
FROM PRESSURE GROUP TO SOCIAL MOVEMENT: ORGANIZATIONAL
DILEMMAS OF THE EFFORT TO PROMOTE NUCLEAR POWER

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From Pressure Group to Social Movement: Organizational
Dilemmas of the Effort to Promote Nuclear Power

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In the division of labor within the social sciences, sociologists deal more with social movements and political scientists deal more with pressure groups. Yet both would agree that pressure groups and social movements seek to influence governmental policy. The difference between social movements and pressure groups is not often explicitly discussed, but there are at least two key differences (Tilly 1978; Gamson 1975). First pressure groups are ordinarily part of the "polity," the set of groups that can routinely influence government decisions and can insure that their interests are normally recognized in the decision making process. In contrast, social movements are launched by groups without access to state power, and whose interests are generally not recognized in government policy making. Second, when pressure groups take actions to influence the government, they normally rely on a previously mobilized constituency. Social movements attempt to mobilize a constituency which is not already mobilized.

A social movement organization becomes a pressure group when it gains routine representation in and access to the government. The new member of the polity may still use the rhetoric of a social movement, but in actual behavior and tactical form the movement resembles other groups in the polity. It moves from outside to inside the legislative and administrative arenas. Much of the sociological interpretation of the transformation of social movements emphasizes the routinization, institutionalization, and growing conservatism of the organizations that once led vital social movements (See Zald and Ash 1966 for a more complete treatment). Thus, the NAACP, the AFL-CIO, the Farm Bureau become accepted members of the polity with varying residual attachment to social movement rhetoric and movement forms.

Much less attention has been given to the opposite process, in which polity members lose their standing. In this process, authorities begin to distance themselves from the polity members. Authorities are no longer routinely accessible, and the interests of the polity members are increasingly disregarded. One option

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for a pressure group in this situation is to transform itself into a social movement.

We posit that pressure groups lose their position through two different though related processes. In the first, societal change in technology, in economic organization, and in values lead to a general loss of status for a pressure group and the interests they represent. Thus, a decline in public support for prohibition and temperance led to a decline in the power of groups that favored prohibition. In the second process, interests groups and its claims are subject to direct attack. Challenger groups attack the legitimacy of the current status and operation of the pressure group and the interests they represent. Where a pressure group has public standing and a claim to represent legitimate social interests, the attack by a challenger group requires self-defense. The two processes described are related because the evolution of the first process facilitates the development of the direct challenges.

This paper treats the development of the pronuclear movement as a case of the transformation from pressure group to social movement. The term "pronuclear movement" is here used to refer to the collective effort to promote utilization of nuclear power as an energy source. The data for this analysis are drawn from semi-structured interviews of 58 pronuclear activists. The interviews were conducted in the fall of 1979 and the winter of 1980. We used a snowballing-sampling technique to generate the final sample. Most interviews were conducted in the New England, Michigan, and the Washington, D.C. areas. We also attended several pronuclear workshops and conferences. This gave us the opportunity to informally talk with activists from around the country. The workshops also allowed us to monitor discussions among pronuclear activists. In addition, we collected and analyzed materials issued by the pronuclear movement, as well as newspaper and magazine articles relevant to the controversy. Finally, we conducted interviews

with a small sample of antinuclear activists in the New England, Michigan, and the Washington, D.C. areas.

The remainder of this paper is divided into three sections. In the first, we examine the transformation of the pronuclear forces from a pressure group to a social movement. We argue that this transformation occurred in part because of a challenge posed by the antinuclear movement. We also analyze the pronuclear movement's several different bases of mobilization. In the second section, we argue that the mobilization problems of a protest group vary with the group's basis of mobilization and its position in the social structure. In a final section, we examine the pronuclear movements' effort to damage the antinuclear movement.

FROM PRESSURE GROUP TO SOCIAL MOVEMENT

In this section, we examine the transformation of the pronuclear forces from a pressure group to a social movement. We argue that the pronuclear movement developed in part out of a struggle against the antinuclear movement over the right to determine governmental policy on nuclear energy. The term "antinuclear" movement is here used to refer to the organized, collective effort that seeks to stop the generation of energy from nuclear fission. Sub-goals of the movement include halting the construction of new plants, closing down existing plants, and implementing strict safety standards for the disposal of radioactive waste material and the operation of reactors.

The antinuclear movement first emerged as a serious protest movement in the late 1960s (Gyorgy 1979; Wasserman 1980; Berger 1977; Mazur 1975). Since then, it has grown dramatically in size and intensity. Local citizen groups, at first confined to a few isolated organizations, are now numerous. National and regional protest rallies have drawn hundreds of thousands. Hundreds have used civil disobedience tactics against nuclear power plant construction. Major anti-

nuclear demonstrations have occurred, for example, in Seabrook, New Hampshire, Rock Flats, Colorado, and the area around Three Mile Island (Wasserman 1979; Stever 1980; Walsh 1980).

During the past five years, the antinuclear movement has been winning its struggle against nuclear power. The best evidence for this is the erosion of government support for the nuclear industry and the current state of near-collapse of the industry. During the 1950s and 1960s, the government strongly supported nuclear development through direct government subsidies and other promotional measures (Bupp and Derian 1978; Montgomery and Quirk 1978). For example, in the mid-1950s utility companies were unwilling to invest large sums of capital in nuclear generating equipment. The utilities' reluctance arose primarily from concern over their financial liability in the event of an accident. In response, Congress in 1957 placed a ceiling of \$560 million on a firm's liability for any one accident. Reactor orders soon followed (Weingart 1980, p. 242).

By the early 1970s, however, federal, state and local governments began to implement a series of measures that seriously undercut the industry's economic viability. The various levels of government promulgated stricter safety regulations; delayed the licensing of new plants; failed to implement an atomic waste disposal system; refused to provide utilities the rate increases necessary to finance nuclear construction; restricted foreign sales of nuclear generators; and tightened environmental restraints (Stroops, Copland and Sieminski 1979; Weingart 1980, Temples, 1980; Stobaugh and Yergin 1979). According to one estimate, two-thirds of the cost of a nuclear power plant finished in 1978 was a result of stricter design criteria imposed since 1969 by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and its predecessor, the Atomic Energy Commission (AEC) (*Fortune* 5/7/77, pp. 117-118).

The current precarious state of the industry is highlighted by several factors. First, since 1977, there has been a de facto moratorium on orders for

new nuclear plants in the United States (Stobaugh and Yergin 1979, p. 125). According to one analysis, the long-term viability of the plant construction industry requires that utilities place at least four to six plant orders per year (Stroops, Copland and Sieminski 1979, p. 17). Second, there has been a reduction in the U.S. share of the nuclear export market from 100% in 1972 to 20% in 1978 (Stroops, Copland and Sieminski 1979, p. 17; Stockton and Janke 1978, p. 4). Finally, the industry is finding it difficult to attract and retain well-trained personnel, which may "lead to a fatal debilitation of research and management capability" (Stroops, Copland, and Sieminski 1979, p. 18).²

In sum, during the 1950s and 1960s, the nuclear industry was a "member of the polity", in the sense that its interests were promoted by the government

²Bernard Cohen, a prominent nuclear physicist, recently emphasized the impending crisis in the industry: "Up to 1973 [the industry] got lots of orders which they're still working on. But they've had very few new orders for plants since 1973. As I see it, the critical time will be about 1981. If there's not a substantial influx of new orders by then, there will be massive layoffs in the nuclear industry, and all the experts in various aspects of the nuclear system will find work in other areas. And once that happens, it would take a very long time to reassemble them" (Cohen 1979, p. 14).

and its views were taken into account.³ During the 1970s, the status became threatened, as the anti-nuclear power movement grew and as authorities at both the state and national level adopted policies inimical to the interest of the industry. In response, both the nuclear power industry and industry sympathizers mobilized.

Mobilization and the Pronuclear Movement

At the beginning of the 1970s, lawyers and lobbyists carried forth the effort to promote nuclear power. Hearings on the licensing of nuclear power plants were usually uncontested and routine. The industry's several trade associations, such as the Atomic Industrial Forum and the American Nuclear Energy Council, maintained active lobbying offices in Washington. In addition, various nuclear architect-engineering firms, reactor manufacturers, and uranium mining firms lobbied for nuclear power. Many of the industry's lobbyists were former Congressmen or staff members of the government agencies that regulated nuclear power. For

³Whether the new Reagan administration will reverse this trend remains to be seen.

Although Reagan advocates increased reliance on nuclear power, industry is concerned that it will not receive the needed fiscal and other types of support from the government. An editorial in American Nuclear Society's Nuclear News, for example, states "Ronald Reagan's platform would take the wraps off nuclear and would give the private sector room to maneuver in this arena. Nonetheless, [the Reagan administration may] turn thumbs down on massive federal subsidies for such things as enrichment and processing plants and for large demo breeder and fusion reactors. Private industry obviously cannot build these things alone, and without them, nuclear is a short-term option" (Nuclear News 10/1980).

example, the director of the American Nuclear Energy Council, Craig Hosner, was former chairman of the Congressional Joint Atomic Energy Committee (Temples 1980, p. 244; Berger 1976, p. 168). There was little attempt to influence public opinion, except through occasional "public service" advertisements placed by industry. Professional engineers and scientists might belong to professional associations, but their focus was largely on technical issues, oriented to member education and technical research. Popular support was not mobilized to defend nuclear power and attack those opposed to nuclear power. The growth of the pronuclear movement involved the mobilization of several different kinds of social movement organizations.

Before describing these organizations, it is important to examine the factors identified by social movement analysts that inhibit or facilitate mobilization. Some analysts use a "community-solidarity" model, while others employ a "professional mobilization model", often posing these models as alternative explanations of the same phenomenon (Perrow 1979). In the community solidarity model, an approach akin to the classical approach to collective behavior, grievances are hypothesized as being transformed into mobilized activity on the basis of solidarity amongst a collectivity (See Fireman and Gamson 1979). Analysts argue that a group's solidarity and ability to act collectively increases if its members have intra-group friendship and kinship ties, participate in the same production organizations and voluntary associations, share a common culture, maintain a common set of subordinate and superordinate relations with outsiders, and lack means of exit from the group (Fireman and Gamson 1979).

Community solidarity provides a basis for mobilization in two ways (Fireman and Gamson 1979). First, when an individual's life is intertwined with that of others in a group, he or she will develop a sense of loyalty to the group. The individual is then likely to help those members when called upon to act

collectively. Second, individuals integrated into group activity are likely to develop a sense that their group is entitled to certain collective goods as a matter of right or justice. Individuals can be mobilized on the basis of their commitment to groups entitlements that are at stake in a protest movement (Fireman and Gamson 1979, p. 26).

Thus, according to the community solidarity model, the degree of solidarity is the central factor affecting a group's ability to mobilize. Traugott (1979, p. 43) goes so far as to argue that "bonds of positive solidarity are so essential to social movements as to constitute one of their defining characteristics." Organizers attempt to strengthen, harass, and only as a last resort create new bonds of solidarity within a community (Fireman and Gamson 1979).

The professional mobilization model differs from the community mobilization model in two main respects. First, professional mobilization theorists begin not with solidarity or grievances, but with organizations and entrepreneurs, individuals who take the lead in defining issues and/or mobilizing resources. Without denying that solidarity may be a factor that affects mobilization, they assume that in some cases movement organizations may mobilize resources from a variety of sources, including isolated individuals, foundations, and churches. Moreover, movement entrepreneurs may integrate participation in movements with careers. A second difference between the community and professional mobilization models concerns the role of mass participation. Since community solidarity provides the basis of mobilization, popular participation is an intrinsic part of the community mobilization theory. In the professional mobilization model, the leadership may or may not seek to involve a mass constituency. Leaders may attempt to create the impression of a popular membership, when, in fact, "the membership may be non-existent or existing only on paper" (McCarthy and Zald 1973, pp.).

In this paper, we posit two sub-types of professional mobilization. We

term the phenomenon described by McCarthy and Zald "entrepreneurial" mobilization, which can be distinguished from what is here defined as "establishment mobilization." The core of the entrepreneurial mobilization model is a distinction among the aggrieved population, the sources of movement leadership and activities, and supporters of the movement (Tilly 1978, p. 29). According to McCarthy and Zald (1973), the aggrieved population may have little or no role in the mobilization process. Instead, "social movement entrepreneurs" create careers as movement activists who take actions on behalf of those aggrieved. For example, a professional staff organized the Citizens' Crusade Against Poverty (CCAP), a 1960s anti-poverty movement (McCarthy and Zald 1973, p. 21). CCAP operated with no involvement whatsoever of poor Americans. Such a mobilization process is typically sponsored by two sources. Established institutions, such as government or foundations, may provide funds and other support for these efforts. CCAP, for example, drew its support from foundations. Other techniques used to obtain support include direct-mail and media advertising to isolated potential supporters (McCarthy and Zald 1977).

A second type of professional mobilization is here defined as "establishment" mobilization. In this process, established institutions, such as business, churches or political elites, are the central actors. Mobilization begins when an established organization makes a commitment to the undertaking of non-institutionalized actions. The organization changes its goals from the performance of a specific non-movement societal function to the accomplishment of a change in society beyond this particularized organizational function. For example, if Catholic Bishops and Cardinals promote organizations to fight abortion laws, or if Protestant ministers create political organizations to resist challenges to church authority, we would consider them cases of establishment mobilization. In these cases established institutions commit personnel to efforts to accomplish social change and train

them in the use of non-institutionalized tactics. The established institution develops new, though affiliated, organizations to make use of these tactics in pursuit of social change.

Now we describe several pronuclear organizations. Each of the mobilization models described above suggests a different organizational origin and dependencies. The establishment version of the professional mobilization model would suggest a focus on the mobilization that might occur within the nuclear industry, defined here as the firms that build, purchase, or supply nuclear plants and their components and these firms' trade associations. The model would suggest that the movement organizations would be staffed by industry employees. The entrepreneurial version of the professional mobilization model would suggest that the pronuclear activists would be professional organizers seeking to mobilize around grievances asserted on behalf of an inchoate constituency--perhaps deprived citizens of the alleged benefits of nuclear power production--and deriving their funds from such sources as the nuclear industry and isolated nuclear supporters. Finally, the community model would suggest that the central force behind the movement would be community based, solidaristic groups. As we shall see, each of the mobilization models describes different parts of the pronuclear movement.

The New Hampshire Voice of Energy (NHVOE), a group with a working class and non-professional middle class membership and leadership, appears to fit the community mobilization model. The organization began in 1975 when a group of Manchester, New Hampshire housewives, who had known one another for several year, complained to the local utility about a proposed rate hike (Interview Nos. 6 and 13).⁴ A utility executive met with the group, and told its members that the construction of a new and controversial nuclear plant in the area would help stabilize the cost of electricity. After researching the issue, the group established a pronuclear organization. The group has since grown primarily

⁴ Interview numbers refer to transcripts of semi-structured interviews which are in our files.

through friendship and kinship networks, and the initial group of housewives has remained the core activists (Interview Nos. 6 and 13). The group's headquarters is the home of one of the members. NHVOE gained national prominence in 1977, when it sponsored the country's first pronuclear demonstration, attended by over 3000 people (New York Times 6/27/77).

The community mobilization model characterized many aspects of the NHVOE. Individuals participated in the movement in order to defend the perceived interests of their own group's members. Participants were drawn into the movement through networks of kinship and social relations.

Most of the members of a similar group, the Massachusetts Voice of Energy (MVOE) are nuclear engineers in a single architect-engineering firm or nuclear engineering graduate students at a single Boston-area university (Interview Nos. 4, 5, 10, 12 and 25). The community mobilization model, rather than the superficially appropriate professional mobilization model, applies to the MVOE for two reasons. First, neither the firm nor the university sponsors the group or encourages participation in it. Top management in the firm, in fact, has attempted to dissuade employees from participating. Since only a small fraction of the firm's business is nuclear-related, management fears that the political controversy arising from employee participation may jeopardize its other business. One respondent reported that he felt an expected promotion had been delayed by his pronuclear activities, and another resigned from the firm because of management "harassment" for MVOE activities (Interview No. 23). The university provides no special support to the campus MVOE branch (Interview No. 25). Second, mobilization has taken place primarily through friendship networks. The students are a closely knit group, who all work together in the same study-office area. Most of the engineers were friendly with one another before the establishment of MVOE.

Among other activities, MVOE has testified in state legislative and regulatory

hearings, established a pronuclear speakers bureau, and sponsored such events as the dumping of empty barrels into Boston Harbor to dramatize U.S. dependence on foreign oil.

Another pronuclear organization, the Committee for Energy Awareness (CEA), was formed shortly after the Three Mile Island accident. CEA was launched and is funded by the industry's two major trade associations, the Atomic Industrial Forum (AIF) and the Edison Electric Institute (EEI). Established in 1953, AIF has over 800 members from all sectors of the nuclear industry (Atomic Industrial Forum 1979). EEI is an association of the 200 largest investor-owned utilities, most of which operate nuclear power plants (Berger 1977, p. 144). Organized under a steering committee of eight senior industry executives, CEA is staffed by public relations experts on temporary loan from the trade associations and nuclear firms. The current chief of staff, for example, is on-leave from AIF. CEA's activities have included sponsoring a "Truth Squad" of two nuclear engineers that followed antinuclear activists Jane Fonda and Tom Hayden on their 1979 nationwide tour, in an effort to publicize rebuttals to their arguments; organizing a pronuclear advertising campaign; publishing a newsletter, Energy Upbeat for pronuclear advocacy groups nationwide; organizing editorial roundtables for major newspaper and magazines on nuclear issues; sponsoring a retreat in April, 1980 for selected pronuclear leaders from around the country; and creating a communications plan to assure the flow of "accurate" information from a nuclear plant in the event of an accident (Interview No. 7).

The development of CEA is consistent with the establishment mobilization model. The nuclear industry sponsors the organization, and its staff are industry employees.

Another organization, Nuclear Energy Women (NEW), is composed primarily of women employed in the industry. NEW's staff director works for AIF, and her

office is in the association's Washington headquarters. AIF requires NEW to regularly report and justify its activities to AIF management (Interview No. 1). The group's most successful project, "Nuclear Energy Education Day", involved more than 4,000 "energy coffees" held in private homes nationwide (Cook 1979). Other activities have included the establishment of a speakers bureau and the unsuccessful attempt to persuade women organizations, such as the National Organization of Women and the League of Women Voters, to reserve their antinuclear positions (Interview No. 9). NEW is a second example of establishment mobilization. The organization was created by and is directly dependent upon the nuclear industry. NEW members are paid for their participation in the movement.

Several nuclear industry firms have become involved in the pronuclear movement, and thus represent further instances of establishment mobilization. Westinghouse Corporation, a major supplier of nuclear plant equipment, has been particularly active. In 1975, Westinghouse established a "Nuclear Information Program" to help promote public and government support of nuclear power (Cook 1980, pp. 16-19). One of the groups activities, the "Campus America" program, sends highly trained and well-rehearsed Westinghouse employees to debate anti-nuclear activists on college campuses (Interview No. 48). If necessary, Westinghouse will pay the expenses of antinuclear debators (Fortune 1/28/80).

In another activity, Westinghouse commissioned a research firm, Cambridge Reports, Inc., to conduct longitudinal national surveys on attitudes toward nuclear power. The surveys are designed to help pronuclear forces do a more effective job of communicating their "message to the American public" (Interview No. 49). For example, the Cambridge surveys have revealed that support for nuclear power is lowest among women, blacks, and young people. Drawing on the survey findings, Cambridge Associates has specified the arguments and channels of influence that are most effective in reaching these three groups. Finally,

Westinghouse management encourages the active involvement in the pronuclear effort of the company's 140,000 employees, particularly the 13,000 to 15,000 who work in the nuclear division. Employees receive a monthly news magazine outlining the types of pronuclear activities in which their colleagues have been involved, and listing upcoming events. Employees are urged to participate in town meetings and all other forums that provide an opportunity to promote nuclear power. T-shirts with the slogan "Nuclear Power, Safer Than Sex" are provided to employees at a nominal cost (Energy Daily 8/16/78).

Another pronuclear group, Energy Research Group (ERG), is a Boston-based engineering-consulting firm. The firm was organized several years ago by five MIT graduates, and has been active in the pronuclear movement at both the regional and national levels. ERG has served as a consultant to many of New England's pronuclear organizations. ERG provides advice on how to deal with the media, organize public forums, and research decision makers (Interview No. 28). At the national level, ERG conducted the CEA-sponsored retreat mentioned above, and was partly responsible for the organization of the pronuclear movement's Second National Conference on Energy Advocacy held in June, 1980. In addition, ERG has drafted several important pronuclear movement documents. One, commissioned by CEA, detailed how industry has and can be involved in the pronuclear movement (Interview No. 28). Another, distributed by the Atomic Industrial Forum, outlined proposed politically effective strategies available to utility companies in the event of a plant-site occupation by antinuclear demonstrators (Goldsmith and Shants 1978).

The entrepreneurial mobilization model describes many characteristics of ERG. The group provides individuals an opportunity to have careers as movement organizers. The staff is professionally trained. ERG does not qualify as an instance of

establishment mobilization, however, since it is located outside of the nuclear industry.

A final group, Americans for Nuclear Energy (AFNE), advertises itself as the nation's largest pronuclear organization. The entrepreneurial model explains most aspects of AFNE, in that a small staff makes the group's decisions and the mass membership has little real role (Interview No. 49). AFNE's 15,000 members have been recruited almost exclusively through mail solicitation, and membership entails no more than payment of \$15.00 dues and checking agreement with a printed pronuclear statement. A staff of only two decides the organization's policies and activities in most instances. On only one occasion has the staff attempted to activate the membership, by organizing a mass mail-in of form postcards in opposition to a Carter NRC appointment.

In sum, the pronuclear movement has developed on the basis of both community and two types of professional mobilization. The existence of these two forms of mobilization has given rise to two distinct sectors in the movement. One, the "professional" sector, emerged from the nuclear industry and mobilizing entrepreneurs. The second, the "community" sector, was initiated by individuals integrated into community-based groups.

PRONUCLEAR MOVEMENT AND PROBLEMS OF MOBILIZATION

In this section, we discuss the mobilization problems of the pronuclear movement. Previous work on the strategies of protest groups has tended to assume that the mobilization problems faced by different types of groups are analytically parallel (Cf. Gamson 1975). We argue, however, that the problems faced by a movement vary in accordance with its position in the social structure. The analysis is organized around four analytic themes.

First we examine the problems in achieving movement legitimacy. Second, we explore the availability of infrastructure supports to a movement. Third, we

analyze the tactical constraints on a social movement. Fourth, we analyze the strategic advantages of a centralized versus decentralized movement structure.

Movement Legitimacy

We first analyze the pronuclear movement's effort to achieve movement legitimacy, which we postulate has two components. "legitimacy of numbers" is a showing that significant numbers of internally disciplined and committed people seek an alternative distribution of power. This concept of legitimacy is based on Tilly's (1978 p. 125; 1976 p. 25) argument that all polities establish tests of membership. Among these tests is the ability of a group to mobilize significant number of internally disciplined people who seek an alternative distribution of power. Especially in systems of parliamentary representation, polity members will allow into their ranks challenger groups that are able to mobilize large numbers of people. To do otherwise, risks further and potentially more serious challenges to the regime. Thus, legitimacy in the first sense is the showing that a committed and mobilized citizenry support political change.

"Legitimacy of means" is the existence of the belief that a movement is an appropriate vehicle to achieve its constituents' goals. A movement not only must justify its goals, but also justify its modus operandi as a social movement. Legitimacy of means helps a movement recruit new members, gain access to the media, and make government repression less likely and effective (Rimlinger, 1970; Zald and Ash; 1966). We next argue that the professional and community sectors of the pronuclear movement face disparate problems in securing both types of legitimacy.

Legitimacy of Numbers and the Pronuclear Movement--We asked each respondent to identify the major problems encountered by his or her group. Activists in the community mobilization groups reported their most pressing problems to be a shortage of resources, such as money, time and organizing skills (Interview Nos. 4, 5, 10

11, 13, 15, 17). Some groups, for example, could not afford office rent, and were thus forced to locate their headquarters in a member's house. Others reported that they lack important skills, such as the ability to deal with the media. Most participants complained that the demands made on their time by family and work obligations often precluded the accomplishment of movement tasks. The activists' perception that they are unable to acquire sufficient resources is evidenced by their frequent and bitter complaints about the resources allegedly controlled by the antinuclear movement. According to the pronuclear activists, the antinuclear groups have ample money, donated by musicians and foundations; time, since its members do not work or will work for the movement at subsistent wages; and organizing skills, since many of its members participated in other movements of the 1960s and 1970s. Pronuclear activists see themselves as far less fortunate.

The community sector's lack of key resources seriously inhibits its mobilization efforts. This in turn undercuts this sector's legitimacy, since it cannot adequately muster the appearance of a well-organized and widely-supported effort.

Respondents in the professional sector reported a very different set of problems. In most cases, the professional mobilization groups have more than adequate organizational and monetary resources to do their work. CEA, for example, has an operating budget of \$1.6 million (Public Utilities Fortnightly 11/6/80). Energy Research Group has a well-equipped and professionally-administered office, and a politically experienced and sophisticated professional staff. This sector's major challenge is the need to demonstrate that the movement is not merely a paper organization or a self-aggrandizing industry group. As a CEA organizing manual states:

(Government) officials rationalize that people who support energy development do so primarily to protect corporate investments or employment opportunities and therefore

discount their opinions (Committee for Energy Awareness 1980, p. 1).

The professional sector thus needs to create the image that a sincere, committed citizenry supports its efforts.

The nature of the respective legitimacy problems of the two sectors suggests a basis of cooperation between them. The professional sector is rich in resources, but lacks sincere citizens; the reverse holds true for the community sector. The CEA organizers' manual describes the nuclear industry's efforts to assist the community sector:

Citizens can provide credible, non-industry spokespersons able to reach decision makers, educate the public and challenge the opposition more effectively than industry. Their pro-energy messages are better received and often their actions can be more attention getting than corporate activities...Industry can plan a significant role in supporting citizen activities. In fact, a number of very successful activities have been conducted with industry support...At a minimum, the commitment by the company wanting to effectively support pro-energy activities must contain the following: staff support time and secretarial time, printing or xeroxing, and money for direct contributions (Committee for Energy Awareness 1980, p. 3).

Several examples of these types of assistance were mentioned in our discussion of movement groups. Other examples include the following: an East Coast Utility company reimbursed local activists for the expenses incurred when they attended the Second Annual Pronuclear Conference in Chicago (Interview No. 52). CEA hired a New York consulting firm to train community activists in media techniques (Interview No. 51). Westinghouse and many other corporations have supplied pronuclear groups with literature, speakers, and technical advice at a nominal cost or free:

and AFNE donated funds to Maine Voice of Energy to help that group defeat an anti-nuclear state referendum (Nuclear advocate 4/80).

Professional sector support, however, threatens to undercut one basis for the community sector's legitimacy: the claim to sincerity. If a professional group's support is too overwhelming, then the recipient community group may be publicly viewed as an extension of the professional sector.

The pronuclear movement has devised several strategies to deal with this problem. One has been to conceal industry involvement in the movement. For example, during a workshop at the national pronuclear conference in Chicago, a discussion leader advised participants not to use utility postage machines when sending out mass mailings. On one occasion when a postage machine had been used, antinuclear activists had traced the meter to the utility, which provided them further ammunition to discredit the pronuclear group. Similarly, a NEW member, employed in the public relations department of a utility, initiated a petition calling for "legislation to keep our seven regional nuclear plants operating and to finish those planned for 1980s." The petition failed to mention the sponsor. Another technique to maintain credibility is to exclude industry employees from membership in the organization. A pronuclear group formed in the Three Mile Island area, for example, prohibits "TMI employees" from formally joining the group, although they are allowed to attend meetings and participate in group activities (Interview No. 50). Finally, some community groups refuse to accept professional sector contributions, though they normally are willing to take in-kind services (e.g., secretarial help, expert advice, or printing), a form of assistance less likely to taint the community groups (Interview No. 54).

The professional sector faces a different set of risks when it supports community sector groups. The CEA manual urges "industry (to) have faith that the (community) group's overall thrust's will be positive" (Committee on Energy Awareness 1980, p. 2). This faith, however, is sometimes difficult to generate. For example, a high-ranking public relations employee of a New England utility company reported that top management initially resisted a suggestion that the company support a community group (Interview No. 55). This employee said that management feared that the group would take irresponsible actions that would reflect poorly on the firm. Similarly, a utility executive explained to an annual meeting of the Atomic Industrial Forum the potential problems associated with utility funding of community groups. State utility regulators require such funds to be drawn from stockholders, rather than ratepayers. Stockholders may object to the use of their money for this purpose.

Legitimacy of Means and the Pronuclear Movement.--As we noted above, legitimacy of means involves the demonstration that a social movement is an appropriate vehicle to achieve its constituents goals. The analysis of the pronuclear movement suggests that the achievement of legitimacy of means is especially problematic for movements based on establishment mobilization. The industry's mobilization of the pronuclear movement appears to have violated a norm that protest movements are a means reserved for otherwise powerless groups. The logic behind the norms seems to be that, since privileged and represented groups are able to use institutionalized means of influence, it is "unfair" for them to use non-institutionalized means as well-- a defining characteristic of a social movement.

The establishment sector of the pronuclear movement has used a number of techniques to help establish legitimacy of means. The most important has been its attempt to recruit blacks and women. According to a statement at a recent Atomic

Industrial Forum convention, the mobilization of women and blacks is a top priority of the movement. The reasons for this emphasis, according to several establishment sector leaders, is that blacks and women are especially effective spokespeople, since their presence suggests that the movement has a true "grass roots" base (Interviews Nos. 7,9). This is born out by the experience of a woman activist, employed in the public relations department of a utility company. She reported that when she spoke as a utility employee, her "credibility was next to zero" (Interview No. 1). Audiences were frequently hostile, and the media provided her with inadequate and highly critical coverage. When she spoke as a representative of Nuclear Energy Women, however, she usually received sympathetic press coverage and her audiences were more open to her pronuclear arguments.

A secondary strategy to establish legitimacy of means is the expansion of the scope of the movement's goals. Over the past five years, the pronuclear movement has evolved from a single issue to a multi-issue movement. The movement's original focus on nuclear power has been widened to include promotion of other forms of energy (e.g., coal), attainment of economic growth, defense of the American way of life, support of a free-enterprise economy, and independence of nuclear power (Interviews No. 47). The expansion of the number of goals has helped establish legitimacy for two reasons. First, the expansion of leadership of the goals has provided a basis of recruitment of blacks and women. The leadership of the NAACP, for example, has endorsed nuclear power in part because they believe it will promote economic growth and social mobility (Wilson, 1980). Second, it seems more reasonable to launch a movement when basic values are under attack than when the issue is the promotion of a particular technology. A employee of the General Electric corporation, for example, advised an Atomic Industrial

Forum conference, "If you're about to enter the nuclear debate--don't. It's a loser! The issue in the energy debate is not energy; the issue is, rather, lifestyles and the structure of society" (Wolfe, 1978).

Movement Infrastructure

An important determinant of the success of the movement is its access to resources, such as money, organizing skills and established channels of communication. Recently, Freeman (1979) has shown how the existence of one movement may generate the requisite resources for subsequent movements. The new left movements of the 1960s, for example furnished the women's liberation movement with a personal communication network, established underground newspapers, office facilities,

and movement-trained activists. Freeman (1979, p. 172). maintains that had the movement "emerged five years earlier--or later--when such resources were minimal, it would have had a much harder time getting off the ground."

Similarly, this type of social movement infrastructure appears to have been in place for the antinuclear movement. Many new left organizations, such as the War Resisters League and Friends of the Earth, have contributed time, personnel, and funds to the antinuclear movement. In addition, the new left papers (such as In These Times and the Guardian) have actively promoted the antinuclear effort. Finally, the leadership of the antinuclear movement gained crucial organizing experience in the movement of the 1960s. As stated by the Atomic Industrial Forum, the antinuclear activists are "the same old crowd that used to be for Ho Chi Minh" (INFO No. 136, 1980).

The pronuclear movement has been less fortunate. Although several right wing protest groups have joined the pronuclear cause, including the John Birch Society, the Ku Klux Klan, and the National Caucus of Labor Committees, they have largely remained at the fringes of the movement. The single mobilized constituency the

pronuclear forces have most assiduously attempted to draw into their movement, women's and feminist organizations, have taken antinuclear positions. The National Organization of Women and the League of Women Voters, and for example, have adopted antinuclear stands (Interview No. 9). In addition, many established feminist and women's magazines, ranging from MS to Redbook, have supported the antinuclear position. Thus, the pronuclear movement has been forced to mobilize without the benefit of trained activists and an already mobilized constituency.

Many grass roots activists report that their lack of experience in movement organizing has substantially slowed down their mobilization efforts (Interview Nos. 4, 5, 6, 10, 11). They indicate that they have had to acquire new skills (e.g., how to deal with the media) and establish a network to share ideas. Several pronuclear activists, aware of this problem, have complained bitterly about their disadvantage on this score.

The availability of a movement infrastructure to a movement may be less important if other resources are available. The pronuclear movement's greater monetary resources, for example, have reduced their disadvantage relative to the antinuclear movement. The pronuclear movement has been able to hire sophisticated public relations firms to train and advise pronuclear groups, run national and regional conferences, and assemble pronuclear literature and training manuals (Interview No. 7).

In sum, in contrast to the antinuclear movement, the pronuclear movement has not had a movement infrastructure on which to build. This had made their task more difficult. The absence of a prior movement infrastructure appears to be especially a problem for pressure groups that seek to mobilize a movement. Social movements are generally the organizational form taken by challenger groups outside the polity. Thus, the repertoire of tactics and resources provided by interconnected challengers may not be available to establishment based pressure groups.

This disadvantage, however, can be counterbalanced to some degree by access to other resources.

Disruptive Tactics

Movements, by definition, use non-institutionalized means to achieve their goals (Wilson 1977); they vary considerably, however, in the extent to which violent or disorderly tactics are employed. Some movements confine themselves to relatively mild forms of protest, such as peaceful demonstrations and signing petitions, while others use extreme tactics, such as boycotts, illegal occupations, and deliberate attempts to physically damage people or property (Marsh 1974). The pro- and antinuclear movements, for example, have been on opposite ends of this continuum. While the antinuclear movement has on occasion used civil disobedience and power plant site occupations, the pronuclear movement has taken only such non-disruptive tactics as letter writing, petitions and legal demonstrations.

We believe the explanation for the pronuclear movements selection of non-disruptive tactics lie in two factors, both of which are related to the movement's ties to the polity and established organizations. The first factor can be better understood if we contrast establishment movements from more spontaneous, locally organized, and diffuse forms of protest, such as the student and inner city rebellions of the 1960s. As Marx (1979) has pointed out, governments often lack an effective intervention technique to control diffuse type of collective behavior. This is less likely to be the case with establishment movements, which provides the government with a concrete social control target. In the case of the pronuclear movement, the government social control agents could use regulatory, legal and tax mechanisms to suppress illegal actions by the corporate sector.

A second factor that may determine the use of disorderly tactics is the movement's access to the normal channels of influence over the government. When

a group has a high or moderate degree of access to the government, it has something to lose by taking militant actions against the government. Antinuclear activists, for example, feel relatively free to use disruptive tactics since they have (or believe they have) little or no influence over the government's energy policy. The pronuclear forces, however, still wield considerable--although declining--influence over the governmental policy. The movement would jeopardize this channel of influence were they to take disruptive tactics.⁵

In sum, the pronuclear movement has taken relatively mild forms of protest actions. The reasons for this concern the availability of instruments of social control, the vulnerability of the movement to social control efforts, and the movements ability to routinely influence policy.

Movement Centralization

Social movement analysts disagree over whether the centralization of power within a movement promotes or inhibits protest success. Gerlach and Hine (1970), for example, argue that the decentralized structure promotes innovation, facilitates recruitment of individuals with diverse background, and blunts the effects of government repression. Similarly, Piven and Cloward (1977) argue that a centralized power structure tends to curb a movement's militancy, which they assume is basic to movement success.

In contrast, Gamson's (1975) analysis of 53 challenging organizations revealed a positive association between movement success and centralization of power.

⁵ See Gamson (1968) on the association between the tactical choices available to partisans and their relationship to authorities.

Centralization promotes success, Gamson argues, because it subdues intraorganizational conflict and factionalism. Finally, Barkan (1979) argues that the extreme decentralization of the antinuclear movement has provided that movement with both disadvantages and advantages. On the one hand, decentralization has increased participants sense of involvement, thereby leading to high morale. On the other hand, it has also made it difficult to arrive at quick, unified decisions in conflict situations.

An analysis of the pronuclear movement supports those who emphasize the advantages of a decentralized or loose relationship amongst movement segments, but for reasons different than given above. The pronuclear movement has maintained a decentralized industry structure in the sense that most groups have only loose ties to each other and no single organization either speaks for the movement or has authority over other organizations. Nor is there any single organization that dominates the others in the sense that it defines the issues or is the center of public attention.

This decentralized structure has been important for the movement for two reasons. The first advantage is related to the complex and multi-leveled system that regulates nuclear power. The licensing and operation of a nuclear power plant requires approval from many federal, state, and local regulatory and legislative bodies. Citizen "intervenor" groups can often play a crucial role when these bodies deliberate. One of the pronuclear movement's main activities has been to represent pronuclear "citizens" in these decision making processes. Often, however, to obtain formal intervenor status, a group must establish that they represent a constituency directly affected by the contested proposal. Centralization of a movement into a unified structure could undercut any such argument. More importantly, however, is that the proliferation of independent citizen groups tends to increase the overall impact of the pronuclear forces. The reasons for this are explained by a Westinghouse Corporation document:

It's not really necessary that every activity of all the groups in a particular region be coordinated with other groups or with industry activities. In fact, it is more important that policy makers hear a number of different views all pointing to a similar direction from a number of different directions (Kearns n.d., p. 10).

Indeed, one pronuclear activist, during a training workshop, reported that he has split his one group of 40 into two groups of 20, since this allowed the same number of people to have twice the representation during a regulatory proceeding. He urged other medium and large size groups to follow his groups example.

Corporate involvement in the pronuclear movement results in the decentralized structure having a second advantage. The decentralization of a movement allows it to engage in activities that a more tightly-directed, industry organization would be prevented from doing. As noted by the Committee for Energy Awareness organizers manual, "specific activities that citizens activities can do that often industry cannot are:

- litigate in court on certain issues;
- provide many pro-energy voices in hearings before utility commissions, regulatory agencies, and the legislative branch;
- volunteer for election campaigns;
- run for office...
- (conduct) pro-energy initiative campaigns...
- ensure that policy makers understand and represent attitudes of the public (emphasis added) (Committee for Energy Awareness 1980, p. 2).

The reasons that a centralized movement structure would inhibit these activities are two-fold. First, federal and local election laws restricts corporate involvement in the electoral process. Second, these activities gain credibility, and loose

some of their self-serving appearance, when "citizen" rather than corporate groups initiate them (See above).

Thus, our analysis supports those who argue that a decentralized structure promotes a movement's goals. We believe, however, that the particular advantages of a decentralized structure enjoyed by the pronuclear movement are specific to movements with ties to established institutions. For other types of movement and movement problems, for example, when factionalism is an extremely problematic or when coordination is important, a centralized structure may be more advantageous.

The pronuclear movement has used a decentralized structure as an organizational weapon in its struggle with the antinuclear movement. Now we examine direct attempts to limit the effects of the antinuclear movement.

MOVEMENT EFFORTS TO DAMAGE OTHER MOVEMENTS

Over the past decade, social movement analysts have begun to focus on the dynamics and effects of government efforts to control social movements. In an important step, analysts have moved beyond a "faucet" image when considering the impact of governmental actions on social movements (Wilson 1977). The sole question raised had often been whether government action prevents or fails to prevent the repetition of protest behavior (See Eg. Smelser 1962).

The more recent research, however, has begun to demonstrate that the relationship between government action and social movements is far more complex. Studies of police behavior during civil disorders, for example, have shown how police may actually promote or even participate in riots (Skolnick 1969; Marx 1971; Stark 1972; Bergesen 1976). Other work has investigated the effect of one special type of control agent, the agent provocateur (Marx 1974). Most often the presence of such agents or even the myth of their presence generates feelings of cynicism, demoralization, and immobilizing paranoia.

Similarly, Wilson (1977) examined the effects of "criminalization," the labelling and treating of protestors as deviant, on social movements. He argued, for example, that the greater the criminalization of a group, the more integrated the group will be, provided that criminalization is not extreme. Finally, Marx (1979) has examined the U.S. government's effort to damage or facilitate the movements of the 1960s. He analyzed the limits to, and various unintended consequences of government actions against and for protest groups. Marx notes, for example, that the lack of social engineering knowledge reduces the effectiveness of social control efforts (1979, p. 118).

Little work, however, has been done on the parallel issue of one movement's efforts to inhibit another. Below we examine the efforts of the pronuclear movement to damage the antinuclear movement.

Before we proceed with our analysis, two caveats are necessary. First, when we consider the pronuclear movements effort to damage the antinuclear movement, it is often difficult to distinguish "industry activities" from "movement activities". For example, when a utility company presses charges against antinuclear "trespassers", is this a pronuclear movement activity or simply a business effort to protect its property? We consider activities directed against the antinuclear movement "movement" activities, when those who initiate or engage in them view them as part of a political struggle. This "rule" is problematic in that it relies on often difficult to measure state of mind factors.

A second caveat is that our focus is on specific social movement efforts to damage other social movements. Of less concern are the broader strategies used by one movement to defeat another. Thus, we assume that general issues concerning movement/counter-movement interaction can be distinguished from specific actions taken by one movement to damage another. For example, the attempt of anti-abortion movement groups to amend the constitution would be treated as

part of overall strategy, not an action directed against the pro-abortion movement. Bombings of abortion clinics or disruption of pro-abortion rallies would be treated as direct acts against the movement.

The pronuclear movement has taken a number of actions against the anti-nuclear movement. The categories used to describe these activities are drawn from Marx's (1979) discussion of the most prevalent forms of government action against the protest movements of the 1960s. We discuss attempts to gather information, limit the flow of resources, and portray the antinuclear movement in a negative light. Finally we examine the effects of these efforts on the antinuclear movement.

Information Gathering

A central aspect of government efforts to damage the protest movements in the 1960s was the collection of information on dissidents. As Marx notes, "knowing that agents are gathering information on it may make a social movement less open and democratic, require that limited resources be devoted to security, and may deter participation" (1979, p. 99). Some pronuclear groups have initiated surveillance activities of antinuclear activists and organizations. Utility companies have taken pictures of antinuclear demonstrators, copied license plate numbers near antinuclear rallies, and maintained files on individual antinuclear activists (Wall Street Journal 1/14/79). Whether these information gathering activities are intended to damage the antinuclear movement is open to question. Industry spokespeople claim that they are part of legitimate security measures. Nuclear power critics, however, charge that the surveillance programs are designed to discourage support for their movement. For example, in a hearing before a state regulatory commission, an antinuclear group charged that a utility's surveillance program had served to "suppress and chill opponents of nuclear power and anyone else who differs from (the companies) policies" (Wall Street Journal 1/11/79).

In addition to collecting their own information, several utility companies have hired security firms to collect information on antinuclear protestors. A West Coast utility has publicly acknowledged that it has retained two security firms, Research West and Information Digest, for that purpose. Similar information was revealed in files obtained in the litigation that followed the 1977 and 1978 Seabrook nuclear power plant construction site. There the utility also hired two private security firms, Operational Systems, Inc. and Information Digest, to obtain information on the Clamshell Alliance (Center for National Security Studies 1981, p. 69).

At least one "citizens"⁶ group, the U.S. Labor Party, has collected information on the anti's for the explicit purpose of damaging the movement. The Seabrook files mentioned above revealed that the Labor Party had provided the New Hampshire State Police and the FBI with details of the Clamshell's tactical plans to occupy the power plant. When asked about these and other efforts to collect information on the antinuclear movement, a Labor Committee spokesman stated: "This is political warfare. We're running a political intelligence operation to expose them (antinuclear activists). We will cooperate with any organization willing to root out this evil" (Guardian 12/5/79). The Labor Committee also claims to have infiltrated the Clamshell Alliance, including its top leadership, for the purposes of information gathering (Guardian 12/5/79).

Finally, the industry's two main trade associations, Atomic Industrial Forum and Edison Electric Institute, have maintained files on antinuclear opponents. In at least one instance, the trade associations requested utility companies in a number of cities to attend and report back on meetings of a particular anti-nuclear group (Washington Post 11/21/77). In addition, the AIF allegedly disseminated

⁶ Leftist groups and others have charged that the Labor Party is actually a police front, not a true citizens group, but this charge has never been verified.

information on antinuclear leaders to its members, including utility companies (Campaign for Political Rights April 1979, p. 3).

Restricting resources

Another tactic used by the government to damage protest movements in the 1960s was to restrict the flow of resources to them, such as money, physical space, and employment opportunities (Marx 1979, pp. 99-100). The pronuclear movement has also attempted to reduce the antinuclear forces' access to resources. Over the last several years, pronuclear activists have tried to eliminate the federal funding of citizen intervenors in regulatory proceedings. The Federal Trade Commission, ACTION, the Department of Energy, and other governmental agencies and programs have traditionally provided such funds (Metzger 1980, p. 40). Several pronuclear movement organizations, such as Americans for Nuclear Energy and the Nuclear Legislative Advisory Services, have led efforts to prevent further disbursement of government funds to antinuclear intervenor groups (Nuclear Legislative Advisory Service July 21, 1980; Nuclear Advocate June, 1980). In another effort, several campus chapters of pronuclear movement groups have organized efforts to eliminate the use of student fees to fund campus antinuclear organizations (Interview Nos. 19, 25).

Finally, two pronuclear groups have used civil litigation to financially damage an antinuclear organization. The New Hampshire Voice of Energy (NHVOE) and American for More Power Sources (AMPS) have sued the Coalition for Direct Action at Seabrook, a faction within the Clamshell Alliance. The suit's stated purpose is to "recover the cost to the taxpayer for the added protection necessary to protect life, limb and property" during demonstrations at the Seabrook nuclear power plant construction site (INFO No. 143, 1980, p. 4). According to Tina Coruth, president of NHVOE, "Our suit is a way for the Seabrook demonstrators to pay

their own way. It's not right for the New Hampshire taxpayer to pick up the tab for the added police protection during those antinuclear demonstrations" (INFO No. 143, 1980, p. 4).

Efforts to Produce a Negative Image

Another technique used to damage the movement in the 1960s was to create an unfavorable public image of it (Marx 1979, pp. 96-98). The pronuclear movement has also used this strategy. Several utility companies have collected and disseminated information derogatory information on antinuclear groups. Between 1973 and 1977 Georgia Power Company, for example, operated a sophisticated surveillance program on company critics, including the antinuclear Georgia Power Project. A former company investigator described the surveillance program as "dirt gathering" effort to label its opponents as "commies and queers" (Center for National Security Studies 1981, pp. 67-68). Similarly, in 1978 Philadelphia Electric Company photographed antinuclear demonstrators and kept files on their activities. The company gave copies of the photographs to a local television station which used them in a story that ridiculed the demonstrators. An antinuclear group filed an administrative complaint with the state Public Service Commission, charging that rate payers' money was being illegally used on a campaign to spy on and "suppress and smear" critics of nuclear power (Center for National Security Studies 1981, p. 75).

The U.S. Labor Party, has also attempted to discredit the antinuclear movement. In 1977, the Labor Party told New Hampshire state authorities that a planned demonstration at Seabrook construction site was "nothing but a cover for terrorists activity" (Center for National Security Studies 1981, p. 7). Governor Meldren Thompson and the Manchester Union-Leader accepted and widely publicized the allegation. The

Labor Party has made similar charges against anti-nuclear activists in Maryland and New York (Center for National Security Studies 1981, P. 7).

Utility companies have also attempted to create a negative image of anti-nuclear demonstrators during plant site occupations. Utility actions, an Atomic Industrial Forum paper points out, should be based on the premise that "public opinion, not demonstrators, is the target" (Goldsmith & Shants 1978). The paper's practical recommendations, drawn from one utility company's own experience, include making sure that the arrests are conducted in such a way as to insure conviction; placing "highly visible 'no trespassing' signs (to) give the public a revealing look at demonstrators' true intentions if the newsphotographers records an individual breaking a barrier that is clearly and unmistakably posted"; and hiring a "politically astute" public relations firm to help manage the events (Goldsmith and Shants 1978).

Another type of effort has been the Committee for Energy Awareness's "Truth Squad". The two person Squad followed Tom Hayden and Jane Fonda in their fifty-two city antinuclear tour in an effort to discredit them (Interview Nos. 29, 30).

Effects on the antinuclear movement

It is difficult to detect the extent of damage afflicted on the antinuclear movement by the above described and other efforts. It is likely, for example, that surveillance activities have inhibited some from participating in the antinuclear effort. It is nearly impossible, however, to estimate the number of those dissuaded from participation. Similarly, according to one report, the Clamshell Alliance disbanded in part to avoid the legal suit against them brought by two pronuclear organizations (INFO No. 143, 1980). It is difficult to determine the independent effect of the suit, however, since many other problems plagued the Alliance, such as factionalism. The suit may have only acted as a catalyst in an

ongoing process of disintegration. Thus, in many cases, it may be impossible to separate the effects of the pronuclear movement's effort to damage the antinuclear movement from other mobilization problems encountered by them.

Ironically, more observable are the positive effects on the antinuclear movement. First the pronuclear movement's efforts have bolstered the argument that the presence of nuclear power brings with it curtailment of civil liberties. Second, the pronuclear movement's actions have provided antinuclear activists with an additional issue around which to organize. One national organization, Campaign for Political Rights, and several local organizations have developed to combat the pronuclear movement's efforts to damage the antinuclear movement. Third, the presence of a common enemy had produced alliances among antinuclear activists and other groups, especially, political rights groups. A manual for antinuclear activists explains how this process occurs: "Groups concerned about civil liberties will become involved in supporting the political rights of antinuclear groups -- and at the same time they will become informed on issues related to nuclear power" (Campaign for Political Right 1979, p. 6).

Conclusion

The above analysis of the pronuclear movement has several implications for the theoretical issues stated at the outset. The findings suggest support for the contention that pressure groups become transformed into a social movement when challenged by another social movement. The pronuclear movement grew out of a struggle with the antinuclear movement over the right to determine government policy toward nuclear power.

We initially described two different mobilization models, the community model and professional model. The examination of several pronuclear groups suggests that the two models are complementary, not alternative theories as some have assumed.

Such movements as the pronuclear effort have so diverse bases of mobilization that no one model can adequately account for their development. The professional model accounted for the mobilization of one sector of the pronuclear movement, while the community model applied to the other. Our analysis of has shown that these different bases of mobilization give rise to different problems in achieving movement legitimacy, infrastructure support, tactics, and strategies of centralization. In the pronuclear movement's effort to achieve movement legitimacy, for example, the professional sector needs to create the image that a committed citizenry and not merely the nuclear industry support's the sectors effort. The community sector, on the other hand, lacks many of the material resources needed for popular organizing. Therefore, these two sectors have become interdependent.

Finally, industry involvement in the pronuclear movement suggests that movement analysts should further explore the efforts of established groups and institutions to mobilize resources outside their usual venues. Among the possible foci for this research is the current effort of the Catholic church to mobilize a popular movement to prohibit abortions and the effort of certain business sectors and foundations to mobilize a right-wing movement. We are fairly certain that the processes underlying these efforts are analytically parallel to those described in this paper.

In sum, an important issue has been raised: how is the position of established polity members undermined, and how do they respond?

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