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FROM DEREGULATION TO DECENTERING IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF «Lusofonia»

Armando Marques Guedes

amarquesguedes@gmail.com

Armando Marques Guedes is Associate Professor with Aggregation at the Law Faculty of Universidade Nova de Lisboa (New University of Lisbon). He studied Public Administration and Social Anthropology at the Higher Institute of Social and Political Sciences (ISCSP, in Lisbon) at the London School of Economics and Political Science (LSE, in London), at the École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales (EHESS, in Paris), and at the Faculty of Social Sciences and Humanities of the Nova University of Lisbon (FCSH), where he obtained his doctorate in Social and Cultural Anthropology. He became Aggregate Professor at the Faculty of Law of the Nova University of Lisbon (FDUNL). He is also Guest Professor at the Portuguese Joint Command and Staff College (IESM) and at the Higher Institute of Police Sciences and Home Security (ISCPSP, in Lisbon), as well as Professor *Honoris Causa* at the University of Bucharest, Romania. He was President of the Diplomatic Institute and policy planning director at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. He has published sixteen books and over ninety articles in areas ranging from African political and legal studies to geopolitics, studies on diplomacy and foreign policy, and on terrorism. He has delivered lectures and organized courses in forty one countries, and his work has been translated into ten languages and published in thirteen countries.

Abstract

The paper shall rest on the geopolitics of the evolving security situation in the southern reaches of the Atlantic, and what this means for Portuguese and Lusophone interests. It will focus, mainly, on the growing threats the region faces and the risks of a rapid degradation which could result from the simultaneous ever louder affirmation of both regional and extra-regional players (State and non-State ones) and the glaring absence of an overarching security architecture there. Brazil, Argentina, Venezuela, South Africa, Angola and Nigeria (to take a few obvious examples) have to contend with a growing US, Russian, and Chinese presence in the area, a presence with an ever-increasing clout economic, political, and military.

Geostrategically, the region is subdivided into four sub-regions, as concerns these enhanced tensions, each raising thorny issues of its own. Special attention is given to Brazilian, Cape Verdian and Angolan interests and responses to this, and on the role Portuguese foreign policy has been playing in the developing and emergent regional tensions, potential and actual. The role of multilateral organization and coalitions, and the various degrees of formality of objectives they display, is also touched upon, albeit only lightly. More than simply on hard economic, political, and military data, the analysis endeavours to take stock of the discursive dimension of threats and tensions in the four sub-regions identified in the South Atlantic.

Keywords

South Atlantic; Lusofonia; security architecture; threat-perception and securitization; risk; geopolitics

How to cite this article

Marques Guedes, Armando (2012). "From deregulation to decentering in the South Atlantic and the construction of «Lusofonia»". *JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2012. Accessed [online] on (date of last viewing), observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol3_n1_art1

Article received on February 2012 and accepted for publication on March 2012



FROM DEREGULATION TO DECENTERING IN THE SOUTH ATLANTIC AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF «Lusofonia»

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Immersed in relative darkness for millennia, the South Atlantic has more recently undergone fluctuations in its centrality¹. Let us focus just on the last half of the millennium, given that it was only in this interval that the basin became more than just a local entity. The South Atlantic gained importance as a sea route with Vasco da Gama's discovery of the maritime route to India in the late fifteenth century – a feat, since “despite increasing the distance, it reduced the number of intermediaries and freight costs, enabling bringing the spice business to Portugal and taking it away from Venetian and Arab merchants”². When Portugal and Spain were replaced by England and Holland as maritime powers, the importance of the South Atlantic did not diminish: even the tea and the cotton routes on clippers from Asia and Australasia, benefiting from the roaring forties, until the late nineteenth century went through Cape Horn and crossed the Atlantic on the way to Europe”³. Once it became recognized, from the sixteenth century onwards the overall political and economic importance of the South Atlantic grew gradually, despite constant advances and retreats; it was non-linear. After the demise of the Portuguese and Spanish golden ages, the southern basin of the large ocean lost some of its importance, as attested by the fact that, in his second exile following Waterloo, Napoleon was not sent to an Elba-type location, where he may have made a sudden comeback, but to Santa Helena, in the back of beyond. Referring to this progression is a useful exercise, as its rising importance only started to wane after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, and later, in 1914, of the Panama Canal – events which, understandably, led to a huge concentration of maritime trade in the Mediterranean and North Atlantic, respectively.

So, on the late eighteenth century, the former core position of the South Atlantic seemed to slow down. Still, the importance of the southern seas increased again in the mid-fifties of the twentieth century as a result of the nationalization of the Suez Canal in 1956 by Egypt's newly appointed President Gamal Abdel Nasser, with all the implications that stemmed from it, namely” the search for newer and safer oil transportation routes, which despite increasing the distance involved, reduced the cost

¹ An Italian translation of a small portion of this article was published in a different format, for instance, without footnotes and referring only to facts of the time in 2010 in the journal *Limes*. “La lusofonia nella partita del Sud-Atlantico”, *Limes* 5-2010: 55-67, *Rivista Italiana di Geopolitica*, numero speciale, *Il Portogallo è grande Roma*. I must also mention a brief article I titled “A Nova Geopolítica do Atlântico Sul”, *Revista de Marinha*: 20-24, Lisbon, which refers to many ideas on Lusophony equally mentioned in the present article.

² The sentence is my own translation of one written by Angola's General João Baptista de Matos, stated in a work published on 2 February 2010, “A importância do Atlântico Sul”, available at <http://www.cepen.org/2010/02/a-importancia-do-atlantico-sul/>. João de Matos is the Director of the Centre for Strategic Studies (*Centro de Estudos Estratégicos*) in Luanda.

³ *Ibid.*



of the freight charged”⁴. As Eduardo Italo Pesce pointed out, “during the twentieth century, the South Atlantic remained the ‘most peaceful of the oceans’, despite a few isolated light actions in World Wars I and II, and the Axis’ submarine campaign during the Second World War.

The South Atlantic regained some importance in the era of the ‘super tankers’ during the 1970s due to the first oil crisis and the temporary interruption of vessel traffic in the Suez Canal. Between April and June 1982, it became the stage of armed conflict between Argentina and the United Kingdom over the possession of the Falklands. As is often pointed out, this only became possible due to the huge increase in capacity – and hence the size – of tankers. The solution was the creation of the *Very-Large Crude Carriers* (the famous VLCC), whose only drawback was not being able to use the Suez Canal and many ports in Europe and in the United States, which required offshore transshipment or offloading. The old Southern Route was thus back in the international economic arena and recovered the former importance it had enjoyed with the European Asian trade and with the intra-Atlantic “triangular trade” started in the Renaissance. And, it seemed, it had come to stay. The end of the bipolar world put the South Atlantic back in the limelight, this time for structural and deeper reasons.

It is certainly fascinating to examine this recovery of centrality that arrived in the last decade of the twentieth century and accelerated in the twenty first century – and see how the South Atlantic managed to emerge out of the penumbra where it had stood for such a long time, at first marked by conjunctural economic and political factors that gradually became “structural” ones. Indeed, this come back nowadays involves far more intricate issues, for once linked to the South Atlantic by the ocean itself, not just by its relative geographical, economic and political position. In fact, both its transnationalization and growing security centralization are easy to understand, in addition to the emergence of powerful coastal states on the back of this ever more central South Atlantic, and of better armed and progressively active movements whose importance on the international stage in increasingly noticeably. The implications are far from negligible and it is likely that the long geopolitical isolation of this ocean is nearing its end and that the region now once more has, so to speak, become overtly geopoliticised.

The South Atlantic as a *de facto* political entity

In political, economic and military terms, I define the South Atlantic as the basin and coast lines that lie below the area of jurisdiction of the Atlantic Alliance, roughly ranging from the Cape Verde archipelago down to, and including, Antarctica⁵. It has many geographical specificities and, in this aspect and without wishing to pinpoint any single cause determinism, I quote Eduardo Italo Pesce again: “the rise in oil production in the

⁴ In an article of the Italian-Brazilian Eduardo Italo Pesce published in *Monitor Mercantil* in 09/07/2010, page. 2. Pesce is a professor at the Production Centre of the University of the State of Rio de Janeiro and a permanent collaborator at the Centre for Political and Strategic Centre (*Centro de Estudos Político-Estratégicos*) of the Naval War College of Brazil and the Centre for Strategic Studies of Universidade Federal Fluminense.

⁵ Other definitions are naturally possible, and may have been proposed, including by the Brazilian government, as we shall see, and by the U.S. Administration. For a definition of what constitutes the geopolitical “South Atlantic” that is similar to mine see the paper by Portuguese Admiral Nuno Vieira Matias (2010). “A geopolítica do Atlântico Sul”, *II Congresso Os Mares da Lusofonia*, which has not yet been published, Cascais.



reserves located in the coastal sedimentary basins of South America and West Africa may increase the strategic importance of the South Atlantic, contributing to reducing US and other western countries' dependence on Middle East oil".

Not including the potential of the Brazilian pre-salt, the daily production of crude at sea in South America can grow from 2.5 million barrels in 2005 to 6.1 million barrels by 2030 (144% growth). In the same period, production in the African coast may rise from 4.9 to 12.4 million barrels per day (up 153%). The increase in international trade, ever more dependent on maritime transport, has led to the structuring of a highly globalized and essentially transnational system of economic use of the seas. I shall examine this economic, political and military resizing and corresponding implications in this brief article.

Understandably, concerns with this rescaling have been growing, yet not major answers have been advanced for the very real problems that this matter has raised. In order to examine, albeit superficially and without making any in-depth analytical considerations of what I consider a rapid degradation of the international political situation in that region, I will now focus on three topics – or, better, two topics and a half. I shall refer to the variety of challenges that have changed the way the players involved perceived, both internally and externally, security in the South Atlantic. I will do little more than list some of these challenges: the new emerging statute of the South Atlantic, largely conceived as a natural extension (at least potentially) of the North Atlantic. I shall address the increasing importance of the strategic resources located there; the "race to the South Atlantic", as the great powers from the 'outside' go there to stay (I will mention the examples of the U.S., China, Russia, the UK, and Germany) and as regional powers of growing importance (Brazil, Angola, South Africa and perhaps also Venezuela and Cuba) are emerging; the intensified and increasingly robust and harsh competition among these internal and external "great powers" and the forms of cooperation among them – and all the material limits of all this.

Finally, I shall examine the slow but not less important long overdue construction of a significant, tangible regional security architecture, which has been very conspicuous by its absence in these southern seas. I will also underline the opportunities brought about by this recentralization for Portugal and Portuguese-speaking countries in what, alongside the Pacific and the Mediterranean basins, is becoming a new *Mare Nostrum* in terms of opportunities, tensions, challenges, and risks. Although I will not go into details, I believe there are at least four security sub-regions in my definition of the South Atlantic, with different properties and characteristics. Two of them are horizontal strips that link the west and the east of the basin (one in the north, from the Caribbean to the African bulge, roughly between the area under NATO jurisdiction and that of Brazil's; the other stands in the South, below the Falklands parallel and extends to the Antarctic); the other two sub-regions run vertically connecting the north and the south of the South Atlantic basin, one on the west side along and off the South American coast, and the other on the east along and off the African coast⁶.

⁶ Obviously these sub-regions interact and complement each other; however, they have different features (albeit to a lesser degree) that separate them. I intend to write an article about this, but for the time being I just mention them.



With regard to all these points, and with more than just empirical hard facts, I shall dwell on the discursive and imminently conceptual analysis of the threats, many of which I believe to be quite real; accordingly, I will focus on the mechanics of an effective, albeit incipient, ongoing securitization policy, which I believe to be amply justified. In order to show why, I shall equally touch on the more “kinetic” political practices that form an inescapable context of this discursive dimension. Then I will examine the framework of the security architecture outlined and will conclude by presenting considerations on what all this implies for Portugal and lusophony.

A serious geo-economic and geopolitical issue? The perception of risks and opportunities by the various global players

To that effect, it is certainly useful to start examining matters in a larger geopolitical and geo-economic framework. In response to the problems we have been facing in the Persian Gulf, the West is trying to obtain fossil energy in places other than traditional ones. It would come as no surprise if in the coming years we see an increase in the already observable tendency for the Gulf of Guinea to become the new “Gulf”. If we focus on West Africa in this regard, the numbers speak for themselves. All we need to do is make a simple general comparison: with an aggregate output of about 4 million barrels per day, the production of Nigeria, Gabon, and Angola – all with a huge growth potential – is about the same as the amount of crude extracted by Iran, Venezuela and Mexico combined. And there are more states in the region that have proven to be potential major producers of hydrocarbons, such as São Tomé and Príncipe and Equatorial Guinea. By 2015, the U.S. intend to increase the percentage of its oil imports from the region from the 16% to 25%⁷.

Still, the issue is of a political and security nature, much more than quantitative. It is not just the fact that 8% of the world oil reserves are in the Gulf of Guinea. From a security perspective, the oil fields of the new Gulf have a decisive positional advantage: almost all are located offshore, thus relatively insulated from the chronic instability that plagues a continental area that has many fragile states, many others clearly failed, and a majority of states eroded by webs of corruption and inefficiency. I am not just being pessimistic when I write that it is likely that political tension (ranging from religious and “tribal” rivalry to irredentist struggles and/or hegemonic ambitions for local and regional power and influence) will continue in sub-Saharan Africa in the coming decades.

It seems difficult to separate all this from the increasingly explicit interest shown by the U.S. and China in the region – just to mention the two most obvious examples of the “late wake up with regard to Africa” which, in the case of Europe, took place in generalized form in the late nineteenth century. Although it might seem an indirect connection – which, to some extent, it is – this is surely one of the backgrounds we will need to consider when analysing the growing relationship between Portugal, China, and a Portuguese-speaking world located around the Atlantic basin.

⁷ E.g. Pesce, *op. cit.*.



Figure 1: Portuguese speaking countries around the world (map produced for Revista de Marinha)



Something similar could be said with regard to Central and South America, where the existence of massive energy reserves have been confirmed. That much becomes obvious as we broaden the scope of the approach and include the other coast of the Atlantic and, like we did with regard to West Africa, look at the security issue in terms of economics and resources, since they play such a major role. The result is plainly clear. It is as true now as it was in 2002 – and certainly with greater force – what Portuguese journalist Jorge Nascimento Rodrigues stated, “[t]he South Atlantic [has become the] prime open maritime area emerging in the field of oil, with easy logistics and a capacity for quick response to the North Westerns powers, particularly to the new hegemony, the U.S. It is gaining strategic importance as an offshore platform with global significance and as a “corridor” of alternative supply”⁸. At the time, the prediction was that rapid growth would place the South Atlantic close to the world’s

⁸ In Jorge Nascimento Rodrigues (2002). “A corrida ao ouro negro do Atlântico Sul”, in *O Ardina na Crise*, in <http://www.janelanaweb.com/crise/corrida.html>. This type of work, focusing on economic and energy issues, gave rise to current approaches that consider themselves to be less reductionist, and such interpretations obviously vary according to the political and ideological stances of the authors. For a critical analysis of the “capitalist” strategies see, as an example of all works on this topic, Sergio Ferolla and Paulo Metri, (2008). “Incertezas e cobiça sobre o petróleo do Brasil”, *Monde Diplomatique*, in <http://diplo.uol.com.br/imprima2511>. For a Deleuzian examination of the multidimensional progression of contemporary “spatiality”, see Heidrich, A. L. (2008). “A relação entre espaço mundial e território nacional sob as dinâmicas da mundialização”, in Oliveira, M. P.; Coelho, M. C. N; Corrêa, A. de M. (Orgs.) *O Brasil, a América Latina e o Mundo: espacialidades contemporâneas*: vol. 1, pp. 77-91, Rio de Janeiro.




largest producers before the end of the decade, thus recognized in terms of its weight as a player.

The quantification has proved to be prophetic. This prediction of the beginning of our century remained on all fronts in the following years and was joined by a new and understandable – albeit apparently somehow unexpected, political and military concern. As the aforementioned African General João de Matos put it crisply, “despite not having major constraints and being seen as a secondary and peripheral strategic area, this important route concerns the great powers, namely the western powers, not only individually but also in terms of their defensive organization, NATO, which has the words North Atlantic in its name. It is no coincidence that the U.S. has just created the Africa Command with the aim of controlling the African shores of the Atlantic [AFRICOM was created on 1 October 2008], as opposed to the Southern Command that controls the South American coasts of the same ocean. It is not by chance either that it has been supporting the training of African armies in recent years. On the other hand, NATO has begun joint exercises with and in Cape Verde on the border between the North Atlantic, its natural and statutory territory, and the South Atlantic, where, like in Afghanistan, it is likely to act in future”.

This was not new, and the Angolan analyst saw similarities with what had happened in the past: “The South Atlantic was the setting of an undeclared war between Britain and Argentina for the possession of the Falklands or the Malvinas, both names by which the war was known. The logistic difficulties for the British proved to be enormous, since they failed to have open ports and airfields in the area to enable the refuelling of its naval and air forces. In fact, at the time, most South American governments showed sympathy for the Argentine cause (Chile was the big exception, and immediately sent military contingents to the border with Argentina, opening up a new potential front), or chose to adopt a total neutral stance, which in practice undermined the British. However, the U.S intervention, particularly by opening access to crucial satellite intelligence and to the stock of weapons, fuel and communication kept at Ascension Island minimized the problem for the British and enabled them to win the war”⁹.

Figure 2: North American Central Commands and their areas of jurisdiction. AFRICOM was established in 2008.





As I will point out, this was not the only measure, far from it. As the years went by, and aware of the rising strategic centrality of the South Seas, the U.S. decided to strengthen its presence in them by restoring the historic Fourth Fleet in the region on 1 July 2008 (this fleet had been deactivated in 1950) and take other steps in the opposite coast.

I shall refer to this later, but not before drawing attention to the less blatant evidence that the U.S. is not alone in the race to the South Atlantic. Many others are doing the same, such as China, Russia and Germany, among them: a vigorous international competition is settling in becoming a new "scramble for the South" – thus creating what we could perhaps see as a new cosmopolitan opening of the ocean basin and its continental surroundings, which surely turns them into a new geopolitical arena increasingly perceived as such by the various players. That is the focus of my attention with regard to the following: the "reception" of regional political and military coalitions outlined by a resurgent Russia; the latter has responded to the economic and demographic positioning of a fully assertive China; the increasingly explicit standing of Germany, France and Spain in the sale of weapons and military equipment (air, sea, and "logistical") to this and other emerging areas, in terms of security. I shall do little more other than list facts and actions.

In purely indicative terms and as a simple list of "neuralgic" actions: China has been investing in people and infrastructure on both sides of the South Atlantic basin – nowadays there are hundreds of thousands of newly established Chinese in Angola, and many more have gone to the State of S. Paulo in Brazil¹⁰. The growing intervention of France goes hand in hand with China's, particularly in South America, in Brazil: the so-called "Rafale deal" bears witness to this, through the announced sale – still not consummated, and looking ever-more dubious – of thirty six Omni Role fighter bombers to the Brazilian Air Force (FAB); the competition goes back a couple of years and involves three fighters – the F-18 Super Hornet of the U.S Boeing, the Dassault Rafale F3, and SAAB's Grippen NG from Sweden, still at project stage. This was such a huge project that Obama personally tried to convince President Lula to prefer North American aircraft, which led Nicolas Sarkozy and Dassault to reduce the price by 2.4 billion Euros and showed their determination to keep the French position in the transaction [even though, the total cost was over 5 billion U.S. dollars]¹¹. The recent

¹⁰ Amongst an increasingly abundant literature, see Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (2007). *Oil and Politics in the Gulf of Guinea*, Hurst Publishers and Columbia University Press, and the work edited by Daniel Large, Christopher Alden and Ricardo Soares de Oliveira (2008). *China Returns to Africa: a Rising Power and a Continent Embrace*. For comparative studies about Chinese investment in Angola and Brazil, see the recent and most interesting article by Ana Cristina Alves (2010). titled "The Oil Factor in Sino-Angolan Relations at the Start of the 21st Century", Occasional Paper No. 55, *South African Institute of International Affairs*, Johannesburg.

¹¹ From the huge literature available, just two references to a purchase which, should it take place, which is increasingly less likely, could include also the acquisition of twelve Rafale Marine planes for the Brazilian aircraft carrier São Paulo (the former French Foch bought in the 1990s) and the second carrier already announced by the Brazilian Navy. With regard to the most recent hypothesis, see the ambitious and confident article by Angela Pimenta titled "França confiante na compra dos caça Rafale pelo Brasil em 2010", in Portal Exame of 21 September 2010, in <http://portalexame.abril.com.br/blogs/esquerda-direita-e-centro/2010/09/21/franca-confiante-do-anuncio-da-compra-de-cacas-rafale-pelo-brasil-em-2010/>. For a debate published on the website *Poder Aéreo* on 19 November 2009, see the article



announcement of Germany's sale of five hybrid (partly nuclear-powered) submarines to Brasilia and three to Pretoria goes along the same lines¹²; Angola appears to have reacted immediately, unwilling to be left out of this "race".

In turn, Russia has accelerated its regional visibility in Cuba and in Venezuela (besides the naval military exercises mentioned earlier), funding and expanding military runways in those countries to enable their use by its own strategic bombers, Tupolev-130 and maybe others¹³ – in October 2010 Russia announced its financial and technical assistance to the creation of a "nuclear programme" in Venezuela, an offer which has since been reiterated at key moments. Everything points to the fact that a vertiginous arms race has started, not only in the North of the South Atlantic, in the Caribbean, and between Venezuela and Colombia.

The growing awareness of risks by regional players

Reactions to this generalized influx of the global major powers were quick to come, and they are not difficult to understand in view of the regional cognitive and security frameworks. To give a handful of examples, let us start again with Brazil with regard to the specific example of the full-blown return of the U.S. navy. What follows is the interpretation of the influential Brazilian academic Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira in 2008, in a paper presented at the Brazilian War College which referred to the very recent reactivation of the United States Fourth Fleet. "The reactivation of the Fourth Fleet implies, of course, many U.S. strategic interests. But what makes its real goal evident is the fact that the command of the Fourth Fleet was handed over to Real Admiral Joseph Kernan, an officer of the US Navy SEALs (United States Navy Sea, Air and Land Forces), consisting of the Special Operations Forces of the War Navy and which are employed in direct action and special reconnaissance missions and capable of undertaking unconventional warfare, foreign internal defence and counter-terrorism operations. One of the components of the Fourth Fleet is the amphibious assault ship USS Kearsarge (LHD 3), whose main mission is to transport, deploy and land forces anywhere in the world and act as Expeditionary Strike Group, a military concept introduced in the U.S. War Navy in the beginning of the 1990s. It consists of highly mobile and self-sustaining forces that carry out missions in various parts of the globe. Its "humanitarian mission" started in Santa Marta, Colombia, in coordination with the General Command of the Armed Forces and the National Army of Colombia".

Following an argument widely shared by the elites of his country, Moniz Bandeira went further, in the presence of the higher ranks of his country, and offered an economic explanation for Washington's reconfiguration of power in the general framework of a current version of the Monroe Doctrine: "it is clear that the United States, with its

"Dassault oferece itens adicionais para tentar vender o Rafale para o Brasil", in <http://www.aereo.jor.br/2009/11/14/dassault-oferece-itens-adicionais-para-tentar-vender-o-rafale-para-o-brasil/>; I will not cite more recent articles as the issue is fast developing, which renders them outdated quickly.

¹² As an example, see the translation of the article published in *Deutsche Welle*, "Germany doubles arms exports", an article republished in Brazil on 15 April 2010, and available at <http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,,5357723,00.html>.

¹³ See, as an example, the article "Russia may send strategic bombers to Cuba, Venezuela", an *Interfax* news published in the North American website *Bloomberg* and available at http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=newsarchive&sid=az_dyBk1Y3T0, which quotes Major-General Anatoly Zhikharev, Commander-in-Chief of Russia's Strategic Aviation.



command of the sea and space, has never ceased to have war ships travelling in the international waters of South America, despite the fact that the Fourth Fleet, created in 1943 during the Second World War, had officially been dissolved in 1950. Its restructuring does not mean major changes in U.S. military activities in the South Atlantic, since 38% of its global trade takes place with countries in that hemisphere, 34% of its oil imports come from the region and 2/3 of the ships transiting through the Panama Canal are going to U.S. ports. It merely made official a presence that had never ceased to exist, with the aim of demarcating and reaffirming the South Atlantic as an area under its control, particularly given the discovery of large deposits of oil in the Tupi field in the pre-salt layer off the coast of S. Paulo. The United States is concerned with the growing presence of China in South America and wishes to control its mineral and energy resources, such as the Mutum iron deposits and the natural gas reserves in Bolivia, Argentina's Patagonia and the Guarani Aquifer, which is the largest groundwater reservoir in the world and is located in the countries that form the Mercosur"¹⁴.


As in the text he wrote as a basis for his presentation, Moniz Bandeira stated with a pinch of political gusto that "the conflict between Russia and Georgia has shown that the 'arc of crisis' which Zbigniew Brzezinski claimed extended from Pakistan to Ethiopia encircling the Middle East is much broader, covering all Central Asia and the Caucasus. Faced with this situation, the geopolitical importance of South America increased further in the security strategy of the U.S., which is seeking oil and gas supply sources in more stable regions. Even Halford J. Mackinder, in the conference he made in 1904 on 'The Geographical Pivot of History', stressed that the development of the vast potentialities of South America could have a 'decisive influence' on the international system of power and strength the United States or, on the other side, Germany, if the latter successfully challenged the Monroe Doctrine". Moniz Bandeira concluded with recommendations to the Brazilian military, explaining that "the economic and commercial [aspect] certainly weighed on the U.S. decision to reactivate the Fourth Fleet in the South Atlantic, with the prospect that the region becomes a major oil producing centre as a result of the recent discovery of fields in the pre-salt layer off the coast of São Paulo and which probably extends across the south to the coast of Argentina. [...] *A Second Cold War has started involving South America, where the penetration of the United States is a factor of instability and unrest. The high degree of internal turbulence and the resistance and opposition of the majority of governments to the will of the United States clearly attests the fading of its hegemony in a region where once its fiat had the force of law, and which reflects profoundly its global strategy to impose the Pax Americana, i.e. 'preserving and extending an international order that is friendly to our security, our prosperity and our principles' according to the guidelines of the Project for the New American Century (PNAC)*"¹⁵ [my italics]. These are intent processes that are certainly understood by a respected scholar as legitimate aspirations of a rising power that increasingly responds to a pan-continental geopolitical doctrine that it considers anachronistic, inappropriate and detrimental to its overall interests.

¹⁴ These statements [their translation is ours] can be found in Luiz Alberto Moniz Bandeira (2008). "A importância geopolítica da América do Sul na estratégia dos Estados Unidos", *Revista Espaço Acadêmico*, 89, <http://www.espacoacademico.com.br/089/89bandeira.htm>, in a paper presented at a Conference held at *Escola Superior de Guerra* (the Brazilian top War College).

¹⁵ *Ibid.*



Figure 3 - U.S. Fleets and their areas of responsibility



None of this is too surprising or truly innovative, even less in the political climate the country is experiencing. However, over the past few years, there have been many proponents of an alternative to the emergence of a North American hegemony in the South Atlantic. For example, another Brazilian analyst close to Brazilian policy makers in his country, Humberto França, wrote in an article published on 5 June 2009 in *Diário de Pernambuco*, significantly titled "Brazil and oil in the South Atlantic", which was subsequently republished by the Brazilian Ministry of Education in a prominent space¹⁶: "the Atlantic Ocean is the first in terms of movement of goods and is of major strategic importance. The south of that sea was explored by Portuguese navigators who settled on the coasts of Africa and America over five centuries ago, and, after a long historical process, those lands led to the formation of Portuguese-speaking countries which, *if driven by Brazil*, [my italics] will currently consolidate a community that is increasingly more important on the world stage. In the post-crisis world, Brazil will emerge as an undisputed economic power and will need to address new challenges. First, it will need to maintain its engagement policy with its neighbours in South America, support and expand the Mercosur, and, at the same time, foster a more comprehensive relationship with African countries, especially with West African nations. In addition, it will also need to focus its attention on strengthening the Community of Portuguese Speaking

¹⁶

<http://www.fundaj.gov.br/notitia/servlet/newstorm.ns.presentation.NavigationServlet?publicationCode=16&pageCode=377&textCode=13194&date=currentDate>. Again, our translation.



Countries – CPLP. The recent discovery of large oil deposits in the South Atlantic basin surely demonstrates that there are still untapped natural resources almost totally unknown – and, of course, this is something which will inevitably alter the geopolitical composition of the region. It is known that the South Atlantic has aroused the interest of current hegemonic powers”. This aspect is currently even more present, for which reason I want to refer to it here.

Humberto França could not have put it clearer when he bluntly stated what had been perceived by several states: “China, for instance, has already demonstrated it wishes to benefit from those huge oil reserves. A few months ago [from 1 December 2008] a powerful Russian fleet visited the South Atlantic ports of Venezuela. And American ships have been sailing those seas for a long time. Therefore, it is time Brazil undertakes a major effort to equip our navy with the latest technology in order to lead an integration process with the Defence Forces of some of the CPLP member states, Angola, Guinea-Bissau, São Tomé and Príncipe, and Cape Verde. In addition, our country should also invite Argentina, Uruguay and perhaps South Africa to join this enterprise in order to form a network of economic and military cooperation capable of ensuring the control of the immense wealth lying in the seabed of that region. This way we shall be able to preserve the security of our coastal areas. We also know that the oil and gas reserves in Angola, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé are huge. Still, with regard to our security, it should be stressed that Brazil should also initiate studies to establish a military base shared with its allies in Cape Verde. This country, whose territory is 500 kilometres off the West African coast and very close to the northeast coast, is in major strategic position for controlling the South Atlantic. Cape Verde is located very near the most important north-south shipping routes. Our initiative would not cause military imbalance, since the United States, in conjunction with NATO, has long maintained an important military at Lajes, in the Azores. And the Falkland Islands, under British rule, provided that it serves the interests of the countries of that organization, can host major military installations to serve the interests of Northern countries”¹⁷. Once more this was a cry of alarm, and, again, one of exemplary clarity shouted at high impact arenas.

Indeed, more formal reactions based on past legal formalities came soon, which somehow found an echo in the reactivation of the U.S. Fourth Fleet. In 2005, Pesce stated that “[t]he President signed Decree No. 5.484 of 30 June 2005 without any fanfare or publicity, approving a new National Defence Policy (NDP) for Brazil. This decree came into force on the date of its publication in the Official Gazette, issue no. 125 of 1 July 2005. Decree no. 5.484 also stipulates that the organs and entities of the Federal Government should consider actions that contribute to strengthening national defence in their planning. Predominantly geared to external threats, the new NDP consists of a political part (dealing with concepts, international and national affairs, and with defence objectives) and of a strategic part (which covers guidelines and directives)” [...]. The normative document divides Brazilian defence policy into two areas. “In the Amazon, priority is given to the need for strategic actions aimed at strengthening military presence, the effective action of the state in development, and at expanding cooperation with neighbouring countries”. In the South Atlantic, primacy goes to the need for resources to carry out surveillance and the defence of Brazilian territorial waters in the “Blue Amazon”, as well as to ensure the security of sea lines of

¹⁷ *Ibid.*



communication. The need to exercise surveillance, control and defence of Brazilian air space is also stressed. The possibility of using armed forces against internal threats, aiming at preserving sovereignty and national unity, is equally considered.

These dispositions also include the following: work in order to keep a climate of peace and cooperation at the borders; strengthen exchanges with the armed forces of friendly nations, especially in South America and West Africa; contribute to regional integration, with emphasis on the industrial basis of defence; play an active role in decisions on the fate of Antarctica; have the capacity for power projection for overseas operations; establish new partnerships with friendly countries in order to develop defence technologies; participate in humanitarian or peacekeeping missions, according to national interests; and increasingly participate in international decision *fora*, with the aim of increasing the bargaining power of the country¹⁸. Indeed, a true map. One which also constitutes a solid security basis for a possible definition of the strength capacity of a new, more pro-active foreign policy that Brazil, feeling harassed and in search of an international affirmation consistent with the importance it believes it has today, wishes to pursue.

Given Brazil's historical grievances against the U.S., none of this is strange or should in any way come as a surprise. What is indeed sweeping is the fact that the convergence of concerns appears to be accelerating the process of rapprochement, albeit in an extreme formal and official way, between the two opponent states of the South Atlantic coast, namely Argentina and Brazil. The Argentines have also been paying attention to security issues in the South Atlantic, somehow "baptizing" it in terms of security. Thus, to give just one paradigmatic example, German Montenegro, former Secretary for Strategy and Military Affairs at the Ministry of Defence, and a Professor at the National University of Quilmes, in Argentina, in an interview given on 2 April 2010, made a series of assertions which are relevant even now, stating that "today we can speak of the problem of the South Atlantic, involving many players and interests, which has to do with the use of natural resources. The example of the Falklands is a symptom of what may happen in the regions in the coming years. We must remember that the international security scenario in the region has undergone major changes. We have a superpower, the United States, but also other rising powers, like Brazil. At the same time, we witness the deterioration of the multilateral system caused by many unilateral initiatives that only benefit the countries with more power. In this context, the natural resources issue has become a major security question. Before, it was fish, now it is oil"¹⁹. In this, as in other documents, the message is a clear rapprochement-convergence.

Consequences of this were not long coming. With the suggestive title "*De Olho no Atlântico Sul*" ("An Eye on the South Atlantic"), on 27 May 2010 *Itamaraty* published the following: the well-known football rivalry between Brazil and Argentina, even in World Cup years, was set aside in the name of science. The two countries came together in a satellite development project aimed at surveying the oceans, which is crucial for monitoring climate change. The Brazilian Space Agency (AEB), together with the Spatial Activities National Commission (Conae) of Argentina will work on the

¹⁸ In Eduardo ItaloPesce (2005). "A nova política de defesa nacional", *Segurança e Defesa*, http://www.segurancaedefesa.com/Nova_PDN.htm]. Once more, our translation.

¹⁹ In an interview to *Opera Mundi* on 2 April 2010, which can be accessed at http://operamundi.uol.com.br/noticias_ver.php?idConteudo=3500



assembly of the *Sabia-Mar* satellite, which will observe the oceans globally and monitor the Atlantic near the two countries. The estimated investment in this project is approximately \$140 million, said the president of AEB, Carlos Ganem, in an interview to the State of Minas. He said that the preliminary technical study prepared by experts from the two countries pointed to a four-year schedule to launch the satellite. Accordingly, "under normal conditions, including with regard to funding", the satellite should be launched in 2014. One of the options examined is to launch it using the Cyclone 4 rocket. In this case, activities will take place at the Alcântara Launch Centre, in Maranhão. The National Institute for Space Research (INPE) will be the executing agency of this project"²⁰.

Is this really new? To a large extent, it is not. From the 1980s, the two states, once fierce opponents, were able to multilateralize their foreign nuclear policies – and since the 1990s they have adjusted them as needed. The signing of the Non-Proliferation Treaty by the two countries, the abandonment by Argentina of its ballistic missile programme, and, by Brazil, of its nuclear weapons, was a major step to this effect. However, it was not the only one in a context of multiple signs of approximation, which was not without important implications. As the renowned Brazilian academic Celso Lafer, at the time Minister of Foreign Affairs of President Fernando Henrique Cardoso, stated shortly after September 11, "[t]he approximation between Brazil and Argentina reversed bilateral relations, which ceased to be a factor of uncertainty for the strategic balance in South America and became instead a guarantee of peace and stability in the region"²¹. This reinterpretation is significant, as it shows that more important interests prevailed.

It seems that these interests are widely shared. Far from being a one-sided stance on Brazil's part, these emerging convergences, very unlikely until recently, are multifold and significant. A unique example is representative of all. With regard to the recent revival of the Malvinas/Falklands question, Argentine G. Montenegro responded to the point, not unlike the Brazilians or the Angolans: "[i]n recent years, Argentina, Chile, Brazil, and Great Britain presented proposals to extend the so-called Continental Shelf (CS) to the UN's commission on limits. This refers to the natural extension of the countries, exceeding the 200 miles of their exclusive economic zone up to a limit of 350 miles from the coastline. Once the UN has recognized this shelf, the coastal state has the right to explore soil and marine subsoil resources. Other tensions have emerged as a result of the discovery of significant oil reserves in Brazilian waters, and of the importance of lithium, for example, in Bolivia. All this confers the region a new geo-strategic importance. *From this point of view also, the picture is changing. Our region enjoys relative calm. However, in recent years we have seen diplomatic conflicts arise, including quite intense military activities: between Ecuador and Colombia, between Colombia and Venezuela, not to mention the reactivation of the American Fourth Fleet, the relationship of some countries with Iran, and the invitation made by Venezuela to Russia for its warships to carry out military exercises in the region. So far, these facts are not able to trigger conflicts, but one must be attentive*"[my italics]²².

²⁰ Article available for download at <http://www.itamaraty.gov.br/sala-de-imprensa/selecao-diarial-de-noticias/midiasnacionais/brasil/estado-de-minas/2010/05/27/de-olho-no-atlantico-sul>. As in the case of all texts in Portuguese and Castilian here quoted, the translations are our own.

²¹ Speech made by Celso Lafer as MFA of Brazil on 14.08.2001.

²² *Ibid.*



The relevance of these considerations is evident. In addition to this, there is also Argentina's and Brazil's development, in tandem, of 'laser cannons' against and from satellites, and of a joint GPS system. The security baptism of the South Atlantic region appeared to be over. However, I keep insisting it is still unpaired.

Let us change quadrant and look at the opposite shore of the ocean basin. On the other side of the South Atlantic, similar concerns have been expressed on the African coast. The Angolan Navy Journal (*Revista da Marinha*) published an article titled "Major interests in the South Atlantic" which reads that "[t]he South Atlantic is today the leading open sea area that is rising in the oil business, with easy logistics and able of giving a rapid response to North Western powers, particularly the new hegemony of the US. It is assuming strategic importance as an offshore platform with global significance, acting as a 'corridor' for alternative supplies. All readers need to do is to think of the worsening of the situation in the Mediterranean, the Persian Gulf or the Bosphorus Strait (due to changes in Turkey and turmoil in the Black Sea) and an eventual total loss of control of the situation in the Caribbean Sea (turmoil in Venezuela, which is the second largest producer in Latin America after Mexico, and in Colombia) to see how the South Atlantic can be a real safety valve. The battle for political, military and economic control of this vast maritime area will therefore become more acute in coming years." Echoing the concerns of Brazil, the anonymous Angolan author, by way of explaining the possible North American reasons for this political control, added: "the combined oil production of the Member States of the Gulf of Guinea Commission (CGG) currently exceeds five million barrels/day and represents about 16 percent of the world production. International studies indicate that the sub-region of the Gulf of Guinea will provide a quarter of the oil consumed by the United States by 2015. The sub-region of the Gulf of Guinea also includes the Congo Basin (the second largest body of water and forest in the world after the Amazon), which covers about two million square kilometres. The international economic traders thus should work to ensure, 'in a concerted and responsible' manner, the management of the aforesaid potential on behalf of future generations. Thus, the existence of the Gulf of Guinea Commission, which defends the common interests of states bordering the Gulf of Guinea, 'gives a comparative advantage in defining and executing global standards regarding the environment, security and development'²³. Again, this shows the various regional States's will to rally together.

Is this reaction similar to that shown by South America? None of this should startle us. As António Pinheiro, a Portuguese Colonel specializing in African matters, wrote clearly, "until the end of the Cold War, the relative indifference of Washington of the African continent was based on a 'geopolitical sub-contracting' that, until then, had been tacitly agreed with France. [As of September 11, everything changed.] Under the backdrop of the War on Terror, the United States 'strategized' the African continent. Aware of its dependence on raw materials vital to its economy, which were fiercely disputed by China, and worried about "securing" its supplies in the medium term, Washington has increased political and military agreements with most African countries. The military, oil companies and U.S. security consulting companies are the key targets of this new strategy"²⁴. Thoughtfully, Pinheiro asks a couple of indiscreet questions at the end of

²³ <http://www.mga.qv.ao/revistamarinha/edicao13/dossier07.htm>

²⁴ António Pinheiro (2006). "Modelos de 'africanização' das Operações de Apoio à Paz", *Nação & Defesa* 114, 3rd series, pp. 141-168: 150.



his study: "can we relate the military coup that took place in São Tomé on 16 July 2003, undertaken by a group of soldiers led by Major Fernando Pereira 'Cobó', to the previous specific training and participation of these men both in the ECCAS multinational force of the 2nd cycle of RECAMP (GABON 2000) and to the lusophone force involved in CPLP exercises (FELINO 2000) in Brazil? As another possible study, we suggest a Guinean case. Is there any relationship between the October 2004 coup (which led to the assassination of General Veríssimo Seabra) perpetrated by a group of military recently returned home and their participation in the Guinean battalion involved in the ECOWAS multinational force planned in September 2003 for the Theatre of Operations in Liberia"?²⁵. The answers that have been advanced are only too obvious and have been increasing in number.

At this point it becomes essential to put such matters into their wider context. The Rwanda debacle that caused so much damage to the Elysée and Quai d'Orsay ambitious "France-Afrique" project was followed by a diffuse business diplomacy conducted by Warren Christopher from 1996 with increasingly more influential, such as the *Pan-Sahel Initiative* (PSI), which had been operational since November 2003. It was conducted by US-EUCOM forces and aimed, on both coasts of the continent, to help Mali, Chad, Niger, and Mauritania fight smuggling, terrorist networks and organized crime, as part of the ACOTA (African Contingency Operations Training Assistance) programme that had been created by the Bush administration in the Spring of 2002 to replace the former ACRI (African Crisis Response Initiative) and quickly complemented by the Africa Regional Peacekeeping (ARP), whose main beneficiaries were West African states like Nigeria, Senegal, Ghana, and Guinea-Conakry, countries where the U.S. could then transfer some military technology. A new programme joined the previous ones from 2003: the *International Military Educational and Training Program* (IMET), a specific programme for military training in units and establishments of the U.S. Armed Forces, which grants scholarships to officers of all countries with which Washington maintains "friendly" relations²⁶.

Let us look at the issue in fast-forward mode: the process seems unstoppable, even with the Obama Administration now in power in Washington. As has been the case of other powers I have mentioned earlier, American power has been positioning itself in a systematic, cumulative and inclusive manner, which its opponents attempt to counter-act, in a region whose centrality is constantly increasing. Admittedly, the discourses have been very different. But looking at the two main players, the ascending Brazilian giant and the U.S., one sees a concept widely accepted in Brazil and in the United States that building a credible security system for the new region is becoming urgent. Not surprisingly, each has been reacting according to its own interests and in terms of corresponding domestic political 'ecosystems'. The Bush Administration did things in its usual way, by regionally deploying forces. The Lula Administration in Brazil, along the same lines, about six years ago decided to respond pro-actively. Indeed, formal reactions were soon to come, based on past legal formalities, largely to counter-act the build-up triggered by President Hugo Chavez of Venezuela and which, somehow, found an echo in the reactivation of the U.S. Fourth Fleet. Indeed, securitization, albeit at

²⁵ *Op. cit.*: 167-168. More than just a work on the "Africanization" of the PSOs, the article provides a useful comparative survey of the French, U.S. and Portuguese "African policy" in the post bi-polar period.

²⁶ As A. Pinheiro wrote in 2006, "currently 44 African countries participate in the IMET. Over the past three years, about 4.500 African officers have benefitted from this programme. The main beneficiaries have been Botswana, Ethiopia, Ghana, Kenya, Senegal, and South Africa" (*op. cit.*: 156).



different levels of intensity, but with a tendency to grow, has been part of the mental landscape, the mind space of policy makers who, in Brazil, think about the South Atlantic. The normative acts generated in the country seem to be leading to a relatively high intensity, preventive and polarizing discourse that contextually “securitizes” (and in the opinion of some, over-securitizes) the implicit interpretations they have in terms of the structural place occupied by Brazil in the international order – a point I shall return to soon – thereby turning a cyclical reaction into a structural situation.

In 2005 a new law came into force called *The Brazilian National Defence Policy*²⁷. It was a short, incisive and very innovative text with regard to what had previously been done in the country. As affirmed by Pesce, “the President of the Republic signed Decree no. 5.484 on 30 June 2005, which was the new Brazil’s National Defence Policy (NPD), without any fanfare or publicity”. This decree came into force on the date of its publication in the Official Gazette, issue no. 125 of 1 July 2005. Decree no. 5.484 also stipulates that the organs and entities of the Federal Government should consider actions that contribute to strengthening national defence in their planning. Predominantly geared to external threats, the new NDP consists of a political part (dealing with concepts, international and national affairs, and with defence objectives) and of strategic part (which covers guidelines and directives)” [...]. As underlined above, the normative document divides Brazilian defence policy into two areas and, indeed, constitutes as if a map of Brazilian security worries – and it also constitutes a solid security basis for a possible definition of the strength capacity of a new, more pro-active foreign policy that Brazil, feeling harassed and in search of an international affirmation consistent with the importance it believes it has today, wishes to pursue.

Without wishing to conduct an analysis that would be inappropriate here, it is worth going a little deeper and examine the text and the formulation of Brazil’s diplomas in detail, given that this *National Defence Policy* (NDP) was a few years later, in late 2008, complemented by a clearer and more extensive *National Defence Strategy* (NDS). The Diploma was published in Decree no 6.703, of 18 December 2008 issued by the Planalto Palace and was signed by President Lula, and by Roberto Mangabeira Unger, a renowned professor at Harvard Law School, at the time in office as Minister of Strategy²⁸.

Part II of this National Defence Strategy, entitled “Implementation Measures” lists what is perceived to be the “main vulnerabilities of the current defence structure of the

²⁷ For the core document which acted as a basis for the diploma titled *Política de Defesa Nacional*, see http://www.planalto.gov.br/ccivil_03/ Ato2004-2006/2005/Decreto/D5484.htm. In a very critical and incisive article titled “National Defence Strategy. Reorganization and Transformation of the Armed Forces” *Interesse Nacional*: April/June, 71-83, Brazil, Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira (2009), a Law Professor at the University of Campinas, who writes that it was about time, following the troubled relationship of the first years of the first term of office of President Lula da Silva. According to Rizzo de Oliveira, “the new version of the National Defence Policy, passed in 2005, was the most prominent positive factor in the relations between the President and National Defence in his first term of office” (*ibid.*, p. 73).

²⁸ The title is precisely *National Defence Strategy* and can be accessed at http://www.fab.mil.br/portal/defesa/estrategia_defesa_nacional_portugues.pdf. According to Eliézer Rizzo de Oliveira, “The background for the multiple discomfort in the relations between political power and the military was the frail structure and weakness of the Ministry of Defence, which did not direct the Armed Forces effectively and did not defend their interests (for the sake of National Defence) with the President of the Republic and the ministers of the mighty economic area. [...] Another important aspect to understand the context in which the decision to establish the National Defence strategy was made was Venezuela’s acquisition of arms, ships and military aircraft, under the command of President Hugo Chavez, and its strategic alliance with Cuba, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Nicaragua. This disturbed the Brazilian top military echelons, who feared Brazil’s loss of military capacity in the regional arena”; *op. cit.*: 73.



country”, which include, it claims, the “obsolescence of most equipment of the Armed Forces, insufficient resources, and inadequate procurement policy, among other factors”. It specifies the functions and roles to be undertaken by each of the three branches of the Armed Forces (Navy, Army, and Air Force, listed in that order). In addition to the “classical” concept of defence, it introduced that of “security”, which greatly enhances the scope for future action and responsibilities of Brazilian Armed Forces. The National Defence Strategy is written assertively and emphatically right from the preface, unlike the conservative tone of the diploma that preceded it in 2005. It assumes that the country already has what has been called a “manifest destiny”²⁹, by stating that “if Brazil wishes to occupy the place it deserves in the world, it needs to be prepared to defend itself not only from attacks but also from threats”. With regard to the status it affirms the country occupies in the international order, the National Defence Strategy states that “Brazil will rise to the forefront of the world without exercising hegemony or domination. The Brazilian people do not want to exercise command over other people. Brazilians want Brazil to get bigger without dominating others”.

It would have been difficult to be clearer about the intention to ensure Brazil will become a first rank power. The document unmistakably shows that the National Defence Strategy goes beyond “ensuring Brazil’s prominent position in the group of nations and increased participation in international decision-making processes”: As Rizzo de Oliveira openly put it³⁰, the implicit assertion contained in the adopted Defence Strategy is abundantly clear: “Brazil will become a power”. A statement of such force and magnitude could not but lead to tempers heating up in the region, and trigger defensive prevention actions. The discourse could not go unnoticed by any minimally attentive observers; and indeed it did not.

Fracturing and merging lines and discourses on security

However, it would be a mistake to stick too closely and in a vacuum to these “securitization” speech acts – as, say, one might be led to, in the wake of the theses proposed by the Copenhagen School. A brief case story illustrates the disparities between discourse reactions and others that this state of affairs may trigger. I classify my next example as “benign”. As has been noted, for several years Portuguese foreign policy has tried to rebalance its core objectives – a focus on the European Union, on NATO, and on the historical area of the Portuguese language. Amongst other forms,

²⁹ The statement, which replicates and historically re-dimensions its American counterpart *Manifest Destiny*, was made by Professor Darc Costa, who wrote “if there is a principle that summarizes the whole concept of Brazil’s national strategy, that principle is the idea that today Brazil is the only craftsman of true globalization, which is the result of our colonization and Portuguese immigration. This is the manifest destiny of Brazil, something that follows naturally from the fact that Brazilian people are the direct descendants of those who started the process, the Portuguese, and the only people with the right magical characteristics capable of building a single human homeland. We will do a quick overview of these magical features, as our objective is to draw a background where our national strategy unfolds. Thus, I shall describe the most important magical characteristics that the Brazilian people possess and which will enable the completion of globalization”. A Fifth Empire vision. Darc Costa is the Coordinator of the Centre for Strategic Studies at the justly famous War College (ESG) in Brazil, as well as President of the Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Industry of South America (FEDERASUR), which is an entity with global representation that strives for the integration of Latin America. The full text where the above sentence was taken from is available at <http://www.cepen.org/2008/11/estrategia-nacional-e-a-imigracao-darc-costa/3/>, as part of an article from 2008 titled “National Strategy and Immigration”.

³⁰ *Op. cit.*.



this has been done by “paying more attention to the North and South Atlantic, i.e. the strategic square that connects Lisbon to the U.S., Brazil and Angola”³¹. “Back in 2009, the Minister of Foreign Affairs Luís Amado argued for a “re-centralization of the NATO strategy in the geographic space of the Atlantic”, where “the privileged relations between Portugal and Africa, the Mediterranean countries and, particularly, Brazil” could be better used. At the same time, he rejected the “world police”³² tag, a label often given to NATO, in what a young researcher studying and publishing in Portugal named Pedro Seabra described as “a clear attempt to pre-emptively attack any possible suspicion that his proposals could encourage”³³.

A few months later, the then new Minister of National Defence, Augusto Santos Silva, revisited the issue and detailed the reasons for it, following a series of publications connected to the Atlantic Alliance³⁴, and stressing the importance of “reinforcing cooperation on an equal basis with both Africa and South America in order to tackle common security risks – such as illegal immigration, drugs, arms, human trafficking, and terrorism – would be mutually beneficial and would allow a better understanding of the perils and gains that could spring from this particular region”.

Never very risk-prone or creative, Amado merely added the CPLP to this. His successor continued the focus, insisting that there was a “gap” in the draft of NATO’s new Strategic Concept, as the document “did not pay as much attention to the South as it should”. Countries like Portugal, said Santos Silva, along the same lines as Amado and calling for common self-representations among a large proportion of Portuguese elites, “contribute to the transatlantic debate and have the potential of knowing how to dialogue with the South and to understand the South”.

Understandably, the Brazilian Administration began to express concerns, in pugnacious tones and formats, over this persistent political and diplomatic discourse on the part of Lisbon – a Lisbon which was evidently determined to increase its external influence³⁵, undertaken as part of an increasingly active and encompassing foreign policy. The Brazilian concerns were vividly expressed by Brasília’s then Defence Minister Nelson Jobim.

In a conference at the National Defence Institute in Lisbon, Jobim stated that the South Atlantic is “a strategic area of vital interest to Brazil”, and that “the security issues of

³¹ Paulo Gorjão (2010). “The end of a cycle: rebalancing and redefining Portugal’s foreign policy” (IPRIS Lusophone Countries Bulletin, No. 3, January): 6, Lisbon. On this topic, but with a more specific focus – a detailed discussion on how this has been done in a limited and understudied area: enhanced image in terms of police, “not so much military”, force – see also the monograph by Armando Marques Guedes and Luís Elias (2011). *Controlos Remotos. Dimensões Externas da Segurança Interna em Portugal*, Instituto Superior de Ciências Policiais e Segurança Interna, Almedina, Lisbona nd Coimbra.

³² Luís Amado (2009). “Luís Amado defends “recentering” on the Atlantic and stresses the role played by Portugal in the relationships with Africa and Brazil” (Lusa, 26 March), quoted in Pedro Seabra (2010). “South Atlantic crossfire. Portugal in-between Brazil and NATO”, IPRIS, *Viewpoints*, downloaded on 2 March 2010 from www.ipris.org/php/download.php?fid=304

³³ Pedro Seabra (2010). “South Atlantic crossfire. Portugal in-between Brazil and NATO”, IPRIS, *Viewpoints*, downloaded on 2 March 2010 from www.ipris.org/php/download.php?fid=304. This young Portuguese researcher has published several interesting articles, of which I would like to stress the following: (2009), “A summer fling in South America. U.S. bases and a weapons race”, *ViewPoints*, IPRIS, October; (2010), “UNASUR.South America’s wishful thinking”, *Viewpoints*, IPRIS, February; (2010). “ECOWAS and the Brazilian foothold in Africa”, *Viewpoints*, IPRIS, September; and (2011). “An ocean apart. Angola, Brazil and the need for a strategic framework”, *Viewpoints*, IPRIS, March.

³⁴ Of which the following stand out: Nikolas Gvosdev (2009). “Expand the West by Looking South” (*Atlantic Council*, 7 June), as well as NATO’s report (2010). *NATO 2020: Assured Security; Dynamic Engagement*, Brussels, from which I took the quotation above.

³⁵ Paulo Gorjão (2010) *op. cit.*, and Armando Marques Guedes and Luís Elias (2011). *op. cit.*.



the two oceans [are] markedly different. The same could be said, he continued, of the alleged "Mid-Atlantic"³⁶. The presence of NATO or of the United States there, he insisted, is "untimely" and "inappropriate"³⁷. The timing and location of the intervention did not go unnoticed to minimally attentive observers. This did not end here, and, a few days later, in a five-day official visit to the US, Jobim met the Secretary for Homeland Security, Janet Napolitano, and attended a series of lectures at George Washington University and at Johns Hopkins University. According to the Brazilian publication *Estado de S. Paulo*, Jobim wasted no opportunity to refer to the "NATO issue", particularly at his meeting with Arturo Valenzuela, Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, to whom he repeated the message he had vehemently stated at the NDI in Lisbon a week earlier.

Jobim did not stop here: on 3 November 2010, at the *Tenth Conferência do Forte de Copacabana*, in Brazil, at an activity organized by the Konrad Adenauer Foundation, he restated the Brazilian government's opposition to any form of "sharing sovereignty over the Atlantic", stating that "neither Brazil or South America could accept that the Americans or NATO claimed any right to intervene in any theatre of operations, at any possible pretext"³⁸. This time, at the *Forte de Copacabana*, former minister Jobim detailed the reasons for Brazil's concerns: for instance, the non-ratification by the U.S. Administration of the 1982 United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (Montego Bay), explaining that Brazil was naturally concerned to ensure its rights with regard to hydrocarbon reserves and other resources found in the so-called "Blue Amazon", as well as across its Exclusive Economic Zone". Brazil's attitude of opposition and distrust remained unaltered: as Pedro Seabra pointed out in a footnote of the article previously mentioned, "this topic was again brought up during the CPLP's 10th Defence Minister Meeting in Brasília on November 10th, where Nelson Jobim stood his ground, while Santos Silva tried to defuse any existing tensions and doubts" as to the reason of the Portuguese stance and intensions, with some degree of success. Was this a demonstration of Brazil's growing inflexibility against the presence of the U.S. in the southern region of the Atlantic basin?

In terms of discourse, it was certainly so, and moreover in a sustained manner. However, let us examine other less rhetorical and more "kinetic" aspects of U.S.-Brazil bilateral policies, given their contrast with the discursive manifestations. We shall first put them into context and focus on the eastern vertical strip I mentioned earlier that runs along western Africa.

As a matter of fact, American securitization of the West African coast dates back a few years. The Hula Bell plan for "out of area" NATO operations was active between 1983

³⁶ Nelson A. Jobim at the closing session of the International Conference titled "O Futuro da Comunidade Transatlântica" (10 September 2010).

³⁷ Nelson A. Jobim (2010), NATO presence in South Atlantic "inappropriate" says Brazil", MercoPress (16 September), accessed on 2 March 2011 at <http://en.mercopress.com/2010/09/16/nato-presence-in-south-atlantic-inappropriate-says-brazil>

³⁸ Cláudia Antunes (2010), "Ministro da Defesa ataca estratégia militar de EUA e OTAN para o Atlântico Sul" (*Folha de S. Paulo*, 4 November), downloaded on 2 March 2011 from <http://www1.folha.uol.com.br/mundo/825261-ministro-da-defesa-ataka-estrategia-militar-de-eua-e-otan-para-o-atlantico-sul.shtml>. Governments such as the U.S. "do not recognize the legal status of countries like Brazil, which has 350 miles of its continental shelf under its sovereignty". Hence its uncompromising harshness: "how can we talk about the South Atlantic with a country that does not recognize the titles referred to by the UN? The Atlantic it refers to, is it the one up to the Brazilian coast, or the one that extends beyond 350 miles off the Brazilian coast?" More than a set attitude, I believe these statements are evidence of a negotiating stance which focuses Brasília's diplomatic guns on the central dispute Brazil wants to see solved.



and 1986. For Portugal and other allies, under the then CINCIBERLANT, the defence of the Cape Route represented the main concern. In addition, two Brazilian frigates and one submarine (Tamoio) participated in the Linked Seas exercise in the late 1990s, at the initiative of CINCIBERLANT and of Vice-Admiral Nuno Vieira Matias, a Portuguese. They carried Portuguese liaison officers who had NATO codes and publications which the Brazilians had obviously no access to, as their officers did not belong to a Member-State of the Alliance. According to some Portuguese participants, the Brazilian officials liked this exercise with NATO very much, as it conferred them "status". In the twenty first century, the American military presence in the area increased. The U.S. send a naval force to the South American coast every year to carry out exercises with the local navies, as part of an operation called UNITAS.

For two or three years Portugal also participated with frigates of the "Comandante João Belo" class, and so did Spain. Since the beginning of this decade, the U.S. sends an amphibious ship, or an auxiliary ship, carrying Polish, French, British, and Dutch officials, among others, to the coast of Africa – from Dakar downwards – stopping on Gulf of Guinea countries. The ship stops for a week and conducts short courses and training activities with the local navies. "*African Partnership Station* is the generic term used to describe this operation³⁹.

There is another recent example, among many others with regard to the eastern vertical strip of the South Atlantic. Between 18 and 23 March, naval military exercises of unprecedented scale titled *Obangame Express* took place in the Gulf of Guinea,⁴⁰ involving nine states: the United States, Cameroon (which acted as host, housing the command centre for the joint exercise at the naval base of Doula, at the Centre for Multinational Coordination – CMC – of ECCAS), Nigeria, Gabon, São Tome and Principe, the Republic of the Congo, France, Belgium, and Spain. Seven of these countries (U.S. Cameroon, Nigeria, Gabon, France, Belgium, Spain, and the ECCAS had their ships involved in the Obangame Express wargames.

In this, as in many other cases, the truth is that the U.S. military presence in the eastern strip of the South Atlantic has been growing, as stated in the Media Fact Sheet of the Washington Embassy in Yaoundé, Cameroon: "Obangame Express is a multinational maritime military exercise organized by the United States Africa Command (headquartered in Stuttgart, Germany) and United States Naval Forces Africa (headquartered in Naples, Italy) in collaboration with Cameroon, members of the Economic Community of Central African States (CEEAC), and international partners.[....] The exercise is part of the Africa Partnership Station (APS) program of the United States Africa Command (also known as 'AFRICOM') and its international partners". On

³⁹ I quote António Pinheiro, in a private conversation we had: "The first APS took place between November 2007 and April 2008 (it was conducted still under the command of EUCOM, as AFRICOM only attained FOC (*full operational capability*) on 1 October 2008). This 'polytechnic mobile school' concept stemmed from an earlier programme called Global Fleet Station (GFS) led by U.S. SOUTHCOM, which was quite successful in the bilateral relationship between the U.S. and Central American and Caribbean countries. The training and educational offer is vast (going well beyond mil-to-mil cooperation), and the multidisciplinary team divided between the two vessels performs multiple tasks 24 hours a day. The excellent media coverage, the multinational nature of the trainers, the diversity of activities conducted in support of local populations during stopovers at African ports, and the strong participation of civilians from the area of development are skilfully [used] arguments to demonstrate the practical application of the [...] motto 'Do no harm!'; which is extensively used within AFRICOM during the training/awareness raising sessions of its staff".

⁴⁰ For additional information, see the quite detailed data available at the U.S. Embassy in Yaoundé, Cameroon, acceded on 15 April 2011 at <http://beegeagle.wordpress.com/2011/03/28/nigerian-navy-participate-in-multinational-sea-exercise-in-the-gulf-of-guinea/>



the ground, despite the government spin in the White House, little or nothing has changed, besides a change in some cases, perceptible in the discourse used. The U.S. commitment or investment in the area has not disappeared, nor has the acquiescence of most states in the region to rely on them.

Let us look at the other side, that of South America. On the South Atlantic vertical strip to the west, this time from the South American side, another parallel example also serves for all, in order to deconstruct illusions. From November to December 2010, the largest air exercises in the history of the continent – CRUZEX V (Operation Southern Cross, no. 5) took place in Natal, in north-eastern Brazil. At Brazil's invitation, crews and aircraft of the Air Force of the United States participated for the first time, as well as, to a lesser extent, its lateral equivalents from Chile, Uruguay, Argentina and France, side by side with Brazilians and North Americans⁴¹. This was a multinational large-scale air exercise, which, for several weeks, brought together resources from various Air Forces that followed the *modus operandi* employed by NATO. The chosen scenario was interesting: in this "double-action exercise based on a low intensity simulated conflict, the Blue Forces (Coalition Forces) fought the Red Forces (Opponent Forces). The Air Forces of guest countries make up the Coalitions Forces in the Blue Country, against the Opponent Forces"⁴². The multinational operation lasted from 28 October to 20 November 2010 and, with almost 950 take-offs and about 1,200 flight hours, it was the biggest exercise in simulated air warfare that ever took place in South America⁴³. The maps used in the exercise were explicit, clearly outlining an area similar to northern South America, where Venezuela and Colombia are located. As was widely noted by Brazilian military commentators and close sources, since no country from South America is part of NATO, this was an excellent opportunity"⁴⁴for the air forces of these countries to learn about the doctrines and procedures of NATO and expand their cooperation with it. And so it was done.

The point I wish to stress is the scale of such joint operations, as well as the simple fact that they were carried out despite the "speech acts" that seemed to render them unfeasible – a disparity between discourse and deed which, as far as this Southern Atlantic part is concerned, points to the realization that the process of building a security structure in the South Atlantic sub-region, albeit incipient, is not new and seems unstoppable, indicating that the new Obama Administration is worried about the opening of new areas of instability. It must also be noted that, in the case of the Latin American powers I mentioned earlier, the foreseeable reactions of Latin American, Caribbean and African entities (state or others) is to counteract, as much as their much more reduced possibilities can afford a systematic and increasing attitude of American power in a huge geopolitical region whose centrality does not cease to expand. To this

⁴¹ Two *petites histoires*: according to several blogs available on the Internet, the big story on the CRUZEX V was that a French *Rafale* fighter-bomber was virtually brought down during the war games by a Northrop F-5 of the Brazilian air force – a plane of the 1970s, which had been modernized with Israeli technology. Another story concerns the interpretation that was done in several websites and in YouTube regarding the actual exercises, which were significantly called "*Hombre, porqué no te callas*" (Man, why don't you shut up?), an obvious allusion to the remark made by King Juan Carlos of Spain to Hugo Chávez a couple of years earlier.

⁴² Check, for example, the site *Poder Aéreo* at <http://www.aereo.jor.br/2010/08/23/cruzex-v-e-a-venezuela/> on these exercises and on Venezuela's absence from them, since the latter had been a regular collaborator of the yearly CRUZEX, this one being the fifth edition.

⁴³ The official website of CRUZEX V, managed by the Brazilian air force, can be easily accessed at <http://www.fab.mil.br/portal/capa/index.php>

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*



we should perhaps add an eventual regional balancing reaction – at least in the South Atlantic vertical western strip, in face of the new assertiveness of Brazil undergoing a paradigm change in terms of foreign policy and security and defence policy⁴⁵.

This could be seen coming, actually. There are many South American states that have expressed concern at the political, economic and military rise of Brazil⁴⁶. Examples include, of course, Venezuela, Colombia, Chile, Argentina, and Uruguay. I shall not go into detail about this in the present paper; it should be noted, however, that the concern is very much real, and that it is here to stay. It will be up to Brazil to allay such understandable fears, which the objectives I have mentioned refer to and current practices enhance. Not too much is worth saying about the differences between the theoretical-discursive aspects and the political “kinetic” practices, unless we do so to stress, like George Friedman did in a different context with regard to the tensions between Iran and the United States, that “from a purely rhetorical point of view, it is not always easy to tell which sides’ politicians are more colourful”⁴⁷.

On the ‘security properties’ of the new South Atlantic highlight

In order to present a successful overview of what I have been referring to, I shall look at the bigger picture in a more comprehensive way. It is true that the weight of the southern seas has decreased significantly, *mutatis mutandis*, as, like South America, Africa remained in the background of the outbreaks of change and modernization which have been redesigning the world since the post 1945. For decades on end the African continent was viewed – both internally and externally – as a passive victim of poverty, corruption, wars, and underdevelopment, and as a setting of natural and humanitarian disasters that often had terrible consequences.

The strategic importance of Africa, when it enjoyed it, was pegged to the geopolitical interests of *others*, namely of the Europeans; that was the case, for example, with the so-called scramble for Africa in the late nineteenth century.

This image is no longer enough – if it ever was – to portray ongoing processes. It is true that the centrality of Africa remains essentially geopolitical and that the interests it reacts to are still mostly *external*. In a general sense, the same could be said about South America. However, this somehow rather gloomy scenario of passivity and subordination is changing. Indeed, there are other ingredients in the “new scramble for Africa” and for South America, both in its northern part and in its southernmost extensions, that bring to the fore an unavoidable proactivity of some regional states in the relationship with the Great Powers (European and other, in a new “South-South” matrix and in an increasingly interdependent world) that interact with them⁴⁸.

⁴⁵ For a general and precise introduction to the multiple roles and concerns of Brazil in this region, see the short study of Brazilian Vice Admiral Wilson Barbosa Guerra (2011). “O Brasil e a Segurança do Atlântico Sul”, *Nação e Defesa* 128: 67-77.

⁴⁶ See, for example, Paulo Gorjão (2010). “The repercussions of Brazil's increasing diplomatic assertiveness”, *ViewPoints*, IPRIS, October.

⁴⁷ In George Friedman (2012). “Considering a U.S.-Iranian Deal”, STRATFOR, 24 January, available at http://www.stratfor.com/weekly/considering-us-iranian-deal?utm_source=freelist-f&utm_medium=email&utm_campaign=20120124&utm_term=qweekly&utm_content=readmore&elq=8cd8f6b74314329975fc1d7ad2edf46

⁴⁸ Several studies have been carried out on recent qualitative changes in recent Brazilian foreign policy. See, for instance the interesting study by Paulo G. Fagundes Visentini (2009). “O Brasil e a Cooperação Sul-Sul no Pós-Guerra Fria. Políticas externas comparadas, relações bilaterais e multilaterais com as ‘potências



Generally, this progression of affairs has been analyzed in Portugal as a “classic” mode; but this will no longer do, as new international political players like the U.S. and China have become centrepieces for understanding regional political dynamics. Looking at African affairs, it has become a rule that these new external “agents” have joined continental ones, such as South Africa, Nigeria, Angola or Botswana (just to mention four of the many possible cases), in the range of players with the potential to play important roles in the global political arena. At multilateral level, the players are organizations such as the African Union and its Council for Peace and Security, and the New Partnership for Africa’s Development (NEPAD) with its supposedly innovative and effective peer-review mechanism.

Across the Southern Ocean the same could be said with regard to Brazil, the Venezuela-Colombia pair, or even small Uruguay, changing what can be altered, which often is. Of course this does not happen in a uniform manner. Due to various reasons associated with internal dynamics – including the cyclical and endemic crises of legitimacy that affect the elites in power, glaring domestic economic inequalities, and human and territorial insecurity political and military situations – the new continental players have not always been able to fulfil their designed potential. Examples include the Congo and Nigeria, on the Atlantic coast of Africa, and Colombia and Venezuela.

It is nowadays growingly clear that the role of South American and South African states is becoming more central in shaping their own place in the increasingly complex geopolitical and geostrategic framework where their own interests are embedded. Besides Brazil, huge South Africa and Nigeria, small Botswana and a rather big Angola surely have been acquiring an ever more central role. In addition to this, Brazil and Angola may not be the only Portuguese speaking countries to come to the limelight: Paul Lubeck, Michael J. Watts and Ronnie Lipschutz⁴⁹, stress that the Pentagon’s strategy has been “to lie low and work through African institutions to train troops and strengthen security”; while John Pike –Director of GlobalSecurity.org – predicted that “the tiny island state of São Tomé and Príncipe will become the AFRICOM base. This island seems destined to be America’s unsinkable aircraft carrier in the Gulf of Guinea, much like Diego Garcia in the Indian Ocean and Guam in the Pacific. Additional strategic advantages of STP are: its isolation from the mainland, location within the Nigerian sphere of influence, and richness of oil and natural gas deposits within its territorial waters. Securing Nigerian energy resources will be, of course, a major strategic goal of the new AFRICOM command”⁵⁰. Despite the formal location of the

emergentes”, Núcleo de Estratégia e Relações Internacionais – NERINT (Centre for Strategic and International Relations) of the *Instituto Latino-Americano de Estudos Avançados* –ILEA (Latin American Institute for Advanced Studies) of the Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul (UFRGS), with the support of the Alexandre de Gusmão Foundation (FUNAG). With regard to the regional impact of those changes in the foreign policy of Brazil, it is useful to check the article by André Luiz Reis da Silva (2009). “A América do Sul na política externa do Governo Fernando Henrique Cardoso, um legado para o Governo Lula?”, equally published by NERINT. Concerning the development of foreign policy for Africa by Itamaraty, the work of Paulo G. Fagundes Visentini and Analúcia Danilevich Pereira (2009). “A política africana do governo Lula”, published by NERINT is very useful.

⁴⁹ Paul Lubeck M., Michael J. Watts and Ronnie Lipschutz (2007). *Convergent Interests. US energy security and the 'securing' of Nigerian democracy*: p.2, International Policy Report, Center for International Security.

⁵⁰ The objective of this Central Command remains, however, less clear than the others that make up the U.S. quadrangle in the world since the end of World War II: “testifying before the Senate Armed Services Committee in 2005, EUCOM’s then-commander, General James Jones, emphasized that his command’s “objective in Africa should be to eliminate ungoverned areas, to counter extremism, and to end conflict and reduce chronic instability” because of Africa’s “potential to become the next front in the Global War on Terrorism”⁵⁰. However, it must be noted that the respected International Crisis Group (ICG) “expressed



command in Stuttgart, Baden-Württemberg, Germany, the regular inflows of U.S. military that over the past six years have been travelling to and from the archipelago may well prove him right.

Are we then now capable of a first assessment? The absence of a robust and consensual security framework may have serious implications. But this will not happen now, and it seems unlikely that it will emerge in a linear way. In any case, the absence of a simple security framework in a South Atlantic with a growing multidimensional importance is seriously felt today in the form of small facts and incidents which otherwise might appear to be individual and unconnected issues. However, they are not, and it is worth listing a few: In May 2010, the turbulent Julius Mulema, the young president of YLANC, the "Youth League" of the African National Congress of South Africa – the ruling party – was accused by his own party as a result of the contacts he maintained with President Hugo Chávez of Venezuela "without authority from above"⁵¹, and, more recently in late 2011 and early 2012, he suffered serious disciplinary action ordered by President Zuma; the same Hugo Chavez who, in early April 2008, officially proposed to President Lula da Silva the joint creation and leadership of a South Atlantic Treaty Organization (which he called SATO), as "opposed" to "North American" NATO⁵²; a 2010 confidential report on coastal security in Namibia, Angola, and the two Congo – an area extending over several thousands of kilometres, full of numerous resources such as diamonds, oil, and several ores – produced under the aegis of a Nordic State, parts of which I had access to, regrets the fact that there were just between one hundred and fifty to two hundred man (Angolan *ninjas*, as they are called) with just a couple of Korean frigates; the report states that the situation in the Niger Delta remains chaotic, and that a rekindle of tensions between the United Kingdom and Argentina with regard to the Falkland/Malvinas Island is ongoing⁵³.

There are many more individual facts and events like these... What in many cases turns out to be less of a one-off episode is the growing perception, often increasingly agonistic in tone, that security threats have triggered structured and precise reactions, at least among regional and global players more aware of this "baptism". Again, a few examples: the vast archipelago of Cape Verde, which is a very clear choke point, has long been *effectively* seen as a "door", a "lock" or the "bottle neck" that can enable – or prevent – the connection between the North Atlantic and the South. Today it is more than ever. The same was implicitly recognized by Solomon Passy, at the time Minister of Foreign Affairs of Bulgaria and later, in 2009, candidate to the post of Secretary-General of NATO – when in 2005 he formally proposed the inclusion of Cape Verde in the Atlantic Alliance; although this was not accepted – among other member states of the organization, Greece objected to it – some states, including Portugal, made a semi-

deep skepticism about the contention that the Sahara and Sahel are terrorist 'swamps' that must be drained by the Americans and their local allies". What, in any case, is clear is that the US does not wish to irritate the locals by ostensibly reinforcing its political and military presence, which has been increasing in the region.

⁵¹ In this regard see, via Google, the article titled "Youth league president remains defiant on nationalization of South African mines", which is shown in dozens of publications. See also the most recent articles (2012) concerning the suspension of Mulema decreed by President Zuma.


⁵² See the article titled "Venezuela and Brazil can create a South Atlantic Treaty Organization" in the Portuguese edition of the famous newspaper *Pravda*, from 14 April 2008, available at <http://port.pravda.ru/mundo/22354-criar-0>

⁵³ It is worth reading the remarkable maps of what is in dispute, executed by the International Boundary Research Unit of the University of Durham, United Kingdom, available at http://www.dur.ac.uk/ibru/resources/south_atlantic/



formal coalition and made the “Declaration of Lanzarote” on 13 June 2009, which was signed with the purpose of outlining a soft security architecture (facing organized crime, health, and the environment) for the South Atlantic area that extends to the south of the allied jurisdictional space⁵⁴. This is attested, albeit episodically, by NATO’s decision to carry out the Operation Steadfast Jaguar in the archipelago between 15 and 28 June 2006, which were the first military exercises in the “African Continent”⁵⁵. The same applies to the ones that followed, although this is not part of the new Strategic Concept of the Alliance⁵⁶.

Figure 4 - The vast South Atlantic, as seen by Google Earth



NATO and the SATO: a succession of avatars in the search for a new regional security architecture

For the sake of hindsight, let us quickly examine the genealogy or pedigree of the matter – a useful analytical move, as this was not the first time that the Atlantic

⁵⁴ It was an initiative of Spain and Portugal involving over ten countries on both sides of the Atlantic, designed merely to increase collaboration between the two sides of the ocean in areas such as immigration, poverty alleviation or environmental protection.

⁵⁵ For NATO’s official press release on the operation, unfortunately not very detailed, see http://www.nato.int/shape/issues/shape_nrf/sfig06/pressrel.htm

⁵⁶ Something I shall not address here, but which enables another article to complement the present one.



Alliance turned its eyes to the south, nor the first time the idea of a SATO was advanced. It is useful to look at the historical and institutional background, even if referring to another time and international order – the bipolar and Cold War period. The genealogy of attempts to make NATO act “out of the area” *avant la lettre* is both extremely complex and interesting for what it reveals of the internal correlation of powers within the Alliance. A couple of examples will suffice: after having considered that “resistance to direct or indirect aggression in any part of the world is an essential contribution to the common security of the free world,” thus expressing its support for French military action in the region⁵⁷ in a resolution in December 1952 – at the request of France, which was committed to maintaining its Southeast Asian possessions, ten years later the North Atlantic Council continued to support, albeit nominally, France’s efforts in Algeria. However, when the Portuguese government requested something similar in relation to its African colonies, this was refused⁵⁸; some states are obviously more important than others...

More was to follow: quoting John Chipman in 1987, “in the mid-1970s, concern centred for some time on problems in South Africa. Fears of the putative Soviet campaign of ‘total onslaught’ in southern Africa led to worries that strategic materials located there would be lost to the West or that the Cape route might be effectively controlled by the Soviet Union. Inevitably, there were a few who felt that NATO should act to prevent this from happening, or should at least be prepared to protect its interests. Speculation that NATO developed extensive plans with South Africa”. The insistence came, in the now distant 1970s, from the apartheid regime in power in the Union of South Africa, but it did not work out: “while some studies were done in the 1970s by Allied Command Atlantic on the defence of South Atlantic shipping and other contingencies south of the Tropic of Cancer, it never received a license to plan operations”⁵⁹.

South Africa’s ambition was to build a “kind of SATO” involving both Africa from Cape Horn to Latin America, which ended in resounding failure for a “West” that was understandably hesitant before the Pretoria regime. Hindsight gives us a glimpse of what was at stake from the perspective of South Africa; as John Chipman pointed out, in 1987 the actors were of a different generation and they lived in a very distinct international situation: “South Africa’s attempts to develop a South Atlantic Treaty Organization must be seen in the light that leaders in South Africa have consistently argued that Soviet naval activities in the South Atlantic might turn the area into a ‘communist lake’ and sought to enlist other governments into a loose military organization in order to protect ‘Western interests’ in the area. In the late 1970s and

⁵⁷ These were the terms of a Resolution of the North Atlantic Assembly Ministerial Meeting agreed in Paris at a meeting held between 15 and 18 December 1952.

⁵⁸ John Chipman (1987). “NATO and out of area insecurity”, *Estratégia*, n. 3, Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos e Internacionais, no. 3, Lisbon. According to John Chipman, then Deputy Director of the Regional Security of ISS, in London, “in October 1968 at a NATO meeting in Lisbon, the Portuguese Foreign Minister argued that ‘the NATO Alliance should not be indifferent to the preservation for the West of vital strategic positions. We have never understood, for example, how one can separate the North Atlantic from the South Atlantic or how one can ensure the security of one without taking into account the security of the other’. The Portuguese government even offered NATO use of its bases in Africa in order to assist in the protection of the Cape route, but this offer was not taken up by other member states, which were more concerned that Portuguese policy in Africa could lead to a smooth transition to independence for its African possessions”. The Portuguese claim was not met. The minister was, obviously, Franco Nogueira, quoted in Christopher Coker (1985). *NATO, the Warsaw Pact and Africa*: 54, RUSI Defence Studies Series, MacMillan.

⁵⁹ Johan Jorgen Holst (1986). “NATO and the Wider World: Strategic Interests and Domestic Constraints”, *NUPINotat*, August, p. 6.



early 1980s, various Argentinean officials seemed to openly support the idea of a South Atlantic defence pact. Other countries in the region were less enthusiastic. The statement made by the Foreign Minister of Brazil in September 1976 to the effect that 'there is not the slightest possibility of establishing a collective security system in the South Atlantic, especially with the awkward and unwanted presence of South Africa, 'is perhaps typical of that country's approach'⁶⁰. In the early months of the Reagan Administration, there were some fleeting references by American officials visiting South American countries on the desirability of greater military collaboration among South Atlantic powers, but the difficulty in bringing the relevant parties together meant that the idea was never carried very far⁶¹. Indeed, "while some studies were done in the 1970s by the Allied Atlantic Command on the defence of South Atlantic shipping and other contingencies south of the Tropic of Cancer, it never received a license to plan operations"⁶². Even at the level of the gap (or, perhaps better, the slot) that connects and separates the discourses and the actual practices that have been carried out, it seems clear that differen subgroups involved did not then (as, of course, they do not now) see eye to eye.

It is true that the bipolar world of the cold warriors is dead and that now the rules of the game have changed. However, I believe that the new conventional wisdom has had smaller eyes and a bigger belly than what would have been appropriate. There are macro moves which run in parallel; and surely more serious, although less easy to consider, is the establishing of increasingly closer ties between Hugo Chavez and the Russian President Dmitri Medvedev and Mahmoud Ahmadinejad from Iran. The same goes for the direct and indirect support the latter received from the then Brazilian President Lula (and later from President Dilma Rousseff) regarding Persia's nuclear aspirations. In a curious political and diplomatic

coup de théâtre, a few weeks before Brazil, as non-permanent member of the Security Council of the United Nations, voted against the extension of sanctions on Iran, Hans Rühle, a former Director-General for Defence Policy of the German Federal Ministry of Defence, published in the many senses official *Internationale Politik*, of the German

⁶⁰ The Minister was António Francisco Azeredo da Silveira, quoted in Andrew Hurrell (1983), "The Politics of South Atlantic Security; A Survey of Proposals for a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation", *International Affairs*, vol. 59, no. 2, Spring, p. 187.

⁶¹ *Ibid*, p. 191.

⁶² Johan Jorgen Holst, *op. cit.*: 6. It must be noted that this was not a mere hesitation of the Atlantic Alliance in the face of a South Africa in loss of international legitimacy: even when it came from other circles, the idea of an institutionalized and coherent regional architecture for the South Atlantic never had much weight, despite increasing problems, or perhaps precisely because of them; "the Falklands war sufficiently complicated the strategic situation in the region to put an end to whatever hopes some might have entertained for the establishment of a South Atlantic security system. Even if a few admirals steeped into Mahanite thinking have occasionally suggested the importance of politically and operationally uniting the North Atlantic and South Atlantic's 'strategic spaces', these ideas have never held any currency in NATO or in national alliance defence establishments". To a certain extent, the problem was 'conceptual'. As John Chipman affirmed, "the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is committed to the defence of a certain region, yet that region has no special geographical meaning and exists only by virtue of the definition given to it in the treaty text. Though the contracting parties agree that the whole region is to be defended, in practice, planning takes place largely for the defence of Western Europe; there are no specific plans for what Europeans might do to bolster American territorial security. These two facts make it difficult to speak of NATO as a regional alliance in the strict sense of the term: no map clearly identifies the North Atlantic area, and security for the part of the area that does make geographic sense (Western Europe), largely guaranteed by an Alliance partner (the United States) whose homeland lies outside it. It is small wonder, therefore, that there should be doubts about how the Alliance should deal with threats that stem from outside the area". To a large extent, resistance was political and structural in nature, and endogenous to the organization, immediately putting in evidence a limitation that was intrinsic to it with regard to the willingness of member states to cooperate beyond the minimum that they had to.



Council for Foreign Relations, a remarkable article titled "Brazil and the Bomb. Vexing nuclear activities in South America", detailing Brazil's many secret nuclear activities, and indicating that the country was also emptying the contents of the already fragile Non-Proliferation Treaties⁶³. It is true that the Brazilian President has since then retreated her steps, moderated her discourse, replaced Nelson Jobim, and distanced herself from Iran and its nuclear aspirations.

But all evidence indicates that the absence of a consensual and robust security architecture for the South Atlantic is becoming very dangerous in the high stakes it originates.

What might all this mean for Portugal and for the future of 'lusophony'?

I shall finish with what I consider to be some educated guesswork with respect to the potential implications for Portuguese and "lusophone" interests brought about by this new state of affairs – the absence of robust security frameworks for a region in turmoil and the obvious need for the eventual emergence of a new security architecture for a seething South Atlantic. I started by focusing on South America, turning then to southern Africa. However, right from the outset, I want to emphasize the enormous weight of "Lusophony" in the South Atlantic as I defined it.

I shall begin by pulling together some of the strands of what I stated earlier: out of the existing eight Portuguese speaking countries, five (Brazil, Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe) are located there; three of them, perhaps four (all, except Cape Verde) have oil and vast additional resources. The main language of this huge basin is Portuguese, and it is in this political universe that the bulk of economic growth and development have taken place in this resurgent region. In my final thoughts, I would like to draw limits to what I find possible, and to outline potentialities. Somehow populating it with details, I touch on issues I have alluded to already, such as the creation of a U.S. command centre for Africa, AFRICOM; the rebirth of the U.S. Fourth Fleet, almost 60 years after its dissolution in 1950, with all its implications; the crescendo in joint military exercises; China's race to both coasts of the South Atlantic; Russia and its approximation to Bolivarianism; and even, as we shall see, the hypothetical "reconnection", through the export of revolutionary and insurgent models from Latin America to Africa, and the eventual centrality, in this framework, of the North-South island geography that is so characteristic of these southern seas, which, as we have seen, have been put into a kind of temporary virtual coma since the end of the pre-industrial Atlantic triangular trade. What are the implications of this for Portugal?

Without any ambition to offer anything even close to a definitive answer, it seems to me important to pose a question which may begin the process of shaping that answer. What is the impact of this deregulation and of this re-positioning for the future of a

⁶³ The article can easily be found at www.ip-global.org. A simplified version published a few days before the voting in New York has been republished many times, as shown by simple search. For some historical background, the following is important: Ricardo Medeiros de Castro (2006). *Reinterpretando a cooperação nuclear entre Brasil e Argentina: as diversas nuances e perspectivas de relacionamento no contextomundial*, Federal University of Rio Grande do Sul, Porto Alegre, Master Degree dissertation. For a good historical background written by a Yale Professor, see Jean Krasno (1994), "Non-proliferation: Brazil's secret nuclear program", ORBIS.



'lusophony' that, if built, will inevitably have its centre of gravity in the South Atlantic? Simplicity should be ruled out from the very beginning: it is not easy to suggest a plausible response, much less a solution, to this quandary. In any case, it seems that the possibility of any Portuguese-speaking state leading, by itself, that apparently much coveted entity, is to be excluded: none has the clout, or the heft, to do so. Also, it is not obvious either that Brazil or Angola, both to be sure undergoing vigorous growth, will consider any supra-national or intergovernmental construct as less detrimental to their strict and narrow national interests.

The US Administration, for its part, does not seem inclined to allow a security deregulation in an area that is increasingly vital to its own interests. In an ideal world, the solution would surely be the alignment of Lusophone countries from the North and South Atlantic with a meta-regional project that only the United States would be in a position to lead. The fact may or may not please us, depending on our political stance and according to our national interests; it is a pure and simple evidence whose implications we should take in. It may be less plausible for the Americans to abandon the deployment of forces to the south that they have been conducting – in a kind of new corollary of the Monroe Doctrine – than for Brazil to be capable, from a logistic and military point of view, in timely fashion and with the necessary robustness, to attend to the security tremors that are expected and which, unfortunately, have been increasing, along the extensive, complex and turbulent African coast on the other side of the ocean.

Even in an optimal scenario, 'Lusophony' is, in other words, increasingly more captive of a *Mare Nostrum* where – should one be minimally realistic, as we of course must – we cannot but play second fiddle⁶⁴. Portugal may, indeed, take some advantage of the various organizations and *fora* it is part of, being a member of NATO, the EU and the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries (CPLP). It has a "strategic partnership" with China, embodied in the "Macao Forum", and, albeit with less autonomy, it can benefit from the Ibero-American Summits in which it participates. The same applies to its counterparts, namely Brazil and Angola, in the *fora* where they also participate. Cape Verde and São Tomé and Príncipe (and Guinea-Bissau, although in a different league) may also take advantage of their position as choke points and areas of some strategic importance. However, we cannot expect much more than that: multilateral posturing. Indeed, the question is not whether 'lusophony' can erect a stable architecture of security in the South Atlantic. Rather, the real issue is one of how not to be left out of the security architecture which will inevitably be built by others – and thus avoid becoming mere passive observers of an ongoing and unstoppable process.

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⁶⁴ For an alternative view, it is useful to read the interview titled "Um clube lusófono" de segurança", in which General Loureiro dos Santos, a Portuguese, argued before journalist Luísa Meireles, on 28 March 2009, the feasibility of such an entity bringing together Brazil, Angola and Portugal; at <http://aeiou.expresso.pt/loureiro-dos-santos-quer-clube-lusofono-de-seguranca=f505869>. Interestingly, the idea no longer appears in a later article by José Alberto Loureiro dos Santos (2011), "Uma Visão Portuguesa da Segurança no AtlânticoSul", *Nação e Defesa*, 128: 19-29.



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GLOBAL COSMOPOLITAN ECONOMICS, THE EURO AND THE PORTUGUESE ECONOMY

Manuel Farto

mfarto@ual.pt

Associate Professor in the School of Economics and Management Studies (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon (UTL). He holds a Degree in Economics from ISEG, UTL, and a Ph.D. in Economics from UTL, per equivalence awarded to the Ph.D. in *Histoire de la Pensée Économique* obtained at the University of Paris X-Nanterre. He is a Visiting Professor at the University of Orléans (France) and at the Federal University of Paraíba (Brazil), and Deputy Director of the magazine JANUS (UAL/*Público*). He has held several public positions, including that of Chief of Staff of the Minister of Public Works, Transport and Communications, Deputy Director-General of Higher Education and Academic Affairs, and Vice Chairman of the Board of ISEG. He participated in several national and international conferences and published several articles in magazines and books. His main research interests are Macroeconomics, International Economics, History of Economic Thought, and Economic Policy.

Abstract

Despite favourable external circumstances, in the last decade the Portuguese economy developed a model of *imbalance* and *dependence* based on the disparity between production and consumption, which was financed from the outside and led to anaemic growth, severe deficits and explosive debt, much similar to the Latin American populist models of the past. The restrictions related to the adoption of the euro and inadequate economic policies are the determinants of this process, and, simultaneously, the barriers that need to be overcome. The internal devaluation/recessionary policy, wrongly presented as a close replacement for external devaluation/expansionary policy, underestimates the recessive effects on demand and the way it gets aggravated amidst strong indebtedness, fostering a deflationary spiral that tends to undermine the policy of austerity that is essential to reduce the imbalances. Doubts about the benefits of the abatement of all obstacles (including those of a monetary nature) to free trade among countries of very unequal development, long expressed by Friedrich List, are intensifying. In the absence of own currency, sovereignty and discretionary budgetary policy will be reduced in favour of prescribed rules, limiting economic policies to microeconomic and mesoeconomic frameworks. Due to the lack of an independent exchange rate mechanism, the exports sector sets the pace for the growth of the economy and of wages in the long term, while the impossibility to devalue tends to lead to cumulative imbalances that are only offset by the occurrence of crises. Avoiding the latter requires paced wage and social policies, and increasing the rate of growth of the product and wages requires the development of an exports sector with high added value. This is the policy and strategy narrow path that Portuguese economy needs to tread.

Keywords

Cosmopolitan economics; euro; Portuguese economy; crisis; imbalance; wage deflation; devaluation; macroeconomic policy; microeconomic policy; demand; debt sustainability; growth

How to cite this article

Farto, Manuel (2012). "Global cosmopolitan economics, the euro and the Portuguese economy". *JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2012. Accessed [online] on (date of last viewing), observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol3_n1_art2

Article received on April 2012 and accepted for publication on May 2012



GLOBAL COSMOPOLITAN ECONOMICS, THE EURO AND THE PORTUGUESE ECONOMY

Manuel Farto

1. Introduction

Today the economies in the periphery of Europe face a particularly difficult situation that threatens the entire continent and has strong implications for the global economy. Greece's economy has entered into effective bankruptcy, while the Portuguese one seems to be following an equally dramatic similar path. Understanding the nature of the imbalances that shape the Portuguese situation and the conditions for overcoming them requires an examination of the framework and dynamics where the Portuguese economy fits in. The present text also aims to reflect on current practices to overcome the crisis and discuss the conditions for recovery towards economic growth and real convergence.

I shall start by examining and systematizing the form Portugal's economy became part of international dynamics, particularly in the euro zone, establishing three periods: European integration and economic and social progress, the euro and stagnation, and recession and debt.

In section three I analyse the nature of the model that has been systematized in the Portuguese economy, based on the major imbalance between production and consumption that mimics the stagnation and dependence model, which inevitably tends to be explosive and has occurred in previous decades in other contexts and regions.

I shall proceed with an analysis of the economic policy that has been conducted, mainly with regards to wage deflation, which I believe to be the core point. In addition to the psychological aspects, I will explain the basic difference between external expansionary devaluation and recession-inducing internal devaluation, underlining the common underestimation of the consequences of lower wages on domestic demand, particularly in situations of high debt, to comment on the limited and doubtful success of such policies.

Finally, before concluding, I shall review the dominant theories on foreign trade that advocate the benefits of free trade in all circumstances, and the analysis of Friedrich List in his *National System of Political Economy* (1841), who doubts these benefits when there are substantial differences in development and productivity, which is particularly significant in systems with a single currency.

I shall examine the consequences of the inexistence of own currency and monetary policies for budgetary policy, which tend to follow rules, which leaves little room for discretionary policies. I will attempt to demonstrate that, in the absence of an autonomous exchange rate mechanism, the rhythm of export growth sets the pace for economic growth in the long term, while the impossibility to devalue tends to lead to



unbalancing cumulative processes that get absorbed only by crises. Preventing the latter from occurring requires wage and social policies marked by rising exports and a state restricted as to its structure, but not necessarily as to its functions.

2. The inclusion of the Portuguese economy in the international system

The first reality that the Portuguese economy had to face was an international context characterized by the *acceleration of globalization* and its insertion in the *euro zone*. In turn, the acceleration of globalization encompassed several aspects, of which two are essential: the development of a *new geoeconomics* and an *increase in inequality in the domestic distribution of income*, both statistically observable.

The new geoeconomics is characterized by channelling growth to other parts of the world, supported mainly on the economic growth of emerging countries (Farto and Morais 2008), from which our economy is detached and with which it maintains limited relations. This situation prevents us from benefiting from this growth dynamics, but does not avert the intensification of global competition, especially with regard to our traditional markets and to comparable technological activities and specialization levels.

A second characteristic of this globalization process has to do with the development of a marked international pressure to maintain very uneven distribution systems in fast growing emerging countries, and to keep the increase of domestic inequality within developed countries where capitalism has long showed a "human face", thus increasing competition pressures and limiting the rise in demand¹ (Farto and Morais 2008, and OECD, 2010).

The second major axis of our external inclusion, which has decisively conditioned the current development process, is related to the insertion of Portugal in the euro zone, particularly to the conditioning factors or the most important choices, that is, the *effects of enlargement, joining the euro and the monetary policy* adopted.


In the process of European integration there were *three periods of Portuguese economy*: the first was our integration into the European Union (EU), supported by favourable international demand, market expansion, international investment, and structural funds, which corresponded to a period of strong growth in economic activity. This was the period of **convergence** that extended to the end of the 1990s (3rd quarter of 1999). The second phase was one of **divergence** and corresponded to joining the single currency. It is associated with economic stagnation, increase of all the imbalances in the Portuguese economy, and rampant debt. The third phase, where we stand today, is a period of dramatic **recession**.

The evolution of the growth rates of the growth domestic product (GDP) shown in the chart below, particularly the average rates, clearly illustrates the three stages mentioned above.

¹ This might provide an important reason for the explosion of debt, in particular the U.S. economy, in order to maintain living standards that the new income distribution undermines.



Chart 1



2.1. European integration and economic and social progress

The revival of economic activity in 1985 took place in a context that resembles a small miracle, creating illusions about the future. The “external shock” manifested itself in the combined effect of several events, namely the falling dollar, the drop in international interest rates, and the sharp fall in the prices of oil and raw materials, while internally a good agricultural year and plenty of rainfall contributed to the reduction of imports, particularly in the energy sector. As a result, the current account (CA) had a positive balance that led the government at the time to dispense the use of 185.7 SDR (Special Drawing Rights), which represented 40% of the amount previously agreed with the IMF (Farto and Mendonça, 2006).

While integration into the EU created favourable expectations in Portuguese entrepreneurs, particularly in relation to new ease of access to European markets, some international companies felt increasingly confident with regard to their possible transactions in Portuguese territory, taking advantage of the existence of a cheaper workforce with the same skills and training. This decisively contributed to one of the best development period of Portugal’s economy and surely the best for democracy in Portugal.

Portugal was able to benefit from a strong external thrust brought about by the integration process while maintaining a crucial protective barrier; its own currency

2.2. The Euro and stagnation

From 2002, the period of **stagnation** and of **real divergence** of the Portuguese economy is clearly perceptible. Despite the possibility of accessing large markets and vast and varied forms of financing, and the fact that it benefitted, at least initially, from



relatively low labour costs, an advantage that worn out over time, Portugal's economy took insufficient advantage from these factors, keeping a low competitive edge. The fragility and vulnerability of the production system, based on a limited specialization and on somehow limited activities with low reduced added-value, led to reduced competitiveness and limited export capacity due to the atrophy of marketable goods and services².

The deterioration of the shares of Portuguese exports on a global and European scale (albeit less severe) and a slight improvement of services worldwide (but not in Europe) denotes a slow but steady loss of competitiveness. The analysis of the real exchange rate (calculated on the unit costs of production) of tradable activities reveals a progress pattern among economies of the north of Europe, and competitive difficulties on the part of the economies of the south, namely Portugal, recording a loss of competitiveness in the last decade of about 15% (Mateus, 2010).

The external opening exerted a persistent pressure on the sectors exposed to international competition, which created a significant asymmetry in the increase of prices unfavourable to the tradable sector (Farto and Mendonça, 2006). The divergence between the increase in production costs for the entire economy and the price increase of exports during the decade reached 7%, which means the reference for the setting of prices and yields was much more stringent for tradable activities. Higher inflation on goods and services more sheltered from foreign competition enabled draining top quality resources from these activities, reducing the potential for development and success in the tradable sector.

It is true that there were unfavourable external factors, including the enlargement to the east and the monetary policy of the European Central Bank (ECB). The EU enlargement to the east increased the competitive pressure on our economy, particularly in some industrial sectors, both in other countries and in ours, leading to drastic reductions in production or simple destruction, while the new countries became a more favourable alternative for international investment. The benefits that Portugal had enjoyed from joining the EU now moved to the east.

The monetary policy conducted by the ECB also contributed to worsening problems in the entire euro zone and to its stagnation during this period, also reflected in the Portuguese economy. I have argued that restrictive monetary policies are inappropriate for a non-optimal currency area like the one we have today. I particularly believe that a 2% inflation target is objectively deflationary (Farto, 2006 and 2009), as it does not allow, without nominal wage reductions, making the inter-sector and inter-regional adjustments that economic dynamics dictate.

As can be seen in the table below, in many countries the changes in GDP since the adoption of the euro up to 2008 are significantly lower than in the previous identical time period. In this comparison, Ireland and Portugal were the great losers, and Greece and Finland the big winners. However, if we take a longer period, by 2012, compared with the previous period, there are only losers, Portugal and Ireland faring the worst, although a wide range of countries also suffered major losses. The crisis and the

² The poor productive and industrial tradition of the country has been dragging over time, hand in hand with a persistent aversion to business risk, a weak inclination to innovate, underestimation of export activities, and insufficient emphasis on education and culture.



hesitations of the monetary policy seem to be eliminating any gains that eventually could be attributed to the single currency.

Table 1

Country	89/98	99/08	Deviation	85/98	99/12	Deviation
Austria	24,84	22,82	-2,02	36,07	25,80	-10,27
Belgium	21,99	19,69	-2,30	37,82	21,18	-16,63
Finland	12,58	32,29	19,70	32,19	30,10	-2,09
France	16,07	17,59	1,52	32,77	18,63	-14,14
Germany	21,42	15,02	-6,40	36,02	17,24	-18,78
Greece	16,66	37,08	20,42	24,07	13,52	-10,55
Ireland	72,10	49,45	-22,66	94,85	40,10	-54,75
Italy	13,68	11,81	-1,87	29,98	5,98	-24,01
Luxembourg	46,42	45,88	-0,54	99,35	42,95	-56,40
Holland	30,77	21,40	-9,36	47,69	20,00	-27,70
Portugal	34,86	12,45	-22,42	68,49	5,52	-62,97
Spain	25,48	34,02	8,54	51,67	27,46	-24,21

Returning to Portugal, what is truly astonishing is that neither the over consumer practices of the Portuguese supported by cheap credit, nor the markedly expansionist economic and social policy were enough to boost an economy undergoing stagnation.

However, whereas these policies did not help to overcome the stagnation tendency, they proved decisive in developing the imbalances that meanwhile had grown deeper, leading to the present crisis. The economic policy was wrong in the way it conducted the budgetary policy³, in the disaster that the public-private partnerships turned out to be⁴, and in the ineffectivity of some reforms⁵. In addition, it did fail by not implementing indispensable structural reforms, namely at the level of job creation and justice.

In fact, a set of populist measures conducted in untimely fashion contributed to enhancing the structural imbalances of the economy, leading to the disarray of internal and external debts. *“Portugal was the first country to breach the Stability Pact as early as 2001. Since then, it has breached it every year, if we do not include the extraordinary measures, except in 2007 and 2008”* (Neves, 2011: 217).

³ The expansionary budgetary policies remained unchanged even during times of economic expansion, when what was paramount was to consolidate public accounts; housing loans at cheap interest rates continued to be granted, while lower interest rates made money cheaper; the new wage system for the civil service was introduced, which increased labour costs, not taking into account external competitiveness.

⁴ Public interest was not always safeguarded, while the deterioration of the legal system contributed to swelling the chaos of our collective life, generating huge concerns about the future of our democratic system.

⁵ The reforms in public administration through the creation of a significant number of institutes, either new ones or by means of reforming existing Directorates General, and extending social functions without taking into account the situation of the national economy led to an increase in the “fatty layers” of the state. The attempts undertaken in relation to taxation and justice produced the same results: increased structural imbalances and costs in the context of the Portuguese economy.



In brief, it can be said that among the multiple factors that always influence an economy, the euro and inadequate economic policy were the father and mother of all problems we are facing today. The adoption of a stateless currency by a group of countries that have renounced their own currency has led to an insufficiently tested new reality, with consequences not yet fully observed and analyzed, particularly in terms of conducting the actual economic policy.

2.3. Recession and debt

The model in which the growth of the economy over the last decades was based has led to stagnation of economic growth and to recession, worsening imbalances and, in particular, to the inability to finance the economy and the state in acceptable conditions.

In fact, while the economy's tendencies towards stagnation were felt, the new monetary conditions⁶ offering better (and cheaper) credit and access to easy money obtained through EU funds⁷ stressed and encouraged imitation attitudes and behaviours, excessively consumerist, increasing household spending and debt. This preference for the present, translated in the reduced savings and increasing exuberant spending that characterized the general behaviour of economic agents in Portugal, particularly public agents, without corresponding growth in productive capacity, led to the constant imbalance in public and foreign debt, particularly the latter.


In terms of its GDP, currently Portugal is clearly a major debtor on an international scale, regardless of the criteria used. The figure shows the evolution of the Portuguese public debt (PD) in millions of Euros, which has tripled since 2000, surpassing the GDP, and the position of international investment, which also indicates the unsustainable growth of external debt, particularly visible in the evolution of the variable *Other Investment* (OI). The investment position (IP) also reflects the stagnation of direct investment (DI) and the cyclical downturn of the portfolio investment (PI).

⁶ Joining the euro has sometimes been questioned for different reasons. It is now clear and undeniable that some of its negative consequences, particularly the effect it had on the external competitiveness of the economy, have not been sufficiently taken into account.

⁷ The relatively easy access to EU funds contributed to the development of corruption, political patronage and subsidy dependence, and influenced consumerist attitudes that contributed to the reduction of savings and to the sustained increase of new needs, which were met through increasing imports.



Chart 2



The recent tendency for the aggravation of public debt, implicit in the chart, is also worrying. In terms of public debt, in 2011 Portugal ranked 7th in a sample of 38 countries, being part of a rich and powerful group of countries, closely following Ireland, Greece and Spain, in addition to the U.S. and the UK, which experienced worsening of the debt ratio even more seriously than Portugal between 2009 and 2011 (Farto, 2011a).

Thus, the high level of debt and its recent dramatic aggravation, both at government level and externally, have become a time bomb whose explosion time is unknown but fatal, which strikingly limits any strategy for economic policy, forcing a current recessive orientation and the release of resources to maintain a high debt service in the future.

3. An explosive model of stagnation and imbalance

The systemization of the course of the Portuguese economy in recent decades has revealed two clear trends since joining the euro: anaemic growth, almost stagnation, and the development of important and persistent imbalances in public and external accounts. It is now important to specify the nature of the main relations that have been developed along this route.

3.1 The development of the basic imbalance between production and consumption


If we compare the ability to create wealth measured by the GDP with the level of Portuguese consumption, we note that in terms of wealth generation, Portugal



represents 64.6% of the EU 27 average, while consumption stands at 67.3%. This difference, which perhaps reflects our individual and collective preferences, is an indicator that clearly expresses the huge accrued imbalances and points to the size of the correction needed.

Chart 3

Produção e Consumo



As mentioned above, the loss of currency and of monetary policy dramatically widened the imbalance of the model that was followed, making it untenable. By increasing the pressure on demand, with the falling interest rates joining the constant inflow of structural funds and permanent budget deficits, the adoption of the Euro and the consequent loss of foreign exchange policy increased pressure on imports and over-dimensioned the non-tradable goods sector. Under these conditions, our companies have proved unable to compensate the ever-growing demand for imported goods by increasing national production. The demand for exports was driven by imitative behaviour and policies that fuelled unprecedented *consumer exuberance*, thus generating a growing unrelenting external imbalance.

An analysis leading to similar results can be done by comparing the evolution of wages and that of productivity, like the one made by João César das Neves, who summarized it as follows: "...our external difficulties and debt are not the result of producing little. Instead, we earn too much for what we produce." (Neves, 20011: 165).

3.2 A model of stagnation, imbalance and dependence

As we have seen, the Portuguese economy had one of the weakest GDP growths in the last decade, just ahead of Italy and Haiti. This stagnation of the product has contributed to maintaining the fundamental imbalance between production and consumption financed by the progressive increase in foreign debt. The model in itself does not bring any novelty. It does not differ substantially from the dependence model



developed by many economies in the past, namely those of the then called developing countries, like Brazil and Argentina, among others, and by the Portuguese economy before joining the EU.

Despite simplifying, we can consider two subgroups with very different economic characteristics in the euro area. Countries in the centre, represented by Germany, have a high productivity economy, modern technology and a current account surplus. A second group of countries, where Portugal is included, have low productivity elementary technology and high constant external deficits in their current accounts. Behaviour in the first group of countries tends towards household saving and strong export propensity, based on a rich industrial sector and on exports directed in particular to the peripheral countries in southern Europe. Conversely, southern countries have difficulty in selling goods and services that may be of interest to markets in the north, despite their size and importance, in order to make up for the situation described above.

Thus, given the asymmetry described above, economic relations between these two groups of countries would not seem very promising. However, the banking systems of the regions solved the problem, with those in the centre collecting the saving of local families and lending them to banks in the south, which in turn lend them to families, investors and peripheral states. Of course there is an assumption of credibility on the part of southern countries, which promise to pay back the capital at a periodic interest rate.

This mechanism, whereby the **exchange of current goods and funding is conducted against promises of future payment**, contrary to what may seem, has enormous potential. This is because both parties (and the parties' interests), benefit from it⁸. Countries in the centre benefitted because this mechanism contributed towards high growth and low unemployment in the region, while families accumulated financial assets, whereas peripheral countries benefitted too, with significant population groups enjoying lifestyles that otherwise they would not be able to afford (at least in this period).

This mechanism, which enabled keeping a very asymmetric exchange system, tends to engender a type of economic relations that lead to very serious imbalances, as now found, and which very few people sensed. It led to the atrophy of national productive structures, clearly confirming the fears that led List (List, 2006) to advocate *learning protectionism*. The premature total confrontation between very different production structures could not but result in constant weakening of a lower quality and less developed productive structure, widening the competitiveness lag of southern European countries with regard to countries in the north⁹.

The single currency acted as an amplifier of the imbalances, as countries from the south borrowed repeatedly under the same conditions as countries from the north, and the perception of risk between the two regions was long perceived as being the same,

⁸ This was clearly a joint responsibility. Both regions benefitted from the situation. Countries from the centre, eager to do business and to have profit, lent out easily, underestimating risks. Peripheral countries, in turn, wanted to have the same goods as those in the north; accordingly, they got into major debt, underestimating the challenges of the future.

⁹ In the last decade, Germany's wage growth was lower than productivity, in contrast to what happened in southern European countries, for which reason the competitiveness gap between the two regions widened significantly.



prompting low interest rates in both areas. The relatively low ECB interest rate of the whole euro zone led to a lending boom on the part of southern countries, which got strongly in debt (specially on the state's part, like in Greece, or specially by private individuals, such as the case of Spain or Ireland, or more or less distributed, as in Portugal), while northern countries accumulated financial assets.

To a large extent, this kind of relationship existed prior to joining the European community. However, integration developed and deepened the pre-existing model, without bringing about any significant change, I argue that, in essence, this is a situation that could be termed of **dependence**, due to the strong analogy with the dominant model that prevailed in many developing countries in previous decade¹⁰.

3.3. The limits: an explosive model

The type of model to which I refer can be represented by the equation: $E_k - S_k = (S - I) + (T - G) + (X - Z)$ ¹¹ with $(E_k - S_k) > 0$, $(S - I) < 0$, $(T - G) < 0$ and $(X - Z) < 0$, which expresses the external funding of the savings deficit, the state deficit, and the current account deficit, and the conditions that put debt on a downwards explosive route, often leading to serious financial crises with unpredictable political outcomes, can be deduced analytically.

Is there a limit to the functioning of this system? No doubt there is, but it is impossible to predict the time of the explosion¹². Basically, internal debt becomes explosive when the real interest rate is greater than the rate of economic growth and foreign debt and when there is a) systematic current account deficits, b) positive flows of loans and funding and c) the rate of external interest rate increases.

It is easy to see that all these conditions were present in Brazil at the end of the 1990s, as they are today in countries like Greece or Portugal. Brazilian minister Delfim Neto defended that "*Debts were not made to be paid, but to be rolled over*". This is partly true, but it becomes a serious problem when the financial market refuses to make the "*rollover*" of debt on terms that are acceptable to the country.

These difficulties manifest themselves in a number of well-known situations, particularly in the number of unsold securities at internal and external auctions, and in the increase in interest rates to unsustainable levels, which ultimately impose the

¹⁰ The temptation to compare our growth model with what is sometimes known as the *Latin American populist model* is huge. The model is based on *overvalued currency*, often associated with fixed parity against a strong currency, and important budget deficits that enable increasing employment, real wages and the welfare of workers above labour productivity, without proper economic structural advances. This model, which is not sustainable, always ends up generating imbalances that inevitably lead to exhaustion and even collapse.

¹¹ In this equation, E_k and S_k represent financial flows in and out; S and I account for private saving and investment; T and G stand for public revenue and expenditure; X and Z represent exports and imports.

¹² It starts to be in trouble when investors successively begin to fear that the debt is becoming untenable, as happened recently with Greece. When this opinion becomes significant, it leads to crisis, and when it becomes dominant, the system collapses.



restructuring of internal debt, mandatory applications and forfeitures, stock market plunges, privatization, currency devaluation, and recession: in a word, crisis¹³.

Will the explosion of the debt in this model in a currency area like the euro be inevitable? Not necessarily. If a monetary zone politically behaves as a country (whether it is a federation in institutional terms, or not), assuming **unlimited solidarity** from all its members, then restrictions on the conduct of economic policy and even on growth will not be fundamental, although not necessarily providing a real convergence. The dismantling of all obstacles, namely of a monetary nature, to free trade will mean that any economic imbalance occurring in less competitive economies will be compensated by the community as a whole, which should maintain, in a more or less constant way, a flow of unilateral transfer to *less developed economies, financing the fiscal and external imbalances that tend to be generated*.

However, if this is not the case¹⁴, that is, if the more developed countries fear that important and persistent deficits in all countries will eventually create a monetary stability problem or that those deficits may only create monetary instability and political difficulties in some countries, it is likely that the currency area ends up taking a **limited solidarity** that will tend to exclude the non-acceptance of budget deficits and/or the debt pooling. This is what is now happening in the euro zone with all its consequences.

4. The Portuguese economic crisis and economic policy

We have seen that the growth model that became consolidated in the Portuguese economy and even the characteristics of the current crisis are not essentially different from other well-know situations described in international economic history literature, particularly with regards to Portugal in the past. However, there are fundamental differences in context that make all the difference in the answers that can be given. I refer in particular to the *levels of the debt* (both public and external) and to the *impossibility to have our own monetary policy*, as a result of integration in the euro area. These *two constraints* are paramount when dealing with the problem of defining an appropriate economic policy.

In the past, there was a pattern that could be taken as a reference, which was the programme of measures suggested by the International Monetary Fund (IMF), and whose implementation led to vast knowledge of its strengths and limitation. However, the aforesaid constraints undermine much of the standard programme, such as currency devaluation, which is its centrepiece¹⁵, requiring thus a thorough reflection on

¹³ In the European sovereign debt crisis, the government in Germany and in other creditor countries realized that banks could carry heavy losses that would jeopardize household savings in the north, for which reason it became necessary to save the banks to protect household savings and to avoid the risk of panic that the collapse of an European banking system already weakened by the sub-prime crisis would bring about. Thus, those governments agreed to grant new loans as long as harsh austerity programmes were put into practice in debtor countries: fiscal discipline, cuts in government spending, increased taxes, structural reforms, and wage deflation. Bailouts in Greece, Ireland and Portugal have provided the necessary liquidity to enable the economies to continue to work.

¹⁴ Naturally, countries that need help are the least well positioned to claim unlimited solidarity.

¹⁵ In this context, in a package of measures of austerity that included control of demand, higher interest rates to attract capital, and other emergency measures dictated by circumstances, currency devaluation was a means to contribute decisively to the recovery of lost competitiveness.



the economic policy being implemented in countries experiencing difficulty in managing sovereign debt.

Within this framework, today economic policy seems guided by three areas: *budget consolidation* to drastically reduce the needs of public funding and to create conditions for public debt sustainability; *wage deflation*, with the double purpose of reducing public debt (like wages in the civil service) and improve the external competitiveness of the economy by reducing costs; and the implementation of a set of *liberalizing structural reforms* (including privatization and flexible labour market) in order to introduce efficiency and foster economic growth.

Clearly, structural reforms will not have significant consequences on the economy in the near future, even if the Portuguese government places high hopes on them, due to their own characteristics and times. Accordingly, it is difficult to anticipate the extent of their actual effect.

It should be stressed that budgetary consolidation is attained at a pace and within the framework of measures to be adopted that depends largely on the pressure of creditors, especially the international authorities that act on their behalf or constitute them (IMF, ECB, EU). This policy includes the usual measures of tax increases and reduction of certain expenses and taxes, like the Single Social Tax (SST), and, in addition, calls for deflation of wages and of pensions as never before. This is the instrument I will focus on next.

4.1. Wage deflation

Let us start this point with accuracy: although the effects may be similar, it is appropriate to distinguish what we can call **forced wage deflation**, when a country that does not have its own currency is forced to reduce the wages of civil servants and pensioners due to its inability to meet its obligations, from **voluntary wage deflation**, when the latter is presented as a policy, that is, as an instrument used to achieve certain economic objectives, such as to reduce unemployment and to increase competitiveness. It is mostly in this sense that I will address the topic.

Wage reduction, in addition to the socio-economic impact of reduced purchasing power, causes a major sense of injustice, undermining social cohesion. This effect, which is subliminal and difficult to measure, yet is often underestimated, is by no means negligible in the behaviour and attitudes of workers. In his *General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money* (1936), J. M. Keynes noted a fundamental difference between the effect of a decrease in real wages and of purchasing power caused by inflation, which has relatively neutral effects on relative wages and on the perception of justice¹⁶, and the effect of reducing normal wages in respect of which "... there is, as a rule, no means of securing a simultaneous and equal reduction of money-wages in all industries... [and therefore]... it is in the interest of workers to resist to a reduction in their own particular case" (Keynes, 1973: 264).

¹⁶ The sense of injustice naturally grows in the presence of additional factors, such as a large distributive imbalance and/or if the responsibility for the seriousness of the situation can be associated with certain sectors, such as the financial one, which has higher yields, or with politicians who, supposedly or actually, have financial perks.



Thus, it is understandable that economists have long considered this reduction to be nearly impossible to achieve. J. M. Keynes explicitly wrote that workers offer a firm resistance to reduced wages, arguing that it is almost impossible in a democratic environment. "It is only in a highly authoritarian society, where sudden, substantial, all-round changes could be decreed, that a flexible wage policy could function with success."¹⁷ (Keynes, 1973: 269)

But even non-Keynesian authors, although considering this worker behaviour as being non-rational, admit this resistance as a fact. In addition to having led to a distribution of income in detriment of labour, globalization¹⁸ has brought about a change in power relations that has facilitated a certain "*vulgarization*" of nominal wage reduction, eroding the modern and progressive wage relationship in favour of its condition as a basic commodity, presenting *labour as a commodity* as K. Marx in Volume I of *Capital* (1867).

Moreover, O. Blanchard (2006) himself, who recommended this therapy for the Portuguese economy, noted that the declines in nominal salaries pose psychological and legal problems that may lead to questioning the possibility of reducing social security taxes and labour costs this way, and maintain the volume of taxes withheld by, for example raising the value added tax (VAT), which the author believes it is difficult to do given the fact it is already high in the EU framework¹⁹.

Besides these general considerations, three major impacts of wage reduction, equally present in the in-depth analysis carried out by Keynes in his *General Theory* (GT) deserve our attention today: the impact on external competitiveness, the consequence on demand, and the effect on debt.

4.2. The restoration of competitiveness: external devaluation vs. internal devaluation

The way to positively solving the problem of public and private over-indebtedness and external imbalance is to establish a path of economic growth. As governments and families have their expenses limited by high cost debts, this leads to recession, and, accordingly, restoring competitiveness amidst an atmosphere of austerity is, indeed, the only possible way to increase exports and income. We find a situation that is similar to past crises.

The effects of currency devaluation in fixed or semi-fixed exchange rate systems seem clear and are solidly implemented. By devaluating currency, exports become more competitive and imports become more expensive. This leads to greater demand for exported goods, a reduction in demand for imports, improving the balance of the current account. Thus, the policy is intended to encourage the expansion of the economy, in particular in terms of output and employment, and it may possibly lead to

¹⁷ This is why he uses the wage unit in the GT as a yardstick of macroeconomic variables.

¹⁸ With the entry of a skilled workforce with low wages and few rights from countries long subjected to dictatorships into the global labour market, the correlation of forces changed substantially in detriment of workers from more developed countries.

¹⁹ The government may even increase the number of working hours without any increase in wage compensation. In this case, it reduces the unit labour cost without necessarily reducing nominal wages, although this may have some negative impact on employment.



some side effects, such as inflation, due to the import of products at higher costs in terms of domestic currency.

Naturally, the improvement of competitiveness through devaluation will always depend on the country's export profile, that is, on the type and quality of goods produced by countries and by their potential competitors²⁰.

Nevertheless, if we exclude the eventual trend of the export sector and/or the potential trend to the formation of over-profit in these sectors, there are no other negative side-effects resulting from devaluation, for which reason it is part of the set of standard economic measures fostered by international institutions like the IMF. Moreover, the increase in exports helps to mitigate the negative effects of the other set of austerity measures on demand, and they tend to generate positive psychological effects on the expectations of various economic agents.

If it becomes impossible, for a particular county part of a monetary union to resort to this instrument to restore competitiveness, economic policy will use the supposedly alternative tool of internal devaluation. Olivier Blanchard, among others, defends that *"the same result can be achieved however, **at least on paper**, through a decrease in the nominal wage and the price of non-tradables, while the price of tradables remains the same."*(Blanchard, 2006: 19).

Albeit less sure, Keynes did not rule out the potential effect of a wage decrease on foreign trade either. "If we are dealing with an unclosed system, and the reduction of money-wages is a **reduction relatively to money-wages abroad**... it will tend to increase the balance of trade"²¹ (Keynes, 1973: 262).

Despite the reservations felt by Blanchard, he ends up stating that, with regard to Portugal *"a decrease in nominal wages sounds exotic, but it can substantially reduce the unemployment cost of the adjustment"* (Blanchard, 2006: 24). Given that wage moderation is insufficient within the moderate "inflationist" framework of the eurozone to reduce imbalances in a timely fashion, wage reduction, stronger in the public sector, would allow, alongside other measures, substantially reducing budget deficits and contributing to improve the competitiveness of the economy and the development of a path leading to balance in both ways.

However, we have reasons to consider that **wage deflation is not a replacement for external devaluation**, because the expansionary effects of the latter on domestic demand are at the antipodes of the deflationary effects on the same demand, and which result from lower wages. These effects, as admitted by Blanchard, are much more important than is generally admitted by the advocates of this policy.

4.3. Wage reduction and domestic demand

The process of internal devaluation in order to promote competitiveness normally starts with a reduction in public sector wages, which immediately causes a reduction of public

²⁰ A serious problem will arise if the export products are such that exports do not increase, even at lower prices. This is what may occur in the peripheral countries of the EU.

²¹ *"The greater strength of the traditional belief in the efficacy of a reduction in money-wages as a means of increasing employment in Great Britain, as compared with the United States, is probably attributable to the latter being, comparatively ourselves, as a closed system"* (Keynes, 1936: 262).



expenditure and budgetary improvement. It then gets generalized to the entire economy, resulting in the reduction of production costs, namely tradable goods, which fosters production and import substitution, thus reducing external imbalance. Up to this point, the effects can prove similar to those that could be obtained through external devaluation, should that be possible.

The problem is that the story does not end here, leading to the development of important collateral effects. The consequence of reducing nominal wages on domestic demand, underlined by Keynes in chapter 19 of the *General Theory*, is indisputable, given that falling wages, particularly in middle income classes, has a very strong effect in domestic demand, heavily penalizing production and employment. This effect is additional to other measures of budget consolidation, such as tax increases, in reducing the disposable income of households²².

The combination of all these effects can exert devastating consequences on demand, particularly on demand for national production, with consequent effects on employment²³. This is a fundamental difference between domestic and external devaluation. While the latter has expansionary effects on employment and economic activity, domestic devaluation can lead to a long deflationary process, reducing prices, production, wages, and income. It must equally be noted that this deflationary spiral could more easily become a reality in those cases when the economy is over-indebted.

4.4. Domestic devaluation amidst widespread debt

The effects of deflation on debt and its consequences have long been stressed by several authors. On the increase of the real value of debt, Keynes stated: "On the other hand, the depressing influence on entrepreneurs of their greater burden of debt may partly offset any cheerful reactions from the reduction of wages. Indeed, if the fall in wages and prices goes far, the embarrassment of those who are heavily indebted may soon reach the point of insolvency, with severely adverse effects on investment. Moreover, the effect of a lower price-level on the real burden of the National Debt and hence on taxation is likely to prove very adverse to business confidence." (Keynes, 1973: 264).

These effects become particularly important in the current context when countries in this situation face high private and public debts. Deflation, particularly wage-related, increases the weight of private and public debts, as well as debt ratios with regard to the GDP. This is undoubtedly the main trap that these countries have to face, when it is not even certain that, as I. Fisher pointed out, the efforts to reduce debt will not lead to its aggravation. This is the reason why the way he proposes is exactly the opposite, that is, inflation: "... *the ways are either via laissez faire (bankruptcy) or scientific medication (reflation), and reflation might just as well have been in the first place*" (1933: 349), given that inflation tends to cause the opposite effect, reducing the burden of debt and benefitting borrowers, including companies.

²² These effects may be further aggravated when wage deflation goes hand in hand with inflation in widespread and inelastic demand goods, such as energy, transport and food.

²³ This is aggravated by the impossibility to use budgetary policy in this context, which Blanchard suggested to make up for the negative effects of the wage deflation policy.



Given the reduction in disposable income and consequent increase in household debt burden, families reduce their expenses further or go into default, compounding the problems of the banking sector.

Similarly, companies producing for the domestic market with lower incomes, even in an environment of cost reduction, will also have greater difficulties to honour past commitments and maintain employment.

Governments also face greater difficulties in dealing with a situation where revenue is declining and the debt ratio is growing as a result of the reduction of the denominator.

The effects on the expectations of economic agents and investment are equally very negative and terribly constraining for growth and employment. The situation will tend to be further complicated if several countries simultaneously adopt the same domestic devaluation and promotion of exports strategy.

Thus, we have strong reasons to believe that the depressing effects on aggregate demand resulting from deflationary policies will be more important than what is usually admitted, and a deflationary spiral cannot be ruled out.

Clearly, while external devaluation tends to restore competitiveness and external balance at a level higher than that of the product, income and employment, domestic devaluation tends to restore the balances mentioned above at a level that is lower than those variables. Moreover, the path should be exactly the reverse, one of inflation, not one of deflation, but this choice does not depend directly on the Portuguese.

We therefore arrive at a particularly uncertain outcome. We do not know at what level of production, employment and quality of life the balances of public accounts and external balance will be attained, let alone if this balance will prevent Portugal from experiencing the explosion of debt recorded in Greece. However, we know that they will occur at a level lower than that of the product, employment and well-being of the population, at tremendous cost and unforeseen consequences.

4.5. Domestic devaluation and deflation. The experience

Unlike external devaluation policies, whose contours and likely effects were more or less established, domestic devaluation and deflation policies have not, so far, given us an experience leading to optimism.

When the gold standard was in use, deflation was used to adjust trade deficits. However, a recent World Bank (WB) study shows no ground for optimism, at least in modern economies. Not many episodes of sustained deflation can be found in the experience of 183 countries between 1980 and 2008, and therefore there are grounds for pessimism²⁴.

The results of deflation processes on competitiveness are not apparent, and are always associated with periods of reduced economic activity, often with long breaks and

²⁴ World Bank (2011) "Sovereign Debt and the Financial Crisis: Will This Time Be Different?" edited by Carlos Primo Braga and Gallina Vincelette.



subsequent list of loss of income, employment, productive capacity, and life standards²⁵.

The recent experience of Germany in the post reunification period appears to be more encouraging, as it went through a process of "wage planification". It is generally accepted that it had positive effects on the competitiveness of the economy, although other factors, such as ensuring a pattern of increasingly sophisticated industrial specialization, namely in luxury and quality products, may have weighed more than actually wage restraint²⁶.

Some authors note that the wage planification carried out by Germany was not without effects, albeit in the opposite direction, on the economies of other euro countries. "Excessive wage restraint in Germany will ... put pressure on wages policy in other EU countries in the medium term. The fact that inflation in Germany is lower than the EU average means that the price competitiveness of German producers in the European market is constantly increasing" (Eckhard Hein *et al.*, 2004).

Wage deflation has recently gained popularity during the 2008-2010 recession, when several countries (Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania) used it in order to restore competitiveness and balance national balances. In the middle of the last decade, these countries have pegged to the euro, developing booms but losing competitiveness. With the 2008 crisis, the product fell sharply in those countries, which, nevertheless, kept the peg and implemented austerity measures. Their economies are now showing signs of growth supported by exports, following IMF intervention and a brutal drop in product.


The charts below show the evolution of the product (change rate) and of unemployment in the three Baltic countries, Ireland, Portugal and Greece. With regard to product, one notes a double trend in what concerns the course of the crisis. A V-path of the three Baltic countries and Ireland (less prominent) and a prolonged U-shaped path which, in Portugal's case, shows a counter-trend in 2010 as a result of an extraordinary expansionary policy that has contributed to the sharp deterioration of public accounts.

²⁵ Argentina, as peripheral countries, lost competitiveness when, in the 1990s, it pegged the peso to the dollar and held deflation for three years until the economy and pegging to the dollar collapsed. In the CFA (*Communauté Financière Africaine*) monetary area, the average inflation between 1986 and 1993 was 0.3%, and some countries experienced some deflation at the end of that period, but competitiveness was not restored, and major devaluation took place in 1994. In the Swedish economic crisis of the 1990s and on the occasion of Finland's accession to the EU in 1995, the results were also questionable.

²⁶ The European Union (2010) stresses that the dynamism of the German export markets almost completely account for the average annual growth of 7.3% of the volume of German exports between 1999-2008, while the contribution of the most competitive prices driven by wage restraints did not exceed 0.3% per year. The reason lies in the fact that German's industry specializes in products that the most dynamic emerging economies want to buy (luxury cars, machinery, computer equipment, transportation infrastructures, etc.). In this equation, prices come second.



Chart 4



The unemployment rates follow the same trend, with Portugal and Greece showing trends that point to aggravation, as a result of the dramatic increase of the last few months.

Experience indicates that it is not certain that lower wages in the peripheral countries of Europe will increase their competitiveness with regard to more competitive countries and to emerging countries with lower wages. What may occur is a mere phenomenon of competition among those countries, with the one that succeeds in imposing lower wages gaining the race. But, in terms of the sovereign crisis in Portugal and Greece, there is a factor that is often missing in former contexts and which has not properly been taken into account, and in which I insist: the debt level reached by those countries.

With no experience of using internal devaluation and deflation amidst widespread indebtness, and given the theoretical considerations previously advanced, it is not unlikely that a recessive deflationary spiral may cause social and political collapse.

5. The conditions for sustained growth

The profound question that subliminally worries minds in the peripheral countries of Europe is to know whether their countries are able to continue to be part of the cosmopolitan economics of the euro, i.e. if they can not only stabilize their economies but also come back to a path of growth that allows them to, at least, not to diverge. This is particularly important in the case of Portugal, due to the **growth anaemia** of the last decade, despite the very favourable conditions it enjoyed, the favourable external environment, extra funds from the EU, expansionary budgetary policies, and the absence of liquidity constraints.

5.1. Globalization, integration, growth, and convergence

With the *adoption of the euro*, all barriers to competition within this area have been abolished, thus creating the conditions for assessing the thesis advocated by the



dominant theories of international trade, according to which free competition necessarily results in everybody benefitting, particularly less competitive countries, in the same conditions as those in a gold standard system.

In fact, judging by the analytical results provided by the dominant economic theories, there should be no fundamental obstacles to the development of countries of southern Europe, even in the context of globalization and European integration. Indeed, the theories that lead to the defence of free trade as a fundamental result are well-established. Whether benefitting from the relative differences in productivity (D. Ricardo), from the differences in factorial endowments (Heckscher-Ohlin-Samuelson), or by taking advantage of economies of scale or product differentiation, countries generally benefit by developing their trade relations with other countries.

Of course, this does not preclude that along with the benefits there may be costs associated with the production restructuring necessary to achieve those benefits. From the outset, between sectors, with the export sectors increasing production and competing sectors reducing it with imports (Ricardo and H-O-S), decline of more labour-intensive sectors and expansion of capital and/or skilled labour intensive sectors, as in the case of more advanced countries, with consequences on the redistribution of income, in principle in favour of the scarcer factor. On newer models, these results are not fundamentally questioned, although important “nuances” may occur. Some authors argue that the intensification of international trade brought about by globalization leads to the reallocation of resources among sectors and intra-sectors, encourages business development in companies with the highest productivity and the decline or closure of those with lower productivity across all export sectors, whether they have liquidity or not. In the opinion of some, this may generate earnings for all production factors²⁷.

This free trade optimism has long held a dominant position in economic literature²⁸, which does not exclude unconventional views on this matter, such as that of Friedrich List. This author, a precursor of the German Historical School that opposed the English Classical School, despite having been relatively overlooked by contemporary economic thinking, deserves to be remembered today because he challenges contemporary mainstream thinking.

List’s analysis follows a historical and evolutionary perspective expressed through a definition of developmental stages, which leads to two results emphasized here using the author’s words: “(1) *It was clear to me that free competition between two nations far advanced in culture could only have beneficial results if both stood at an equal industrial level;... (2) and that a nation which, by unhappy fate, was lagging much behind in terms of industry, trade, and navigation, but otherwise had the mental and material resources to have them, would first need to become capable through its own efforts before it could compete freely with more advanced nations. In a word, I discovered the difference between cosmopolitan economics and politics.*” (List, 2006: 40).

²⁷ For a summary, see Manteu, Cristina (2008).

²⁸ The situation is much less evident at the level of the economic policy of the international organizations, especially if we exclude communication and propaganda levels. The history of the GATT or of the WTO is both the history of the rise of liberal communication and that of the maintenance/institutionalization of obstacles to free trade of the dominant theory, and the beneficiaries of liberalization and protectionism are not difficult to detect.



However, F. List was not neither anti-European nor anti-globalization. He merely opposed the theory of value of the Classical School by advancing a theory of productive forces which states that the wealth of a country lies more in the potential and structural factors than on the value created at a given time, requiring the creation of a set of conditions prior to full competitive confrontation. "A nation like England, whose manufacturing strength placed it very much ahead of other nations, maintains and expands its supremacy in manufacturing and trade through trade as free as possible (List, 2006: 110).

This author also briefly exposed the alleged scientific neutrality of the classical thought.

"Hence the preference of enlightened English economists for absolute commercial freedom, and the aversion of sensible economists from other countries to implement this principle in the current world conditions" (List, 2006: 110).

Supporting his analysis on the strength of historical argument, the author recalled the guidance and outcome of the work of the Count of Ericeira as follows: "Portugal, thanks to the work of a strong and wise minister, was attempting to establish a manufacturing industry, whose initial success is amazing" (List, 2006: 190). He then contrasted the potential of Portugal's manufacturing development with the consequences of the Treaty of Methuen for Portugal. "*Immediately after this trade contract was agreed, Portugal was flooded with English goods. And the first consequence of this flood was the sudden and utter ruin of Portuguese factories*" (List, 2006: 192). "Portugal's agriculture, industry, trade and navigation, instead of increasing with the exchange with England, sank more and more" (List, 2006: 197).

This analysis of F. List makes sense when compared to subsequent well-known historical facts. Indeed, all the successes of less developed countries with regard to achieving a sustained rate of growth and real convergence of their economies, ranging from the industrialization of Germany to the new Asian newly industrialized countries (NICs) and to the current emerging countries, we realize that they always had an intelligent and skilful management of the various types of barriers (tariffs, non-tariff related issues, monetary issues) as a basis, combined with a prudent policy of openness

However, with the adoption of the euro, all barriers to competition within this area disappeared, creating all the conditions for an assessment of the thesis defended by the international trade dominant theories, which argues that free competition would necessarily benefit all, particularly less competitive countries, as conditions like the gold standard system would be restored. The question is whether the optimism of the Classical School will prevail, in practice, over the pessimism of the German School.

5.2. The theoretical and political constraints of integrated areas

The fact that the economic policy changes profoundly when a country waives its own currency to take on the currency of an integrated area does not need to be underlined. First, the loss of the exchange rate as a variable to adjust the economy to the outside world greatly limits the capacity to manage the economy and to maintain its external competitiveness. But the absence of an own currency also implies increased difficulty and restrictions in the management of credit and price policies, which limits the ability



to adjust the price variables with regard to future imbalances, whether domestic or external in origin.

Nominal wages turned into the only variable – flexible pricing – will not be able to provide an answer to asymmetric shocks except at the expense of painful deflationary processes and drops in social cohesion that may reach unpredictable proportions. That is to say: there are no socially and politically acceptable automatic mechanisms that can accommodate the necessary imbalances that naturally tend to arise in a growing economy.

It should be noted that the loss of sovereignty resulting from the decision to join a monetary area extends in a more or less direct way to other variables and to economic policy, limiting them more or less importantly, particularly in terms of budgetary policy. This has been much misunderstood by some countries, especially those with a tradition of persistent public deficits.

Under conditions of limited solidarity, budgetary policy within a monetary area tends to be conducted through rules, which in the case of the EU, are defined in the Stability and Growth Pacts (SGPs), which considerably limit discretionary policies. Usually, a path centred on a structural deficit of a certain amount is set. This means that *renouncing monetary sovereignty means accepting limited budgetary sovereignty*. Clearly, if the country has a debt and a high debt service, surely there will be no leeway for discretionary budgetary policy.

The only way to be able to conduct a discretionary budgetary policy, **which is the expression of a certain amount of sovereignty**, during a recession, is by keeping the budget balance and debt in their comfort zone, so that spending can be significantly increased during recessions. The budget balance emerges as a trend reference when one needs some room for budgetary sovereignty.

The state, insofar it impacted a significant amount of resources to the economy, will continue to play an important yet qualitative role, expressing different alternative choices in a long term (or almost) budgetary balance framework, at the same time that the nature and structure of the state should conform to the sovereignty restriction mentioned above.

By reducing the role of macroeconomic policy, both in terms of stimulating economic activity in general and in its stabilization role, growth (or rather, lack of it) becomes a problem that can be addressed solely from the perspective of microeconomics and mesoeconomics, substantially reducing the effect of economic policy. In terms of economic policy, this is the main consequence of the loss of monetary sovereignty.

5.3. Exports, growth and long-term balance in integrated areas

The absence of own currency prevents the exchange mechanism from restoring the balance between tradable and non-tradable goods, affecting resources between these two sectors. Therefore, there will be a tendency for cumulative effects to develop in either direction, depending on the economic structures and the policies of different countries. Countries with trade surpluses will tend to strengthen their production structure by investing more, getting more and better resources at lower prices, not only for export sectors but also for the entire economy, improving the very




framework of the export sectors and their growth potential. On the other hand, countries that develop trade deficits, particularly small countries, tend to face often unfavourable prices set internationally, low incomes that contribute to inhibit the development of the production of tradable goods, growing difficulties in attracting quality resources and/or at acceptable prices, generating persistent imbalances and a worse situation, until a new crisis comes along to restore the lost balance. Of course, the process is identical in the situations that tend to occur within a fixed exchange rate system. However, there is one fundamental difference. Whereas in the latter system one can resort to currency devaluation before the imbalances become seriously exacerbated, in a single currency system this possibility does not exist. In this context, only crises will restore long-term balances, creating the conditions for the economy to get back on track. *“Crises are violent and momentary solutions to existing contradictions, violent eruptions that temporarily restore lost imbalances”* (Marx, 18. 1976).

Naturally, imbalances will tend to arise spontaneously as the result of economic dynamics, although their amplitude can extend (as was the case of Portugal and Greece), or shrink depending on the policies implemented. On this matter, it is essential not to contribute so that excess of expenditure, namely state expenditure, expands imbalances. Social and wage expenditure should take into account the over-determination mentioned earlier and evolve according to the growth of national production. It can exercise some pressure on the latter, but it continually cannot move away from it.

An important consequence in terms of analysis must be stressed. In the long term, the tradable goods sector sets the pace for the production of wealth and all other sectors. The growth potential of the economy depends mainly on the potential growth of the tradable sector.

The strong relationship between economic growth and changes in exports is well known, with a strong correlation (0.86%) in the world, showing also significantly in the chart below (on the left). This correlation is equally very strong in most countries of the euro (12), with the exception of Portugal, Greece, and Spain, as can be seen in the chart on the right.

Chart 5





But what I really want to emphasize is that characteristically, in an economy without its own currency, the rate of growth of the long-term balance of the economy tends to be determined by the exports rate of growth. Similarly, the evolution of average wages cannot fail to be in line, in the long term, with the evolution of productivity and wages in the export sector. The capacity to develop a high value-added export model will decide if it will be possible to get the Portuguese economy closer to more developed ones.

This result is associated with a profound alteration in the nature and size of the instruments that governments can use to support the economy, making them basically dependent on themselves. I refer to endogenous growth factors, such as territory and resources, population and knowledge, character and initiative, individual and institutional preferences, etc. In particular, policies aimed at investment, particularly foreign direct investment, are crucial. However, *“Instead of broad spectrum policies to attract investment...it is preferable to adopt specific measures, selectively targeted and focused on more interesting targets, particularly projects that produce exportable goods and services in Portugal...”* (Pinto: 252).

In any case, all policies must serve a clear strategy. Only the development of sophisticated strategies and business operations, especially in the tradable goods sectors, and individual and institutional preferences in favour of national production will, together, create renewed conditions for the sustainable growth of the Portuguese economy. Although not necessarily guaranteeing any real convergence of the Portuguese economy, such strategy is a necessary condition to avoid the stagnation that characterized the last decade of the Portuguese economy and avoid a continuous impoverishment that a burden of debt and interest seems to have sentenced us.

Less indirect influence of the state in the economy does not mean its total impossibility to influence some exogenous factors. It means that the opportunity to allocate resources to areas that can stimulate growth now depends very significantly on the size and quality of the state and its sectors²⁹, and that the capacity to influence many of the endogenous factors, such as capacity and entrepreneurship and certain individual and institutional preferences, depend on the development of strategies and imaginative and effective actions on the border of the community legal framework. This possibility gives particular emphasis to the need for a shift in demand for domestic production, which is unlikely to occur by simple automatic operation of market mechanisms. The Statesman has to know “ how the productive forces of a whole nation are aroused, multiplied, protected, and what weakens them, makes them dormant, or even kills them...” (List, 1841/2006: 581).

6. Conclusion

The analysis of the economy over the past decades shows that the economy has progressed, but reveals some features that seem to remain part of our history for centuries. The pepper of the Indies, the gold from Brazil, emigrants’ remittances, and

²⁹ An austere, small, and flexible state will tend, under the circumstances, to leave more room for social functions and investment carried out by the state, will limit corruption factors in its various forms, typical or mitigated, and will impose a more competitive tax structure.



external funding from Europe (structural funds and loans) have chiefly contributed to sustaining sumptuous spending, such as silk fabrics, monastery building, wars, or exuberant top of the range consumption. However, in the past as today, they were not used to create a production basis capable of maintaining sustained economic progress in accordance with the aspirations of the Portuguese.

The development in the last decade of an dangerous model of stagnation, imbalance and dependence, based on an insufficient level of production with regard to excessive consumption, funded from the outside, with explosive characteristics, very similar to the situation in many Latin American countries two decades ago, finally resulted in collapse when the conditions for funding the debt became unsustainable and the European Union declined unlimited solidarity.

This collapse has made paramount a stabilization policy marked by strong austerity, namely wage depreciation. However, this policy greatly underestimates the depressing effects on aggregate demand, particularly within a context of heavy debt, threatening to drive the economy into a deflationary spiral that could undermine the very objectives of budgetary consolidation and thus threaten social and political stability. Accordingly, neither the theory nor the much limited experiments help clarify the ways ahead. Whether the Portuguese economy will find the path of recovery or simply tangle in a recessionary spiral that will lead to stagnation and depression is a key issue with a simple answer: we do not know.

The conditions for sustained growth and real growth in peripheral countries in the euro zone have become a key issue, particularly after the anaemia of growth in the last decade, despite the extremely favourable conditions it enjoyed, both in terms of the general situation and international funding and of the domestic expansionary policies. The recent evolution of the Portuguese economy, but also other international experiences, seem more in line with the pessimistic view of F. List on the negative consequences of the full removal of barriers to competition among countries with very uneven productivity levels and development than with the optimistic views advocating the advantages of free trade in all circumstances.

Within the euro framework, with no monetary policy and with a budgetary policy conducted by rules, discretionary budgetary policy is only possible within a very narrow bandwidth, through the creation of a comfort zone to be auctioned in times of recession. General economic activity finds no development room in macroeconomic policies, for which reason it should be encouraged resorting to microeconomic and mesoeconomic policies.

On the other hand, in the absence of a foreign exchange market, the growth of the export sector in the *long run* sets the pace for the production of all other wealth and sectors, while the evolution of productivity tends to serve as a reference for the wages of all the economy. Public wage and social contention policies, as well as the presence of a state strict in its structure in order to keep the scope of its duties, become necessary to prevent the expansion of the imbalances that the economic dynamics tends to generate, which, in the absence of price systems that correct them, these imbalances will inevitably be corrected by the crisis.

The adoption of a national economy viewpoint promoting the stimulation of endogenous factors that attempts to reap the benefits of the European Union to maintain a route of progress is indispensable, despite the fact that EU policies are not always convergent



and appropriate to our particular situation. The construction of an export economy model with high value-added is a necessary strategy for the stable growth of the product, wages and welfare. Making this aspiration possible is the challenge that the authorities, businessmen and Portuguese workers will need to address. If this path does not ensure real convergence of the Portuguese economy, it will allow keeping it a member of the club of rich, even if with declining growth and misguided policies.

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PORTUGAL: PARTICIPATION IN PEACE MISSIONS AS A FACTOR OF EXTERNAL CREDIBILITY

Maria do Céu Pinto

mceupinto@gmail.com

Department of International Relations and AP,
Economics and Management School (EMS), University of Minho

Abstract

In per capita terms, Portugal is one of the most significant European contributors to international peacekeeping operations around the world. It presently ranks 45th in a list of 115 countries contributing to the United Nations (UN) peace operations and 7th in the European Union (EU). The multiplicity of forces used, as well as the diversity of the locations of deployment, reflect the ambition and effort made by the Portuguese governments in the last 20 years. Portuguese participation in peacekeeping missions has been seen as a vehicle for strengthening Portugal's position in the world: the involvement under the flag of international organisations raises the profile of Portuguese foreign policy and diplomacy. In this paper, we argue that Portuguese involvement in peace missions reflects Portugal's pursuit of its national interest and foreign policy. The aim is to bolster Portugal's capacity to influence the decision-making process in major international *fora*, such as the UN, NATO and the EU. The goal established since the late 1980s aims to strengthen the visibility and specific weight of Portugal in the multilateral framework. The country's contribution to peacekeeping operations has increased the bargaining power of Portugal, which has become an active partner with a more audible voice within those organisations. That voice led to gaining a better position when it came to negotiating major international posts and policies.

Keywords

Peace support operations; Portugal; peacekeeping; Armed Forces; United Nations

How to cite this article

Pinto, Maria do Céu (2012). "Portugal: participation in peace missions as a factor of external credibility". *JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2012. Accessed [online] on (date of last viewing), observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol3_n1_art3

Article received on December 2011 and accepted for publication on April 2012



PORTUGAL: PARTICIPATION IN PEACE MISSIONS AS A FACTOR OF EXTERNAL CREDIBILITY

Maria do Céu Pinto

"We live in a time of peace when the Armed Forces will increasingly become an instrument of states' foreign policy. We can even say that the specific weight of each country's foreign policy is often measured by the ability to be part of national resources in multinational forces to fulfil the duties legitimized by the Security Council of the United Nations. Those who are not included are not important"¹.

Introduction

Portuguese Armed Forces and security forces have been increasingly required to take part in peace support operations (PSO) (see Pinto, 2007; Pinto, 2010, chap. IV). Portugal currently ranks 45th in the list of 115 countries contributing to the UN PSO², with 315 permanent staff, of whom 189 are military and 126 are police officers ("Ranking", 2012; "Monthly Summary", 2012). In Europe, Portugal is now the 7th largest contributor to the UN peacekeeping operations, which is an important demonstration of the effort of a small country with limited resources. Since 1990, Portugal has engaged over 26 thousand soldiers in peacekeeping missions in over 30 settings in all continents (DGPN, 2012: 9-11). The multiplicity of forces used, as well as the diversity of the locations of deployment, reflects the ambition and effort made by the Portuguese governments in the last twenty years.

The budget for national forces deployed in international missions has nevertheless suffered from significant cuts since 2010. In 2012, the cut will be of 30%, from 75 million to about 52 million Euros, partly due to the abandonment of two operations (Financial Agency, 2011). The current defence minister admitted that after finishing participation in the UN's mission in Lebanon (early withdrawal six months before predicted) and in Somalia, Portugal may have to take part in new operation theatres depending on how the international security situation evolves, especially in terms of the so-called Arab spring (Financial Agency, 2011).

This paper examines the set of circumstances that led Portugal, from the 1990s, to make a strategic choice to participate in PSO, and aims to deepen the relationship

The author thanks the referees' suggestions for improvement.

¹ General Soares Carneiro at a speech made on 8/07/1993 on the occasion of the Armed Forces Celebration Day, *cit.* in Sousa (undated), pp. 10-11.

² It means Peace Support Operations.



between Portugal's foreign and security policy and its participation in PSO: the key argument it advances is that engaging in peace missions reflects Portugal's pursuit of its national interest and foreign policy, with the aim of strengthening the country's prestige and bolster its weight in decision-making processes at main international *fora*.³

Increased international intervention

Portugal only started to participate actively in peace support missions in the early 1990s. With the end of the Cold War and subsequent changes in the international situation, Portugal revised its strategic options, at the same time it realized the importance of having stronger means to intervene in international decision-making fora. Portugal, which had not been involved in conflict in Europe since World War I, was forced by circumstances to change its traditional African and Atlantic-centred defence paradigm (Cordeiro, 2005: 4; Silva, 2008; Vasconcelos, 1999). This paradigm was replaced by a new model based on a global intervention policy (Silva, 2008) legitimized by a set of values such as peacekeeping, respect for human and minority rights, democracy, Rule of Law, reconstruction of post-conflict states, and development.

All this happened at a time when peacekeeping missions were also analyzed at the Agency for Peace by the then United Nations Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, and a UN global doctrine for peacekeeping operations and the role of the Organization in the prevention, containment, resolution, and termination of conflicts was established. The *Agenda* was a key document in making peacekeeping a core theme of the United Nations. Published in 1992, that document initiated, in the post-Cold War, a profound debate on the importance of peacekeeping as an instrument in the process of conflict resolution. In the *Agenda*, Boutros-Ghali defined the so-called instruments for peace and security: preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping, post-conflict peacebuilding, sanctions, and peace enforcement. Peacekeeping thus emerged as part of a range of instruments used to manage a crisis in its latent stage (pre-conflict) to its escalating stage (conflict) and to the post conflict stage (peacebuilding). Accordingly, this implies using troops not only during a restricted period of the conflict, extending it to its previous and post-violence stages (preventive deployment and peacebuilding). In the post-Cold War, the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) started to play a more active role in the regulation of the international order, passing resolutions that justified and legitimized its peacekeeping military interventions and enhanced peace enforcement operations. With this change, the military "remade their doctrine, organization and instruction to be able to adapt to using military force in what some terminology has termed operations other than war" (Espírito Santo, 2006). In 1995, in the *Supplement to the Agenda for Peace*, when analysing the failure of some post-Cold War missions (Angola, Somalia, Rwanda, and Bosnia), Boutros-Ghali affirmed the need for new forms of action with greater civil and military involvement, new concerns with the security of the military and with the coordination between humanitarian and military missions.

In 1994, the amendment of the National Strategic Concept denoted a new concern about the adaptation of the Armed Forces to the technical and operational parameters of the other allied forces, which was essential to fulfil Portugal's commitments within

³ The author is grateful for these insights from the referees.



these alliances. The challenge of participating in the international mission to the former Yugoslavia with a large-scale military contingent was then taken up:

"In the case of Bosnia, the fact that it chose to send a significant contingent and a combat unit, not a support unit, clearly demonstrated the will to call attention to its involvement in the Implementation Force (IFOR)" (Freire, 2007: 89).

Portugal thus started to contribute with significant contingents to crisis scenarios, initially as part of United Nations missions, then within NATO, and, only in the 2000s, in EU missions.

Portugal remained attentive to the set of changes occurring internationally, which had implications at home and fostered the redefinition of foreign and national defence policies. To that effect, the Armed Forces began to be involved in meeting the international commitments assumed by Portugal within the organizations it belonged to. The military component thus became one of the instruments to reinforce Portugal's position in its foreign policy. This is what some authors have referred to as growing interdependence between internal and external aspect of security, or, to put it more clearly, the external dimensions of internal security (Bigo, 2006; Eriksson and Rhinard, 2009). Nowadays, risks and dangers are considered to have no borders, for which reason the limits to the security measures of states need to be redefined and adjusted to the new freedom and security requirements of citizens (Guedes and Elias, 2010). The emerging debate in Portugal about the need to assign the Armed Forces a more active role in terms of national security depicts an underlying awareness of a new geo-strategic context of threats and risks. Today, states need to win their internal security in remote areas, as illustrated by the example of Afghanistan, an incubator of international terrorism (Noivo, 2009).

A new vision of security

In terms of political rationale, the decision made in the 1990s to participate in missions in Africa and, above all, in the Balkans makes sense in terms of the "extended security" approach adopted by our political elites. The interest of security thus extended well beyond national ones, often materialized away from territorial states. Today, its concept has flexible and extended meaning, which requires states to have a new type of understanding within the international community.

In the words of former Defence Minister Severiano Teixeira:

"The guarantee of national security is increasingly promoted far from our traditional borders, of the traditional geographical boundaries of states. Therefore, the definition of our intervention doctrine can no longer be predominantly determined only by historical factors or geographic proximity. It must include regional



and international security criteria, promoting the values of democracy and the rule of law” (Teixeira, undated: 12).

In this regard, as part of Portugal’s mandate in the UNSC, the effort to highlight issues related to human rights, the protection of civilians and the role of women in national peace and reconciliation processes has become an essential feature of its action. This concern has been recognized as distinctly Portuguese (Monteiro, 86-87;⁴ Seabra, 2011) and has given Portuguese diplomacy as many praises as criticism (interview). Portugal is seen as committed – successfully – to promoting the visibility and the legitimate essence of human rights in the work of the United Nations. This effort legitimizes the action of the UNSC and acts as a catalyst for tangible changes on the ground, albeit slow in time. This is also one of Portugal’s commitments made during the campaign and met throughout the mandate: it is an innovative approach that intervenes in terms of security and its corresponding relationship with human rights and other cross-cutting areas. Portugal takes over the role of defender of these causes that affect developing countries, normally small, which normally do not attract media attention, nor command the international agenda.

Secondly, security and defence are ensured in the so-called “border security” (Leandro, 1992:6; Garcia, 2005), in the framework of collective security systems. State integration, especially in the European Union (integration organization), but equally in NATO (intergovernmental collective defence alliance) and in the UN (global intergovernmental organization) has attested the importance of collective thinking where states share common interests in variable proportions: “the border of Portuguese security is the border of European security” (Teixeira, 2009: 105); “Defending national interests often means defending the projects in which Portugal is involved” (Mário Soares Foundation, 2006: 651). However, this does not mean that national concerns terminate at the borders of the organizations to which it belongs and in the missions in which it participates.

Thirdly, it must be noted that behind this *global intervention policy* there is the enlargement of the actual concept of national interest, defined not only in its traditional form – defence of territorial integrity and of the nation – but as a promoter of security, international peace and stability, conflict resolution, and human rights. It is this concept of national interest that has guided the definition of Portugal’s priorities with regard to foreign policy, defence and security, and has informed its choice to intervene in particular conflict scenarios.

The participation in PSO has followed this broad concept of security and flexible boundaries. In the twentieth century, Portugal underwent several dramatic border changes (African colonies, Macao, EU integration), which naturally changed the traditional concept of sovereignty. In an increasingly globalized world where the country’s integration is done at various layers, “the problem of the new dimensions of the concept of border” is an issue of paramount importance, as the definition of the “several areas of insertion” where Portugal wishes to have a say depends on it (Garcia, 2005). This question arises in national terms but is also of fundamental importance

⁴ With regard to Portugal’s performance in the UNSC in 1997-1998, Ambassador António Monteiro said: “An area that deserved the particular attention of the Permanent Representation of Portugal in the United Nations was human rights issues” (2003: 86).



within organizations such as the EU or NATO, whose area of intervention has expanded globally. According to Portuguese experts and academics, our security border coincides with that defined by NATO; our economic and political border coincides with that of the EU; the cultural border corresponds to the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Peoples (Moreira, 1996). One could also add the vulnerability border, in the words of General Garcia Leandro (Leandro, 1992; Garcia, 2005).

The PSO as capacity to influence

Over the last twenty years, Portugal has gained a certain visibility in the context of its participation in peacekeeping missions. This profile is part of a "strategy fostering the increasing affirmation and appreciation of the role of Portugal in multilateral issues" within international organizations" (Paixão, 1997: 67). This goal, established in the late 1980s, has served as a beacon to national diplomatic activities ever since. For small countries like Portugal, the only way to make a point of some importance on the international arena, which is the privileged ground of "large" states, like the P-5,⁵ is through what some authors call "diplomacy of opportunities", that is, to whenever possible take the opportunity to establish its presence on the big stages and do it by obviously leaving a positive mark (Coelho, undated).

Participation in PSO cannot be seen as an isolated initiative, but as part of the goal to portray Portugal as a modern country willing to assume its responsibilities in the international arena, thus contradicting the more "reactive and defensive" Portuguese foreign policy inherited from colonial times (Monteiro, 1999: 164). Portugal's efforts to voluntarily increase the national contribution to the UN budget (Monteiro, 1999: 164-5) and its relevant participation in various peacekeeping operations have also contributed to this end. In 1996, Portugal occupied the 26th position in the ranking of countries contributing with forces to the UN (Paixão, 1997: 71). Portuguese contingents in international peace missions are thus an indispensable element in affirming Portugal as a useful ally of the Atlantic Alliance, as an active agent in building a united and effective Europe, and as a responsible member of the family of nations. In the multilateral context, Portugal intends to assert its presence and engagement in the international organizations and alliance systems to which it belongs. Accordingly, it must participate in developing the Common Foreign Policy and Security and be at the forefront of the construction of the Common Security and Defence Policy, including participation in military missions commanded by the EU, as well as involvement in the permanent structured cooperation in matters of defence established by the Treaty of Lisbon. Regarding the UN, Portugal supports the organization's role in maintaining legality, international order and peace, affirming the centrality of its role and the need to strengthen its instruments in peace support and post-conflict reconstruction processes, especially in failed states. Due to its relationship with the former colonies, Portugal should also strengthen its friendship and cooperation ties with Portuguese-speaking countries, particularly within the Community of Portuguese-Speaking Countries, promoting military and technical cooperation.

Portuguese politicians and diplomats have quite often mentioned the role played by the Armed Forces in this type of missions in increasing the visibility of the country

⁵ The five permanent members of the UNSC.



internationally, including among partners and allies, and in strengthening the bargaining power and the political weight of Portugal in international *fora* (Vitorino, 1996: 87-96). The military vector has unquestionably become a valuable instrument of foreign policy and in the promotion of national values and interests, and, linked to other vectors and dimensions, particularly diplomacy, has contributed to enhancing the position and the international visibility of the country.⁶ Portugal's participation in multinational missions has a "multiplying effect on the position of Portugal in the world" (Vitorino, 1998: 165).

In this sense, the decision to participate in IFOR and SFOR in the 1990s and, after September 11, in ISAF in Afghanistan, strengthened Portugal's presence and credibility with NATO. The contribution that the responsibility assumed by Portugal in the missions in the Balkans in the 1990s, in particular, gave to the country's image in the world was also reflected within the Atlantic Alliance and other international organizations, portraying Portugal as a country that meets its obligations and, as such, deserves recognition for engaging in common causes.

Still, besides being an end in itself, the participation in IFOR and SFOR NATO missions was also a means to win other important victories in terms of foreign policy, notably in the UN. Participating in the Balkans increased the bargaining power of Portugal, which became a more active partner with increased say in NATO. The country's involvement and the good performance of Portuguese forces, whose size was remarkable given national resources, helped reinforcing Portugal's position as a credible partner of the Atlantic Alliance (Mário Soares Foundation, 2006: 648; Vitorino, 2000: 32). Portugal proved its political and operational capacity to the world as it ensured the presence of its forces in the Balkans and in Africa, two operational theatres with totally different characteristics and geographically apart, from each other and from Portugal. It should be recalled that during that same period Portugal deployed around 1200 staff in Angola and Mozambique in the missions ONUMOZ/Mozambique and UNAVEM/Angola (later replaced by MONUA), which were the ones where Portuguese presence was larger in operational and political terms (not to mention Portugal's diplomatic engagement in the peace processes of both countries (Mário Soares Foundation, 2006: 647).

Portugal's participation in NATO operations in Bosnia-Herzegovina deserves special attention and has yielded some important dividends, of which the following stand out: the election of Portugal to the UNSC in the 1997-1998 biennium (Monteiro 1999, 163-164; Gomes, 2000: 58; Vitorino, 2000: 32 and Vitorino 1999) and the maintenance of the NATO Command based in Oeiras and its upgrade to Regional Command within the then new NATO structure in 1999 (Freire, 2007: 90; Vitorino 1999, 94-95; Vitorino 2000, 37-38; Teixeira 1999, 31). Having a more audible and influential voice placed Portugal in a better position with its allies to force the resolution of the East Timor issue in 1999 (v. Vitorino, 1999; Freire, 2007: 94). A few Portuguese diplomats and political leaders testify that during the post-referendum East Timor crisis, Portugal's Prime Minister António Guterres put pressure on U.S. President Bill Clinton, saying that if the international community did not act and crashed genocide in progress, Portugal would cease its participation in the Balkans mission (Freire, 2007: 94). Another way of operationalizing Portugal's involvement has been to demand from international bodies

⁶ The author thanks the referee for this insight.



the country's greater intervention in territories where it had an historical presence (Freitas do Amaral cit. in Mário Soares Foundation, 2006: 645).

In the words of diplomat Alegre Duarte: "Portugal has been a *demandeur* of United Nations' intervention in regard to peacekeeping operations, conflict mediation, political stabilization, and economic and institutional reconstruction (see the cases of Angola, Mozambique, East Timor and Guinea-Bissau)" (Duarte, 2008: 135).

Portugal's policy of active involvement in international peacekeeping operations, which has been consistently followed by various governments since the early 1990s, has clearly been a form of increasing the influence of the Portuguese state through the use of military forces. This participation, which has the objective of contributing to international peace maintenance and security, is part of the global scope of Portuguese foreign policy and aims to:

- *obtain and maintain influence and visibility within the United Nations, NATO and the European Union;*
- *strengthen Portugal's position in the world's most important political decision structures;*
- *give increased legitimacy to request the involvement of the international community, particularly the United Nations, in areas that are important for Portugal;*
- *encourage candidatures to high level posts in international structures"* (Freire: 2007: 84-85; v. Amaral 2005: 24-5)

The participation of the Portuguese Armed Forces in multinational operations, particularly in PSO, in addition to strengthening the credibility and visibility of Portugal, has also provided arguments for its assertion in international *fora* and contributed to Portuguese diplomats and military being chosen to top positions in the global context:

"Portuguese involvement in international peace missions has indeed contributed to Portugal's affirmation in the world and, according to Freitas do Amaral, 'facilitates the appointment of Portuguese individuals to high posts'" (quoted in Mário Soares Foundation, 2006: 645).

Portugal has sought to take advantage of its efforts and did so by obtaining several important victories, such as the election as a non-permanent member of the Security Council in 1997-98 and again in the 2011-12 biennium, as well as conquering other positions of great international visibility. Examples include the election of Ambassador José Cutileiro as Secretary-General of the WEU in November 1994 (and subsequent re-election in 1997); the appointment, in 1995, of Freitas do Amaral as President of the 50th United Nations General Assembly; the appointment of diplomat Luís de Almeida Sampaio as political adviser to the commander of the SFOR; the OSCE summit held in Lisbon in December 1996; the appointment to important posts in the Department of



Peacekeeping Operations (DPKO) of the United Nations; the support given to the candidature of Prof Paula Escarameia to the UN International Law Commission; the appointment of Ambassador Seixas da Costa to the Economic and Social Council; the appointment in 2004 of Durão Barroso as President of the European Commission; the choice, in 2005, of António Guterres as UN High Commissioner (Mário Soares Foundation, *op. cit.*, p. 679-80; Sousa, undated: 9).

The Armed Forces as an instrument of foreign policy

It is interesting to note how the Portuguese government became aware it was essential to combine diplomatic activity with the military instrument to ensure the best results, a vision translated into the several revisions of the National Defence Strategic Concept in 1994 and in 2003, in the fourth constitutional revision in 1997, and in the National Defence and Armed Forces Laws. These documents acknowledge the military component as an instrument for affirmation in the field of foreign policy. Accordingly, the Armed Forces, through international cooperation, are one more “vector”, “arm” and “instrument of foreign policy:

“The Armed Forces have thus become a core instrument of the country’s foreign policy – a fact clearly assumed by the political power, and have contributed significantly to the country not becoming an irrelevant entity in terms of international relations in the post-Cold War” (Branco, 2009: 112).

The conflicts where the Portuguese Armed Forces were more significantly engaged were: in the 1990s - Angola, Mozambique, the former Yugoslavia, and East Timor. Currently, the most important theatres of operations are: Afghanistan, Somalia, Kosovo, and Lebanon. The Portuguese Armed Forces now enjoy a prestigious international experience and have made an important contribution to international security in settings as diverse as Bosnia-Herzegovina, Kosovo, Afghanistan, Lebanon, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Chad, and Guinea-Bissau, among others. Performance at these international missions is a decisive factor not only for the country’s international credibility but also, in parallel, for the modernization of the Armed Forces.

Portugal thus presents itself as a “producer” and not as a mere “consumer” of international security (Freire, 2007: 90; MDN, 2001: 19-20; Pereira and Farinha, 2009; Duque, 1998, 46-47; Teixeira, 2009: 20). Portugal’s commitment to peacekeeping has conferred it an international image that has become increasingly consistent.

In conclusion, it seems possible to assert that the international influence of the Portuguese state was based, alongside several diplomatic vectors, on its participation in PSO⁷. The flexibility that the Armed Forces have often given governments in making policy decisions with regard to cooperation with several international organizations has contributed to this. For the sake of rigour, it is pertinent to note that the size of the forces involved is not the same as a decade ago. Compared to the 1990s, in recent

⁷ The author is grateful to the referee for this insight.



years there has been a perceptible decrease in the country's participation in UN missions. In addition, Portugal has preferred to participate in NATO and EU missions in detriment of UN ones. Currently, the largest share of operations, which is about 19 million Euros, is allocated to national involvement in the NATO mission in Afghanistan, which Portugal has decided to maintain in full until 2014, having been considered a strategic priority intervention area. Portugal will reduce its presence in Lebanon and leave the UN piracy fighting mission in the Indian Ocean, but will continue to participate in EU operations in that region. These decisions are explained, above all, by the context of acute crisis that has forced Portugal to reduce its workforce and pick its contribution carefully. The logic in this context of crisis, as explained by former Defence Minister Severiano Teixeira, is to "avoid geographic dispersion and excessive multiplication of settings in which to carry out the missions, and concentrate our efforts in theatres of operations where Portugal can enhance its effective value. And, finally, have a balanced participation in EU and NATO missions, which are the two multilateral organizations Portugal has privileged when meeting its international commitments" (Teixeira, 2009; 44).

Therefore, Portugal is pursuing a more rational path: without exhausting its participation in settings of greater wearing and risk, it has invested in niches that have enhanced its importance with relative economy of resources. There is no longer the need to increase size to affirm the participation or presence of Portugal; the tendency now is to choose what to do and how to do it to affirm Portuguese presence in settings that policy makers consider a priority, not neglecting the commitment to what is required internationally, and the capacity to meet those requests and simultaneously meet national interests.

Interviews:

Interviews by email (October-November 2011) with a diplomat of the Security Council who does not want to be identified.

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HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE CONTROVERSIAL HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION OF A UNIVERSAL MORAL

Soraya Nour Sckell

sorayanour@yahoo.com

Soraya NOUR SCKELL is researcher at the Sophiapol, Université Paris Ouest Nanterre la Défense, and at Observare, Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa. She has made research at the Universities of Saint Louis (SLU), Nanterre, Frankfurt a.M. and Berlin (HU) and taught at the Universities of Sao Paulo, Munich, Metz and Lille. She is the vice-president of the Association Humboldt France and received the German-French Friendship Prize. Her main areas of research are the philosophy of international law, international relations and the peace movement. Her main publications are: *À Paz Perpétua de Kant. Filosofia do Direito Internacional e das Relações Internacionais* (São Paulo, 2004); (ed.) *The Minority Issue. Law and the Crisis of Representation* (Berlin 2009); (ed. with Christian Lazzeri) *Reconnaissance, identité et intégration sociale* (Nanterre 2009); (ed. with Olivier Remaud) *War and Peace. The role of science and art* (Berlin 2010); (ed. with Damien Ehrhardt) *La Fascination de la Planète. L'éthique de la diversité* (Berlin, 2012); (ed. with Damien Ehrhardt) *Interculturalité et Transfert* (Berlin 2012).

Abstract

Humanitarian law was conceived by legal and moral normativism founded on universal principles. Despite its undeniable universal moral content, its formulations and application methods are however the result of historical conflicts. This article aims to analyze how the universality of humanitarian law is produced by highly controversial conflicts. It is necessary to overcome the antagonism between an analysis that focuses on the moral undeniable value of humanitarian law by ignoring its controversies and an analysis that focuses on social antagonism questioning the achievability of the moral and universal value of humanitarian law. For this, we must consider that humanitarian law is a construction. It appears as autonomous and independent of power relationships, as based on the rationality of morality and thus worthy of universal recognition. Yet its development is only possible when one considers the historical roots of reason. It is only through political struggle that humanitarian law is realized in history.

The aim of this paper is to analyze how the universal nature of humanitarian law is produced by highly controversial conflicts. Firstly, an analysis is offered on the universal but at the same controversial character in the codification of humanitarian law, recalling controversies around the creation of the Additional Protocols of 1977 (Section 1). Next, an analysis is given on the conflictual character of organizations supporting humanitarian law, taking in account conflicts between the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders and controversies around the ambitions to pass from an humanitarian law to a right of humanitarian intervention (Section 2). Finally, a reflection is offered on how the theories of international relations that most appropriately grasp the universal nature of humanitarian law must be complemented by a "historical sociology of the universal" that embraces the conflicting historical dimension in the construction of the universal (Section 3).

Keywords

Humanitarian law; law of war; the Geneva Conventions; Red Cross; Doctors without Borders

How to cite this article

Sckell, Soraya Nour (2012). "Humanitarian law: the controversial historical construction of a universal moral". *JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2012. Accessed [online] on (date of last viewing), observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol3_n1_art4

Article received on March and accepted for publication on April



HUMANITARIAN LAW: THE CONTROVERSIAL HISTORICAL CONSTRUCTION OF A UNIVERSAL MORAL

Soraya Nour Sckell

Introduction

Humanitarian law, once called "jus in bellum" (law in war), the law of the battlefield and later extended to all kinds of non-military catastrophic situations, became very popular in the 1990s: its meanings have multiplied; a polysemy gave origin to the noun "humanitarian" and also justified the idea of a "duty to interfere". As Ladi explains, facing the lack of an enemy advance, it is the logic of a situation calling for a commitment that brings out the "humanitarian" (Laidi, 2001: 186) in a process that makes it increasingly autonomous from politics. The vogue of humanitarian is thus explained by a strategy without high political costs (loss of life), economic costs (resource transfers) or social costs (migration); the humanitarian meets the requirements of an unimpeachable legitimacy (to save lives), being limited in time (before the doubts of public opinion) and escaping from fundamental solutions that would jeopardize past responsibilities or would require massive economic and military resources. During the conflict in Kurdistan, humanitarian intervention served as an objective policy to protect the Kurds, ensure the autonomy of Kurdistan and prevent Kurdish refugees from destabilizing Turkey. In contrast, its privileged role in Yugoslavia was explained mainly by the absence of seeking a political solution to the conflict. In Somalia (where humanitarian agencies have stepped in to care for victims of the "humanitarian war" led by the UN), it was nevertheless expected that humanitarianism would lead to a policy of reconciliation (Laidi, 2001: 168-170). The scepticism that all these difficulties constitutive of humanitarian law have also created, however, offer an opportunity to rethink the frameworks within which it can still be meaningful. This requires associating its theoretical, essentially "moral" presuppositions with a "political" conception of humanitarian law, which clarifies that, despite being devoted to universal values conceived as products of "universal reason", "universal moral conscience" or "consensus", its formulations and its implementation are the result of highly controversial political and legal compromises.

The aim of this paper is to analyze how the universal nature of humanitarian law is produced by highly controversial conflicts. Firstly, an analysis is offered on the universal but at the same controversial character in the codification of humanitarian law, recalling controversies around the creation of the Additional Protocols of 1977 (Section 1). Next, an analysis is given on the conflictual character of organizations supporting humanitarian law, taking in account conflicts between the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders and controversies around the ambitions to pass from an humanitarian law to a Right of Humanitarian Intervention (Section 2). Finally, a reflection is offered on how the theories of international relations that most appropriately grasp the universal nature of humanitarian law must be complemented by a "historical sociology of the universal" that embraces the conflicting historical dimension in the construction of the universal (Section 3).



1) Political controversies in the codification of an universal humanitarian law

Precursors of the rules of humanitarian law are found in all cultures: in ancient India, among African, Greek, Roman, Persian, Sumerian and Hittite customary traditions, in the Code of Hammurabi, in the great literature (Mahabharata) and religious books (such as the Bible and Koran), in the rules of warfare (the laws of Manu and the Japanese Bushido) and in the rules of chivalry of the Middle Ages. While the ethical reflection on the very humanity of the enemy goes back to the ancient times of different cultural traditions, we find its modern legal formulation in the Enlightenment. Jean Jacques Rousseau establishes the difference between combatant and non-combatant: "War is not a relationship between humans, but a relationship between States, in which individuals are enemies only accidentally; not as men, nor even as citizens, but as soldiers; not as members of the homeland, but as its defenders..." (Rousseau, 1962: 240-241). Immanuel Kant criticizes the basis of the traditional "right to war" (*jus ad bellum*), the right that a State claims to have to use or threaten the life or the things of its citizens to make war. This means the right to do what we want with properties - which may apply to things, but not human beings, "who are not chickens, pigs, cows or apples that can be consumed, but persons" (Kant, 1797: 344-345). Kant's critique on the right to war, which founds the distinction between "just war" and "unjust war" that has justified aggression in modern times, is one of his most important attacks on the classic law of the people. The "right to war" means that a State that has suffered an actual violation (first attack) has the right to defend itself. According to Kant, this right means that it is "just" for human beings to "exterminate each other, finding the perpetual peace in the vast grave that covers all the horrors of violence as well as its authors" (Kant, 1795: 143). Secondly, Kant sets down the principles of the "law in war" (*jus in bellum*, which would later be called humanitarian law) - despite being a contradiction, since war is a state of the most complete absence of law: "Law in war is precisely that part of the law of the people that presents the greatest difficulty to make from it a concept and to think of a law in this state without law (*inter arma silent leges* - between arms, laws are silent). Under this title, Kant condemns inhuman war procedures and other unacceptable practices based on the idea that even the extreme situation of war requires the observance of certain rules of law (Kant, 1797: 347).

It is within this framework of thinking, which inspires the peace movement as well as the liberalist theories of peace, that humanitarian law is codified. Until the Middle Ages, warring nations were allowed by ethics and law to kill their enemies, be they combatants or not. Grotius justifies several acts of violence against the enemy, even captives and those who want to surrender (Grotius, 1999; Morgenthau, 1978: 242). War did not suffer significant moral restrictions because it was considered a conflict between the inhabitants of a territory, not between armed forces, which made all citizens of the enemy State themselves enemies.

It is only since the end of the Thirty Years War that the conception prevails that war is not between people, but between the armed forces of warring States (Morgenthau, 1978: 241). The distinction between combatant and non-combatant becomes a fundamental ethical and legal principle; only those who can and want to participate actively in combat may be subject to military action - the sick, wounded, prisoners or



those who want to surrender cannot be attacked; not to attack, injure or kill a non-combatant becomes a legal and moral duty (Morgenthau, 1978: 242). This trend towards the humanization of war, introduced in the sixteenth century, culminates in multilateral treaties in the nineteenth and twentieth century. 291 international treaties are drawn up between 1581 and 1864 to protect the lives of the wounded and sick in war.

In 1863, Abraham Lincoln approved the "Lieber Instructions" written by the lawyer Francis Lieber, a code with instructions of conduct to be applied by the U.S. army in campaigns, which can be considered representative of the rules of war at the time. In the same year, a decisive event for humanitarian law took place - the founding of the Red Cross, which symbolizes the realization of these institutional moral convictions (Morgenthau, 1978: 242).

Henry Dunant, a Swiss businessman, arrived in the village of Castiglione delle Stiviere in the evening of June 24, 1859 in what is currently northern Italy. The Battle of Solferino had just taken place in the neighbourhood in the context of the Franco-Austrian War, leaving about 6000 dead and 40,000 wounded. The next day, Dunant went to Solferino, finding the thousands of wounded left on the battlefield without medical care. France and the Austro-Hungarian Empire had provided more vets to treat horses than doctors to treat their wounded. Dunant organized the assistance to the wounded on both sides with the help of people from the surrounding area, mostly women, who chanted the motto "tutti fratelli". Deeply affected by the horror of war and the tragic fate of the wounded, Dunant began a campaign back in Geneva to organize volunteers to treat the war wounded. He vividly described his experiences in the manuscript *A Memory of Solferino* (1862), distributed throughout Europe, which attracted considerable attention and a large number of supporters for his ideas. This led to the creation of the International Committee of the Red Cross in 1863, the source of the humanitarian conventions on the protection of war wounded, prisoners and civilians decisive to the formation of humanitarian law until today.

The Geneva Convention of 1864, followed by those of 1906, 1929 and 1949, transforms the moral convictions related to the treatment of the wounded and sick as well as the doctors treating them during war into a statutory, concrete, detailed legal duty (Morgenthau, 1978: 242). Moreover, if prisoners of war are no longer killed in the eighteenth century, but still treated as criminals, Article 24 of the Treaty of Friendship signed between the United States and Prussia in 1785 represents a change in the moral convictions on this matter, which will lead to the creation of a comprehensive system of legal rules in the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 as well as the Geneva Conventions of 1929 and 1949. The treaties, continues Morgenthau, concluded by the middle of the nineteenth century reflect these same concerns regarding life and suffering, aiming to humanize war, defending or limiting the use of certain weapons: The Paris Declaration of 1856 limits maritime war; the St. Petersburg Declaration of 1868 prohibits the use of projectiles with explosive or flammable substances; several international conventions prohibit gas, chemical and biological weapons; the Hague Conventions of 1899 and 1907 codify the laws of war on land and sea and the rights and duties of neutral States; the London Protocol of 1936 limits the use of submarines against merchant vessels; and, since World War II, considerable efforts have been made to limit the use of nuclear weapons (Morgenthau, 1978: 243).



Today, the most important treaties concerning humanitarian law can be grouped under 5 main themes:

- 1) **Protection of Victims of Armed Conflicts:** Geneva Conventions I-IV (1949) with their Additional Protocols I, II (both of 1977) and III (2005) and the Declaration; Convention on the Rights of the Child (1989) with its Protocol (2000);
- 2) **International Criminal Court:** Rome Statute (1998);
- 3) **Protection of cultural Property in Armed Conflicts:** Hague Convention (1954) with its Protocols I (1954) and II (1999);
- 4) **Environment:** New York Convention (1976);
- 5) **Weapons:** Geneva Protocol on Asphyxiating, Poisonous or other Gases (1972), London, Moscow and Washington Convention on Biological and Toxic Weapons (1972); Geneva Convention on Conventional Weapons (1980) with its Protocols I-III (all from 1980), IV (1995), IIa (1996), V (2003) and Amendment (2001); Paris Convention on Chemical Weapons (1993), Oslo Convention on Anti-Personnel Mines (1997); Convention on Cluster Munitions (2008).

This codification was, however, characterized by a profound conflictuality, which can be easily seen in the 1977 Additional Protocols to the Geneva Convention, the first related to international armed conflicts and the second related to civil wars. These protocols attempt to regulate the new generation of conflicts. Such conflicts are rather more internal and driven by irregular guerrillas than international and driven by regular battles between uniformed armed forces (Greenwood, 1999: 3) in order to recognize the armed struggle against colonial powers, even if the conflict is not between States. Going beyond the initial proposals of the International Committee of the Red Cross, the lobby of Third World States sought to amplify combatant status to include members of a guerrilla, so they would also be treated as prisoners of war in the case of capture. This group has had several victories, such as the highly controversial Article 1 (4) of the 1st Protocol, according to which "armed conflicts in which people fight against colonial domination and alien occupation and racist regimes in the exercise of their right to self-determination" should be characterized as international conflicts to which all humanitarian law, and not provisions for internal conflicts, should be applied (Greenwood, 1999: 6). Thus, as Greenwood observes, Additional Protocol I is the "only agreement of humanitarian law described by a member of the U.S. government at the time as 'law in the service of terror'" (Greenwood, 1999: 4; see Feith, 1985 and Solf, 1986). According to observations of representatives of the German delegation, the fundamental antagonism in the Conference was not between West and East, but between North and South (Bothe et al, 1982: 7-8).

The North-South divide conditioned the negotiations on the status of combatants, the methods and means of fighting, the prohibition and limitation of armaments and the protection of the civilian population, marked by what Greenwood calls the "Vietnam syndrome", which is the paradigm of a conflict between an industrialized and non-industrialized country. The tendency was to accept the tactics of the Guerrillas of the Viet Cong and North Vietnam and reject the practices of the United States and their allies, based on two military concepts: "the power of man" and "power of weapons". This conflict was accompanied by the controversy between the "realists", who were



more attached to the "power of weapons", and "idealists", who were more attached to "human power" and who had more weight in the votes as well as more impact on the final solutions, which are well suited to asymmetrical conflicts, but not to disputes between developed countries with dense population (Bothe *et al.*, 1982: 9-10).

2) Conflict in humanitarian international organizations

Humanitarian law, as it has developed and become legalized, acquired a content that is interpreted by supporters and opponents alike as primarily moral and charitable. Jean Pictet, general director of the Red Cross in the 1950s and one of the main theoretical references to humanitarian law in the following years, makes the distinction: "To judge is to separate (...) the just from the unjust; it is to measure individual responsibility. However, charity has no use for this justice. It refuses to calculate the merit or fault of each individual. It goes much further; (...) it is the very image of mercy – of goodness without limit (Pictet, 1966: 19) ... Humanism would therefore prefer solutions dictated by compassion to those dictated by an imperfect justice, behind which revenge is (scarcely) hidden. In wartime, when the concepts of just and unjust become virtually indistinguishable and when moral standards are shaken, it is nearly impossible to be fair. If you want to act for the good of your neighbour and improve the average lot of people, you must be guided by spontaneous generosity" (Pictet, 1966: 20). The author goes on to say, "... justice in its highest degree eventually unites with charity. However, until it has reached this summit, there will always be room alongside it for charity, as charity generates initiative and spontaneity; it brings a human element into social relations that law, which is impersonal and abstract, does not know" (Pictet, 1966: 22). Pictet quotes Lao Tzu: "I am good to whom is good and I am good to whom is not good" (Pictet, 1966: 19). The author also quotes Lossier: If "justice is to respect human beings, love is to move toward them" (Pictet, 1966: 22).

Following this doctrine, the Red Cross kept silent on the extermination fields in World War II based on its belief that impartiality is a necessary condition for treating victims. Despite considering making the information they had on the extermination policy public in 1942, the International Committee of the Red Cross decided to keep silent. Thus, the Red Cross became an accomplice by omission. In 1969, Bernard Kouchner and other doctors serving the International Committee of the Red Cross on a mission in Biafra decided to break the silence and make a political denunciation, creating a new organization denominated "Doctors Without Borders".

While Doctors Without Borders represents a significant correction of the doctrine of silence of the Red Cross, transforming humanitarians into whistle blowers of atrocities, it becomes clear very early on that it is not easy to escape the political strategies of States. It was not the case in Biafra, as they had been led to believe, of a genocide organized by the Government of Nigeria. The starving people were held hostage by the military that led the secession, which presented these people as victims of the enemy. Unaware of the political problems in the disaster that they wanted to relieve, the humanitarians had ended up supporting the criminals.

The two organizations work with different but complementary aims. While one denounces, seeking to mobilize public opinion, but sometimes losing authorization to act in the territory of the State it denounces, the other keeps silent (although not more so much than in the past), but thusly it ensures access to the sick and wounded.



2.1) From humanitarian law to humanitarian intervention

The aspect that has proven the most problematic of its doctrine is that Doctors Without Borders have understood politics as the humanitarian policy of State, calling for military action. Despite the nonexistence of a "right" of humanitarian intervention in the UN Charter or customary international law, mandates authorizing the use of unilateral force, such as arbitrary acts of the Security Council UN, have relied on this doctrine.

It is precisely this idea that Habermas will develop in the 1990s with a reconstruction of Kant's cosmopolitan right aimed at legitimizing a worldwide realization of human rights. According to Kant, the three levels of legal organization – the State, international law and cosmopolitan law – should be maintained simultaneously and the idea of a world State is rejected as "soulless despotism", but several reconstructions of Kant argue that the historical difficulties that conditioned Kant's thinking have been overcome. For these reconstructions, a cosmopolitan law in the sense of a global right must replace international law, allowing the use of force on behalf of humanity.

Habermas (1996) considers three dimensions of law: the law of each country, international law (that of relations between States) and cosmopolitan right in the Kantian sense, which sees every citizen not as a citizen of the State but of the world. The Kantian idea of cosmopolitan law, says Habermas, should now guide policies aimed at the worldwide triumph of universal human rights, the main instrument of which is humanitarian intervention: "The weakness of the global protection of human rights is the absence of an executive force that would, if necessary, be able to ensure compliance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights by intervening in the sovereignty of member States." Thus, Habermas concludes, the prohibition of intervention must be reviewed: "Except when, as in the case of Somalia, there is no State power that may be exercised, the world organization works (as in the case of Liberia and Bosnia-Croatia) with the consent of the governments involved. With Resolution 688 of April 1991, a new path in the Gulf War is opened, at least in practice, if not with regard to the legal justification for intervention. At the time, the United Nations invoked the right of intervention based on Chapter VII of the Charter on 'threats against international security'. In this sense, the UN has not intervened in the 'internal affairs of a sovereign country.' But the allies knew very well that this was what they were doing (...) to create 'protection zones' (...) for Kurdish refugees and to protect the members of a certain national minority against its own State". Habermas understands that the aim of interventions is the democratization of the internal order, a condition of a "sustainable economy, supportable social relations, egalitarian democratic participation, the rule of law and a culture of tolerance".

Academic debate arises in newspapers when NATO attacks Kosovo. Habermas writes in the newspaper *Die Zeit*, referring to the virtual disappearance of the rhetoric of "reason of State" still evoked in the Gulf War, that "fortunately, the dark tones are absent from the German public space (...). Supporters and opponents of the [NATO] attack use a crystalline normative language" (Habermas, 1999: 1). In an article published in the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung*, entitled "The unfair enemy: what would Kant have said about the Kosovo war", Reinhardt Brandt asks, "How can we judge the appropriateness of NATO attacks against Serbia? What philosopher can be put in the bags of soldiers? We must go back two hundred years to re-enter the conceptual world that is now claimed by the political leadership of NATO." Hegel, the author recalls, focused on the



singular Germanic State; Marx and Nietzsche took distance from legal ideas. Kant remains the most classic modern author to consider a peaceful legal world order. A note by the *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* attached to this article warns its readers that "Kant's work *Perpetual Peace* is now a key text from which to evaluate a universal policy of human rights. The current issue of reconciling the legal principle of non-interventionism with the principle of humanitarian intervention had been addressed at its foundations in 1795" (Brandt, 1999: 11).

Habermas, however, makes an exception to the requirement that he had made four years earlier that human rights violations must be pursued legally. Facing a blocked Security Council, the NATO intervention in Kosovo could be based on the principle of the "necessary assistance" of international law, even without a UN mandate, since human rights have a moral content, sharing the moral norms of the claim to universal validity (Habermas, 1999: 1; Anderson-Gold, 1998: 103-111). Challenging this view of humanitarian law, the lawyer Marcelo Neves argues that "according to this conception of the moral character of humanitarian interventions conducted unilaterally by major Western powers, Habermas' idea does not exactly produce a world domestic policy for the achievement of human rights, but a Western external political control of human rights. In this case, decisions regarding attacks and their selective, arbitrary applications do not occur under the control of procedures based on the model of the rule of law and democracy" (Neves, 2000: 207). Among the critical responses to Habermas formulated in a Kantian perspective, two weeks later and also in *Die Zeit*, Reinhard Merkel states that any international act requires the mandate of a legal entity recognized by the international community; that a war without a mandate destroys the conditions of the judicialization of international relations and threatens the future of the international order as a legal order - and not for the precarious balance of self-legitimized powers, he notes, explaining that he does not argue in realistic terms (Merkel, 1999: 10). Likewise, Reinhardt Brandt remarks that, given the absence of a UN mandate for NATO action, "Kant (...) would certainly have seen an extremely serious injury to law in the weakening of an international forum" (Merkel, 1999: 10). Four years later, Habermas contests the Iraq war of 2003 and U.S. foreign policy, calling on Europe to redefine its "foreign policy". Habermas identifies the European foreign policy with "a Kantian expectancy of an inner world politics", relegating the role of following the "European model" to the South (Habermas and Jacques Derrida, 2003). However, the difficulty in the argument that Europe should act as a counterweight to the United States is the reintroduction of the "balance of power" of realism in the "crystalline normative language" that he once praised and that normativism claimed to fight so decisively.

There is here a displacement firstly from politics to law (to legitimate political action), then from law to moral (when law, at an impasse, cannot justify) and finally from moral to power (when moral does not help understand "what happens"). Fichte is in fact emblematic of such a pathway. Inspired by Kant, Fichte denies at first that peace can be achieved by the balance of power, which only serves to justify new attacks and wars: peace cannot result from a compromise between powers, but from an international law that rules over them, a League of Nations, whose driving centre would be revolutionary France (Fichte, 1971: 90-96; Losurdo, 1991: 74-105). He begins to suspect that France could be the centre of such a federation after the defeat of Prussia and the triumph of the Empire of Napoleon, when he felt that the enthusiasm for the



French Revolution and the ideal of perpetual peace prevented him from clearly seeing power relationships. And that's when the turn begins from Kant to Machiavelli, this "magnificent mind" (Fichte, 1971: 408; Losurdo, 1991: 119), says Fichte. This return to Machiavelli should not serve to investigate the true nature of the human being nor develop politics of power based on cynicism or brutality, but simply to be aware of hazards that can cause unpleasant surprises in the international scene: Machiavelli's lesson has painfully been confirmed by history (Losurdo, 1991: 119-120). Fichte, Losurdo analyzes, does not abandon the ideal of perpetual peace to be conducted by a law above States and their conflicts, but until then ... we must take power relationships into account (Losurdo, 1991: 135-136).

Humanitarian logic is completely different from a military project, which makes the choice between those who should live and who should die, assuming that the sacrifice of a few is justified by a "lasting peace" (Weissman, 2004: 62). Many humanitarians believe that the vulnerability of the humanitarian doctrine comes primarily from the use of a universal moral language, of the certainty that all people of good will reach a consensus on its rules, irrespective of their political or religious convictions, because, thereby constituting a unanimous international opinion that could change the world (Milner, 2004: 53). This is undoubtedly a desirable situation from a normative point of view, but does not provide tools for analyzing the political issues of contemporary disasters.

3) The conflicting nature of the universal in theories on international relations

In international relations theory, humanitarian law, together with human rights, is consecrated as the great evidence of the existence of a global moral built by a global society that knows no borders – world-society. As Jean-Jacques Roche (2010) analyzes, as opposed to a conception of international society as a society of States united by common interests and agreement on standards of behaviour, the idea of a world society considers a society of individuals united by common values, a society that considers itself independent of all political authority, thus challenging violence between States. This idea, which dates back to ancient cosmopolitanism and persists in various forms across the history of philosophy, finds its most recent theoretical inspiration in the liberalism theory based on the principle of a civil society and in positivism, which considers the replacement of "the theological age" with the "scientific age" and "mechanical solidarity" with "organic solidarity", in which each individual chooses his/her own links with others. In the theory of international law, Scelle develops the concept of a "sociological objectivism": the international society, such as the internal society, is a group of individuals. The individual, not the State, is the first component of both the national and international society and the first subject of both domestic law and international law. Sovereignty belongs to the international society; the State is an intermediate group whose internal and external powers are conferred by international law. In 1972, the year of apogee of the Soviet-American detente, with the summit in Moscow in June 1972, Robert O. Keohane and Joseph Nye published *Transnational Relations and World Politics* and John Burton published the *World Society*, which had great impact. With the increase in the East-West tension in the 1980s, the theme of Burton's World Society no longer played a central role and Keohane and Nye refocused



their attentions on the role of the State. These transnationalist ideas regain interest in the post-Cold War after the fall of the Berlin Wall (1989); many authors believe that the world of States, which finds its origin in the Treaty of Westphalia, has been surpassed. The post-Westphalian world is characterized by the emergence of a world society in confrontation with the logic of States - a world in which global problems require new tools for decisions and actions. The *Theorie des kommunikativen Handelns* (*Theory of Communicative Action*, 1981) by Jürgen Habermas, the *Gesellschaft der Individuen* (*Society of Individuals*, 1983) by Norbert Elias and *Turbulence in World Politics* (1990) by James Rosenau become central theoretical references. The privileged method of acting by global society, which considers the individual and not the State in the centre of its concerns, is "governance", addressing issues such as humanitarian law, which goes beyond the limits of the State and which could hardly be addressed by the traditional categories of international relations. Governance is not based on political solidarity between States, but includes transnational solidarity between individuals. NGOs emerge as the preferred form of governance. NGOs focused on the implementation of humanitarian law, as the Red Cross and Doctors Without Borders, are then considered the ultimate symbol of the world-society.

3.1) The universal and identity conflicts: the perception of the world

Conflicts in the world-society result not from conflicts between States, but above all from conflicts in the 'world economy' and 'conflicts of identities', which may or may not be confused with political entities, such as a State. The identity issue was already present in the thinking of classical realism, in which identity is confused with the morality of the State. The classical realist Morgenthau in *Power Among Nations* (1948, followed by several re-editions) recognizes and affirms the existence of an international morality, expressed by excellence in humanitarian law. Although there are arguments against the effectiveness of these treaties, which are completely violated, the author states, "this is no argument against the existence of a moral conscience that feels ill at ease in the presence of violence, or at least certain types of violence, on the international scene". Most States try to harmonize these moral principles through international treaties and, when they are violated, governments have to justify and apologize. "They are the indirect recognition of certain moral limitations, which nations at times completely disregard and frequently violate." Large groups within a State at war revolt against violations of moral principles in the conduction of war, which proves "the existence of a moral conscience aware of moral limitations" (Morgenthau, 1978: 243).

Morgenthau does not question whether an international morality exists or not – he considers it incontestable that such a morality exists –, but he sees that the larger dimensions of war make humanitarian law impossible. These larger dimensions can be identified in four central aspects:

- 1)** the portion of the population engaged in essential activities of warfare;
- 2)** the portion of the population affected by the conduction of war;
- 3)** the portion of the population identifying with war through conviction and emotion; and



4) the objectives of war.

Mass armies are supported by the production of the majority of the civilian population, such that the successful production of a civilian population is as important as the military effort itself. Modern warfare takes its weapons from a vast industrial machine that eliminates the distinction between soldier and civilian: "The worker, the engineer, the scientist are not innocent bystanders... They are as intrinsic and indispensable a part of the military organization as are the soldiers, sailors and airmen." The Second World War has air strikes and long-range shelling to destroy the productive capacity of a nation and its force of resistance (Morgenthau, 1978: 245). Based on the moral conviction of the inter-war years, on June 11, 1938, American Secretary of State Cordell Hull expressed his disapproval regarding the sale of aircraft and aircraft armaments to nations that bombed civilian populations following the bombardment of Canton by Japan. A year later, U.S. President Roosevelt made the same moral embargo to the Soviet Union regarding attacks on civilians in Finland. However, all warring nations soon practiced attacks to a higher degree than that which had been condemned. The morality of war, analyses Morgenthau, change with Warsaw and Rotterdam, Coventry and London, Nuremberg and Cologne, Hiroshima and Nagasaki: "The war in Indochina war for all practical purposes obliterated the distinction between the combatants and the civilian population" (Morgenthau, 1978: 246). In destroying enemy productivity and the emotional engagement of the masses, national interest destroys international morality: "As the religious wars of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries were followed by the dynastic wars of the later seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, and as the latter yielded to the national wars of the nineteenth and the early twentieth centuries, so war in our time tends to revert to the religious type by becoming ideological in character. The citizen of a modern warring nation, in contrast to his ancestors of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, does not fight for the glory of his prince or the unity and greatness of his nation, but he 'crusades' for an 'ideal', a set of 'principles', a 'way of life', for which he claims a monopoly of truth and virtue. In consequence, he fights to the death or to 'unconditional surrender' all those who adhere to another, a false and evil, 'ideal' or 'way of life'. Since it is this 'ideal' and 'way of life' that fight in whatever persons they manifest themselves, the distinctions between fighting and disabled soldiers, combatants and civilians - if they are not eliminated altogether - are subordinated to the one distinction that really matters: the distinction between the representatives of the right and the wrong philosophy and way of life. The moral duty to spare the wounded, the sick, the surrendering and unarmed enemy, and to respect him as a human being who was an enemy only by virtue of being found on the other side of the fence, is superseded by the moral duty to punish and to wipe off from the face of the earth the professors and practitioners of evil" (Morgenthau, 1978: 246).

For Morgenthau, the subjective vision of the world is thus closely linked to the national moral. Raymond Aron, in turn, arguing that international relations cannot be fully rational because they are human relations, distinguishes material interests from immaterial interests. Non-objective and non-quantitative criteria influence diplomatic choices, such that each interpretation is different, depending on the culture, origin and psychology of each observer. If Morgenthau and Aron mainly take into account the perception in the framework of the State, the most recent studies on the perception of



international relations are detached from the State as a place of the critical construction of subjectivity. Major reference works include *The Image: Knowledge of Life in Society* (1956) by Kenneth Boulding, *Introduction à l'Histoire des Relations Internationales* (1964) by Pierre Renouvin and Jean-Baptiste Duroselle and *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (1976) by Robert Jervis. Renouvin and Duroselle consider it necessary to "realize" the influences, the "deep forces", the unstable variables that guide the course of international relations. Behaviourism is incorporated into international relations, focusing on the study of the representation that the individual has of her/his environment. In the post-Cold War, the theoretical "constructivist" approach (Alexander Wendt, 1999) develops in international relations, aiming to determine the role of social structures in international life. The question raised is how social structures influence the identity and the conduct of the actors and how these actors reproduce or create social structures. It thus shows a great interest in "unstable variables"; norms, values and identities acquire as much importance in the analysis of international relations as material criteria for power (realism) or safety (neorealism). According to these doctrines, humanitarian law appears as the consecration of a moral value and a transnational rule of law constructed by several players – a law that can predominate on the international scene as well as other interests and that can even be a deciding factor in the behaviour of States.

Culture is now considered by some authors as the main source of antagonism. Norbert Elias already saw that globalization widens the areas of freedom of the individual while promoting the phenomenon of identity relocation as soon as the individual needs a space in her/his measure. Samuel Huntington, however, gives a radical sense to this idea: the ideological competition between East and West, in his view, leads to a confrontation between the West and the rest of the world. Civilizations transmit antagonistic conceptions of the human being. However, this is an exaggerated description of identity conflicts that does not offer the theoretical tools needed to explain the undeniable phenomenon of the construction of universal values that support humanitarian law.

3.2.) The political history of the universal moral of humanitarian law

The fundamental political question, however, still most affects the concept of humanitarian law that does not relate to the causes of war in a vain attempt to reintroduce law where law has failed and to submit to law those who have replaced law with violence (Chemillier-Gendreau, 2002: 80-81). In the case of humanitarian intervention, this refusal to combat the causes of conflicts becomes all the more dramatic (Chemillier-Gendreau, 2002: 82). The problems at the root of dramatic situations that call for humanitarian responses require a legal framework, indicating the deficiency of international law with regard to facing contemporary problems. As Chemillier-Gendreau analyzes, the following are its major inefficiencies:

- 1)** the maintenance of peace (the central legal mechanism of the UN, but the operation of which is subject to the veto power of the permanent members of the Security Council) is discredited by impotence, partiality, wars disguised as maintenance of peace and the criminalization of operations conducted;



- 2) the judicial mechanism of dispute resolution also proves ineffective: the International Court of Justice in the Hague requires the consent of States to be able to judge; the International Criminal Court and the special courts set up by the Security Council for the former Yugoslavia and Rwanda have not had the expected results;
- 3) there is no control of weapons that are used in international crimes, especially devastating landmines, despite several agreements on specific weapons (which apply only to signatory States); and
- 4) the economic realm, which is the main cause of the breakdown of societies, divides humanity between those who benefit from a social organization that ensures survival, freedom and (potential) participation in the decision-making process and the growing masses of those sentenced to be eliminated, who later call for the humanitarian (Chemillier-Gendreau, 2002: 83-85).

The latter problem requires the differentiation between functional violence, which consists of the structural oppression inherent to social relations and which eliminates any kind of resistance incompatible with the reproduction of the system, and non-functional violence, which concerns the rest of the world market (this is the kind of violence that does not exploit, but leaves to die, also as a product of the world economy). These people have no possibility of emancipating themselves through their fighting. Balibar calls "civility" the politics that, having this problem in mind, aims at producing the very conditions for political action, reducing the extreme violence that prevents any form of communication and recognition between persons. This is a kind of politics that distinguishes itself from politics as "emancipation" (the conquest of individual rights) and "transformation" (transformation of power relationships and structures) (Balibar, 2001: 183). In the framework of such a policy, which takes these forms of violence into account, humanitarian law may regain its senses.

This conception of law supposes that its contents can hardly be seen through categories of rationalization and consensus (Habermas), but it is still the category of "compromise", as Kelsen insists, that expresses the very substance of law: it is a product of the struggle between different actors, a struggle that determines the formulation, interpretation and application of the rules of humanitarian law, the meaning of which is understood in its social function and conditioned by the context into which they are inserted. Despite all the difficulties of the implementation of humanitarian law, the historical analysis of its quarrelsome emergence and development, of its institutions, documents and rules, reveals the violence in international relations, but, at the same time, underlines the possibilities of political and legal action that can oppose this violence.

It is necessary to surpass the cosmopolitan normativism of Habermas as well as the realism of Morgenthau. According to Habermas' legal theory, humanitarian law depends on the institutionalization of the legal forms necessary for the formation of rational will. According to the Morgenthau's realism, the construction of a negative image of the enemy excludes the possibility of making universal values effective. It is necessary to overcome the antagonism between an analysis that focuses on the undeniable moral value of humanitarian law by ignoring its controversies and an analysis that focuses on social antagonisms, questioning the feasibility of the universal moral values of



humanitarian law. We must then consider that humanitarian law is a construction. There is nothing obvious in the idea of having humanitarian rights against the enemy even during war or in the conflict against her/his own government or against a dominant power. As Bourdieu analyzes, nothing is less obvious than to feel oneself a victim of injustice and to have rights and this applies even in the extreme situation of the absence of rights – war. The question is how to reconcile universal discourse on humanitarian law with a sociological analysis that considers how legal discourse is socially and historically produced. With Boudieu, it is possible to understand that the symbolic effect of humanitarian law is possible only if it is socially accepted as a neutral and independent response to real needs. For this end, codifying is essential. In the codification of humanitarian law, it appears that it is neither a product of universal reason nor the imposition of a dominant ideology. It results from a long, cumulative systematization that produces coherence and rationality, causing the effect of universal and normalization. Humanitarian law is also based on customs, but rationalization produces clarity, unlike customs. It appears as autonomous, as independent from power relationships, as based on the rationality of morality and thus worthy of universal recognition. The historical forms seem to have a transcendental foundation. However, the development of humanitarian law is only possible when one considers the historical roots of reason. As Bourdieu analyzes, the power of reason is not enough to achieve it. It is only through political struggle that reason is realized in history. Only by discovering its historical and social conditions, humanitarian law finds the means to escape its historicity.

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THE STRATEGIES OF PORTUGUESE CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FIELD OF THE ENVIRONMENT

Brígida Rocha Brito

brigidabrito@netcabo.pt

Lecturer at the Department of International Relations, *Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa* - UAL (Environment and International Relations, International Cooperation, Contemporary World). Researcher at OBSERVARE (UAL) and Deputy Director of JANUS.NET, e-journal of International Relations. Collaborated with the Sociology Department of the University of Évora as Guest Assistant Lecturer and with the Higher College of Agriculture (Escola Superior Agrária) of Coimbra as Assistant Lecturer. Has worked as a consultant, diagnosing and evaluating development projects in Portuguese-speaking African countries for civil society organizations (*Instituto Marquês de Valle Flôr, Artissal, Acção para o Desenvolvimento*) and international organizations (The World Bank Group; International Organization for Migrations and Labour International Bureau, Programme STEP-Portugal). Worked for the Ministry of Environment of Brazil in preparing a strategic document on environmental education to be used in all Portuguese-speaking countries (CPLP), "Passo a Passo" (Step by Step), and has been involved in cooperation activities between the Portuguese government and Sao Tomé and Príncipe in the field of training. She has carried out research on the following African countries: Angola, Cape Verde, Guinea-Bissau and São Tomé and Príncipe

Abstract

"The strategies of civil society organizations in the field of the environment" is the result of research conducted as part of the Project "strategies of international players in the area of the environment" carried out at OBSERVARE, the Observatory for External Relations of Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa. The objective of the study was to understand and characterize the involvement of Portuguese NGOs, or of those based in Portugal, in the field of the environment, identifying and evaluating the relationships they have established with external partners, namely with regard to the following: privileged countries; types of partners; intervention areas; methodologies and tools. The study was based on the concepts of development cooperation, including players and tools, partnership in international relations, and social and environmental sustainability, taking also into account the Millennium Development Goals, in particular as regards the Seventh Target: Guaranteeing Environmental Sustainability.

Given the broad scope of the study, a short questionnaire was built following the principle of guaranteed anonymity and made available online. After making a list of NGOs (ENGOS and DNGOs), the questionnaire was sent to many of these organizations, requesting them to respond to the questionnaire (N=43). From the data analysis and by confronting it with the concepts previously explored, it emerged that the majority undertake joint activity in Portugal and in partner countries, mostly with other similar organizations after the establishment of partnerships. The activity focuses on social and environmental projects of local relevance, with mixed funding that is mostly international in nature, and has clear objectives for promoting development.

Keywords

Environment, Conservation, Non-Governmental Organizations, Partnership

How to cite this article

Brito, Brígida (2012). "The strategies of Portuguese civil society organizations in the field of the environment". *JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2012. Accessed [online] on (date of last viewing), observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol3_n1_art5

Article received on December 2011 and accepted for publication on May 2012



THE STRATEGIES OF PORTUGUESE CIVIL SOCIETY ORGANIZATIONS IN THE FIELD OF THE ENVIRONMENT

Brígida Rocha Brito

1. Introductory aspects

The text "The strategies of civil society organizations in the field of the environment"¹ is the result of research (study) conducted by the Observatory for Foreign Relations (OBSERVARE) of Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa (UAL) on the international activity of Civil Society Organizations (NGOs) in the field of the environment. This topic has been given particular attention under the project "strategies of international players in the area of the environment", which is part of the Research Strand "Trends in International Current Affairs". The overall objective of the study was to understand the involvement of Portuguese NGOs, or those operating in Portugal, in the area of the environment. The specific objectives centred on:

- a)** Identifying the areas of intervention of the NGOs, considering a wide range of possibilities, but taking as a reference and common factor their concern to create a balanced relationship between human communities, environmental areas, and natural resources;
- b)** Charactering the main and subsidiary activities of NGOs with regard to social and economic dynamics;
- c)** Defining the relationships established with other international organizations, perceived as facilitators of further action and of implementation of planned projects.

In general, both in the academic and scientific community and in terms of intervention, there is agreement as to the various difficulties² that civil society and the organizations that emerge within it have faced regarding the continuity of their action. In order to minimize the constraints that limit their intervention, often threatening the continuity of projects, NGOs are inclined to consider the possibility of opening external links that end to position them either as beneficiaries or as promoters and supporters, or, even more frequently, as partners.

¹ The results of the research were presented at the First International Conference of OBSERVARE, held on 17 November 2011, in the section "Economy and Ecology", which took place at the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation in Lisbon. The Conference was organized by the Observatory for Foreign Relations (OBSERVARE) of *Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa* and focused on the topic "International Trends and Portugal's position".

² Around the world, particularly in countries with poor economies but also in Portugal, it is common to find references to Non-Governmental Organizations faced with restricted activity as a result of reduced budget capacity, lack of funding, scarce specialized scientific and technical knowledge of particular sectors of activity, and shortage of human resources, among other factors.



In this sense, the study was conducted from the perspective of internationalization of partnerships, seeking to identify:

- a) the key geographical areas that have caught the attention of Portuguese NGOs, or those operating in Portugal;
- b) countries with which partnerships have been established;
- c) the main funders of projects and programmes, including international organizations;
- d) standard international partners;
- e) preferred sectors of intervention;
- f) methodologies followed and tools that have acted as the basis for intervention in relation to previously outlined objectives.

2. Some considerations on the methodology

Bearing in mind the objectives set (see. 1. Introductory aspects), and the concern to complement conceptual analysis with the interpretation of reality to avoid analytical dispersion and overly theoretical discussions, we sought to follow a methodology that was as close as possible to the activities carried out by the NGOs involved in the study. As the research proceeded, some difficulties³ related to pursuing a proximity approach and intervening on the ground⁴ to better understand the organizational models and practices of NGOs came to the fore. Thus, a combined methodology was adopted, starting by enquiring Portuguese NGOs or those with activity conducted in Portugal, without completely ruling out the assumptions of the case study.

As the name of the methodology suggests, ever since the merit and scientific significance of these approaches have been acknowledged, there has been a tendency to focus studies on clearly pre-identified situations, the aforesaid "case studies". A cross-reading of the different methodological methods would characterize the case study as one that tends to be qualitative, given that most research that has adopted these practices as a means to reflect on reality lies within the Social Sciences and works on the ground, resorting to direct observation and subsequent evaluation. In this context⁵, the use of case studies for conducting research that imply field work is very common, for which reason they are associated with predominantly qualitative approaches.

³ The initial decision to use the case study model was a result of the prior knowledge that the author of this study had of the organizational model of Portuguese NGOs, as well as of their approaches and ways of operating, international fund raising, and establishment of partnerships. However, as the research progressed, it was decided to expand the scope of the study in order not to restrict interpretation by favouring a particular civil society organization in detriment of others.

⁴ Adopting the case study methodology in this type of research is not consensual, although it can be justified according to the criteria described in this text.

⁵ Since case study-based methodology became accepted from a scientific viewpoint, it has been particularly used in analysis within the scientific areas of sociology, anthropology and psychology. Recently, new concepts that enable interconnecting quantitative and qualitative techniques, or give priority to one of them according to the characteristics of the object of study have emerged. This factor does not remove importance to the way it is approached nor does it take away its scientific merit.



A thorough review of the literature indicates that currently there are no limits to the use of this methodology, nor a mandatory binding to merely qualitative procedures. Initial conventional approaches resorting to case studies focused analysis on qualitative techniques, namely by using interview techniques and direct observation to build a research diary or field journal. Our understanding of this methodology has evolved towards greater flexibility in the selection of data collecting and processing techniques, precisely because field work and on-site observation is not always feasible.

In more recent research⁶ where the methodology adopted was the case study, the possibility of resorting to quantitative techniques with regard to data collection and processing has been demonstrated, as showed through the use of questionnaires. This is a methodological option that depends on the study that is being carried out, on the object of analysis and on the scope of the universe, and there may be a need for a sample basis, due to the inability to consider the entire situation⁷.

In the present study, a combination of procedures has been consciously adopted with regard to the risk of a less consensual interpretation, but also as a contribution to the promotion of future discussion. Although the adaptability of this methodology is not consensual and may generate discussion as to the relevance and appropriateness of the analyses with a tendency for quantification, it is important to clarify that, over time, the relevance of this methodology and its adaptability to distinct types of research have been subject to both conceptual and procedural review, opening different possibilities as regards the selection of the instruments used during the research. Giving a revisionist direction to more conventional methodological approaches, some authors⁸ refer to "case studies" or even to "multiple case studies", thus enabling the use of a very wide range of data collecting and processing, including statistical sources and questionnaires.

According to Robert Yin (1994; 2001) and Judith Bell (1997), this methodology is particularly used whenever one wants to understand and describe the assumptions of a complex problem and identify the interactions between the parts that form it. Thus, this can be considered a methodology suitable for both exploratory studies, enabling the presentation of leads for future reflection, and for descriptive studies which seek to present a picture as detailed as possible of the reality under study. When resorting to this methodology, Bell (1997) proposes using different data collecting techniques – qualitative and quantitative – and presents an analogy between case studies and an umbrella that allows using several techniques that can be brought together depending on the variety of facts in question.

Three distinct but interrelated key moments are considered in the planning of actions to be undertaken (Yin, 2001), namely: 1) defining the theoretical framework and selecting the cases to analyse; 2) collecting data based on previously constructed data collection instruments; 3) relating the data analysis to the theoretical questions previously

⁶ Despite the fact that initially social sciences resorted to these methodological procedures, with time some studies within exact science, such as mathematics and its suitability for accounting, have opted to use case studies and mainly quantitative techniques. For further information on this topic, see, for example, Ponte, João Pedro (2006). *Estudos de caso em educação matemática*. Bolema, Boletim de Educação Matemática, 25.

⁷ In these cases, the objective is not to make inferences and generalizations from a pre-defined representative sample and following statistical criteria; rather, it is to identify trends that facilitate knowledge about a given topic.

⁸ On this topic, see authors such as K. Eisenhardt, Lisa Ellram, Flávio Bressan, Robert Yin, and Judith Bell, among others.



submitted. According to this explanation, the decision to adopt the case study method seeks to present facts, rather than offer a discussion of concepts or theoretical approaches, thus enabling a better understanding of the subject of study and a description, as detailed as possible, of real situations which promote the advancement of knowledge about a particular situation. João Pedro Ponte defines this methodology as:

"a research that is particular to a specific situation and deliberately addresses a particular case perceived as unique or special, at least in some aspects, and attempts to discover what its most essential and characteristics features are, and thus contribute to the overall understanding of a particular interesting phenomenon" (Ponte, 2006: 2).

With regard to this specific study, I have attempted to follow the criteria presented by the authors referred to concerning the revisionist approach to case study methodology, framing the activities of NGOs in the field of the environment and taking as a guideline their relationship with international counterparts. Accordingly, the decision to use the study case methodology was anchored on the following presuppositions:

- 1) It was not possible to see the work in the field of the civil society organizations that participated in this study. As they provided the main source of information, the use of mostly qualitative techniques was frustrated at the outset, for which reason it became necessary to choose other quantitative techniques to conduct the survey;
- 2) Both the pre-identified universe (N=75) and the number of NGOs involved in the study (N=43) was not broad enough to justify the use of other quantitative models with sequent statistical analysis that include validation tests;
- 3) The objectives of the analysis were complex and assumed, on the one hand, a descriptive interpretation of the available information, and, on the other, the intersection of data collected with the conceptual criteria previously defined and presented;
- 4) The environment and development NGOs involved in the study have been identified, and some of them were willing to be formally referenced in the texts to be produced in future and in public presentations on the results of the study, such as the First OBSERVARE Conference.

In accordance with the three moments defined by Yin (2001), in the beginning the conceptual and theoretical framework was explained, in addition to building the data collection instrument (see Appendix). This was followed by consultation with civil society organizations⁹ working in the field of the environment. Accordingly, a list of

⁹ Among the 43 Civil Society Organizations (NGOs) that cooperated and enabled this study the following agreed to be identified: WWF – *World Wildlife Foundation Portugal-Mediterranean Programme Office* (Ángela Morgado); ASPEA – *Associação Portuguesa de Educação Ambiental* (Fátima Matos Almeida); NEREA-*Investiga* – *Associação Internacional de Investigadores em Educação Ambiental* (Joaquim Ramos)



Portuguese or acting in Portugal Non-Governmental Organizations for the Environment (ENGOS) was drawn up, including those operating in the mainland and in the autonomous regions of Madeira and of the Azores. This was followed by a supplementary list of Non-Governmental Organizations for Development (DNGOs) whose main activity was not the environment but which carry out projects within an environmental context or which have environmental impact.

To facilitate the collection of data, a short questionnaire following the principle of anonymity was built (see Annex) and made available online¹⁰ for a predetermined period of time. The entities had the option to identify themselves should they wish to do so. The request for cooperation was done by email to all ENGOS and DNGOs on the list previously drawn up. Accordingly, it can be stated that it was the consultation process to civil society organizations directly and indirectly involved in the field of the environment that enabled defining the cases under study (N=43)¹¹.

The questionnaire (see Annex) was mainly composed of close-ended questions, including, in some cases, the possibility of multiple choices, and, in some fields, open answers. This arose from the conviction that, in some situations, open answers offer qualitative information that complements quantitative data. In these situations, the information was subsequently classified in groups according to types, contributing to better understanding and interpretation. The consultation thus reconciled two complementary ways of collecting data which, for practical purposes, were done at the same consultation moment: closed-ended questions, for a quantitative based analysis, and questions allowing open answers, to enable qualitative analysis.

After the data was collected, it was analyzed according to the criteria described earlier with a view to drawing valid conclusions regarding the research objectives initially set.

3. Some concepts under analysis

3.1. Brief reference to the importance of environmental issues

Despite the trend towards a gradual appreciation of environmental issues worldwide, this awareness has not been regular nor continuous, having often been sidelined in relation to other issues considered to be priorities, such as the emerging economic crisis, socio-political instability, violation of human rights, or the outbreak of conflicts or wars that frequently involve international intervention, both armed and through diplomatic channels to ensure stability and the maintenance of peace. This fact has meant that the impacts of the conceptual, theoretical and methodological discussion have been faint and not consistent in strategic terms, not leading to the adoption of effective broad measures enabling a balanced socio-environmental relationship.

Pinto); SETA – *Sociedade Portuguesa para o Desenvolvimento da Educação e Turismo Ambientais* (Fernando Louro Alves); OIKOS – *Cooperação e Desenvolvimento* (José Luís Monteiro); TESE - *Associação para o Desenvolvimento* (Henrique Gomes); *Escola de Mar* (Cristina Brito); *Centro de Energia das Ondas* (Teresa Simas); *Associação dos Amigos do Parque Ecológico do Funchal* (Raimundo Quintal); *Amigos dos Açores – Associação Ecológica* (Diogo Caetano); *Onda Verde, Associação Juvenil de Ambiente e Aventura* (Serafim Silva); AESDA – *Associação de Estudos Subterrâneos e Defesa do Ambiente* (Frederico Regala).

¹⁰ The questionnaire was built using the SurveyMonkey platform, and was temporarily accessible at <http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/7YDC55M> (between 30 March and 30 April 2011). It was subsequently closed down for data processing.

¹¹ At an early exploratory stage 75 requests for collaboration were sent to DNGOs and ENGOS. Forty three returned complete questionnaires, yielding 43 complete responses (57.3%), which formed the sample basis.



Over time and since the emergence of environmental concerns, the topic has been part of international agendas predominantly in connection with other areas usually classified as critical, and been portrayed as an additional factor for a better understanding of the causes and impacts of problems. Awareness that the environment is an area for intervention as important as others, in that it puts them into context and justifies them, while being the receptacle of impacts, is recent and, despite efforts, not yet consensual. This idea is confirmed by identifying some moments in history that nowadays are seen as points of reference following the emergence of ecological thinking and which show a growing international awareness, albeit lacking continuity¹²:

a) the Zero Growth Issue, widely presented and discussed in the Reports of the Club of Rome¹³, which confirmed the direct interconnection of the cause-effect relationship between scarcity and the possible exhaustibility of particularly profitable natural resources, such as petrol, and the likely inability to continue the models favouring economic growth implemented in the Western world. This concern with the environment, based purely in utilitarian motives, presents development from an economic perspective, playing down the importance given to natural resources in a systemic and integrated approach. In the 1960s, the understanding that Nature contained an intrinsic value was still far from widespread, and, above all, there was a triple perception with regard to environmental issues:

- First, awareness of the limits on economic growth heavily dependent on the availability of natural resources as a result of the finite nature of the environment;
- Secondly, the idea of the imbalance in the equation geographic space-availability of resources, i.e. the unequal distribution worldwide;
- Thirdly, the perception that the productive activities that foster economic circuits worldwide depend on the whole on the available quantity and accessibility of natural resources;

b) the formulation of the concept of *sustainable development* inspired by the earlier conceptualization of *eco development*¹⁴, widely disseminated from 1987 onwards through the well-known Brundtland Report, "Our common future"¹⁵. Knowing that the proposal of the World Commission on Environment and Development focused on the

¹² It must be pointed out that the moments described here are just a few examples and that there is no intention to provide an exhaustive description of all the stages that have marked the history of environmental thought.

¹³ The Reports of the Club of Rome that show the Problem of Zero Growth are "The limits to growth", dated 1972, prepared by a team from the MIT and coordinated by Donella Meadows; "Mankind at the turning point, from 1974, coordinated by Mihajlo Mizarovic; " Reshaping the International Order (1976), coordinated by Jan Tinbergen.

¹⁴ The concept of *Eco development* arose following the UN Conference on Environment (1972), commonly known as the Stockholm Conference on the initiative of Maurice Strong. It brought together the principles of economics and ecology in a unique way, seeking to minimize the differences between those who advocated development at any cost and supporters of environmentalism. At the time, the concept was considered to be innovative and was later adopted by Ignacy Sachs, who saw other implications in it, such as social, cultural implications, and ethics. For additional information, see Sachs, Ignacy (1986). *Ecodesenvolvimento: crescer sem destruir*. São Paulo: Vértice.

¹⁵ The original document of the report "Our Common Future" can be found in <http://www-un-documents.net/wced-ocf.htm> (accessed on 28 November 2011).



preparation of a diagnosis of the socio-environmental situation worldwide, identifying common problems and shared solutions, the concept is defined as the process that:

"seeks to meet the needs of the present generation without compromising the ability of future generations to meet their own needs, which means enabling people, now and in the future, to reach a satisfactory level of social and economic development and of human and cultural fulfilment and, at the same time, make reasonable use of the Earth resources preserving endangered species and natural habitats" (Brundtland Commission, 1987).

At least three key ideas to remember are implicit in this definition:

1. The first idea is the systemic and integrative assumption that defines and characterizes development as a process of qualitative change in the living conditions of populations, allowing encompassing different concerns, including environmental;
 2. The second idea is conveyed by the time dimension that openly and without limitations to epochs identifies two major moments – the present and the future – where the criterion of continuity is implicit;
 3. The third idea is the conviction that it is possible to establish, worldwide, a global partnership for development centred on solving social and environmental problems through international cooperation mechanisms;
- c) The results achieved after the Earth Summit¹⁶ in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, as well as those of the Global Forum and in thematic parallel events organized in that context. In this high-level summit, and contrary to what was common until the early 1990s, there was a strong incentive for civil society massive participation. The importance of the proactive capacity and involvement of distinct groups and social movements in mitigating environmental problems, which in one way or another jeopardize the balance and wellbeing of human lives, was acknowledged internationally. Specifically, in the Global Forum and parallel events the civil society had its own areas for presenting concrete cases, marked by shared experiences, promoting debate with the purpose of building together a coherent and workable strategy capable of being implemented over time, the twenty first century being

¹⁶ This is the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development held in Rio de Janeiro in which 172 countries participated and 108 heads of state were present, mobilizing 2400 civil society organizations. It was considered to be one of the major international events in the area of the environment, and which more results has achieved to date. It had the merit of bringing together to the same event politicians, local stakeholders and activists. It is noteworthy to mention that despite distinct types of players being allowed to share their experiences and have strategic discussions, there was no direct interaction between the representatives of civil society and heads of state, with different areas being created, which resulted in the production of two documents which naturally focused on the specific concerns of each group. Also as a result of this, civil society activists were critical of the functioning of the Rio Summit, believing that the objectives had not been met. However, analyzing it now, and comparing this summit with other events in the area of the environment, allow us to recognize the merit of this summit, in such a way that Rio+20 brings hopes for new advances on this matter.



the objective. Since 1992, scholars in social and environmental issues have gained a new resource that strongly motivates people and which over the years has been readapted according to the sectors and target groups: Agenda 21¹⁷;

- d) The progress achieved through the Kyoto Protocol¹⁸ which, although not followed across the world, is almost consensual internationally¹⁹. Since the main goal is to reduce greenhouse emissions worldwide, one of the most important point of the agreement lies in the assumption of shared responsibility, albeit in different ways²⁰. If, on the one hand, it proposes the co-responsibility of different states to adopt, at national level, concrete measures that have a positive impact on the environment worldwide, on the other hand, it argues for international cooperation through the exchange of experiences in order to achieve effective results.

Despite various international meetings held following the events described above, the truth is that results seem to be either thematic or sectorial, or specific and without continuity²¹, demonstrating a lack of global and systemic strategy with integrated mobilizing capacity worldwide. This is sometimes justified on political grounds, other times in the alternation in setting priorities, and also for budgetary reasons, which means that environmental issues continue to have a reduced importance compared to real needs.

3.2. The Environment in the context of International Relations

Despite being a relatively recent issue in the context of International Relations, there is room for a brief examination of the main theoretical orientations that more or less directly support this area of knowledge. International Relations theories address environmental issues in a broad, global and systemic way, balancing the need for distinct players to cooperate with the objective of creating conditions that foster the maintenance of the environment worldwide. In addition, the analysis focuses on the complex issues of sovereignty versus state intervention which, in this case, is directed towards the regulation of environmental issues (Colombo, 2007). Referring to the

¹⁷ The Agenda 21 is currently seen as one of the strategic papers which, to date, has attained most results in promoting behavioural changes all over the world in the search for a balanced relationship between people and nature. This text was at the origin of what is known as Environmental Education with practical application and international recognition. The original document was organized around four major topics: a) social and economic dimensions; b) preserving and managing resources for development; c) reinforcing the role of the key groups; d) means of implementation.

¹⁸ According to the Protocol, the main areas in which there should be a global intervention are: 1) reform of the energy and transportation sectors; 2) promotion of renewable energies; 3) elimination of inappropriate financial and market mechanisms; 4) reducing methane emissions; 5) protection of forests.

¹⁹ During the negotiation of the Protocol in 1997, and subsequent ratification in 1999, the signatory countries recognized there was a more or less direct relation between the emission of greenhouse gases and climate change, and that it was urgent to adopt regulatory measures at both industrial and business levels, and individually, which led to the creation of a global citizenship supporting social and environmental well-being worldwide.

²⁰ In this context, the principle of proportionality was adopted, which means that, although all member states have to adopt measures to attain the objectives that were set, the largest polluters are the ones that have to reduce emissions more. For additional information, see the text of the Protocol at http://mudancasclimaticas.cptec.inpe.br/~rmclima/pdfs/Protocolo_Quito.pdf (accessed on 28 November de 2011).

²¹ Examples of this perplexity are: first, the Earth Summit held in 2002 in Johannesburg, South Africa, following the Rio Summit in 1992, as well as Rio+20, which will take place in June 2012, once again in Rio de Janeiro; on the other hand, the Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change (2005) was expected to give continuity to the progress made with the Kyoto Protocol, as well as the Durban Summit (2011).



debate on the concept of sovereignty, there are concerns around the notion of territoriality and, consequently, with the forms of using and managing resources and areas. In this sense, by addressing environmental issues and taking into account the notion of sovereignty, some questions are posed about the interconnection between the intra and inter-state dimensions²². As mentioned above, although often the appreciation of environmental issues does not have the necessary continuity, the growing recognition of its importance in events such as intergovernmental summits²³ attests its rising importance in the international context. In parallel, the emergence of new contemporary problems with particular emphasis on environmental issues, which, to some extent, stem from the unregulated and unbalanced relationship, often aggressive, that human communities maintain with nature, have alerted the academic and scientific communities to the urgency of including these topics in the discussion. On the other hand, there is rising global awareness that the environment is not a closed and sealed reality, or simply regulated (and capable of being regulated) by border divisions²⁴. Environmental issues have come to require a systemic and inclusive approach since, in what concerns environmental resources and areas, it becomes essential to have an approach that is consistent with all the problems.

Analyses conducted within the scientific field of international relations have acquired a rising importance in this area, since the global dimension of causes and impacts of environmental issues has been acknowledged, which presents the opportunity for an international approach. In fact, in the presence of problems that cross different countries and regions in the world, the need to redefine strategies, often classified as alternative, based on joint reflection and shared by different players seems obvious²⁵. Worldwide, various events allow exemplifying these problems, including: threats to biodiversity and the possible exhaustibility of natural resources, both living ones (fauna and flora) and inert; the transformation of ecosystems with habitat loss; accentuated deforestation; degradation of marine environment; greenhouse emissions; increasingly frequent environmental disasters with more pronounced social and environmental effects (tsunamis, high impact earthquakes, intense floods, and prolonged droughts); loss of soil productivity; the management of finite resources, among others.

The approach to these issues has naturally been oriented according to the stakeholders: states; international organizations; civil society organizations; companies. This stance has enabled addressing issues around international environmental policies from a tripartite perspective of the relationship with the environment (Barros-Platiau, 2004), namely: 1) local, national and international or global; 2) transborder, global public good and common heritage of mankind; 3) nature, demography and technology.

²² Luigi Ferrajoli (*apud* Colombo, 2007) considers that, viewed in the international context, sovereignty has limits, and cannot be conceived in absolute terms. In this sense, it is important to clarify that the state is defined as a major player in international relations, but that the latter are equally regulated by broader power relations which often go beyond inter-state understanding.

²³ This importance is attested by the signing of agreements of understanding and strategic protocols with regard to the environment which, over time, have resulted mostly in inoperative declarations of intent rather than in models to be implemented.

²⁴ The idea that the environment is a global inclusive issue enables the creation of an image of an interconnected world attentive to identifying the problems that directly and indirectly affect all states, focused on solving the negative impacts and on predicting the occurrence of undesirable situations with a view to correcting them.

²⁵ In this context, the contributions made by representatives of states, public and private entities, more or less formal civil society organizations, and international organizations are considered.



Part of the theoretical approaches of International Relations focuses the analysis of environmental issues on the role of the states²⁶, reviving the concept of Nation–State and the importance of sovereignty as a regulatory mechanism legitimated by territorial borders²⁷ (Barros-Platiau, 2004; Colombo, 2007), among other factors. In the international context, the concept of sovereignty refers to the established idea of independence and subsequent recognition by other states. With regard to global issues, as is the case with all matters pertaining to the environment and which somehow are perceived as being transnational, the domestic competences traditionally assigned to individual states become limited because they exceed the limits of their sovereignty. Since environmental risks and impacts have acquired a global dimension, the regulation of activities has also been viewed from an international stance. Risks became defined as being common to all and impacts are now felt at an increasing global level. In the context of international relations, states are not the only players which, to some extent, require us to review the theoretical assumptions that underpinned the analysis of the state's regulatory ability through the exercise of power. Over time, awareness of the emergence of global environmental problems with transnational impact extends beyond the action of states and the exercise of sovereignty.

Another player that has been gaining importance due to growing internationalization are international organizations, including United Nations agencies²⁸ and the World Bank²⁹, which have made a decisive contribution to highlighting the problem, denoting new conceptual associations with reference to poverty and socio-environmental sustainability, and going beyond interpretations merely focusing on conservation. In this context, international organizations have expressed concern that extends beyond raising the awareness of the different players involved. It is important to note that, despite efforts, results have been short of the objectives previously outlined, particularly with regard to action taken by states³⁰. Environment and natural resources began to be perceived as a fundamental right (Colombo, 2007), which means looking at nature both in the present, safeguarding the welfare of populations around the world, and in the future, from the viewpoint of sustainability.

The third player is Civil Society Organizations, which emerge and are structured around specific objectives (see. 3.3. Civil Society Organizations: activity implementation) and, in the case of environmental issues, have a targeted intervention based on practical problems which, in most cases, national states have not resolved. The mobilization of civil society comes as an alternative without, nevertheless, a corresponding shift of

²⁶ Silvana Colombo (2007) analyses the importance of the role of the modern state based on the Treaty of Westphalia, developing the concept of sovereignty based on the approach made by Jean Bodin with regard to the legitimate use of power. Subsequently, the issue around authority of the state is analyzed based on the theoretical contributions of Raymond Aron (1986).

²⁷ In this context, the concept of territoriality is of great relevance, given that, according to this view, areas, ecosystems and living and inert resources are included.

²⁸ At this level the international awareness work conducted by the United Nations Environment Programme, UNEP stands out .

²⁹ The World Bank's Environment Strategy - "Making sustainable commitments. An environment strategy for the World Bank" (2011). Washington D.C.: The World Bank stands out. Accessed online: <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/ENVIRONMENT/Resources/244380-1250028593656/6382907-1252510780845/6428643-1255012678534/WBG-Environment-Strategy-2001-Full.pdf> (accessed on 12 March 2012).

³⁰ On this matter, Michel Bachelet (1997) and Silvana Colombo (2007) refer to the right of environmental interference, the latter writing that "interference is a right provided that, in the presence of omission on the part of one state, the other can resort to it; it is a right because the responsibility for protecting the environment is shared" (Colombo, 2007).



responsibility, as they create their own internationalization mechanisms anchored on partnerships and networking.

Companies³¹ are a player which, in the context of international relations, have seen their role increase from the viewpoint of theoretical analysis. They have drawn attention due to their actions and to the ability to create multiple international synergies, relating with states, interacting with international organizations and conditioning civil society. The internationalization strategies of companies have also been studied in this field of knowledge, due to the fact that they result in environmental impacts that in general require global regulation³².

According to the presuppositions of realist theory, it is possible to foresee the need to create conditions to regulate international socio-environmental relationships, since balance is characteristically called into question by human activity³³, with a negative impact worldwide. Since Realism sees international relations as being based on the use and exercise of power (Mallmann, 2005), often leading to conflicts, the active role of the states is important. Thus, it is up to the state, as a player that guides its action rationally and objectively, to promote the national interest and this implies, among other factors, the management of natural resources and spaces. In this sense, the intervention of states appears to be particularly evidenced by participation in intergovernmental summits with their subsequent commitment expressed in the signing of declarations, protocols and even treaties.

Theoretical approaches to the scientific area of international relations that focus on environmental issues do not fully agree with Realism. According to the view proposed by Ana Barros-Plataiu (*et al*, 2004), the most common theoretical perspectives for the analysis of (global) collective management of the environment focus on organizational approaches, international regimes and on global governance³⁴, denoting, on the whole, international cooperation practices to minimize environmental problems. To a large extent, environmental issues are explained from the concept of risk in global relations because they lead to a complex process involving different players, multiple interacting dimensions and the intersection of different generations at different times in an historical continuum.

The idea of risk in global relations with regard to environmental issues, seen from the perspective of the trans-nationalization of the impacts, calls for awareness of the emergence of global problems that are the result of local actions (Vieira, 2008). This understanding gives rise to new thoughts in international relations, enabling a close relationship between different territorial levels and the possibility for interaction among various players.

³¹ Although not within the scope of this study, it is important to note that issues around the trade of resources and species with great environmental impact also fits the context of the internationalization of companies.

³² In addition to the notion of social responsibility, companies have been adopting an attitude of environmental responsibility that is transposed into the international context due to its inherent global implications.

³³ Deriving from conceptual analyses such as that of Thomas Hobbes and the Theory of the State of Nature (Mallmann, 2005), Realism in International Relations has an interpretation of social life with influence at various levels, including the environment. As happens in all forms of international relations, power is particularly referred to as a regulatory mechanism.

³⁴ The presuppositions of global governance are further stressed by James Rosenau and Ernst-Otto Czempiel (2000).



3.3. Civil Society Organizations: activity implementation

During the evolutionary process that has characterized ecological thinking, the role of social movements and of more or less official civil society organizations has benefitted from progressive appreciation, though not yet consensual at global level. To some extent, this recognition resulted from the direct intervention on the ground of groups that were either formally constituted, or characterized by the informality of their action with regard to the environment and, more broadly, to development. Social movements also started to be seen as special vehicles for public participation, sometimes spontaneous, other times organized, in various areas, including the political sphere, on the part of individuals and groups not formally recognized as having the dual capacity for mobilization and intervention.

The appreciation of civil society as a development player stemmed from a process that was often marked by contradiction and “which mixed old and new structures, institutions and political projects” (Ferreira, 2004: 5) to the form it has today. Recognition of its importance was largely due to the so-called “New Social Movements”³⁵ that particularly focused on a set of emerging situations³⁶, guided by collective objectives and interests, of which Environment Protection Associations stand out (Rodrigues, 1995).

Civil society organizations defined as privileged actors of development³⁷ are characterized by their heterogeneity which, in part, is the result of the dispersion of sectors in which they intervene; in part, it stems from a certain irregularity in their action or failure to follow up projects that have been initiated; and in part it is the result of the lack of consensus with regard to terminology³⁸. However, the reference literature presents a set of characteristics that helps us understand better the organizational model that distinguishes them from other organizations (Ferreira, 2004; Salamon, 2005; Franco, 2004; The Johns Hopkins Comparative Non Profit Project). Accordingly, these organizations can be defined as follows:

1. as non-governmental, that is, not dependent on states or governments, which confers them a private attribute in the form of organization and management, fundraising, obtaining materials, and even human resources;
2. their objects are not-for-profit, which means that despite their non-public operations (see previous point) and the need for funding sources that ensure

³⁵ The New Social Movements are usually defined as a product of contemporary western societies that experienced the overvaluation of the welfare state concept (Rodrigues, 1995), where the assistance presuppositions of an active, attentive, intervening, and protecting state which history has proved ineffective, were showcased to the limit.

³⁶ Eugénia Rodrigues (1995) gives examples of these situations, such as the 1970 crisis, the nuclear threat and corresponding international stigma, gender discrimination, and the awareness of the existence of environmental problems at global level. These issues led to the emergence of peace, feminist and environmental movements guided by active citizenship principles which often gained political interpretations.

³⁷ In this context, development is seen as a process of change that can have multiple dimensions and which ideally is viewed from a systemic, global and inclusive form.

³⁸ In the context of civil society organizations, it is common to find references to Non-Governmental Organizations (NGO) which can focus on Development (DNGOs) or on the Environment (ENGOS), Non-Profit Organizations and Tertiary Organizations, for example. Their names vary a lot and appear to be defined by the specificities of the work conducted with regard to methodologies, target groups and even topics.



internal management and the pursuit of planned activities, organizations arising out of civil society are not driven by concerns about profitability or enrichment;

3. they tend to have an economic framework centred on the presuppositions of the solidarity economy, which on the one hand suggests the limited pursuit of goods production, distribution and consumption activities and, on the other hand, a high risk associated to intervention;
4. they give priority to sector areas and/or to specific target groups previously selected according to the needs and whose situation points to the urgency for direct and close intervention enabling the resolution of problems identified previously. As a result, they are defined as organizations whose action is motivated by service to the community;
5. they defend and follow methodologies targeted for intervention in specific situations, on a case by case basis, by first analysing and diagnosing the situation, followed by monitoring and evaluation of the impacts, whether positive or negative. In this sense, they see intervention as a learning process and as a means of improving practice and, whenever possible, of sharing experiences as examples to be disseminated;
6. they show a particular aptitude for mobilizing supporters and involving them to carry out concrete actions, often based on a volunteer-based principle and taking into account the objectives set previously, valuing and acknowledging the capabilities of all, including minority groups;
7. they promote the dissemination and adoption of values guiding individual action that legitimize community action, such as social solidarity, respect for difference, accountability for action, and ethics.

As regards socio-environmental issues, and in accordance with the principles that characterize their action, Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations (ENGOS)³⁹, as a model of organization of civil society, have been seen as the ones that have adopted an intervention in close proximity methodology. As has been happening in other areas of the world - Portugal being no exception -, the diversity of situations has been a fact in the course of civil society organizations, calling for the case by case action methodology. This methodological presupposition implies prior identification of problems, characterization and subsequent solutions adapted to distinct contexts. Naturally, this type of intervention progressively moves away from the action that is characteristic of states, thus requiring a different and differentiated look at situations. The relationship between human communities and the environment has received increased attention from the ENGOS which, over time, have been complementing the purely environmental approach, which aims at preserving areas and species, with a socio-cultural and economic approach, thus giving rise to a socio-environmental interpretation. Indeed, there has been an increasingly differentiated understanding of the environmental situation and now it is believed that often human communities tend to influence the state of the environment through their actions, sometimes spoiling it,

³⁹ In Portugal, recognition of Environmental Non-Governmental Organizations was late coming, dating from 1998, when the ENGO Law no 35/98 of 18 July was published. For further information, see the website of the Portuguese Environment Agency at <http://www.apambiente.pt> (accessed on 10 February 2012).



other times protecting it. This action appears to be clearly dominated by socio-cultural representation of spaces, resources, and species, but equally by socio-economic activities which, in specific contexts, depend directly from nature, and also by rooted traditional cultural practices that generate habits and behaviours that promote imbalances. In this regard, the literature points to two specific typical situations: a) behaviours guided by irresponsibility and disrespect, based on markedly utilitarian concerns, resulting in predatory actions; b) attitudes and practices that favour a change that is accountable and that calls for accountability concerned with the establishment of a sustainable relationship with nature. Regardless of the priority areas of intervention of civil society organizations, and despite the motivation for action with the goal of solving concrete problems, hence increasingly focusing on the local dimension, we have realized that these organizations have shown some inability in complying with all the proposed actions in an individual and autonomous manner.

Given the evolution of international contexts, which allow us to view various crises with different impacts, it is indisputable that the new development players have emerged with specific objectives without attempting to replace the role conventionally attributed to the state, intervening directly in the identification of problems and priorities, as well as in the possible alternatives to solve them.

It is in this context that civil society organizations, often called non-governmental organizations, are formed or reinforced, precisely due to their extra-governmental nature⁴⁰, shown in their constitution, acting profile, and in how they attract and manage financial, human and material resources. As has been happening almost in all areas and activity sectors, these organizations face constraints with regard to availability of funds, technical and scientific knowledge, and human resources, and ultimately find ways of finding alternative forms to promote the institutional effort. The most frequent way to do so is to resort to international cooperation by establishing partnerships⁴¹.

Civil society organizations can also be classified as national or international in nature. According to Kathleen Staudt (1991), for a long time these organizations focused their attention on international cooperation mechanisms, ensuring the funding of projects based on private financial support or from other international institutions. However, as the operational costs proved to be too high without immediate or direct returns in terms of efficacy, the trend was to establish partnerships and to conduct joint actions with local partners.

Initially, a significant part of NGO activities has proved problematic because they operate in an unknown geographic, natural, social, cultural, economic, and political environment where experience and familiarity for purposes of identifying problems and solutions are perceived to be inclusive mechanisms. On the other hand, the management and implementation of projects has in many cases been done at a distance without an overall perception of reality, which means a relative lack of

⁴⁰ The connection between NGOs and developmental issues has gained particular importance after the recognition that management by the states was ineffective regarding solving concrete issues, which basically had to do with the lives of people, particularly in poorer countries, where dependence on the environment is a fact.

⁴¹ The idea of Development Partnerships (DP), particularly in international terms, is quite recent and has not been immediately accepted and implemented by civil society organizations, which ended up being perceived as an operational methodology for targeted action and as a guarantee to achieve the outlined objectives.



connection with regard to problems, needs, constraints, and people. As those involved became aware of the frailties of the model, the cooperation methodology resorting to civil society underwent changes which led to the partnership model, which has proved more beneficial and effective, enabling a regular and continuous intervention with no peaks or stops.

According to the seven characterization factors described earlier, one can say that NGOs focus their attention on fostering change, defined as associations (Alves, 1996) that start, reinvent and implement international cooperation projects with the purpose of attaining development. They are not bound to public power and the necessary funding to enable them to carry out their activities is provided by national or international private entities.

Whereas initially NGOs were mainly focused on humanitarian aid, implementing projects aimed at food security, mitigation of hunger, poverty reduction, and assistance to war refugees, it was only later that they shifted their activity to other issues related to development. Naturally, given the scope of the afore-mentioned socio-economic problems, concerns over the environment came second because, to a large extent, they were believed to be part of the ethos of the projects, making no sense separating them and treating them as a separate issue. Regardless of the sector area, the main goal became having a long-term positive impact, once again rediscovering the principles of sustainability.


It is customary to think that NGOs support concrete specific tasks according to pre-identified needs, mostly technical in nature, in distinct sector areas, such as: project management; credit to small-scale initiatives (microcredit) including agricultural, commercial, and handcraft projects; education; health; environmental preservation, and the conservation of species. Accordingly, the intervention methodology focuses on the work carried out with local entities following the Development Partnership (DP) principle. This involves NGOs, non-formal associations and working groups, in addition to traditional authorities and representatives of local government, in order to encourage the principles of participation and involvement (Staudt, 1991).

The reference literature suggests that civil society organizations act to seek consensus with the target groups, given that the intervention is perceived as an inclusive instrument and an enabler of the cultural references that tend to promote and motivate community action by strengthening identity. Anyway, despite that being the engine for their work, these organizations do not play down the importance of economic growth, as it is perceived as one of the dimensions of sustainability⁴², particularly after the conceptual review presented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), which gave rise to a global, systemic, and inclusive perspective of Sustainable Human Development (see Fig. 1), centred on the principle of equity.

⁴² This principle is largely supported by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) in the concept of Sustainable Human Development.



Fig. 1. – Dimensions of Sustainable Human Development presented by the UNDP




As mentioned earlier, given the inherent constraints of limited budgets that these organizations typically have, the methodology adopted tends to focus on the location; projects in specific areas and well-identified sectors are preferred, to ensure that set objectives are achieved. This methodological option does not mean they do not follow a systemic and interdisciplinary approach. Indeed, this seems to be a constant reference in the literature when addressing the issue of involvement of civil society organizations, since the impacts they wish to create tend to be mixed and interrelated.

The field of action of ENGOs and DNGOs fits within the large umbrella of Cooperation for Development alternative practices, since by acting externally, these organizations foster the establishment of partnerships and the creation of networks and platforms (see Fig. 2) based on common guidelines and synergies. Besides concern about strengthening civil society, the idea that the closer these organizations are the greater their strength to act in the mitigation of problems and in promoting development is also implicit. Thus, within the context of civil society, different types of players are valued (Non-Governmental Organizations for Development and for the Environment, informal and pressure groups, non-formal local associations, occasional social movements, among others) and clearly stand out from conventional players (traditionally identified with the state or entities decentralized from the state, and, more recently, companies). The role of these new development players that turn to international cooperation is recognized, the same applying to their accountability in action.



Fig. 2. – Schematic Representation of the Work of Civil Society Organizations



The scope of NGOs' activities thus focuses on the location, given that concrete actions involving the communities regardless of gender, age or socio-professional group, are planned, promoted, and implemented. As regards the necessary financing, to a large extent they resort to external sources, namely funds made available by various international organizations.

4. Civil Society Strategies in the field of the environment

As part of the study "Strategies of Civil Society Organizations in the field of the environment", Portuguese NGOs or with a presence in Portugal were consulted. As explained in the objectives of the study (see 1. Introductory Aspects and 2. Some References on the Methodology), the contact sought to understand⁴³ the scope of the intervention of Portuguese civil society organizations, or those acting in Portugal, in the area of the environment, particularly whenever this involves external relations.

The sample that acted as a basis for the study comprised 43 civil society organizations, including those directly aimed at addressing environmental issues, and those working on development issues cutting across the environment⁴⁴ or living and inert natural resources, denoting specific concern with the conservation of endangered species or deemed to be at risk⁴⁵. Despite the fact that it did not match the number of NGOs in Portugal, nor account for the experience of the total number of entities contacted, the

⁴³ It is true that the aim was also to gauge the level of participation of these organizations in research projects carried out by academics. The turnout was positive, as of the 75 organizations contacted, 43 agreed to participate in the study.

⁴⁴ The environment category includes protected areas, livestock and agricultural zones, forests, oceans, coastlines, rivers, landscapes, and beaches.

⁴⁵ Natural resources are living resources such as land flora (trees, shrubs, flowers), land, sea, and river fauna, and inert resources (sand, coral, etc.).




number of responses obtained was considered significant, reflecting a positive participation in this type of analysis. Thus, the analysis presented below refers to the interpretation based on data provided by the organizations that participated in the study (N=43), and the results cannot be extrapolated to all Portuguese or operating in Portugal civil society organizations.

On average, civil society organizations have been operating for over 10 years (69.8% was formed and began activity until 2000 and 46.5% prior to 1990) and may be considered stable organizations with consolidated operations and knowledge of methodologies of direct intervention on the ground.

According to the information shown in chart 1, most civil society organizations work with their own funds (24%), also using private donations (22%) or international funds, especially European Union funds (22%) or those made available by other international organizations (14%). Less relevant, but nevertheless significant, is the financial support of public and private companies⁴⁶ (14%) for implementing and developing projects and concrete activity and for one-off projects. It is interesting to note that public institutional support through governmental channels responsible for the environment is clearly unexpressive (only 4% of funds are granted by the Ministry of the Environment), which strengthens the idea presented earlier that there is no competition between civil society and the state. Indeed, the two sectors work in parallel with little cross over.

Chart 1 – Identification of NGOs funding sources



⁴⁶ The relationship between businesses and NGO's intervention area has not been considered in the present study, but it seems to make sense for future studies. Indeed, for more than one occasion, this relationship was mentioned by representatives of the civil society organizations contacted, confirming some points raised by the reference bibliography and which pave the way for new possibilities in addition to those already tested. However, given the goals of the research, this issue was not addressed in depth for which reason no conclusion can be drawn.



Of all civil society organizations that participated in the study, 76.7% (N=33) work in partnership with other foreign counterparts, and most carry out projects in Portuguese-speaking African countries (49%) or in EU countries (35.2%). With regards to Portuguese-speaking African countries, there is some dispersion evidenced by their spreading over five countries, with greater emphases on Cape Verde (25.6%), followed by Guinea-Bissau (20.9%), Angola and Mozambique (18.6% each) and, finally, São Tomé and Príncipe (16.3%). This ordering may seem obvious in the African context, since Cape Verde is the country which, due to its geographical proximity to Europe, political stability, favourable economic orientation, and fragile ecosystems has, over time, been the country that has enjoyed enhanced international attention. Instead, São Tomé e Príncipe appears to be an example of a peripheral country, typically insular, marked by strategic uncertainty from an economic perspective, with a slight political or governing instability but with diversity and environmental richness. This Small Island State (SIS), as opposed to Cape Verde, has been side-lined in terms of establishing international partnerships, which can be explained by the fact that it only started paying attention to environmental issues quite late⁴⁷. Angola and Mozambique are two countries that have been getting increased attention, albeit not yet predominant, because they are becoming more important from a geo-strategic viewpoint. Guinea-Bissau comes second in attracting the attentions of Portuguese NGOs due to a long-term traditional collaboration largely encouraged by the EU in-country delegation that promotes bids for development partnerships⁴⁸.

Table 1 – Countries and regions with which Portuguese NGOs have partnerships

REGION / COUNTRY	%
EUROPEAN UNION	35.2
Spain	38.7
France	9.7
United Kingdom	9.7
Ireland	3.2
Italy	6.5
Greece	9.7
Malta	6.5
Czech Republic	3.2
Romania	3.2
Slovakia	3.2
Poland	3.2
Hungary	3.2
PORTUGUGUESE SPEAKING AFRICA	49.0
Angola	18.6
Cape Verde	25.6
Guinea-Bissau	20.9
Mozambique	18.6
São Tomé and Príncipe	16.3
Brazil	7.9
Other	7.9

⁴⁷ This information arises from the in-depth knowledge that the researcher of this study has of Small Insular Developing States in Africa, both in terms of change processes and of the practice of development cooperation.

⁴⁸ This information arises from the in-depth knowledge that the researcher of this study has of Small Insular Developing States in Africa, both in terms of change processes and of the practice of development cooperation.




As regards Europe, Spain (38.7%) is the country with which Portuguese NGOs work the most, the remainder being spread over remaining countries. However, the relative importance of France, United Kingdom and Greece ((9.7% each) is evident. It is also interesting to note that, although not statistically representative in the global analysis, two NGOs mentioned they worked all over the world, with completed or undergoing projects in all continents.

The type of activity that has been promoted in partnership is predominantly centred on planning, implementing, developing, managing, and evaluating intervention projects (38.8%), followed by a thematic approach focusing on concrete needs identified previously. In their response to the questionnaire (see Chart 2), NGOs described their activities, projects and environmental education courses (31.2%) with regard to all other projects (see Annex).

This is an indicative aspect that is highly relevant to the analysis, as the concern with the environment and above all with the relationship established between the communities and nature is highlighted. It is at this level that NGOs interact more directly with people, helping to raise new awareness and a sense of greater concern and responsibility for preserving areas and species, often identifying together alternative socio-professional activities that ensure socio-environmental balance, and, in parallel, minimizing the socio-economic constraints related to the acquisition of income.

Chart 2 – Identification of NGO intervention areas



Less important than the projects mentioned above, but nevertheless relevant in this analysis, are the scientific research activities (18.8%) which often underlie environmental activities. Other activities with less weight (11.2%) have been identified, such as citizenship education, management of resources, protection of heritage, and



political intervention through activism attributed to the New Social Movements they belong to.

As regards activity areas, environmental education (26.1%) is once again referred to with great emphasis compared to other possibilities, followed by:

- a)** Forestry work (17.1%), including reforestation, opening and cleaning trails, and forest fire prevention, among others;
- b)** Conservation of species (16.1%), especially sea species and birds, including marine and migratory;
- c)** Promotion of nature tourism (10.9%), including programming and developing activities to observe species and landscape, whether in forests or coastal and marine environments.

The following activities are less important but still have some weight:


- water resources conservation (6.6%), including the capture of groundwater (aquifers), and making freshwater available to the population and water management;
- food safety projects (5.2%), which requires the management of space (with or without deforestation and reforestation) and the regulation of local natural resources;
- waste collection (5.2%), including solid waste recycling and awareness-raising measures for reuse of materials, in the countryside and in the cities;
- cleaning of beaches (4.7%);
- sanitation campaigns and activities (2.8%).

It should also be noted that 5.2% of responses fall into other areas of intervention⁴⁹ which, despite their importance, are not significant for the analysis, for which reason they were not considered.

The activity of civil society organizations leads to the realization of a wide range of products that either focus on the systematization of functional performance that facilitates evaluation and which is usually a requirement imposed by donors, or are involved in the creation of educational and scientific instruments (see Chart 3).

Thus, annual and activity reports are the most frequently mentioned product (24.7%), followed by: dissemination materials (22.8%), including posters, leaflets and brochures; scientific texts (17.9%) and participation in conferences and similar events involving presentations (11.7%), which together make up 29.6%; educational handbooks (13.6%); and, finally, merchandising (9.3%).

⁴⁹ Such as developing action and management plans, maintenance and restoration of houses and boats, Millennium Development Goals, Disaster Preparedness, offshore energy, corporate sustainability, Climate International Policy and wider campaigns, such as the Earth Hour.

**Chart 3 – Identification of the main products**

The analysis of the products enables us to understand that, strategically, the activities of civil society organizations do not invest on trade in a decisive manner, which could be attained by raising funds through merchandising. They are more concerned with direct intervention on the ground following previously established goals. The work of NGOs is mostly portrayed via inclusion in scientific channels, since, in their structures, they rely on the collaboration of technicians and experts in specific distinct scientific areas.

By way of conclusion

The study “Strategies of civil society organizations in the field of the environment” aimed to contribute towards a better understanding of the activities of NGOs specializing in environmental or development areas. The work does not offer an exhaustive or final interpretation on the topic; rather, the intention was to present an overview that may lead to future analyses. NGOs, like other players on the ground, are constantly evolving, following local, national and international changes. This is because, to a large extent and according to the data presented in the study, they depend on the context in which their activity is conducted.

It can be said with some certainty that Portuguese NGOs or those operating in Portugal act in interdependence with their counterparts. There is more an idea of effective partnership rather than a more conventional perspective that some are donors while the others are beneficiaries of such actions.



The ground where civil society intervenes is open, and quite permeable to all areas concerning the environment, as long as they are regarded as a priority at a particular time and social context, and flexible regarding the approaches, requiring, above all, joint action.

This study allowed us to identify possible paths to be further explored, of which two main areas stand out:

- 1) The role of NGOs as an international player for cooperation;
- 2) The environmental and social impacts of the activities conducted by civil society, identifying the changes.

Finally, I could not fail to thank the 43 ENGOs and DNGOs that cooperated in the study and made the information available. Of them all, I highlight those that expressed their interest in being mentioned in this text: *Associação Portuguesa de Educação Ambiental (ASPEA)*; *Associação Internacional de Investigadores em Educação Ambiental (NEREA-Investiga)*; *World Wildlife Foundation Portugal- Mediterranean Programme Office (WWF)*; *Sociedade Portuguesa para o Desenvolvimento da Educação e Turismo Ambientais (SETA)*; *OIKOS – Cooperação e Desenvolvimento*; *TESE - Associação para o Desenvolvimento*; *Escola de Mar*; *Amigos dos Açores – Associação Ecológica*; *Associação dos Amigos do Parque Ecológico do Funchal*; *Centro de Energia das Ondas*; *Associação de Estudos Subterrâneos e Defesa do Ambiente (AESDA)*; *Onda Verde*, *Associação Juvenil de Ambiente e Aventura*.

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ANNEX

SURVEY TO NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS OPERATING IN THE FIELD OF THE ENVIRONMENT

As part of the project "Strategies of international players in the field of the environment", which is included in the research strand "Current International Trends" of the Observatory for External Relations (OBSERVARE), a study on the activities of civil society organizations (NGOs) is currently underway.

The study seeks to enable a better understanding and characterizations of the activities carried out by Portuguese NGOs, or those operating in Portugal in this area, and to evaluate their relationships with the outside world, perceived as a strategic methodology to attain their prosed objectives.

Given the broad scope of the research, we designed a small questionnaire, with guaranteed anonymity, which we would like you to respond to and thus collaborate with our study. If you wish that the participation of your NGO is made public, after completing the questionnaire please send an email to brigidabrito@netcabo.pt so that we can mention your collaboration.

The research results will be presented at the Section Economy and Ecology of the First International Conference of OBSERVARE under the topic "International trends and Portugal's position" (<http://observare.ual.pt/conference>), which will be held at the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation on 16-18 November 2011, and published in the Conference Proceedings. The short questionnaire does not take long to complete and can be accessed at <http://www.surveymonkey.com/s/7YDC55M>

I thank you for your collaboration and take the opportunity to invite your organization to be present in the public presentation of the results. All data collected and the analysis will be made available for future use.

Q1 – In what year was the NGO set up?

- Before 1980
- Between 1981 and 1990
- Between 1991 and 2000
- After 2001

Q2 – What are the main areas of activity of the NGO?

- Research
- Intervention Programmes and Projects
- Environmental Education
- Other (please specify)



Q3 – Which geographic areas have been given priority in the last 5 years?

- Mainland Portugal
- Autonomous Region of Madeira
- Azores
- Africa
- South America
- Asia
- Other European countries
- North America
- Other (please specify)

Q4 – Does you NGO have partnerships with foreign NGOs?

- Yes
- No

Q5 – If yes, which countries?

Q6 – What are the main sources of funding of projects in the area of the environment?

- European Union
- Other International Institutions
- Ministry of the Environment
- Consortia
- Private companies
- Donations from individuals
- Own funds
- Other (please specify)



Q7 – In which sector areas has your NGO carried out projects in the last 5 years?

- Clearing forest areas
- Forest fire prevention
- Reforesting
- Cleaning beaches
- Conservation of water resources
- Tourism (Nature, Ecological, Environmental...)
- Listing of species
- Food safety
- Conservation of endangered species
- Sanitation
- Collecting and/or recycling solid waste
- Community awareness-raising
- Environmental education programmes
- Other (please specify)

Q8 – What main products have resulted from the work?

- Reports
- Educational handbooks
- Leaflets, flyers, brochures
- Merchandising
- Thematic and analytical books
- Scientific articles
- Participation in scientific meetings
- Other (please specify)

Thank you very much for your collaboration

WHEN A DIPLOMAT GOES INTO POLITICS BECAUSE OF WAR The case of João Chagas (1910-1914)

Luís Alves de Fraga

alvesdefraga@gmail.com

PhD in History (UAL), Master in Strategy (UTL-ISCSP), Degree in Political and Social Sciences (UTL-ISCSP), Graduate of the Military Academy of (AMP). Air Force Colonel (retired) Former permanent lecturer at the Air Force Institute for Advanced Studies and at the Air Force Academy. Former Director of University Education at the Air Force Academy and at the Higher School for Military and Aeronautical Technologies. Auxiliary Professor at Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa (UAL), Department of International Relations. He has published nine books and dozens of articles in collective works and conference and congress proceedings

Abstract

Analysis of the case of a Portuguese diplomat, João Chagas, who, during the First Republic, and by resorting to the conditions available to him as representative of his country, surpassed the mere negotiating role attributed to diplomacy to conduct national politics, succeeding in changing the international statute of Portugal in the Great War.

The article describes the internal and external situation of Portugal in political, geopolitical and geostrategic terms, the conflict between Portuguese and British interests, the activity of Portuguese diplomats in London, Berlin and Paris, and, finally, the work of João Chagas

Keywords

Portugal; Great Britain; France; Great War; diplomat; conflict; João Chagas; strategy

How to cite this article

Fraga, Luís Alves de (2012). "When a Diplomat goes into politics because of war. The case of João Chagas (1910-1914)". *JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2012. Accessed [online] on (date of last viewing), observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol3_n1_art6

Article received on February 2012 and accepted for publication on April 2012



WHEN A DIPLOMAT GOES INTO POLITICS BECAUSE OF WAR

The case of João Chagas (1910-1914)

Luís Alves de Fraga

Introduction

It is often believed that between the second half of the 19th century and the first half of the 20th century diplomats were negotiators accredited to governments or entities with international weight and, as such, mere instruments of the authorities they represented, acting to attain the goals set to them. Thus, a diplomat did not make politics, because he carried out the policy he was instructed to conduct. This fact placed him, and forced him, to be above any partisan trends, conferring him a status of independence and impartiality.

Over twenty years ago I detected a situation that breaks away with this model (Fraga, 1990: 149-155). Therefore, I believe it is important to disclose the case of a Portuguese diplomat who, with wit and intelligence in the performance of his mission, penetrated the restricted fields of politics and set out on his own what the Portuguese government should have defined all-together.

In order to understand the contingencies that determined the action of this diplomat, it is necessary to make several incursions into history to perceive the context of the constraints and conflicts that existed at the time. These conflicts involved a mesh of internal and external motives, as well as opposing interests of a geopolitical, geostrategic, personal, and collective nature. The wise assessment and the overcoming of these obstacles by the diplomat in question have today catapulted him to a level that can be taken as exemplary.

Let us go back to the proclamation of the republic and look briefly at events at the time.

The republic: its conflicts and instabilities

By proclaiming the republic, the new political regime carried within a set of conflicts that were difficult to resolve. These were both inherited conflicts and conflicts in the making, some of which were expected to be settled politically, whereas others were believed to be of difficult resolution. Indeed, inherited conflicts were more potential than real, and the result of either structural weakness – in the economy – or of geostrategic factors. Conflicts in the making had two clearly defined aspects: on one hand, the non-acceptance of the new regime by the monarchists and, secondly, the divisions that the Portuguese Republican Party had carried within from the time of propaganda.



We shall focus our attention on the potential internal conflicts among republicans and on the actual conflict between republicans and monarchists¹. Then, under the scope of potential external conflicts, we will attempt to understand the geostrategic situation that placed Portugal on one of the axes of the Madrid-London-Lisbon triangle, and have a fleeting look at the potential conflict involving Portugal, Great Britain and Germany over Portuguese colonies in Africa.

The guerrilla between republicans and monarchists started, virtually, days after the republic was established in Portugal. Monarchist elites did not accept the new political regime. However, it was only after the first quarter of 1911 that the date of the first organised counter-revolution was set (Santos, 2010: 87-97). The petition made by Captain Paiva Couceiro to War Minister Colonel Xavier Correia Barreto demanding that the government made a national referendum to determine if voters chose the republic or the monarchy, marked the date.

Galicia was the refuge of all active monarchists who were dissatisfied with the new regime. Sometimes, some of the most faithful internal conspirators living in Portugal secretly passed the Minho River to settle in Vigo, thus answering the call of royalist leaders (Mello, 2002: 38-39).

The nightmare of the counter-revolution remained active and ongoing until February 1919, when the so-called Monarchy of the North came to an end, of which, among others, we have the report made by Rocha Martins (Martins, 2008). It should be pointed out that the monarchist counter-revolution, in addition to carrying out two militarised raids on the province of Trás-os-Montes in 1911 and 1912, and to keeping the conspiracy alive over time by taking advantage of the fluctuations of domestic politics, as soon as the Great War broke out in August 1914, tended to support a possible German victory, against the will of the deposed monarch (Ferrão, 1976: 116-119).

Besides the conflict with the monarchists, the republicans maintained another with the catholic party (Fraga, 2001: 66-68). We cannot say it was autonomous because, in fact, the latter never, in themselves or through their clergy, plotted independently against the Republic, due to the non-official alliance between the two. We can say that, at least up to 1919, the governments of the republic had to openly fight royalist and catholic resistance, even though the latter was much smaller in number than the former.

Still in the domestic arena, let us look at the conflict that destabilized the old PRP during the first year of the Republic. Indeed, even two or three years before the establishment of the new regime, the existence of at least two tendencies within the party could be felt: one was radical and Jacobin, the other moderate and conservative. The former was led by Afonso Costa and had the largest number of supporters. It followed the ideas of Brito Camacho and was supported by groups of intellectuals who were cautious and preoccupied with reconciling, in social and political terms, fields that would hardly remain together. In fact, the fall of the monarchy could not be just a change of regime; it had to mean a break with tradition and, therefore, gain a revolutionary stance as advocated by the most extreme wing of the PRP.

¹ I do not wish to go into major detail here, as I have addressed this topic in depth on previous occasions (Fraga, 2001: 49-101).



In 1912, the PRP split up, giving rise to two parties: the Evolutionary Party (*Evolucionista*), led by António José de Almeida, and the Unionist Party (*Unionista*), lead by Brito Camacho. Accordingly, what remained of the old Republican Party – now called *Partido Democrático* (Democratic Party) – represented the majority (Marques, 1991: 703-705). The splintering of the republicans went even further, as in the new years of the regime the *Independentes* (the Independents) gained prominence. They were followers of Machado Santos, who was “crowned” with the glory of having been the big winner of the republic in the morning of 5th October at Parque Eduardo VII in Lisbon.

The division and political guerrilla between these party groups continued practically unchanged until the end of the Great War in November 1918. Indeed, the great divide took place between August 1914 and December 1917², with the *democráticos* (democrats) and the evolutionists supporting the idea of active warfare in the battlefields of Europe, whereas Machado Santos’ unionists and independents opposed it by all possible means (Fraga, 2001: 84-89)³.

When one looks at the overall picture of Portugal’s domestic situation between 1910 and the end of the Great War, one realizes that conflicts criss-cross and mutually reinforce each other, because the various parties realized the vulnerabilities of each other and exploit them, in an attempt to obtain political and even social advantages.

Looking at the external panorama, let us try to understand the scenario of conflict within which Portugal had to conduct its diplomatic action, particularly in the London-Madrid-Lisbon geostrategic triangle. In the months prior to the outbreak of the revolution in October 1910, the PRP gave assurances to London that once the republic had been established, there would be no changes in the relationship with Great Britain. In the same fashion, Lisbon expected London to keep the commitments that had bound the two countries for centuries (Relvas, 1977: 221-222). But the truth is that Britain had always had a special interest in Portugal due to the strategic position it occupies in the Iberian Peninsula and Lisbon, either as a monarchy or a republic, never lost sight of the advantages it represented to Britain⁴.

However, a fear always hung with regard to the relationship with Britain: the possible closeness between London and Madrid in clear detriment of the good relationship with Portugal. This fear was neither vain nor void in meaning, as Spain had always had a special appetite for annexing Portuguese territory. The dream of Iberian unification under the hegemony of Spain would have placed the latter in a unique strategic position, and would have turned it into a single important platform with regard to the

² Date when Sidónio Pais dictatorially took power resorting to revolution and violence.

³ The war was the major generator of successive political instability in Portugal: *Movimento das Espadas* (Movement of the Swords), led by Machado Santos in December 1914; at the same time the palace coup of Manuel de Arriaga took place in order to place his friend General Pimenta de Castro as head of government, who imposed the Republic’s first dictatorship; democratic revolution of 14 May 1915 (Fraga, 2001; 167-211); revolutionary attempt by Machado Santos, from Tomar, in December 1916 (Afonso and Guerreiro, 1981); and, finally, the revolutionary and dictatorial coup of Sidónio Pais in December 1917 (Fraga, 2010 a: 439-487).

⁴ Namely: a wide coastline in the Atlantic in the route to Europe, close proximity to North Africa and the entrance to the Mediterranean, the Algarve coast acting as a possible in-depth support to Gibraltar and the adjacent archipelagos of Madeira and the Azores, which are located exactly half way between Europe and the North American continent. Before 1910, the strategic importance of Portugal was established during the Napoleonic wars, the larger scale military conflict in Europe, due the fact it was the gateway for English goods into the continent, thus rendering ineffective the blockade imposed by Napoleon and acting as a platform for the invasion of Southern Atlantic Europe.



Atlantic and the Mediterranean, further enhanced by the possession of the Mediterranean and Atlantic islands, which would have brought increased maritime power to the Peninsula.

In this context, although wanting to become less dependent on its London counterpart, the Lisbon government could not dispense the diplomatic, and, if necessary, military support of England, which made it act with redoubled caution in the capital of Britain, due to the fact that the deposed monarch lived there and the existence of British political trends that were favourable to the annexationist intentions of the Spanish king (Vincent-Smith, 1975: 43). On the other hand, Lisbon had to deal with Madrid carefully, as it knew that Spain sheltered all the active opponents of the Republic. Accordingly, flaring the tempers of a few Spanish social and political sectors could have led to the latter's increased support of Portuguese counter-revolutionaries, and, worse even, could push Spain into the arms of England.

From this brief review of the relations between Lisbon, Madrid and London, one concludes that the representatives of the republic had no easy task in hands in any of those capitals, particularly Manuel Teixeira Gomes, who was Portugal's minister plenipotentiary in London. Maintaining the equilibrium, without compromise or subservience, was the watchword.

We shall now briefly examine the potential conflict Portugal-Britain-Germany over the Portuguese possessions in Africa. The talks that had taken place between London and Berlin in the last years of the 19th century over their agreed division of Portugal's most important colonies in Africa were known to Lisbon in the period between the establishment of the republic and the outbreak of the Great War. In 1914, there were suspicions of further negotiations between Britain and Germany to, once more, endanger Portugal's colonial patrimony (Fraga, 2001: 93-101). Republican politicians knew that, on the one hand, their English counterparts had no major qualms about negotiating with the Germans the transfer of all or part of the Portuguese colonies, even the archipelagos of Madeira and the Azores, in exchange for the containment of the growth of the German merchant and war marines. On the other hand, they were also aware that Germany was anxious to have colonies in Africa and Oceania⁵.

The fact that there was an alliance between Portugal and England that went back centuries had never been a sufficient reason for the distinct governments of Portugal to rely on British decisions. A realistic foreign policy had to suspect the trickery engendered by the British rulers, as they imperturbably put the interests of Great Britain above all else. Therefore, it was clear that behind the formal alliance between Britain and Portugal, there was a climate of suspicion felt by the Portuguese, matched by British evident contempt. In other words, diplomatic relations, albeit friendly in appearance, were potentially conflicting, more than with Germany, because from the latter one could only expect hostility when its national interests, particularly in Africa, became dominating.

Having described the instabilities and the context of conflict – whether existing or in the making – that affected the republic between 1910 and the beginning of war in Europe,

⁵ Britain's *generosity*, offering Portugal's colonial territories, lasted until 1937, when London tried to appease Hitler's expansionist aspirations by *offering* Angola and Mozambique as *gifts*, in addition to the Belgian Congo (Nogueira, 2000: 171-172).



we need to take a leap in time to 1914 in order to understand the evolution of Portuguese politics in this new scenario.

1914: the interests of Britain and those of Portugal

I will not outline the interests of Britain as part of its foreign policy, since that task would exceed the objectives of the present work. However, it is important to understand at which point the national interests of Britain crossed the national interests of Portugal. When war in Europe broke out, Portugal adopted two sequential attitudes with the London government: it started by stating its neutrality and, the following day, it tried to ascertain Britain's wishes with regard to the Alliance. In other words, first it presented itself as equidistant with regard to the contenders, and then, in a more calculating, wiser and more restrained approach, it transferred the weight of the decision to London, in order not to clash Portugal's position with British interests. Portugal had to protect itself from Spain and from any eventual understanding London and Madrid may have come to have, and, at the same time, it had to protect the integrity of its colonial possessions. Accordingly, Britain had a word to say on the matter. Indeed, the most important word. London was immediately interested in guaranteeing the neutrality of Spain, whose political sympathies leaned towards Germany. Then, it was important that Germany lost its underwater cable strategic connections so as to be isolated from the rest of the world as much as possible. However, most German underwater cables were tied to Portuguese islands in the Atlantic. Moreover, it was necessary to prevent German ships from refuelling coal in those islands. In addition, Mozambican ports were crucial for reinforcing the presence of troops and war material in the colony of Southern Rhodesia.

All these interests involved Portugal, but at the same time, for the sake of Iberian equilibrium, it was necessary to ensure the neutrality of the Peninsula, which in practice was incompatible with the demands that would need to be made to the government of the young Republic. And due to the precedent provided by the Anglo-Boer war (Magalhães, 1990: 215-216), London asked Lisbon to state it was non-neutral and, simultaneously, non-belligerent. Thus Britain could ask Lisbon to carry out international belligerent actions, because the onus of the ambiguity fell on Portugal. This was too much to ask under a covenant, which, in recent times, had not given assurances to the distinct Lisbon governments other than the removal of the threat of a potential Spanish intervention.

The more radical sectors of the republican politics soon defined the real national interest of Portugal: the modification of an ambiguous status that embarrassed the young republic in the international arena (Fraga, 2001: 118-122). The change would take the form of entering war with the support of Britain. This led to a clash of interests between London and Lisbon, originating tension and, therefore, an atmosphere of conflict. The interest of Portuguese radicals in changing the status that had been requested by London was all the greater, given Portugal's ambiguity defined in Parliament on 7 August 1914 (Fraga, 2001: 113), and, about eight days later, the outrage it represented when Portugal's minister in France — João Chagas — was forbidden from receiving or sending coded telegrams, the same applying to the country's representative in Berlin — Sidónio Pais — (Fraga, 2001: 121). The German and French governments responded to a position they had not understood and which,



in different ways, frustrated their expectations. At home, the political trends immediately collided. The monarchists started to want a German victory without caring about the dangers threatening the independence of Portugal as a result of having a pro-German Spain as a neighbour (Lavrado, 1947: 249). The conservative republicans and the independents, led by Brito Camacho and Machado Santos, advocated, at best, war in the colonies to defend them from the ambitions and incursions of the Germans. The trade unions and the socialists were against any kind of belligerence (Fraga, 2001: 115-118).

Finally, the Catholics were divided and stood close either to the monarchists or to the conservative republicans. At the end of August 1914, the radical wing of the PRP led by Afonso Costa interpreted national interest in a realistic and detached manner with regard to past political experiences. A few republicans no longer involved in political and party movements were left out of this process.

The struggle of Afonso Costa and of his supporters began to focus, externally, on the termination of the ambiguity created by Britain, taking Portugal into war, since it was the only way to gain international respect and honour for the country and the Republic, while at the same time opposing the imperialist arrogance of Britain with the simple, yet dignified sovereign will of Portugal. According to the interpretation in those days, belligerence would provide safety as to the possible interference of Spain, enhance the Iberian importance of Portugal regarding a neutral Spain, save the integrity of Portugal's colonial territories, ensure Portuguese diplomats would have a seat at the peace conference, and, internally, safeguard the duration of the republic (Fraga, 2010 b: 103-106).

As can be seen, the context of conflict in which Portugal had to act was complex both internally and internationally. It was necessary to overcome the opposition of the conservative forces and the resistance of the Foreign Office and, wherever possible, link the two actions, given that, internally, the resistance would decrease if belligerence was requested by Britain.

Having now explained the bundle of interests at stake and the dormant conflicts behind them, I shall now briefly analyse Portugal's diplomacy and how it proceeded in the three capital cities most involved in the Great War.

Diplomacy and Portuguese diplomats in three European capitals

It should be noted that the ministers plenipotentiary of Portugal in London, Paris and Berlin, although unquestionably republican, were not affiliated to any party faction. They were personalities who, before or after their appointment to their posts, generally enjoyed the political support of Brito Camacho⁶, as they belonged to the range of republican intellectuals the latter was so fond of. Still, this fact did not prevent them from relating easily with António José de Almeida or even with Afonso Costa.

At this point, it is important to understand how diplomatic activity was perceived in Portugal and, to some extent, across Europe. Accordingly, the republic, in line with the monarchy, still followed the French diplomacy paradigm that had emerged in France in

⁶ João Chagas should be excluded from this assessment, as he had little sympathy for the Unionist leader who, in turn, believed Chagas to be closer to Afonso Costa than he actually was.



the 17th century and remained throughout the 18th century, requiring diplomats to master the art of negotiating (Moreira, 2002: 80-82). They did not make politics; they executed politics through negotiation, using the delimited powers conferred to them, and only those powers. The diplomat was basically an intermediary that conveyed information, understood the signs and acted in order to attain the objectives set from above. It is true that high-level meetings took place during state visits, but they did not yet have the negotiating impact of some of today's visits. They were forms of contact to iron out the negotiations that governments would undertake, since, particularly after the French Revolution and the Congress of Vienna, sovereignty lied increasingly on the nation and not on the sovereign representing it. To a certain extent, it was United States President Thomas Woodrow Wilson who introduced high-level talks between heads of state and heads of government in Europe in 1919, when signing the Peace Treaty and the creation of the League of Nations (Kissinger, 1996: 200). Of course diplomats continued to fulfil their negotiating mission; however, it became clear that something was changing in the relationship between states, hence, in their possible role.

Manuel Teixeira Gomes, a large farm proprietor in the Algarve and owner of a stable dry fruit exporting company, a writer and traveller, used to negotiating and an affable gentleman (Rodrigues, 1946), was invited to represent the republic in London in 1910. His mission was extremely difficult because, in addition to London being the city chosen by King Manuel II to be in exile, it was where the Marquis of Soveral, the former Portuguese minister accredited to the court, lived, and he moved within the British diplomatic circles with great ease. All the difficulties that the Portuguese foreign policy went through between 1910 and 1914 had some impact on England, and Teixeira Gomes took charge of them with much skill, knowing how to overcome the hurdles that certain areas of British policy created in relation to Portugal (Gomes, s. d.: 20). Perhaps the most difficult moment for Teixeira Gomes before the outbreak of the Great War was in 1913, when there were rumours about the new Anglo-German agreement concerning Portugal's colonies. The minister made incessant contacts with the Foreign Office until he was able to confirm the existence of an understanding that revived the 1898 agreement, although Sir Edward Grey, British Foreign Minister, believed that the new document had proper dissemination. Teixeira Gomes contributed greatly to this end (Silva, 2006: 328-329). Germany disagreed with the publication of the agreement and only agreed with it on the eve of war, on 28 July 1914.

At the outbreak of the Great War, Teixeira Gomes merely followed Lisbon's instructions, at the same time he conveyed to the government of the republic all the information deemed relevant and that would enable the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to make the wiser decisions. Although he never stated it categorically, Teixeira Gomes made it clear he was not a supporter of Portuguese belligerence, although realising that, ultimately, it ensured Portugal's security internationally and, in particular, in the peninsula. Incidentally, D. Manuel II came to the same conclusion because, being in a centre of important decisions, he received information from Portugal and from Spain and, as Teixeira Gomes, he feared the ambitions of Alfonso XIII (Lavrado, 1947: 250).

At the suggestion of Brito Camacho, Artillery Major Sidónio Pais, a full professor at the University of Coimbra, was chosen to represent Portugal in Berlin. He went to the capital of Germany in September 1912. At first he stayed in a hotel because the



Legation was not inhabitable, and he had to wait over a month before moving in, buying most of the furniture at his own expense.

From a political perspective, in those days Germany could be described in one sentence: "autocratic monarchy with a few parliamentary ornaments" (Silva, 2006: 315), which allows us to question the importance that such an experience may have had on the future behaviour of Sidónio Pais. We shall never fully know in this regard. At the diplomatic level, we know that foreign affairs were riddled with tricks, whereas intrigue abounded in internal affairs. Diplomats obeyed blindly to the *Kaiser* without contesting his orders, which removed their capacity for independent negotiation, turning them into mere transmitters of a will that came from above (Silva, 2006: 315-316).

It was with this type of diplomats that Sidónio Pais had to carry out instructions from Lisbon, which were to convince, as best as possible, the German market to buy Portuguese products, namely cocoa from the S. Tomé colony. This was a mission of charm that Sidónio Pais tried to accomplish during the first years of his stay in Berlin, by establishing relationships with some journalists working for the press with a wide circulation in the capital and even in Germany. His task was not easy, as the news sent to the Reich's capital by the German correspondents in Lisbon discredited the information that the minister so diligently gave in interviews to Berlin's newspapers (Silva, 2006: 318-321). Perhaps the greatest difficulty Sidónio Pais had to face regarding the fulfilment of the mission he had been assigned was the huge bureaucratic barrier that restricted his access to decision-making entities, even within the German Foreign Affairs Ministry.

The Minister Plenipotentiary had the opportunity to slightly expand his limited ability to manoeuvre when the news that Germany and Britain were about to reactivate the 1898 agreement on Portugal's colonies started to circulate in February 1913. At the time, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Zimmermann, received him, assuring him that Portugal's colonies were not at any type of risk, and that Germany only wished to expand its trade with the approval of London and Lisbon. This was enough for the Portuguese minister to be sure that something was being plotted (Silva, 2006: 327) and he informed the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Republic. Not satisfied, Sidónio Pais requested an audience with Germany's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, who was so peremptory, so convincing, so honest that Sidónio Pais was absolutely sure that nothing was being negotiated behind the republic's back (Silva, 2006: 327).

With the outbreak of war in August 1914, all communication with the Portuguese Foreign Ministry began to be made through the chargé d'affaires of Portugal in Berne. This represented the end of a diplomatic presence. However, the Minister of Foreign Affairs could still see that Sidónio Pais was clearly in favour to Portugal's neutrality in the conflict that was about to start⁷.

João Chagas was appointed Minister Plenipotentiary to Paris on 23 March 1911. He was a republican journalist, a pamphleteer, well-spoken, polite, elegant, a distinguished gentleman who had taken part in the revolution of 31 January 1891. For this reason, he was arrested and deported to Angola, but never lost his political convictions. After

⁷ Moreover, Sidónio Pais was on his way to Lisbon to spend the summer holiday when war broke out in Europe. He did not stay long in Portugal, returning to his post after having conferred with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Colonel Freire de Andrade.



-serving the sentence, he returned to Portugal and, as a freemason, conspired in the last stage of the monarchy. Together with António José de Almeida, he ended up assuming responsibility for the higher civilian organisation that followed the military in the revolution. This led him to establish close links with the Carbonária society.

When he had been in post for a few months, in early September 1911 the newly elected President of the Republic Manuel de Arriaga convened him to form the first constitutional government of the republic. His detachment from the republican tendencies that would fracture the PRP had been acknowledged. This government did not last longer than a few months, as in the beginning of November it no longer had the parliamentary support of the more conservative wings — almeidistas (supporters of José de Almeida) and camachistas (supporters of Camacho). He was given the Legation in Paris once more, by decree of 21 November. The mission he was given was not as complex as that of Teixeira Gomes, but was not as simple as that of Sidónio Pais.

In 1910, the Republic of Portugal had broken with the tradition of a monarchical Europe⁸, becoming a reproached, even feared republic, due to its adoption of social and political behaviours of unexpected radicalism. France, already politically and socially more appeased, represented a model for Portuguese republicans, who expected ideological solidarity from the country. Therefore, João Chagas had to placate the opinion of the most conservative French social sectors.

Due to his long experience as a journalist, his command of the French language and natural elegance, it was hoped that he would intercede with the main French newspapers and soften the picture that was being outlined of a Jacobin Portugal. It was also hoped that he would be able to penetrate in a correct, pervasive and persistent way in the political and social circles of Paris to present a more orderly and temperate image of Portugal, one of a country less subservient to the wishes of Britain but in need of all support to be able to overcome the obstacles it was facing. Alongside this mission, João Chagas was expected to remove the leeway enjoyed by the monarchists who were exiled in France or conspired there. Accordingly, the mission of the Portuguese Minister Plenipotentiary to Paris was complicated. He was able to bring it to fruition, thanks to his tactfulness, consideration and the vast knowledge he acquired in the French capital and his ease of access to the France's Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Novais, 2006: 43-53).

Of all our representatives in the most important European capitals — London, Berlin and Paris — he was the one who had greater success in accomplishing the mission assigned to him. Such success can only be justified by a combination of extrinsic and intrinsic factors. He benefitted from the social atmosphere that pervaded the French capital, which he was able to take advantage of thanks to the excellent relations he established as a result of his intelligence and personality⁹.

João Chagas was undoubtedly insightful, had a broad view of international politics and excellent knowledge of Portuguese politics. Moreover, he was in a great position to be aware of the distinct conflicts that took place between 1911 and 1914, since he was not at the centre of decisions, like Teixeira Gomes, or unaware of them, such as Sidónio Pais. Thus, he was sufficiently distant from the facts, which gave him the insight to

⁸ The exceptions were France and Switzerland.

⁹ Just check any of the four volumes of the diary he kept to understand the intense social life he led.



intelligently discern the interests of Portugal amidst the webs being woven and that pushed Europe into war. On 2 August 1914, he wrote the following passage, which I underline, in his Diary:

"This afternoon the German Ambassador was still in Paris. Thus, it is confirmed that Germany wanted war and wove it in collusion with its Austrian sister. *I am not proud of my good sight, but I believe I have seen it.* Germany's attitude was ambiguous. *One must always be wary of ambiguity*" (Chagas, 1930: 125-126)¹⁰.

The self-profile of the Portuguese minister in Paris is thus described in a few sentences. And how did João Chagas see the situation in Portugal on that very same day 2 of August? More than a mere impression, he writes the only strategy that his country should follow in his Diary:

"Pressed by me with questions sent by telegraph on what would be Portugal's attitude in case Britain intervened, the Foreign Minister told me that Portugal would be neutral 'except if Britain demanded the fulfilment of the treaties'. I was heartbroken! What! Portugal does not understand that now is the time, or never, to redeem its past tutelage of England and be its ally, be somebody! My poor country! Beautiful country! Ugly men! Ugly animals!" (Chagas, 1930: 28).

It is not the diplomat speaking; it is the politician that writes this outburst in his Diary. And he will play a key role in the first change of the ambiguity he disliked.

A diplomat doing politics: the solution of the insoluble

We have examined the international stance adopted by the Portuguese government in August 1914 following the request made by Britain – non-neutral and non-belligerent – and how only the more radical republican wing – the *democrats* – was willing to fight off this attitude, as it opposed the interests of Portugal. Without having exchanged views with representatives of this republican ideological segment, on 2 August, as soon as French troops moved to the battlefield, João Chagas concluded, like them, that Portugal's national interest required the country to fight on the side of Britain

In 1990 when I wrote the results of my research for a master dissertation on strategy¹¹, I was the first to notice that João Chagas played a key role in the first attempt to change Portugal's status in the conflict that had broken out in Europe (Fraga, 1990: 149-155). Six years later, without acknowledging my research, Nuno Severiano Teixeira came to the same conclusion (Teixeira, 1996: 226-231) and, several years later, Noémia Malva Novais referred vaguely to my work and revisited the topic

¹⁰ My italics.

¹¹ Titled *Portugal e a Primeira Grande Guerra: Os Objectivos Políticos e a Estratégia Nacional: 1914-1916*.



(Novais, 2006: 73-78). I am convinced that this is a situation that deserves a place within History of International relations in Portugal since it reflects a rare attitude in the life of a diplomat, for which reason I believe it is worth explaining what, over twenty years ago, I brought to the attention of the scientific community: how was it possible for a man – a diplomat – outside his normal workplace to intervene in any significant way, indeed as a politician, in the decisions of the government of his country resorting to diplomatic mechanisms.

Early in the war, due to the risk of Paris being bombed or even occupied, the French government moved to Bordeaux. As was his duty, João Chagas also moved to that city. On 8 September 1914, he left Bordeaux and went to Lisbon, on the grounds that the government of his country had not officially ordered, as was usual, the statement underpinning Portugal's international situation over the armed conflict to be handed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of France. In my view, this was a merely formal excuse to start what I describe as going beyond his competences, no longer acting as diplomat but as a politician. João Chagas was not the kind of person to act on impulse. He wanted to reverse the course of Portugal's foreign affairs. Accordingly, he devised an interesting and effective plan.

By way of a parenthesis, there is an important detail that enables us to understand the relationship between the brief account I gave earlier and the attitude of João Chagas I shall describe next: the characteristics of the Cabinet that faced the onset of the Great War in Portugal.

By decision of the President of the Republic Manuel Arriaga, on 9 February 1914, the one-year old stable government led by Afonso Costa was replaced by a *party tight* Cabinet led by Bernardino Machado. As its name indicates, it was a government where all republican political tendencies coexisted, in an attempt to manage the equilibrium. Possibly as a result of this feature, it proved unable to set definite directions to ascertain the national interests of Portugal. It lacked the strength of popular legitimacy achieved at the polls and confirmed in Parliament. To some extent, this was what made Portugal accept the ambiguity of the request made by Britain with regard to Portugal's position in the war. In any case, as soon as the Minister Plenipotentiary to France arrived in Lisbon, he sought and managed to get in contact with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Colonel Freire de Andrade, to learn about the situation, which, seemingly purposely, he had not been informed about.

On 11 September, Freire de Andrade said to João Chagas that he believed that the latter's wish was "to send a Portuguese expedition to the battlefields". In the own words of Portugal's minister in France

"I dissuaded him. I told him what my wish was, which was to see the country in a clear situation, [...]. It is necessary to define the position of the country through diplomatic means. To help him understand, I told him that the official text of the statements of the Prime Minister should have been, or had to be, communicated by letter to the Ministers of Germany and Austria" (Chagas, 1930: 215).



This transcript is enough to realise that Portugal postponed the solution of an abstentionist stance that should have been resolved at the outset of hostilities in Europe. In addition, we also come to know what Freire de Andrade, at least, thought of João Chagas.

My view is further reinforced by the fact that João Chagas resorted to a diplomatic reason to come to Lisbon. That was the justification, but not the purpose. Accordingly, after a meeting with the British Minister Plenipotentiary Lancelot Carnegie, to whom he skilfully demonstrated the lack of transparency in the way the British government was dealing with the government of Portugal, he met the French Minister in Lisbon, named Deaschner. He writes nothing important about this meeting, held on 12 September, in his Diary. A careful analysis of all entries over a four-year period shows that João Chagas was quite wordy, to the extent of writing about details that current readers would find insignificant. The absence of detailed information about the meeting with Deaschner is, thus, an odd fact and almost an unusual slip.

On 14 September, João Chagas wrote about another meeting with the Minister of Foreign Affairs:

"I told him that, in order to take up my post, he should give me the authority to make a clear communication to the French government. I even told him what the contents of that communication should be. He immediately agreed. There was a Cabinet meeting this afternoon, which he called for to assess the situation of Portugal, a matter that I had raised in my official correspondence. Freire de Andrade *informed me that the Cabinet had thought that the attitude that had been taken was the best. I did not insist, because I still hope that forthcoming events will force the government to change it. My efforts need to be tenacious, but discreet*" (Chagas, 1930: 223)¹².

Note how João Chagas associated matters and how he concluded, with almost total certainty, about the need to change the government's attitude.

It is easy to think that Chagas was thinking of carrying out, or supporting, some revolutionary act. That could not be further from the truth. The minister enjoyed his post; he would leave it when he was sure a large majority, at the *request* of political leaders, would accept him, as was the case in May 1915, when he accepted to be President of the Council of Ministers. By then he had left the Portuguese representation in Paris to serve the dictatorial government of Pimenta de Castro. To further strengthen my point, it should be recalled that on 6 September 1914, while still in Bordeaux, he had assured journalist Hermano Neves "*that he had already carried out enough revolutions, and what Portugal needed now was order*" (Chagas, 1930: 210).

After the meeting with Freire de Andrade on 14 September, the following day João Chagas returned to the Foreign Ministry for a new interview, during which the head of Portuguese diplomacy told him he had been *approached* by the *minister of France* with

¹² My italics.



the aim of investigating whether the government would be willing to *give any weapons* to his country.

"He [Freire de Andrade] replied that Portugal would willingly concede France a few rifles, as long as men to handle them went along too. He could not give the rifles alone." (Chagas, 1930: 225)¹³.

Let us examine the situation. Before leaving for Lisbon, on 7 September João Chagas had a meeting with Delcassé, Minister of Foreign Affairs of France, to whom he hinted that he would not return to his post if the Portuguese government did not clarify its position to the Bordeaux government, as was customary. On the twelfth, he had his first contact with the minister of France in Lisbon and did not provide details of interest about the meeting held a few days earlier. On the 14th, he was awaiting developments that "perhaps" would require the Portuguese government to change its position. On the 15th, Freire de Andrade told him what I have transcribed earlier and Chagas *did no enter any comment on his Diary*. All this is strange and suggests that João Chagas was secretly involved in the request made by the French government. This move can only be understood if we go back to the meeting he held with the French Minister of Foreign Affairs on the 7th. In order to explain his unexpected departure from Bordeaux, he said

*"I asked my government's permission to go to Lisbon to deal with a [note the term used] matter about which we have not been in complete agreement [note how he "opens the game" with Delcassé, using minced words]. He said with a smile [note the "smile" detail]: — Politics! [Delcassé was sounding things out to confirm his suspicions] I interrupted him: — No! I am interested about the internal politics of my country, but not passionate about it [João Chagas stirs the curiosity of the French minister ... what is he passionate about then?] This is a broader issue regarding national politics [he is giving his interlocutor all the clues; let him understand, but still have doubts...]. I am committed to my country having an absolutely clear cut position with regard to the war [It's all said! Chagas has opened the way for Delcassé to be able to manoeuvre from then on, especially as the Minister Plenipotentiary knew only too well that following Bernardino Machado's ambiguous statement in Parliament on 7 August, France started to think that Portugal was informing the world about its belligerence]. Your Excellency knows what the views of the Portuguese government on this matter are, and how the country feels about this [Chagas now wants to be sure the French Minister of Foreign Affairs understands him correctly]. Our sympathy for France.... He interrupted: *Franco-anglaise...* [says Delcassé, to prove he is aware of the links between Lisbon and London]*

¹³ My italics.



Certainly *franco-anglaise*, but even if we currently share our sympathies between the two countries, France's sympathies are not smaller [João Chagas thus let the French minister know which side he was on, and extended his hand to him in an act of alliance]. However, there are some inaccuracies in our politics that I believe should be ironed out. And I added: Should I take up my post again, that will be a sign that those inaccuracies no longer exist [Chagas was urging the French government to take action urgently, and at the same time he was making a clear warning].

Delcassé made a movement clearly expressing his satisfaction and told me: — In that case, I sincerely hope you will come back soon [the message had been understood..., all that was needed was a confirmation ...the empirical realization of the trust that Chagas placed in his mission in Lisbon]. He asked me if my wife would be joining me in my trip [Chagas understood the reason behind his question ...]. — No. My wife stays [the Portuguese minister was astute]. And I added, to ensure he had understood me correctly: — She will stay until I come back, or until she needs to join me in Lisbon [it was all said, I trust my mission will be successful, but one always has to think of distinct outcomes, including the possibility of France doing nothing to help me in my mission!]. The two men shook hands vigorously [they had understood each other without committing themselves to anything]" (Chagas, 1930:211-212)¹⁴.

Following this explanation, let us go back to Lisbon and try to understand the attitude of Portugal's Foreign Minister with regard to the request made by the French plenipotentiary.

Freire de Andrade, who had always favoured Portugal's neutrality, immediately decided that the country would show a belligerent stance — the same Freire de Andrade who only informed Teixeira Gomes of France's request for artillery supplies on 24 September (Estrangeiros, 1920: 40) and who, on 26 October, wrote the following to the above-mentioned minister in London:

"Given the fact that the British government has supported France's request for us to provide it with artillery, I *immediately* wished that this request had been made directly by Britain under the terms of the English Alliance. However, *right from the onset there have been divergences with the War Minister*, who felt that the fact of *sending only artillery* to the detriment of other weapons *would not go down well* in the Army. [...]. In this regard, his stance was uncompromising [...]" (Estrangeiros, 1920: 66)¹⁵.

¹⁴ The comments in square brackets are mine and have the purpose of clarifying the subliminal messages exchanged between the two men.

¹⁵ My italics.



In view of this transcript, there are only two possibilities: either João Chagas lied in his Diary, or minister Freire de Andrade was a liar and a coward, since he was the one who first stated he was in favour of belligerence when he spoke to France's Minister Plenipotentiary earlier when the latter asked him to supply weapons. Personally, I believe in the second hypothesis, although of course I am not one hundred per cent certain.

I have attempted to demonstrate how João Chagas, as a diplomat and using this status, undoubtedly carried out internal and external politics to clarify Portugal's position regarding the Great War, overcoming all existing fears concerning clashes and conflict, at home and abroad. Going beyond his competences, Portugal's minister in France went above the Portuguese government, and in collusion with France's Minister of Foreign Affairs, not clearly verbalized, he went over Britain's will and for a while he changed the status that the latter had imposed upon Portugal. In case any doubts persist with regard to my interpretation of the events, let us go back to João Chagas' Diary to disperse them, and see what he wrote in the days that followed France's request.

Thanks to him, we know that Bernardino Machado was double dealing Freire de Andrade, because on the one hand he asked him not to leave his post as Minister of Foreign Affairs, and on the other he privately accused him of betraying his orders (Chagas, 1930: 229), although the Prime Minister was the author of the ambiguous statement made on 7 August. João Chagas had a low opinion of him due to his political zigzagging, and knew that Bernardino Machado was anxious for him to return to his post in Bordeaux as soon as possible. Accordingly, on 16 September he wrote in his Diary:

*"This is how this abominable impostor [Bernardino Machado] wants to let me know that I am over extending my stay in Lisbon. I have stayed long enough and there is nothing left for me to do here. What is left to do will be up to those who stay here"*¹⁶ (Chagas, 1930: 229-230).

I believe there is no need for further evidence that Portugal's minister in France only came to Lisbon to alter the course of the international stance that the country had adopted as a result of the ambiguous British request. This is what can be inferred from what Chagas wrote. But let us go a bit further to clarify any possible doubts.

Once he was back in Bordeaux, on 21 September Chagas sent the Minister of Foreign Affairs of France the statement he had written in Lisbon with Freire de Andrade, and waited for Delcassé to call. The meeting only took place on 3 October. In his Diary Chagas describes some of the conversations held with Delcassé, with the caution that is common in diplomatic contacts:

¹⁶ My italics.



"[...] in order to initiate the matter I wanted him to talk about, I discreetly alluded to the request for artillery material made by France's minister in Lisbon. He confirmed the request [i.e. he had understood the message Chagas had passed on to him at the last meeting before his departure]. He said that France had three thousand pieces of artillery, but added — *il y a de blessée* (he meant they were deteriorated) which need to be sent to the arsenals ... What intrigued me in Freire de Andrade's telegram was him telling me that the French government had asked for the pieces and the ... gunners [i.e. the French Minister Plenipotentiary in Lisbon meanwhile had recast the request according to Freire de Andrade's initial reaction]. I also mentioned this fact discreetly, which he also confirmed, changing the word to — *attendants*. This is when I told him that this act implied involvement in the war, and that in this case the number of attendants was insufficient [...], and I clearly asked him for his opinion on this matter [Chagas had come to the conclusion it was time to speak clearly]. He exclaimed in a frank manner: — Portugal's involvement in the war?! Do you want my opinion? My personal opinion is that would be great [Chagas thus realized that his efforts had not only been understood but greatly appreciated by France]. And he added: *On n'est jamais de trop*. I thought to myself— *À la bonne heure!* [as can be noted, the understanding had been perfect and João Chagas' 'mission' a success!] (Chagas, 1930: 258-259)¹⁷.

Conclusion

In order to understand the timeliness of João Chagas' action it was necessary to outline a complex situation, both internally and externally, and then emphasize the analysis of the atypical behaviour of Portugal's Minister Plenipotentiary to France. His performance between 1911 and 1914 was paradigmatic, given that, amidst the most critical periods of Portuguese politics in a context of major turmoil and conflict, and by combining his diplomatic status with his sensitivity and political experience, he was able to define a national strategic change which, indeed, was the responsibility of the government and not of an individual who was a mere representative and negotiator. The political inversion triggered by João Chagas did not linger because the opposing forces had time to get an almost immediate regression. Another year was required to ensure that the conditions that would lead Portugal to take the position coveted by João Chagas were present, both at home and abroad. Months later, when it was no longer possible to return to the point of departure, Britain first and Sidónio Pais later placed Portuguese politics in a situation of compromise (Fraga, 2010 a: 637), demonstrating that the limited prospects of a policy lacking audacity or broad horizons stood above the values of a clear national strategy. At this point, I believe it calls for a brief reflection on the legitimacy, or absence of it, of the conduct of João Chagas, as a diplomatic agent, to act by himself in defiance of instructions from his government. Indeed, diplomats have the duty of negotiating within the limits imposed on them, leaving their political

¹⁷ The comments in brackets are mine.



convictions out of the arena where discussions between states are held. From a restrictive view, the behaviour of Portugal's representative in France was wrong. However, as in very special circumstances involving military commanders, he realized that the national interest would be in serious danger if rulers pursued a policy of ambiguity with regard to the war that was about to start. When he became aware of it, he attempted to draw the government's attention to the change in course Portugal's foreign policy was going through. He did so in the correct way, dictated by the ethics inherent to the post he held. He was not listened to, nor understood, regardless of the fact that he was out of the country and in a privileged position to assess the international legitimacy of Portugal's belligerence. For this reason alone he went beyond the rigorous boundaries of the ethical fulfilment of his mission, and conspired internationally — without leaving incriminating traces— against the government of the state he represented. The government's *deafness*, dictated by excessive submission to the will of London, legitimized the action of João Chagas, who knew he was not politically isolated in terms of the observation of Portuguese foreign affairs in 1914. In order to better serve, he went over the limit, and ultimately saw his action legitimized by the political party led by Afonso Costa that came into power, achieving the desired belligerence in March 1916. Thus, one concludes that in very specific circumstances where state sovereignty is seriously at risk, whole or in part, and all legal possibilities to correct the course of matters in foreign affairs have been exhausted, the diplomat, when backed by internal support representing the majority and justifying his attitude, gains legitimacy to subvert the instructions received by the government he represents on behalf of the nation's best interest. In doing so, he is acting on behalf of the nation and not merely because he openly disagrees with it in a conflicting manner, in which case resignation is the only ethical way out.

Portela de Sacavém, July 2011

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Notes

FIRST OBSERVARE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE: International trends and Portugal's position

Luís Moita

lmoita@universidade-autonoma.pt

Full Professor and Director of the Department of International Relations of Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, Director of OBSERVARE, Observatory of External Relations and of JANUS.NET, *e-journal of International Relations*.
Deputy Rector of Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa between 1992 and 2009

The first International Conference of OBSERVARE, the International Relations Research Unit of *Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa* (UAL) was its greatest public scientific event to date. It was held on 16-18 November 2011 at the University headquarters and at the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation.

The Conference was an important occasion for the confluence of Portuguese and foreign experts in International Relations, and focused on the topic "International Trends and Portugal's position. In addition to researchers from OBSERVARE and lecturers from UAL, the event was attended by several researchers from other universities, particularly those with which a partnership was agreed to that effect: The Carolina Foundation in Madrid, NOREF from Oslo, NICPRI from the University of Minho, IPRI from *Universidade Nova de Lisboa* (New University of Lisbon), *Instituto de Estudos Superiores Militares* (Institute for Higher Military Studies), *Instituto de Defesa Nacional* (National Defence Institute), *Instituto de Estudos Estratégicos Internacionais* (Institute of International Strategic Studies), *Rede Portuguesa de Estudos de Segurança* (Portuguese Network for Security Studies), and *Observatório Género e Violência Armada* (Gender and Armed Violence Observatory) of CES, of the University of Coimbra.

As Conference Coordinator, I made the opening and closing speeches. Both are recorded here, notwithstanding the fact that the complete texts can be accessed at <http://observare.ual.pt>.

Opening session (17 November 2011)

We meet at this Conference to discuss international trends and Portugal's position: this is a title that speaks for itself and does not require much explanation or additional justification. It is an initiative of



OBSERVARE, the International Relations Research Unit of *Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa*, in the tradition of the Observatory for External Relations, a study centre created in the distant year of 1996.

At the beginning of last year, the Minister of Foreign Affairs in post gave an important interview to a Lisbon newspaper, where he reflected on the situation of Portugal in the course of changes underway in the world. He recalled that Portuguese diplomacy had long centred on colonial issues, followed by a phase focused on Europe. He wondered whether this cycle was coming to an end, and if Portugal should rethink its position with regard to lusophone areas, the Americas, the Mediterranean, the new Asian powers, and so forth. Motivated by the stimulus of his point of view, we started research around the topic, trying to identify new international trends and alternatives for Portugal's foreign policy. The recent publication of our yearbook JANUS 2011-12 rightly notes the results of this study, for which reason we have distributed it to all conference delegates, as our meeting is a corollary of that research. The present conference is thus the culmination of a scientific path that aims to deepen our understanding of the main trends affecting the world today and, in addition, of the implications they have for a country like Portugal.

As we start this conference, I would like to first thank the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation, which has put this excellent venue at our disposal, in the person of its Chairman of the Board of Directors. Dr. Rui Vilar has given us the honour of opening this session, and every time we listen to him, we are always surprised: we expected a speech typical of these occasions, and, instead, he offered us his deep and timely reflection on the topics that bring us here.

We extend our thanks to the other sponsors: *Banco Santander*, the Luso-American Foundation, the Orient Foundation, *EPAL – Empresa Portuguesa das Águas Livres* (Portuguese Water Company) –, *SPA – Sociedade Portuguesa de Autores* (Portuguese Authors Society) –, *Fundación* Carolina of Madrid, Friedrich Ebert Foundation, and particularly NOREF – Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Center – whose collaboration must be highlighted. I take the opportunity to give a special welcome to the Ambassadors of Germany and Norway.

This event occurs at a particular gratifying occasion for us, as it closes down the celebrations of the 25th anniversary of *Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa*, which was set up by *Cooperativa de Ensino Universitário - C.E.U.* Hence a special greeting to the Rector of the University, to the Board of C.E.U., to all fellow lecturers and students of UAL, a university that aspires to be a school characterized by consistency and diversity and which is now recognized as a solid and dynamic institution.

This is an international conference, not just due to the issues it addresses, but also due to those taking part in it. I must underline the importance of foreign participation and the presence of delegates from Brazil, the U.S.A., Argentina, Spain, Germany, Uruguay, Angola, Cape Verde, and possibly from other countries. A special thanks too to our guest speakers, some of whom have travelled all the way from the U.S.A., others from Scandinavia and Central Europe. We are very much looking forward to benefitting from their knowledge, as they are renowned experts in the areas they will be addressing here.

Still, more than being international, this conference is, above all, an inter-university event. The content that will be presented over the next days is the result of the work



conducted by OBSERVARE researchers, and, particularly, of the projects resulting from the multiple partnerships with other higher education or research institutions. I have already mentioned NOREF and *Fundación Carolina*, and now I add the centres from the Universities of Coimbra, Minho, Nova, the National Defence Institute, the Institute for Higher Military Studies, and the Institute of International Strategic Studies, whose involvement is truly decisive for the success of this event. However, beyond these more formal partnerships, the truth is that the authors of the scientific papers that will be presented, an impressive number of eighty, come from no less than sixteen Portuguese universities, in addition to eight research centres or higher institutes, eight foreign universities or institutions, just to mention the ones presenting papers. To this we should add the considerable number of delegates.

This conference favours a multidimensional approach to international relations and world politics. It departs from the reductive classical view and from the concept that limits international life to inter-state relations, either through diplomacy or through war, and to arm-wrestling between the dominant powers. In contrast to this view, we favour the multiplicity of interpretations, and consider the various fields involved, studying the political, strategic, economic, demographic, cultural, social, environmental, and communication aspects. It is undeniable that most papers focus on the fields of geopolitics and security, and there are fewer papers on environmental, social, and, above all, economic issues. This shows the road ahead for International Relations Studies in order to fully incorporate these other areas.

This conference also emphasizes the importance of an interdisciplinary approach. The areas we are addressing here take input from distinct fields of knowledge, such as political science, economics, history, sociology, and law. However, such a variety of contents in no way affects our strong belief that international relations is an area of science in itself, which is specific and different from other scientific areas, which is not without consequences for the institutional framework of the study cycles in this field. Our explicit objective is to affirm that the study of international relations is, I repeat, a specific field in itself, an area that is increasingly consolidated in Portuguese university communities and which is increasingly becoming independent of other branches of knowledge, including political science.

This conference is intentionally open to theoretical and ideological pluralism, since autonomous and critical thinking is the very condition for validating our practice of doing science. Indeed, what unites us is the will that our gathering together is an occasion for the advancement of knowledge, so that we may have the most refined intellectual tools to better interpret our world.

Ultimately, we would like this conference to be an act of human density and positive interaction among us, which is far from being indifferent for accessing knowledge. We know the value of human relationships and their significance for our own reflection process. The pace of our work seeks to respond to that belief, hence the decision to allow time for open debate, and also for those moments of conviviality, breaks, meals, hallway talks, and bilateral meetings...

The conference folder contains a significant number of supporting documents, with emphasis on the book of abstracts and the small guide detailing activity over the next days. I hope you will find them useful and that they contribute to the success of this event. The texts have been carefully prepared, as well as all the organizational aspects.



Therefore, we must thank the Conference Organizing Committee and all those who collaborated with us on this occasion, particularly the speakers and those who prepared papers for presentation, our guests, and all participants.

Closing session (18 November 2011)

Throughout this First OBSERVARE International Conference, we listened to seven major conferences in plenary and no less than eighty presentations in four sessions. Despite the time constraints, our debates were long and fruitful. We have reasons to believe that we achieved our goal of advancing scientific knowledge in the area of International Relations. We went through various knowledge paths believing in the fertile nature of interdisciplinarity and in the benefit of pluralism of paradigms and approaches. Perhaps we have not gone as far as we desired in developing alternative thinking, perhaps more in line with the changes that are taking place under our very eyes, and with the new forms of analysis that the current situation seems to impose. However, that is a time consuming task and we know we have to persevere.

In any case, at the end of three days of work, we are in a position to consider the subject of our discussions and to jot down some thoughts which have been raised.

The conference followed an easily identifiable script. We discussed the major issues of the day, ranging from the inflexions in the globalization process to the uncertainties of social and economic evolution, including the emergence of new powers and the "technology" of conflict resolution. And, wherever possible, we have taken into account Portugal's viewpoint as to its position in the international arena. In turn, the content of our work in the sections followed the three topics addressed by the reflection subgroups: geopolitics and security; economy and ecology; transnational social issues.

The reference to the three major levels that coexist and intersect in the international system is implicit in this triangle. Briefly, let us say that it refers to three levels; the inter-state system, the world economy, and the diversity of identities and cultures. Or, to use an even briefer formula, we find the well-known trilogy state/market/society. Political powers, production and distribution activities, peoples in their uniqueness and in their openness.

These three levels overlap and interact with each other. The first, the inter-state system, is the area of formal sovereignty and of the international community, and its players are the forms of political organization which we call states and multilateral entities. The second, that we have designated world- economy in the line of Braudel, is the space that tends to be identified with the world economy in the form of market economy or capitalism. The third level, which is cultural, is the ground where languages, religions, traditions, and values delimit social realities, but also where societies are crossed by multiple interactions. And, as we well know, interdependence is currently the hallmark of these multiple processes.

Large-scale turmoil can be found within the sphere of the inter-state system, and we are witnessing a tectonic plate movement where the new powers are asserting themselves, and where the epicentres seem to shift. Being as it is at the mercy of demographic imbalances, environmental threats, or of new strategic data, the international situation has become unclear and of an uncertain evolution. However, within this unpredictability, some constants have been expressed, such as the blurring of borders as delimitation lines, and the worrying fact with regard to a certain



evaporation of power as a result of the erosion of the centres of political power, hamstrung by other little or not at all controlled non-elected powers, which introduce factors of crisis in the independence of sovereign nations and perhaps even more so in the democratic legitimacy of implemented policies.

Viewed from our European periphery, we are fully aware of the reconfigurations that are underway in this area. The emptying of European treaties coexists with the assertiveness of the Franco-German condominium, or even the mere German hegemony, and the corresponding uncertainty about the future of the Union. By its side stands another condominium agreed in 2010, of a political-military type, formed by the British and the French. It foreshadows the possible demise of NATO or at least the slowing down of U.S. protection, undermines the so-called European Security and Defence Policy and confirms France and the United Kingdom as expeditionary powers ready to undertake future military operations, like their recent intervention in Libya. In the eastern Mediterranean, the attraction to the Turkish model prevails, along with the spread of moderate Islamism, predicting a meaningful future for the Muslim Brotherhood and its various ramifications. And Israel's isolation, now compounded by the inflections of post-Mubarak Egypt and of Erdogan's Turkey, and by the debate on the recognition of the Palestinian State, could result in increased temptation to reach Iran's nuclear facilities, an act that, if confirmed, would threaten global security.

These political and strategic developments, briefly exemplified here, occur at an historical moment when military power faces a persistent difficulty in imposing the political will of its holders, and perhaps this accounts for the rarity of war. In this light, the objective of the zero option on nuclear weapons proclaimed by the U.S. President deserves to be followed with interest. It is a goal that probably will not serve our generation but which should not be erased from our minds. These facts seem to make the ambition to abolish the use of armed violence in international relations a little less utopian.

If disturbances of this kind occur in the inter-state system, others, not smaller in size, affect the globalized world-economy. The societies that until recently were advanced capitalism ones are going through a particularly difficult phase. After the miracle, we witness stagnation in Japan, one of the four economies which grew the least in the first decade of this century, along with Haiti, Italy and Portugal. It is worth recalling the critical situation the Eurozone is facing, particularly in the peripheries of the European Union, which are the target of the offensive of large international banks. Even the U.S. economy shows many worrying signs, starting with the excessive concentration of wealth in one percent of the most powerful at the expense of the distributive policies that generate broad prosperity. One would say that end of the industrial society as we have known it for over a century brings with it the traumatic reduction of the working classes and now the sudden impoverishment of the middle classes in areas where economic growth does not mean job creation, and where the multitude of the jobless reaches alarming proportions.

All this is happening at a time when the financial system has become autonomous and appears to fly over the reality as a non-material form, disconnected from the real economy, in the hands of speculative priorities, inhibiting the leeway of the centres of political decision. Concomitantly, an aggressive market economy burst into new



latitudes, leaving open the great question of development sustainability and rendering unknown the question concerning the depletion of the earth's resources.

These political-strategic disorders and economic-environmental disturbances go hand in hand with social and cultural instabilities. Sociologists have diagnosed the decay of our societies, largely caused by the dematerialization of the economy and by the hegemony of the financial sector. This has led to the dismantling of collective life institutions, families, political parties, trade unions, democratic representation, and of the classic social movements and organizational formations they have segregated over decades. And the cultural entities of people now live attracted by opposite forces: on one side lies the standardization of values and lifestyles, on the other stand the assertions of identity, often exacerbated, if not violent.

We, the scholars of international relations, thus face a deeply troubled situation at the three levels of politics, economy and social culture. The raw material of our study, the international configuration in its various forms, has acquired a high profile, is on all types of media, and is now perceived by public opinion. However, understanding it has become difficult and subject to many distortions. This means that our scientific work faces a major responsibility. In our role of interpreting international affairs, we know that we must redouble our rigour and critical stance.

We have had to create new mental categories to address the unforeseen events that we have had to deal with. We came up with different words, sometimes sophisticated ones, to describe the innovations that the current situation imposes on us. We talk, for instance, of postnational constellation, cosmocracy, biopolitics, planetary macroethics, or global governance, in our attempts, not always successful, to better interpret the present state of affairs.

Along the way, we have discovered new and unsuspected contradictions that run through present times. We talk of globalization and of its opposite, which is fragmentation, and even of its sub-product, which is exclusion: a more globalized world has been the cause of large-scale exclusion. We talk of the aforementioned contrast between the financial system and real economy, with the disruptive consequences we are familiar with. We see the contradiction between a truly exorbitant over-armament and the frequent failure of the use of violence in the relations among peoples and within countries. We have the feeling that sometimes the old logic of Clausewitz is inverted and that politics seems to be the continuation of war by other means. And as we are so used to reflect about international relations from the standpoint of power, of its games and traps, we are caught by surprise when we see peoples stand up and make history with their own hands, like in the "Arab Spring", and perhaps also in Wall Street or in *Puerta del Sol*.

In the exercise of our profession, in addition to being social scientists and scholars of the internationalization of collective processes, we are also cosmopolitan citizens. As such, we are often constrained between the roar of the crowds and the pride of the powerful, knowing that we are not allowed to remain insensitive to this antagonism. We almost feel the need for a new world social contract where we would impose upon ourselves the undeniable respect for human rights, the correction of imbalances in the distribution of wealth for the sake of a fairer planet, the elimination of violence in international relations, the assurance of a sustainable development respecting the



ecosystem, a relationship of parity and partnership between men and women, and the responsible use of scientific and technological innovation.

All the wealth of the contents of this conference cannot finish with the end of this final session. The product of our studies has to stay behind, like a depository of knowledge available to all who wish to access it. We hope you will send us your texts in their final version so that we can publish the Conference Proceedings, preferably in English and Portuguese. The proceedings will record the most important part of what we brought here, and will showcase the inter-university nature of the initiative. We cannot but praise the openness shown by the various academic communities in this joint work, continuing the collaboration we have become accustomed to, in the form of the joint organization of research projects, scientific meetings, roundtables, and workshops, making this area of International Relations a particularly dynamic one.

To conclude, I would like to once more express my thanks to the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation for the opportunity to use these excellent facilities, as well as to the other sponsors who helped this conference to come into being. Special thanks are due to the tireless organizing committee, as well as to the interpreters who provided the simultaneous translation. We thank our foreign guests for the wealth of knowledge they have shared with us, as well as the speakers, and all delegates in general. I leave you with a promise: we will meet again!

How to cite this Note

Moita, Luís (2012). "First OBSERVARE International Conference: International trends and Portugal's position". Notes, *JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, N.º 1, Spring 2012. Consulted [online] on date of last visit, observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol3_n1_not1

Notes

OPERATIONAL ART: FROM NAPOLEON BONAPARTE TO JOHN WARDEN

Fernando Leitão

fernando_leitao@hotmail.com

Lieutenant Colonel Aviator, *Instituto de Estudos Superiores Militares* (Portuguese Joint Command and Staff College). He is lecturer at *Instituto de Estudos Superiores Militares*, in Air Force specific education. BSc. Hons degree in Military and Aeronautical Sciences from *Academia da Força Aérea* (Air Force Academy, 1994) and Master of Military Operational Art and Science, Air University, Alabama, U.S.A., 2011

War forged the world, as a blacksmith working iron. Throughout human history, and still today, men have been waging battles in ways that have changed over time, but skill and power have always been, and still are, essential elements. Early in time, theorists have tried to rationalize war. Some failed in doing so and were obliterated by time, but others succeeded and became known and revered still today. Besides their theories, it is also in the study of campaigns and wars from the past that lays the possibility to learn for the future. Whether by influence of the epoch, context, or leader, armies have always had a tendency to operate according to certain principles and showed evident personality or characteristics.

The link between the operational level of war, as we know it today, and the extended battlefield, in which armies maneuver nowadays, is obvious. From the small and limited grounds of the past, where knights and infantry maneuvered for a decisive termination as a result of a single battle, the battlefield expanded deeply into enemy territories and simultaneously into different theatres of operations. To add, the ultimate warfare model had the decisive battle replaced by a decisive campaign. To accommodate this template, logistics, and therefore sustainability, gained increased range and special relevance (Guseiken, 2005: 4).

This magnitude of operations aroused the need for detailed planning, and improved organization, which could provide the commander with adequate ways to influence the course of events across the battlefield. In fact, this operational level of war links the tactical employment of forces to national and military strategic objectives (JP 3-0, 2006: II-2).

While the former usually provide effects of a transient nature, the latter are long lasting and have even a political nature.



According to Clausewitz, in order to plan and conduct a campaign successfully, the general has to be talented with *military genius* (Clausewitz, 1873: Book 1, Ch3). Such a perspective is deeply embedded in today's concept of operational art, that is, "the application of creative imagination by commanders and staffs - supported by their skill, knowledge, and experience - to design strategies, campaigns, and major operations and organize and employ military forces" (JP 5-0, 2006: IV-1). It is on operational art, and in the assumptions therein included, that Commanders materialize their attempt to overcome the fog of war.

Eventually, not all models of operational art were equally successful as they proved different strengths and weaknesses when tested on the battlefield. In fact, while technology lent strength to some models of operational art, it also revealed their weaknesses when they ignored the context, and assumptions disregarded intelligence prevailing over reality. To explain this statement, this paper will address the models of operational art adopted by European and American military, from Napoleon Bonaparte to AirLand Battle and John Warden, exposing their strengths and weaknesses. First, it will analyze the Napoleonic campaigns and their influence abroad; second, it will focus on Mahan strategy for the command of the sea; next, it will address the First World War; and finally it will center on the AirLand Battle model and on the subsequent air theorist John Warden.

The strength of Napoleon's armies resided in the way he understood the era in which he was living. Napoleon deeply integrated the French Revolution in its strategies. He embodied a country in revolution, not only in ideals but also in warfare. This revolution in warfare evolved from his deep trust on the outcomes of the employment of mass armies, the pursuit for total victory, and the rejection of limited and non-decisive wars (Paret, 2006: 141). This approach was designed to guarantee the fast movement of his armies towards the objective, and to the extent possible, minimize attrition before the conclusive engagement with the enemy.

Naturally, this was only possible because Napoleon played both the role of national leader and military commander. Accordingly, allocation of resources was never problematic in a country mobilized to war. Moreover, it is known that a victory abroad, when associated with the charismatic traits of a leader, often translates internally in terms of popularity and political gains (Hanson, 2010: 8).

What Napoleon had different from other leaders was the fact that his strategies were "attuned to the possibilities of his age, and for some years succeeded in exploiting them fully" (Paret, *op. cit.*: 141). He was also able to take advantage of the technology he had available, making full use of artillery mobility and increased firepower (Weigley, 1973: 79).

To be decisive, the military strategy as Napoleon conceived it, required the maximum concentration of force in each battle. Initiative, offensive, movement, and concentration of force were essential to gain the momentum that could, and for the most part really did, drive the army to victory. If this strategy stood out as a strength, it nevertheless included weaknesses, as friction and attrition came into play. The invasion of Russia, today understood as an error, laid bare some weaknesses of the Napoleonic strategy. In the progression to Moscow, the slow destruction of his army along the way undermined the mass effect that it could have achieved. At the same time, in such an



extensive campaign, communications became more and more difficult, leading to a decline in Napoleon's ability to command effectively his army (Paret, *op. cit.*: 137).

Accordingly, but in a different scenario, insurgency in Spain exposed some weaknesses of the Napoleonic framework, as his army was never able to achieve complete victory. "Even military geniuses find that consolidating and pacifying what has been brilliantly won on the battlefield proves far more difficult than its original acquisition" (Hanson, *op. cit.*: 6).

Much to the influence of Jomini¹, during the American Civil War military leaders were clearly looking for inspiration in Napoleon's achievements (Weigley, *op. cit.*: 82). Clearly, they focused just in Napoleon's victories and not in his defeats. What they failed to understand was not only the different context in which they were fighting - unlike France, the nation was not mobilized against an external enemy - but also because of the technological advances in place. The increase in the rifle's range posed a real threat to artillery units like Napoleon used to employ them, and the train gave mobility a new meaning and dimension. As a result, timeworn strategies were not successful and casualties became colossal.

The Nineteenth Century was fertile in warfare theorists. Alfred Thayer Mahan was one of them, and again Jomini was influential in how his thinking evolved, to a point that some saw Mahan as the naval counterpart of that military thinker (*Ibid.*: 173).

Mahan envisioned the sea as the new battlefield and, in his beliefs, the purpose of naval strategy should be to gain its control (*Ibid.*: 175). Moreover, navies should take the role that armies had had until then. Because Mahan saw war as business - Clausewitz (1873) before him made the same comparison, because of the conflict of human interests it represents - to obtain the sea control, it was vital to ensure the free use of lines of communication and possess decisive geographic points (Weigley, *op. cit.*: 175).

It is a fact that navies were then eminently strategic instruments, with global reach, and that fact could represent a strength of this model. However, Mahan did not acknowledge the advances in technology that could challenge the control of the sea and render it impossible to obtain. At that time, torpedoes, mines, and submarines, existed already but he ignored them, as he did not embrace the need for faster ships (*Ibid.*: 180). Mahan also failed to realize the difference in context, as he focused on the British example and tried to apply it elsewhere (*Ibid.*: 178). As a result, a weakness of this model was the fact that by advocating expansion to obtain the command of the sea, he was involuntarily favoring dispersion and not concentration of forces.

In face of the new improvements in communications, transportation, and armament during the First World War, Europe saw a shift in the way that armies clashed on the front line. It is commonly accepted that the industrial revolution reduced friction in war. Innovations like the railroad and the telegraph made it easier not just to mobilize and move armies, but also to control and communicate across the battlefield (Rothenberg, 1986: 300). However, the search for a rapid victory for Germany, as envisioned by

¹ Unlike the Prussian theorist Carl von Clausewitz who was an abstract thinker, Antoine Henri Jomini, of Swiss origin but flag officer both in the French and Russian armies, stated that despite all the possible changes in the nature of war, there were a number of principles that could apply in any circumstance. Rather than the genius of the commander, Jomini advocated a scientific approach to war planning and practice (Shy, 1986: pp 143-153).



Alfred von Shlieffen (*Ibid*: 312) did not succeed². Instead, WWI became a war of attrition.

Despite all the improvements that technology made possible, the German leaders were too optimistic about the speed they could achieve when moving their armies throughout the French territory. The assumption that it would be a fast operation faced the reality of the trench warfare. Against static machine guns, the French army rediscovered artillery, and against the massive casualties, they found motivation and national pride. Also, airpower, still a new player in those days, started to show the characteristics that would influence so many to articulate promises of relevance and decisiveness in future conflicts. The principles of the offensive and rapid movement generally stand out as dogmatic truths in what concerns to military strategy. Nevertheless, critical assumptions of success were fatal to the goals outlined. Although the technology employed represented a real strength of this model, as conventional armament, transportation, and communications are still relevant today, it was based in beliefs and did not considered a war of attrition like the one WWI turned out to be.

In the years that followed the war in Vietnam, the focus of the US military shifted from Southeast Asia to Europe. Then, the major concern and subject of discussion was how to deal with the threat coming from behind the Iron Curtain. The Army proposal, that the Air Force quickly embraced, came out under the name of AirLand Battle. This new concept revealed influences from the Blitzkrieg through the Arab-Israeli wars (Citino, 2004: 258). In face of the Soviet supremacy in military numbers across the European theatre, and acknowledging that an army cannot be strong everywhere, the former version of the US doctrinal Army Field Manual 100-5, *Operations*, prescribed a concept of active defense (*Ibid.*: 257). This meant that air and mechanized ground forces would have to stop the advance of the Warsaw Pact wherever it might occur, almost as firefighters who fight several igniting fires (*Ibid.*). This model of operational art, weakened by giving the enemy all the initiative, was a synonym for slow erosion and defeat in the outnumbered West forces, and therefore it needed revision. Under the same perspective, other criticisms of this model reported two opponent currents of thinking to stop the Soviet Army: while some favored maneuver, others preferred a war of attrition (*Ibid.*: 258). Another weak point of this model was that it relied in assumptions rather than in facts. In reality, it assumed that the Soviet Union would maintain unchanged its traditional plan, both in attacking with tanks as in keeping its military behavior intact (*Ibid.*: 260).

In light of these weaknesses, a change in FM 100-5 was more than welcome. The new AirLand concept "had four basic tenets: Initiative, Agility, Depth, and Synchronization" (*Ibid.*: 262). In this new model, lessons of past conflicts, especially involving German and Israeli forces, were poured and melted together with classics of military history and theory, like Clausewitz and Liddell Hart (*Ibid.*: 263).

AirLand Battle represented an "attempt to achieve a balance between the factors of maneuver and firepower" (Skinner, 2003: 9) and therefore looked as if it was tailored to extract the most effect from air power capabilities, although just in a supporting role.

² The Prussian strategist Shlieffen draw a plan for a possible war, in which Germany could be forced to fight in two fronts, as a consequence of Franco-Russian agreements and treaties between 1891 and 1894. His plan, developed well before WWI, advocated for a fast defeat of the French in the west, and then, if necessary, a fast redeployment of forces to fight the Russians on the eastern front (Rothenberg, 1986: pp. 311-312).



Still, AirLand Battle clearly benefited from the offensive and the integration of air strikes with ground maneuver. This new approach, enhanced with modern armament like new tanks, and attack helicopters, seemed intended for success.

In this respect, new air strategists like USAF Col John Warden thought otherwise. He envisioned a victory in war through paralysis. Air power alone, by means of a series of parallel attacks at the strategic level, could render the enemy helpless (Warden, 2011: 71). Viewing the enemy as a system, it would be possible to attack and defeat him by attacking its Centers of Gravity (Creveld, 2010: 363). This approach to warfare depended greatly on technology, mainly precision munitions and stealth aircraft. Despite some criticism derived, from the obliteration of the role played by the other military services, this strategy proved repeatedly successful in the Gulf Wars and the Balkans, and even relaunched airpower to an era of glamour and renewed hopes of decisiveness.

An adverse effect of those achievements was this idea created in the aftermath of Desert Storm, that technology, namely air power, would always provide a quick and clean victory. It is undeniable that this model benefited from the principles of offensive and surprise to shock the enemy. Notwithstanding its enormous success, some say it was limited in scope. In those views, Warden's ideas remained limited to conventional warfare and did not respond to other challenges posed by rough terrain, jungle, insurgency, and nuclear warfare.

This paper makes an analysis of some models of operational art, showing that their weaknesses are often related with false assumptions and poor employment of technology.

While Napoleon's operational art possessed the strengths inherent to his understanding of the feasible strategy, based on the offensive and mass armies to engage the enemy in decisive battles, it also suffered from communication problems and from the inability to fight insurgencies. When others tried to follow his achievements, namely during the American Civil War, they failed to understand the differences in context: a civilian war instead of a nation against enemy state actors. To add, they underestimated the role of available technology which revealed weapons of increased lethality, and faster and more capable transportation.

The model of operational art that Mahan advocated had the strength of having a global reach, making possible to project power across the globe. It had nevertheless some weaknesses originated by the failure in acknowledging the existing technology and the different circumstance in which it was inspired: the former British Empire circumstances could hardly be applied to the American contemporary reality.

Although they acknowledged the role of technology, Shlieffen's assumptions of fast army movements across Europe proved erroneous in face of what became a trench war, showing that plans for a war of attrition must be integrated into any campaign design.

Likewise, the AirLand Battle model combined technology with maneuver. However, this concept assumed a static and rigid enemy, rather than a flexible and adaptive opponent, and into some extent, by giving air power just the supporting role, it limited its effectiveness. Opposite to this model was the view of John Warden, who in turn advocated for air power decisiveness through strategic attacks on the enemy's centers



of gravity. This model of operational art relied largely on technology, but despite its huge success in Iraq and in the Balkans, lacked the global view of what the other military services could lend to a campaign overall outcome. An often mentioned limitation of Warden's model - one that recent conflicts can erode - was that its domain was limited to conventional warfare.

This paper clearly shows that context, available technology, and reality, meaning precise intelligence, rather than assumptions, are some of the tenets that any model of operational art must take into account. Every time a strategist failed to acknowledge these principles, he was ignored, unable to materialize his ideas, or even worse, he was crushed on the battlefield.

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How to cite this Note

Leitão, Fernando (2012). "Operational Art: from Napoleon Bonaparte to John Warden". Notes, *JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, N.º 1, Spring 2012. Consulted [online] on date of last visit, observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol3_n1_not2

Notes

EMERGING MIDDLE POWERS AND GLOBAL SECURITY CHALLENGES: THE CASE OF BRAZIL AND TURKEY – IMPLICATIONS FOR PORTUGAL

Evanthia Balla

evanthiab@yahoo.com

Assistant Professor (Professora Auxiliar) in the Law Department at the University Portucalense. Scientific Researcher at OBSERVARE and at the Instituto Jurídico Portucalense. PhD in "Political Science and International Relations" by the Catholic University of Lisbon. M.A. in "International Politics" by the Université Libre de Bruxelles. M.A. in "European Studies" by the University of Reading, England. B.A. in "Political Science and Public Administration" by the University of Athens, Greece. She has been a consultant and researcher on European Union legislation and EU business opportunities in Brussels, Lisbon and Athens.

Today's global order fundamentally differs from the one of classic multipolarity, Cold War bipolarity or post Cold War unipolarity. There are many emerging powers and many no nation-states entities with powers. Yet, the world seems to slowly adjusting to these new realities.

Two fast-growing countries, Turkey and Brazil, both non-permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, surprisingly reached a deal in May 2010 over Iran's nuclear programme. Traditionally, Brazil and Turkey were both countries within America's circle of influence but now they seem to question their reliance upon Western world pre-eminence. In both cases their ambitions are global.

This presentation portrays Brazil and Turkey especially in the context of the changing dynamics of international relations, the economic, the political and the security character of each country presently and the perspectives for each of them for the future, focusing mainly on the relation between the old (post WWII order) and the new world order (post Cold War, beginning of the 21st century).

Focusing on Portugal, the current communication defines the reasons behind Portugal's necessity to engage dynamically with both countries in the future, both bilaterally and multilaterally, without neglecting of course the values and interests connected to its alliances with both United States of America and European Union.

The theme of this presentation is "Emerging Middle Powers and Global Security Challenges: The case of Brazil and Turkey – Implications for Portugal". Given this title, two questions arise automatically: What is middle power and why Brazil and Turkey?



Middle power can be considered a key state that is able, in economic and political terms (with an active involvement in security issues too) and willing to project power and influence developments beyond its own borders¹.

Brazil is a "brother" nation to Portugal, with huge historical and cultural links, a strong commercial partner and a notable political ally. Turkey is a strong player, in political, strategic and economic terms, in Eurasia, a fact that cannot leave Portugal uninterested either.

Furthermore, Brazil and Turkey ("powers of the future", according to Iran's president), surprisingly, reached a deal in May 2010 over Iran's nuclear programme². During the cold war, Brazil and Turkey were unquestionable partners of the West but nowadays these rising powers seem to move away and in some cases even challenge the traditional global order, marked by Western world pre-eminence.

1. But how one ranks these states as emerging middle powers?
2. What will be the impact of their action to security and stability in the world playfield and how can old and new political structures reform to incorporate these new parameters?
3. How Portugal shall act to best ensure a global order congenial to its interests?

In order to best answer these questions, the current presentation firstly discusses the present global security challenges. It then moves to Brazil's and Turkey's strengths and weaknesses and their impact for the West (mainly, US and EU – thus Portugal), highlighting Portugal's best approaches to these new realities.

With the end of the Cold War, the scholars of international relations have been debating on how the new global order will emerge. Francis Fukuyama argued about the "End of History" and Samuel Huntington predicted the "clash of Civilizations". Realists insist that nothing has changed in the world playfield since Thucydides and Machiavelli. State remains the key determinant. Joseph Nye though saw international relations as a game played on three levels: power/military conflict, multilateral economic affairs and transnational relationships. Additionally, the 9/11 terrorist attacks in New York and Washington brought about academic concerns over religious fundamentalism and the increasing domination of the American unilateralist approach toward international politics (Ikenberry, 2001; Kagan, 2008; Cooper, 2003). The academic analysis has placed little focus, comparatively, on the imperatives of new emerging, middle powers. Nevertheless, scholars' attention on these powers is rising gradually (Brzezinski, 1997; Mearsheimer, 2001; Haass, 2008; Khanna, 2008).

With the end of the Cold War and the beginning of the 21st century, the traditional international order began to undergo a significant transformation with the rise of new economic and regional powers. However, the world seems to slowly adjusting to the

¹ After the Second World War, Canadian leaders saw Canada as a middle power. For instance, Prime Minister Louis St. Laurent called Canada "a power of the middle rank".

² Under the deal, Iran would ship 1,200kg (2,645lb) of low-enriched uranium to Turkey, in return for fuel for a research reactor. The deal fell apart under political pressure in Iran as it would have required that Iran place disproportionate trust in the Western powers (by agreeing to give up its low-enriched uranium stockpile in one delivery, only to receive fuel rods for Iran's research reactor nine to 12 months later).



new realities, while the post cold war international structures (as UN, NATO, World Bank, IMF) have remained almost the same. Commonly, the proliferation of new actors on the world stage is causing concern in the Western capitals. Indeed, while, under the current severe economic crisis, US and EU stumble out of recession, Asia, Africa and Latin America are accelerating and contributing more than ever before to the world output.

Brazil, first of all, has long seen itself as a rising power. In fact, a prominent theme of the Lula years has been the search for recognition, by engagement and negotiation.

This country does have street children, has carnival and has football. But this country has much more. This country has greatness ...this country has everything to be the equal of any other country in the world. And we will not give up on this goal³.

Indeed, Brazil ranks eighth worldwide in the size of its economy (which has world-class agriculture, aerospace and bio fuels sectors, with huge foreign-exchange holdings too). Despite the economic crisis, Brazil grew 5 percent in 2010. Brazil also ranks fifth globally in area and population and top ten in proven oil and gas reserves. Brazil is a country with high environmental assets including massive mineral deposits, rich biodiversity and the largest renewable freshwater resources on earth.

In the last years, Brazil has been very active internationally, acting as a mediator for the interests of the South *vis-a-vis* the North and as a promoter of South-South alliances.

Indeed, Brazil is the main regional power in Latin America⁴ and a great emerging power forming part of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India China and South Africa). According to a Goldman Sachs, the economic potential of BRICS is such that they could become among the four most dominant economies by the year 2050⁵.

Based on the above mentioned set of strengths, Brazil's foreign policy strategic lines lay mainly on the following priorities:

- a) Economic growth (Oil wealth will propel Brazil to developed-country status)
- b) Increasing nuclear capacity⁶
- c) International status: Western World (USA/ UN) + South-South relations

As far as economic growth is concerned, Brazil was one of the G20 economies with fastest growth in 2010, surpassing some traditional developed nations. From an average of 1.7% annual growth between 1998 and 2002, the Brazilian economy began to grow around 4% from 2003 to 2010, and gathered the conditions to achieve an

³ Speech of President Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva, Itamaraty, Brasilia, 18th September 2003.

⁴ Brazilian Ministry of Finance, Brazilian Economic Outlook, Special Edition | Year of 2010.

⁵ Goldman Sachs Group, Inc. Official site: <http://www2.goldmansachs.com/our-thinking/brics/index.html> last access: 11.11.2011.

⁶ Brazil has known resources of around 278,000 tonnes of uranium – 5% of world total. [All mined uranium is used domestically, after conversion and enrichment abroad.](#)



average growth above 5% between 2011 and 2014⁷. Thus Brazil's key asset will continue to be its flourishing economy, a decisive element for Brazilian diplomatic activity in the economic, trade and political fields.

As far as nuclear power is concerned, Brazil does not have a nuclear arsenal and defines itself as anti-hegemonic. Still, in the past years we have seen more interest in harder military power, including the development of a nuclear submarine. At the same time, Brazil's public embrace of Iran questions the country's determination to prevent nuclear proliferation.

However, Brazil remains a member in good standing of all major nuclear regimes, it is a party to the Treaty of Tlatelolco⁸, which prohibits nuclear weapons in Latin America, and it is prevented by its constitution from developing an atomic arsenal.

Concerning Brazil's global status and stance, the search for recognition is mainly based on a North-South relation (mainly with old allies as US & EU /+ Western international organisations) and a South-South cooperation activism.

Brazil is a founding member of the United Nations and a good partner to the West since WWII⁹, member of the post-1945 «liberal order» that linked the United States with its Cold War allies and partners. This American system consisted of the trans-Atlantic and trans-Pacific alliance systems, involving an intense network of norms and institutions in the security, political and economic fields, together with a set of multilateral agreements and institutions (Bretton Woods institutions, OECD, WTO and the United Nations).

The promotion of South-South cooperation has also been top in the Brazilian foreign policy agenda¹⁰. Brazil secured a place in the G20, has flexed its muscles within the BRICS coalition, and into Middle East diplomacy.

Concerning the BRICS, a brief remark shall highlight the new dynamics in the world scene and the need for change: few days ago Reuters published the news that the BRICS are open to investing in the euro zone through the IMF. [Leading emerging economic powers called also for reform of international financial institutions to give developing countries more voice, saying their group was vital to achieving a new world order.](#)

⁷ Brazilian Ministry of Finance, Brazilian Economic Outlook, Special Edition | Year of 2010.

⁸ Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean. Brazil has been a party to the Tlatelolco Treaty since 1967. Non proliferation Brazil is a party to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) since 1998.

⁹ Is interesting to note that Brazil is among the twenty top contributors to United Nations peacekeeping operations, and has participated in peacekeeping efforts in the Middle East, the former Belgian Congo, Cyprus, Mozambique, Angola, and more recently East Timor and Haiti. Between 2010 and 2011, Brazil occupies a non-permanent seat in the Security Council for a two-year mandate. Brazil and Japan has been elected more times to the Council than any other UN Member State.

¹⁰ Promotion of South-South cooperation, as reflected in initiatives like the Brazil-Africa Forum, regular meetings with Arab countries, increasing numbers of Brazilian embassies in African countries, and the launch of the dialogue forum IBSA, an alliance between the southern powers India, Brazil and South Africa. As far as the IBSA initiative is concerned, it was launched in June 2003 with the aim of increasing trilateral cooperation in key areas such as energy and trade, and achieving greater impact in the global arena. Recently the IBSA dialogue forum launched the IBSA Facility for Development cooperation in the context of the UNDP programme for South-South cooperation. The fund has the financial support of the UNDP and is currently realizing two main projects: waste collection in Port-au-Prince, Haiti; and agricultural assistance in Guinea Bissau. Further projects, for example in Palestinian territories are under discussion.



Another example of the changing dynamics in the world scene is the fact that due to the global financial crisis, bilateral trade balance between Brazil and US has become negative (*deficit*). Brazil offsets such negative result by increasing exports to the BRICS countries¹¹.

In regional terms, Brazil is a founding member of the Mercosul created in 1991, an economic community along with Argentina, Paraguay and Uruguay. Yet, Brazil is still not a Latin America's natural representative¹².

At the same time one goal still escapes: permanent membership in the UN Security Council. Last US National Security Strategy declares that "*International institutions must more effectively represent the world of the 21st century, with a broader voice—and greater responsibilities—for emerging powers*"¹³. Obama's reform agenda presumably includes enlarging the UN Security Council, the world's most important institution. And yet, US fears that new members will dilute American influence and weaken council enforcement. Indeed Brazil's unpredictable behavior suggests that emerging powers may not always follow Washington's wishes, even if they are democracies and their policies shall gradually influence the new security landscape¹⁴.

The power structure of the world now is such that several major countries that need to be in the centre aren't. Brazil deserves to be there based on the size of its population and the size of its economy, and not based on an outdated world order. Definitely, Brazil will pursue Brazil's national interest, just like any other country. It is expected, according to this interest, in some cases to represent a point of view consistent with other developing economies and in other cases to represent a point of view consistent with the developed world.

Given Brazil's own changing situation (internal and external), and the changed international context (including the diminished role of the US and EU and the growing importance of China and India) Brazilian policy will continue, broadly, raising its global profile¹⁵. And it is in the interest of the West to take this lesson on seriously as soon as possible – thus including not excluding such players.

Portugal, given its cultural and economic links with Brazil, including a common language and an elevated financial interaction (open market and investments) should act as a bridge, as facilitator in the dialogue between the old and the new world. Portugal does have a comparative advantage that must explore.

Similarly, the direction of Turkey's future foreign policy plans is of great importance for both US and EU and subsequently for Portugal.

¹¹ Brazilian Ministry of Finance, Brazilian Economic Outlook, Special Edition | Year of 2010.

¹² Some questions will be crucial for the future as is Brazil ready to assume the leadership role in an integrated continent and to provide economic aid to countries like Paraguay and Bolivia? Is it willing to mediate disputes among neighbouring countries (Bolivia and Chile, for example, or Argentina and Uruguay? Is it willing to use its security forces to assist neighbours suffering from crime and/or insurgency?

¹³ United States Government, "National Security Strategy 2010" White House site official, http://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/rss_viewer/national_security_strategy.pdf last access: 11.11.2011.

¹⁴ Brazil and Iran good relations in the interests of both countries. Brazil gets a big share of the economic benefits and these may grow larger in the future. The relationship with Brazil is certainly helpful to Iran's international image.

¹⁵ President Dilma Rousseff's government will continue, broadly, along the course set by Lula.



Turkey's GDP expected to exceed \$1 trillion by 2015. Turkey ranks 15th by GDP and 14th by GDP-per-capita, among largest countries – has scale advantage. Turkey's growing and young population fuels the growth of its trade volume and the rise of the middle class. Turkey is strategically important acting as a natural link and bridge to markets in Caucasia, Central Asia, Balkan states and the Gulf. Turkey is a gateway to energy resources such as gas and oil pipelines in the region. Trade-wise Turkey is integrated into the EU/ Full EU-integration potentially. Thus, the direction of Turkey's future foreign policy plans is of great importance for both America and Europe and subsequently will have a strong weight in the new global security arrangements.¹⁶

Turkey is an old key US partner and member of leading international organisations: was a founding member of the United Nations in 1945; member of UN Security Council during 2009-2010; NATO (second military power after US) member since 1952; one of the Founding Members of OEEC in 1948, which became OECD in 1961; member of EU custom-union, since 1996; member of World Trade Organization; active in key organizations like Worldbank, IFC, Islamic Development Bank. Worldbank and IFC utilize Turkey as a hub to serve broader regions.

Turkey is also a Muslim state which has built a sophisticated financial and commercial system. Thus, it does enjoy many advantages when it comes to commerce with the vast markets in its neighborhood. Similarly, the energy resources of the Arab and Central Asian states are a powerful element for Turkish economy. Furthermore, Turkey has flirted with an east-facing policy in the last years. Indeed, by improving relations with Iran, Turkey highlights its value as a bridge with the West, it re-engages with the Arab world and promotes its economic interests.

More recently, Turkey did call early for change in Egypt. It endorsed NATO's intervention in Libya. It backed the opposition to the Assad regime in neighboring Syria.

However, Turkey's active foreign policy has attracted censure in parts of the West, especially America. Critics in Washington recall the Turkey's 2003 refusal to allow American troops to cross their territory to invade Iraq. Nowadays they accuse the Turkish government of turning its back on the European Union and NATO. There have been also some aggressive recent outbursts over Greek-Cypriot and Israeli gas exploration in the eastern Mediterranean. Critics point also to continuing harsh treatment of Turkey's Kurds and soft treatment of Iran, especially after the 2010 deal¹⁷. Above all, they blame Turkey for switching from being a firm friend of Israel, the only longstanding Western friend and an established democracy in the region, into a rival.

The Helsinki Summit of the EU Council granted Turkey candidate country status in 1999. But the EU in 2004 began discussions only on a "privileged partnership" rather than full membership for Turkey. At the same time, America's refusal to back Turkey's line towards the Kurds in northern Iraq significantly strained Turkey's relationship with America. The country thus was suddenly left without reassurance that either US or the

¹⁶ "Global Advantage of Turkey", DEIK, BCG, (Boston Consulting Group), September 2011

¹⁷ For Turkey, support for reform in Iran in the 1990s was guided by self-interest: among other things, improved economic relations, particularly in the energy sector, and bilateral cooperation in addressing the Kurdish issue. Turkey's relations with Iran presently are complicated by the difficulty of balancing trade interests – up from \$1 billion in 2000 to \$10 billion in 2009 – against its commitments as an ally of the West.



EU would secure Turkey's interests. This need coupled with the desire to remain strategically relevant will definitely determine Turkey's foreign policy in the future. ¹⁸

In fact, in the Middle East, US and EU are pursuing policies shaped to fit a cold war security environment that no longer exists. Saudi Arabia and Israel have been America's closest partners there for the last half-century. But alliances and partnerships produce stability when they reflect realities and interests. In the Middle East, the US should seek more partners. Turkey has been one choice. It is a longtime OTAN ally and a booming capitalist democracy, and has unique influence around the Islamic world. Turkey has been urging the US to change its approach to Iran by abandoning its policy of threats and sanctions. It suggests an approach that would recognize Iran's new role and give it a stake in regional security. India has recently made this same appeal to US. The Western world should definitely take under consideration these new calls.

The US and EU have to redefine their relations with Turkey, allowing it to play a more active role in the region. At the same time, it is indispensable that Turkey tries seriously to resolve its problems with its neighbor countries if it is to play a positive role in the region.

Turkey's growing international influence makes it a potentially interesting partner for Portugal. Hence, Portugal has to continue the path of business approach and productive political negotiations with Turkey.

In particular, Portugal could work with Turkey to reinforce this country's contribution to and participation in UN institutions and mechanisms, from peace building to climate change, and from non-proliferation to international justice. There is a real need to help Turkish NGOs develop their international outreach/ exchanges. This could be done by inviting representatives of Turkish NGOs to international meetings and helping establish programmes monitoring Turkey's foreign policy.

*The disposition to aggression is not intrinsic to states, but is instead the product of the constant search for survival in a world of uncertainty, offensive military capability, and a changing distribution of power*¹⁹.

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¹⁸ At present, this raises also the following question: how is instability in the Middle East likely to impact on Turkey's business interests? The tension between Turkey's business interests and regional aspirations was reflected in the reticence with which Turkey agreed on a NATO military intervention in Libya in the first half of 2011.

¹⁹ The Tragedy of Great Power Politics John J. Mearsheimer New York: W. W. Norton, 2001



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How to cite this Note

Balla, Evanthia (2012). "Emerging middle powers and global security challenges: the case of Brazil and Turkey - implications for Portugal". Notes, *JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, N.º 1, Spring 2012. Consulted [online] on date of last visit, observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol3_n1_not3

Notes

ORGANIZED CRIME MAKES SWINDLING GO GLOBAL

René Tapia

reneluis@iol.pt

Full He was born in Chile, and has Portuguese citizenship. PhD in Economics by the *Jules Verne University*, Amiens, France, and specialist in Drugs Political Economics. He has published extensively and been a speaker at several conferences in this field, and done research in offshore businesses and corruption. Professor at the Universities of the Algarve, Coimbra, and Lisbon, and his currently studying organized crime

"L'argent apoudri".
Destanne De Bernis

In September 2007, EUROPOL and regulatory and consumer protection agencies in Australia, Belgium, Canada, the Netherlands, Nigeria, United Kingdom, and the U.S. created the International Mass Marketing Fraud Working Group (IMMFWG) with the aim of exchanging information and coordinating border operation to detect, apprehend and terminate mass marketing fraud, and improve public information on the international schemes operating in Africa, North America and Europe, as well as in Brazil, Costa Rica, United Arab Emirates, Philippines, Hong Kong, India, Israel and Thailand. This is an incisive global threat that affects millions of people and companies from around the world each year, representing losses of tens of billion dollars and the financial well-being of staff and families. In June 2010, the Group presented its report on "**Mass Marketing Fraud: A Threat Assessment**", on which this article is based.

Mass marketing fraud uses the Internet, mail, radio, television programmes, large concentrations of people or even "word of mouth" rumour; however, regardless of the means employed, it will always have the following two characteristics:

- 1) the scheme involves persuading a victim to transfer money or any valuable property to the criminal based on a promise of future profit or valuable services that the victim will never receive in practice;
- 2) the criminal command uses the scheme on many individuals or companies in order to maximize income.

The scheme resorts to a variety of tricks (pitches), such as lotteries, or winning tickets, investment opportunities, businesses involving counterfeit cheques, or "romance".



Losses with mass marketing fraud

As most victims of mass marketing fraud do not complain, whether because they feel embarrassed or because they do not want to be involved in corruption schemes, there are no reliable statistics to assess the magnitude of this type of fraud on a global level. The British authorities estimate that only five per cent of people complain about fraudulent offers, and an investigation in Canada conducted in 2007 found that nine out of ten victims do not notify the authorities. However, other calculation methods suggest losses of about ten billion dollars per year.

The Office of Fair Trading in the UK in 2006 estimated that 3.2 million people (6.5% of adult population) were victims of the mass-marketing scheme, accounting for total losses of £3.5 billion. Similar studies, but not comparable, have been conducted in other countries, such as Australia, Belgium and the U.S., always exposing the deception of millions of people and involving millions of dollars (including foreign lottery schemes, "promotional prices" or Internet fraud)¹.

However, fraud victims not only bear the financial costs or the loss of their savings and even homes, but also experience physical risks that can lead to depression or even suicide. Mere contact with the scheme may evolve to threats or kidnapping for ransom. However, there are records of cases when the family physically abused the kidnapped for having to pay a large sum for his/her release. Many people mortgage or sell their homes in order to enter the scheme or to pay back the debt, with subsequent loss of property. There is an additional serious economic consequence for legitimate trade and the institution of confidentiality of banking or commercial data: many victims of mass-marketing fraud change their behaviour with regard to shopping and their attitude towards purchases using credit cards, thus using them less, the same applying to online shopping.

Pyramid investment scheme


Developed by mobster Carlo (Charles) Ponzi in the United States in the 1920s and lately by Bernard Madoff, or still "Dona Branca" in Portugal in the 1980s, it has been reinvented with the liberalization of Eastern European countries. It is a system that works in the short term with the first investors, but that ends up in bankruptcy for most unwary people involved in the scheme. It offers high yields at the expense of new investors and works as they increase exponentially, which is statistically unsustainable, as any basic mathematical calculation shows that a dozen iterations requires the participation of the entire world population. It consists of a payment or a payment promise of high interest rates at the expense of the money of the next investors. Several of these schemes have been uncovered lately, and in 2009 alone, just in the United States, they totalled \$16.5 billion. Ponzi started the business with \$5.000 and had deposits of 1 million when he was discovered six months later. Madoff was found

¹ The "Consumer Sentinel" network of the United States Federal Trade Commission (FTC) received 630.604 complaints in 2009, totalling US\$1.715.973.109, which is an average US\$2.721 per person. In the same year, the Canadian Anti-Fraud Centre reported over 40.000 complaints, totalling almost 60 million dollars, while in Australia there were over 20.000 complaints totalling 70 million dollars (The International Mass-Marketing Fraud Working Group, "Mass-Marketing Fraud: A Threat Assessment", p. 5).



out as a result of the 2007 financial crisis and sentenced to 150 years in prison for fraud totalling \$65 billion².

Maria Branca dos Santos started her activities in the late 1970s and when she was found out in 1984, she had raised 17.5 billion Escudos (\$130 million at the time)³.



Source: <http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/2/2d/PyramidSchemeMS.jpg>

Globalization of mass- marketing fraud

Although some crooks use fraud scams in their own localities, particularly the *Ponzi* scheme, recent investigations show that mass-marketing fraud schemes operate in a variety of countries in Africa, North, Central and South America, Asia, the Middle East, and in Europe, with a lot of similarities in their application, such as: choosing victims in different countries (we shall see further on that this fraud is dominated by international organized crime), internationalization of the laundering of the money obtained, hiring legal companies for carrying out the activities in preparation of the fraud (e.g., printing fake lotteries, conducting orders).

Organized crime in action

This type of fraud can be conducted by an individual or a small group, varying in complexity and size according to its nature and structure. However, recent investigations have revealed that lately organized crime such as the U.S. *Cosa Nostra* or the Nigerian and Jamaican mafias lead or facilitate mass fraud scams, benefitting from their elaborate corporate structure⁴. Organized crime can control the entire

² <http://losangeles.fbi.gov/dojpressrel/pressrel10/la011210.htm>

³ Since then the pyramid schemes offered by companies to potential consumers started to be considered to be "unfair trade practice" and legally prohibited (D.L. 57/2008).

⁴ International organized crime, which is mixed with legitimate businesses, is involved in a wide variety of activities that are part of the economic cycle, including finance, major retailers, production, and transport. However, small trade or street distribution is left to "petty crime" or "street crime", which is controlled by



process or provide “specialized services” (false documents or websites, laundering, lists of people, financial instruments, etc.) running a comparatively lower risk of being detected or of facing potential penalty.

The Process

Criminal investigation services have demonstrated the international nature of this fraud and of mafia rings in terms of their organization and control. They subcontract firms and employees to offer seemingly real products and services, and use sophisticated communication and processing technologies experienced in the diversion and concealment of goods and money. Victims are contacted by mail, via the Internet (the most used), radio and television, or in person; in most cases the request is initiated by telephone⁵.

The means

This fraud requires a variety of means to find and communicate with the victim, as well as to obtain and legitimize illicit procedures and avoid being caught and investigated. First, the potential victim must be contacted, and then the procedures described above must be followed. This requires the following:

- 1) Legal business companies, which may or may not know the fraudulent nature of the business they are being hired for, or virtual companies, with or without a real address or telephone, which are necessary for printing, packaging, transporting, sending, or receiving false documents;
- 2) Mailing lists, which can be bought from other marketing companies, with names and contact details according to any organization criterion;
- 3) Payment procedures, often separated from the nature of the fraud to make it easier for the victim to re-collect the money (bank transfer, pre-dated cheques, credit card);
- 4) Communication methods and networks. The sophistication of this type of fraud requires access to an array of networked communication instruments: telephone cards, cell phones, internet cafes, email accounts, databases, and computerized data storage with enhanced features, etc., which make it difficult to identify the users. There are proven cases of transatlantic use of Internet or VoIP simulating a local call;

organized crime but conducted by small groups or gangs associated by a common characteristic: neighbourhood, ethnicity, etc. (R.T.).

⁵ VoIP (Voiceover Internet Protocol) was created in 1974 by U.S. mathematicians, engineers in computer science with doctoral degrees in communication, Vinton Cerf, vice president of Google, and Robert Kahn, one of the creators of the Internet. It began to be developed in 2004 as mass marketing. It is the normal protocol used by any internet users, as this technology is used to receive written and spoken messages. The Voiceover Internet Protocol has many applications (free calls among some users, SMS messages, multimedia), but its technical nature makes it difficult to geographically locate users and it is susceptible of being violated. A “platform” of a company’s customers’ numbers can be sold to another company or be intercepted. As the voices are digitized and transmitted as a compressed “packet”, which the receiver plays as a stream, sophisticated technologies enable using a platform from abroad, simulating a local or national call to sell a product, offer a service or request humanitarian aid (R.T.).



- 5) False identity cards. They are absolutely necessary to open a bank account, install telephone services to contact the victims, pick up mail packages, and rent offices for enabling the fraud. Passports, identity cards, driving licenses, or work permits are tampered with when they are made or with regard to personal data, and many scammers have multiple identities, to the extent of one group of rogues having a common identity to obstruct the location of the crook and the interception of the network. Official documents such as cheques and others, both private and governmental, are also forged.
- 6) Method to avoid the police investigation of the fraud. Once the victim becomes aware of the fraud, the scammer changes method, using false names, often pretending to be the representative of prestigious organizations, and creating inaccurate email addresses. Some groups act by simultaneously making a counterfeit offer, and quickly changing the product when it is found out;
- 7) Identity theft and money laundering are the critical points of fraud schemes. The lists of potential customers may be bought or stolen from another company, and used for other purposes, to which the forgery of official companies can be added. Once they own the names and personal and financial information of customers, this can also be used fraudulently, simulating shopping or using the names without authorization, or even forging identity documents or violating databases. Once in possession of the money, scammers use formal or informal financial services, which can be legal or illegal, domestic or international and off shore, to transfer the money to its final destination.

All these procedures, such as the choice of victims, the origin of the money, beneficiaries, destination of the fraud, and methods are kept in great secrecy to prevent the authorities from both discovering the fraud and the amounts involved. For this reason, the requested forms of payment are cash, cheques, bank transfers, bank debit or credit card charging, varying according to the particular situation. Often the money changes hands and form until it reaches the final destination so as to hide personal enrichment and investment in new schemes. Some victims consciously continue to work with the criminals, in the hope of recovering some of the lost money⁶. It has not been demonstrated that the money is used to smuggle weapons or drugs.

Use of violence

Swindling is a type of non-violent fraud, but some groups resort to coercive tactics in victims who do not cooperate. Often violence is perpetrated against members of the group and against other groups.

By way of conclusion

International mass marketing fraud is a global threat to people, companies and financial institutions. By exploring the global financial system, communication networks

⁶ Victims of fraud are exploited to receive and launder money from other victims or to use false financial instruments, make deposits and transfers or agree to use fake cheques, sell stolen goods, or pay for them with stolen credit cards, or export them and act as a guarantor to foreign companies. (p. 23).



and markets, and by hiding the origin of the operations and illicit procedures, this fraud compromises legal businesses as unaware supporters of criminal activities. Organized crime increasingly initiates, facilitates and profits from this fraud, extracting billions of dollars from vulnerable consumers worldwide. Schemes change and adapt to mislead investigations and to respond to consumers who become aware of fraud schemes.

In short, with regard to the nature, scope and impact of Mass Marketing Fraud, researchers warn of this global criminal threat that involves tens of billion dollars per year. For the victims, the danger extends beyond the loss of funds or savings, and may include risks or physical injury, loss of homes, depression and even the possibility of committing suicide.

This fraud has a substantial impact on the economy and markets by undermining consumer confidence and the legitimacy of businesses. This is an international crime conducted by mafia organizations.

On methods and techniques, one can say that it is becoming increasingly international, involving alliances between groups and billions of dollars annually. Victims are contacted by all types of communication (mail, Internet, telephone, TV, radio) and in person, using different resources that the legal authorities find difficult to detect. The fraud covers legal businesses, mailing lists, several types of communication, multiple payment methods, false identity documents and forged financial instruments, including lotteries, cheques, cash and employment contracts. Fraud agents adapt and change methods and techniques quickly to escape justice and suspicious customers, and to reduce the chances of being found out.

Identity and laundering are the crucial points of the schemes, and a disturbing option is to use victims to receive and launder funds or to receive and apply false financial instruments. Being a non-violent criminal activity, violence can be exercised over non-cooperative victims, within criminal groups or between mafia groups.

According to the report, to fight it will require five globally coordinated international measures and the following:

- 1)** expanded capacity to bring together intelligence services to cooperate in all aspects of the scheme and of its participants;
- 2)** develop the capacity to intercept the operations of mass marketing fraud schemes through legal methods (e.g. filing counterfeit documents);
- 3)** educate the public and assist potential victims to recognize fraud and take action to minimize losses;
- 4)** increase effective measures to identify and promptly assist victims with public and private funds;
- 5)** develop coordinated efforts among investigators, law enforcement agencies and regulatory entities to use power of coercion against perpetrators of the mass marketing fraud scheme.



ANNEX: Types of mass marketing fraud (pp.26-29⁷).

Mass marketing fraud includes an extensive array of false and deceptive schemes to steal money from companies and individuals, properties, information or services. Some schemes are well-known, but due to their proven effectiveness, they are recycled and adapted, in nature and implementation, to the target population. The most profitable and efficient are reproduced, as the crime profits from the delay in recognizing the fraudulent proposal. The versions of schemes most frequently reported to authorities and consumer protection agencies in Africa, North America, Australia, and Europe are as follows:

Emergency assistance: The swindler contacts the victim pretending to be a friend or relative of the victim, asking for urgent help, as the victim's family member has been arrested abroad and needs to pay bail, or has had an accident and must repay medical expenses.

Fraudulent acquisitions or warnings to target companies: companies are a favourite target of fraud because the amount of money at stake is higher than that involving fraud with individuals, and because it is easier to deceive an employee. One technique used is the "sham sale": it involves convincing the employee that someone in the company has authorized a purchase and, through false documents and phone calls, requiring payment. A variant is to show up as a vendor from a well-known supplier company and request the return of surplus or defective products, aware of the absence of the sales director or of Internet adverts, to the extent of selling them at higher prices.

Calls for charitable causes: request for false financial contributions taking advantage of touching humanitarian causes, such as environmental issues, disasters, and holidays for special groups. Even if the money is delivered to the cause in question, some of it will be diverted for personal enrichment or other purposes.

Forged cheques (including transfers or powers of attorney): a variety of false lotteries or online auctions involve using false cheques or money to strengthen the look of it being legal transactions. Money or a cheque is sent to the victim as a lottery win or as payment for a high value asset, like a car, so that it can be deposited in the victim's bank account and part of it subsequently transferred to the con person as commission for the "help" given. Sometime later, the bank will inform the victim that the cheque was a fake and that he/she would need to return the entire amount.

A different scheme consists of presenting oneself to an attorney or lawyer as a representative of a foreign company requesting legal assistance to collect arrears. As the representative of the foreign company, the lawyer requests the alleged debtor to pay, receives the corresponding money, and sends the corresponding money to the scammer, after having deducted the legal costs. A variant of the scheme is to show up as the representative of a widow or divorcee and claim the corresponding part of the agreement or inheritance.

⁷ International Mass-Marketing Fraud Working Group, June 2010, *Mass-Marketing Fraud: A Threat Assessment*, <http://www.ice.gov/doclib/cornerstone/pdf/immfta.pdf>



Clairvoyants: Victims are told of an event that will change their lives, in exchange for a prepayment. Seduced by the omen of good fortune or due to threats of setbacks, people agree.

False services companies: Just like the false representations of sale of goods, this scheme involves offering false services, such as Internet and communications, medical services, insurance, energy, cars, immigration and residence permits, financial services such as credit protection, replacement support, debt management etc.

Investments: It is a variant of the *Ponzi*, and consists of fraudulent promises of high returns in exchange for advanced money for the "opportunity to join" or "help" to buy a "bargain", such as shares or interests in businesses, like oil wells, strong currency or jewels, etc.

Lotteries or false games: The impostor presents himself to a person, often with false financial instruments, to convince the victim to pay or advance some money, or to pay the fees and costs, of a supposedly winning lottery ticket or false game.

"Recovering debts": Often posing as lawyers or government or legal representatives, the impostor offers victims the possibility of helping to recover a debt in exchange for advanced payment of expenses.

Romance: the victim is picked up in a social networking site to fake a romantic interest. Once the relationship and the affection are secure, the victim is asked for cash or marketable goods amidst regular intimate conversations and exchange of gifts. Some victims have reported having sent money to obtain travel documents and buy the airfare ticket, pay for a hospital stay to recuperate from illness, help a charity programme or assist the impostor to recover from a financial difficulty. Since all these schemes represent heavy psychological burdens for the victims, they end up emotionally shattered.

Sales of goods by false representatives: A range of false schemes leads potential buyers to purchase products or services over the Internet: auctions, catalogues, purchase orders, classified ads, etc. It is a purchase promise, often at reduced prices or to companies "in trouble", of goods that never arrive, or arrive but are defective, or are different from what had been promised, or have a lower value than that charged. The product or service can be virtually anything: technologies such as iPhones, digital cameras or video game consoles are the most popular. Other products include pets, specialist journals, job vacancies, holidays, health products, precious stones, and metal surpluses. Often victims are invoiced and requested to pay compensation or charged with legal action to collect the fraudulent debt. There is still the case when the legal website of the product is used to offer the victim a second chance, but payment is then made using a dubious form of payment or bank transfer.

Sale of overpriced goods: In this scam, the scammer sends fraudulent payments using false documents or money to buy expensive products or services, such as cars, computers or electronic goods. Generally, payment is higher than the cost of the product, and the scammer asks the seller to deposit it and transfer the difference to him electronically. Sometimes stolen credit cards are used. The authorities have noticed that often these companies hire criminals to recover the large amounts at stake.



How to cite this Note

Tapia, René (2012). "Organized crime makes swindling go global". Notes, *JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, N.º 1, Spring 2012. Consulted [online] on date of last visit, observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol3_n1_not4

Critical Review

Dunoff, Jeffrey; Trachtman, Joel (eds.) (2009). *Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

by Mateus Kowalski*

mateus.kowalski@gmail.com

PhD student in International Politics and Conflict Resolution at Universidade de Coimbra, holder of a Master Degree in International Law and of a Bachelor Degree in Law. Author of articles and papers on the Theory of International Law, the UN system, human rights, and security issues. Guest lecturer at Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa, where he is a researcher in the field of international criminal justice (Observatory for External Relations), and at Universidade Aberta. Legal adviser to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Portugal, in the field of International Law

Global constitutionalism emerges as a legal response to globalization. By recognizing that globalization has given a global expression to certain phenomena that extend beyond the sphere of the state, this doctrine proposes mechanisms that give them global regulation towards the formation of a universal public order. Basically, the proposal of global constitutionalism offers a normative compensation to the state constitutional deficits induced by globalization¹. This is a structural debate which, although still discussed within the theory international law for the most part, has broad implications in the organization and governance of international society. It is in this sense that Allott notes that «the problem behind international constitutionalism is the core challenge facing internationalist philosophers in the twenty first century»².

The book *Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance* provides a starting point to put this current important debate into context and to extend it to other fields such as International Relations.

Organized by Jeffrey Dunoff – professor of International Law at Temple University – and by Joel Trachtman – professor of International Law at Tufts University –, this collective work brings together contributions from thirteen prestigious authors, a total of thirteen chapters organized into three distinct parts³. The first part⁴ sets global

* The author wishes to thank the Calouste Gulbenkian Foundation for the support given to the PhD in International Politics and Conflict Resolution he is carrying out at the University of Coimbra.

¹ Peters, Anne (2009). «The Merits of Global Constitutionalism». *Indiana Journal of Global Legal Studies*. 16(2): 397-411.

² Allott, Philip (2001). «The Emerging Universal Legal System». *International Law Forum*. 3(1): 12-17, 16.

³ In addition to the preface by Thomas Franck - «International Institutions: Why Constitutionalize?».

⁴ Contributions from: Jeffrey Dunoff, Joel Trachtman - «A Functional Approach to International Constitutionalization» (3-35); David Kennedy - «The Mystery of Global Governance» (37-68); Andreas Paulus - «The International Legal System as a Constitution» (69-109).



constitutionalism into context while proposing an analytical framework for progressing the debate. The second part⁵ examines the constitutional aspects of a few specific international systems often mentioned in the literature as examples of global constitutionalism: the United Nations, the European Union and the World Trade Organization. Finally, the third part⁶ looks at some cross-cutting issues that inform this debate: relationship with state constitutionalism, constitutional pluralism and the democratic legitimacy of constitutionalism beyond the state.

A fundamental question arises immediately in the analysis of global constitutionalism: "why constitutionalize?" This is actually a question that Thomas Franck asks right in the preface. The answer may lie in the need to complement national constitutionalism and adapt it to the global situation, which states cannot address by themselves. The dilution of the power of the state into other political levels beyond its own, the increasingly stronger demand for the globalization of democracy, development, and of respect for human rights, chained to the practice of "good governance", trigger new constituent impulses that complement and reverse national constitutional systems. The creation of a constitutionalized global public order would thus be an imperative of reason. It is in this sense that Andreas Paulus recognizes the potential of global constitutionalism so that the world is governed by rules of law that go beyond the logic of power.

Although there may be an intrinsic goodness transmitted by the followers of this doctrine, which aims to organize international society according to international standards and principles characteristic of state constitutional orders that limit power and guarantee fundamental rights, the answer to the question "why constitutionalize?" does not end here. First, this is because this doctrinal construction is also a reflection of the anxiety that informs current international law regarding its nature and its value. As Jeffrey Dunoff warns, the "constitutional discourse" may be a defence reaction of internationalist jurists. On the other hand, the structuring power of liberalism is currently present in International Law⁷. Accordingly, as underlined by Joel Trachtman using the World Trade Organization as an example, constitutionalization also stems from an increasing need to produce International Law that promotes liberalization. It is in this sense that David Kennedy draws attention to the fact that the "metaphor" of constitutionalism runs the risk of offering an institutional platform leading to the spread of universal ethics, when ethical pluralism is what is required.

The existence of a global constitutional order is, nevertheless, a premise of this doctrine. As Bardo Fassbender points out, this is not a creation exercise, rather a revelation or rediscovery (and, it should be added, eventual progressive development). Instead, David Kennedy defends that the global constitutional order has yet to be

⁵ Contributions from: Michael Doyle - «The UN Charter - a Global Constitution?» (113-132); Bardo Fassbender - «Rediscovering a Forgotten Constitution: Notes on the Place of the UN Charter in the International Legal Order» (133-147); Neil Walker - «Reframing EU Constitutionalism» (149-176); Jeffrey Dunoff - «The Politics of Internationalism Constitutions: The Curious Case of the World Trade Organization»; Joel Trachtman - «Constitutional Economics of the World Trade Organization» (206-229).

⁶ Contributions from: Stephen Gardbaum - «Human Rights and International Constitutionalism» (233-257); Mathias Kumm - «The Cosmopolitan Turn in Constitutionalism: On the Relationship between Constitutionalism in and beyond the State» (258-324); Daniel Halberstam - «Constitutional Heterarchy: The Centrality of Conflict in the European Union and the United States» (326-355); Miguel Poiras Maduro - «Courts and Pluralism: Essay on a Theory of Judicial Adjudication in the Context of Legal and Constitutional Pluralism» (356-379); Samantha Besson - «Whose Constitution(s)? International Law, Constitutionalism, and Democracy» (381-407).

⁷ Koskenniemi, Martti (2005). *From Apology to Utopia: The Structure of International Legal Argument*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.



created. In any case, the work assumes that premise and presents three examples traditionally identified in the literature as manifestations of global constitutionalism. The first example goes back to the United Nations Charter. Both Michael Doyle and Bardo Fassbender, departing from a somehow formal exercise of comparing the Charter with the "constitution-type" (the state one), see the United Nations Charter as the "constitution of the international community". This is a structural issue to which this doctrine, understandably, pays special attention. The possibility of the United Nations Charter taking this status permits not only seeing the Charter as the matrix of international public order, but also considering the United Nations as the centre of global governance. Secondly, the European Union is often invoked as a model of constitutionalism beyond the state, which Neil Walker and also Daniel Halberstam refer to. However, it has also been argued, with some assertiveness, that it cannot serve as a model for global constitutionalism due to its specificities and unique characteristics – it is a regional process based on political and cultural consensus⁸. Moreover, the present integration political crisis that the European Union is experiencing attests how difficult it is to "constitutionalize" beyond the state. Finally, the third example refers to the World Trade Organization. Whereas Joel Trachtman acknowledges that it is part of the international constitutional matrix, Jeffrey Dunoff, in turn, adopts a slightly more cautious stance, refusing that the Organization may be considered a constitutionalized entity, whilst accepting that it might be seen as such when there is greater openness and participation. In addition to these three examples, it would be relevant if the book also paid particular attention to the International Criminal Court and to the Security Council as a reflection of the trend towards the creation of "organs of sovereignty" in the context of global public order.

One of the major challenges facing global constitutionalism is the constant (but impossible) comparison, even competition, with state constitutionalism. To overcome the difficulties stemming from this, Mathias Kumm introduces a new paradigm in the discourse on constitutionalism – cosmopolitanism. Thus, constitutionalism would be conceived within a cosmopolitan dimension, not merely state-based. This would pave the way for a pluralist perspective of global public order regarding the relationship between the domestic law of states and international law, overcoming the insufficient and conflicting explanations offered by monistic and dualistic theories. It is along these lines that Stephen Gardbaum concludes that the international system of human rights does not merely replicate the catalogue of fundamental rights of state constitutions: There is a difference between the rights of individuals and the rights of citizens of a state. Similarly, Miguel Poiares Maduro argues that courts should adapt their ways of reasoning and their institutional role to the new constitutional context in which they operate. The ever-present and much debated question of the legitimacy of International Law can also find new ways here. In this regard, Samantha Besson mentions the advantage of a pluralistic form of legitimacy inherent to international constitutionalism, as it requires the implementation of democratic and constitutional requirements at national, regional and international levels.

The book *Ruling the World?* is an interesting contribution to our understanding of global governance in the language of constitutionalism. This is a doctrine that, in itself, is a demanding theoretical exercise. However, the intellectual appeal of the global

⁸ Peters, Anne (2006). «Compensatory Constitutionalism: The Function and Potential of Fundamental International Norms and Structures». *Leiden Journal of International Law*. 19: 579-610.



constitutionalism project must be restrained by an vigilant critical exercise. First, because in the current framework of international social relations, the project risks enhancing the dynamic of the logics of power, which already influence more or less institutionalized, more or less informal mechanisms of international social relations. In this case, the intention of limiting power and creating an international dynamic underpinned by law could instead be co-opted – perhaps naively – by other type of prevailing power interactions. It might even become a Leviathan hidden under a cloak of legitimacy conferred by international law. It is worth recalling Zolo’s scathing criticism to the thesis he dubbed “cosmopolitan law”⁹. The author draws attention to the fact that the disparity between the elite of the few rich and powerful countries and the mass of weak and poor countries cannot be solved simply by resorting to “instruments of institutional engineering and even less through the tools of ‘global constitutionalism’”¹⁰. Zolo stresses that even the most liberal and democratic form of global constitutionalism will remain a fiction, since the bodies with coercive power in the context of international order coincide with the military structure formed by a small group of powers that are exempt from any judicial control.

In this book there is an apparent intention to undertake an open discussion on global constitutionalism – the very question in the title *Ruling the World?* seems to indicate it. However, the work is in fact representative of the debate taking place within this doctrine, and does not really leave way for fracturing opinions that challenge its own fundamentals or purposes. Most of the authors who contributed to the work are followers of the global constitutionalism doctrine. Although their perspectives do not always coincide, despite some critical stances almost all see global constitutionalism as a valid route to explore (with the exception of the ultra-sceptical view of David Kennedy, which contrasts sharply with that of others).

On the other hand, while addressing a topic that is based on the idea of supporting a paradigm that tends to be universal, the book reflects a distinctly “western” vision, in that the authors are all from the U.S. and Europe. *Ruling the World?* is an important contribution to the debate on global constitutionalism. However, it is also true that this work does not provide a definitive answer to the question that is its title.

How to cite this Critical Review

Kowalski, Mateus (2012). Critical Review of Dunoff, Jeffrey; Trachtman, Joel (eds.) (2009). *Ruling the World? Constitutionalism, International Law, and Global Governance*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, *JANUS.NET e-journal of International Relations*, Vol. 3, No. 1, Spring 2012. Accessed [online] on date of last view, observare.ual.pt/janus.net/en_vol3_n1_rec1

⁹ Zolo, Danilo (1997). *Cosmopolis: Prospects for World Government*. Cambridge: Polity Press.

¹⁰ *Ibidem*, 121.