisfactory to any one. France has been profoundly humiliated and does not care to show any resentment. England is not inclined to sympathize with her as she seems unconscious of her injury. The Bear is licking his own wounds and does not care what happens to the Cock and the Lion. It was a good time for the Kaiser to tread the stage in the Ercles vein."⁴¹

3. M. ROUVIER AT THE QUAI D'ORSAY

If M. Rouvier thought that with M. Delcassé out of the way, and the portfolio of foreign affairs as well

⁴⁰ Von Bülow, "Imperial Germany," p. 98.

⁴¹ Thayer, "Life and Letters of John Hay," Vol. II, p. 404.

as the premiership in his own hands, Germany would be satisfied, he was apprised very quickly of his mistake. On June 10 in a conference with Prince Radolin, he showed that he was no more anxious for a conference than M. Delcassé had been. He declared that France could not consider a conference without a preliminary agreement with Germany, and if such an agreement was reached there would be no further need of a conference. In fact under those circumstances a conference would be a complication rather than a solution. "Therefore," he suggested, "before considering the question further we must know Germany's attitude towards the reforms." The brutally frank response of the German ambassador showed that personal feelings of friendship had no place in German diplomacy: "We insist on the Conference. If it does not take place, the *status quo* remains and you must know that we are behind Morocco." ⁴²

Prince Radolin was merely carrying out the orders of the Chancellor, and in his notes to the German ambassador, June 12 and June 16, Prince von Bülow insisted that before any preliminary arrangements should be discussed, France must submit first to the idea of a conference.⁴³ M. Rouvier was sure there must be some misunderstanding; surely Germany would listen to his explanation even though she had refused the same request when made by M. Delcassé.

⁴² Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 269. M. André Tardieu declared that M. Rouvier told him that the German ambassador added that they were back of Morocco "with their entire strength." "France and the Alliances," p. 187.

⁴³ German White Book, Nos. 18 and 19, Arch. Dip., Vol. 73, p. 383, et seq.

Consequently in a long despatch to Prince Radolin, M. Rouvier once more pointed out the position of France, her intention of maintaining the independence of the Sultan and the crying need for reforms. As to a conference, France still insists that it would be dangerous if not preceded by an entente, and useless if it followed one. However in order that France may show her conciliatory spirit she does not categorically refuse a conference. Nevertheless she would like to know what the Imperial Government regarded as the precise points to be treated and the solutions if proposed.⁴⁴ That there might be no mistake about its reaching the German Chancellor, M. Rouvier sent a copy to M. Bihourd asking that he transmit it to the Imperial Chancellor. The reply to this note left no further room for misunderstandings. Prince von Bülow informed M. Bihourd that he found M. Rouvier's note "a surprise and a deception," and was wholly unacceptable. Furthermore, he advised M. Bihourd that France ought not to allow this dangerous question to drag, nor "ought she delay upon a road bordered with precipices and even with abysses."⁴⁵ Two days later, on June 25, upon the occasion of another interview with the French ambassador, the German Chancellor again warned him that France must hasten, for the Sultan was uneasy and was multiplying his offers to Germany, and his demands also, and "an incident might arrive which would render the already grave situation fatal."⁴⁶

⁴⁴ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 272.

⁴⁵ Ibid., No. 276.

⁴⁶ Ibid., No. 278; see also German White Book, No. 21, Arch. Dip., Vol. 73, p. 390.

M. Rouvier had conceded too much to stop now, and on July 8, by a mutual exchange of letters, the two governments accepted the principle of an international conference upon the following basis: sovereignty and independence of the Sultan; integrity of his empire; economic liberty without any inequality; need of reforms both financial and in the police, their introduction to be regulated by an international agreement; and recognition of the special situation of France in Morocco through its possession of Algeria.⁴⁷ France might take such comfort as she could out of the last provision.

Hardly had the two governments come to an agreement before Germany broke faith. In the discussions leading up the exchange of letters of July 8, it was agreed that from the moment that a conference was accepted both sides would suspend individual negotiations with the Sultan. Yet on July 12 M. Rouvier received a letter from the French minister at Fez, stating that the German minister was on the point of obtaining certain concessions for a German firm.⁴⁸ M. Rouvier protested, but later he learned that not only had a contract been awarded to a German firm for the construction of a mole and other enterprises at Tangier, but similar advantages were being sought in other ports.⁴⁹ Another protest obtained a most evasive reply.⁵⁰ Then reports began to come in that German bankers were negotiating a loan to the Sultan, which was not only a direct violation of German

⁴⁷ Ibid., No. 287.

⁴⁸ Ibid., No. 288.

⁴⁹ Ibid., No. 291.

⁵⁰ Ibid., No. 297.

pledges, but a direct violation by the Sultan of the clauses of his contract in the last loan which he had obtained in France. The German reply to this was that the Sultan had demanded a huge loan of from two to three million pounds sterling from British bankers, who since they were unwilling to advance it turned it over to German bankers. They in order to safeguard the general interests of Morocco promised the Sultan a small loan of ten million marks, simply to relieve his present critical financial situation. In order to keep faith with France no economic concessions had been demanded as security.⁵¹ As for the constructions in the ports of Tangier, the concessions had been obtained months before the entente with France.⁵² At the same time the Sultan relying upon his new allies, seized one of the Algerian subjects of France, violating thereby both his agreements with France and the principles embodied in the Conference of Madrid.⁵³

This was more than even the prudent banker Rouvier was willing to stand. Apparently Germany was preparing to make her position strong in Morocco before the conference should be called. As for the difficulties which France might have over her Algerian subjects, Germany as being *persona gratissima* at the court of the Sultan, was unwilling to see force employed at this most critical time. Curtly disregarding the German interference, M. Rouvier sent an ultimatum to the Sultan which soon brought that worthy to reason, when he found that his German friends were much less interested in supporting the Sultan's interests in Mo-

⁵¹ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 306, annexe.

⁵² Ibid., No. 310.

⁵³ Ibid., No. 311.

rocco than they were in supporting their own.⁵⁴ Protesting again at the lack of faith shown by these operations in Morocco, M. Bihourd was informed by Prince von Bülow that these enterprises were most insignificant, in fact that of the port was one of the Sultan's gifts which he sought to refuse. "In your place, I should force him to make me a similar concession." M. Bihourd replied that the French did not intend to disregard their reciprocal engagements.⁵⁵ The German Chancellor realizing that France could be browbeaten no further, ordered Dr. Rosen, German minister at Tangier to proceed to Paris and come to an agreement. Now that Germany was really ready to treat, little difficulty was found in coming to an accord; it was signed September 28, 1905, and merely elaborated upon the program adopted in the exchange of letters of July 8. It included: organization of the police; regulations for the suppression of contraband in arms; financial reforms, consisting principally in the establishment of a State Bank and the study of a better collection of imposts and the creation of new revenues; finally the fixing of certain principles destined to safeguard economic liberty. As to the frontier region between Morocco and Algeria, the question of policing was to continue exclusively in the hands of France and Morocco, as also was the regulation of contraband of arms in the same region. Algeciras was chosen as the place for the conference if Spain was willing. As regards the German loan, it was to be regarded simply as a short time advance of money, and the French banks

⁵⁴ Ibid., No., 341, annexe 2.

⁵⁵ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 338.

were to share in it. As for the constructions in the port of Tangier, France conceded the Sultan's right to grant these concessions to German interests, unless the French company which had also been asked to make a survey, could show titles of value equal to those of the German concern.⁵⁶

On the whole, France could hardly complain of this program after having chosen M. Rouvier to draw it up. She had promised that the independence of the Sultan should be respected, that commercial liberty should be guaranteed, and that her sole purpose in attempting to put into effect a program of reforms was to safeguard her own interests in Algeria. The conference had the same purpose, and it was recognized in advance that her situation in Algeria gave her the right to special consideration. It was her privilege to show in the conference the great importance of these rights and interests. As M. Rouvier said in his declaration before the Chamber December 16, 1905, in presenting the situation: "the recognition of a special situation, resulting from the most evident facts, admitted by the Powers most interested, inscribed in the last accords that we have concluded with the Imperial Government can be prejudicial to no one. . . . From the negotiations which have resulted in the Accords of July 8, and September 28, our rights have come forth if not entirely recognized, at least entirely preserved. . . . We calmly await the results of the Conference."⁵⁷

⁵⁶ Ibid., Nos. 350, 351.

⁵⁷ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 77ii, p. 1385. It is surprising to note that some deputies who were the most bitter in their denunciations of M. Delcassé, who wished to resist Germany, now excoriated M. Rouvier

The European situation which had looked so gloomy to France at the fall of M. Delcassé was rapidly brightening. When on May 27, Admiral Togo completely destroyed the fleet of Admiral Rodjestvensky in Tsushima Bay, Russia realized that she had lost the war. The Kaiser, taking advantage of the despondency of the Czar, finally persuaded him to sign a secret alliance at Bjorko on July 23.⁵⁸ Although the meeting took place in absolute secrecy, France realized that her ally was much less cordial than she had reason to expect. When M. Witte was asked to explain it he did not mince words: "You tell me that they have the impression of a Russo-German *rapprochement*. Why shouldn't there be one? The German Emperor throughout the whole course of the war has been with regard to Russia more than correct, he has been friendly. On all occasions he has affirmed and proved his desire of not causing us any embarrassment, of aiding us as far as was in his power and keeping us out of all complications. However, the essence of the

as follows: "M. Rouvier has acted not as a diplomat, but as a banker who wishes to avoid a complication, an emotion, an ennui in which he sees a catastrophe. He has opened his safe saying, 'What do you wish?' He has not examined whether the demand was excessive, unreasonable or insulting. He has paid with his cash-box open and then returned to his desk." Guibert et Ferrette, "Le Conflict Franco-Allemand," p. 287.

⁵⁸ "Willy-Nicky Correspondence," No. 30, et seq. A further confirmation of the *rapprochement* between Germany and Russia at this time was given by Prof. Schieman in the *Kreuzzeitung*. He asserted that if the Delcassé system had provoked war over the question of Morocco, Russia would have refused to consider the situation a *casus foederis*. He added in conclusion: "In affirming that the German foreign office had been informed concerning this point, and that Emperor William had carefully weighed the possible consequences when he disembarked at Tangier, we make more than a simple supposition." Ques. Dip. et Col. Feb. 16, 1906.

relations between Russia and France have not changed.”⁵⁹ With the signing of the Treaty of Portsmouth, September 5, Russia had opportunity to take stock of the situation. Germany had been prodigal with kind words but France had furnished her funds, and Great Britain had cooperated closely with the United States in bringing Japan to make very reasonable terms. She was also given to understand that the London money market which had always remained closed to her might be persuaded to open its golden doors.⁶⁰ The war had been a great drain upon her financial resources and it would have been almost suicidal to turn her back upon France and England. Germany did not have funds to loan even if she had been willing to loan them. The Czar therefore began to wonder whether he had been wise to tie himself up too closely with the Kaiser, and towards the close of the year became very unwilling to attempt to bring France into the secret agreement which he had signed with the Kaiser.⁶¹ At any rate it would be well to

⁵⁹ *Le Temps*, Sept. 21, 1905.

⁶⁰ Baron Greindl, Belgian minister at Berlin wrote on September 23, 1905: “In spite of the great difficulties that are in the way of a *rapprochement* between London and St. Petersburg, the possibility thereof is no longer excluded . . . the principal cause of the differences between England and Russia has been removed for the time being. I mean the unhealthy Russian ambition incessantly to extend the boundaries of an Empire which is already too big. . . . They have been grateful to Germany at St. Petersburg for her benevolent neutrality which permitted Russia to concentrate all the forces at her disposal in the Far East; but neither peoples nor governments can pride themselves on their gratitude. How long will Russia’s gratitude last when the danger is over? Russia is always in straits; she has flooded France and Germany with her loans; will she be able much longer to resist the temptation to open a new financial market for her benefit?” Belgian Doc., No. 8.

⁶¹ Writing in November, 1905, the Czar says: “Our alliance with

await the results of the Conference of Algeciras.

France also, towards the close of 1905, began to recover from the nervous tension shown after the resignation of M. Delcassé. Another secret agreement was signed with Spain on September 1, 1905, which clarified and strengthened the secret accord of October 3, 1904. It provided that the police of Morocco should be of native troops, but that the officers in Tetuan and Larache should be Spanish, while in the ports of Rabat and Casablanca they should be French, and in Tangier the police should consist of a Franco-Spanish corps. It was also provided that a State Bank should be created with the presidency reserved for France, and again reserved future economic concessions to French and Spanish groups. Article IV of the accord was especially important, for after declaring that both Powers would attempt by pacific action with the Sultan to insure the loyal accomplishment of its clauses, it declared: "Spain, having formally decided to endorse fully the action of France in the course of the deliberations of the projected Conference, and France agreeing to act in like manner with Spain, it is understood between the two governments that they will mutually assist each other and proceed in accord in the said deliberations as regards the stipulations of the Convention of October 3, 1904, in its broadest and most friendly interpretation as in that which concerns the different objects of the present accord. . . ." ⁶²

France is a defensive one. Think the declaration I sent you could remain in force until France accepts our new agreement. I will certainly do all in my power to bring the Morocco Conference to a general understanding." "Willy-Nicky Correspondence," No. 53.

⁶² For text see Martens, *Recueil*, 3d., Vol. 5, p. 670.

What was even more important, France now began to realize that a nation could not depend wholly upon agreements with other nations to keep her out of trouble. Nor was it enough to put faith wholly in pacifist doctrines and international good-will, when one could see on their very threshold "the resurrection of the Holy Empire of the Germanic nation, no longer in phantom state and dragging along in the mantle of Charlemagne, but armed with modern science, sustained by victorious legions, enriched by industry, resting with one hand upon the Rhine and the other upon the Danube and by these two arteries master of the commerce of Europe. Compared with this formidable power what would be the vacillating Empire of a Charles V or even the Continental Blockade of a Napoleon?"⁶³ The result was that France from October to December voted two loans, one for fifty million francs, and another for one hundred eleven millions, for immediate equipment of arms, stores and munitions. It might be after all that Morocco was merely an excuse. At any rate a new spirit of confidence was noticeable both in the press and in the Chamber; "*ne troublez pas l'agonie de la France,*"

⁶³ René Millet, "La Conscience Nationale," Rev. Pol. et Parl., March, 1905. At the same time that M. Millet was thus trying to arouse France by showing the danger on her Eastern frontier, Herr Schieman, a close friend of the Kaiser and editor of the *Kreuzzeitung*, in reviewing the events of 1905 declared France to be in full social decomposition, and profoundly impregnated with the revolutionary spirit. It was shown by the development of anti-militarism, internationalism and anti-clericalism. He sneeringly pointed out that the Rouvier cabinet, the 41st of the Third Republic, contained an ex-salesman of produce, an ex-reporter, an ex-broker, a journalist, a physician, psychiatrist and a former waiter in a café. See article by Henri Lechtenberger, Rev. Pol. et Parl., March, 1906.

gave way to "*aide-toi et le ciel t'aidera.*" Furthermore the same government which had discounted the assistance which Great Britain might give when M. Delcassé had promised it, now decided it had best receive definite assurances upon this point.⁶⁴ The question was asked whether if the Moroccan crisis developed into war between France and Germany, England would give armed support. Sir Edward Grey gave it as his opinion that if war was forced upon France over the question of Morocco, public opinion in Great Britain would rally to the material support of France. The French Government then asked: "If you think it possible that public opinion of Great Britain might, should a sudden crisis arise, justify you in giving to France the armed support which you cannot promise in advance, you will not be able to give that support, even if you wish to give it, when the time comes, unless some conversations have already taken place between naval and military experts." Sir Edward Grey acknowledged the force of the statement and agreed. He thereupon authorized these conversations to take place, with the distinct understanding that nothing which passed between military or naval experts should bind either government or restrict in any way their freedom to make a decision as to whether or not they would give that support when the time came.⁶⁵

⁶⁴ At the beginning of June, 1905, when the assurance had come that England was prepared to support France in case of aggression, M. Rouvier had cried: "*Que ma main se sèche plutôt que de signer un papier qui déchaînerait l'Allemagne.*" Now he himself was soliciting the renewal of these accords. Georges Reynald, "La Diplomatie Française," p. 48.

⁶⁵ Speech of Sir Edward Grey in the House of Commons, Aug. 3, 1914. Parl. Debates, Vol. 65, p. 1812.

France had finally awakened to the German menace. It was not simply M. Delcassé, or the policy of M. Delcassé, that Germany found hostile to her interests; it was *any* policy that threatened the hegemony which the German Empire had so long enjoyed, owing to the European rivalries which she had carefully fostered. But Europe had begun to realize its mistake, and M. Delcassé had made it his task to remedy it effectively. His success was his undoing. Germany waited patiently until the time to strike had come, and M. Delcassé was the victim. But the cause was not entirely lost. The German policy of bluster and intimidation over-reached itself. France felt that perhaps she had made a mistake, and was prepared to make reparation. She soon found that she had been needlessly humiliated, and she reacted accordingly. France had been forced into a conference against her wishes, she soon realized that all Europe was in the same position, and she hastened to profit by the knowledge. Germany might have easily driven a very hard bargain with France alone, but she wished to demonstrate that she could do equally well in the face of the whole world. M. Rouvier had foolishly believed von Bülow's protestations of friendship, and that Germany wanted a square deal. His negotiations with von Bülow, and von Tattenbach's underhanded operations in Morocco, quickly convinced him of his error. It was to his credit that he profited by the lesson, and when on December 1, 1905, the Sultan sent forth his invitations for an international conference to be held in Algeciras, to discuss the necessary reforms to be effected in the

Shereefian Empire, M. Rouvier had strengthened France sufficiently to be able to say with confidence to the Chamber: "We await with calm the results of the Conference."

CHAPTER VIII

THE CONFERENCE OF ALGECIRAS

1. THE DRAFTING AND SIGNING OF THE ACT

THE Conference of Algeciras convened on January 16, 1906, in the little town of Algeciras in Spain, with representatives of all of the thirteen Powers signatory of the Conference of Madrid present, except Norway. Furthermore, Russia, which had not participated in the Conference of 1880, sent representatives to this Congress. The majority of the Powers sent two delegates, though strangely enough Great Britain whose commercial interests were greatest of all sent but one, Sir Arthur Nicolson. The French representatives were M. Paul Révoil and M. Eugène Regnault. The former was especially well fitted for his task both by temperament and by training. He had been minister at Tangier and Governor-general of Algeria, and had been signally successful in both capacities. M. André Tardieu thus describes his qualities: "a patriotism active and worthy, much abnegation in an exhausting struggle, a marvelous richness of invention and arguments, a meritorious tenacity, infinitely gracious, good humored and of perfect uprightness, the last, a quality which was to gain him in a few weeks the confidence of even those who arrived at Al-

geciras, the most prejudiced against us.”¹ His colleague, M. Regnault, was also thoroughly familiar with Morocco, having served as a delegate of the French investors in Morocco. The German delegation consisted of Herr von Radowitz, the ambassador at Madrid, and Count von Tattenbach, the German emissary to Fez, whose operations in Morocco have already been mentioned. Having already triumphed over France once, his attitude was one of “cordial disdain,” and he never faltered in his belief that by dictatorial and blustering tactics, he could ride rough shod over the rights of France and any other nation whose interests clashed with those of Germany.

At the opening sitting, the Duke d’Almodovar, the first Spanish delegate, was unanimously chosen president of the Conference.² As a precautionary measure, the delegates decided to discuss the less important projects first, so that from January 16 to February 20, the Conference debated peacefully enough upon the questions of contraband in arms, and reforms in the imposts and customs duties. The two most important questions, namely the State Bank and the organization of the police were not broached. But while the public discussions were proceeding on these non-contentious subjects, private conversations were going on among the various delegates. Herr von Radowitz commenced sounding out the situation on January 23,

¹ André Tardieu, “La Conférence d’Algésiras,” p. 84. M. Tardieu as first secretary of the “ambassade honoraire” has been enabled to say the last word in the Conference of Algeciras. His exhaustive and documented treatment of the affair makes his work the primary source book on the subject.

² Doc. Dip., “Protocoles et Comptes Rendus de la Conférence d’Algésiras, No. 3.

when he approached the American delegate, Mr. Henry White, and the Italian delegate, the Marquis Visconti-Venosta regarding the organization of the police, but without giving any clearer statement of his views than that France should not be given this mandate alone or in connection with Spain.³ From the beginning M. Révoil took the position that since Germany had called the conference it was up to her to make definite proposals. On January 26, Herr von Radowitz had his first private conference with M. Révoil, but little came of it seeing that Germany was determined that France should not have charge of the organization of the police, the one prerogative that France was insistent upon.⁴ The French delegates were further hampered in their stand by the divided sentiment at home, since influential personalities like M. Clemenceau in the *Aurore* and M. de Lanessan in the *Siècle* demanded that France refuse to take the responsibility for the organization of the police,⁵ in direct opposition to the Government's position.

Neither were M. Regnault and the Count von Tattenbach able to come to an understanding in regard to a financial arrangement. The German delegate proposed to start with a clean slate, wiping out completely the preferential rights already held by French financiers, and then divide up the shares of the State Bank equally among the various Powers, putting France and Spain upon a par with Holland and Sweden.⁶ Needless to say France refused even to consider such a settlement.

³ Tardieu, op. cit., p. 138.

⁴ Ibid., p. 141.

⁵ Recouly, "La Conférence d'Algésiras," Rev. Pol. et Parl., Feb., 1906.

⁶ Tardieu, op. cit., p. 142.

Germany's next attempt was to break the bonds between France and the nations supporting her, by making them separate offers of various sorts. Spain was offered the mandate of policing the ports alone, but she refused to consider it. Count von Tattenbach then made an attempt to come to a separate understanding with the English delegate, but here he met with a more chilly reception than in his proposals to Spain.⁷ The next move was a false report made by the Wolff Agency that France sought to police the whole of Morocco, and thus under cover of a European mandate, to "Tunisify" Morocco. It was for this reason that Germany found it necessary to reject the French proposals. The "Temps" of February 13, was able to issue a categorical denial to this false despatch. In fact, throughout this first month France showed such willingness to treat upon any reasonable grounds, and Germany's attitude remained so uncompromising, that gradually the support of the neutral powers began to swing towards France.

In truth, Germany's dilatory tactics seemed to have more effect upon the internal situation in France than upon the delegates of the various Powers at the Conference. The situation was complicated by a presidential election in February, when M. Fallières was chosen to the place which had been held by M. Loubet. Although M. Rouvier was asked to continue in office, public opinion was aroused by the disquieting rumors constantly arriving from the Conference. The question was brought up in the Chamber on February 23, and M. Rouvier was very severely criticised by both

⁷ Ibid., p. 148.

M. Jaurès and M. Cochin for refusing to discuss the situation. The latter went so far as to assert that although M. Rouvier had taken charge of the foreign office because he wished to save everything, it now appeared as though all that he wished was the head of his predecessor. M. Delcassé at least had a policy; M. Rouvier seemed not to have even that. The condition of Morocco also appeared more chaotic than usual. Raids across the Algerian frontier were incessant, the Pretender was rapidly extending his operations; the bandit Raisuli was becoming bolder than ever in his exploits. If something were not done soon, an army rather than a force of police would be required.

When it began to look as though an *impasse* had been reached, since Germany seemed to have no definite program of her own and would not assent to any proposal acceptable to France, Count von Tattenbach, on February 19, produced a complete project for the State Bank which he presented as a basis of discussion. M. Révoil had another proposal ready; so that when the session opened on February 20 for the discussion of the State Bank, the delegates had two projects before them.⁸ The German project entirely disregarded the rights possessed by the French Syndicate recognized by the Act of June 12, 1904. It provided that the capital should be divided into as many shares as there were Powers represented at the Conference, and as a sop to Spain the *peseta* was to constitute the medium of exchange. The State Bank was to receive all the revenues of the Empire, including the customs duties which had already been guaranteed to the French loan.

⁸ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 20 annexe.

It was to have a *Conseil d'administration* of twenty-six members chosen by the thirteen Powers represented at the Conference, also a *Conseil de surveillance*, consisting of the ministers at Tangier of the signatory Powers, and finally, a directorate chosen by the *Conseil d'administration*. This unwieldy organization of more than forty officials, a political organization rather than a financial concern, would have completely destroyed that sovereignty of the Sultan that Germany had been so intent upon preserving. The French scheme proposed that the capital should be divided into fifteen shares of which four should be allocated to the banks which had contracted for the loan of 1904, in return for which they would cede to the Bank their preferential rights established by the Act of June 12, 1904. Instead of a *Conseil de surveillance* of the diplomatic corps, it provided for a *Conseil d'escompte*, sitting at Tangier consisting of representatives from the foreign colony, while the *Conseil d'administration* of twenty-five members should be chosen by the stockholders of the Bank, and should choose its own director.⁹

The discussion of these two proposals occupied the Conference until March 3, and at that time no indication of a settlement was visible. Seeing that no immediate solution was possible in regard to the State Bank, M. Révoil asked that the question of the police should be brought up in the next discussion. Herr von Radowitz opposed and the question was put to a vote. The result was ten votes in favor of the French proposal and three against, the Austrian and Moroccan delegates being the only ones willing to sustain Germany

⁹ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 20 annexe.

in her efforts to drag out the proceedings. Although this was merely a vote on procedure, it showed clearly enough that Germany had completely isolated herself by her tactics, and the sympathy of the delegates was now with France. At the same time, other influences were at work for the French cause in Europe. Count Witte, who was passing through Germany on his return from America, at the request of France sought an interview with the Kaiser, and asked that he show his friendly sentiments towards Russia by taking a more conciliatory attitude towards her ally, France.¹⁰ At the same time Baron de Courcel, the French envoy to the funeral ceremonies of King Christian IX of Denmark, while passing through Berlin on his return, was given an audience by Prince von Bülow.¹¹ Both the Kaiser and Prince von Bülow were very conciliatory in tone, but the concessions they were willing to make would have separated France from both England and Spain by tearing up her accords with these two Powers. President Roosevelt, who had been so successful in bringing Russia and Japan to a basis of compromise, now decided to exert his influence here. Learning from Mr. White that France was willing to compromise upon the organization of the police by accepting a Franco-Spanish Police, checked by the Italian legation at Tangier, he urged a German acceptance of this proposal. Emperor William refused to consider this compromise, nor did a second telegram from the President change his attitude.¹² Nevertheless, the fact that

¹⁰ Tardieu, *op. cit.*, p. 247, et seq.

¹¹ *Ibid.*, p. 241, et seq.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 249. Mr. J. B. Bishop promises to show in his forthcoming life of Roosevelt that the President played a leading part not only in arranging the Conference, but also in drawing up the settlement and compelling the Kaiser to assent. See Scribner's, April, 1920.

Germany had not been able to separate either Spain or England from France, that Russia persisted in sustaining her ally, that the United States was clearly sympathetic to France, and that even Italy could not be counted upon to support her partners, began to render Germany more tractable. The vote of March 3 was a clear portent.¹³

The discussion concerning the police, the most important and the most thorny question before the Conference, opened March 5. M. Bacheracht, after pointing out the inequality of the European interests in Morocco but the crying need for protection for such interests as each had, declared that both France and Spain were especially well equipped to organize and supervise the police since they both had under-officers, Algerian and Riffian, who were of the Mohammedan faith. In fact, a French officer, assisted by several subordinate officers, had already by express order of

¹³ It was just at this time that King Edward VII made another visit to Paris, where he not only exchanged visits with President Fallières and M. Rouvier and the Baron de Courcel, who had just returned from Berlin, but also received M. Loubet and M. Delcassé at luncheon. M. Leghait, the Belgian Minister at Paris writing to Baron de Favereau, Minister of Foreign Affairs, March 6, 1906, thus characterized this incident: "This mark of courtesy towards M. Delcassé at this moment is very much discussed. It is generally considered as a very significant demonstration which is disconcerting on account of the extent and gravity of the consequences which it may have. . . . This act of King Edward is regarded almost as a return thrust for the landing of Emperor William at Tangier, and all the more importance is attached to this step, because it cannot be imagined that a sovereign, the poise of whose mind is known could have decided in favor of it without weighing all its consequences and without assuming all responsibility for it.

"The King, so it seems, wanted to show that the policy which caused the energetic intervention of Germany has nevertheless, remained the same, because England kept firm and immutable the principles which the Agreement of April 8, 1904, has imposed on her." Reports of Belgian Representatives, No. 16.

the Sultan begun to organize the police at Tangier.¹⁴ M. Révoil in outlining the French plan, declared that for all the eight ports hardly more than from two thousand to two thousand five hundred soldiers would be required, under the direction of about sixteen officers. Furthermore, the Sultan would be consulted in the appointment of these officers, and the police would remain under the command of the Shereefian authorities, the officers' rôle being limited to lending to these authorities their technical assistance in the exercise of the command and in the maintenance of discipline.¹⁵ M. Caballero then showed the weakness of the German proposal for an international police, and declared that he could not see how the assistance of Spain and France in the organization of the police would be a danger to economic liberty.¹⁶ The German delegates apparently felt that they had no chance of succeeding with their project, so on March 7, the Austrian delegate produced a proposal which was clearly a bridge for the Germans to get back upon. Their scheme provided French instructors for the police at Tangier, Safi, Rabat and Tetouan, Spanish at Mogador, Larache, Mazagan, and Swiss, Dutch or Belgian at Casablanca; the whole to be under supervision of the diplomatic corps.¹⁷ The German representatives were willing to subscribe to this, and as this was very close to the proposal which the French presented, it at last appeared as though the Conference might soon reach a satisfactory agreement on all questions at issue.

¹⁴ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 23, annex No. 1.

¹⁵ Ibid., annexe No. 3.

¹⁶ Ibid., annexe No. 4.

¹⁷ Ibid., No. 25, annexe No. 4.

While the diplomatic skies were clearing at Algeciras, a sudden ministerial storm had blown up in Paris, and before it calmed down the Rouvier cabinet had fallen. The vote of censure was upon a domestic question—the harsh method of carrying out the inventory of church property—but the result might well have a strong repercussion upon the foreign policy. The situation was made the worse by the difficulty in forming a new cabinet, and it was almost a week before the new Sarrien ministry received a vote of confidence. The opportunity was too good for Germany to let pass. Although Herr von Radowitz had publicly asserted that the French and the Austrian proposals might easily be reconciled,¹⁸ and the French were willing to concede inspection of the police, providing the Swiss or Dutch officers who should be given this authority should make their report to the Sultan rather than to the diplomatic corps,¹⁹ on March 11, Herr von Radowitz declared that his government had said its last word,—that it was the Austrian project unchanged or nothing.²⁰ Herr Tattenbach became equally unyielding on the question of the State Bank. The French delegates now found themselves in a serious dilemma. There was no government at Paris to indicate a policy. The representatives of the Powers could not fail to be influenced by the fact that by overthrowing M. Rouvier, the French Chamber had not shown itself favorable to its foreign policy. Otherwise, in the critical situation which existed, it would not have allowed a question of domestic policy to overturn a ministry whose head

¹⁸ Ibid., No. 27.

¹⁹ Tardieu, *op. cit.*, p. 309.

²⁰ Ibid., p. 312.

held the portfolio of foreign affairs. At the same time the German press, the Kaiser, and the German delegates at Algeciras, began a violent campaign to show that France was isolated, and to force her to submit to an immediate and humiliating settlement. The "Lokal Anzeiger" even went so far as to declare that "the resistance of France has isolated her and forced the neutral powers, Russia, Italy, America, and even England over to the German side."²¹ On March 12, the German ambassadors in various capitals received a circular despatch from Berlin declaring that the majority of delegates at Algeciras were favorable to Germany.²² On the same day the German Chancellor telegraphed to Count Witte: "Thanks to our concessions everything was going on favorably at the Conference when, suddenly, M. Révoil created fresh difficulties, to the surprise of all the other plenipotentiaries, who deem his pretensions unwarranted, and who even with the English, incline in our favor. We hope that M. Witte will make his influential voice heard if he desires to avoid a final rupture."²³ Finally the Kaiser himself entered the lists and sent three personal telegrams to President Roosevelt. The first declared that England, Spain, and Russia approved of the Austrian proposal and that the United States should add their influence; the second was a denunciation of the whole French policy; the third stated that the United States was the only power still backing France.²⁴ The effect of these telegrams upon the

²¹ Quoted in the Temps, March 13, 1906; Tardieu, *op. cit.*, p. 316.

²² Tardieu, *op. cit.*, p. 318.

²³ *Ibid.*, 319.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 319 et seq.

American Government is indicated by a communication from the American Secretary of State, Mr. Root, to the German ambassador, March 17, the date of the last of the Kaiser's telegrams. The communication was in regard to the American view of the Austrian proposal. M. Root declared: "We do not approve that proposal. We regard it as an essential departure from the principle declared by Germany and adhered to by the United States, that all commercial nations are entitled to have the door of equal commercial opportunity in Morocco kept open. . . . France has yielded to this view of international right to the extent of offering to become jointly, with Spain, the mandatory of all the powers for the purpose of at once maintaining order and preserving equal commercial opportunities for all of them. . . . This arrangement seemed to accomplish the desired purpose."²⁵ Needless to say, Germany's misrepresentations and misstatements were no more successful in the other countries which were behind France than they were in the United States,²⁶ and when the Sarrien ministry was at length formed on March 13, with M. Léon Bourgeois in charge of the Quai d'Orsay, France found herself in a stronger position than ever. The *Président du Conseil*, M. Sarrien, was of rather colorless personality, but his lack of forcefulness was immaterial since he had the dynamic, driving power of M. Georges Clemenceau, the new Minister of Interior, behind him. With this *tombreur de ministères* in the cabinet, the country could be cer-

²⁵ Foreign Relations of the United States, 1906, Part 2, p. 1481.

²⁶ Great Britain affirmed her intention of standing back of France by a circular dated March 13, Russia followed her March 19. See the Temps, March 20, 1906 for texts of these documents.

tain that there would be no further truckling to the bully across the Rhine.

In his ministerial declaration read before Parliament on March 14, 1906, M. Sarrien made it evident that France had fully recovered confidence in the justice of her stand. "Fully conscious of the rights and vital interests which our diplomacy must safeguard, we are convinced that the exercise of these rights and the normal development of these interests can be assured without interfering with those of any other power; as our predecessors to whom we must fully render justice, we hope that the fairness and the clearness of this attitude will permit the early and definitive settlement of the outstanding difficulties."²⁷ France had made her last concession and her position was clear cut and final. She was willing to allow inspection of the police, but she insisted absolutely that Casablanca be included with the other seven ports under the Franco-Spanish police. Germany realized that she had lost and that any further opposition would only weaken her position the more. At the plenary session of the Conference on March 26, the Austrian delegate conceded that Casablanca should be included with the other ports under the Franco-Spanish police, and Count von Radowitz expressed himself as satisfied with his colleague's statement.²⁸ There still remained the question of the nationality of the inspector, and the subordination of the police to the control of the diplomatic corps. Austria had demanded that the inspector be Dutch or Swiss; France insisted upon the

²⁷ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 78ii, p. 1634.

²⁸ *Doc. Dip.*, op. cit., No. 28

latter, and was finally able to make her views prevail, owing to the diplomatic manner in which Sir Arthur Nicolson presented the proposition.²⁹ As to the control by the diplomatic corps, it was finally decided that the reports of the inspector should be sent both to the Maghzen and to the Diplomatic Corps, also that the Diplomatic Corps could demand an investigation at any time, but only through the Sultan's representative. France had been successful in preventing international control of the police.³⁰

There still remained the question of the apportionment of the ports between France and Spain. According to the secret treaty of September 1, 1905, it had been arranged that French officers should be in charge of the police in Rabat and Casablanca, while Spain should control in Tetuan and Larache, Tangier being under a Franco-Spanish corps commanded by a French officer.³¹ Since the three ports to be newly assigned, Mazagan, Safi and Mogador, were within the French sphere of influence France took it for granted that she would receive them. Spain, however, was unwilling that French influence should predominate completely, and insisted upon the immediate control of Tangier, which according to treaty would only be hers after fifteen years. M. Bourgeois did not wish to offend Spain; nor did he feel justified in allowing her to disregard the treaty which she had so recently ratified. As a compromise, he suggested that Spain share the control in Casablanca as well as in Tangier. Spain was at first inclined to insist upon immediate control of Tan-

²⁹ Ibid., No. 29.

³⁰ Doc. Dip., No. 29 annexe.

³¹ Martens, "Recueil," 3d Ser., Vol. 5, p. 670.

gier, and it was only after a long struggle that France was able to prevail. Her solution was presented by M. Bacheracht in the session of March 31.³²

At this same session the last problems outstanding in the question of the State Bank were also settled. The censors, of which there were to be four, were divided equally among the banks of France, England, Spain and Germany. As for the capital, it was finally agreed that an equal portion be attributed to each of the Powers represented at the Conference, with two portions equal to those reserved to each of the subscribing groups, assigned to the syndicate of bank signatories of the contract of June 12, 1904, as compensation for the cession of their rights to the State Bank.³³ With these points settled it only remained to draw up the General Act and submit it to the delegates for their signatures. The final cession took place on April 7, and with the signing of the General Act by the delegates representing the thirteen Powers, the Conference was declared adjourned.³⁴

2. SIGNIFICANCE AND RATIFICATION OF THE GENERAL ACT

The General Act of the International Conference at Algeciras, to give it the official title, consisted of one hundred twenty-three articles divided into seven sections, covering the organization of the police, regulations for the suppression of the illicit trade in arms, the State Bank, the establishment of a better system of taxes and revenue, the regulation of customs and the suppression of smuggling, the public services and pub-

³² Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 31.

³³ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 31.

³⁴ Ibid., No. 36.

lic works, and finally the ratification of the act, which was to occur not later than December 31, 1906.³⁵ The three vital principles which all the Powers had subscribed to, namely the independence of the Sultan, the integrity of his territory, and commercial liberty, had been carefully maintained. The two most pressing reforms: an organized police, and a self-supporting financial system, had been most elaborately provided for. For the first, provision had been made for a force of from two thousand to two thousand five hundred, to be recruited by the Sultan from among the Moors, and under Moorish chiefs, and distributed among the eight ports; from forty-six to sixty French and Spanish officers, approved by the Sultan were to be appointed as instructors, under the general control of a Swiss Inspector-General who was to report to the Maghzen, but who could interfere neither in the command nor in the instruction of the force. For the second, a Morocco State Bank had been established, which was to act as disbursing Treasurer for the Empire, its capital to be divided into fourteen parts (the United States did not subscribe) of which twelve were assigned to the Powers participating and two to the French Syndicate. The Bank was given the power to adopt such measures as it should deem necessary for ameliorating the monetary situation in Morocco.

The majority of the nations of the civilized world had participated in a conference to prepare a program of reforms which was to put an end to the anarchy existing in Morocco, a program which France alone was anxious to draw up and put into effect. All the

³⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 37.

world except Germany seemed willing to allow her to proceed. Germany, however, wished to make the world realize her international importance. When questions of world interest were to be decided, Germany must be called into the discussion, otherwise she could and would challenge the settlement. In the Conference of Algeciras, Germany found to her discomfiture, that it was easier to focus the world's attention upon her, than to force the world to pay attention to her claims. The Powers assembled at her behest, they listened calmly to her extravagant claims, they were somewhat dismayed at the *furor Teutonicus*, but they gave their decision wholly unmoved by her bluster, and in direct opposition to her loudly asserted demands. France had been keenly humiliated by being forced to attend the Conference; Germany had suffered a humiliating diplomatic defeat by the results of the Conference. The other nations had little interest in the whole affair, but had done the best they could under the circumstances. It remained to be seen whether a conference conceived in jealousy and held under protest, could produce an arrangement which would function smoothly or obtain results.

For Germany, the result of the Conference was a most disagreeable setback. Instead of isolating France, if that was her purpose, she found herself ultimately with only Austria to back her. Not only did she fail to separate France from her newfound friends, but by her reprehensible methods, she even forced those nations which wished to be neutral to take sides with the French. Spain and Italy remained faithful to their pledges of friendship, Russia showed

unexpected vigor in her championship of the French cause, while one might say of the *Entente Cordiale*, that at Algeciras "it had passed from the static to the dynamic state and that its power had correspondingly quickened." Herr Basserman, a Liberal member of the Reichstag, thus summed up the situation: "To-day the Triple Alliance has no further practical utility. The Italian press and population lean more and more towards France. Austria has been too much praised for this rôle of 'brilliant second' which she herself declined. The Franco-Russian Alliance remains intact, and the disposition of France towards us is less friendly than formerly. . . . We live at an epoch of alliances *between other nations*." ³⁶ The "Berliner Tageblatt" conceded that "neither Bismarck's genius nor Talleyrand's subtlety could have obtained more, but Bismarck would have never gone to Algeciras." ³⁷

Prince von Bülow attempted to forestall criticism by bringing the question up in the Reichstag on April 5, two days before the signatures of the delegates were affixed to the General Act, and by emphasizing the point that Germany had neither direct political interests nor political aspirations in Morocco. "We have not like Spain a Mauritanian post of several centuries, and we have not like France a common frontier of several hundreds of kilometres with Morocco; we have no historic rights acquired by all sorts of sacrifices as have these two civilizing European nations. . . ." From the tone of his introduction one might have sup-

³⁶ Sten. Ber. v. d. Verhand des Reich. Session 1905-06, Vol. V, p. 4238.

³⁷ Quoted by Tardieu, "France and the Alliances," p. 206.

posed that the Chancellor was making excuses for Germany for not raising the question, rather than giving the causes which led her to force the Conference upon an unwilling Europe. However, this deprecatory tone of his exordium served but to heighten the contrast when he came to recount the advantages which had accrued to Germany. "We wished to show that the German Empire does not allow itself to be treated as a negligible quantity, that the basis of an international treaty cannot be displaced without the assent of the signatory powers, and that upon a territory so important from the economic point of view, which is independent, and situated upon two great routes of the world's commerce, the door must remain open to assure the liberty of foreign competition." There is no doubt that Germany had clearly proved to Europe that she could not be treated as a negligible quantity, the Anglo-Russian *rapprochement* whose base was laid at the Conference gave evidence of that; but it remained to be seen whether it was either wise or advantageous for her to arouse the world to the Teuton menace. But of the other two points upon which the Chancellor rested his case, the first, regarding the revising of international treaties, was wholly irrelevant here, since France had no intention of violating any of the clauses of the Treaty of Madrid, and as for the second, a direct arrangement with France would have been far more likely to safeguard German interests than the elaborate international arrangement which after all was to be put into effect by the very nations which Germany had most reason to fear. In concluding, Prince von Bülow attempted his most remarkable *tour de force*: "One

cannot easily refuse to recognize that no country was more capable, by reason of its experience, of furnishing police instructors than Spain and France, countries which are neighbors of Morocco.”³⁸ Even the members of the Reichstag must have smiled at the naiveté of this statement, when they recalled that it was Germany’s refusal to recognize this fact that had been her principal excuse for calling the Conference together. Some years later Prince von Bülow expressed far more accurately the real advantages of the Conference to Germany: “The decisions of the Algeciras Conference . . . provided a bell we could ring at any time should France show any similar tendencies again.”³⁹

The Chancellor had one more opportunity to defend the Act before it came before the Reichstag for ratification. On November 14, 1906, he made a long and comprehensive survey of the foreign policy of the Empire, and the relations with France were given special prominence. On this occasion his tone was quite pessimistic. He declared that a closer relationship with France could not be hoped for, seeing that past events were viewed differently by their neighbors on the west, and not a minister or a deputy had defended a closer relationship between the two countries. When a voice on the left cried: “How about Jaurès?” von Bülow countered: “One swallow does n’t make a summer.”⁴⁰ When the Act came up for a vote on December 7, some of the deputies in the Reichstag very frankly pointed out why Franco-German relations were so unsatisfactory. Herr Wiemer declared that Germany had no

³⁸ “Fürst Bülow’s Reden,” Vol. II, p. 303.

³⁹ Von Bülow, “Imperial Germany,” p. 98.

⁴⁰ “Fürst Bülow’s Reden,” Vol. II, p. 306.

reason to feel satisfied with the Conference of Algiers. The hesitating attitude of her foreign policy, its useless provocations, its misplaced advances, had conducted it to a diminution of its diplomatic prestige.⁴¹ Herr Blumenthal imagined that the government was about as pleased at the results of the Conference as the fox of La Fontaine was at the grapes which he found too green. There had been too much rattling of the saber—too much force to produce such an unsatisfactory result. Since the Chancellor had said Germans were Russians in Bulgaria, Austrians in Servia, why not be French in Morocco? ⁴² The Chancellor did not even deign to appear in defence of the Act—the opinion of the Reichstag counted for very little in the foreign policy of the Empire. After the various deputies had expressed their opinion the Act passed by a show of hands.

In France the sentiment regarding the results of the Act was divided. The bitterness at being forced into an international conference against her will, the realization that the payments she had made to Great Britain, Spain and Italy for a free hand had gone for naught, the knowledge that a series of international barriers had been raised against her progress in a country which she had long regarded as her legitimate sphere of influence—all these factors prevented any manifestations of keen satisfaction. On the other hand, she had strengthened her alliance and her friendships, she had been successful in maintaining her position on every point which she considered vital, her pres-

⁴¹ Sten. Ber. v. d. Verhand. des Reich. Session 1905-06, Vol. V, p. 4237.

⁴² Ibid., p. 4238.

tige had been increased at her rival's expense, and the whole world had recognized her position as the predominant power in Morocco. In the words of M. Léon Bourgeois, the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, in presenting the Act of the Conference to the Chamber, April 12, 1906, a result had been obtained "in terms absolutely honorable for all, and without anything, as far as our country is concerned, having been abandoned, either the fruit of its past efforts, or the dignity of its present situation, or the safeguard of its future."⁴³ The Act was not voted upon until December 6, but the discussion then centered upon the methods to be employed in putting the Act into effect rather than upon the acceptance of the Act. When the vote was taken it was found that the Chamber had accepted the Act unanimously.

3. THE APPLICATION OF THE ACT

If one were to stop with the ratification of the Act, the Conference of Algeciras might well be called successful. The Powers had honestly tried to draw up a program of reforms which would put an end to the impossible conditions existing in Morocco, and to do it in such a way that the special interests of the Mediterranean Powers should be recognized, and at the same time the general interests of the world safeguarded. If there had been a government in Morocco able and willing to cooperate with France and Spain to put an end to anarchy, if France and Spain had been ready to provide the necessary officers to drill the police directly after the Act was signed, the Confer-

⁴³ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 78ii, p. 2182.

ence might still have been called successful. But international machines move slowly and the road in Morocco was exceedingly rough. The Sultan was not particularly anxious to provide the necessary soldiers to police the ports, where European interests were for the most part at stake, and allow the rest of his empire to fall apart because Europe had few interests there. The whole Conference had given clear evidence to the Sultan that Europe's interests in Morocco were wholly selfish. Why then should he exert himself to co-operate with Europe to reduce his own power? The situation was rendered the more difficult by a series of unfortunate incidents.

On May 29 a well known resident of Tangier, a French citizen, M. Charbonnier, was shot down in broad daylight. The local authorities offered no excuses and made no efforts to apprehend the assassins; and the European colony, aroused by the affair, demanded that an immediate end be put to such conditions.⁴⁴ The bandit Raisuli had become more powerful than ever, and the Shereefian troops were never sent against him. It was even suspected that the Moroccan Government was using him as a means to stir up trouble, and thus check to some extent the advance of the Europeans. Hardly had France obtained the apologies and indemnity demanded from the Sultan and a promise to apprehend the murderers, before there was a new outbreak in Tangier, in which half a dozen Moors were killed.⁴⁵ French marines landing to obtain fresh water were fired upon; an outbreak

⁴⁴ Doc. Dip., "Affaires du Maroc," 1906-07, No. 10.

⁴⁵ Ibid., No. 37.

against the Jews was staged at Mogador; and the French government was constantly in receipt of reports concerning the unchecked hostilities of the Moroccan tribes along the Algerian frontier. By the first of November, the Act had not yet been ratified by all the Powers; France, Spain and Switzerland had not yet decided upon their officers for the police; the bandit Raisuli had complete control of the village of Arzila in the vicinity of Tangier, after having killed some of the guards and chased out the others;⁴⁶ the false prophet Bu-Hamara was as powerful as ever, and a new contestant for the throne had come forth in the person of Hafid, the brother of Abdul Aziz. M. Regnault, French Minister at Tangier, thus summed up the situation to M. Georges Villiers of the "Temps": "At the present time and especially at Tangier, the Maghzen's authority does not exist. The total impotence and abdication of power has profited Raisuli, who has become a functionary but kept his habits of a brigand. Since no government exists, the police established by the Conference should be put in charge as quickly as possible, and as the State Bank must pay the police it should be established immediately. There is need for vigilance and vigor on the frontier, prompt organization of the police in the ports, surveillance and precaution everywhere."⁴⁷

These conditions could not continue much longer, and when in the middle of October M. Sarrien was forced to resign because of ill health, and M. Georges Clemenceau was asked to form the new cabinet, more

⁴⁶ Ibid., No. 69.

⁴⁷ Temps, Nov. 10, 1906.

vigorous action was looked for. The portfolio of Foreign Affairs was given to M. Stephen Pichon, who had creditably won his spurs in the Boxer Rebellion. In his ministerial declaration made before the Chamber November 5, 1906, M. Clemenceau promised to maintain a policy of peace, but it must be a peace of dignity, and since the peace of the civilized world was based upon the strength of arms it could not be expected that France would disarm and destroy with her own hands the supreme guarantee of her independence.⁴⁸ Neither Morocco, nor Franco-German relations were mentioned, but in an interview which he gave to Herr Wolff of the "Berliner Tageblatt" the new Premier was not so reticent. "The Germans have one fault," he declared, "that of treating us for a certain time with an exquisite amiability and then soon after with an exaggerated brusqueness. . . . War I do not wish; when one does n't wish war he wishes good relations, that is my state of mind, and if I am given opportunity to act in this fashion I shall rejoice. But naturally it is necessary to be strong and it is necessary to be ready. . . ." ⁴⁹ The new government's attitude regarding Morocco was plainly stated by M. Pichon in the Chamber, November 29, in reply to an interpellation by M. Jaurès: "Since the Act of Algeciras has intervened it has regulated from the international point of view, the respective status of all the Powers in Morocco. It is by virtue of this Act that we consider ourselves as obliged to-day to take the measures I have just indicated to you. It is absolutely impos-

⁴⁸ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 80i, p. 5.

⁴⁹ *Ques. Dip. et Col.* Dec. 1, 1906.

sible for us to leave the lives of our citizens at the mercy of the outlaws who threaten to become masters in the city of Tangier. It is impossible for us to allow another power the opportunity of profiting by these circumstances, to substitute itself for us in the defence and safeguard of French citizens.”⁵⁰

The measures which M. Pichon had taken was the sending of a naval expedition to Tangier, after notifying Spain and asking her cooperation. Since by the terms of the Act, Tangier was to be policed by France and Spain jointly, M. Pichon felt that the responsibility was already theirs, and the situation was such as to demand urgent action.⁵¹ Notice was also sent to the Powers that the expedition was being sent with no intention of disembarking unless such troubles should arise as would render an immediate policing imperative.⁵² This was followed on December 4 by a concerted note drawn up by France and Spain, declaring that “the recent events in the region of Tangier and the repeated incidents which have taken place in that city are of a nature to make it feared that strangers no longer find there sufficient guarantees for their security. If the situation should give rise to more serious disorders, the institution of the police provided in the Act of Algeciras would appear with a character of urgent necessity, and both France and Spain would have to take measures to hasten the organization on the conditions accepted by the Powers who have participated in the Conference. It is in this spirit that the two governments have decided to send to Tangier naval

⁵⁰ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 80i, p. 491.

⁵¹ *Doc. Dip.*, op. cit., No. 102.

⁵² *Ibid.*, No. 113.

forces capable of coping with any eventuality.”⁵³

The arrival of the naval expedition finally aroused the Sultan to action, and he forthwith despatched his minister of war in personal command of an improvised army, with orders to place the city of Tangier under “the shadow of security,” and to permit the execution of the reforms of Algeciras.⁵⁴ Raisuli seemed little disturbed, and even attempted to arrest a Frenchman while the Sultan’s troops were on the march. Arriving late in December, El Guebbas, Minister of War, took charge of the town’s protection, read a decree censuring Raisuli and depriving him of his rank as Kaid, while the populace applauded vigorously. In the meantime Raisuli had left Tangier and fortified himself at Linat. The Sultan’s troops decided to follow him, but when they arrived Raisuli had departed.⁵⁵ As evidence had now been given that the Sultan could police Tangier, there seemed no further reason to maintain the squadron there, and it withdrew without disembarking a man or firing a gun. Neither Raisuli nor his band had been taken, the murderers of M. Charbonnier were still at large, but M. Jaurès and his followers were determined that the letter and spirit of the Act should be carried out by France with absolute fidelity. Germany was not to be given another opportunity to cry “Wolf!”

At the same time that France was honestly trying to carry out the provisions of the Act of Algeciras,—while M. Paul Deschanel, President of the Commission of Foreign Affairs, was stating publicly in the Cham-

⁵³ Ibid., No. 123.

⁵⁴ Ibid., No. 142.

⁵⁵ Ibid., No. 164.

ber that "we wish neither adventures, nor expedition, nor conquest, we wish to fill loyally the mandate that Europe, all Europe, has confided to us at Algeciras,"⁵⁶ —Germany was already conniving with the Sultan to obtain special privileges and to interfere with the policing. Lieutenant Wolff, a German officer and also a representative of Krupps, was engaged as an instructor for the Moroccan cavalry; Captain von Tshudi of the German Corps was given the post of Chief Engineer to the Sultan.⁵⁷ Although by the Act, arms and munitions were contraband, German steamships were being employed regularly to carry on this trade.⁵⁸ The construction work of the German firms at Tangier was proceeding rapidly and they were preparing to begin that of Larache. France began to realize that Germany was playing the game of the *fait accompli* behind the smoke-screen of the Act of Algeciras, and already it was becoming evident that France would have to come to some agreement with Germany before the Act would be effective.

The Sultan, relying upon the lack of unity visible in the international action, became indifferent to French demands. Although both French and Spanish had submitted the lists of officers designated for the police by the end of January, 1907,⁵⁹ by the middle of March no action had yet been taken.⁶⁰ As Abdul Aziz became more dilatory, his subjects became more openly hostile. On March 8, at Fez, the capital of Morocco,

⁵⁶ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 80i, p. 729.

⁵⁷ *Doc. Dip.*, op. cit., No. 172.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, Nos. 196, 204.

⁵⁹ *Ibid.*, No. 191.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, No. 209.

a French engineer was attacked by the populace and very seriously injured before he succeeded in making his escape.⁶¹ On March 19, Dr. Mauchamp, an eminent French surgeon, in charge of the French dispensary in Marrakesh, was murdered by a mob in a most revolting manner.⁶² If such outrages were to continue, France would forever lose her prestige among the bloody, fanatical Berbers, who attributed inaction to fear. M. Pichon had to act immediately and effectively. A cruiser was despatched to Tangier, and on March 25, the Council of Ministers decided that Algerian troops should occupy Oudja on the Moroccan frontier, until suitable reparation had been made.⁶³ When it was learned that the Governor of Marrakesh had made no attempt either to send assistance to Dr. Mauchamp, although he had warning of the excitement of the populace, or to apprehend those guilty of the outrage when the murder was reported, France demanded his dismissal and imprisonment, in addition to an indemnity to the victim's family.

The excellent record that Dr. Mauchamp had achieved, and the unselfish nature of his work, made his murder seem the more outrageous. The subject was brought up in the Chamber, and some of his friends excoriated the government for permitting such conditions to continue in Morocco. M. Ribot, although not of the government, came to its defense in a remarkably

⁶¹ Ibid., No. 212.

⁶² Ibid., No. 214. Dr. Mauchamp had served with great distinction for five years in the Holy Land at a time when epidemics of typhoid and cholera were devastating Syria and Palestine, and it was because of this enviable record that he had been given this most difficult post in the interior of Morocco.

⁶³ Ibid., No. 220.

convincing speech: " . . . We are at the present hour in the presence of an aroused excited fanaticism, and we are also in the presence of all that has happened during the last two years. Europe has given to the Mussulman world the spectacle of its divisions, and of the struggles which it pursues in the shadows. It is not worthy of European civilization, that the great Powers—jealous certainly of their interests, jealous to defend their rights, having legitimate ambitions—instead of coming to an understanding, instead of conferring, try to strike each other down in the darkness. These are blows aimed at civilization. This policy of ambushes must cease. We must confer. I know well enough that to confer there must be two. It must be understood that we seek no adventures and are faithful to our word. . . ." ⁶⁴ But Germany was not yet ready to confer, nor was the Moroccan Government ready to establish order; the fishing was still good in the troubled waters. The German firm, Renschhausen, had just signed a contract for the construction of the sewers of Tangier, and a boulevard along the sea; the German firm of Haessner was expecting new concessions in the port of Larache, which would raise the value of its work there to five million marks. ⁶⁵ Two months after the murder of Dr. Mauchamp, the Sultan was still debating whether he would have to make reparation, and whether he would really have to permit the organization of the police. M. Pichon might well remark: "*Nous restons donc exposés à de nouvelles surprises.*"

⁶⁴ Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 81, p. 1029.

⁶⁵ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 253.

A bit of humor was brought into the situation when the Sultan sent his Scottish adviser, MacLean, to bring the bandit, Raisuli, to terms. The canny Scot more than met his match in the wily Moor. Instead of treating with MacLean, Raisuli seized him as a hostage, and declared that he would only release him on condition that the Sultan should reinstate him (Raisuli) in his former position of authority. All thought of the predicament of Scottish Kaid was obliterated by the news of an outbreak in Casablanca July 31, in which nine Europeans were massacred, three French, three Italians, two Spaniards, and one unidentified.⁶⁶ Again France was forced to send a squadron, and this time it was accompanied by a landing force under General Drude, with orders to seize the city and its suburbs, reestablish order and remain until the police should be organized. Spain was asked to cooperate with an equal contingent.⁶⁷ When the forces attempted to land they were treacherously attacked and six were wounded, one an officer. The war-ships in the harbor thereupon bombarded the town, sparing as far as possible, the European houses.⁶⁸ Before the town was completely invested the French troops suffered fourteen casualties. The French then turned their attention to the organization of the police, but when assurances were demanded from the Moroccan Minister of War that these officers would be safe from assassination at the hands of their own soldiers, he would not give it. Thereupon the two governments decided that a temporary police must be organized from their own

⁶⁶ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 334.

⁶⁷ Ibid., No. 351.

⁶⁸ Ibid., No. 368.

effectives, and the Powers signatory of the Act were notified to this effect.⁶⁹

To complicate the situation, Mouley-Hafid, the elder brother of the Sultan, now raised the banner of a Holy War and some of the western tribes immediately enrolled under his banner. Before the end of August he was proclaimed Sultan in Marrakesh, the ancient capital of Morocco, thus giving him an excellent strategical position to work from. Abdul Aziz, becoming worried at the progress of the revolt, removed his court to Rabat, where he might be able to call upon the warships of the Powers in case of an emergency. Conditions in Morocco had become so impossible that even Germany conceded the right of France to intervene. The "Berliner Tageblatt" declared that "the bloody episode of Casablanca is only the prelude of other acts of the Moroccan tragedy which are going to follow. We Germans have committed many faults; for example, only the obtuse hatred of Herr von Holstein and his systematic stubbornness would have repulsed the treaty which M. Rouvier formerly offered to Germany after the fall of M. Delcassé. France has occupied Oudja, she now occupies Casablanca and she has the right to do so. . . ." ⁷⁰ Chancellor von Bülow, speaking in the Reichstag November 29, 1907, seemed to reproach France by intimating that the sad events of Casablanca might never have occurred if the police provided by the Act of Algeciras had been established. But since it was not, France could not do otherwise than enforce justice herself.⁷¹

⁶⁹ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 437.

⁷⁰ Quoted Ques. Dip. et Col. Aug. 16, 1907.

⁷¹ "Fürst Bülow's Reden," Vol. III, p. 71.

Thus at the close of 1907, a year and a half after the Act of Algeciras was signed, the work of the Powers was seen to be a failure. This diplomatic effort of Europe to establish order had only created confusion and tumult; this attempt to bring peace had brought anarchy and war. The odious rôle of policeman which the Act had imposed upon France without providing the means to carry it out properly had made France the object of a blind and bitter hatred on the part of the Moors. At the same time, it gave the Kaiser the opportunity to pose as the champion of Islamism, to the corresponding advantage of German interests.⁷² As for the reforms: the police existed only on paper, trade in contraband of war was flourishing, the State Bank could not even provide for the Sultan's needs, the reforms in the revenue had not been attempted, the collection of the customs was being carried out because that was the easiest way to obtain money, and as for the public works, only those were being undertaken which were not provided for by the Conference. The results were just what the French had foreseen. As a French diplomat summed up the situation: "This admirable chart, the Act of Algeciras, provided for everything except that which happened. The architects of Algeciras have built upon quicksands and have stretched their surveyor's chains over chaos. They have disturbed everything without accomplishing anything, alarmed the Mussulmans who live in disorder, without imposing order, excited their spirits without mastering their wills, and there is nothing more dan-

⁷² See an excellent article by Camille Sabatier "L'Erreur d'Algeciras," *Rev. Pol. et Parl.*, Nov., 1907.

gerous in the Orient than to make oneself detested without making oneself feared.''⁷³

If France had been able to carry out a definite policy of reorganization in Morocco at this time, the Moroccan question might have been settled once for all. The Sultan, once installed in Rabat, turned to France to help him against his brother; General Drude with reinforcements and assisted by Spain, could have put the whole coast region in order, while General Lyautey was victoriously proceeding against the tribes troubling the Algerian frontier. All Europe seemed willing that France should put an end to the chaotic condition, and Germany seemed to expect it. But once more the internal condition of France interfered with her foreign policy. From its very inception the Clemenceau government had to cope with a number of very serious strikes. The manifestations during the summer of 1907 in various parts of the South, often resulted in bloody clashes. Many of the regiments stationed in the *Midi* mutinied, the entire administration of several towns resigned, and the government was hard pressed to avert a civil war. Under these circumstances the government's foreign policy was bound to suffer, and its policy in Morocco was vacillating in the extreme. The Act of Algeciras had been prescribed as the proper medicine for the Moroccan sickness, therefore the Act must be applied. But as to the means of application, no decision could be reached, and the Moroccan question was destined to drag along—the *bête noire* of the French Foreign Office.

⁷³ René Millet, "Maroc devant l'Europe," Rev. Pol. et Parl. Nov., 1907.

CHAPTER IX

FRANCO-GERMAN RIVALRY IN MOROCCO, 1907-1909

1. THE SECOND HAGUE CONFERENCE AND THE FRANCO- JAPANESE ACCORD

THE idea of world peace has ever been dear to the hearts of the French. The Grand Design of Henri IV published by his minister, Sully, the Project put forth by the Abbé Castel de St. Pierre, and the judgment upon it by Jean Jacques Rousseau, rank high in the early literature of the subject. Documentary evidence has even been produced to show that Napoleon was only conquering the world in order ultimately to give it perpetual peace. Some of the earliest peace congresses also made a strong appeal to the French, and it would be difficult to find a more impassioned appeal in favor of world peace than the oration delivered by Victor Hugo in 1849 at such a congress.¹

¹ A short quotation will show the eloquence of the poet-orator: "A day will come when you France, you Russia, you Italy, you England, you Germany, you, nations of the continent, without losing your distinct qualities and your glorious individuality, will blend yourselves closely into a superior unity, and you will constitute the European fraternity, absolutely as Normandy, Brittany, Burgundy, Alsace, Lorraine, all our provinces, are blended into France. A day will come when there will be no other battlefields than market-places opening to commerce and minds opening to ideas. A day will come when the bullets and the bombs will be replaced by votes, by the universal suffrage of peoples, by the venerable arbitration of a great sovereign senate which will be to Europe what Parliament is to Great Britain, what the Diet is to Germany, what the Legislative Assembly is to France. . . ."

But the Treaty of Frankfort intervened between Hugo's eloquent plea for world peace and the calling of the first Hague Conference. Alsace and Lorraine were no longer provinces of France and the phrase: "*Y penser toujours, n'en parler jamais*," had become a *parole célèbre*. Tangier and Algeciras came between the first and second Hague Conferences; and almost simultaneously with the Czar's second call, the Kaiser in congratulating the Colonial party upon its victory over the Social Democrats, had declared: "What do we care for the rules according to which the enemy fights if he is beaten in the fighting? We have now learned the art of conquering him and are filled with the desire to practice it further."² Under these circumstances it could hardly be expected that France would go into the second Hague Conference, called by her ally, with the idea that international peace and friendship were soon to be achieved. Even if M. Jaurès or M. d'Estournelles de Constant so thought, M. Clemenceau assuredly did not.

When the question came before the Chambre, June 7, 1907, M. Francis de Pressensé made a long and eloquent appeal in favor of the reduction of armaments, and urged that the French delegation should be authorized to support such a proposal. In his reply M. Pichon showed that since Germany had already given a categorical refusal to discuss any such proposition, France was hardly in a position to insist. However, he declared that France was willing to discuss the question with those Powers that understood the utility and necessity of such a debate, and that France was send-

² Gauss, "The German Emperor," p. 258.

ing her delegates with the hope that they might succeed "in strengthening the idea of conciliation, of solidarity, of justice, in diminishing uncertainty and arbitrary methods, in weakening as far as possible the idea that force is the generatrix of right, and if they accomplished the task set for them they would render a signal service to humanity." ³

But while the Clemenceau government was willing that M. Léon Bourgeois, M. d'Estournelles de Constant, and M. Louis Renault should work for peace at the Hague, both the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary were unwilling to let any opportunity slip whereby they might accomplish the same result by strengthening France. The Conference of Algeciras, by showing clearly to the world the blustering, quarrelsome, braggadocio spirit of the young German nation, tended to draw the other nations into closer relations as a mere matter of self protection. France and Great Britain, who were most threatened by this bellicose attitude of Germany, profited by the situation to strengthen themselves by further accords and agreements. On December 13, 1906, a convention was signed between France, England and Italy in regard to Abyssinia. The political and territorial *status quo* of Ethiopia was guaranteed and the neighboring territorial interests of the three Powers were set forth and mutually recognized. The economic sphere of influence allotted to France was the hinterland of her protectorate over the Coast of Somalis including the zone necessary for the construction of a railway from Djibouti to Adis Abeba; Italy

、 ³ Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 82i, p. 410.

obtained Eritrea and Somaliland; while Great Britain was to have the Nile Basin.⁴

On May 16, 1907, declarations were signed at Paris between France and Spain, and on the same day notes were exchanged between Spain and Great Britain, in regard to the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Mediterranean. The three governments expressed their intention of following a policy having for its object the maintenance of the territorial *status quo*. In case circumstances should arise modifying the present situation the governments were to communicate with each other and determine what measures to take in common.⁵ At first glance there seemed to be no particular need for the three governments, who were already bound by treaties which covered exactly the same ground, to make new declarations in regard to the maintenance of the *status quo* in the Mediterranean. However, much water had gone through the mill since the treaties signed in 1904; the German Michel had put his foot on the shore of the Latin lake and seemed disposed to keep it there. He had forced the world to come to him at Algeiras, and had proved to

⁴ British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 99, p. 486.

⁵ Text of the Franco-Spanish Declaration, British and Foreign State Papers, Vol. 100, p. 933; the Anglo-Spanish Accord, *Ibid.*, p. 570. M. Pichon speaking in the Chamber July 5, 1907, regarding the Franco-Spanish Accord declared: "Nothing is more clear and more pacific in the present and for the future than this accord. It is essentially conservative of the *status quo*, that is to say of peace. It could only be disagreeable to those who dream of territorial conquests at the expense of the two contracting powers. But as all the Powers wish peace, as all say so, they must be reassured by the reciprocal guarantees that France and Spain on the one side and Spain and England on the other have given in identical terms." *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 82ii, p. 995.

his own satisfaction that he must be considered in the making of international arrangements. France and Great Britain may well be excused for this bit of self-assertion, this salve to the wounds in their *amour-propre* left by Algeciras. They still considered Germany a *quantité negligible* in questions of the Mediterranean and they took this means of showing it. Incidentally it also gave them another opportunity of proving that Germany had strengthened rather than weakened their mutual friendship.

A month after the announcement of the Mediterranean understanding, France signed another accord of a more surprising nature—the Franco-Japanese Accord of June 10, 1907. An agreement with Japan so soon after the Russo-Japanese War was the more unexpected because of the bitter hostility aroused in Japan against the French, through numerous alleged breaches of neutrality on the part of France during the war. In fact Admiral Rojestvensky's fleet had coaled at Cherbourg, had anchored off the coast of Madagascar for over two months obtaining both coal and supplies, and had made its final stop of ten days in Kamranh Bay in French Indo-China.⁶ The indignation aroused in Japan was intense, and Count Hayashi conceded that if the Japanese had been defeated in the Battle of Tsushima Straights their hostility would have been permanent. But the Japanese won an overwhelming victory, and "the excitement and satisfaction of the Japanese nation entirely overshadowed any resentment they felt against France on account of the breaches of neutrality. In their triumph after the

⁶ Stowell and Munro, "International Cases," Vol. II, p. 295.

war they entirely forgot the affair."''⁷ The Japanese were now very eager to float a loan on the Paris Bourse, and at the same time were negotiating with Russia for the modification of a few unsatisfactory clauses in the Treaty of Portsmouth. Therefore an understanding between France and Japan at this time would facilitate the Russo-Japanese negotiations, would be a new link of strength to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance, and would further both French and Japanese interests in the Far East.

The Franco-Japanese Accord consisted of two parts, a political arrangement and a commercial declaration. The first specified that both France and Japan agreed to respect the independence and integrity of China as well as the principle of the "open door." The two nations also agreed to support each other in assuring the peace and security of those regions of the Chinese Empire adjacent to the territories where they have the rights of sovereignty, protection, or occupation, with a view to maintaining the respective situation and the territorial rights of the two parties in the continent of Asia. The second looked to the signing of a commercial treaty whereby the most favored nation treatment should be accorded to the Japanese in French Indo-China and to the protégés of French Indo-China in Japan.⁸ The following month a similar accord was signed between Russia and Japan, thus bringing to an end the dangerous rivalries between the four great nations particularly interested in the Far East.⁹ Another stone in the protective wall against Germany had

⁷ "The Secret Memoirs of Count Hayashi," p. 214.

⁸ For text see *British and Foreign State Papers*, Vol. 100, p. 913.

⁹ *Ibid.*, Vol. 101, p. 443 and p. 463.

been laid, and again without her participation or permission. The culmination of the accords of 1907 was the Anglo-Russian treaty of August 30, 1907, by which the ally and the friend of France settled their outstanding differences in Persia, Afghanistan and Thibet and brought into being the Triple Entente.¹⁰ At last a counter-weight to the Triple Alliance had been formed which brought the European balance of power to a stable equilibrium whereby peace was assured so long as both sides willed it. M. Delcassé's policy had been crowned with success. Neither Germany nor France herself could withstand the forces which he had set in motion. Gambetta's dream had triumphed over Bismarck's purpose. "To improve ceaselessly, to fortify ceaselessly, unceasingly to extend the international situation of France . . . to dissipate the atmosphere of defiance and suspicion, to solve equitably the existing differences, to consolidate the work accomplished. . . ." ¹¹ Thus only could France rise from Sedan to make ready for the Marne.

2. THE TWO SULTANS OF MOROCCO

At the close of 1907, Sultan Abdul Aziz had come to a realization of the fact that without the support of France his brother Mouley Hafid would soon be the real Sultan of the Shereefian Empire. Consequently when M. Regnault came on a mission to demand the immediate application of the reforms, and also recognition for the responsibility of the Moroccan Govern-

¹⁰ Ibid., Vol. 100, p. 555.

¹¹ On January 24, 1908, M. Delcassé made a remarkable speech in the Chamber, the first since his fall in 1905, proving the wisdom and pacific nature of his policy. *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 84, p. 128.

ment in the events of Casablanca, the Sultan yielded all along the line. The order for the immediate organization of the police in the towns still under his supervision was given; France and Spain, in his name, were authorized to repress the trade in contraband, and permission was given to start on the progressive execution of public work in the ports.¹² But while Abdul Aziz was making up his mind in Rabat, his brother was having himself declared Sultan in Fez.¹³ Being thus proclaimed Sultan even in his absence, with the adhesion of the notables, and in accordance with the Koran, Mouley Hafid was in an excellent strategic position to wrest the power from his brother, unless the French should come to the support of Abdul Aziz in a whole-hearted manner. As Mouley Hafid was making his reputation by his hostility to the French, and by the proclamation of a Holy War, but one course seemed left open to France, namely, to put Abdul Aziz back on the throne and, if need be, keep him there. The small French force in Morocco under the desultory leadership of General Drude, *Fabius Drudus Cunctator*, as he was called, was wholly unequal to any such program.

But the Government neither wished nor dared to follow any such definite policy. M. Jaurès and his cohorts were ever on hand with the cry *pas d'aventures*.¹⁴ M. Pichon could hardly do otherwise than re-

¹² Doc. Dip., "Affaires du Maroc," (1907-1908), No. 60.

¹³ Ibid., No. 82.

¹⁴ In his speech in the Chamber, January 24, 1908, M. Jaurès violently denounced any attempt of France to support Abdul Aziz: "It is ridiculous, it is humiliating for France to associate herself in the discomfiture of this operatic Ismael, and I ask you why you lead around this shadow of the Shereefian majority as if you yourselves were no

fuse to intervene between the rival sultans, he could only follow out a policy of "watchful waiting," while "the Chamber, resolved to apply the Act of Algeciras and to assure the defense of French rights and interests in Morocco without intervention in the internal politics of the Shereefian Empire, . . . passes to the order of the day."¹⁵ However, even to maintain a neutral policy required an increase in effectives and an increase in funds. General d'Amade was given the command in the place of General Drude, and early in March it was decided to send reinforcements to the number of three thousand men.¹⁶ More money also was required before the necessary contingents could be hired to police the ports, and the *Conseil d'Administration* of the State Bank authorized an advance of two and one-half million francs to be used exclusively for the payment of the coast garrisons.¹⁷

Mouley Hafid continued to make decisive gains, nor did he confine his operations to the battlefield. Realizing the advantage that would accrue to him by playing off the Germans against the French, he carried

more than a shadow of a government in Morocco. . . . Break this capacious net in which you struggle, in which you vainly exhaust yourself. Do not permit the great soul of France to remain longer captive of the Moroccan imbroglio." *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 84, p. 117.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 179. M. Robert de Caix commenting upon these interpellations declared that not only did it require "a certain effort to extract coherent and thought-out ideas, but any ideas at all in the parliamentary rubbish of the last Moroccan interpellations. . . . M. Jaurès serves as a sounding-box for all the objections which can arise among foreigners to our Moroccan action. He does it with a constancy which would be revolting as treason, if one did not easily see in it the result of the enormous candor of a man in whom verbal virtuosity leaves no place for the exercise of any other faculty. . . ." *Ques. Dip. et Col.*, Feb. 16, 1908.

¹⁶ *Doc. Dip.*, op. cit., No. 177.

¹⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 162.

on a constant intrigue with the former. He even conceded that the Germans were blood relatives of the Berbers through their common ancestors, the Vandals. He also sent a mission to Europe to plead his cause, and although assurances were given to the French Government that the envoys would not be received at either Rome or Vienna in case they should come, they were received in Berlin.¹⁸ This, coming at a time when France was supporting Abdul Aziz with both forces and treasure to protect European interests in the coast towns, showed that Germany was still willing to make trouble for France. At the same time the German authorities maintained a continuous campaign of recriminations against French action in Morocco. Exorbitant claims were made for alleged damages to German interests through the shelling of Casablanca, complaints were made that German steamships could not obtain tenders or docking facilities, numerous acts of violence towards German protégés were alleged against French troops, none of which withstood a searching investigation.¹⁹

With the entrance of Mouley Hafid into the holy city of Fez on June 7, 1908, he ceased to be a pretender. His position was now stronger than that of his brother, and he demonstrated his cleverness by the methods which he employed to strengthen it. By immediately visiting the sacred mosque of Mouley-Idris, he appealed to the religious devotion of the zealous Mohammedans; his next move was to consign to a huge bonfire all the European gew gaws and contraptions

¹⁸ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 279.

¹⁹ Ibid., see especially Nos. 298, 306, including annexes I-VII and 381.

so dear to the heart of his brother, thus proving his antagonism to foreign influences; as a final proof of his political sagacity he revived the taxes upon goods entering the city, and the typically Berber custom of beheading those who did not promptly obey. Abdul Aziz could no longer afford to remain inactive at Rabat and allow his brother to get control of all his kingdom except the coast. Speedy action was imperative if he was to hold his throne. His best move was to get his forces together and march directly to Marrakesh, and from there extend his sovereignty over the southern part of Morocco. France now carried her neutrality to the point of preventing Abdul Aziz from crossing Chaouia, the district lying to the east and south of Casablanca which General d'Amade had pacified and was still holding under his control. The Sultan left Rabat with his mehalla on July 12 on his way to Marrakesh, and as new additions kept joining themselves under his banner, the journey seemed almost like a triumphal march. His uncle, however, seemed by no means so confident of victory, and early in August he sought a personal interview with General d'Amade and besought his support to assure the success of the expedition, pointing out that Abdul Aziz had abandoned everything to follow the counsels and serve the interests of France.²⁰ Arriving at the outskirts of Merakesh, either through treachery or through a sudden panic, the Sultan's army suddenly changed into a disorganized mob and fled without striking a blow.²¹ The cause of Abdul Aziz was irrevocably lost, and before

²⁰ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 372.

²¹ Ibid., No. 385.

the first of September Mouley Hafid had been recognized in practically all the towns along the coast.

The question now came up as to the terms under which the Powers should recognize the new Sultan, and on August 26, M. Pichon consulted with the Spanish ambassador regarding the guarantees which should be demanded of Mouley Hafid.²² On September 1, M. Pichon notified the diplomatic representatives of France in the various capitals, that France and Spain were prepared to draw up a program of the guarantees considered essential, and submit it to the Cabinets of the various signatory Powers for their approval.²³ On the same day Herr von Lanken, the German *chargé d'affaires* at Paris, made the following verbal communication to the Quai d'Orsay: "Considering the situation created by the recent events in Morocco, the Imperial Government believes it should call the attention of the Powers to the necessity of proceeding to the recognition of Mouley Hafid, with the effect of leading finally to the pacification of the Shereefian Empire, of establishing peace in a definite manner, and *returning to the obligations assumed at Algeciras.*"²⁴ M. Pichon called the attention of the Imperial Government to the fact that the Powers had already been informed that France and Spain were at that very moment formulating the terms of a note to be submitted to them in regard to the guarantees to be demanded from the new Sultan as a condition to his recognition, and as for "returning to the obligations assumed at Algeciras" the Government of France was not aware

²² Ibid., No. 403.

²³ Ibid., No. 418.

²⁴ Ibid., No. 419.

that any departure had been made from these obligations.²⁵ The position of Germany was the more equivocal in that Dr. Vassel, the German consul, left Casablanca immediately for his post at Fez upon news of the disastrous defeat of the army of Abdul Aziz. The German press itself recognized the ill-advised action of Germany in thus attempting to force recognition of Mouley Hafid by independent action: "We would prefer to assume that the action of the German Government represents another of those sudden impulses of German policy, which make a terrific noise, but afterwards vanish, leaving not a wrack behind. The only harm they do is that German policy has once more shown itself to be incalculable, untrustworthy, and therefore disturbing. But this unfortunately is harm enough." ²⁶

The joint note drawn up by France and Spain announcing the terms upon which the new Sultan would be recognized by the Powers was issued on September 14, 1908. The guarantees were as follows: confirmation of all former treaties and engagements entered into by the Maghzen with foreign states, including a general adherence to the Act of Algeciras; acceptance of responsibility for all debts contracted by the former Sultan; payment of the Casablanca indemnities; formal and public disavowal of the Holy War; and immediate adoption of measures necessary to assure security in the ports and upon the principal routes of the interior. The note also called attention to the position of France and Spain, granting to them the

²⁵ Ibid., No. 422.

²⁶ Frankfurter Zeitung, Sept. 3, 1908.

surveillance of the sea to prevent the illicit importation of arms, granting them reimbursement for their particular expenses caused by the recent expeditions, as well as payment of indemnities for the murder of their citizens. In conclusion the note asked that honorable treatment be accorded to Abdul Aziz and the functionaries who had served under him.²⁷ The Powers, including Germany, accepted the principles of this note, the only suggestions made by Germany being that the new Sultan should be given a certain freedom of action to allay the fanaticism which had been aroused, and that France and Spain should take into consideration the financial condition of Morocco and not aggravate the situation by undue pressure.²⁸ A new note was thereupon drawn up and this time no mention was made of disavowing the Holy War, the Sultan merely being asked to inform his subjects that he wished to maintain with all countries and their citizens relations in conformity with international law.²⁹ This note was approved by the Powers and presented by the *doyen* of the Diplomatic Corps at Tangier to the representative of the Sultan on November 19, 1908. An official acceptance from Mouley Hafid was received December 5, and one month later the Powers officially announced their acceptance of Mouley Hafid as Sultan of Morocco.³⁰

3. THE DESERTERS OF CASABLANCA

France had supported the wrong Sultan, or, to be

²⁷ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 443, annexe.

²⁸ Ibid., No. 460, annexe.

²⁹ Ibid., No. 469, annexe.

³⁰ Doc. Dip., "Affaires du Maroc" (1908-1910), No. 81.

more exact, she had failed to support the right one, and with the recognition of Mouley Hafid by the Powers she found herself in a very difficult position. The new Sultan was cruel, vindictive and subtle; he hated all Europeans and the French most of all.³¹ Having made himself Sultan in spite of the benevolent attitude of France towards his brother, he was not only hostile but disdainful towards her representatives. Furthermore, and this was far more important, Mouley Hafid was the candidate of Germany, and his success was bruited about both in Europe and Morocco as a victory for Germany. France had found it hitherto impossible to put the Act of Algeciras into effect, chiefly through the weakness of the Sultan and the opposition of Germany. Was it going to be any easier with a strong Sultan on the throne, when that Sultan was tacitly pledged to support Germany? There seemed to be but one solution,—an agreement must be reached with Germany. Back in July, 1907, Baron von Langwerth, at that time *chargé* at Tangier, had made a proposal for a Franco-German consortium of all the banks and establishments interested in Morocco and an accord to this effect was concluded at Tangier, August 22, 1907. France immediately approved and it was to be expected that Germany would agree, since the proposal had come from their side. But with the massacre of Casablanca and the consequent occupa-

³¹ To a representative of the Journal he declared: "I know nothing of your country save the sound of its guns. France has always been hostile to me in sustaining my brother. She has fought me with all her power, with her money which is abundant, with her soldiers who are brave and with her bullets which go far. . . . I am mistrustful of France. . . ." Quoted in Ques. Dip. et Col., Nov. 1, 1908.

tion of Chaouia Germany became hostile again and all immediate hopes of an accord disappeared.³² However, again in May, 1908, Dr. Rosen suggested that an arrangement be made whereby firms of the two nations might participate on an equal footing in the construction of the sewers at Tangier and the public works in the port of Larache. Again an agreement was reached only to fall through on a sudden and inexplicable change of front shown by the German interests.³³

Undoubtedly the real reason for the failure on both occasions was the futility of attempting to construct a commercial edifice without the foundation of a political understanding. The financial interests of both parties wished to agree, and it was to their interests to do so. But the year 1908 was an especially troublesome one for the Wilhelmstrasse,³⁴ and the Imperial Government may well be excused for being unable to maintain a consistent policy. The month of May, *le mois de l'Entente Cordiale*, as it was called, was especially painful to those who saw in the friendly relations between Great Britain and France, strengthened by the adherence of Russia, the forging of an iron ring around Germany. M. Clemenceau visited London, on the occasion of the funeral of Sir Henry Campbell-Bannerman and he was followed shortly afterwards by M. Cruppi, Minister of Commerce, M. Ruau, Min-

³² Laloy, "La Diplomatie de Guillaume II," p. 80.

³³ Doc. Dip., "Affaires du Maroc" (1907-1908), No. 442.

³⁴ David Jayne Hill in his "Impressions of the Kaiser" says: "The *annus mirabilis* of 1908 as it has been called, brought sore trials to the Kaiser. In the twenty years of his reign he had never attempted so much, never succeeded in so little, and was never so distrusted."

ister of Agriculture, and M. Viviani, Minister of Labor, in connection with the Franco-British Exposition. Finally President Fallières visited London towards the end of the month, and in receiving him at Buckingham Palace, King Edward expressed the hope that the entente might prove permanent. At the same time it was announced that King Edward intended to visit the Czar at Reval early in June. The simultaneous encounter of these three great ships of state produced a backwash of fury in the North Sea. The "Hamburger Nachrichten" voiced the German sentiment: "The President's visit to London and the King's visit to St. Petersburg announce to the whole world that they have succeeded in uniting England, France, and Russia into an entente directed against the Triplice, or more exactly against Germany.

"Italy does not enter into the case and one cannot count upon her. It is the attitude of the Wilhelmstrasse during the Moroccan affair which has permitted England to awaken French suspicions against us. . . . King Edward knew how to profit by the occasion and he struck while the iron was hot. . . . Let us henceforth abstain from any further attempt at reconciliation with France, it is useless . . . but let us become strong enough to support a war, but upon two fronts . . . let us put our hand on our sword and await confidently trusting in our good star the outcome of the situation." ³⁵

The Kaiser became extremely restive during this period. In his famous letter to Lord Tweedmouth written in February, 1908, he criticized severely Eng-

³⁵ Quoted in Ques. Dip. et Col. June 1, 1908.

land's attitude toward the increase in the German navy; he declared that Lord Esther, who had written a letter to the press advocating an increase in armament to meet the German increase, would do better to concern himself with the supervision of his drain pipes at Windsor than with battleships of which he knew nothing.³⁶ While King Edward VII was at Reval, the Kaiser at the conclusion of a cavalry inspection at Doberitz said to his officers: "It seems in truth, that they wish to encircle and provoke us. We shall be able to support it. The German has never fought better than when he had to defend himself on all sides. Let them come against us, then. We shall be ready."³⁷ On September 11, the Kaiser came within one kilometer of the French frontier and proposed to the French that he be allowed to ascend the Hohneck from their territory. Instead of making difficulties about it and giving an opportunity for further rattling of the saber, the French officers consented willingly and even offered the Kaiser a bodyguard to ascend with him. An "incident" being prevented, the Kaiser changed his mind suddenly and left for Colmar.³⁸

If either nation was desirous of war, an excellent opportunity was given them by an incident in Morocco. On September 25, 1908, six members of the French Foreign Legion of whom three were Germans, deserted and attempted to take passage on a German vessel lying in the harbor, bound for Hamburg. They were under the protection of an employee of the German consulate, and when they were recognized and seized

³⁶ London Times, March 6, 1908.

³⁷ David Jayne Hill, "Impressions of the Kaiser," p. 108.

³⁸ Ibid., p. 109.

by the French a scuffle ensued, blows were exchanged, and the German official was arrested with the men. The agent was released on giving proof of his identity, but the French refused to surrender the deserters at the demand of the German consul, who insisted that he had the right to give them safe conduct by virtue of his consular authority under the capitulations. Thereupon the affair was taken up by the home governments and on October 10, Germany demanded the liberation of the deserters and an apology for injury to the consular prerogatives. Germany was wholly unjustified in her demands and France refused to discuss the matter upon any such basis. Thereupon Herr von Schoen suggested to M. Jules Cambon, the French Ambassador at Berlin, that the two governments have recourse to arbitration. France accepted this solution willingly enough until Germany demanded as a preliminary step, that France express regret for the injury committed by French agents to the prerogatives of the German consul, and in return Germany would express regret for the incorrect attitude of her consul, and for giving passports to individuals who were not German citizens. Since three of the deserters were non-Germans it was conceded that the German official had been guilty of an abuse of power in extending his protection to them. By accepting such a statement, France would be conceding in advance that the German consul did have the right to grant safe conduct to the three Germans, and France maintained that this contention was the very bone of the argument. Her position was that the incident should be considered as a whole, that no expression of regret for any part of it

be made by either side which might prejudice the question submitted to the arbitrators.

The German Government, confident in its power to browbeat France into compliance with its wishes, was obdurate, but the French were no longer hampered by the temporizing Rouvier. M. Georges Clemenceau, the Tiger of France, was in power and the country was behind him. France had made every concession which she could honorably make; to concede further would be to yield once more to German might. Movements of troops were reported on both sides, and relations daily became more strained. The Kaiser took advantage of the situation to permit the publication of his famous interview in the "Daily Telegraph," thinking thus to crystallize English opinion in favor of Germany.³⁹ This startling example of personal diplomacy had the effect of crystallizing English opinion, but not in favor of the Kaiser. M. Clemen-

³⁹ In this interview the Kaiser admitted that during the Boer War German opinion had been hostile to Great Britain, "bitterly hostile," but not so official Germany. He had refused to receive the Boer delegates at Berlin, "where the German people would have crowned them with flowers." Being asked by France and Russia to join with them to call upon England to put an end to the war he had replied: "far from Germany joining in any concerted European action to put pressure upon England and bring about her downfall, Germany would always keep aloof from politics that could bring her into complications with a sea power like England. Englishmen who now insult me by doubting my word should know what were my actions in the hour of their adversity."

The Kaiser then went on to tell that in answer to a sorrowful letter from Queen Victoria written in December, 1899, when the situation was very dark he worked out what he considered to be the best plan of campaign, submitted it to his General Staff for criticism and then despatched it to England. And it was a campaign formulated on these very lines which Lord Roberts had carried into successful operation. London Times, October 29, 1908.

ceau, who had always been on extremely cordial terms with England, knew that he could count upon her assistance if it should be required; he also knew that Count von Aehrenthal after his audacious *coup* in declaring the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina to Austria, following King Ferdinand's proclamation of the independence of Bulgaria on October 5, 1908, would be in no position to support Germany in a war without justification. The time had come to call Germany's bluff, and M. Clemenceau did it most effectively. When the time had come for him to play his last card, the German ambassador presented himself to the *Président du Conseil* and said: "Monsieur le Président, if complete satisfaction is not given to my Government, I am forced by order of his Majesty the Emperor to ask for my passports. . . ." "The best train for Cologne leaves at nine o'clock," replied M. Clemenceau after consulting his watch. "Monsieur l'Ambassadeur, if you don't wish to miss your train you'll have to hurry."⁴⁰

The German ambassador did not ask for his passports, and on November 10, Germany accepted the French formula, which stated that "each of the two governments agree to express its regrets for the acts of its agents in accordance with the award to be rendered by the arbitrators upon the facts and upon the question of law."⁴¹ A *compromis* was then signed

⁴⁰ Georges Lecomte "Clemenceau," p. 87.

⁴¹ For an exhaustive and fully documented treatment of the affair giving the *mémoires* of both sides, the debates of the tribunal and the award see Gilbert Gidel, "L'Arbitrage de Casablanca," *Rev. Gen. de Droit Int. Public*, Vol. 17, pp. 326-407. See Stowell and Munro, "International Cases," Vol. I, p. 377 for an excellent summary.

fixing the rules of the arbitral procedure and stating that the tribunal should consist of five arbitrators chosen from the Permanent Court of Arbitration at The Hague. The decision handed down May 22, 1909, although a compromise, was really a victory for France. She did not have to surrender the deserters, "the German Consulate did not under the circumstances have the right to grant its protection to the deserters of German nationality."⁴² The press on both sides received the award favorably, and the "Temps" declared that it was a verdict acceptable to all, one "which had furnished an honorable solution to a dispute which however trivial was its origin, had almost set Europe on fire."⁴³

4. THE FRANCO-GERMAN ACCORD OF 1909

The storm of condemnation aroused in Germany at the publication of the Kaiser's Daily Telegraph interview had a moderating effect upon the over-aggressive foreign policy of the Imperial Government. The critical situation in the Near East resulting from the Young Turk Revolution, and the annexation of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria in direct defiance to the clauses of the Treaty of Berlin, was even more conducive to a period of clear, calm thinking on the part of the Wilhelmstrasse. Not that Germany feared trouble from Russia. All Europe realized that protest as Russia might against the blow at the Pan-Slavic hopes she was nourishing, the war with Japan and the serious internal troubles which had followed, had left her

⁴² Gidel, *op. cit.*, p. 400.

⁴³ *Le Temps*, May 24, 1909.

in a hopeless position to make her protest effective. Germany's fear was rather for her relations with Turkey and the preservation of her Bagdad Railway scheme. Turkey had even greater reason to resent the rape of Bosnia and Herzegovina than did Russia. The problem which Germany had to face was: how could she support Austria as she must in her spoilation of Young Turkey, and yet prove to the Turks that she was backing the new regime just as strongly as she had formerly supported Abdul Hamid? Austria returned the Sandjak of Novi Bazar at her instigation but Turkey was still far from being placated. It still remained to be seen also to what extent France and Great Britain were prepared to back Russia in any protest that she might make. The German Foreign Office perceived very clearly that the time was not suitable for a *politique d'aventures* in Morocco.⁴⁴

Germany gave the first indication of her appreciation of the new situation in Europe by her concession in regard to the affair of Casablanca. In his speech before the Reichstag, December 7, Prince von Bülow gave further indications of Germany's new policy of friendly understandings. . . . "Here as elsewhere there is an excessive estimation of what is called *Prestige politik* . . . let us seek our advantage, let us seek our honor in the maintenance of the foundations of the German power, and in the preservation of the

⁴⁴ Germany may also have been influenced by the friendly disposition towards France exhibited by Austria at this time. The Ballplatz had shown great willingness to accept the Franco-Spanish note in regard to the recognition of Mouley-Hafid, and in the Casablanca incident, although one of the deserters was an Austrian, the Austrian ambassador hastened to tell M. Pichon that he did n't claim his deserter—"je ne réclame pas mon déserteur."

future of the German people, but not in vanity and glitter. . . . In the examination of situations and in regard to several diplomatic *démarches* the German and French governments have shown that they know how to appreciate this favorable attitude."⁴⁵

France had an opportunity to test out the sincerity of this new attitude early in January, 1909. The agreement which gave France and Spain the right to patrol for contraband expired at the close of 1908, and it was necessary to obtain the consent of the Powers to have it renewed for another year.⁴⁶ When the request was brought to the German government, instead of seizing the opportunity to make difficulties it raised no objection to the renewal.⁴⁷ A few days later Herr von Kiderlen engaged in a long parley with M. Jules Cambon in regard to an arrangement between France and Germany in regard to Morocco. He assured M. Cambon that Germany's interests there were purely economic. M. Cambon replied that if Germany had no intention of interfering with the political interests of France and would recognize her special situation in Morocco, the two Governments might express their common intention of pursuing no economic privilege and the desire to see their nationals become associated in enterprises of an economic order.⁴⁸ Both M. Pichon and Herr von Schoen approved this statement as the basis of an accord, and a declaration to this effect was signed at Berlin on February 9, 1909. As this declaration was to remain the basis of all future Franco-Ger-

⁴⁵ "Fürst Bülow's Reden," Vol. III, p. 160.

⁴⁶ Doc. Dip. "Affaires du Maroc" (1908-1910) No. 84.

⁴⁷ Ibid., No. 94, annexe.

⁴⁸ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 114, annexe.

man relations in Morocco it will be well to give the complete text:

“The Government of the French Republic and the Imperial German Government, animated by an equal desire to facilitate the execution of the Act of Algeciras, have agreed to define the meaning that they attach to its clauses, in order to avoid all cause of misunderstanding between them in the future.

“In consequence,

“the Government of the French Republic, entirely attached to the maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Moorish Empire, resolved to safeguard their economic equality and consequently not to hinder their German commercial and industrial interests,

“and the Imperial German Government pursuing only economic interests in Morocco, recognizing on the other hand that the particular political interests of France there are closely bound up with the consolidation of order and internal peace, and decided not to impede these interests,

“declare that they will not pursue nor encourage any measure of a nature to create in their favor or in the favor of any other Power an economic privilege, and that they will endeavor to associate their citizens in the affairs for which they may obtain concessions.”⁴⁹

A profound feeling of satisfaction was manifested on both sides of the frontier at this amicable solution of the Moroccan difficulty. The declaration seemed to cover every contingency. By recognizing the Act of Algeciras as the basis of the accord the other Powers

⁴⁹ Ibid., No. 114, annexe.

could hardly object; it was a victory for France in that her particular political rights were recognized by the only power that had any interest in interfering with their maintenance, and who by her friendly relations with the new Sultan was in a strategic position to make her interference most troublesome; finally it was eminently satisfactory to Germany since she not only secured economic equality, but the privilege of associating with France in all the concessions which might be obtained. At the time France failed to realize fully the sinister possibilities of the last phrase.⁵⁰ Neither did she appreciate the hostility that it was bound to provoke in Spain, who could not reconcile this Declaration with the secret agreements which France had already signed with her. France accepted the arrangement at its face value as "one which dissimulated nothing and which implied no clandestine concession, and which on the part of Germany was the abandonment of her policy of chicanery and the inauguration of a policy of conciliation."⁵¹ The Kaiser telegraphed to Prince Radolin, the German Ambassador at Paris, his expressions of satisfaction, and the French Government conferred the Grand Cross of the

⁵⁰ That she did recognize to a certain extent that danger lurked under too broad an extension or interpretation of this phrase is shown by the fact that M. Cambon demanded that an explanatory letter should follow the declaration, but agreed to withhold its publication as a favor to the German Government, which was unwilling to appear before the German people as giving up too much. This letter stated first, that Germany was disinterested politically in Morocco, and secondly, that "*in the economic affairs which admitted an association of French and German interests, account should be taken as far as possible of the fact that French interests in Morocco are superior to German interests.*" André Mévil in *L'Echo de Paris*, Dec. 8, 1911.

⁵¹ Auguste Gauvain, "L'Accord Franco-Allemand sur le Maroc," *Journal des Débats*, Feb. 9, 1909.

Legion of Honor upon Prince Radolin and Baron von Schoen. If France required any further proof of Germany's changed attitude in the Moroccan question it was given by Chancellor von Bülow the day after the accord was signed. Receiving M. Cambon in a most gracious manner he said to him: "Now, Morocco is a fruit which is ripening for you and you are sure of picking it; we only ask one thing of you, that is to be patient and to have regard for German public opinion." ⁵²

One of the chief advantages accruing to France from the accord was the immediate effect which it had in increasing the prestige of France in Morocco. In his exhaustive report before the Senate on the whole Moroccan question January 25, 1912, M. Pierre Baudin says: "It proved to the Sultan and the chiefs of the tribes that they had nothing further to hope for from the antagonism between France and Germany. In every Mohammedan country in Africa it created a profound impression. It destroyed the effect of the propoganda cleverly organized, which since the events of Tangier in 1905 had been attempting to persuade the natives that France would soon cede her place to the German Empire." ⁵³ With the Kaiser appeased and the Sultan cowed, France saw the last of the obstacles in her Moroccan pathway removed. The situation appeared so promising that one deputy was led to remark: "*Que va devenir M. Jaurès?*" The retort was exceedingly prescient: "*Timeo Danaos donaferentes.*"

⁵² René Pinon, "France et Allemagne," p. 187.

⁵³ *Annales du Sénat, Doc. Parl., Vol. 56, p. 263.*

CHAPTER X

RESULTS OF THE ACCORD OF 1909

THE BOSNIAN CRISIS AND THE TRIPLE ENTENTE

ALTHOUGH the Quai d'Orsay played a very minor rôle in the crisis resulting from the seizure of Bosnia and Herzegovina by Austria, the whole European situation was so profoundly affected by this sequel to the Young Turk Revolution, that some attention must be given to it. The mere annexation by Austria of the two provinces, which she had administered for thirty years under a virtual mandate of the Powers, was of vital interest to none but Turkey and Serbia. Of the two, Serbia, who saw her long sustained hope of a free outlet to the sea dashed, had more reason to complain than Turkey, whose chief interest was the amount of compensation that she could obtain. If this had been the only side of the situation to be considered, no nation in Europe would have protested, save perhaps Russia as the protector of Slavic interests in the Balkans. The serious side from the European point of view was the fact that Austria had deliberately torn up a pact concluded with the other Powers of Europe, although she had been one of the signatory Powers to the Declaration of London which stated specifically that "contracting Powers could rid themselves of their treaty engagements only by an understanding with their co-signatories." Russia had

attempted to free herself from the Treaty of Paris during the Franco-Russia War and had been forced to sign the Declaration of London as a result; she now intended to see to it that the Powers should show no partiality to Austria.

M. Isvolsky, Russian Secretary of Foreign Affairs, who happened to be in Paris at the time, added his protest to those of Turkey, Italy, Serbia, and Montenegro, and demanded that a conference of the Powers signatory of the Treaty of Berlin be called to deliberate on the various questions involved. Proceeding to London, he drew up with Sir Edward Grey a program for the proposed conference in which a complete identity of views between the two powers was shown.¹ Both France and Great Britain were ready to support Russia vigorously in her just demands. A conference of the Powers was the last thing desired by Austria, and Baron von Aehrenthal showed himself to be a second Talleyrand in his method of procedure. His first move was to placate Turkey, and he attempted this by promising to turn back to her immediately the Sandjak of Novi Bazar. This by no means satisfied the Turks but it opened the way to a solution. Austria's negotiations with Turkey were facilitated through the assistance of Baron Marschall von Bieberstein, the German ambassador at Constantinople, one of the most able members of the German diplomatic corps and extremely popular with the Turks. Having paved the way for an understanding with Turkey, Austria now declared that the question was wholly between herself and the Porte, neither Serbia nor Montenegro having

¹ For text of the Program see London Times, Oct. 16, 1908.

any right to object, since their legal or territorial rights had not been violated.

Baron von Aehrenthal had informed both Germany and Italy of his annexation project, but without indicating the time or manner of the seizure,² and although neither was in sympathy with it, he now looked for support to Germany. Von Bülow, although realizing Italy's hostility, did not dare refuse his support, and his first plan was to separate France and Great Britain from Russia. The interests of these two powers in the Balkans were negligible, and it was considered that France might be willing to withdraw her support from Russia for a free hand in Morocco. A suggestion was thereupon made to the Quai d'Orsay that the question of Morocco be joined to the Eastern question. M. Pichon, however, refused to be drawn into any such discussion.³ We have already seen the disastrous results of the Kaiser's attempt to win over the British by the publication of the Daily Telegraph interview. He failed not only in improving the Anglo-German relations, but even more so in attempting to embroil England with France and Russia. The irritation produced by these two failures resulted in the short period of blustering bellicosity manifested in the Casablanca incident, but as has already been seen, this

² Von Reventlow, "Deutschlands Auswärtige Politik," p. 326.

³ On this point M. Deschanel, Reporter of the Budget of Foreign Affairs, speaking in the Chamber Nov. 26 had this to say: "At no moment I am sure has our diplomacy linked the question of Morocco to the Eastern question. If it should have done so it will have committed an irreparable blunder, it would risk being the dupe and victim of one of those illusions which have cost so dear to Napoleon III when he allowed himself to be drawn, with regard to Belgium and Luxembourg into those perilous bargainings which brought about for him such cruel results." *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 86ii, p. 1197.

policy was very short lived. The increasing hostility manifested by Italy towards the Balkan policy of her ally may have helped to bring Germany to the realization that the position of the Triple Alliance was a delicate one.⁴ Austria must be sustained at all hazards; and in concluding his speech before the Reichstag December 10, 1908, the German Chancellor made Germany's position abundantly clear: "We stand beside Austria-Hungary. And we believe also that the cause of peace is best served by allowing no doubt to arise concerning the stable character of our alliance and the seriousness with which we look upon our duty as ally."⁵

At the same time there is little doubt that Germany pointed out to her ally that certain concessions must be made if a conference was to be avoided. After Algeciras, Germany had little more faith in conferences than her ally. The first indication of a more conciliatory policy on the part of Austria came a few days after the Chancellor's speech, when the Cabinet at Vienna put forth the tentative proposal that a concession might be granted for a railway across Bosnia, joining Serbia with Montenegro, as a compensation to the two Balkan states. At the same time direct negotiations were entered into with Russia as a means of delaying or avoiding a conference of the Powers. This was followed by the offer of an indemnity to Turkey

⁴ Signor Fortis, former prime minister speaking in the Italian Chamber Dec. 3, 1908, declared: "There is only one power with whom Italy is accustomed to envisage the possibility of a conflict. This power, I regret to say, is our ally Austria." Quoted by Gauvain, "L'Europe au Jour le Jour," Vol. I, p. 199.

⁵ "Fürst Bülow's Reden," Vol. III, p. 165.

for the two provinces she had lost. With the acceptance of her offer by Turkey, Austria felt that she need fear no longer that the Powers would make the annexation a *casus belli*. If Turkey were satisfied, the Powers had few further grounds for complaint. As for Serbia, Austria would welcome an opportunity to put her in her proper place if the conflict could be localized.

In the meantime Germany was strengthening her position by friendly advances to both France and Great Britain. The Accord of February 8 with France in regard to Morocco, and the cordial reception given to King Edward VII on his visit to Berlin at almost the same time, were evidences of the new spirit of conciliation. Russia's motion for a conference of the Powers seemed to have been laid on the table, for the time being at least, and France and Great Britain were perfectly willing to subordinate their Balkan policy to that of Russia. Serbia alone was unwilling to allow the matter to rest, and Austria appeared just as unwilling to grant her any compensation. The Austrian press seemed eager to force an immediate issue. The "Neue Freie Presse" on February 13, solicited for Austria-Hungary "a mandate from Europe to occupy Serbia temporarily," and on February 26, the very day on which Turkey signed an accord accepting an indemnity to the amount of fifty-seven million francs for Bosnia and Herzegovina, the "Dunzers Armee Zeitung" declared that Serbia was a virulent abscess which should be operated upon immediately; "we shall chastise Serbia, we shall conquer her, we shall keep her; if this displeases any one let him come

on. . . .”⁶ The Entente Powers, having thus far striven successfully to prevent war, did not intend to surrender at this stage without a valiant effort. Sir Edward Grey and M. Pichon thought that the best way out of the situation was a direct appeal to the two Powers concerned to make a clear statement of their position. Austria, urged on in her course by a chauvinistic public opinion, curtly refused to consider such a proposal, demanding that the appeal be made to Serbia alone, since the latter alone was at fault. France and Great Britain were willing to go that far, providing they could associate Russia with them in their *démarche*. Russia expressed her willingness, but immediately upon her assent being known, the Austrian press raised a shout of victory, claiming that “thanks to the Franco-German Accord, to the fidelity of Berlin and the complaisance of Paris, Serbia was at last going to be brought to reason.”⁷ The Entente proposal went no farther, but Russia, acting alone, seized the occasion to urge the Government at Belgrade to maintain a pacific attitude, to cease demanding territorial compensation, and to put her case in the hands of the Powers.⁸ Serbia very wisely assented, and in a note dated March 10, 1909, replied: “. . . Considering that the question of Bosnia and Herzegovina is a European question . . . Serbia, confiding in the wisdom and justice of the Powers, places her case unreservedly in the hands of the Powers as being a competent tribunal, and consequently at this

⁶ Quoted Debidour, “Histoire Diplomatique de l’Europe” (1904–1916), p. 121.

⁷ Gauvain, “L’Europe au Jour le Jour,” Vol. I, p. 394.

⁸ Ibid., p. 398.

time demands from Austria-Hungary no compensation, neither territorial, political or economic." ⁹

This might have been satisfactory to Austria if she had been willing to submit her case to a conference of the Powers. But she had no such intention. She had already partially mobilized, and she proposed to force Serbia to recognize the annexation unconditionally and without any recourse to the Powers. There were but two obstacles to a decisive victory on these lines: Russia and Italy. Russia might be willing to support the Serbs, even to the extent of going to war in their behalf; while Italy, who had looked askance at the whole proceeding, was now reiterating the suggestion of a general conference.¹⁰ Once more the occasion was ripe for the entrance of the *Deus ex machina* in the person of the German war lord. On March 21, the Kaiser ordered the German ambassador at St. Petersburg to inform M. Isvolsky that if Russia should sustain Serbia, Germany would be back of Austria to the full extent of her forces.¹¹ The threat prevailed, and Serbia, forsaken by Russia, was obliged to renounce her attitude of protest and to promise to maintain more agreeable relations with her neighbor in the future. Serbia's humiliation was bitter, but scarcely less so than that of Russia. France and Great Britain,

⁹ Ibid., p. 421.

¹⁰ Since the war, Signor Tommaso Tittoni has shown how he proposed a conference upon a new program which was received as a satisfactory basis for negotiations by all the Powers, including Austria and Germany. But at the same time, without taking Italy into their confidence, Prince von Bülow and Baron von Aehrenthal had determined upon the *coup* which was to result in such a brilliant success for the Triple Alliance. Tittoni, "La Responsabilité de la Guerre," Pages Actuelles (1914-1916) No. 96, p. 87.

¹¹ Debidour, op. cit., p. 123.

who had subordinated their policy to hers, were silent partners in her defeat. In spite of the recalcitrance of one of its members, the Triple Alliance had gained a brilliant diplomatic victory and had increased its prestige at the expense of the Entente. In Germany's eyes the iron ring of King Edward VII had been broken; "the group of Powers whose influence had been so much overestimated at Algeciras, fell to pieces when faced with the tough problems of Continental policy. . . . The ingenious encirclement of Germany, for some time the terror of timid souls, proved to be a diplomatic illusion devoid of political actuality."¹²

2. THE FALL OF CLEMENCEAU AND FURTHER DIFFICULTIES IN MOROCCO

With the passing of the Bosnian crisis there still remained a few vexatious questions for Europe to settle. The Armenian question seemed destined to endure as long as there were Turks and Armenians; the recognition of Bulgaria by the Powers had not yet formally taken place, and hardly had the four Powers responsible for the maintenance of order in Crete withdrawn their last contingents before the Greek flag was raised again, and since the Cretan Government did not dare to pull it down, the Powers were forced to send another landing party to do it for them. As one of the French deputies remarked, it was impossible to prevent Crete and Greece making love to each other, but it would have to be *amour libre*, since the Powers refused to give their consent to their union.¹³ But in

¹² Von Bülow, "Imperial Germany," p. 57.

¹³ M. Denys Cochin, Speech of July 5, 1909, on the Cretan situation, *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 88ii, p. 979.

France all interest in foreign policy once more turned towards Morocco; and with Germany favorably disposed, and the strong Government of M. Clemenceau in office there was excellent reason to hope for a progressive amelioration of the still chaotic situation in the Shereefian Empire.

In any country save France such a hope might have been reasonable; but in the Third Republic any expectation based upon the premise that a ministry will remain in office so long as its policy is satisfactory to the people is very liable to prove unfounded. The Clemenceau ministry had not been particularly successful in its handling of the labor uprisings, but in the Casablanca Affair it had taken a fearless stand which had gone far to restore the prestige compromised by Fashoda and Algeciras. Yet, paradoxical as it seems, the mention of this very fact caused the downfall of the ministry. The man who wanted to defy Germany but had failed, now brought down the minister who had defied Germany and succeeded. In a session when the discussion was completely divorced from foreign affairs, when M. Delcassé was making a report on the cause of the explosion of the *Jena*, a thrust was made that stirred the Tiger's ire. Forgetting that in bringing up the humiliation of Algeciras he was striking at the pride of France as well as at M. Delcassé, M. Clemenceau baited his own trap. "I have never humiliated France and I say that M. Delcassé had done so." The allusion was unfair and wholly unworthy of M. Clemenceau. His only excuse was the bitter and unprovoked attack by M. Delcassé. But that a retort made in anger, and almost excusable under the circumstances,

should have caused the downfall of the ministry, might well be considered ridiculous, if at the same time it were not so tragic. M. Delcassé had his revenge, the Chambre satisfied its *amour propre*, and France paid the penalty.¹⁴

M. Clemenceau's downfall did not elevate M. Delcassé. M. Briand, socialist, "an anarchist who had adapted himself" became the *Président du Conseil*. From the point of view of domestic policy, M. Fallières could not have made a happier choice; responsibility made M. Briand a most conservative socialist. But from the point of view of foreign policy, especially when France was about to enter into partnership with Germany in Morocco, the choice was hardly one that would discourage Germany from attempting to run the firm in the interest of the junior partner.¹⁵ M. Pichon was retained at the Quai d'Orsay, but the Wilhelmstrasse was more interested in the fact that M. Briand had replaced M. Clemenceau.

Before any hopes could be entertained by either France or Germany of profiting by economic concessions in Morocco, it was essential both that the country be pacified and that France and Spain come to some

¹⁴ This memorable session occurred July 20, 1909. For the debate see *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 88ii, p. 1526. For a brilliant analysis of the psychology of the affair see Lawrence Jerrold, "The Real France," chap. IX.

¹⁵ As an example of the German viewpoint towards French Socialism the following quotation is interesting: "We shall perhaps think of making war upon you when your pacifists, your internationalists, your anti-militarists and other imbeciles of that sort will have sufficiently weakened you, and destroyed in your souls the idea of *patrie* which makes us so strong. . . . We shall merely wait—and we shall not have to wait long until your divisions and your anarchy have made you incapable of self-defence." Quoted by Fullerton, "Problems of Power," p. 116, note.

sort of an agreement with Mouley Hafid. It was hoped that now that Europe presented a united front, the new Sultan would recognize that it was to his advantage to cooperate with the European representatives. M. Regnault was sent as a special plenipotentiary to Fez at the end of January, 1909, with instructions to arrange for putting into effect the terms of the Franco-Spanish note, and to assist in the reorganization of the Shereefian Empire.¹⁶ The Sultan, however, was more interested in obtaining the withdrawal of French forces from Chaouia than in obtaining the cooperation of the French and Spanish police and in repaying the cost of the occupation. But when he learned of the Franco-German Accord he showed a much greater willingness to negotiate, and he also signified his desire to send a mission to Paris to consider the question of Moroccan finances.¹⁷ Even the bandit Raisuli who had only been persuaded to surrender the Kaid McLean upon the payment of half a million francs, now visited the French *chargé d'affaires* at Tangier and gave assurances of his good will.

The Moroccan mission sent to Paris under the direction of El Mokri received a favorable reception, and in a statement given to a representative of the "Temps," El Mokri declared that the situation in Morocco was as satisfactory as could be expected, considering the long period of anarchy. He claimed that Mouley Hafid was the only recognized Sultan, and if sufficient financial backing could be secured, the Sultan could pay his troops, reestablish peace and secur-

¹⁶ Doc. Dip., "Affaires du Maroc" (1908-1910) No. 112.

¹⁷ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 138, annexe.

ity, collect the taxes, and enter upon a program of general economic development of the country. He assured the French that the Sultan was firmly decided to respect the Act of Algeciras and to do all in his power to strengthen the bonds of friendship now attaching Morocco to France.¹⁸ But however willing El Mokri was to negotiate, he saw no need of haste, and not until the middle of August was a note finally signed stating the conditions upon which France would withdraw from the Chouia, and the methods whereby Morocco could pay her debts and establish a sound financial foundation.¹⁹ It still remained necessary to obtain the Sultan's signature to this agreement.

While these negotiations were dragging along, Spain, whose resentment had been smoldering ever since she had been refused participation in the Franco-German Accord,²⁰ saw an opportunity to show that she still had important interests in Morocco and intended to protect them. Early in July several Spanish workmen on the outskirts of Melilla in the Riff were killed in a skirmish with the natives. Reinforcements were immediately sent and, being drawn into an ambush, a large number of Spanish soldiers were killed. Spain now determined to send over a large force; but in order to obtain the forty thousand troops considered

¹⁸ *Le Temps*, May 26, 1909.

¹⁹ *Doc. Dip.*, op. cit., No. 249, annexe.

²⁰ On February 9, the very day that the declaration was signed, the Spanish ambassador at Paris said: "The mandate that we hold in Morocco should allow us certainly to participate in a manner to be determined in the Franco-German conversation whose result M. Pichon has communicated to me." M. Tardieu asserts that it was at this time that Spain made her decision to follow out her own independent Moroccan policy. Tardieu, "France et Espagne," *Rev. de Deux Mondes*, Dec. 1, 1912.

necessary, she was compelled to call out her reservists, and as a result riots broke out in Barcelona and martial law had to be declared throughout the country. The Sultan protested vigorously against this great expedition and notified the Powers that Morocco would not bear the expense.²¹ As these warlike measures continued, France also commenced to look askance, and General d'Amade issued a statement in one of the French newspapers, in which he expressed the opinion that Spain was nourishing ambitious projects in Morocco, and if France did not intervene shortly she would find Spain firmly entrenched in her sphere of influence.²² He was relieved of his command for his undiplomatic utterance, but when the Moroccan question came up in the Chamber the deputies were even more outspoken in their criticisms. M. Merle asserted the whole Spanish expedition to be a violation of the Act of Algeciras, and quoted a Spanish senator to the effect that Spain was not limiting her ambitions to Ceuta but would go to Taza and perhaps even to Fez. M. Merle gave it as his opinion that the Spanish were strengthened in their ambitious projects by the belief that they would have German support, since it was notorious that Germany much preferred to see a weak nation like Spain the predominant power in Morocco.²³ M. Jaurès in a long and brilliant speech, thereupon urged a complete and immediate withdrawal as the only satisfactory way out of the Moroccan wasps' nest.²⁴ M. Pichon showed that the situation was not quite as

²¹ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 247.

²² *Le Matin*, Oct. 7, 1909.

²³ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 89i, p. 688.

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 695.

hopeless as it was pictured, that France and Spain were still cooperating, that Spain had affirmed on numerous occasions that her expedition was only temporary, and that to withdraw from Morocco just at the time when conditions were commencing to improve was utterly preposterous.²⁵

Mouley Hafid was not slow to perceive that the European bogey was not so frightful after all, and he continued his dilatory tactics in coming to a final agreement with France. To impress his subjects with his independence of the Powers, he proceeded to torture the followers of the Pretender Bu Hamara whom he caught, in direct violation of the Powers' protests. He increased his prestige greatly by finally capturing Bu Hamara himself. As Bu Hamara had taken sanctuary, Mouley Hafid had him smoked out, put in an iron cage and led in triumph to Fez. The Pretender was then crucified, mutilated, and finally shot in accordance with the directions given in the Koran for those who wage war against God and his earthly representative. The Sultan then sent a long note to the representatives of the Powers extolling the benefits and sacredness of torture.²⁶ As his influence increased among the fanatical Berbers Mouley Hafid's disdain for the Powers, and for France in particular, increased, and in a note to M. Pichon, October 23, 1909, he demanded immediate evacuation of Casablanca and Chaouia, complete control on the frontier, and refused the loan which was to pay the cost of the military expedition.²⁷ El Mokri, who remained in Paris, was

²⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 735.

²⁶ *Doc. Dip.*, *op. cit.*, No. 300, *annexe*.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, No. 333.

finally convinced of the necessity of coming to an agreement with France, and in December he arranged for a loan of eighty million francs, part to go for liquidation of the cost of the expedition, and part for the expenses of administration.²⁸ Although El Mokri signed this as a delegate with full powers, and undoubtedly with the consent and approval of his master, when the arrangement was submitted to the Sultan he flew into a rage and would have none of it. M. Pichon thereupon sent an ultimatum giving the Sultan forty-eight hours to sign the agreement as concluded by his representative in Paris, covering the loan, the instruction to be given by French officers to Moroccan troops, and the naming of the high commissioner for the Algerian frontier.²⁹ He followed this by a demand that the murderers of M. Charbonnier and Dr. Mauchamp be punished and that the further reparation agreed upon be effected.³⁰ If these demands were not met within the specified time, the French colony and officials would leave Fez, and the French government would immediately take such measures as it should deem necessary. The Sultan's representative realized that the time for speedy action had come, and on February 21, El Mokri announced to M. Pichon that Mouley Hafid had ratified the accords.³¹ The ultimatum, however, had already been sent, and it was not considered advisable to withdraw it without full concession on the part of Mouley Hafid himself. His first reply was equivocal, but he finally gave way on

²⁸ Ibid., No. 355, annexe.

²⁹ Ibid., No. 396, annexe I.

³⁰ Ibid., No. 399, annexe II.

³¹ Ibid., No. 412.

all points, and the accord was signed at Paris, March 4, 1910.

After fifteen months of struggle France had succeeded in taking a first step, but her position was still far from encouraging. In the words of M. Tardieu: "France had granted to the Sultan a loan which would allow him to liquidate the past but not to organize the future. She had gained her points that the chief of the military mission should become the chief of all the instructors; that a French engineer should be placed at the head of the Shereefian administration of public works. . . . But in order to translate into acts these promises, she had before her a Sultan of rebellious character and full of surprises, who saw in this accord neither the proof of power to injure him or to aid him. Our effort had been used up in obtaining his signature. France was for him a convenient banker rather than an indispensable and redoubtable associate."³² The loan was not guaranteed by France, it created neither resources nor new income for Morocco, and it left the Sultan without means to create an army. But without an army there was no way to collect taxes; so in November El Mokri reappeared in Paris seeking another loan, and this time it was to cover the organization of the army and police and the construction of public works, as well as for the payment of debts. He was able to obtain neither the full sum nor the guarantee of France; the Government seemed afraid to give the loan that political significance which the Accord of 1909 with Germany expressly permitted. The result

³² Tardieu, "Le Mystère d'Agadir," p. 100. This volume is the most complete and authoritative treatment of the subject, a worthy companion of the author's volume on the Conference of Algieras.

was that the army was not organized, anarchy continued, and France was finally forced once more to intervene with a military expedition.

3. FAILURE OF THE ACCORD OF 1909

With the signing of the Accord of April 8, 1909, general satisfaction was manifest in both France and Germany and there is little doubt that both countries, for the time being at least, intended to fulfill their engagements loyally. The unfortunate part of the arrangement lay in the fact that its vagueness allowed each side to interpret it to its own advantage. For Germany it was merely a *quid pro quo* arrangement, a sort of condominium whereby her commercial and industrial enterprises might profit in spite of the Act of Algeciras. The only clause of the arrangement to which she attached great importance was the last, which stated that the two nations would endeavor to associate their nationals on such concessions as might be obtained. This was the foundation—indeed, the *raison d'être*,—of the accord. On the other hand, the French regarded this last clause as a polite formula, significant of the new amicable spirit which was to prevail between the two countries, but of no particular importance. Had not the Wilhelmstrasse declared in the confidential letter accompanying the declaration that it realized that French interests were superior, but that German public opinion must be considered? Therefore they fixed their attention on the clause recognizing the special political interests of France in Morocco, which gave them the right to establish peace and order without further opposition on the part of Ger-

many. They had found out by experience that the Act of Algeciras was an impossible program so long as Germany opposed its execution. The new agreement withdrew this opposition; henceforth France was free to put the Act of Algeciras into effect.³³

If Germany was willing to interpret the accord in any such self-denying manner while the Bosnian crisis held the chancellories of Europe in suspense, the brilliant diplomatic victory gained by the Triple Entente speedily brought about a change of intention. *Lupus pilum mutat, non mentem*, the wolf changes his coat but not his disposition. Immediately after the signing of the accord Germany suggested an exchange of views in regard to the economic questions at issue, and M. Guiot, member of the administrative council of the Moroccan State Bank, was sent to Berlin to discuss the situation.³⁴ France was willing enough to discuss the financial and economic condition; a new loan had to be made, and this was a good time to settle some of the disputed points in regard to certain German concessions which had already solicited French financial cooperation. The result of the conferences, which began March 24 and lasted a week, was a memorandum from the German government dated June 2.³⁵ According to its clauses a veritable Franco-German condominium would be established in Morocco whereby all concessions, "to avoid sterile and harmful competi-

³³ The first clause of the Accord of 1909, which explicitly stated that the basis of the agreement was the desire of the two Governments to facilitate the execution of the Act, surely gave ground for this interpretation.

³⁴ For a complete account of the Guiot mission see Rapport Baudin, op. cit., p. 263.

³⁵ Doc Dip., "Affairs du Maroc (1908-1910) No. 206 annexe I.

tion," were to be limited practically to groups representing the financial interests of the two countries. In order that Article 107 of the Act of Algeciras, which definitely stated that the validity of concessions should be subject to the principle of public awards, should not be violated, France might share her half with England and Spain. Germany further stipulated that the two concessions already possessed by German firms, the mole and sewers of Tangier, and the harbor construction at Larache were to receive priority of payment. "Germany had arrived late at the Moroccan feast with a formidable appetite and without any regard for the guests who had been invited before her." ³⁶

The French Government found it very difficult to frame a satisfactory reply to these most unsatisfactory proposals. To accede meant to disregard the Act of Algeciras, to the detriment of the very Powers which had supported her against Germany in the drawing up of the Act. Nor was a complete refusal possible under the circumstances without endangering the new *rapprochement* which seemingly promised such a satisfactory solution. Although an early reply was requested, it was not until four months later, October 14, that M. Pichon sent his response, a masterpiece of ambiguity and circumlocution, which while conceding the principle of an association of French and German groups, did not fail to point out that Article 107 of the Act must be taken into account. Where the German note specified French and German groups, the French reply spoke of *entrepreneurs*

³⁶ Tardieu, "Le Mystère d'Agadir," p. 36.

of various nationalities. Thus at the first exchange of views a fundamental divergence of intention was evident. France still intended to associate with Germany only so far as was permissible under the Act of Algeciras, while Germany cast overboard all her much vaunted demands for economic liberty just as soon as she was in a position to profit by an opposite policy.

Nevertheless, negotiations were continued, and a serious effort was made to come to an agreement in various enterprises. The Union des Mines, an international mining concern of which France possessed 50 per cent. of the stock, attempted to combine with the Mannesman Brothers, a German enterprise which claimed to have very important mining concessions. For the construction of public works it was proposed to form a large company in which France and Germany would have the most stock, but to which Great Britain, Spain, and Austria, and the smaller Powers were to be invited to participate.³⁷ As to railways, considering their strategic value, France thought that she should have complete control, but Germany asked that the construction be put in the hands of the same company that was to have charge of the public works, and she further demanded the right of appointing a certain number of the personnel. Innumerable proposals were made by both sides, and conferences were held, but on none of the three questions was a real accord reached. In the case of the mines the Mannesmans

³⁷ The shares were distributed as follows: France 50 per cent., Germany 26 per cent., England $6\frac{1}{4}$ per cent., Spain 5 per cent., Austria 4 per cent., Italy, Belgium and Sweden each $2\frac{1}{2}$ per cent., Portugal $1\frac{1}{4}$ per cent.

would accept no proposals which were not overwhelmingly in their favor. For public works, a large company was organized, the *Société marocaine des travaux publics*, with a capital of two million francs, which made a number of proposals to the Moroccan Government for the construction of street car lines, water works, port improvements and other profitable public works; but it was prevented from accomplishing anything by the jealousy of the French and German interests, by the hostility of the English (who felt that they had not received fair treatment in the percentage of stock offered them) and by the hopeless condition in which Morocco remained financially. As to the railways, Great Britain did not look with favor upon giving this enterprise to the company in charge of the public works, while France seriously objected to German station agents in Morocco.³⁸

"The wind of concord blew even outside of the limits of Morocco," and the French Government decided to make a clean sweep of all the economic difficulties between the two countries while the occasion was so favorable. A dispute of long standing existed between the rival groups of *concessionnaires* in the German Cameroons and the French Congo, a dispute which both the French Foreign Office and the Colonial Office had found extremely wearisome. An inquest conducted by Captain Cottés in 1906 showed conclusively that the French company, the Ngoko-Sangha, had well-founded claims for damages against the German Cameroon Company. M. Millies-Lacroix, French Min-

³⁸ The best discussion of the efforts to establish these joint enterprises is found in Tardieu, *op. cit.*, Chap. I. The "Rapport Baudin," *op. cit.*, p. 264 gives a very complete summary.

ister of the colonies during 1907 and 1908, was willing to support the French company in its claims, but M. Pichon was unwilling to introduce further causes of dispute into Franco-German relations at a time when the strain was already so great. Since the French Government refused to support them in their just claims for damages against Germany, the Ngoko-Sangha Company thereupon demanded an indemnity from France. Their request was laid before the Chamber, and the Committee of Foreign Affairs recommended that an equitable settlement be made, considering that "equity commanded an indemnification for the victim of the carelessness, apathy and weakness of the government."³⁹ Neither the Colonial Minister nor the Foreign Minister was willing to act in accordance with this suggestion, but under the mellowing influence of the Accord of 1909 it was hoped that a settlement might be arrived at. M. Pichon therefore suggested to Berlin that a Franco-German consortium be constituted which should jointly exploit the concessions on the Congo-Cameroon frontier.⁴⁰

³⁹ This whole question was discussed in a very frank manner in the Chamber April 5 and 6, 1911. *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol 93ii, pp. 2215 et seq. See also Tardieu op. cit., Part 11, Chap. I, and Pierre Albin, "Le Coup d'Agadir," p. 131 ff.

⁴⁰ M. Pichon in testifying before the Budget Commission, Dec. 14, 1910, thus outlined the need for such an agreement: "The troubles caused in this region by the prolonged struggle of rival colonists are still felt among the natives even after a definite accord has intervened between France and Germany; it has seemed opportune to the French administration to assure completely the pacification, the calm and the security by realizing in a concrete manner in the eyes of the local tribes the union of these elements of civilization.

"The formation of the Franco-German consortium which would put an end to the regrettable struggles between the South Cameroon Company and the Ngoko-Sangha Company will have the double advantage of preventing the return of incidents whose diplomatic effects might

When the proposal was submitted to the two companies, the German group accepted without reservations; the Ngoko-Sangha accepted, but on condition that they first receive the indemnity from the French government which had been fixed at something over two million francs. It was this indemnity that was to prove the stumbling-block. Although it had been awarded by an arbitration tribunal, and accepted by the government, the budget committee showed itself hostile to the idea and did all in its power to impede payment. As a result, although the basis for the new company was established by a convention in June, 1910, it was not until December that the arrangements were definitely determined upon by the two governments, and it remained to be seen whether the indemnity would be paid. An opinion given by the eminent jurist, M. Renault, that the payment was illegal destroyed the last hope of a settlement, and the Briand cabinet, worn out with the constantly increasing opposition, resigned.⁴¹

The Monis cabinet was constituted March 3, 1911, with M. Cruppi, a man wholly inexperienced in foreign relations, as Minister of Foreign Affairs.⁴² With M. Caillaux, Minister of Finances, one of the most ardent opponents of the consortium, and with M. Messimy, Minister of Colonies, who had also been unfavorably

have grave consequences and to facilitate on the spot the civilizing work of our colonial administration."

⁴¹ "They wish the power," he said to his friends, in speaking of the organizers of the campaign of violence against him, "well, let them have it. They will soon see the difficulties that they will run into." Albin, "Le Coup d'Agadir," p. 140.

⁴² M. Monis had invited MM. Ribot, Deschanel, Cambon and Barrère to take the portfolio of Foreign Affairs without success.

disposed towards the project, the government was not slow in stating its position on this question. M. Messimy declared to the Budget Commission that the indemnity would not be paid nor the consortium constituted.⁴³ One more project of cooperation between the two countries had failed, and this time the blame rested wholly upon the French. Their policy in this project was a mixture of friendly advances and timid retreats, a policy of vacillation inexcusable in dealing with a distrustful and powerful neighbor, who knew what she wanted and was not particular over the means employed in getting it. A final effort was made to substitute the idea of a Congo-Cameroon railway for the consortium scheme, but it fared no better than the other proposals. After two years of negotiations for participation in almost every sort of business enterprise, for the exploitation of mining interests, for the construction of railways, for a monopoly of tobacco, for engaging in all sorts of public utility projects, for the gathering of rubber and ivory, not a single enterprise had been satisfactorily established. In some instances, such as the Mannesman claims, and in the projects for military railways in Morocco, Germany's demands were wholly out of reason, but in the Ngoko-Sangha-Cameroon Company project the policy of France was both weak and reprehensible. The Senatorial Commission of Foreign Affairs had a very clear appreciation of the situation: "In a general fashion Germany seems disposed to conclude from these facts that a successful association of economic interests with France is impossible."⁴⁴

⁴³ Tardieu, *op. cit.*, p. 346.

⁴⁴ René Pinon "France et Allemagne," p. 210.

The German Government had given numerous indications that it was exceedingly desirous that success should crown these enterprises of economic cooperation. While M. Pichon was in London to attend the funeral of King Edward VIII in May, 1910, the Kaiser approached him and said: "I should be very glad to see this Moroccan question finally settled. I should also be glad if you can come to an understanding with the Mannesman brothers."⁴⁵ In a note dated February 3, 1911, M. Jules Cambon, French ambassador at Berlin, declared that Germany was much interested in the project of the Moroccan railways and thought that in the future it would have a great importance.⁴⁶ A month later he was more explicit in his opinion: "It would be very inconvenient in my opinion if the accord relative to the Moroccan railways should not be signed. . . . Permit me to remark to Your Excellency that the object that was pursued in forming the Moroccan Company was precisely to do away with German competition in Morocco in the future by giving her a limited satisfaction."⁴⁷ M. Conty, Under Secretary of Foreign Affairs, in a note to M. Cruppi, dated March 13, relating to the Congo-Cameroon Consortium, was even more outspoken in his views: "In the actual state of Franco-German relations, the abandonment of the Consortium will risk provoking at our expense another one of those disagreeable manifestations so habitual to Germany."⁴⁸ With the complete failure of the Consortium through the deliberate action of the Monis govern-

⁴⁵ Tardieu, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁴⁶ Doc. Dip., "Affaires du Maroc" (1910-1912) No. 57.

⁴⁷ Doc. Dip., *op. cit.*, No. 85.

⁴⁸ Pinon, "France et Allemagne," p. 209.

ment, Germany realized that France did not mean to spend her blood and treasure to police Morocco and then permit Germany to participate equally in any benefits which might be derived. When Baron von Schoen, the German ambassador, next saw M. Cruppi his remark was a covert threat: "You have put aside the Ngoko-Sangha. I understand perfectly, for you would not have had a half dozen votes in the Chamber, but we have from your predecessor an engagement which implies the carrying out of a project relating to the Ngoko-Sangha, so that to-day we have Herr Semler on our back, which is very serious, for he has all Hamburg behind him. . . . You should try to show that you are not disposed to prevent all business arrangements between French and Germans."⁴⁹ These were all straws indicating clearly enough the direction of the wind, but the cabinet in power was fitted neither to avoid difficulties nor to meet them when they came. Germany had only to await a suitable occasion and then force the issue. The internal situation of Morocco gave indication that she would not have long to wait.

4. THE FEZ EXPEDITION

Although the Accord of 1909 had given France full opportunity to bolster up the authority of the Sultan with whatever forces should be deemed necessary to put an end to the recurrent tribal uprisings, at the beginning of 1911 the situation was practically as bad as ever. On November 20, 1910, Mouley Hafid had asked for new instructors for the police, and on De-

⁴⁹ Tardieu, *op. cit.*, p. 352.

cember 12 the French *chargé d'affaires* sent an urgent request for at least thirty officers, and with the least possible delay. Two months later the Minister of War designated ten officers to carry out the mission!⁵⁰ In the meantime the situation of Mouley Hafid was becoming more and more precarious. Insurrections became more prevalent and more serious. In January a small detachment of French troops was led into an ambush and massacred, and General Moinier, the head of the expeditionary force in the Chaouia, asked for reinforcements. The Briand Cabinet, ready to resign, took no action; but the Monis Cabinet, realizing the danger of allowing the situation to develop, granted a small increase.⁵¹ Germany was immediately informed of the situation, and although Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter conceded that the guilty must be punished, he observed that it was very easy to be drawn on little by little by progressive military actions until the Act of Algéciras should be annulled.⁵²

Hardly had the Government decided to increase its forces before news of a new uprising reached Paris, and this time in the vicinity of Fez. More urgent measures were now demanded, and again M. Cambon outlined the situation to the German Foreign Secretary, and showed the responsibility of France to protect the Europeans in Fez. Herr von Kiderlen seemed far more interested in the state of mind manifested by the German people in regard to the expedition than he did in the situation of such Europeans as happened

⁵⁰ Rapport Baudin, op. cit., p. 266.

⁵¹ See the speech of M. Cruppi, March 24, 1911, for a detailed explanation, *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 93ii, p. 1805.

⁵² Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 102.

to be at Fez.⁵³ The instructions given to General Monier were such as to prevent any misconception of the purpose of the expedition. He was ordered not to lose sight of the fact that France intended to do nothing which might injure the independence of the Sultan or diminish the prestige of his sovereignty, that there was to be no new occupation of territory, and that the operations of the expeditionary force were to be as restricted as possible and terminated in the shortest possible time.⁵⁴ That the French Government realized the delicacy of its situation, was shown by the debate in the Senate on April 6 and 7. M. Ribot pointed out that although France had assumed the positive charge of maintaining order in the ports where she had forces, she had not asked for the right to do so in every Moroccan city where Europeans were found. To do so implied a complete conquest of Morocco. After succoring the Europeans in Fez they could not be abandoned, thus sufficient troops for their protection would have to be left and it was difficult to see just where the matter would end.⁵⁵ Yet the justice of M. Cruppi's attitude could not be gainsaid, "if the security of foreigners, of the European colonies of Fez is menaced, it is our duty to try to aid them . . . this attitude is forced upon the government first by the most elementary sentiment of humanity, and secondly by the special interest that we have in maintaining order in Morocco." ⁵⁶

By the middle of April the tribal uprisings around

⁵³ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 166 annexe II.

⁵⁴ Ibid., No. 292.

⁵⁵ *Annales du Sénat* Vol. 79i, p. 463.

⁵⁶ Ibid., p. 470.

Fez had become so general that the situation of the European colonies in the Moroccan capital had grown serious, and on April 17 the French Government decided to send further reinforcements. Once more the German Government was notified. This time the reply was even more reserved: "I do not say no, neither do I encourage you. You know the German opinion concerning Morocco. . . . You tell us: 'if we go to Fez it will only be temporarily to reestablish the authority of the Sultan and to prevent anarchy.' But once at Fez, will you be able to withdraw? I can only advise the need for observing the Act of Algeciras, for once the French troops are at Fez the difficulties will commence."⁵⁷ By the end of April the city was completely blockaded; the Sultan urged the French troops to advance, and on May 21 the French column arrived under the walls of Fez. By the end of June complete security was established in the immediate surroundings of Fez; but even before this time, on June 20, the order had been given to begin the retreat.⁵⁸ To prevent any complications, M. Cruppi was careful to keep the Powers informed of the progress made; and he promised that the French troops would withdraw just as soon as the Sultan's troops could be reorganized.⁵⁹ These assurances satisfied all the Powers except Germany. The German newspapers engaged in a campaign of threats and innuendoes,⁶⁰ and Herr von Kider-

⁵⁷ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 200.

⁵⁸ Tardieu, op. cit., pp. 365-377.

⁵⁹ Doc. Dip., op. cit., Nos. 219, 255, 308, 360.

⁶⁰ The Nord Deutsche Gazette expressed the general attitude: "It is hoped that events will permit the French government to observe its program. If it should pass it, it would cease to be in accord with the Act of Algeciras of which one of the essential elements is an inde-

len-Waechter became more and more dubious in his replies to M. Cambon. On April 28 he declared that if the French should be forced to remain at Fez it would be a complicated situation, for the whole Act of Algeciras would be at stake, each power regaining its liberty.⁶¹ M. Cambon refused to subscribe to any such eventuality, but the German Foreign Secretary remained unconvinced. Rendered uneasy by this enigmatic attitude assumed by the Wilhelmstrasse, M. Cruppi ordered M. Cambon to find out definitely the attitude of the German Government upon the Fez expedition. On June 10 M. Cambon had an interview with Herr Zimmerman, Under Secretary for Foreign Affairs, and the next day with Chancellor von Bethman-Hollweg, but in neither interview did he receive any satisfaction. The Chancellor finally advised him to see von Kiderlen at Kissingen.⁶²

The first clue to the German attitude came most unexpectedly. Meeting the Crown Prince at the races at Grunewald, June 12, M. Cambon was complimented on the progress of the French in Morocco: "Well, my dear ambassador, here you are at Fez. Accept my compliments. Morocco is a fine bit of territory. We won't speak of it any more now, *but you fix it up with us and it will be all right.*"⁶³ The interview at Kis-

pendent sovereign in an independent Morocco. An infraction of one of the essential clauses of the Act of Algeciras, even if it should be provoked by force of circumstances and contrary to the wish of the power so acting, would give back to all the other powers their full liberty of action and might provoke consequences which cannot be foreseen for the moment." Quoted, Albin, "Le Coup d'Agadir," p. 156.

⁶¹ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 239.

⁶² Doc. Dip., op. cit., Nos. 361, 366.

⁶³ Tardieu, op. cit., p. 385.

singen was even more enlightening. Herr von Kiderlen detailed the various instances in which France had failed to act in the spirit of the Accord of 1909,—the Ngoko-Sangha Consortium, the Moroccan railways, and others—and asserted that the Fez expedition was a clear violation of the Act of Algeciras. M. Cambon pointed out the straightforward program of France, and Germany's promise of political disinterestedness. Herr Kiderlen refused to concede the need of the expedition and finally declared that further plastering up in Morocco was impossible. When M. Cambon suggested that compensation be sought elsewhere, Herr von Kiderlen replied: "Go to Paris and bring us back an offer." ⁶⁴

M. Cambon returned to Paris as was suggested, and found the political situation in hopeless confusion. The disorders in the Champagne vineyards had completely unnerved the government: "The Prime Minister sat like Belshazzar at the feast, gazing with dismay at the awful lettering on the midnight sky, while the deputies wrung their hands like a Greek chorus." ⁶⁵ Nemesis seemed to dog the government's footsteps. At the occasion of the Paris-Madrid aeroplane race one of the machines got out of control, and from the great multitude assembled one person was killed and one seriously injured—M. Berteaux, Minister of War, was the one killed, and M. Monis, the Prime Minister, was the one injured. To make matters worse, Spain now decided to act in an unfriendly manner, and in direct opposition to a request from France that no

⁶⁴ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 399.

⁶⁵ Fullerton, "Problems of Power," p. 102.

military action be taken, despatched troops to El Ksar and Larache. She claimed as justification, that such action was essential to protect those interests which had been granted to her by the secret agreement made in 1904 in connection with the Anglo-French Entente.⁶⁶ M. Jaurès rose to the occasion by urging a complete withdrawal from Morocco, thus only, he declared, could France be assured of the sympathy of Spain and Germany.⁶⁷ To the whole Chamber at this time the independent action of Spain seemed of much more importance than the covert hostility of Germany. Even such a close student of foreign affairs as M. Gabriel Hanotaux, writing in June, 1911, on the diplomatic situation, said: "Germany after having shown her claws at the beginning of the affair has hidden them for the moment; she waits, her eyes half closed, ready to profit by the slightest fault. Without believing that she has entirely renounced her ambitions I do not accuse her of evil designs. . . . To push her demands to the extreme did not succeed at the Conference of Algeiras. She would find herself in an analogous position, if by a hazardous manoeuvre she should try to force her fortune, and should put the other Powers on guard. Let us say that her diplomacy is keeping an eye upon us; if she can slip into the play without compromising

⁶⁶ Tardieu, *op. cit.*, p. 392. M. Cruppi authorized the French ambassador to protest vigorously against this action. "Give notice to the Foreign Minister in a friendly but clear fashion that the measures taken by the Royal Government—measures which have not been the result of any preliminary accord between France and Spain,—and of which we have been informed only after their realization, cannot have our assent." Quoted Tardieu, p. 393.

⁶⁷ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 94, p. 321.

herself too far, she will enter you may be sure of that." ⁶⁸

M. Hanotaux was only half right. Germany was watching, she was watching very closely; but her method was not to slip in; if a suitable occasion should show itself she was ready to batter down the doors. If she had learned a lesson at Algeciras, it was to strike at France alone, rather than at all Europe. It was France that furnished the occasion. The Monis government, weak at best, fell on a question of domestic policy, June 23, and M. Fallières asked M. Caillaux, Minister of Finances in the former cabinet, to form the new ministry. Not as much was known concerning the character of M. Caillaux as is known to-day, but the little that was known was not such as to inspire much hope. He was a recognized authority on finances, author of an excellent treatise on the subject, *Impôts en France*, and he had served as Minister of Finances in the Waldeck-Rousseau, Clemenceau, Briand, and Monis cabinets. But in a period when the storm clouds were everywhere visible on the horizon of foreign relations, the wisdom of his choice seemed problematical. It was at least hoped that M. Caillaux would choose an experienced statesman to take the all important position of Foreign Minister. He chose M. de Selves, for the past fifteen years Prefect of the Seine, and before that Director-General of Posts and Telegraphs. Even Germany manifested its surprise at the strange appointments which M. Caillaux made. The "Lokal Anzeiger" said: "It is astonishing that M.

⁶⁸ Gabriel Hanotaux, "La Politique d'Equilibre," p. 335.

Caillaux should have entrusted the portfolio of War to M. Messimy, whose competence appears doubtful, and that of Foreign Affairs to M. de Selves, at the very moment when his bad administration of Paris has brought down upon his head the censure of the municipal council. M. de Selves, who during fifteen years has been unable to clean, pave, or light the capital, as a recompense is put at the head of Foreign Affairs of his country.”⁶⁹ To official Germany the time seemed suitable to reopen the Moroccan question, and four days after the formation of the Caillaux Cabinet the German gun-boat, *Panther*, appeared in the harbor of Agadir.

⁶⁹ Quoted *Le Matin*, June 29, 1911. Further light is thrown upon the Caillaux ministry by this extract from a despatch sent by Baron Guillaume, the Belgian Minister at Paris, to his chief the day after the despatch of the *Panther*: “When forming his Cabinet, M. Caillaux avoided offering a portfolio to M. Etienne, who is an interested partisan in the Moroccan adventure. He chose M. de Selves as Minister of Foreign Affairs who, I am told, wishes to put an end to that affair and wants the French to leave Fez. That is the moment which the German Government chose to gain a footing in Morocco! Was the German Government badly informed . . . or did it fear lest France draw back and thus deprive it of a suitable pretext?” *Belgian Doc.*, No. 73.

CHAPTER XI

AGADIR

1. THE GERMAN DEMANDS

THE portfolio of Foreign Affairs is often a *lourd héritage*, and hardly had M. de Selves left the Hotel de Ville for the Quai d'Orsay before he realized this fact. Simultaneously with the sending of the *Panther* to Agadir, the German ambassador at Paris informed the new Foreign Secretary that certain German firms, alarmed at the troubled situation in Morocco, had appealed to the Imperial Government for protection, and it was in pursuance of their request that Germany had dispatched a war-ship charged with the task of lending aid in case of need. As soon as peace should be reestablished in this region the gun-boat had orders to leave Agadir.¹ Even the inexperienced Foreign Secretary realized that the excuse for sending a war-ship to Agadir was a most palpable pretext. In the first place, Agadir was a closed port where no power had the right to exercise police duty, secondly there was practically no European commerce there, and Germany had none at all. Finally there had been no troubles recently in this particular region. Herr Zimmerman, in commenting on the affair to the French *chargé d'affaires* at Berlin, was somewhat more frank. For his first reason he, too, mentioned the pro-

¹ Doc. Dip., "Affaires du Maroc" (1910-1912) No. 418.

tection of German interests, but his second was more truthful: "public opinion in Germany is such that the Imperial Government can no longer seem to disinterest itself in Moroccan affairs at a moment when France and Spain no longer seem willing to abide by the Act of Algeciras."² But considering the fact that the Fez expedition had already received orders to withdraw, that Herr von Kiderlen had invited M. Cambon to make an offer, and that the French ambassador was in Paris for that very purpose, it was not clear why Germany should seize this moment—when France had shown herself most willing to negotiate—to provoke an international crisis. In the words of M. Pierre Albin, "A conversation was being held. Bruskiy during an interruption one of the two interlocutors placed a revolver upon the table, then invited the other to renew the discussion."³

The answer was, after all, very simple. Under the Act of Algeciras it was clear that France and Spain would ultimately become masters of Morocco. Time was working for them, and the chaotic condition existing there was bound to bring about a protectorate sooner or later. The Accord of 1909 was an attempt on the part of Germany to recoup commercially what she had lost politically. It is possible that at first she fully intended to disinterest herself gradually in Morocco, but *l'appétit vient en mangeant*, and as numerous profitable ventures suggested themselves her subjects became more insistent in their demands for equal participation with the French. When it was

² Ibid., No. 419.

³ "Le Coup d'Agadir," p. 28.

seen that cooperation was impossible, the idea of a partition or compensation took its place. The Pan-Germans had long been demanding an Atlantic port, and the idea finally developed into the desire for a stretch of the coast with the hinterland included.⁴ The march to Fez had given the Wilhelmstrasse the excuse to protest against a violation of the Act, and the weakened internal situation of France, which put the inexperienced Caillaux ministry in power, gave it the opportunity to make the protest effective. Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter gave a very frank outline of the situation to Baron Beyens, the Belgian ambassador:

"When I first came to the Wilhelmstrasse I witnessed, without being able to raise any protests, the successive encroachments of France in Morocco, which assuredly were breaches of the Algeciras Act. . . . If the Republican Government had continued to show prudence and to advance at a leisurely pace, we should have been compelled to put up with its pretensions and to champ our bit in silence. . . . The invasion would have crept on slowly like a sheet of oil. I thanked Heaven when I learnt of the march on Fez, a flagrant violation of the Algeciras Act. This drastic proceeding which the position of Europeans in the Moroccan capital did not justify, restored to us our freedom of action. . . . We admitted that it was out of the question to make France draw back and conform to the Algeciras treaty. We consented to give up Morocco to her, but we demanded in return a cession

⁴ Herr Theobald Fischer expressed the Pan-German view: "Germany's minimum demands should include the part of Morocco situated between the Atlas Mountains and the Atlantic, the territory south of Rabat including the Sous." Tardieu, *op. cit.*, p. 428.

of territory in Africa. Since this friendly conversation led to no result, just as our proposals in accordance with the 1909 agreement . . . we decided to send the *Panther* to Agadir.”⁵

This was a sufficiently bald statement of the case from the German viewpoint. But inadvertently the Germans have given us a clearer and more brutal exposition of their intentions. In a political libel suit in which the editor of the “*Rheinisch-Westfälische Zeitung*” was implicated, he made the following declarations on oath in the court, January 9, 1912:

“Herr Klass, the President of the Pan-Germanic League, is prepared to state upon oath before this Court that Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Herr von Kiderlen-Waechter, writing to him from Kissingen, requested Herr Klass to meet him at the Hotel Pfälzer Hof in Mannheim. During the interview, which occupied several hours, Herr von Kiderlen stated: “The Pan-Germanic demand for the possession of Morocco is absolutely justified. You can absolutely rely upon it that the government will stick to Morocco. M. Cambon is wriggling before me like a worm. The German Government is in a splendid position. You can rely on me and you will be very pleased with our Morocco policy.”

Herr Klass called at the Wilhelmstrasse July 1, and as the Foreign Secretary was not in, he was received by Herr Zimmerman, the Under Secretary.

⁵ Beyens, “Germany Before the War,” p. 230. It is rather difficult to reconcile this statement with the actual facts. Not only do we find the French representative in Fez begging for aid, but the Sultan himself is equally insistent upon French intervention as the only possible means of putting down the insurrection. See Doc. Dip., op. cit., *passim*. for reports on the situation.

Herr Zimmerman was unable to restrain his enthusiasm: "You come at an historic hour. To-day the *Panther* appears before Agadir, and at this moment the Foreign Cabinets are being informed of its mission. The German Government has sent two *agents provocateurs* to Agadir, and these have done their duty very well. German firms have been induced to make complaints and to call upon the government in Berlin for protection. It is the government's intention to seize the district, and it will not give it up again. . . ."⁶

At first France seemed wholly unable to decide what action should be taken. M. de Selves thought that a French war-ship should be sent as an immediate *riposte* to the German thrust, after which further counsel could be taken. M. Jules Cambon supported the Foreign Secretary in his attitude, but M. Caillaux hesitated. The attitude of M. Caillaux in this whole affair is not yet entirely clear, but it was proved conclusively in the Senatorial inquest that while he was still Minister of Finance in the Monis cabinet he was carrying on secret negotiations with Germany in regard to the Congo-Cameroon railroad, and that when he became Prime Minister, he continued these negotiations wholly without the knowledge of his Minister of Foreign Affairs.⁷ M. Caillaux suggested that M. Delcassé, now Minister of Marine, be asked to give his opinion and M. Delcassé advised that Great Britain be consulted first, in order that her attitude might be conformable to that

⁶ J. Ellis Barker, "Anglo-German Differences and Sir Edward Grey," *Fortnightly Review*, March 1, 1912.

⁷ For a scathing indictment of M. Caillaux's diplomatic methods see the speech of M. Jenuvrier in the Senate, February 5, 1912. M. Tardieu fails entirely to do justice to this phase of the affair. *Annales du Sénat*, Vol. 81i, p. 156.

of France. His advice was taken and M. Paul Cambon, French ambassador at London, was asked to obtain the views of the British Foreign Office. In fact immediately upon learning of the dispatch of the *Panther* M. Paul Cambon had gone to see Sir Edward Grey without awaiting instructions, but in the absence of the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Arthur Nicolson, Under Secretary, assured him that the British Government would model its attitude and its decision upon the attitude and decision of the French Government.⁸

It soon became evident that France once more intended to let Germany make her proposals. President Fallières had made all arrangements to start on a trip to Holland July 3, and M. de Selves was to accompany him. It was decided that to change their plans at this late moment would be giving too much importance to this incident.⁹ This decision placed the management of the situation for the next few days entirely in the hands of M. Caillaux. He first authorized M. Jules Cambon to enter into discussion with Germany as to the significance and purpose of its act,¹⁰ and at the same time he telegraphed M. Paul Cambon to the effect that he need not ask the British Government to join with France in sending war-ships to Morocco, as France did not intend to make a naval demonstration.¹¹

⁸ Albin, "Le Coup d'Agadir," p. 31.

⁹ Kaiser Wilhelm had also planned to leave Kiel for a cruise in the North Sea at this time, but he found it convenient to delay his trip until he learned how France would take the incident.

¹⁰ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 425.

¹¹ Ibid., No. 427. It is interesting to note that M. de Selves protested vigorously against this telegram when he received a copy of it and asked M. Bapst, Director of Political Affairs, to tell M. Caillaux that he thought it advisable that the French ambassador should refrain from making any communication to the British Government of

Whether an interview which he was known to have had the same morning with Herr Gwinner of the Deutsche Bank, who happened to be in Paris at the time, had any influence upon his decision remains to be proved. Sir Edward Grey, immediately upon his return, insisted that any change in the *status quo* of Morocco called for a diplomatic discussion among the four Powers principally interested, France, Spain, Great Britain and Germany; but first Great Britain desired to know the views of France, and after an agreement between them a conversation *à quatre* would be in order.¹²

The French press on the whole took the incident almost as calmly as did the *Président du Conseil*, with the exception of newspapers notoriously anti-German such as the "Eclair" and the "Echo de Paris." The conservative "Journal des Débats" declared that it was high time to examine the Moroccan question with *sang froid* and commonsense. However, on July 8 such a sort as to dissuade her from a naval manifestation if the need should arise. Ibid., No. 429.

¹² Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 428. On July 4, after a cabinet meeting, Sir Edward Grey declared that the British attitude could not be a disinterested one with regard to Morocco. She had to take into consideration both her treaty obligations to France and her own interests in Morocco; in her opinion a new situation had been created by the dispatch of a German warship to Agadir. He explained this position in Parliament Nov. 27, 1911, as follows: "I think in the German mind it has sometimes been assumed that our agreement made with France in 1904 entirely disinterested us with regard to Morocco. . . . It is quite true we disinterested ourselves in Morocco politically but we did it on conditions laid down both strategic and economic. . . . It is obvious, if the Moroccan question was to be reopened, and a new settlement made, unless we were consulted, unless we knew what was going on, unless we were in some way parties to the settlement, the strategic and economic conditions stipulated for between ourselves, France, and Spain in 1904 might be upset." Parl. Debates, Vol. 32, p. 43, 5th series.

the "Matin" aroused public interest to a white heat by announcing that Germany wished a cession of the entire French Congo in return for a free hand in Morocco. In fact it was on this day that Herr von Schoen, the German ambassador, declared that his government was willing to continue the conversations begun at Kissingen, declaring that his government cherished no pretensions of a territorial order in regard to Morocco, but that the Congo seemed to offer a ground for negotiation.¹³ At the same time, M. Jules Cambon informed the German Foreign Secretary that the discussion could not be limited to Paris and Berlin, as had been suggested by Germany; France intended to keep her allies and her friends in touch with the course of events.¹⁴ On July 10, in the course of his first long conversation with M. Cambon, Herr von Kiderlen again reproached France for the present situation, harping ever upon the failure of the economic collaboration. In conclusion he declared: "You desire that we give up Morocco as entirely hopeless; well as far as I am concerned I would consent to it, but in order to have Germany accept it we must present ourselves to her as having served her interests; satisfaction must be given on the colonial side, for example in the Congo." ¹⁵

France was to suffer now for lack of a real man at the head of the State. A Clemenceau, a Delcassé, a

¹³ Doc. Dip., *up. cit.*, No. 439.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*, No. 441.

¹⁵ *Ibid.*, No. 444. As far back as 1905 the Congo had been suggested as compensation by Herr von Kuhlmann, member of the German legation at Tangier in conversations with M. de Chensey, the French representative. See Tardieu, "Coup d'Agadir," p. 438.

Millerand, a Poincaré would have sent a war-ship to Agadir or some other Moroccan port, and would then have informed Germany that since she had torn up the Act of Algenciras she could state her claims to the signatory Powers. Another conference was the last thing that Germany wanted, yet if France had insisted, it is hard to see how Germany could have avoided it, after the Algenciras precedent that she herself had set. But M. de Selves, ignorant not only of diplomatic methods but also of the whole background of the affair, was wholly unable to cope with the situation. As a result he took his orders from M. Caillaux. There was no doubt as to the ability of the Prime Minister, but there was real cause to question his methods. Nor was this the only factor prejudicial to the French cause. The powerful influence of M. Jaurès in the Chamber, who in his ardent pursuit of internationalism always saw his country's interests from the German point of view, the out and out pacifism of M. Sembat and M. d'Estournelles de Constant, who believed that the only way to live as a neighbor to Germany was to allow her to have her own way—she would have it ultimately, why bother to fight about it?—were influences which Germany counted upon in bargaining unsubstantial claims for very substantial territory. There were other influences still more deadly which she knew about only too well—especially the sinister power wielded by men like Gustave Hervé, anti-militarist, anti-patriot, anti-French, who dared to come out in his sheet, "La Guerre Sociale," on July 10, with the following challenge: "We shall wreck your mobilization if you commit the crime of not coming to an agreement with Germany

regarding Morocco—and while waiting we will wreck (*saboterons*) your diplomacy.”¹⁶

Under these circumstances it is not surprising that when Germany declared her terms to M. Cambon in the famous interview of July 15, they were found to be exorbitant in the extreme. They were nothing less than the cession of the whole French Congo between the Ocean and the Sangha River. M. Cambon immediately informed Herr von Kiderlen that although French opinion might consent to substantial compensations it would never submit to the loss of a colony. The German Foreign Minister then allowed that Germany might give in return the north of the Cameroon and perhaps even Togoland. He followed his concession with a veiled threat of war, declaring that such a contingency might be unavoidably forced upon Germany by the pressure of public opinion unless reasonable compensation were secured. “You have purchased your liberty in Morocco from Spain, England, and even Italy, and you have thrust us aside. You should have negotiated with us before going to Fez.” Fortunately for France, she had in M. Jules Cambon a diplomat fully experienced in German methods. Refusing flatly the German suggestion, he advised Herr Kiderlen to confer with the Minister of Colonies, and then if Germany really wanted to come to an agreement with France let her make a proposal.¹⁷

On the whole, it seemed as though Great Britain was more interested in the affair than was the French Government. On July 21 Sir Edward Grey conferred with

¹⁶ Cited in *Le Matin*, July 11, 1911.

¹⁷ *Doc. Dip.*, op. cit., No. 455.

Count Wolff Metternich, the German ambassador, and informed him of the interest which Great Britain had in the question, and as the German ambassador's reply was most equivocal in its nature, it was felt necessary to give public notice of the British position. It was thought to be the more necessary as the "London Times" had published on July 20 an account of the impossible terms demanded by Germany. Mr. Lloyd George was scheduled to speak for the Bankers' Association at the Mansion House, and here was an opportunity for the government to go on record in a semi-official way. The Chancellor of the Exchequer had the reputation of being extremely pacific in his views, and an ardent supporter of a decrease in armaments, and as was expected his speech extolled the blessings of peace. Therefore his conclusion occasioned the greater surprise: "But if a situation were to be forced upon us in which peace could only be preserved by the surrender of the great and beneficent position Britain has won by centuries of heroism and achievement, by allowing Britain to be treated where her interests were vitally affected as if she were of no account in the Cabinet of nations, then I say emphatically that peace at that price would be a humiliation intolerable for a great country like ours to endure."¹⁸

The "Times" comment the next day is especially pertinent: "Mr. Lloyd George's clear, decisive, statesmanlike reference last night to the European situation created by the German demands in West Africa, will be endorsed without distinction of party by all his countrymen. The purport of such demands as were

¹⁸ London Times, July 22, 1911.

outlined in Berlin last week is nothing less than a claim for absolute predominance. Neither France nor Great Britain could have entertained them for a moment without confessing themselves overborne by German power. That is not the intention of our French neighbors, nor is it our own."

The publication in the press of the German demands angered the Wilhelmstrasse exceedingly, and when Herr Kiderlen met M. Cambon on the 20th his tone was very aggressive. He declared that unless more discretion were observed, further conversation was impossible—that Germany would take her liberty of action, demand the full application of the Act of Algeciras, and if necessary push matters to the end. M. Cambon was not to be browbeaten, and he declared that France was prepared to go just as far as Germany. Furthermore, when he learned that the German Secretary was not ready to make any further proposals, he informed him that unless Germany was prepared to disinterest herself completely in Morocco, it was not worth while to continue the discussion.¹⁹ The Mansion House speech of Lloyd George changed the whole situation. At last it was brought to the German comprehension that the Triple Entente was not merely a paper agreement, but one which a great nation was willing to risk war to maintain. The German eagle paid little heed to the crowing of the Gallic cock, but when accompanied by the roar of the British lion it was time to take heed to the situation. A tense situation for some time was produced between Germany and Great Britain, but the beneficial effect of the Lloyd George speech was imme-

¹⁹ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 463.

diately noted by M. Cambon in his next interview with the German Foreign Minister: "The conversation that I had with Herr Kiderlen last night was carried on in an entirely different tone from that which marked the two preceding. My interlocutor manifested towards me, as he has never done up to the present, his desire of an entente with us."²⁰ However, Herr Kiderlen still insisted upon the whole of the French Congo from the Ngoko-Sangha to the sea, though he was now willing to offer definitely all of Togoland and the northern part of the Cameroons in return. M. Cambon took cognizance of the offer, but frankly refused to consider the abandonment of the French Congo. Another interview on July 28 did not advance the situation, and the following day Herr Kiderlen left for Swinemunde to consult with the Kaiser.

Thus at the first of August, a month after the sending of the *Panther* to Agadir the negotiations seemed to have reached an *impasse*. France was willing to exchange some of her islands of Polynesia, or of the Indian Ocean, and some of her territory at the east of the Cameroons, for the *Bec de Canard*, and a free hand in Morocco. But she was unwilling to cede any of the coast line of the Congo. Germany, on the other hand, insisted upon having free access to the sea between Libreville and Spanish Guinea, thus completely en-

²⁰ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 467. The best account of the Anglo-German situation arising out of the Agadir Affair is found in Bernadotte E. Schmitt, "England and Germany," Chap. XI. Mr. E. D. Morel in his highly colored *exposé* which has been published under two titles, "Morocco in Diplomacy," and "Ten years of Secret Diplomacy," gives a graphic though lurid presentation of the same situation. Mr. Morel finds greater justification for the German aims than do the Germans themselves.

circling this colony, and territorial access to the Congo River, which meant that French Congo would be cut in two. "Upon this point," insisted Herr Kiderlen, "the resolution of the German Government is formal." In return Germany was willing to give France a free hand politically in Morocco.²¹ In the interview of August 4, Herr Kiderlen eliminated the question of the South Sea Islands, renounced the demand for the access to the sea through the Congo, but still demanded half of the Gaboon and French Congo and the right of pre-emption of Spanish Guinea; he was no longer certain as to whether Germany would cede both Togo and the *Bec du Canard*. In fact, German public opinion showed itself so hostile to the cession of Togoland that in the next interview, August 9, Herr Kiderlen informed M. Cambon this offer would have to be withdrawn, although Germany was not willing to abate any of her demands.²² Other interviews on the 13th, 14th and 17th were equally unproductive of results. As France showed herself more and more willing to make concessions, Germany became more insistent in her demands. M. Cambon strove valiantly to hold his ground, but his position was the more difficult owing to the apparent willingness of the Quai d'Orsay to compromise on almost any basis.²³ It was also evident that while France was anxious to settle the Moroccan question once for all, Germany was inclined to disregard that phase of the matter, her whole interest was

²¹ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 480.

²² Ibid., No. 494.

²³ M. Jules Cambon himself complained that he had to keep up the fight having behind him those who would not have been sorry to see him lose it. Tardieu, op. cit., p. 478.

centered in the amount of French territory she could obtain.

The attitude of Germany had now become so intractable that negotiations were broken off and M. Cambon returned to Paris. Whether the secret negotiations carried on by M. Caillaux, or the fact that a serious railway strike held the attention of the British Government, gave encouragement to the German pretensions, a new belligerency of attitude was apparent. In his last despatch before quitting the German capital, dated August 20, M. Cambon noted the increasing exasperation of the German public. All the political parties at the approach of the elections had commenced to sing: *Deutschland über alles*. He had evidence that if the negotiations should fail completely—and that seemed very possible—Germany would refuse to attend a conference, would maintain her hold on Agadir and await developments.²⁴ French public opinion also showed itself weary of the interminable discussions and increasingly hostile to any cession of the valuable Congo territory. A pathetic letter to President Fallières from the Countess de Brazza, widow of the explorer Savorgnan de Brazza, who had given his life to open the Congo region to the French, protesting in her dead husband's name at the cession of any part of the French Congo to Germany, added fuel to the flames of discontent.²⁵ The idea, that never could the difficulties with Germany be satisfactorily settled without an appeal to arms became prevalent. If war had to come, one might as well "*en finir tout de suite*." It was under

²⁴ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 513.

²⁵ His last words were said to be: "When you bury me here, they will not dare to give this country to the Germans."

these inauspicious circumstances that M. Cambon returned to Paris August 21, to obtain further instructions.

2. THE FRENCH OFFERS AND THE FINAL SETTLEMENT

If M. Joseph Caillaux should ever write his memoirs—confessions would be the better word—the historian will have a bird's-eye view of a large part of the seamy side of French politics in the period preceding the war, as well as the clue to many of the traitorous plans hatched after the war had begun. But even without this primary source of information, it is not difficult to prove that while M. Cambon was struggling valiantly to serve his country in Berlin, and M. de Selves was doing his best in Paris, the Prime Minister was carrying on secret negotiations with German interests which were having a deadly influence upon the success of the French position. M. Jenouvrier, speaking in the Senate, February 5, 1912, went so far as to declare that M. Caillaux, in conference with Baron Gunzbourg, one of the directors of the Deutsche Bank, on July 26, 1911, formulated the basis of a Franco-German entente for the settlement not only of African but also of European affairs. This program promised the assistance of France in the Bagdad Railway enterprise, permitted German railway stocks and German rents upon the Bourse, gave Germany the presidency of the surveillance of the Ottoman debt, offered to abandon almost all of French Congo to the Alima River, and established a general accord between France and Germany for their whole European policy. As proof of his assertions, the Senator declared that an *aide-mémoire* to this

effect was at present in the archives of the Foreign Office. As additional proof, he stated that on August 19, Baron Lancken presenting himself at the Quai d'Orsay, was much disappointed at the attitude of a high functionary who discussed the situation with him, and said: "How is this! What you say to me does not coincide with what has been offered." When the French official declared that whoever had made any other offer was not in a position to do so, the German financier replied: "It was the person the most highly qualified." ²⁶

M. Caillaux also attempted to discourage British co-operation immediately after the sending of the *Panther*. Baron Guillaume, the Belgian minister to Paris, writing on August 10, 1911, made the following report: "In my report of July 8th, I had the honor to tell you that according to my information at that time it seemed as if M. Caillaux were regretting that he had insisted so much on receiving 'the word of command' from London in order to determine the stand to be taken in face of the despatch of a German man-of-war to Agadir, and that he appeared not to agree with the attitude which the cabinet of St. James' took at that time. This information seems to be confirmed. I am told that at first England proposed to France that the two governments despatch without delay two men-of-war each to the waters of Agadir. The cabinet of Paris objected to this, and there the matter stands." ²⁷

However, in the conferences in Paris, August 22, in which M. Caillaux and M. de Selves thought it best to

²⁶ Annales du Sénat, Vol. 81i, p. 164.

²⁷ Belgian Doc., No. 80.

take counsel with their *confrères*, and in which both M. Jules and M. Paul Cambon, and M. Barrère, French ambassador to Italy, participated, it was thought best to establish first of all the situation of France in Morocco as far as Germany was concerned, and only then to discuss the Congo. This situation must be a full diplomatic, military, and political protectorate, with the capitulations of 1880 abolished, the Accord of 1909 discarded, and with the provision that Germany should intervene with the Powers signatory of the Act of Algenciras to obtain their adhesion to the new arrangements. In return France was willing to cut her equatorial Congo territory so as to give Germany access to both the Ubangui and Congo Rivers, and to enlarge materially the hinterland of the Cameroons, also to give another strip running from the Ngoko to the coast. As a rectification of the frontier, the *Bec du Canard* was to go to France. The terms were given to M. Cambon in writing in the form of a *projet de convention*, and he was not to depart from them without authorization by the Cabinet.²⁸

The negotiations were resumed at Berlin September 4, and Herr Kiderlen seemed disposed to consent to the French protectorate in principle; but when a few days later he presented the German counter-project, it was found to contain, in the words of M. Cambon, "every precaution against us." France could only intervene at the Sultan's request, mixed tribunals were demanded, Germany should still be represented by a minister to Morocco, and along economic lines such a list of reservations and restrictions were included that the

²⁸ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 520 annexe.

result amounted to internationalization of all the resources and economic possibilities.²⁹ The French Cabinet discussed the project, but would have none of it. M. Caillaux attempted to concede on several points in opposition to M. de Selves, but the *Conseil* supported the Foreign Minister in his contentions. The French reply was very little different from the original project. The unsatisfactory nature of the proceedings now began to have a serious effect upon the financial situation in Germany, and the 10th of September was a "sinister Saturday" for the Berlin banks. Herr Kiderlen finally began to make some concessions, and by September 20, an agreement was virtually reached as regards the basis of settlement for Morocco; but not until October 11, after five successive French texts were submitted were the details finally agreed upon. The interpretative letters on the text consumed three days more.

The Moroccan question was finally liquidated; the question of the territorial compensation to be surrendered to Germany as the price of her political disinterestedness in Morocco remained. The latter was bound to be a delicate problem, owing to the highly excited state of public opinion in both countries. In addition, there was a strongly organized propaganda in Germany against allowing France a free hand in Morocco, and an equally strong feeling in France against giving up any territory in the French Congo as compensation to Germany for her unsubstantial claims in Morocco. M. Jules Cambon wrote from Berlin, October 18, that a campaign against the cession of

²⁹ Ibid., No. 539, annexe.

German rights in Morocco for the Congo was being carried on in the Reichstag and regret was already being felt at the concessions made. The next day he believed that public opinion would willingly accept a rupture of negotiations in order to return to the idea of a partition in Morocco.³⁰ Opinion in France had become so opposed to the *coupure* of the Congo that even the Radical-Socialist Congress, held early in October, demanded that the government maintain the continuity of the French colonies of Gaboon and Central Africa.³¹

At first no progress was made. Germany insisted on an outlet to the sea and a territorial approach to the Ubangui and Congo Rivers, while France refused to consider this cutting in two of her Congo territory. A compromise was finally reached whereby, instead of a solid stretch of territory along the Ubangui down to the Congo, a stretch of territory in the shape of a lady's high-heeled boot was blocked out, with the toe on the Congo and the heel on the Ubangui—a *pique* instead of a *coupure*. On October 26 it appeared as though a satisfactory solution had been reached on all questions at issue. But Germany still had a last card to play. On October 27 Herr Kiderlen raised the question of the French right of preemption over the Belgian Congo, which had existed ever since the formation of the Congo Free State.³² The French Government

³⁰ Doc Dip., op. cit., Nos. 593, 596.

³¹ Albin, "Le Coup d'Agadir," p. 298.

³² Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 611. Here again M. Caillaux without consulting M. de Selves had attempted to enter into negotiations with the Belgian Foreign Minister to obtain enough territory on the left bank of the Congo to assure France a right of way by land in case she surrendered all the right bank to Germany. M. Fondère, M. Caillaux's

could not accept German interference with this right, but the attack was cleverly met by a promise that if any changes should occur in the Congo Basin as defined by the Act of Berlin of 1885, the Powers signatory of the treaty should be notified. Germany could not do otherwise than accept, and on November 4, the accords, their annexes and the explanatory letters were signed.³³

It seems unnecessary to give a detailed analysis of these conventions, which finally settled the Moroccan question between France and Germany, but a statement of the most essential features is desirable. In the convention concerning Morocco, France was granted complete freedom of action to introduce such administrative, judicial, economic, financial, and military reforms as should be deemed essential for the good government of the empire, after obtaining the consent of the Moorish Government. France was to have control of the diplomatic and consular service of the empire, and to represent the Sultan in all his dealings with foreign powers. The note accompanying this convention went so far as to state that "in the event of the French Government deeming it necessary to assume the protectorate of Morocco the Imperial Government would place no obstacle in the way." On the other hand, in the economic clauses France was bound to maintain the principle of commercial liberty in Morocco; and no inequality as regards customs' duties, taxes, or other contributions was to be permitted. No export duty should be levied on iron ore exported from the Moorish ports,

emissary, was informed that if France wished to discuss the question, Belgium maintained an ambassador at Paris for that purpose. Albin, "Le Coup d'Agadir," p. 314.

³³ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 644.

and all contracts for works and materials needed in connection with any future concessions for roads, railways, harbors, telegraphs, etc., were to be allotted by the Moorish Government in accordance with the rules of adjudication. It was further agreed that the rights and proceedings of the Morocco State Bank, as defined in the Algeciras Act, should be in no way impeded.³⁴ To sum up the Moroccan situation: although France did not succeed in obtaining a free hand in Morocco economically, she did have in her hands the direction and control of the exploitation and concession of the great enterprises; while from the political standpoint "it is a real protectorate that we obtain and not a phantom protectorate."³⁵

The convention in regard to the Congo was not so satisfactory to France. She had been forced to cede a tract of territory comprising over 100,000 square miles, almost one half of her Congo colony. Besides, by granting to Germany an outlet upon the Ubanguï and the Congo Rivers, she had created an almost impossible frontier. The great stretch of territory extending south from Lake Chad to the Belgian Congo, and thence west to the Atlantic was now cut by two huge German tentacles, which by a slow advance would be able to strangle the French colony. The small triangle of swampy land south of Lake Chad, known as the *Bec du Canard*, ceded by Germany, was a mere rectification of frontier. In the words of M. Hanotaux: "We had an empire, they have left us corridors."³⁶

Now that the conventions had been signed by the rep-

³⁴ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 644, annexe I.

³⁵ Tardieu, "Le mystère d'Agadir," p. 564.

³⁶ Hanotaux, "La Politique d'Equilibre," p. 391.

representatives of the two Powers, in what spirit would they be ratified, and would public opinion be satisfied? The Pan-Germans had looked for Morocco and had received land in Equatorial Africa where a white man could scarcely live. They had looked for an open port on the Atlantic and had received a river side village on the Congo. France had lost almost half of the colony which the valiant de Brazza had given her in return for the right to pacify the savage Berbers and open Morocco to the world's commerce.

The Reichstag had an opportunity to express its opinion before the *Chambre des Députés*. In the session of November 9, Herr von Bethman-Hollweg tried valiantly to prove that the arrangement was satisfactory to Germany and safeguarded her interests: "I believe that by thus multiplying the regulations we have rendered a good service to the German economic interests in Morocco. . . . Before Fez and Agadir, Morocco was nominally independent, but in fact already in the power of France. But what is the actual situation? We have given nothing in Morocco which we had not already given and we have gained a great increase in our colonial domain."³⁷ The members received his assurances with mocking laughter, and the Crown Prince manifested his displeasure openly. Herr von Heydebrand, the leader of the Conservatives, declared that Germany ought not to be satisfied with an arrangement which imposed upon her considerable sacrifices without giving her in return sufficient compensation. France had come off well. But it was not by concessions that peace would be assured but by the

³⁷ Le Temps, Nov. 10, 1911.

German sword. Then, referring to Great Britain, he continued: "Like a flash of light all this has shown to the German people where the enemy is. Now we know when we wish to expand in the world and have our place in the sun who it is that pretends to universal domination. . . . Under these conditions the German people will know how to give a German reply."³⁸

When the treaty came up before the Chamber for ratification, December 14, the reception was equally hostile. Here, however, the diplomatic methods of M. Caillaux were even more harshly criticised than the conventions themselves. M. Jules Delahaye declared that M. Caillaux gave evidence of a more open spirit towards the conquerors of 1870 than towards the conquered, "M. Caillaux, who was too completely involved in the questions of international finance which were for the moment dominated by German interests."³⁹ M. Denys Cochin gave as his reasons for refusing to sign, the three reasons that Herr von Bethman-Hollweg gave in the Reichstag: Germany abandoned nothing, obtained a large French territory, and signed a treaty with France for the first time in forty years.⁴⁰ M. Caillaux made a specious plea in defense of his work and he was ably supported by MM. Sembat and Jaurès, who, as usual, found valid reasons for the German policy. After spending a week criticising the arrangement, the Chamber ratified it as was expected from the beginning, and by a vote of three hundred and ninety-three to thirty-six.

The Senate, however, was not so easily satisfied. A

³⁸ Ques. Dip. et Col., Dec. 1, 1911.

³⁹ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 95ii, p. 1401.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 1455.

special commission consisting of all the former prime ministers and former ministers of foreign affairs was appointed to investigate the underlying causes of the crisis. M. Caillaux was called before the commission, and as he completed his testimony by swearing upon his honor that he had never carried on any political or financial transactions of any sort outside of the official diplomatic negotiations, M. Clemenceau got up and addressing himself to M. de Selves: "Is *M. le ministre des Affaires étrangères* able to confirm this declaration? Can he tell us whether certain documents do not exist establishing the fact that our representative at Berlin complained of the intrusion of certain persons in the Franco-German diplomatic relations?" "Messieurs," replied M. de Selves, "I have always had a double care: the truth on one side and on the other the duty that my position imposed upon me. I ask permission not to reply to the question which M. Clemenceau has just addressed to me."⁴¹

That same day M. de Selves handed in his resignation to the President and two days later M. Caillaux was forced to follow suit. He had tried in vain to obtain any one to serve in his ministry as minister of foreign affairs. It was with a feeling of intense relief that the press hailed his fall: "The occult negotiations of M. Caillaux would have resulted in the dismemberment of the French African Empire without visible compensation, the ruin of our influence in the Levant, a rupture with Spain, a falling out with England, and the subordination of French policy in Europe to Austro-German interests. We can understand the

⁴¹ Albin, "Le Coup d'Agadir," p. 327.

regret manifested this morning by the newspapers of Berlin and Vienna at the fall of their great French Minister. For France this fall is the end of a nightmare.”⁴²

In its report the Senatorial commission severely criticised the methods employed by the Government. Two of the members, MM. Clemenceau and de Lamarzelle voted to reject the agreement entirely; but the majority, against their personal wishes, voted to accept it as the only way to terminate the Moroccan quarrel. The accord came up for discussion in the Senate early in February, and the senators expressed in no uncertain terms their feelings on the whole transaction. M. Jenouvrier scathingly denounced the Caillaux methods of private diplomacy; M. Pichon pointed out how carefully Germany's economic interests were protected in Morocco—she took back with one hand what she gave with the other; M. Clemenceau, remained bitterly opposed to the very end. “These obscure negotiations,” declared the Tiger, “have led by mysterious phases to the birth of a sort of diplomatic monster which is not without likeness to that famous Trojan horse, which was an offering to peace, but which resounded with the sound of arms.”⁴³

On the other side M. Ribot, although condemning with equal force the methods employed, pointed out that Europe was weary of the whole affair, and it was to the ultimate interest of France to come to an immediate settlement. M. Poincaré, in a brilliant speech, took the same position; and as there was really noth-

⁴² Auguste Gauvain in *Le Journal des Débats*, Jan. 11, 1912.

⁴³ *Annales du Sénat*, Vol. 81i, p. 272.

ing left to do, the Senate finally approved by a vote of two hundred and twenty-two to forty-eight, "*avec une répugnance publique et la mort dans l'âme.*"

3. THE SETTLEMENT WITH SPAIN

It will be remembered that early in June, 1911, the Spaniards had taken possession of both El Ksar and Larache in flat violation of the secret accord of 1904, which specified that Spain would only undertake military measures in Morocco after having first come to an agreement upon the subject with France. In this case the disembarkment had taken place first and then M. Cruppi was notified. M. Cruppi protested in a friendly but vigorous fashion on June 8 and again on June 11.⁴⁴ but he was out of power before the end of the month and on July 1, the sending of the *Panther* brought on the crisis with Germany. France was not equal to a struggle on two sides at the same time, and no attempt was made to come to a definite settlement with Spain until after an arrangement had been made with Germany. Hardly, however, had the treaty of November 4, 1911, been signed, before the "*Matin*" published the secret treaty of 1904 between France and Spain. The realization that, after a four months' struggle with Germany to obtain a free hand in Morocco, whose successful outcome had only been achieved by the surrender of a large stretch of French territory in the Congo, France now had to share her newly acquired territory with Spain, who had done nothing to assist her throughout the crisis, provoked a serious outburst of public opinion against submit-

⁴⁴ Doc. Dip., "Affaires du Maroc" (1910-1912), Nos. 351, 364.

ting to the treaty. Secret diplomacy and its disastrous results came in for a bitter arraignment at the hands of French editors and publicists. At the same time, public opinion demanded that since France had made all the sacrifices to secure a free hand in Morocco, Spain should now make certain concessions to France as her share in the payment.

The Cabinet of Madrid saw the matter from an entirely different standpoint. In their eyes it was France that modified the *status quo* in Morocco by her march on Fez, and by so doing gave Spain the same freedom of action in her sphere of influence as France possessed in hers. If France got into difficulties with other nations, that did not concern Spain; "Spain only recognized the treaty of 1904. This treaty by which she renounced to the profit of France a part of her historic pretensions created for her a right. She had nothing further to pay because she made use of this right." ⁴⁵

Other more concrete difficulties also arose to interfere with a speedy and satisfactory settlement. The lines of demarcation traced in 1904 were now found to be unsatisfactory from both a geographic and ethnographic standpoint. The policing under this arrangement was made exceedingly difficult. Furthermore, the terms of the agreement did not specify what relations should exist between the two protected areas; the Sultan's sovereignty and the territorial integrity of Morocco must be respected and Spain had no intention of looking up to France as the Sultan's principal adviser in questions pertaining to her own sphere

⁴⁵ Tardieu, "France et Espagne," Rev. de Deux Mondes, Dec. 1, 1912.

of influence. Nor could Spain expect to have full sovereignty within her sphere of action while France had only a protectorate in hers.

The French opened their negotiations with Spain early in December, 1911. The principal questions to be settled were: the administration of the Spanish zone, especially regarding the nature and extent of the Sultan's control over this region; the construction and control of the Tangier-Fez railway, a part of which must pass through the Spanish zone; finally, certain rectifications of frontier which would enable both countries to administer their zones with less friction and in a more efficient manner. It is not necessary to go into the long and arduous negotiations which followed. New difficulties constantly arose, the political status of Tangier and the collection of customs in the Spanish zone proving particularly thorny questions. The Poincaré ministry must constantly suffer through the latent suspicion inspired in the Spanish government by the remembrance of the French diplomatic methods as exhibited by M. Caillaux. Not until November 27, 1912, was the treaty finally signed. It was of considerable length and very exact in its details.⁴⁶

The boundary question was settled by certain rectifications of frontier; in return for a portion of the Riff country Spain was given a considerable piece of territory adjoining her colony Rio de Oro on the north. France tried hard to keep one suitable seaport on the northern coast, the Cap de l'Eau in particular, and as Spain had two others, the desire seemed legitimate;

⁴⁶ Text in *Ques. Dip. et Col.*, Dec. 16, 1912; also in *Rev. Pol. et Parl.*, Feb. 1913, and Martens, "Recueil," 3d series, Vol. VII, p. 323.

but Spain refused to make this concession. On the political side, the Sultan maintained his civil and religious authority over all Morocco. However, in the Spanish zone the Sultan's sovereignty was to be exercised by a Khalifa appointed by the Sultan from two candidates named by Spain. France and Spain were to organize the courts, which would thus do away with extraterritoriality jurisdiction. On the economic side, the collection of the customs was the most difficult to adjust; but it was finally arranged that Spain should administer the customs in her zone, but each year should pay over to the Moroccan Government a sum equivalent to the receipts obtained the preceding year in the ports of the Spanish zone. Provision was made for the settlement of the position of Tangier by a special commission, and a protocol provided for the construction of a railway from Tangier to Fez, sixty per cent. of the capital to be subscribed by French interests, forty per cent. by Spain, and nine of the fifteen members of the Council of Administration were to be French.

The chief objection raised to the treaty was that it gave full liberty to the Spaniards without demanding from them corresponding sacrifices; also that it consecrated the principle of the separation of Morocco into two distinct states, each administering affairs in a wholly independent fashion and attempting to maintain artificial frontiers which the tribes would never respect. Finally, France could not forget that Spain with little and no cession of territory, had gained the same control over her sphere of influence as France had gained by the cession of over a hundred thousand

square miles in the Congo, and only after a war scare that might well have developed into a death struggle.

Both the Chamber and the Senate passed the treaty with very little discussion. The Moroccan question, primarily one of colonial policy, had already for too long a time thrust itself forward as the chief stumbling block to the foreign policy of the Quai d'Orsay. After paying Germany an extortionate price, after settling with England at almost her own terms, after even conceding to Italy a free hand in Tripoli as the price of her withdrawal from the field, France could hardly refuse to give a suitable compensation to Spain, who both geographically and historically possessed the most legitimate claims of all. Besides, the two nations still had a difficult task before them; the Moroccan question, within Morocco itself, was far from settled, and a friendly cooperation was the only possible basis of a successful solution. M. Pichon, once more Minister of Foreign Affairs, happily described the situation when the treaty came before the Senate, March 29, 1913: "the satisfactory conclusion of the negotiations have resulted in assuring the collaboration of two governments and two peoples who have already had so many reasons to come to an understanding, and who have henceforth one reason more to unite for the daily practice of a policy destined to guarantee upon the African shore, the security, the well-being, and the prosperity of an empire of the future in which they are henceforth equally interested."⁴⁷

⁴⁷ *Annales de Sénat*, Vol. 83i, p. 484.

CHAPTER XII

TOWARDS THE WORLD WAR

1. THE MINISTRY OF M. POINCARÉ

WITH the downfall of the dangerous Caillaux ministry early in January, 1912, came a strong revulsion of feeling in France against all anti-patriotic, anti-militarist, and defeatist parties and programs. A political house-cleaning was in order, and public opinion demanded that it be thorough. President Fallières invited M. Raymond Poincaré to form the new ministry, and a glance at the names of those who agreed to associate themselves with the new premier will indicate why it was immediately termed *le grand ministère*. With M. Briand as minister of justice, M. Millerand, minister of war, M. Delcassé, minister of marine, and M. Bourgeois, minister of labor, M. Poincaré had a nucleus of men who would rank favorably with any cabinet which has directed the affairs of the Third Republic. M. Poincaré himself was a type of man whom the French admire, a man of keen intellect, highly cultured, a member of the French Academy, of rather distant bearing, and a statesman rather than a politician. The country was weary of socialism and pacifism and was prepared to return to a regime of nationalism. The Poincaré ministry was eminently fitted to furnish the right leadership. England, which had viewed with much misgiving the at-

titude of the Caillaux government, noted the character of the new cabinet with a feeling of keen satisfaction. The "Daily Chronicle" declared that the formation of the Poincaré cabinet was one of the most reassuring manifestations which the history of contemporaneous France had shown.¹

M. Poincaré retained the portfolio of foreign affairs in the new ministry, and his speech to the Chamber was eagerly awaited as an indication of his attitude towards the recent agreement with Germany. His ministerial declaration did not disappoint. "This treaty permits the maintenance between a great neighboring nation and France, in a spirit sincerely pacific, of relations of courtesy and frankness, inspired by the mutual respect of their interests and their dignity. As ever, we intend to remain faithful to our alliances and to our friendships. We shall strive to strengthen them with that perseverance and that continuity which are in diplomatic action the best pledge of uprightness and probity."²

Now that France had a ministry well fitted to deal with any emergency that might arise, she was destined to have a rather uneventful year. The Italians were still waging a desultory contest with Turkey for the possession of Tripoli, and immediately after the new cabinet was installed several minor disputes arose regarding questions of international law. The Italians had seized an aeroplane on its way to Tunis claiming that it was contraband of war; they had also stopped the French steamer *Manouba*, transporting a Turkish

¹ Daily Chronicle, Jan. 15, 1912.

² Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 96i, p. 22.

sanitary commission to Tunis, taken her into port and seized the Turkish subjects. In both cases Italy promptly agreed to allow the Hague tribunal to settle the damages.³ With Austria openly hostile towards her ally's Libyan venture and Germany decidedly antagonistic, Italy could not afford to lose the good will of France.

An event in the year 1912 which should have aroused France far more than it did was the enormous increase in the German budget for both army and navy. France had dared to stand up for her rights at Agadir; Germany immediately decided that her forces needed to be increased.⁴ France did not yet seem to realize the urgent need of protection. The reduction of military service from three years to two, one of the fruits of Combism which had been carefully preserved by Jaurès, Sembat, de Constant and their followers, had placed France with her almost stationary population at a decided disadvantage as compared with Germany.⁵ Yet as one living on the side of a volcano grows accustomed to the constant eruptions of smoke and fire and often forgets the lava beneath, France had become accustomed to the military preparations and rattling of the saber of her neighbor across the Vosges. She failed to realize that nations need insurance as

³ Stowell and Munro, "International Cases," Vol. I, pp. 414, 453.

⁴ A law of 1911 in accordance with Germany's regular plan of increasing her army every six years had made notable increases, but this was followed by the law of May 10, 1912, which brought her effectives to the greatest strength since 1871. See *Le Temps*, May 12, 1912.

⁵ M. Driant speaking in the Chamber, June 18, 1912, pointed out that by Oct. 1, 1912, Germany would have 200,000 more men under arms than France. The two year law gave France 505,000 as opposed to Germany's 705,000. *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 97, p. 535.

well as individuals. Individual economy had made her one of the most wealthy nations of Europe, but national economy on the war and naval budgets was not the best means to guarantee the retention of that position. Fortunately, M. Millerand in his quiet, effective way, was bringing the forces that France possessed to a very high point of efficiency. But he could not remedy the fatal defect that France did not have enough forces.

An incident occurred in connection with the visit which M. Poincaré made to St. Petersburg in August of this year which might well have been recognized as a sinister portent. Both in going and returning he encountered German cruisers at the entrance of the Baltic, and they ostentatiously saluted him. If the French did not see the omen in it, the Germans were willing to interpret it for them. The "Lokal Anzeiger" said on the subject: "The French will be perspicacious enough to see in this salute a warning which should resound in their ears. You see the German fleet at its port in the Baltic. It rules over this sea and is ready for any contingency, in times of peace as in times of war. The Franco-Russian Convention, whether it exists in actuality or whether it is merely a fantasy, will make no change in this state of affairs. We, too, have an important word to say in the world's politics. And now, *bon voyage*." ⁶

Russia, as well as Great Britain, had looked with a satisfied eye upon the apparent change in French policy, and to show that she was prepared to hold up

⁶ Quoted, Debidour, "Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe," (1904-1916), p. 189.

her end in the Triple Entente, she had made a very substantial increase in her naval budget for 1912. The reception of M. Poincaré was rendered even the more cordial, if possible, by the announcement just previous to his arrival of a new naval convention between the two Powers. Apparently all lingering traces of the coolness which had developed after the famous interview of Potsdam between the Czar and the Kaiser in 1910 had completely disappeared.

Upon his return M. Poincaré learned that the peace of Europe was not destined to live out the year. The Balkan cauldron, eternally seething, was about to boil over again. Bulgaria, Serbia, and Greece, disappointed at obtaining no improvement in their condition under the Young Turk regime, and seeing Turkey barely holding her own with Italy, quickly patched up their differences and brought on war before the European Powers could attempt to settle their demands once more at the council board. They were weary of these settlements, which with the Turk meant no settlement at all. The "sick man of Europe," instead of a rejuvenation at the hands of the Young Turks, had, as it appeared, received a *coup de grâce*, and the Balkan states had a definite opinion as to the division of his property. The Turks appreciating the danger of their position, quickly signed the Treaty of Ouchy with Italy conceding to her a free hand in Tripoli. The last of the Barbary states had come under European control, and Italy took her place with France and Spain on the Mediterranean shore of Africa. To eliminate any possibility of future difficulties, Italy signed an agreement of friendly accord with France,

October 28, confirming their agreements of 1902, outlining their mutual spheres of influence in Morocco and Tripoli, and granting to each other the most favored nation clause in all commercial enterprises.⁷

The Balkan situation now held the attention of the Powers, and in a speech made at Nantes, October 27, M. Poincaré expressed the hope that an accord of the great Powers in regard to the conflict in the Balkans would succeed in localizing the conflict and perhaps hasten the conclusion of peace. Incidentally, while again affirming the pacific sentiments of France, he insisted upon the need of a strong and well trained army and a powerful fleet, that they might face calmly any eventuality which might arise.⁸ In November, at the request of Russia, M. Poincaré sounded the Powers regarding an expression of territorial disinterestedness which might eventually serve as a basis for collective action. The plan received a very cold reception at Vienna.⁹ Austria insisted that she desired no territorial aggrandizement through the war, but absolutely refused to be bound by any official agreement. She continued to maintain her harsh attitude towards Serbia by demanding the creation of an autonomous Albania, thus shutting off the Slavic state from an outlet upon the Adriatic.

Nor was this plan of M. Poincaré received with unanimous acclaim at home. The President of the Council had made his proposal of mediation in the

⁷ Martens, "Recueil," 3d Series, Vol. VIII, p. 144.

⁸ Rev. Pol. et Parl., Nov. 1912.

⁹ For an excellent and detailed treatment of the Balkan diplomacy of this period see Larmeroux, "La Politique Extérieure de l'Autriche-Hongrie (1875-1914), Vol. II, pp. 234, et seq.

closest cooperation with Russia and Great Britain; the Balkan states were unanimously grateful to France for taking this stand; and public opinion throughout France approved of the *démarche*; yet in the *Palais Bourbon* there was a strong note of criticism. The politicians could not forget that a presidential election was at hand and that M. Poincaré was the strongest candidate. His proposal of territorial disinterestedness was claimed to be a personal policy to thrust himself forward as an arbiter in the destiny of Europe. "That he failed to prevent the outbreak of war in the Balkans was a personal check. His diplomatic successes are pitilessly changed into failures. And why all this if you please? Simply to weaken the personality of M. Poincaré on the eve of the presidential election."¹⁰ It seems to be one of the greatest weaknesses of democracies that except in periods of crisis or danger, foreign policy is ever subject to the control of the petty politicians who measure its value in relation to the votes of their constituents.

Even secret diplomacy has its advantages at times, and while M. Poincaré was fighting the selfish political interests at home, M. Paul Cambon, ambassador to England, was exchanging identic notes with Sir Edward Grey, the purport of which was to define more accurately the scope of the *Entente Cordiale* in case of attack by a third power. Sir Edward Grey's note in substance declared that if one of the two Governments had reason to fear an unprovoked attack, this Government ought to discuss immediately with the other Government whether they should act together

¹⁰ Cagniard, "Politique Nationale," p. 152.

to prevent the aggression and maintain peace, and to consider measures which they might take in common. If military action were necessary, the plans of the general staffs of each country should be taken into consideration and the Governments would then decide what effect should be given to them. M. Cambon accepted the suggestion *in toto* and replied immediately to this effect.¹¹

An armistice had been signed late in November between Turkey and the Balkan states, and the terms of the peace were to be settled by a conference in London under the auspices of Great Britain. Both Sir Edward Grey and M. Paul Cambon did all in their power to moderate the exorbitant demands of Turkey, and early in January, M. Poincaré telegraphed to the French ambassador proposing European mediation. By a collective note to the Ottoman Government the Great Powers threatened to withdraw all moral and financial support if their advice was not taken.¹² At the same time that the representatives of the Balkan states and Turkey were attempting to arrive at a satisfactory basis of peace, the ambassadors of the Powers signatory of the Treaty of Berlin were engaged in an unofficial reunion at London to obtain the various points of view with the idea of arriving at a satisfactory and permanent solution of the Balkan problem. All finally agreed upon an autonomous Albania which should allow Serbia commercial access to the Adriatic. Austria wished Albania to be as large as possible, and

¹¹ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 103, p. 909, or *British Blue Book* (1914), No. 105, inclosures.

¹² Larmeroux, *op. cit.*, Vol. II, p. 287.

having already mobilized almost three-fourths of her armies, was inclined to be arbitrary. The negotiations were rendered the more difficult by the fact that Austria was so harassed by internal troubles and by her great debt, that she seemed almost willing to settle her domestic troubles by a war abroad. Attempts were made by the German and Austrian press to weaken the friendship of France and Great Britain by recalling the methods of the Caillaux ministry, but M. Poincaré in his speech before the Chamber, December 21, was able to assure the deputies that never had the relations between France and England been closer and more confident. He did not deign to reply to the intriguing politicians who were attempting to weaken their country by a campaign against Great Britain with the underlying purpose of injuring him.¹³ The Chamber received his speech with great applause, and in its editorial the next day the "Journal des Débats" expressed the popular sentiment: "At the moment when the year ends France can render this homage to M. Poincaré, that always in accord with our allies and friends and without giving cause of provocation to any one he has consecrated himself within the limit of human forces to the maintenance of general peace and the grandeur of France."¹⁴

With M. Poincaré as the leading candidate for the presidency in January, 1913, it was not surprising that more than usual interest was manifested. Ordinarily a presidential election in France causes very little excitement. The fact that the chief executive

¹³ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 98ii, p. 1340.

¹⁴ Gauvain, "L'Europe au Jour le Jour," Vol. IV, p. 364.

is elected by parliament rather than by a popular vote, and because of the almost negligible power left in the president's hands by the constitution of 1875, the French presidential election is of far less interest and importance than a presidential campaign in the United States. At the time of this election, however, it was hoped that M. Poincaré might raise the office of President of the Republic into a position of real power and influence. The fear that he might do this very thing lent strength to the Radical opposition, and it seemed willing to go to any lengths to prevent his election. The difference between M. Pams, to whom the Radicals finally threw their support, and whose negative qualities were his sole recommendation for the presidential office, and M. Poincaré, universally conceded to be one of the few great Frenchmen in the political arena of the day, showed to what lengths politics were permitted to take precedence over patriotism. After a bitter struggle M. Poincaré won on the fifth ballot with a substantial majority, and the country weary of the politics of the *arrondissementiers*, as they were called, was well satisfied with the result; although as one of the Poincaré adherents said, "*On ne peut contenter tout le monde—et M. Clemenceau.*"

It was during the presidential campaign, and while the Powers were at a deadlock in London concerning the cession of Adrianople and the final disposal of the islands of the Aegean, that the French legislative assembly showed its utter disregard for truly efficient and patriotic service by forcing the resignation of M. Millerand, one of the ablest ministers of war who had served the Third Republic. The Radicals of the Ex-

trepreneur Left made a violent attack upon him for reinstating Lieutenant Colonel du Paty de Clam, one of the officers who had played a leading rôle in the condemnation of Captain Dreyfus for treason. A purely petty internal issue completely overshadowed the national welfare, though France little realized at this time the need that she had for the services of a Millerand. It was realized across the Rhine, and a French ambassador wrote: "The day that M. Millerand gives up his portfolio of war there will be bonfires in Berlin."

His one year's service, however, had brought about the *reveil de l'armée française*; its progress had been wonderful because its chief had set it a wonderful example. His greatest service was in completely wiping out the misunderstanding which had existed between France and her army ever since the scandal of the Dreyfus trial. His watchword was that an army was an implement of war, and as such should always be on a war footing, and in spite of constant opposition he had practically remade the French army. The whole situation is well stated by Gaston Cagniard:

"When I see the Radicals attacking the Poincaré Cabinet at the very hour when it was making every effort to preserve the delicate balance of European peace, when I hear them disparage the work of military reorganization to which the Minister of War has devoted himself, simply because M. Millerand has resisted inadmissible political interference, I recall an occurrence of forty-five years ago. Marshal Niel was speaking of reorganizing the French army and demanded obligatory military service for all. As he was de-

fending his program in the tribune of the Legislative Assembly, Jules Favre cried to him from his bench: 'Are you going to turn France into a barracks?'

"The Marshal replied with these words: 'Beware lest you turn it into a cemetery.'

"Three years later human hetacombs confirmed the prophecy, and our country paid for its generous illusions with a terrible mutilation."¹⁵

Even though M. Millerand's resignation was a terrible blow to the patriots who felt so keenly the need of national defence, his work was not in vain, and the return to the three years' service which was to come the following year, may be traced back to the affection for their army which he caused to glow once more in the hearts of the French people.

2. THE AWAKENING

A glance across the Rhine was all that was necessary to make France realize the dangerous situation in which she was allowing herself to be placed. Every six years Germany had been increasing her army by at least 20,000 men, and at the conclusion of the Franco-Russian Alliance she had made an increase of 60,000. In 1905 there was an increase of 38,000; an increase of 11,000 in 1911 was followed the very next year by an increase of 29,000 men and 8,000 officers.¹⁶ General Heeringen, minister of war, explaining the law before the Reichstag, April 22, 1912, gave the reasons: "Between last year's law and that of this has been the ex-

¹⁵ "Politique Nationale," p. 196.

¹⁶ For a complete discussion of the German effectives as increased by the laws of 1911 and 1912 see Bourdon, "The German Enigma," Chap. XII.

perience of Agadir, which proved our increases insufficient. . . . We wish to fortify our national defence and above all to acquire a greater rapidity in the preparation of war.”¹⁷ In 1913 the increase of 1912 was doubled, which put approximately 850,000 into actual service to France’s 531,000. After 1913 there was to be an *annual* increase of 63,000 men.¹⁸ For France there was but one solution, and that was the return to the three years’ service.

President Poincaré realized the situation, and in his message to the Chamber, February 20, 1913, he made a powerful plea for preparedness: “Peace is not decreed by the desire of a single power. It is possible for a people to be pacific in an efficacious way only on condition that they be ever prepared for war. A France denuded, exposed by its own fault to challenges or to humiliations, would be France no longer. It would be committing a crime against civilization to allow our country to fall behind in the midst of so many nations developing ceaselessly their military forces. Our army and navy are the most useful auxiliaries of our diplomacy. Let us not recoil before any effort, before any sacrifice to consolidate them and strengthen them.”¹⁹

One of the first official acts of President Poincaré was the appointment of M. Delcassé as ambassador to St. Petersburg. Although he had been Minister of Marine in the Monis, Caillaux, and Poincaré cabinets, M. Delcassé’s forte lay in foreign affairs, and now after almost eight years he was given a post where his

¹⁷ Albin, “D’Agadir à Serajevo,” p. 16.

¹⁸ Ibid., p. 25.

¹⁹ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 99i, p. 601.

ability would have ample expression. Ever since the Potsdam interview in 1910 there had been a slackening of the bonds of the Dual Alliance, and it was felt that no one was better able to strengthen them than M. Delcassé. Although in some circles the appointment was looked upon as an act of bravado, of defiance to Germany, wiser minds saw in it merely a part of M. Poincaré's program to strengthen France.²⁰ "It is not the politician, not the parliamentarian who has been appointed, it is the former minister of foreign affairs, the statesman who for seven years has maintained the alliance in intimate community of sentiments with the Czar and his ministers, who accompanied M. Loubet to St. Petersburg in 1902, who has been there twice as minister, and who has been one of the principal authors of the Anglo-Russian *rapprochement*." ²¹ Facing the enlargement and improvement of the German military machine, and the troubled European situation which furnished an ever ready excuse for its going into action, France had good reason for a program of national defence.

With the resignation of the Poincaré cabinet owing to the elevation of the Prime Minister to the presidency, M. Aristide Briand was asked to form the new ministry. One of the first tasks presented was to determine the best method of increasing the French army to meet the new German program. The Superior

²⁰ Baron Guillaume, the Belgian minister at Paris, commenting on this appointment, wrote: "I believe that M. Poincaré, the Lorrainer, has taken pleasure in asserting from the first day of his high office his strong desire to take a firm stand and to upraise the flag of his country." Belgian Documents (1905-1914) No. 99.

²¹ Gauvain, "L'Europe au Jour le Jour," Vol. V, p. 37.

Council of War discussed the problem early in March and finally came to a unanimous conclusion that the only solution was the immediate return to the three years' service.²² Two days later M. Briand laid before the Chamber the project of a law based on these recommendations. France must be protected whatever the cost. However, the question of electoral reform—the change from the *scrutin d'arrondissement* or election on a small district basis, to the *scrutin de liste* with the department as the unit, combined with a system of proportional representation—still held over from the Poincaré ministry. In attempting to put the law which the Chamber had already adopted through the Senate, the Briand ministry failed to secure a majority and was forced to resign. The German press, which had attributed the reawakened spirit of the French people in their desire to prepare themselves in case of a German attack, to the chauvinistic tendencies of the Government, noted the downfall of the Briand ministry with unconcealed satisfaction. Fortunately for France, the new Barthou cabinet was equally well fitted to carry out the excellent policies of MM. Poincaré and Briand. M. Etienne, who had drawn up the *projet* for the three years' law, retained the portfolio of Minister of War, and M. Pichon once more took charge of the Quai d'Orsay. In his ministerial declaration made before the Chamber, March 25, M. Barthou declared: "The recent increase of the military forces of other peoples imposed upon the preceding cabinet the duty of submitting to you the project of a law raising to three years the duration of

²² Albin, "D'Agadir a Serajevo," p. 45.

service, equal for all. Both this duty and this project we make our own.”²³

It was just at this time that the attention of Europe was once more directed to the Balkan imbroglio. The representatives of the great Powers in London had caught a Tartar in the person of King Nicholas of Montenegro. He was especially set on capturing Scutari and had been besieging it since the beginning of the war. Owing to the bombardment which had damaged her consulate at Scutari, Austria demanded the right for the civil population to withdraw, and the Powers were forced to ratify the demand. Nicholas granted an armistice of fifty hours; but the Turkish general, having received no official order, refused to allow the withdrawal, and the Serbs and Montenegrins resumed the bombardment. Austria was ready to take violent measures, and if Austria went to war it was almost certain to embroil Europe. King Nicholas might have thoroughly enjoyed the situation if the fate of his kingdom had not been hanging by such a slender thread. When finally, the Montenegrins captured Scutari and seemed ready to hold it, Austria insisted upon a naval demonstration. Russia, whose hostility to Austria had been fanned to a fever heat, refused to participate; England and France did not dare allow Austria to go in alone. Fortunately for all concerned, Nicholas himself cut the Gordian knot by withdrawing. The Treaty of London, signed May 30, 1913, arranged the situation temporarily, and Sir Edward Grey felicitated the representatives of the Balkan states in his best diplomatic French upon the happy result. Turkey

²³ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 99ii, p. 1493,

wisely left the Albanian question for Europe to settle.

If the disturbed condition of Europe was not enough to make the French realize that it was time to put their house in order, the series of troublesome incidents on the German frontier ought to have awakened them to action—a frontier which since 1870 has been the Achilles heel of France with the Prussian sword of Damocles ever suspended. In the words of a brilliant French publicist: “England has her empire of the sea, the United States her Monroe Doctrine, and France her Eastern frontier.” On April 3, a Zeppelin landed on French territory at Luneville, and although the French government allowed the occupants to depart after an examination, the German government complained that the French authorities had acted in a suspicious and unfriendly manner. On April 14, three German soldiers from Metz, who were passing the day at Nancy, got into trouble with some students in a wine shop, and were handled rather roughly. It was afterwards proved that the Germans had provoked the quarrel, but Herr von Jagow, speaking in the Reichstag, took the opportunity of painting a vivid picture of French chauvinism. A week later a German military biplane from Darmstadt descended at Arracourt, five miles from the frontier. The aviators claimed that they had lost their way, and were allowed to return. This time M. Jules Cambon called the attention of the German government to the provocative nature of such incidents.²⁴

²⁴ Viallate et Caudel, “La Vie Politique dans les Deux Mondes” (1912–1913), p. 50.

These occurrences might have been accidents, but the French Government had been receiving secret reports from the embassy, the consular service, and other sources in Germany of a more serious nature. In every possible manner the Imperial Government was seeking to arouse patriotic sentiment by revising memories of the victories of 1813.²⁵ The mere rumor that the French were contemplating a return to the three years' military service caused one of the members of the Reichstag to say: "It is a provocation; we shall not allow it." Lieutenant Colonel Serret reported that people were exceedingly angry that France would not allow herself to be outdistanced. This second-rate power had withstood them in 1911 and the Government and the Emperor gave way. "People are determined that such a thing shall never happen again."²⁶ The German press did all in its power to stir up ill-feeling between the two countries, the "Kölnische Zeitung" in its issue of March 10 predicted a war of the *revanche* just as soon as France felt herself able to force it.²⁷ In his speech before the Reichs-

²⁵ Doc. Dip., "La Guerre Européenne" (1914), No. 1.

²⁶ Ibid., Enc. 1.

²⁷ In its much talked of article entitled: "The Enemy of Peace," this newspaper declared: "It would not be difficult for the German Government to justify the necessity of the new law if it should merely draw the country's attention upon the nation whence the peril comes, that is to say France. . . .

"Never have relations with our Western neighbors been so tense as to-day, never has the thought of vengeance shown itself in so undisguised a form, and never has it been so obvious that the Russian Alliance and the friendship of England have been claimed only for the purpose of regaining Alsace-Lorraine.

"Wherever the storm may break, one thing is certain and sure—we shall have to cross swords with France. . . . We must not seek too far for the reasons of the increase of our army . . . we should

tag April 7, Chancellor von Bethman-Hollweg, in order to show the need of the new increase in the army, painted a vivid picture of the Balkan upheaval and the critical state of European peace. He showed that although the relations between Germany and Russia were still friendly the Pan-Slavic movement which Bismarck feared had been strengthened by the victories in the Balkans. Then speaking of the chauvinistic tendencies exhibited by the French he declared:

. . . "Across the Vosges they are eulogizing the French army in comparison with ours. They boast of the superiority of the French artillery, of the advance of French aviation, of the better education of the French soldier. . . . With their ardent temperaments the French have seen in the Turkish defeats of Kirk-Kilisse and Lule-Burgas, German defeats, victories of French instructors over German instructors. Already they count on the support of the Balkan states and on Alsace-Lorraine. In her illusion France has already won the war." ²⁸

Considering the fact that the French increases for their army were not even proposed until Germany had made hers an accomplished fact, this criticism of the German Chancellor directed at French chauvinism seemed far fetched; and considering that it was an official utterance, it was decidedly unfriendly. One searches in vain among French official utterances at this time for the expression of similar sentiments. However, the French Government was receiving secret

plainly point to the West and with outstretched finger indicate where the enemy of peace sits—in France." Quoted Ques. Dip. et Col., April 1, 1913.

²⁸ Ibid., April 16, 1913.

reports of a far more alarming nature concerning the German intentions. One in particular, dated April 2, and received by M. Etienne, minister of war, not only gave in detail the various methods being employed to strengthen the German army as rapidly as possible, but also included a statement of the aims of the Imperial national policy which was extremely enlightening to the French. A few excerpts testify to the real desire of official Germany for peace:

“We must allow the idea to sink into the minds of our people that our armaments are an answer to the armaments and policy of the French.²⁹ We must so manage matters that under the weight of powerful armaments, considerable sacrifices, and strained political relations, an outbreak should be considered as a relief. . . . We must not be anxious about the fate of our colonies. The final result in Europe will settle their position. On the other hand we must stir up trouble in the north of Africa and in Russia. . . . In the next European war it will also be necessary that the small states should be forced to follow us or be subdued. In certain conditions their armies and their strong positions can be rapidly conquered or neutralized; this would probably be the case with Belgium

²⁹ Baron Beyens substantiates this statement as follows: “A password went the round of the newspapers: dates were to be confused, and the French bill was to be represented as earlier than the German. This flagrant lie was blazoned abroad by the whole Press, with the exception of the Socialist organs, as a damning accusation against France. Dr. Schieman in the *Kreuz Zeitung* went so far as to maintain that the three years’ term had been forced upon M. Poincaré by the Czar, during the visit of the President (then Foreign Minister) to St. Petersburg in the previous year. It was the price exacted by Russia for her military aid and for the upkeep of the alliance.” “Germany Before the War,” p. 260.

and Holland. . . . *Our aim must be to take the offensive from the first days. . . .*"³⁰

With such documents in its possession, it is hardly strange that the Barthou government urged the legislators to pass immediately the law for a return to the three years' service. There was violent opposition from both the Radicals and the Socialists. M. Jaurès fought the proposal in the Chamber, and his organ, "L'Humanité," and the anarchistic sheet of M. Gustave Hervé, "La Guerre Sociale," undoubtedly did much to provoke the various manifestations which occurred in the garrisons of Toul, Belfort, Macon, and other towns, when the government wisely decided to keep under colors the class which normally would be freed in the autumn.³¹ M. Caillaux attacked the law savagely at a Radical Socialist banquet. But the most pitiable sight of all was the misguided effort of the pacifist Senator, M. d'Estournelles de Constant, to tame Prussian militarism by international idealism and pacifism.

The National Council of Switzerland had invited the representatives of the parliaments of France and Germany to an interparliamentary conference at Berne "to discuss together upon the neutral soil of the Helvetic Confederation the question of armaments, and to examine by what ways and means it would be possible to bring about a *rapprochement* between France and Germany."³² M. d'Estournelles was very suc-

³⁰ Doc Dip., op. cit., No. 2, enc. II.

³¹ The law of 1905 gave the government this power; see speech of M. Barthou in the Chamber, May 15, 1913. *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 100i, p. 106.

³² Albin, "D'Agadir à Serajevo," p. 50.

cessful at recruiting in France for this meeting, and when the conference opened, May 11, 1913, there were 191 members of the French legislative body present, 167 deputies and 24 senators. M. Bebel apparently had not been so persuasive, as he had succeeded in rounding up only 37 members of the Reichstag. This disparity, however, by no means indicated the difference or relative importance of the representation of the two countries; for it must be remembered that the French delegates were men who held the destinies of France in their hands, while the representatives from the Reichstag had no more power or influence over the Imperial Government, especially in its conduct of foreign affairs, than the humblest burgher of the realm. They were simply members of the official German Debating Society, allowed to discuss and give their opinion on the affairs of the empire, but their opinions had little weight if they conflicted with those of the Bundesrat or the Imperial Chancellor.

The Conference heartily approved Mr. Bryan's proposals for arbitration treaties, demanded that all difficulties which could not be settled by diplomacy be referred to the Hague, and expressed the hope that a *rapprochement* between France and Germany would facilitate an *entente* between the two European groups. M. Vazeille, one of the French Socialist deputies, whose views on internationalism received a very decided setback as a result of his attendance, thus described his impressions: "It was a day of miracles. You saw an assembly conducted in German in which about 150 Frenchmen and 40 Germans participated; you saw the French who are usually considered loquacious make

one speech to the seven or eight made by the Germans; you saw the French Socialists entrusting to M. Ricklin, President of the Alsatian Landtag, the burden of converting William II to disarmament.”³³ Looking backwards their ideal might be paraphrased: “*L’utopie est le rêve d’aujourd’hui et le cauchemar de demain.*”

France, at last aroused, determined to prepare, and the only feasible, sane, or even possible way, was to go back to the three years’ military service. The law came before the Chamber on June 2, and on the very first day the discussion became so bitter that General Pau threatened to leave the Chamber. M. Chautemps proved that a sudden attack against France by Germany was impossible; ³⁴ M. Thalamas, who was to gain everlasting opprobrium in connection with the Caillaux Affair, declared that France might as well not try—she could never hope to rival Germany in point of numbers; ³⁵ when he saw the current had set against anti-militarism, M. Jaurès was ready with a counter-proposal—to substitute a militia for an army.³⁶ The law was brilliantly defended by MM. Reinach, Lefèvre, and Benoist, and on June 26, M. Barthou intervened and made a stirring speech to the Chamber, urging them to forget politics and think of national duty—the time demanded it.³⁷ After almost a month of acrimonious debate, the measure passed the Chamber, July 19, by a vote of 358 to 204, and M. Caillaux had the doubtful honor of delivering the last attack.³⁸ The Senate

³³ Debidour, “Histoire Diplomatique de l’Europe” (1904–1916), p. 218.

³⁴ Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 100i, p. 427.

³⁵ Ibid., p. 466.

³⁶ Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 100i, p. 836.

³⁷ Ibid., p. 1139.

³⁸ Ibid., Vol. 100ii, p. 1859.

was more awake to the situation; and although M. d'Estournelles proclaimed his confidence in the pacific solution of all international difficulties,³⁹ the law passed on August 7, after about a week's discussion, by a vote of 254 to 37.⁴⁰

In the summer of 1913 the attention of Europe was turned once more to the Balkans, where the autonomous Albania and the sharing of Macedonia had taxed the rivalries too greatly. Bulgaria, drunk with the pride of conquest and confident of her ability to defeat all rivals, suddenly attacked her erstwhile allies. She soon found the armies of the Greeks and the Serbs far different from those of the Turks, and when Roumania also came in against her she was forced to sue for peace. Turkey, now seeing an opportunity for a share in the booty which she had lost, seized Adrianople. The Powers once more intervened. Russia seemed willing that Bulgaria should retain Kavala, but France sustained the claims of Greece; Austria again showed herself hostile towards Serbia and insisted upon the continuation of an autonomous Albania. The Treaty of Bucharest, signed August 10, satisfied nobody. Bulgaria, stripped of her former gains, nursed a bitter resentment which needed only the slightest opportunity to arouse her to a new struggle. Austria had gone so far as to propose action against Serbia and asked the assistance of Italy, but the latter, declaring that a *casus foederis* could not be

³⁹ *Annales du Sénat*, Vol. 83ii, p. 1560.

⁴⁰ The law provided that every Frenchman physically able must serve in the active army 3 years and in the reserve 11 years, or in the territorial army 7 years and in the territorial reserve 7 years. He enters the service at the age of 20.

established, refused.⁴¹ It is very probable that Germany, who was not yet fully prepared, also refused to sustain Austria at this time.⁴² Again in October Austria attempted to force the issue by a virtual ultimatum to Serbia, demanding the withdrawal of her troops from the Albanian frontier, and once more peace was purchased at the price of Serbian submission.

With the end of the second Balkan war the international situation became somewhat less strained, but the tension in the relations between France and Germany was but slightly relaxed. An incident which occurred towards the close of 1913 in the little Alsatian town of Saverne aroused public sentiment in France to the highest pitch, and proved that although the spirit of the *revanche* had died down, so long as Prussian methods were employed in the lost provinces, the wrong could not be forgotten. It also showed how the militarist element in Germany was gaining in strength, how futile were the efforts of the Reichstag to combat it, and how utterly impotent that body was when it came into direct opposition to the military party.

A young German lieutenant, Baron von Forstner, quartered at Saverne, angered at the covert hostility shown by the Alsatian population, thus expressed himself to his soldiers: "If you should be attacked by one of the Alsatian dogs (*wackes*) I hope you will not hesitate to cut open his hide. I myself will give you ten marks for every one that you stick."⁴³ When his

⁴¹ M. Giolitti brought this affair to light in his declarations before the Italian Chamber Dec. 5, 1914. For the text see Larmeroux, "Pol. Extér. de l'Autriche-Hongrie," Vol. II, p. 372.

⁴² Headlam, "History of Twelve Days," p. 5.

⁴³ Le Temps, Nov. 10, 1913.

statement was noised abroad, he was hooted at in the streets and did not dare to go about unattended. On one occasion when a crowd had congregated, his superior officer, Colonel von Reuter, ordered the soldiers to arrest everyone they found in the streets, and among those arrested were several German judges coming from a court session. On another occasion von Forstner struck with his sword a lame shoemaker who, he claimed, had threatened him. The inquest showed that the man was unarmed and was held by two German soldiers when he threatened the German officer. For once the Reichstag was aroused and demanded punishment. When the Chancellor refused, a vote of censure was passed by a majority of more than two hundred. In direct defiance of their attitude, the lieutenant who had been given forty-three days in prison for wanton attack on the shoemaker, was acquitted on appeal, and Colonel von Reuter, who had upheld his actions, was not only absolved from blame but received a personal letter of commendation from the Crown Prince.⁴⁴

A final example showing the change in the attitude of the Kaiser himself, who as an ardent lover of peace had for his valiant efforts in that direction been awarded the Nobel Peace Prize, is given in a despatch from M. Jules Cambon to M. Stephen Pichon, minister for foreign affairs, November 22, 1913. In a conversation between King Albert of Belgium and the Kaiser, King Albert was greatly surprised to learn that Emperor William had come to believe that war with

⁴⁴ *Le Temps*, Nov. 30, Dec. 23, 1913. See also Hazen, "Alsace-Lorraine Under German Rule."

France was inevitable, and in such a contingency the Kaiser intimated that King Albert would do well to remember that he was a Colburg. King Albert's reply does him credit: "I shall remember above all that I am a Belgian." "What would you do," the Kaiser then asked, "if my troops should enter Belgium?" The reply again was straightforward, "I should do my duty."⁴⁵

All indications pointed the same way. Europe was not large enough for an awakened, patriotic France, who would not be browbeaten with impunity, and a powerful, imperialistic Germany, whose needs were outstripping her resources, and who felt that she had the strength to obtain what she wanted. In Germany's eyes, France had ceased to be a world power, and if she did n't realize the fact it was time that Germany brought it home to her. An Austrian diplomat speaking to Prince Lichnowsky, aptly summed up the situation: "Whenever the French begin to forget about *revanche*, you always remind them of it with a jackboot."⁴⁶

3. RADICALISM VS. PATRIOTISM.

Now that the three years' service law had been passed and the crying need for the reorganization of the army in accordance with the new regime shown in so many ways, one might have supposed that the Barthou Cabinet, which had supported the change and was striving valiantly to put it into effect, would be retained. But the two deadly influences in French

⁴⁵ Doc. Dip., op. cit., No. 6; Debidour, "Histoire Diplomatique de l'Europe" (1904-1916), p. 227.

⁴⁶ Lichnowsky, "My Mission to London," 1911-1914, p. 2.

politics now combined—M. Jaurès, “who divided Parliament in front of the foreigner,” and M. Caillaux, “who almost wrecked French foreign policy,”—and caused the downfall of the Barthou ministry upon a question of taxation to increase the budget for national defence. The editorial in the “Temps” well expressed the feeling in the capital: “Yesterday will count among the most deplorable and most nefarious that we have known; they could not overthrow the Barthou ministry while it was endowing France with a stronger army, but they have caused its downfall while it was defending with a noble ardor and an admirable courage our national credit.”⁴⁷

The vote was not in reality upon a financial question, but an insidious revenge against those who were supporting the law of national dignity and defence. The headlines of “L’Humanité” clearly indicated the real issue: *La Chute du ministère des trois ans*. More illuminating than a complete perusal of the “Journal Officiel” was the cry of the Socialist, M. Vaillant, at the fall of the ministry: “*A bas les trois ans.*”

President Poincaré first called upon M. Ribot to form a ministry, and then upon M. Dupuy, but both failed owing to strong Radical opposition. Being forced to go to the Radicals, he asked M. Doumergue, the Radical-Socialist, who succeeded in forming a ministry December 8. The new premier took the portfolio of Foreign Affairs; M. Caillaux that of Finance; M. Moulens, that of War; and M. Monis, that of Navy. It was suggested by M. Viviani that M. Pichon be retained as Minister of Foreign Affairs, as he had both

⁴⁷ Le Temps, Dec. 4, 1913.

experience and ability, but M. Caillaux could not forget M. Pichon's speech in the Senate after the crisis of Agadir, and M. Caillaux was the predominating influence in the new cabinet. M. Raymond Recouly pertinently remarked that it might be possible to live under such constant changes of government in an isolated planet or a separate continent, but not in the Europe of to-day.⁴⁸

M. Doumergue, in his speech to the Chamber, promised that as the three years' service had been voted, it would be loyally applied.⁴⁹ Considering that his party had always disapproved of the law, regarding it as a purely provisional measure, and intended to make it an issue in the coming elections, it was difficult to see how a loyal application was possible. M. Briand in his speech at St. Etienne, which was widely commented upon, declared that among the very people who fought against the law, were the majority of those whose politics were responsible for it.

However, to prove that all thought of "peace on earth and good will toward men" had not disappeared, M. d'Estournelles de Constant came out in the Christmas number of the "Frankfort Gazette," declaring that

⁴⁸ Rev. Pol. et Parl., Jan. 1914, p. 154. Commandant de Thomasson, editor of Questions Diplomatique et Coloniales, was more outspoken in his condemnation: "One would say that our fatal parliamentarians always choose the moment when the international situation is particularly troubled to overturn ministries. To-day the Barthou ministry, the fifty-fourth that the Third Republic, more famished than Saturn, has devoured in forty-three years, falls when we are engaged in difficult negotiations with Germany and Italy, when Turkish affairs must be followed with more attention than ever, and when the incidents of Alsace-Lorraine give evidence of a danger that the blind alone do not see." Ques. Dip. et Col., Dec. 16, 1913.

⁴⁹ Annales de la Chambre, Vol. 101, p. 696.

while two former presidents of France, M. Loubet and M. Fallières had each in his turn been named "le père de la paix," M. Poincaré passed in Germany for a partisan of the *revanche*, a dictator, the creator of poincarism, more enlightened but more dangerous than boulangism. He explained this fact by pointing out that M. Poincaré, being a native of Lorraine, and a neighbor of the frontier, could not help urging France to be on guard. But M. Poincaré was too intelligent not to know that the *revanche*, even if victorious, was a leap in the dark for all concerned. In conclusion he declared that his formula had long been—"ni *revanche* ni *oubli*," and M. Poincaré might well adopt it.⁵⁰

At the beginning of the year 1914 two influences were becoming more and more evident, the one tending to weaken the Entente, the other to strengthen the Triplice. Although it was the treacherous calm which precedes the storm, very few of the officials of the foreign offices or publicists in the nations of the *Entente* seemed to recognize the fact, and a dangerous weakening of the rather lax bands of the *Entente* provoked little uneasiness. Russia, offended at the quiescent attitude of France and England over the German military mission to Turkey seemed disinclined to back up her allies in the Albanian question or on the return of the Aegean islands. France found that her relations with Italy were less friendly because of her support of Greece in the question of the Aegean islands. Nor had Greece seemed over grateful. King Constantine, while visiting in Berlin in the fall of 1913, declared that the victories of the Greek army were to a

⁵⁰ Le Temps, Dec. 22, 1913.

great extent due to the excellent training which the King and his officers had received in Germany.

On the other hand Lloyd George declared that Anglo-German relations were never better and the Liberal party must put a limit to the "organized insanity of armaments." Lord Haldane had been sent over in 1912 at the request of the Imperial Government to discuss a closer relation between Great Britain and Germany. When, however, he proposed a mutual reduction of the naval budgets he was met by a counter proposal of absolute neutrality in case either power became engaged in war with a third party. The proposition was so drawn as to nullify Great Britain's agreement with France and Russia while it in no way affected the treaties of the Triple Alliance. Although an agreement in this form was impossible, throughout the following year and a half, a *rapprochement* was a leading topic of discussion in both Chancellories.⁵¹

The internal affairs of both France and Great Britain were anything but favorable to a successful foreign policy. The Home Rule question in Great Britain was rapidly approaching a crisis, which might even lead to civil war. The Ulsterites openly declared themselves ready to resist the Bill by armed force if necessary, and they were preparing themselves so that their resistance would not be futile. France was wholly engrossed in the strenuous debates on the income tax, for although the Prime Minister, M. Doumergue, was the Minister of Foreign Affairs, everyone knew that

⁵¹ For an account of the Haldane missions from an English point of view see Harold Begbie, "The Vindication of Great Britain," Chap. III; for the German viewpoint, see von Reventlow, "Deutschland's Auswärtige Politik," 3d ed.

he was merely the presiding officer, and M. Caillaux, Minister of Finances, was the actual director of the cabinet. And so long as M. Caillaux was the real power in France, a loyal application of the three years' service law or any other protective measures against Germany were not to be hoped for.⁵² Well might it be declared that the *Triple Entente*, "this magnificent instrument of diplomatic action, presented a veritable appearance of ataxia."⁵³

On January 25, 1914, the "Echo de Paris" appeared with the sensational report that the great Russian foundry, Poutiloff, which manufactured heavy ordnance in accordance with designs and plans from the Creusot factories of France, had arranged with the bankers of the Krupp establishments for a loan of twenty million roubles. Such a report galvanized into action even the Doumergue-Caillaux cabinet. It soon developed that the Russian Government knew no more about the affair than did the French, and the officials of the two governments were uncomfortably busy during the next few days. Finally, on March 19, M. Doumergue attempted to explain the whole affair to the Chamber. The Poutiloff plant was in urgent need of a loan for new equipment, and a representative of the Creusot establishment was conducting the negotia-

⁵² Baron Guillaume, the Belgian ambassador, wrote his government as follows: "M. Caillaux, who is the real Prime Minister, is known for his sentiments in favor of a rapprochement with Germany. . . . This statesman may be dangerous for the finances of the country; he may cause divisions which are unhealthy and regrettable for the internal policy of France, but I consider that his stay in power will diminish the acuteness of international rivalries and will furnish a better basis for the relations between France and Germany." Belgian Doc. (1905-1914), No. 110.

⁵³ *Le Temps*, May 1, 1914.

tions at St. Petersburg when he was suddenly recalled by the death of his mother. In his absence the Krupp bankers made an offer in a private capacity. Both Creusot and M. Doumergue had been notified (his negotiation had come two days after the article had appeared in the press and then not through official channels), and upon receipt of a communication from the Quai d'Orsay, the Russian Government had stepped in and had so arranged the situation that the French need fear no further competition of this kind on the part of German bankers. The newspapers delved a little more deeply and brought to light the fact that the director of the Poutiloff establishment and practically the whole governing personnel were Germans—a new phrase of pacific penetration.⁵⁴

The other influence becoming more and more evident was the chauvinistic campaign against both France and Russia waged by the German press. To furnish additional material the various organizations of the militarist party, the Military League, the Naval League, and the Pan-German Association, sent generals and admirals through the German states to arouse the people to the necessity for more heavy military and naval expenditures, that they might be better prepared for the war which was sure to come. The return to the three years' service in France was constantly brought forward to prove that France was preparing for the *revanche*, and if Germany realized that war was necessary, it would be foolhardy not to strike before the new regime could be put into smooth operation, and before

⁵⁴ Cf. version given in Ques. Dip. et Col., Feb. 16, 1914, with the speeches of M. Thomas and M. Doumergue in the Chamber, March 19. *Annales*, Vol. 102iii, p. 2039 ff.

the extra equipment could be procured. At the same time that the newspapers tried to arouse the German people to the chauvinistic attitude of the French, they attempted to disparage the possible effect of the law. With Jaurès and Augagneur to attack openly, with Caillaux to undermine secretly, and with the Radical Socialists in power, an easy German victory was assured. As the "Lokal Anzeiger" declared:

"The spontaneous, the heroic movement which caused the adoption of the three years' law was in reality mere words. Doubtless the majority of the deputies believed in it at the time, but to-day more than one deputy has forgotten his own language. It's a question for each one of being re-elected before anything else—it's a beautiful subject, politics." ⁵⁵

The French Foreign Legion seemed to be the object of particular hatred, and the attacks directed against it were most venomous. A League against the Foreign Legion was formed and at a great meeting in Berlin both the war and navy departments were officially represented. A pantomime was given, called "Die Wacht am Rhein" in which the effigy of a French uniformed soldier was shot by German sentries, and it was known to the audience that the actors were in reality soldiers of the German army. The scandal was so great that the matter was brought up in the Reichstag; but no action was taken. ⁵⁶

Certain Frenchmen were not blind to the seriousness of the situation, but they were voices crying in the wilderness. The Commandant de Thomasson, editor

⁵⁵ Quoted by *Le Temps*, Feb. 26, 1914.

⁵⁶ *Le Temps*, May 1, 1914.

of one of the sanest and best informed periodicals devoted to politics in Europe, insistently called the attention of his readers to the feverish condition of Germany, and the dangerous influence which it was exerting on the peace of Europe.⁵⁷ President Poincaré preached preparedness upon all occasions, but unfortunately, now that he held the first office in the Republic, his words lacked the force which they had when he was prime minister. M. André Chéradame and M. Victor Bérard had long been striving valiantly to show the danger of the Pan-German scheme especially in its relation to Turkey and the Bagdad Railway. Now after many years of earnest effort to preserve French interests in Asia Minor, they saw the complete annihilation of their hopes in the Franco-German arrangement of February 15, 1914. The Doumergue-Caillaux government had made one more vain concession to satisfy the insatiable *Welt-politik* of their jealous neighbors. For the right to construct public works and to control the railways and ports of Syria and Northern Anatolia, a right which had to be purchased again from the Turkish Government by a loan of eight hundred million francs, France gave up all her interests in the Bagdad Railway and allowed her other three railways in Asia Minor to be completely isolated.⁵⁸

⁵⁷ See especially his excellent editorial on the currents of public opinion in Germany and his deductions from them in *Ques. Dip. et Col.*, Feb. 1, 1914.

⁵⁸ *Le Temps*, Feb. 17, April 12; see also Guyot, "Causes and Consequences of the War," p. 177. Baron Beyens writing from Berlin to the Belgian Minister of Foreign Affairs had this to say of the situation: "Doubtless France has been excluded for all time from the great enterprise of the Bagdad Railway, the principal line which will traverse

The unfortunate feature of this policy of peace at any price was its utter futility; it was positively pernicious in its tendency to inspire false hopes of security. Never did a nation give clearer evidences of its desire to live at peace with its neighbors than did France in the early months of 1914. She was so willing to live and let live that she unwisely attributed the same kindly sentiments to the rest of Europe. M. Doumergue in his speech on French foreign relations made in the Chamber March 10, 1914, showed clearly this naïve confidence: "We cannot close our eyes to this reality that everywhere a desire and need for peace is shown, and we can well hope that this common desire of eliminating the causes of conflicts will end by prevailing over the elements of disorder. France had proved her sincere desire for peace—she nourishes no hidden designs—she needs peace to accomplish her social and economic reforms. . . ." ⁵⁹ In a world uninhabited by nations seeking a place in the sun, where economic and racial rivalries did not exist, his ideal might have proved a valuable foreign policy, but not in Europe in the year of our Lord, 1914.

The Caillaux controlled ministry from its very inception had been much criticised in the press, but M. Gaston Calmette of the "Figaro" now began to assail M. Caillaux in a continuous campaign of carefully documented and utterly damning evidences of political turpitude, with the avowed intention of forcing his resignation. When he gave conclusive evidence that

Asia Minor draining it of its products. But as you know the fault is due to the short-sighted diplomacy of the Quai d'Orsay. . . ." Belgian Doc., No. 111.

⁵⁹ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 102ii, p. 1679.

M. Caillaux had used his official position to put off the trial of a swindler, Rochette, against whom there was a complete case, the question was brought up in the Chamber, and both M. Doumergue and M. Jaurès were hard pressed to defend their colleague. When M. Calmette promised even more sensational disclosures Mme. Caillaux went to the editorial rooms of the "Figaro" and shot down the editor in cold blood. Not even the affair of Madame Stendhal had aroused such intense interest in the capital. M. Caillaux was forced to resign immediately and a commission of investigation was appointed to go to the bottom of the whole affair and report its findings. The English newspapers deplored the affair but were very guarded in their comments. The German press seemed much perturbed lest M. Caillaux might lose his influence and completely disappear from the political arena at this most inopportune time, with the elections almost at hand and the fate of the proper enforcement of the three years' service law dependent upon them.

The report of the investigating commission proved the truth of M. Calmète's allegations, but when it came to adopting the report, the Chamber had one of the stormiest scenes in its history. The order of the day which was finally passed showed that the influence of Caillaux was almost as strong as ever. Instead of a stinging rebuke, the order simply declared that the Chamber taking note of the report of the investigating committee reproved the abusive interventions of finance into politics and politics into the administration of justice. To some of the most eminent men in the Chamber such action was a mere travesty of justice.

M. Briand deplored the conditions of parliamentary practice which had so degraded French public life, and M. Maurice Barrès declared that only a ministerial operation could cure the *pourriture parlementaire*.⁶⁰ One of the inexplicable phases of the whole situation was the fact that when M. Caillaux decided to stand once more before his constituents of Mamers, upon a record which had been the gossip of every nook and cranny in Europe, he was reelected. Well might a leading French publicist write: "It is especially these detestable internal politics forever brewing in France, England and Russia which tempts Germany to be arrogant." ⁶¹

The French had barely time to complete their governmental housecleaning before eminent guests were upon them in the persons of the King and Queen of England. The occasion was the tenth anniversary of the *Entente Cordiale*, and a retrospective glance at the results tended to increase its popularity. France, with her exposed frontier, well realized that her safety was bound up with the *Entente*. The remembrance of England's backing at Algeciras, Casablanca, and Agadir was still fresh. But with the phenomenal increase of the German fleet, England, too, had cause to be thankful that she no longer stood isolated on her sea-girt isle; she, too, could remember the aid of France both in forming and preserving the accord with Russia. She felt that as the Italian and Austrian fleets were increased in the Meriterranean, an even closer agreement might be advantageous. Great Britain might

⁶⁰ *Annales de la Chambre*, Vol. 102ii, p. 2646, et seq.

⁶¹ *De Thomasson, Ques. Dip. et Col.*, June 1, 1914.

soon need the larger part of her fleet in the North Sea if the Kaiser continued to think that Germany's future lay upon the ocean.

The wild enthusiasm displayed in Paris at the arrival of the sovereigns was unique, even in that foyer of excitement. As they drove into the city under the *Arc de Triomphe*, and passed down the *Champs Elysées*, they found almost the entire population waiting to bid them welcome. The warmth of the reception, and the marked friendliness and desire to please shown by the whole nation must have warmed the heart of Queen Mary herself. The German press did not allow the event to pass without a few covert sneers. The "Kölnische Zeitung" thus expressed the German sentiment: "We hardly expected that the toasts would be so insignificant, composed of such stereotyped banalities upon the pacific influence of the *Entente Cordiale*. This insignificance is the more surprising after the floods of ink spilt in the recent press campaign favoring a strengthening of the alliance. We may say like Cholchas in 'la Belle Hélène': '*Des fleurs, rien que les fleurs,*' and yet we must add that they are faded flowers which have served already many times before." ⁶²

The Kaiser could comfort himself with the knowledge that the internal policy of a state always reacts powerfully upon its foreign policy. While he held the internal policy of Germany in his mailed fist, both France and Great Britain were struggling in the throes of domestic ailments which were bound to weaken them to his advantage. In fact the interest in the spring elections in France was so great that even the Caillaux

⁶² Quoted by *Le Temps*, Apr. 24, 1914.

affair had lost its hold on the public. Three mooted questions were to be decided: the maintenance of the three years' service law, electoral reform, and the income tax. When the results were in, no one was entirely satisfied; the three years' law had a slight majority, the electoral reform a substantial majority, while the deputies were about evenly divided on the income tax. "The only inference that could be drawn from the election of 1914 was that under the present electoral system, Radical prefects, guided by a Radical cabinet, were seen to return a Radical majority."⁶³

The Radicals were clearly in the majority and the Socialists had increased their number. The Caillaux-Jaurès *bloc* was still powerful, but hardly strong enough to prevent the application of the three years' service law. The opinion of Great Britain and Russia as shown in the press was that France was playing with fire, and that it was a dangerous game. The German press seemed confident that from a financial and political standpoint a return to the service of two years was essential. President Poincaré, in a speech at Rennes, on the last day of May, declared that France must have a large army well prepared, or be exposed to accept foreign domination. There was no middle ground.⁶⁴

But before the Chamber could finally settle down to sane and patriotic service it had to give a final exhibition of ridiculous and criminal perversity. At the resignation of M. Doumergue, President Poincaré called upon M. Viviani to form a cabinet. But at the

⁶³ Dimmet, "France Herself Again," p. 167.

⁶⁴ *Le Temps*, June 1, 1914.

first meeting the Radical-Socialist element protested so strongly against the maintenance of the three years' service law which he insisted upon putting in his program, that he gave up the attempt. MM. Deschanel, Delcassé, Dupuy, and Petral refused to try. M. Ribot finally formed a cabinet, but the hostility of the Chamber was evident and the very first vote of confidence was lost. The German press openly exulted at the situation, predicting an utter failure of the three years' law. The Paris press bombarded the deputies with denunciation and satire. It finally seemed to seep into the minds of these representatives of France that they were losing both the confidence and respect of their allies and were playing directly into Germany's hands. When M. Viviani was again called in he had little difficulty in forming the cabinet or in carrying through his plan for the loan and income tax, and giving a loyal application to the three years' service law.

Fortunate it was that a realization of the situation had at last come, for events which were to involve all Europe in their train were shaping themselves with increasing rapidity. While Sazanoff was declaring to the Douma that "the *Triple Entente* is entirely free from any spirit of aggression, and its end is solely to contribute to the conservation of the European balance of power and is always ready to cooperate with the Triple Alliance to preserve peace," the Kaiser was preparing to open the Kiel Canal, enlarged for the passage of his largest cruisers,—the final event which completed his preparations for *der Tag*. Less than a week later the murder of Archduke Ferdinand raised the curtain on the bloody drama for which the whole world has be-

come the stage. The drama is not yet played out. To satisfy the imperialistic ambitions of a Caesar and the vainglorious dreams of a deluded people, whole nations have had their Calvary, and a century will hardly suffice to heal the wounds of a stricken world.

4. CONCLUSION

With the crime at Serajevo a new period of French foreign policy began—a period in which the nations of Europe seemed to lose their individual liberty and become mere pawns on the chess-board of Fate. Drawn up in two great armed camps, the time to play for world dominion had come, and Germany intended that the game should be played through to the end. France did not want war; she was willing to make almost any sacrifice to avert it. Great Britain desired peace and was ready to do all in her power to maintain it. But in a balance of power one group is helpless to maintain the equilibrium. The foreign ministers of the nations desirous of peace had become mere puppets, forced to perform in the dance of death when the Kaiser pulled the strings. French diplomacy was an integral part of the diplomacy of the *Entente*, and the diplomacy of the *Entente* could but react to the diplomacy of the Triple Alliance. Therefore in attempting to form any conclusions upon the subject of contemporaneous French foreign policy, it seems more essential to consider the vital period preceding the assassination of Duke Ferdinand when the policy of France was clearly distinctive, than the period when the Third Republic was striving courageously but vainly in conjunction with her allies to avert the struggle which Germany was determined to

precipitate. It is this period, extending from the entrance of M. Delcassé at the Quai d'Orsay in June, 1898, when the new orientation of French foreign policy in the direction of Great Britain began, up to the murder of the Austrian Archduke in June, 1914, when the result of this policy was the immediate and effective support of France by Great Britain and Russia, enabling her to stem the onrush of the Teuton host and to emerge finally victorious, which we have attempted to portray.

France undoubtedly owes her present paramount position in Europe, as established by the Treaty of Versailles, in a great measure to the strong friendships which she made and retained in the decade immediately preceding the Great War, and to that extent her foreign policy may be regarded as brilliantly successful. On the other hand it must be conceded that this result was obtained in spite of the wishes of many representative French politicians rather than by the consistent efforts of a united majority. The two greatest faults of French foreign policy seem to be the inability of the French Foreign Office to divorce itself from the influence of purely domestic questions, and the complete impotence of the President in matters of foreign policy, although his position is particularly suited to exercise a beneficial influence in matter of diplomacy and foreign relations. As an instance of the first, we need only recall the unfortunate influence which the controversies over the relations of the church and the state have had on the foreign policy of France; a striking example of the second, was the unimportant part which President Poincaré was forced to play in the greatest crisis of French history.

But in contrast with these weaknesses it must be noted that the Third Republic has for the most part been very careful in the choice of her ministers of foreign affairs. With such statesmen as Hanotaux, Delcassé, Bourgeois, Poincaré and Pichon in charge of the Quai d'Orsay, it is not surprising that results have been extremely satisfactory. Furthermore, although it seems as though Frenchmen will not unite under the flag until it is threatened, when a realization of the menace comes, factional interests are forgotten and all parties and groups unite unreservedly in a *union sacrée*. But for all its apparent inconsistencies and instability French foreign policy is like the French Government—"plus ça change plus c'est la même chose"—it is rooted in right and faces the stars, often an opportunist on the surface it is ever a knight errant in its soul, and ultimately proves itself worthy of *la France éternelle*.

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
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
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