

From Simple Metaphors to Conceptual Blending: The Mapping of Analogical Concepts and the Praxis of Translation

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Abstract

I have five goals for this paper. First, I will demonstrate the influence that the understanding of metaphor has had on the praxis of translation. Second, I will introduce and apply more recent insights in human conceptual processes, in particular those of *image-schemas*, *conceptual metaphors* and *conceptual blends*. Third, I will introduce optimality principles and relate them to the suggested conceptual blends. Fourth, I will present some translations of conceptual blends and then suggest optimality principles for translating conceptual blends and evaluate the translations by them. Finally, I will suggest areas that require further research. This study is exploratory and suggestive. Hopefully, readers will wish to broaden their understanding of cognitive linguistics and refine what is presented here.

1. Prolegomena: traditional perspectives on how God speaks

Many traditional conceptualizations of God have been regarded as axiomatic, i.e., they are assumed and require no evidence, nor any defense. It is simply a given that God exhibits attributes that are absolute and total. Thus God is characterized by *absolute perfection*, *unmitigated love*, *total knowledge*, *thorough constancy*, and so forth. Attributing such axiomatic truths to God is generally not problematic. What may become problematic, however, is when people draw inferences from such axioms, treat those inferences as having an equal, although derivative, truth status, and then overlook the possibility that the inferences may not have been warranted. Thus, Callahan (1996:356) notes that Protestant scholastic theologians “consistently maintained that perspicuity was an attribute, a property, of Scripture,” that “Scripture must be clear because God, its author, can only speak clearly and understandably.” Such deductive reasoning shapes much of the contemporary debate as well. Geisler (1992) presents a series of syllogisms which derive the inerrancy of Scripture from the character of God as the giver. Although it may be axiomatic that God “can only speak clearly and understandably,” it does not follow that “Scripture must be clear.”² This is the case simply because Scripture was composed by humans. As such it bears the imprint of humanity, is constrained by human cognitive processes, framed by human conceptual structures, and embedded in

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² Kaiser (1980:128) weakens the claim, “The principle of perspicuity means simply that the Bible is sufficiently clear in and of itself for believers to understand it.”

human cultural models. Any interpretation of Scripture necessarily has to account for the human factor as well as the divine factor.³

“The principles of interpretation,” according to Kaiser (1980:120), “are as native and universal to man as is speech itself.” This statement allows the inference that an understanding of the principles of interpretation (i.e., hermeneutics) may be gained through an understanding of the human factor. Moreover, “native and universal to man” can refer to nothing other than the innate, species-specific capacity of humans for thought. With this statement Kaiser grounds the principles of interpretation in human cognition. It follows, then, that the more we know about human cognition—how as humans we conceptualize and structure our knowledge of the world—the better understanding we will have of the principles of interpretation. This is because the principles of interpretation, as the means for decoding a message, ought to mirror those conceptual processes used in encoding a message. What Kaiser writes about interpretation is equally true of translation, since in the context of inter-lingual communication the two are coterminous. The implication for both theologians and translators is that they would be well advised to keep abreast of recent developments in cognitive semantics and to expand their principles of interpretation and translation accordingly.

The belief that scripture must be clear has had a lasting impact on interpretation and translation. It was readily combined with an Aristotelian concept that metaphors are deviant, ornamental forms of language that serve to embellish language. The result has been that clarity is often regarded as dependent upon literal, propositional statements. Callow (1998:154-55) writes,

A proposition represents the simplest possible thought pattern, the weaving together of several concepts in a purposive way.... [P]ropositions are cognitively based, not word based; one proposition underlies the various expressions in different languages.⁴ The concepts, therefore, which combine to form the proposition, are at a cognitive level which relates to experiences not to words. Words follow later.

Moreover, propositions are generally regarded as expressing pure thought, and so truth is also associated with words that are understood literally. Thus Geisler (1999:742) writes,

Communication depends on informative statements. But correspondence to facts is what makes statements informative. *All communication ultimately depends on something being literally or factually true.* We cannot even use a metaphor unless we understand that there is a literal meaning over against which the figurative sense is not literal. So, it would follow that all communication depends in the final analysis on a correspondence to truth (*italics added*).⁵

Thus, when we read Jesus’ referral to Herod as a fox (ἄλώπηξ Luke 13:32), we know that Herod is not literally a fox, so we have to discover in what sense Herod is compared to a fox. Such a *simple metaphor* is generally treated as an isolate, and its meaning is based wholly on a perceived similarity between the referent and the object to which it is compared. Opinion as to what Jesus is implying varies: that Herod is cunning and treacherous (Evans 1990:216), but perhaps destructive (Bock 1994:247), merely worthless (Louw and Nida 1988:I:755), contemptuous (Morris 1988:249) or that he “plays the crafty fox to Caesar’s lion (Luke 13:32) [and] ... is a political nuisance, but not worth bothering with” (Ryken, et al. 1998:30). Translators are faced with the choice of either finding an equivalent metaphor or suggesting a sentence that

³ Interestingly, whereas on the one hand, theologians have accepted the axiom that God “can only speak clearly and understandably,” on the other hand, they attribute to the apostle John the privilege of deliberately choosing words that introduce ambiguity to that unequivocal, clear and understandable message. Thus John is said to make plays on words when he used of καταλαμβάνω ‘to overcome (take control over), understand’ (John 1:5), ἄνωθεν ‘again, from above’ (John 3:3) and ἀναβαίνω ‘to go up (on a road), ascend (to heaven)’ (John 7:8). The claim that John took liberties with the God’s clear message has serious implications for the doctrines of inspiration and inerrancy, because both are based upon the notion that the words of Scripture are inviolable because they are “God-breathed” (2 Tim. 3:16).

⁴ This claim is axiomatic for theories grounded in the Chomskyan distinction between deep and surface structure.

⁵ Max Black (1955:273) writes, “I should like to do something to dispel the mystery that invests the topic [of metaphor]; but since philosophers (for all their notorious interest in language) have so neglected the subject, I must get what help I can from the literary critics. They, at least, do not accept the commandment, ‘Thou shalt not commit metaphor,’ or assume that metaphor is incompatible with serious thought.”

is faithful to the presumed propositional content.⁶ Once a meaning is recognized it is simply entered into a mental lexicon. When we hear the metaphor “fox” again, it evokes a presumed literal equivalent such as “crafty person”.

Those committed to the view that truth can only be expressed propositionally in sentences that are understood literally have elevated literal translation over all other forms. Recently there has been an emergence of calls for literal translation (Grudem 2000, Grudem and Thacker 2005, Grudem, et al. 2006, Poythress and Grudem 2004, 2005; Ryken 2003, 2005).

2. Traditional Methods for Interpreting Metaphors

Geisler’s statement of the necessity of decoding metaphorical language into a literal meaning reflects a principle for interpreting metaphors that has been traced back at least as far as Aristotle’s *Poetics*. Gutt (2000:89) notes that metaphors and similes have been regarded as having just “one ‘point of similarity’ which the translator has to identify in order to understand [it] ...”⁷ Following Sperber and Wilson (1986), he asserts that this perspective is mistaken because the approach is based upon a misconception that implicit information is determinate. Rather, he notes that there is a continuum of relative strength between “wholly determinate, specifically intended inferences” at one pole and “indeterminate, wholly unintended inferences” at the other. In defending a claim for indeterminacy he posits a number of different contexts for the remark ‘John eats like a pig’. By attributing semantic indeterminacy to metaphors and invoking a general category of implicit information for interpreting them, Gutt gives credence to what is known as “polyvalent interpretation” as is frequently practiced by some theologians.

I suggest that there is a tendency to overstate indeterminacy in language and that this tendency is largely an outcome of an analytical method, one that is commonly practiced by linguists, philosophers, and theologians. This method consists of removing a linguistic unit from its context and then analyzing it by re-constructing possible contexts in which it could occur. Nearly a half century ago K. L. Pike (1955:138-139) identified this removal as the activity of analyzing a unit in *hypostasis*.

Any abstraction of an activity from a normal participant sequence for purposes of viewing it, studying it, mentioning it, analyzing it, listing it, cataloging it, or discussing it as such, we shall call HYPOSTASIS of that activity. (...) The native speaker, in quoting a word out of normal context, is performing an act of hypostasis.⁸

Pike goes on to state that the native speaker “is doing something further: he is making an abstraction from various contexts ... and is giving to his abstraction a name, or ‘label.’” In assigning a meaning to the abstracted lexical unit, the person is treating that unit in hypostasis and implicitly assuming that the particular meaning replaces the meanings of the lexical unit “utilized in normal non-abstracting sequences” [i.e., the natural language contexts]. Pike terms this activity *conceptualized hypostasis* to differentiate it from *hypostasis*. What I understand Pike to be saying is that the *meaning* of the lexical unit is often conceptualized hypostatically, i.e., as though it were context free, in spite of the fact that it always occurs in various contexts.

⁶ Evans (1990:216) suggests that the equivalent metaphor in American English is *rat*.

⁷ Robert H. Stein (1978:285) cites Adolf Jülicher, in 1888, as arguing for a single meaning for parables—as extended similes. See Mell (1999). Dodd (1961) lauds Jülicher’s contribution, but suggests a more flexible approach.

⁸ This is not unlike those physicists who provide a scientific model of physical motion by ignoring contextual features. In distinguishing scientific models from folk models, Ungerer and Schmid (1996:53) report an experiment in which the examiners present a scenario of an airplane flying at constant speed and altitude and dropping a metal ball. The respondents are to “draw the path the ball will follow until it hits the ground, ignoring wind and air resistance. Its final position in relation to the plane should also be indicated.” Not unexpectedly, most respondents provided a folk rather than the scientific model. The scenario, as it is presented, assumes a hypostatic, context-free condition—that of a plane and metal ball in a vacuum—one that never occurs in the real world. Ungerer and Schmid sum it up, “To get through everyday life, laypersons do not need scientifically correct models, but functionally effective ones” (ibid.). The same may be said regarding a semantic theory, for it ought to reflect the reality of life as people actually experience it, not the theoretical interests of academia.

When analysts wish to explore the range of meaning for a given hypostatized lexical unit they take that unit, which already has an assigned meaning, and construe possible contexts for it. As they construe these various contexts they observe the changes in its meaning. The result is that the meaning of the lexical unit appears to exhibit semantic indeterminacy. Furthermore, this semantic indeterminacy becomes more extreme as additional contexts are construed. I submit, however, that this factor of increasing indeterminacy may be more of an artifact of the analytical method than it is of language *per se*. Because the analysts are so focused on the ever-changing, kaleidoscopic range of meaning for the lexical unit, they are prone to overlook the role that their methodology plays in the creation of that indeterminacy. The fact is that in natural language lexical units occur in context, and the context rarely allows for multiple interpretations. My own experience is that it takes considerable processing effort and creativity to say something that has more than one meaning in a given context, let alone say something that allows for the kind of semantic indeterminacy that is associated with the analytical method of hypostasis and context re-construal.

It is important to bear in mind that I am only suggesting that it is inappropriate to use the method of hypostasis and context re-construal to analyze the meaning of lexical units that are better understood when they are observed in natural language use. I have some empathy for those who are interpreting literary texts, however, because they necessarily have only a portion of the context that is normally available for the interpretation of natural language. Nevertheless, Gibb's (1994:73) comment on the nature of textual interpretation is significant:

Texts are not static containers of meaning but provide the common ground for writer and reader from which meaning may arise. Reading requires constant reference to prior knowledge from speech-based culture, not just the application of logical rules. For example, when reading legal texts (e.g., interpreting the First Amendment to the Constitution, protecting the right to free speech), meaning is constructed through consideration of the culture of law and the interpretation of human intentions that are brought to bear in the oral forum of the courtroom. This mix of cultural knowledge and speech-based understanding clearly contradicts the belief that any sentence has some sort of autonomous meaning in written language. It simply is not clear how intentionality and culturally derived knowledge can be suspended during text interpretation.

Relevance theory has a potential contribution to make at this point in its recognition of *contextual effects* and *processing effort*. My understanding of these two components is that they are similar to two concepts that have a role in contemporary theories of cognitive semantics, those of *centrality* and *saliency*.

Centrality relates to how our concepts are structured around a central, idealized prototype or model that serves as a template for recognizing the exemplars encompassed by that concept and for grading them from the center to the margin. We recognize the deviant, marginal scenarios of behavior depicted in some talk shows on the basis of a central, normative scenario of behavior. With respect to the art of the masters, the better we know the original work of the artist, the easier it is for us to recognize a counterfeit. In essence, our recognition of deviancy is enabled by our sense of centrality and what is normative.

Saliency relates to processing effort, in that when we are presented with a message, the interpretation that first comes to mind is usually the one that is most relevant to the context and requires the least processing effort. For example, consider an interpreter wanting to exegete a use of a Greek participle. Although the adverbial use of the participle has been understood generally to express eight senses in hypostasis (cause, condition, concession, manner, means, purpose, result, and temporality), in a given context it is likely to be limited to, say, two or three possibilities, and without very much processing effort, the interpreter can narrow the choice to one or two. The simple fact is that responsible interpretation does not attribute a wide range of meanings to linguistic units in a natural language context. In this regard, the principle of relevance ought to mitigate tendencies to regard meaning as indeterminate and thereby constrain the interpretations that could reasonably be regarded as sanctioned by the context.

Rather than echoing the Aristotelian perspective on deviant language and treating metaphor as "loose-talk," those invoking the principle of relevance would do well to minimize the range of meaning attributed to an instantiation of a metaphor, for the meaning of a metaphor, when occurring in the context of natural

language, is also subject to the factors of centrality and saliency.⁹ Those interpreters who are inclined to assign a single meaning to a metaphor in a natural language context are likely to be more accurate than those who claim that the meanings of metaphors are indeterminate and therefore suggest a wide range of meanings for the listener or reader to exploit.

Whether just one, or perhaps two, interpretations are possible for any given metaphor in context does not address the question of how metaphors are to be translated. Peter Newmark (1985) suggests a practice for translating metaphors that is dependent upon

- (1) the genre of literature in which the metaphor is found,
- (2) the superficial, formal features of the metaphor, and
- (3) how the metaphor is placed within the analyst's classificatory schema.

He identifies five types of metaphor (dead, cliché, stock, recent and original) and distinguishes between one-word and complex metaphors. He claims that “dead metaphors are no part of translation theory” (1985:301). With regard to clichés, he writes, “As I see it, a translator is entitled to get rid of clichés in any informative text, where only facts (or theories) are sacred” He adds, “A translator is not entitled to touch clichés in expressive texts, authoritative statements, laws, regulations, notices etc.” (1985:302-303). Beyond such issues, he suggests a hierarchy of procedures for translating metaphor:

- (1) reproduce the same image in the Target Language (TL, also referred to as the Receptor Language RL),
- (2) replace the image in the Source Language (SL) with a standard TL image,
- (3) translate a metaphor with a simile,
- (4) translate with a simile plus a sense statement,
- (5) convert the metaphor to its sense,
- (6) modify the metaphor,
- (7) delete the metaphor and its sense component, and
- (8) retain the SL metaphor and add a gloss.

Procedures such as these belie an underlying model of translation that treats figurative expressions as isolates for which the translator has only to suggest an equivalent expression in the TL. Moreover, those promoting this model assume that expressions are best understood in terms of semantic components and that these semantic components play the main role in achieving an equivalency between the SL and TL expressions. All the translator has to do is to ensure that all the semantic components of the SL expression are somehow accounted for in the TL expression. Nida (1971:185) states,

the correctness of a translation must be determined not in terms of the corresponding sets of words, but on the basis of the extent to which the corresponding sets of semantic components are accurately represented in the restructuring. This is essential if the resulting form of the message in the receptor language is to represent the closest natural equivalent of the source-language text.

His approach is affirmed by Newmark (1988:114) that the process of translation is “to compare a SL word with a TL word which has a similar meaning, but is not an obvious one-to-one equivalent, by demonstrating first their common and then their differing sense components.”

How the approaches differ may be shown with reference to Rev. 2:23. The first approach is that of translating the SL expression with an equivalent TL expression. The Greek of Rev. 2:23 — ἐγὼ εἶμι ὁ ἐραυνῶν νεφροῦς καὶ καρδίας ‘I am the one who searches *kidneys* and *hearts*’—is regarded by many as a literal translation of Hebrew words that reflect a dichotomy of the emotions and intellect as found in Jeremiah 17:10. Preisker's (1967:911) comment that νεφρός occurs only in “quotation of Jer. 11:20

⁹ Gibbs faults the *metaphor-as-loose-talk* view as it has been developed within the framework of relevance theory on the basis that it assumes that figurative language requires more processing effort on the part of the listener than does more literal language. Empirical psychological research “clearly shows that listeners do not ordinarily devote extra processing resources to understanding metaphors compared with more literal utterances. (...) Furthermore, the very notion of metaphor as loose talk presupposes that metaphorical language only resembles [a] speaker's thoughts rather than being a direct reflection of ideas or concepts that are actually constituted by metaphor” (1994:232).

(17:10), though not accurately according to the LXX,” coupled with the range of meanings attributed variously to νεφρός ‘kidneys’, καρδία ‘heart’, and the related σπλάγχνα ‘intestines’, suggests that it is presumptuous to assume that John’s readers understood νεφρούς καὶ καρδίας in the same way that the readers of Jeremiah understood the presumed Hebrew equivalents. Nevertheless, many interpreters have presumed that the English dichotomy of *emotions* and *intellect* sufficiently matches that expressed by νεφρούς καὶ καρδίας (Barclay 1926, Beasley-Murray 1981, Charles 1920, Düsterdieck 1887, Morris 1987), and this perspective is reflected in translations as well: “I am He who searches the *hearts* and *minds*” (NIV) or “*minds* and *hearts*” (NASB). Presumably the interpreters and translators recognized the likelihood that their choices did not represent an exact match, but that there was sufficient overlap in the semantic features that their choice of translational equivalents was justified. Other interpreters, however, have resolved the issue by interpreting νεφρούς καὶ καρδίας as simply indicating a more abstract concept such as the totality of one’s “inner person”.

The second approach, that of removing metaphors, is exemplified by Louw and Nida who suggest the use of words expressing the presumed, salient emotions that the metaphors conveyed to the original readers, “Rather, however, than attempting to employ a figurative expression which may or may not be fully equivalent, it is often preferable to refer to the *emotional content* by using terms such as ‘feelings,’ ‘intents,’ ‘desires,’ or ‘compassion,’ depending upon the context” (italics added). They note that νεφρός ‘kidney’ expresses “the psychological faculty of desire, intent, and feeling” (26.11; 1988:I:324). With regard to the figurative use of καρδία, they note (26.3; 1988:I:321) that it represents “the causative source of a person’s psychological life in its various aspects, but with special emphasis upon thoughts - ‘heart, inner self, mind.’” Thus, for Rev. 2:23 they suggest, ‘I am he who searches people’s *feelings* and *desires*’ (italics added).¹⁰

The presumption here is that the use of a more literal sense, such as *feelings* and *desires*, is more likely to achieve an equivalency between the senses of the SL and TL expressions than would the use of metaphors. This presumption, however, is questionable, particularly so when equivalency is sought between vocabulary that expresses abstract concepts. Indeterminacy in an abstract concept shows up in the range of behavioral instantiations that it encompasses, and within that range there will be exemplary acts as well as marginal ones. For each individual, the meaning of such an abstract concept is determined by the actual behavioral instantiations that he or she has experienced, not by the presumed list of semantic features generated by an analyst.

The association of abstract concepts with their behavioral instantiations lies behind Paul’s injunction to his readers in Philippians 4:8, “Finally, brothers, whatever is *true* (ἀληθῆ), whatever is *noble* (ἀρετῆ), whatever is *right* (δίκαια), whatever is *pure* (ἀγνά), whatever is *lovely* (ἔπαινος), whatever is *admirable* (σεμνά)—if anything is *excellent* (εὖφημα) or *praiseworthy* (προσφιλή)—think about such things. Whatever you have learned or received or heard from me, or seen in me—put it into practice” (NIV). Each of these virtues embraces a range of “whatevers”, i.e., the particular instantiations of the behavior associated with that virtue. In 1 Tim. 3:8-10, 12 Paul provides some instantiations of the whatevers for a deacon who is σεμνός ‘admirable, dignified’ and δοκιμαζέσθωσαν ‘proven worthy’. He is to be sincere, not drinking too much wine, not pursuing dishonest gain, keeping clear the insights he has into the faith, having one wife, and managing their children and their household well. Moreover, a deacon’s wife who is σεμνάς is temperate, trustworthy and does not talk maliciously.

It should also be noted that the “whatevers” of σεμνός ‘admirable, dignified’ in an African culture will not necessarily be admirable to the same extent as those in the New Testament Greek culture or in a given contemporary Western culture. Although we may achieve only an approximation of the range of behavioral instantiations for a given abstract virtue listed in a biblical passage, nevertheless such an approximation is required for an adequate understanding the meaning of that virtue. For translation purposes, the greater the

¹⁰ Callow (1998:332) agrees with this approach: “But fixed figures, whose reference is not literal [e.g., idioms and certain kinds of metaphors], should not be represented literally in a propositionalisation. Rather, the actual reference should be made clear. Hence, ‘She took it in her stride’ is the surface-structure expression of *she continued-to-be unperturbed*. (...) Figures of speech can be very difficult to re-express for propositional purposes in nonfigurative language, but it is essential to make the attempt.”

presumed degree of overlap in the instantiations respective to the SL and TL, the greater is the adequacy of that translation.

3. Principles for Interpreting Conceptual Metaphors

The traditional practice of regarding figurative language as ornamental, picturesque, and deviant long dominated semantics. In 1980, however, Lakoff and Johnson demonstrated that metaphor was not simply a literary device but rather reflected a process by which we understand much about daily life. They demonstrated how collections of related metaphors exhibit an underlying regularity that structures our thought along certain lines rather than others. They introduced *conceptual metaphor* to refer typically to a primarily tacit conceptual structuring of an abstract domain in terms of a physical domain. A commonly cited example is that our understanding of how we live out our lives is structured by the concepts we use when we talk about going on a journey.

Because the traditional method for interpreting metaphors has been to treat each metaphor as an isolate, little or no thought was given to potential regularities that may underlie similar metaphors. For example, the Merriam-Webster (2003) dictionary simply lists each occurrence of figurative language under what is regarded as the key word to a given expression. Because no indication is provided that a given expression may be related to some other, no basis is laid that would enable a reader to see any regularity. For example *to spill one's guts* is listed under the verb *spill* with the gloss 'to divulge especially personal information' and *to stick in one's craw* is listed under the word *stick* and glossed as 'to irritate, nag at, or obsess one'. Both of these, however, are exemplars of the conceptual metaphor ASSIMILATING IDEAS IS ASSIMILATING FOOD (McElhanon 2005). This conceptual metaphor also encompasses expressions with meanings that are generally treated as secondary senses, as, for example the Merriam-Webster entries for *ruminate* 'to engage in contemplation, reflect' and *mull* 'to consider at length, ponder'. Moreover, the meanings of some words, perhaps because they may occur with a wider distribution, are not at all related to potentially systematic conceptual processes, as, for example, *savor* 'to delight in, enjoy' and *relish* 'to appreciate with taste and discernment'.

This practice is even more evident in Louw and Nida (1988) who cite a number of words as not occurring in the New Testament with a literal meaning. The literal meaning is accorded little or no semantic role in the determination of the meanings of expressions that are classed by the lexicographer as "figurative" or "idiomatic."

An obvious example of this predisposition to avoid metaphor is found in the entry "πλανάω; πλάνη^a, ης f. (figurative extensions of meaning of πλανάω 'to cause to wander off the path,' not occurring in the NT) to cause someone to hold a wrong view and thus be mistaken – 'to mislead, to deceive, deception, to cause to be mistaken' (31.8; 1988:I:366-67).¹¹ Translators who avoid the use of metaphors regularly follow Newmark's option five for translating metaphors—"convert the metaphor to its sense." Accordingly, Louw and Nida translate the various forms of πλανάω as 'deceive, mislead' rather than 'stray': Mt. 24:4 βλέπετε μή τις ὑμᾶς πλανήσω with "watch out, and do not let anyone deceive you," 2 Tim. 3:13 πλανῶντες καὶ πλανώμενοι with "deceiving others and being deceived themselves," and 1 John 4:6 ἐκ τούτου γινώσκομεν τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς ἀληθείας καὶ τὸ πνεῦμα τῆς πλάνης with "this is the way we know the difference between the Spirit which leads to truth and the spirit that misleads us, ... causes us to hold a wrong view," or "... causes us to be mistaken." Their practice is no different from that commonly practiced by Bible translators as a reading of almost any English translation will reveal.

In McElhanon (2005) I noted that translators have not taken into account the Greek conceptual metaphors TRUTH IS A ROAD and EXPERIENCING A LIFE OF FAITH IS GOING ON A JOURNEY. The elaborations of these metaphors describe how Christians are to *live out the truth as they journey*.

There are hazards for those on the journey of faith, such as striking one's foot on something and stumbling (προσκοπῶ Rom. 14:21), tripping (πταίω 2 Peter 1:10), or falling down (πίπτω, Rom. 11:11), and some interpreters have understood that these events lead to a person "losing" their salvation. The fact of the

¹¹ Bauer (1979:821) lists Heb. 11:38, Mt. 18:12ab, 13; and 1 Peter 2:25 as expressing the literal sense of the word.

matter is that such people are still on the road, and although their progress has been made difficult, their goal, as followers of Jesus, is to complete the journey. Stumbling, tripping and falling down are typical of those traveling on a road. There is a danger, however, and that is in straying from the road (*πλανάω* cf. Mt. 24:4; 2 Tim. 3:13; James 5:19-20; *passim*), and this is why it is so important that translators not obscure these metaphors by translating the content as suggested by Newmark (option five) and adopted by Louw and Nida in their suggestion that *πλανάω* is best translated ‘to mislead, deceive, ... cause to be mistaken’. I suggest that the conceptual metaphors TRUTH IS A ROAD and EXPERIENCING A LIFE OF FAITH IS GOING ON A JOURNEY exhibit gestalt characteristics. That is to say, they exhibit a meaning that is greater than the sum of their component metaphors. With regard to *truth*, it is that the biblical concept of truth is primarily *experiential*, more about HOW Christians live, rather than merely *rational*, only about WHAT Christians say.¹² This is an important perspective, one that is regrettably lost when metaphors are replaced with sentences representing what the interpreter regards as the propositionalized meaning.

It is enigmatic that Louw and Nida eliminate Greek metaphors based on *πλανάω* and assign to the word such propositionalized senses as “to cause someone to hold a wrong view and thus be mistaken—‘to mislead, to deceive, ... to cause to be mistaken,’” but then suggest that translators consider expressing it “idiomatically, for example, ‘to twist people’s thoughts’” (31.10, 1988:I:367). Their suggestion is, however, consistent with the English conceptual metaphor TRUTH IS AN OBJECT in which an object may be manipulated. It clearly reflects the contemporary Western concept of truth as *rational* in contrast to the New Testament Greek concept of truth as *experiential*. One may wonder why they reject a Greek conceptual metaphor only to suggest a substitute English conceptual metaphor.

4. On the motivation for Conceptual Metaphors

A number of cognitive semanticists have addressed the nature of conceptual metaphors and their relationship to cultural models (Holland and Quinn 1987, Lakoff and Kövecses 1987, Quinn 1991, Kövecses 1999, 2000a, 2000b, 2002, 2005, 2006; Littlemore 2003). Generally these researchers have attempted to determine which is basic. I suggest that there are three primary motivations for conceptual metaphors: (1) universal image-schemas, (2) universal human physiology, and (3) cultural models.

4.1 Universal image-schemas as motivating conceptual metaphors

Cervel (2003), building on Turner (1987), provides a comprehensive study of image-schemas, which, she states, arise as the result of our interaction with the environment and which provide the basic blueprint for the understanding of metaphorical expressions.¹³ She defines an image-schema as “a recurring pattern of experience which is abstract and topological in nature” (2003:42). It is

- *preconceptual* (therefore also non-linguistic),
- *non-propositional* (not expressed in an underlying language or thought),
- *embodied* (it emerges from physical experience),
- *structured* (it is organized as patterns or systems with a series of structural elements that serve as a basis for their internal logic),
- *non-representational* (there is no duality between the subject and the activity being carried out), and
- *abstract* (schematic patterns arise from imagistic domains—*containers, paths, links, forces* ...).

Some examples of image-schemas are PATH, NEAR-FAR, BLOCKAGE, MERGING, LINK, CYCLE, ITERATION, SCALE, VERTICALITY, CENTER-PERIPHERY, PART-WHOLE, CONTAINER, FULL-EMPTY, BALANCE, and COUNTERFORCE.

¹² I have addressed this issue in the context of cultural relativism in McElhanon 2000.

¹³ Mandler (1992 and 2004) details how image-schemas develop in infant cognition.

Cervel's goal is to ascertain whether or not the large number of image-schemas, principally proposed by Turner, evidence a hierarchical relationship. In proposing a hierarchy, she suggests that three image-schemas—CONTAINER, PATH, and PART-WHOLE are basic for the construction of most image-schematic emotion metaphors in English (2003:41). Assuming that her suggestion is correct, then it seems reasonable also to assume that these basic image-schemas have a greater likelihood of representing universals than do some of the derived ones. An implication of image-schemas for translation is that serious consideration ought to be given to using language that retains the image-schemas latent in the SL text. For example, the image-schema of *verticality* that construes the conceptualization of *pride* may be retained in the TL even if the language expresses it differently.

Another indication that image-schemas in general are likely to be universal is that the characteristics given for image-schemas are also pre-cultural and therefore, presumably, culture-free. More will be said about this when we consider how image schemas motivate cultural models as the source for the structuring of conceptual metaphors. But first, let us consider two examples of how image schemas motivate what Lakoff and Johnson (1980) classify as orientation metaphors.

4.1.1 VERTICALITY image-schema

Table 1 presents some primary conceptual metaphors based upon the VERTICALITY image-schema realized with the oppositions HIGH vs. LOW, ABOVE vs. BELOW, UP vs. DOWN.¹⁴

¹⁴ All quoted Scripture is from the New American Standard Bible (NASB) unless otherwise noted. Because the examples in Table A are drawn from a translation, the suggested image-schemas must be regarded as preliminary. A rigorous study requires that the image schemas be based on the text of the original languages.

<p style="text-align: center;">HEAVEN IS UP — EARTH/SHEOL IS DOWN</p> <p>Ps. 14:2 <i>The LORD has looked down from heaven upon the sons of men</i> to see if there are any who understand, who seek after God. Ps. 55:15 Let them go down alive to Sheol, For evil is in their dwelling, in their midst.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">HOLY IS UP/HIGH — EVIL IS DOWN</p> <p>Is. 57:15 For thus says the <i>high and exalted One</i> Who lives forever, whose name is <i>Holy</i>, “I dwell on a <i>high and holy place</i>,” Prov. 14:19 <i>The evil will bow down</i> before the good,</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">STRENGTH IS UP — WEAKNESS IS DOWN</p> <p>Ps. 21:13 Be <i>exalted</i>, O LORD, <i>in Your strength</i>; Ps. 61:3 For You have been a refuge for me, <i>A tower of strength</i> against the enemy. Ps. 88:4 I am reckoned among those <i>who go down to the pit</i>; I have become like <i>a man without strength</i>,</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">HONOR IS UP — DEFERENCE IS DOWN</p> <p>Deut. 26:19a “and that He will <i>set you high</i> above all nations which He has made, <i>for praise, fame, and honor</i>” Gen. 43:28 They <i>bowed down in homage</i>.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">SECURITY IS HIGH — INSECURITY IS LOW</p> <p>Ps. 107:39 When they are <i>diminished and bowed down through oppression, misery and sorrow</i>, 107:41 But He sets the needy <i>securely on high away from affliction</i>,</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">PROSPERITY IS UP — POVERTY IS DOWN</p> <p>Ps 49:1-2 “Hear this, all peoples ... Both low and <i>high</i>, <i>Rich</i> and poor together.” 1 Sam 2:7 The LORD makes poor and <i>rich</i>; He brings low, He also <i>exalts</i>.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">PRIDE/HONOR IS HIGH — HUMILITY/CONTRITION IS LOW</p> <p>Job 40:11-12 And look on everyone who is <i>proud</i>, and make him low. [Note that the NIV chooses to replace “make him low” with “humble him”.] Prov. 29:23 A man's <i>pride</i> will bring him low, But a humble spirit will obtain <i>honor</i>.</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">ARROGANCE IS UP/LARGE — DISDAIN IS DOWN/SMALL</p> <p>Jer. 49:15-16 “I have made you small among the nations, Despised among men. ... The <i>arrogance</i> of your heart has deceived you, O you who live in the clefts of the rock, Who occupy the <i>height of the hill</i>. Though you make your <i>nest as high as an eagle's</i>, I will bring you down from there,” declares the Lord. (cf. Obadiah 1:2-4).</p>
<p style="text-align: center;">INTELLIGENCE IS HIGH</p> <p>Ps. 139:6 Such <i>knowledge</i> is too wonderful for me; It is too <i>high</i>, I cannot attain to it. Is. 55:9 “For as the heavens are <i>higher</i> than the earth, So are My ways higher than your ways, And My <i>thoughts</i> than your thoughts.</p>

Table 1: VERTICALITY image-schema

The imagery is too often lost in those translations that avoid translating literally both image-schemas and the conceptual metaphors that are based upon them. We have noted that this practice has resulted in most contemporary English translations replacing the Greek metaphors that express the concept of truth as experiential with English metaphors that express the Western notion of truth as rational (McElhanon 2000, 2005).

4.1.2 CONTAINER image-schema

This avoidance of a literal translation of image-schemas and any metaphors based upon them has also impacted our understanding of Paul's use of a container image-schema to express abstract concepts. His use of the container image-schema consists of a physical container and abstract contents, and it is depicted with two varieties—one in which a person is in a contained substance and another in which the person is a container full of the substance. When we speak of a person being *in* something, e.g., an emotion such as *love* or *despair*, we speak as though the person is in a container although the container may not always be specified. When it is specified it often occurs in association with a prepositional phrase with *of*, as in “He is in the *pit of despair*.” More commonly we simply speak of *sinking into despair* and *climbing out of despair* or *being in love* and *falling out of love*. I suggest that when we do not overtly specify the container, we are using the abstract concept metonymically: CONTENTS OF THE CONTAINER STAND FOR THE CONTAINER.¹⁵ Thus, when Paul was with the Corinthians, he was with them ἐν ἀσθενείᾳ καὶ ἐν φόβῳ καὶ ἐν τρόμῳ πολλῷ ‘in weakness, in fear, and in much trembling’.

In writing to the Corinthians with regard to how they had punished an offender, Paul uses personification in construing an implied container: “Now instead, you ought to forgive and comfort him, *so that he will not be overwhelmed by excessive sorrow*” 2 Cor. 2:7 (NIV). The Greek expression is literally μή πως τῇ περισσοτέρῳ λύπῃ καταποθῆ ‘so that he will not be swallowed up in/by excessive grief’. Here the container is left implied. Interestingly, at least a vestige of the container image-schema is maintained in those English translations that use the verb *overwhelmed*. More likely than not, however, the translators were unaware of the metaphorical roots of *overwhelm*, or if they were, they likely regarded it as a dead metaphor.¹⁶ Nevertheless, in both the Greek original and those English translations, the person ends up being immersed in an abstract concept. Note, however, that Louw and Nida (25.285, 1988:I:319) remove the container image-schema completely by translating it as “in order that somehow he may not so despair as to give up completely.”

Alternative to being in the abstract content of an implied container, a person or a body part may be overtly specified as the container. In the case of body parts, a given body part may be typically associated with a given emotion, as is likely in the case of σπλάγχνα ‘intestines’ that is said to reflect the more deeply felt emotion of ‘compassionate mercy’ (Köster 1971). On the other hand, many abstract concepts may be associated with a single body part as in Mark 7:21-22: “For from within, out of the heart [καρδία] of men, proceed the evil thoughts, fornications, thefts, murders, adulteries, deeds of coveting and wickedness, as well as deceit, sensuality, envy, slander, pride and foolishness.”

Luke, in relating the account of Ananias having retained part of the sale of a property, does not specify the content of the heart: “But Peter said, ‘Ananias, why has Satan filled your heart to lie to the Holy Spirit and to keep back some of the price of the land?’” (Acts 5:3). From what is written above in Mark 7:21-22 we may infer that it was likely that Satan filled Ananias’ heart with deceit [δόλος], and that deceit was expressed by the act of lying.¹⁷

¹⁵ The role of a container vis-a-vis its contents is much more complex than what I have presented here, but a definitive study is beyond the scope of this paper.

¹⁶ Partridge (1983:802) gives the etymology for *overwhelm* as “derives from ME *hwelmen*, to turn upside down... a blend of OE *helman*, to cover, and *-hwelfan* in *āhwelfan*, to cover over, hence to overcome completely.”

¹⁷ *Deceit* is an abstract concept that may be instantiated by either telling a lie or telling the truth, i.e., a factual statement. That either may be used to deceive highlights the futility of limiting truth to the expression of a factual proposition. Understanding *truth* as experiential does not allow for one to deceive another by telling the truth. See McElhanon (2000).

When a person is specified as a container, however, I suggest that the person is thought of holistically as the container or perhaps a body part is used metonymically to stand for the person. Thus we have a metonymy A BODY PART STANDS FOR A PERSON.¹⁸ When Jesus healed the paralytic and demonstrated that he also had power to forgive sins, the people were ἐπλήσθησαν φόβου ‘filled with fear’ (Luke 5:26). Note, however, that Paul cites his heart as the container, “I am telling the truth in Christ, I am not lying, my conscience testifies with me in the Holy Spirit, that I have great sorrow and unceasing grief in my heart” (Rom 9:1-2; also John 16:5-6). Similarly, whereas Paul depicts the offender cited in 2 Cor. 2:7 as in an implied container full of sorrow, John 16:5-6 images the hearts of Jesus’ disciples as full of sorrow, “But now I am going to Him who sent Me; and none of you asks Me, ‘Where are You going?’ But because I have said these things to you, sorrow has filled your heart.”

The question that begs to be answered is whether or not there is a difference between a person *being filled* by an abstract substance and a person *being in* that substance. Whereas Luke records that Stephen was πλήρης πίστεως ‘full of faith’ (Acts 6:5), Paul writes that he lives ἐν πίστει ‘in faith’ (Gal. 2:20). We should not assume that these phrases are synonymous. It may be that when a person or a body part is the container, the focus is on *the person’s life as it exemplifies a quality or virtue* at a given moment, or is contingent on a given experience. This is likely for those who watched Jesus heal the paralytic and for those reflecting on how Stephen lived as a follower of Christ. On the other hand, it may be that when a person is in the substance, the focus is on *the quality of that person’s experience*.¹⁹ Thus, when Jesus says that true worshippers will worship the Father ἐν πνεύματι καὶ ἀληθείᾳ ‘in Spirit and truth’ (John 4:23), he may be characterizing their worship as an experience that reflects the influence of the Spirit who produces the evidences of truth. Recall that Paul enjoined the Philippians to practice whatever reflected the virtue of truth (Phil. 4:8). This is undoubtedly what John had in mind when he wrote, “I have no greater joy than this, to hear of my children walking in the truth” (3 John 1:4).

4.1.3 NEAR-FAR image-schema

As we consider how God is imaged in the Scriptures, it is helpful to begin with an observation by A. W. Tozer (1961:83):

God is spirit, and to Him magnitude and distance have no meaning. To us they are useful as analogies and illustrations, so God refers to them constantly when speaking down to our limited understanding. The words of God as found in Isaiah, ‘Thus saith the high and lofty One that inhabiteth eternity,’ give a distinct impression of altitude, but that is because *we who dwell in a world of matter, space, and time tend to think in material terms and can grasp abstract ideas only when they are identified in some way with material things*. In its struggle to free itself from the tyranny of the natural world, the human heart must learn to translate upward the language the Spirit uses to instruct us (italics added).

The NEAR-FAR image-schema, coupled with the CONTAINER image schema, is also relevant to our rather limited understanding of God’s transcendence.²⁰ Had the image-schemas and the conceptual metaphors based upon them been retained in the translations, the readers would have been aided in recognizing that the concept of transcendence says more about the human state of alienation than it does about the nature of God. In the elaboration of God’s transcendence, both of these image-schemas are scalar.

The reality is that God cannot be contained: “Behold, heaven and the highest heaven *cannot contain You*; how much less this house which I have built” (2 Chron. 6:18). Although creation does not contain God, nevertheless, from the human perspective of not being able to see beyond creation, God is represented as contained by creation. Thus Jeremiah writes, ““Can a man hide himself in hiding places so I do not see

¹⁸ Köster (1971:555) asserts, “Like other anthropological terms, e.g., καρδία, νοῦς, the word [σπλάγγνα] is used in Paul for the whole man...” Although the metonymy A BODY PART STANDS FOR A PERSON seems more common, there may be instances that suggest the reverse metonymy A PERSON STANDS FOR A BODY PART.

¹⁹ This suggested difference needs to be confirmed by further study. It is important to note that, given the nature of language and cognition, any conclusions will likely need to be phrased in terms of tendencies.

²⁰ See McElhanon 2003 for an application of image-schematic interpretation of expressions relating to the concept of God’s transcendence.

him?’ declares the LORD. ‘Do I not *fill the heavens and the earth?*’” (Jer. 23:24).²¹ Paul also wrote this of Christ, “He who descended is the very one who ascended higher than all the heavens, *in order to fill the whole universe*” (Eph. 4:10). The image here is that God is a substance in a container. This perspective may also lie behind Paul’s statement that combines the personification of God with a container image schema, “God did this so that men would seek him and perhaps reach out for him and find him, though he is not far from each one of us. ‘For in him we live and move and have our being.’” (Acts 17:27-28, NIV). We begin, therefore, with the concept that God is everywhere; there is no place known as “non-God space.”

This metaphor that accounts for God’s omnipresence is THE UNIVERSE IS A CONTAINER. In the following selections the perspective is that of a person within the universe that serves as a container filled by God so that the person is in God.

Job 11:7-9 “Can you discover *the depths* of God? Can you discover *the limits* of the Almighty? They are *high as the heavens*, what can you do? *Deeper than Sheol*, what can you know? Its measure is *longer than the earth* And *broader than the sea*.”

Ps. 139:7-10 “*Where can I go from Your Spirit? Or where can I flee from Your presence? If I ascend to heaven*, You are there; *If I make my bed in Sheol*, behold, You are there. *If I take the wings of the dawn*, if I dwell in the *remotest part of the sea*, even there Your hand will lead me, And Your right hand will lay hold of me.”

The NEAR-FAR image schema is fundamental to our experience in that all entities are perceived in terms of proximity. This is a scalar relationship in that the closer an entity is to us the more likely it is that it will have an effect on us. The NEAR-FAR image schema is the basis of the conceptual metaphor EMOTIONAL DISTANCE IS PHYSICAL DISTANCE. This metaphor is expressed in English by the following:

- *When they married, he was still attached to his mother’s apron strings.*
- *During the first years of marriage he was very aloof, very distant.*
- *But soon she was able to get through to him.*
- *He was drawn to her and became stuck on her.*
- *So, they became inseparable love birds.*
- *For years his devotion to her touched everyone, but in later years, they drifted apart.*
- *Eventually he became emotionally unavailable and more distant than ever.*

With this understanding of the CONTAINER and NEAR-FAR image-schemas, we may consider the concept of God’s transcendence. Since we live, move and have our being in God and there is no place where we can go and get away from God, it stands that references to God being NEAR or FAR are instantiations of the conceptual metaphor EMOTIONAL DISTANCE IS PHYSICAL DISTANCE.

In light of the universality of image-schema it is not surprising to find variants of this metaphor commonly used to describe a person’s relationship with God.

EMOTIONAL DISTANCE IS PHYSICAL DISTANCE

Job 22:23a If you *return* to The Almighty, you will be restored;

Ps. 39:21 Do not *forsake me*, O LORD; O my God, do not *be far from me!*

Ps. 22:1 My God, my God, why have You *forsaken me?* Far from my deliverance are the words of my groaning.

²¹ Given the nature of the abstract contents of a container, the perspective that God fills the universe implies that his attributes characterize that creation. Thus, it is recorded that “God saw all that he had made, and it was very good” (Gen. 1:31), and Paul writes, “For since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities—his eternal power and divine nature—have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made....” (Rom. 1:20).

BEING ACCEPTED IS BEING ALLOWED TO APPROACH

Exodus 24:2 Moses alone, however, shall come *near to the LORD*, but they shall not come near, nor shall the people come up with him.”

Heb. 4:16 Therefore let us *draw near with confidence* to the throne of grace, so that we may *receive mercy and find grace* to help in time of need.

BEING UNINVOLVED IS BEING DISTANT

Ps 10:1-2a “Why do You *stand afar off*, O LORD? Why do You *hide Yourself* in times of trouble? In pride the wicked hotly pursue the afflicted....

REJECTING IS BEING ABSENT

Ps. 88:14 O LORD, why do You reject my soul? Why do You hide Your face from me?

4.2 Universal human physiology as motivating conceptual metaphors

Kövecses (1999, 2005, and 2006) addresses the relationship between conceptual metaphor and cultural model and suggests that the former is basic. In support he demonstrates that certain emotions are associated with universal, human physiological conditions, as, for example, when a person who is angry senses an increase in the heart rate, pulsating temples, a higher blood pressure, a reddened complexion, and/or an increase in body temperature. These are then treated metonymically as INTERNAL PRESSURE STANDS FOR ANGER, BODY HEAT STANDS FOR ANGER, and REDNESS IN THE FACE AND NECK AREA STANDS FOR ANGER. Such associations motivate metaphors such as the PRESSURIZED CONTAINER METAPHOR. He also uses the model to account for a potential universality for conceptual metaphors vis-à-vis the culturally particular instantiations of that metaphor. Thus, he writes that general metaphors, e.g., THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER, constitute a “generic schema that is filled out by each culture that has the metaphor” (Kövecses 2005:68). He illustrates it with culturally variant metaphors that instantiate a given emotion. Thus, he reports that Japanese, in addition to having the same metaphors for anger as does English, has additional metaphors that center on the *hara* ‘belly’ (Matsuki 1995). He also reports that the Chinese metaphor for anger is similar to that of English, but whereas English has a liquid in a pressurized container, Chinese has a gas (Yu 1998). Moreover, although Zulu shares many conceptual metaphors with English, Zulu metaphors expressing anger are based on the heart as the container (Taylor and Mbense 1998). English metaphors involving heart as the container relate to love and affection.

In attempting to determine the conditions for the universality of conceptual metaphors, Kövecses surveyed analyses of conceptual metaphors relating to the *self* (one’s inner life) in a number of unrelated languages, principally English, Chinese (King 1989; Yu 1995, 1998), Hungarian (Boker 1997), Japanese (Matsuki 1995), Wolof—West Africa (Munro 1991), Zulu—South Africa (Taylor and Mbense 1998) and Polish (Micholajczuk 1998). Although people from radically different cultures—English, Japanese, and Hungarian—talk about and conceptualize the notion of self in surprisingly similar ways, he concluded that “it would not be appropriate to claim that this treatment of the self is universal”, but that “it is a good candidate for near-universal status” (2005:63). Kearney (1984), however, claims that the self-other distinction is a worldview universal and fundamental to human relationships.

4.3 Cultural models as motivating conceptual metaphors

A potential weakness in Kövecses’ proposal is that the analyst may express the conceptual metaphor with as much generality as is needed to encompass the purported variants. THE ANGRY PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER is less abstract than the metaphor he suggests to account for the cross-cultural variation found in the concept of marriage. For this he posits a very abstract metaphor, NON-PHYSICAL UNITY IS PHYSICAL UNITY, and then, because marriage is a more concrete instantiation of that metaphor, he states that the metaphor gives rise to the American cultural model of marriage. Others, however, have proposed less abstract conceptual metaphors that account for American concepts of

marriage such as MARRIAGE IS A BUSINESS PARTNERSHIP, A PARENT-CHILD RELATIONSHIP (Lakoff and Johnson 1999), A MANUFACTURED PRODUCT, and AN INVESTMENT (Quinn 1987). These construals are based on American cultural models relating to business, finance, and kinship. In order to transcend such culturally dependent variants, all that is required is that the metaphor be construed as abstractly as necessary. Kövecses' abstract construal, however, does not seem likely to encompass those cultures where marriage is regarded as a covenant between social groups rather than as an emotional or physical unity between spouses. In such cases a more appropriate construal may be MARRIAGE IS A COVENANT, or following up on the kind of construal suggested by Kövecses, NON-PHYSICAL UNITY IS SOCIAL UNITY. These possibilities highlight the fact that as the data base is expanded by the incorporation of additional cultural varieties, the greater is the likelihood that the conceptual metaphor that accounts for the data has to be construed in greater degrees of abstraction.

5. Principles for Translating Image-schemas and Conceptual Metaphors

Kövecses (2005) presents three types of conceptual metaphors, and it is likely that they represent a continuum that reflects increasing degrees of cultural influence:

1. core conceptual metaphors that arise directly from image-schemas are those least likely to be influenced by cultural factors,
2. primary conceptual metaphors that are motivated by universal correlations in human bodily experience are prone to some cultural influence, and
3. complex conceptual metaphors that are motivated by universal human experience are more susceptible to cultural framing.

Accordingly I suggest the following principles for translating conceptual metaphors. These principles reflect the continuum underlying Kövecses' three types of conceptual metaphors. These principles are suggestive, and it is expected that there will be refinements of them and additions to them.

5.1. Universalism: Translate a metaphor that reflects a universal, human conceptual process so as to preserve the underlying image-schema structure.

This principle reflects Lakoff's (1990) *Invariance Hypothesis* statement that the mapping process from the source to target space ought to preserve the image-schematic elements and structure of the source. This principle likely entails that conceptual metaphors that arise directly from image-schemas should be translated as literally as necessary to ensure such preservation.

One of the best candidates for universality, if not in actual occurrence then at least in a potential for being introduced where it does not occur, is that of LIVING LIFE IS GOING ON A JOURNEY. This conceptual metaphor derives directly from the PATH image-schema. I suggest, moreover, that motivating the PATH image-schema is an underlying concept of SELF vs. OTHER, what Kearny (1984) suggests is a world-view universal. Experientially, the PATH image-schema may be regarded as the SELF successfully covering a distance and making connection with the OTHER. This self-oriented connection necessarily entails movement from the SELF as the SOURCE over a PATH to the OTHER as the GOAL.²²

It may be regarded as axiomatic that the universal human mode of movement from one point to another point is that of walking along a path. Accordingly, it is reasonable to expect that LIVING LIFE IS GOING ON A JOURNEY BY FOOT has the potential to serve as a universal conceptual metaphor. It is particularly useful when translating the Bible because journeying on foot was the prototypical way of going on a journey. The Bible draws upon the conceptual metaphor LIVING LIFE IS GOING ON A JOURNEY for developing a number of related metaphors for the faithful. These related metaphors have other underlying image-schemas:

²² Turner (1987) includes a *link* image-schema, but I suggest that the *link* image-schema also may be regarded as a successful completion of the Source-Path-Goal image-schema and may not warrant an independent status.

1. BEING RIGHTEOUS IS BEING/WALKING UPRIGHT:

1 Sam. 29:6 “Then Achish called David and said to him, “As the LORD lives, you have been upright, ... for I have not found evil in you...”

1 Kings 9:4a “As for you, if you will walk before Me as your father David walked, in integrity of heart and uprightness,”

Job 1:1 “There was a man in the land of Uz whose name was Job; and that man was blameless, upright, fearing God and turning away from evil.”

I suggest that two underlying image-schemas, VERTICALITY and STRAIGHT-DEVIANT underlie this metaphor.²³

2. BEING FAITHFUL IS STAYING ON THE PATH

Ex. 32:8 “... in order that the house of Israel may no longer stray from Me and no longer defile themselves with all their transgressions. Thus they will be My people, and I shall be their God,” declares the Lord GOD.”

Hosea 7:13a,b “Woe to them, for they have strayed from Me! Destruction is theirs, for they have rebelled against Me!”

Here we have the STRAIGHT-DEVIANT image-schema as underlying movement along a path. In as much as the conceptual metaphor BEING RIGHTEOUS IS WALKING UPRIGHT has underlying VERTICALITY and STRAIGHT-DEVIANT image-schemas, then it seems that BEING FAITHFUL IS STAYING ON THE PATH ought to have underlying HORIZONTALITY and STRAIGHT-DEVIANT image-schemas. This raises the question whether the VERTICALITY image-schema is best combined with HORIZONTALITY into a VERTICALITY-HORIZONTALITY image-schema that is analogous with the widely accepted NEAR-FAR, FRONT-BACK, and UP-DOWN dyadic image-schemas.

3. SINNING IS STUMBLING

Hosea 5:5 “Moreover, the pride of Israel testifies against him, And Israel and Ephraim stumble in their iniquity; Judah also has stumbled with them.”

Prov. 4:11-12 “I have directed you in the way of wisdom; I have led you in upright paths. When you walk, your steps will not be impeded; And if you run, you will not stumble.”

Prov. 24:16 “For a righteous man falls seven times, and rises again, But the wicked stumble in time of calamity.”

Jer. 31:9b “I will make them walk by streams of waters, On a straight path in which they will not stumble;”

The underlying image-schema is verticality. Thus the metaphors are variants of GOOD IS UP, BAD IS DOWN.

5.2 Human physiology. Translate a metaphor that reflects common human physiological processes so as to preserve the sense of a physiological basis.

Kövecses has demonstrated that certain human emotions have correlative human physiological responses that motivate general metaphors with generic schemas. These schemas are instantiated in different, but related ways, in various societies. Thus, he notes that metaphors expressing the emotion of anger are often based upon the generic schema A PERSON IS A PRESSURIZED CONTAINER.

²³ This image-schema is often expressed by *erect, upright, direct, accurate, etc.* vs. *deviant, crooked, bent, stray, etc.* Cervel (2003:16) posits a DIVERSION image-schema as subsidiary to BLOCKAGE and COUNTERFORCE image-schemas. Some of her examples, however, are consistent with my proposed STRAIGHT-DEVIANT image-schema.

He goes on to make an important observation that people from diverse cultures do have “surprisingly similar ways” of talking about their concept of self. In McElhanon (1975, 1978a, 1978b) I observed what I categorized as *body image idioms*—expressions that consist of a limited number of terms for body parts and predications—that refer to a wide range of emotions and virtues. Two observations are particularly significant. First, these expressions are dynamic rather than static: any change in the predication correspondingly changes the meaning of the expression. For example, in the Selepet language, ‘she became agitated’ could be changed to ‘she became increasingly agitated’ by replacing the verb meaning ‘to raise up’ with one meaning ‘to gradually raise up while uncoiling’ (as does an aroused snake). Second, this phenomenon is found to be characteristic of a large number of Papuan languages, and the body part terms utilized show areal characteristics. For example, regarding expressions based on the terms for internal organs, the speakers of one group of related languages use terms that may be glossed as ‘inside’ and ‘stomach’, but those of another group use ‘heart’ and ‘liver’. Such semantic and areal characteristics undoubtedly contribute to the dynamics of translation. In light of the richness of metaphorical structure, it is regrettable that many contemporary translators have chosen to rid their translations of metaphors. It is important that the translator not replace such physiologically based conceptual metaphors with non-metaphorical expressions. To do so is not only to restrict the range of potential expressions and their associated nuances of meaning, but also is to stifle the imagination that gives expression to human conceptualization.

5.3 Experiential cultural models. Translate a metaphor that has an underlying cultural model with a similar model ensuring that the coherence and integrity of the underlying translation model is not compromised.

We have noted that image-schemas are pre-conceptual and therefore, presumably, culture free. This is the basis for claiming that since the metaphor LIVING LIFE IS GOING ON A JOURNEY is derived directly from the SOURCE-PATH-GOAL image-schema, it is likely to be culture free and universal. Such universal image-schematic conceptual metaphors, by maintaining their typological structure, serve as the basis for the development of conceptual metaphors based upon cultural models. Thus, the cultural model of seafaring is the basis for the conceptual metaphor LIVING LIFE IS GOING ON A JOURNEY BY SEA. This metaphor underlies Paul’s comment that Hymenaeus and Alexander “have rejected these [faith and a good conscience] “and so have *shipwrecked* (ἐναυάγησαν) their faith” (1 Tim. 1:20, NIV).

Note the NIV translation of Peter’s (2 Peter 3:17) warning, “Therefore, dear friends, since you already know this, be on your guard so that you may not be carried away by the error of lawless men and fall from your secure position.” The NIV translators have removed any hint of an underlying conceptual metaphor, thereby compromising the effect of the passage. Compare the NIV with my suggested translation that preserves the nautical imagery: “Therefore, dear friends, since you already know this, be on your guard so that you may not be carried away by the *straying* (πλάνη) of lawless men and *drift* (ἐκπέσητε—a nautical term) from your *fixed* (στηριγμός) *course*.²⁴ Given the importance to theology of the conceptual metaphor EXPERIENCING A LIFE OF FAITH IS GOING ON A JOURNEY BY SEA, it is regrettable that the translators of the NIV—and undoubtedly many more English translators—chose to remove the metaphor.

6. Conceptual Blends

For centuries all metaphors were treated as simple metaphors. They were regarded as isolated expressions coined by a speaker on the basis of a perceived similarity between two objects. We have noted that Lakoff and Johnson (1980) introduced conceptual metaphor theory with the notions of source and target domains, invariance, mappings, and so forth.

More recently Fauconnier and Turner (Fauconnier 1985, 1997; Fauconnier and Turner 1998, 2000, 2002) seek to explain much of the same linguistic data, and also to unify the interpretation of metaphor with the

²⁴ Bauer cites στηριγμός ‘fixed, firm’, possibly ‘safe, secure’ (1979:308, 945). Louw and Nida remove the nautical imagery and translate it as “so that you will not be led astray by the error of lawless people and fall from your safe position” (13.59; 1988:156), (31.10; 1988:I:367) (21.13; 1988:I:240) (74.20; 1988:I:678).

interpretation of a variety of other linguistic and conceptual phenomena. This framework—referred to variously as the theory of *blending*, *conceptual blending*, and *conceptual integration*—shares many aspects of conceptual metaphor theory (CMT). For instance, both approaches treat metaphor as a conceptual rather than as a purely linguistic phenomenon; both involve systematic projection of language, imagery and inferential structure between conceptual domains; both propose constraints on this projection; and so forth. However, there are also important differences between the approaches: CMT posits projection between two mental representations, while blending theory (BT) allows more; CMT has defined metaphor as a strictly directional phenomenon, while BT does not have such a limitation; and, whereas CMT analyses are stated in terms of entrenched conceptual relationships, BT emphasizes blending as an “on-line process,” which both instantiates entrenched metaphors and can yield short-lived and novel conceptualizations to complement them (Grady, et al 1999).

Conceptual blending, to my knowledge, has not been applied to the praxis of hermeneutics and translation. Conceptual blends are ubiquitous in the Scriptures and underlie a wide range of phenomena, from dreams, visions, parables, and allegories to simple comparisons as that of the domestic and wild olive trees (Rom. 11:16-24), and to statements that have been traditionally regarded as simple propositions such as “Nor do people put new wine into old wineskins; otherwise the wineskins burst, and the wine pours out and the wineskins are ruined; but they put new wine into fresh wineskins, and both are preserved” (Mt. 9:17).²⁵

Conceptual blending is usually a routine process whereby selective content from *input* spaces is projected to a *blended* space in a process called *composition*. One of the input spaces supplies an event or scenario that structures the content in the blended space. To distinguish this space from other input spaces I will refer to it as the *source* space. The structure in the blended space is often enhanced through the processes of *completion*, *elaboration* and *compression*. Inferences from the blended space are then projected to a *target* space that usually has abstract content with the result that it changes the way we think about the situations in that target space (Fauconnier and Turner 1998). Alternatively, these inferences may be projected back to one of the input spaces, thereby *transforming it to a target space*. The parables often exhibit this characteristic as Jesus sought to correct misunderstandings about the Kingdom of God. Figure 1 presents a schematic overview of the process.

²⁵ Although Dodd separates *parable* from *allegory*, he does recognize a single principle of *comparison* operating within his posited “three classes of parable—figurative sayings, similitudes, and parables proper” (1961:7), so that “one class melts into another, and it is clear that in all of them we have nothing but the elaboration of a single comparison....” His need to keep the parables of Jesus distinct from other types of analogies precluded him seeing that the principle was more generally applicable.




Figure 1: Conceptual blend network

6.1 Steps in the Interpretation of Conceptual Blends

In as much as a conceptual blend represents the output of thought, interpretation necessarily begins with the blended space. We receive the blend prepackaged, so to speak, and our role in interpreting it is that of identifying the various mental spaces, tracing the links between them and drawing the appropriate inferences. Accordingly, I suggest the following steps:

1. First, work backwards from the blended space to describe the content in the blend and the spaces from which it was projected to the blend. One of these source spaces serves as the primary space that provides the organizing frame or scenario for the events depicted in the blended space. Since a limited number of the entities in this frame are actually projected to the blended space, the analyst should expect to recognize non-projected, or latent, entities. These are available for recruitment should someone decide to “run the blend”—similar to transforming it from a single frame to a motion picture. *Running the blend* is to recruit such latent entities or schemas from an input space and integrate them with the content of the blend in order to allow additional inferences to be drawn and projected to the target space. In most cases the blended space constitutes a virtual world in which reality is suspended and the strange and amazing become commonplace.
2. If the blend is metaphoric, map the metonymic links between the entities in the source space with the corresponding entities in the other input spaces or target space.
3. Examine the content of the virtual world in the blended space in order to identify how it has been adapted to meet the goals of the blend’s creator through the processes of *composition*, *completion*, *elaboration*, and *compression*.
4. Identify any emergent meaning(s) that serve(s) as the basis for inferences that may be projected back to a separate target space or back to one of the input spaces, thereby transforming it to a target space. Projecting inferences back to a source space with abstract content serves one of the goals of conceptual blending, viz., to correct or modify abstract concepts.
5. Extract the structure that is common to the mental spaces, suggest a cover term for it, and enter it in the generic space. Often this is simply an idealized cognitive model or some skeletal structure such as an image-schema. Because it is necessarily abstract, it may be readily phrased as abstractly as necessary to account for a presumed commonality shared among the other spaces.

6.2 Interpretation of the Seattle Sounder conceptual blend

Not long ago I noticed a billboard (Figure 2) in Seattle, Washington. The time it takes residents of the Seattle area to understand the message of this billboard is likely to be in milliseconds.²⁶ The message is clear, “Leave the high pressure of the gridlocked traffic that characterizes Seattle traffic conditions and enjoy a peaceful and serene commute aboard the suburban train system.” Although the billboard projects simplicity by depicting very few elements, the blend is conceptually very complex. An apparent characteristic of successful blend creation is that the message that is clear is the one that is not cluttered by irrelevant accoutrements. Simplicity promotes ease and speed of interpretation. My interpretation suggests that each of the halves of the billboard represents a blend (Blends A and B), and that there are implicit third and fourth blended spaces (C and D) that serve as the final Target spaces expressing the message of the advertisement.

²⁶ For empirical research on the processing time of typical conceptual blends, see the many publications of Raymond W. Gibbs, Jr., particularly Gibbs 2006 and Gibbs and Colston 1995.




Figure 2: A billboard on Aurora Avenue in Seattle, one of the busiest urban routes for north-south commuting.


Let us begin our interpretation by first considering the blended space on the left with the caption ESCAPE (Figure 3). Stylized content from two input spaces is projected to this space. First, a variety of motor vehicles that is typical of a daily commute is projected from a freeway scenario (Source Space A). The blend ingeniously miniaturizes the motor vehicles and packs them very compactly into an empty sardine can that is projected from a second space (Source Space B). The goal is to evoke a sense of claustrophobia and anxiety in those who view the billboard. The grey color is also significant in as much as it evokes the dreariness of the grey, cloudy days that are so characteristic of the Seattle-Tacoma area for several months of the year and associates it with being gridlocked in traffic.

Generic space: containment of objects in a restricted space.

Source Space A: Only the vehicles are projected to the blend.



Source Space B: Only an empty sardine can and the compactness of the sardines as they are packed in the can are projected to the blend.



Blended Space A: Virtual World of miniaturized vehicles packed in a sardine can.



Explication of Blended Space A:

Composition. Only motor vehicles and an empty sardine can are imported from the two source spaces. Details are not imported, e.g., lane markers, freeway shoulders, exits, signs, and High Occupancy Vehicle lanes.

Completion. That prototypical freeways in urban areas have three or more traffic lanes allows the reader to identify the compacted vehicles as representing gridlock on a three-lane freeway.

Elaboration. Whereas sardines are packed facing opposite directions, the vehicles all point one direction, and importantly, away from the opening, in the direction of no escape. This heightens the *stress and anxiety-producing experience* associated with gridlock. The background grey color also contributes to the *drudgery* of traffic.

Compression. An emergent claustrophobic emotion is heightened by the extreme compaction of the miniaturized motor vehicles in a presumed traffic pattern. That they are packed in the confines of a sardine can also contributes to that heightening.

Figure 3: Displayed Interpretation of the Blended Space A.


Next let us analyze the blended space on the right half of the billboard (Figure 4). It also has stylized content from two input spaces: a depiction of the interurban train, the *Sounder* (Source Space C), and another of the mountainous, rural countryside that lies both west (the Olympic Mountains) and east (the Cascade Mountains) of the Tacoma-Seattle-Everett corridor (Source Space D). Simplicity is again characteristic of the blend. The *Sounder* is removed from its normal operating context, stripped of all images that would evoke the negative aspects of commuting in the *Sounder*, such as parking one's vehicle in crowded lots, jostling with other commuters to embark or disembark from the train, and potentially having to stand for the duration of the commute. Having removed the *Sounder* from its normal operating context, the creator of the blend depicts it with a backdrop of a simplified, stylized mountain scene in soft hues of blue, an image that evokes a sense of a comfort and relaxation. Missing are such details as creeks, cliffs, back roads, and logged-off swaths of forest.

Generic space: people and environments


Source Space C: the interurban *Sounder* commuter train that serves the greater Seattle-Tacoma metroplex



Source Space D: expansive, rural, mountain scenery that evokes a sense of tranquility and relaxation.



Blended Space B: Stylized, virtual world of the *Sounder* commuter train in a rural, mountainous setting.



Explication of Blended Space B

Composition. Only a stylized image of the *Sounder* and stylized mountainous terrain are imported from the two source spaces.

Completion. The expansiveness of the mountain landscape, that stands in stark contrast to the cramped Seattle-Tacoma metroplex, evokes a sense of freedom and tranquility. Note that the reality of the *Sounder* environment—first commuting by auto to parking lots, jostling with crowds, enduring the rudeness of disgruntled passengers, and standing when the carriages are crowded—is conveniently not imported.

Elaboration. Juxtaposing the *Sounder* with a rural setting evokes the peaceful conditions that promote a *stress- and anxiety-free experience*. The soft blue mountain hues further contribute to the serenity that is to be associated with commuting by the *Sounder*.

Figure 4: Displayed Interpretation of Blended Space B.

Finally, the goal of the advertisement is to motivate those commuters who view the billboard to change their behavior, from that of commuting in their cars to that of commuting on the *Sounder* (Figure 5). Viewing it from our conventional pattern of reading left to right allows the word *ESCAPE* to link the two blends of the billboard (now Input Spaces E and F) and assist in projecting the emotions associated with each of the input spaces to a new blend, Blend C, a blend with conflicted emotions—those of frustration and turmoil associated with gridlock and those of tranquility and relaxation associated with commuting on the *Sounder*.

The word *ESCAPE* on the left half of the billboard also invites the viewers to create a third, implied, conceptual blend, Blend D. This blend resides only in their imagination of what the future could be like when the viewer chooses to escape the dreary, frustrating commute in the car and ride in the tranquility and comfort of the *Sounder*. This blend is that of an idealized cognitive model comprised of skeletal information projected from input spaces E and F, depicted on the billboard, not the complete scenario that is pictured in the photo representing Blend D. The internal environment of the car need not be fully specified. It will stand metonymically for the comfort and relaxation associated with the outside environment depicted for the *Sounder* in Blended Space B (Input Space F). If the viewer is motivated to change his behavior, the advertisement will have been successful.

Generic Space C: human emotions as motivation for change

Blended Space A becomes Input Space E.

Frustration, stress, and anxiety as experienced while commuting by motor vehicles is projected to Blended Space C.



Blended Space B becomes Input Space F.

Tranquility and relaxation as imagined to be the state of those riding the *Sounder* are projected to Blended Space C.



Blended Space C: Conflicted emotions.

This space is an abstract space of emotional conflict within the person viewing the billboard. By identifying himself as one of the drivers in the **virtual world of Input E** he experiences the emotions associated with being in gridlock. By virtue of imagining the tranquility and relaxation associated with the **virtual world of Input F** he also longs for that tranquility and relaxation.



Blended Space D: Imagined scene in the *Sounder*

This space is the imagined virtual world in which the driver envisages himself in the tranquil environment of a carriage of the *Sounder*. It also serves as a target that encompasses the goal of the advertisement, viz., that the driver will switch his commute to the *Sounder*.



Explication of Blended Space C:

Composition. The emotions of frustration and tranquility are placed in conflict.

Compression and Rhetorical force. The extreme spatial compression of motor vehicles packed into a sardine can is juxtaposed with an extreme spatial decompression of the *Sounder* within a wholly rural environment. Both of these scenes are nonexistent virtual worlds that are set forth in bold contrast. The result is a heightened rhetorical force and a strengthened emotional response sufficient to induce a behavioral change in the viewer so that he forsakes the highway commute and leaves the driving to the conductor of the *Sounder*.

Explication of Blended Space D:

Composition. The convention of reading left-to-right and the word *ESCAPE* also suggest to the viewer that he resolve his emotional conflict by changing from his current situation depicted on the left to a future situation implied on the right.

Completion. The viewer imagines the ambience characteristic of the *Sounder's* cars.

Elaboration. The viewer is induced to create this new **Blended Space D**, a virtual world in which he can imagine himself sitting comfortably in the very *relaxed and tranquil* environment of the *Sounder*.

Figure 5: Displayed Interpretation of Blended Spaces C and D

7. Conceptual blends and genres of Scripture

Fauconnier and Turner have demonstrated how conceptual blending is ubiquitous in human conceptualization. That being the case, we should not be surprised to discover that it is also ubiquitous in the various genres of literature that make up Scripture. Obvious genres include parables, allegories, dreams, and visions. In the remainder of this section we will consider the parables of the Wheat and Weeds (Mt. 13:24-30, 36-43), the Mustard seed (Mt. 13:31-32), the Old Wine Skins and New Wine, and Joseph's dream of the sheaves of wheat (Gen. 37:5-7). Before we consider an application of conceptual blending to the parable of the Wheat and the Weeds, I will make a few comments about the nature of parables. Following the consideration of these conceptual blends, in Section 8 we will consider optimality principles for interpreting conceptual blends as suggested by Fauconnier and Turner (1998, 2002) and relate them to the analyses of the blends.

Huffman (1978) points out the atypical features of Jesus' parables, features that were so atypical that they are very much like what we have seen in the imaginative world of the blended spaces promoting the *Sounder*. For example, in the story of the prodigal son (Luke 15:11-32), dividing the estate as depicted would have presented legal problems. Moreover, the actions of the father were rather extravagant. With regard to the parable of the leaven (Mt. 13:33), Huffman suggests that no housewife would have baked such a vast quantity of bread, enough to feed about 150-160 people (Luz cited by Hagner (1993:390)). In the parable of the soils (or sower) (Mt. 13:3-9, 18-23), only an accidental scattering of seed fits the scene. Furthermore, the harvest exceeds actual rates of reproduction. In the parable of the marriage feast, it would have been unlikely that *all* of the invited guests would have refused. To Huffman's examples we may add the parable of the rich man and Lazarus (Luke 16:19-31), in which an incredulous conversation takes place between Abraham in heaven and the rich man in Hades. Although most theologians have accepted that some parables are simply stories that need not reflect the reality of life, there have always been some who assume that Jesus only spoke words that contributed to propositional truth. This belief is an entailment of the law of perspicuity as noted by Callahan (1996:356), "Scripture must be clear because God, its author, can only speak clearly and understandably." Jesus, as God, likewise could only speak clearly.

Consequently, many theologians have sought for some thread of evidence that would validate events in the parables as normative. For example, Marshall addresses the reality of the parable of the wicked husbandmen (Luke 20:9-19). He asks, "On the one hand, there is the question whether the parable can be explained as a reasonably coherent picture, or must be regarded as an unnatural and fantastic story of something that could not happen in real life; i.e. is the story a real story, or has it been constructed in order to serve as an allegory, without due regard to what was possible in real life?" (1978:726). He cites the works of Jeremias (1972) and Dodd (1961) as demonstrating the general conditions in Palestine at that time, and asserts that "Even the sending of the son, which is the most obviously allegorical feature in the story, will fit into this framework. Accordingly what we have is a real story, but one that could easily lend itself to allegorisation" (1978:727).²⁷ Moreover, his lengthy discussion of the parable of Lazarus and the Rich Man hints that his goal was to explain all the details as reflecting real life, including some events that are eschatological in nature. For example, he notes "Lazarus is separated from the rich man by a great gulf, which suggests that they are adjacent to each other, ... but the visibility of the blessed from the abode of the damned also seems to be possible after the last judgment (Luke 13:28, but this may be to over-press the language)" (1978:637).

Such attempts to ground the details of the parables in reality are unnecessary in light of the nature of the virtual world of the blend, a world that suspends reality. So also are comments of wonderment such as that of Dodd (1961:9) who rejects as an allegory Paul's conceptual blend of wild olive branches being grafted into a domestic stock (Rom. 11:6a24). He regards it as "A curious piece of horticulture!" but on the other hand he claims that "In the parables of the Gospels, however, all is true to nature and to life" (1961:9). Paul, however, in order to show that God's plan was to reconcile the Gentiles by extending to them the

²⁷ Dodd's remark is that "...there is reason to think that it [the parable] has suffered a certain amount of expansion, but the story in its main lines is natural and realistic in every way" (1961:96). He goes even farther and treats the parable itself as "evidence of the kind of thing that went on in Galilee during the half century preceding the general revolt of A.D. 66" (1961:97).

promises made to Abraham, creates a conceptual blend that reverses the normal procedure for grafting plants. He concludes his blend with the words, "For if you were cut off from what is *by nature* a wild olive tree, and were grafted *contrary to nature* into a cultivated olive tree, how much more will these who are the natural branches be grafted into their own olive tree?" (Rom. 11:24). Paul was obviously aware that he was writing of a world in which the laws of nature were suspended.

The necessity for many theologians to ground Jesus' parables in reality so as to distinguish them from what they regard as the second-rate allegories of Paul and others belies an assumption that Jesus, as God, would have only made statements that could be reduced to propositional truth. In so doing they imply at worst that Jesus was not endowed with the full range of normal human conceptual processes or at best that he did not stoop to conceptualize his life experience as would a normal human. The resolution of this discrepancy is crucial for establishing credible hermeneutical principles and responsible Bible translation. To recognize that Jesus and the other speakers and writers created conceptual blends reveals a commonality within the various genres of text as noted above. To maintain the discrepancy on whatever ad hoc basis is to claim that the interpretation of many of the statements attributed to Jesus rests on principles that differ from those for the interpretation of natural language texts and rejects Kaiser's (1980:120) claim that "The principles of interpretation are as native and universal to man as is speech itself." An entailment of Jesus' full humanity is that he also possessed and utilized the full range of human conceptual processes.

7.1 Conceptual Blend: Parable of the Wheat and the Weeds, Mt. 13:24-30, 36-43

This parable consists of two source spaces that are related metaphorically (Figure 6). When Jesus' disciples fail to understand this parable, he supplies the metonymic links between the entities and events in the source space of the horticultural scenario and their counterparts in the input space of his role in the kingdom of heaven (vs. 36-43). Presumably, with an understanding of these links, his disciples would be able to draw the appropriate inferences. The linked entities are indicated by their corresponding colors in Source Spaces A and B.

Generic Space: life cycles.		
<p>Source A: Horticultural scenario</p> <p>Landowner hires workers to sow his fields and tend them. As time passes, the wheat grows, but weeds always appear throughout the wheat. Landowner may take steps to guard his crops from thieves. When the time for harvest arrives, the reapers gather the crop, separate the weeds from the wheat, burn the weeds, and place the wheat in a barn for storage.</p>	<p>Source B: World of Jesus</p> <p>Son of Man chooses people who serve him in the world. The sons of the Kingdom live with the Sons of the evil one. At the end of their lives God will judge people and send his angels to bring the Sons of the Kingdom to him and to consign the sons of the evil one to be burned.</p>	<p>Target: misunderstandings of the kingdom of heaven</p> <p>His disciples believed that</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Jesus, as the Messiah, would dispel the Romans, establish a geo-political Kingdom and grant his disciples political authority and prestige. 2. Jesus would also purge society by removing and punishing evildoers.
The virtual world of the blend.		
<p>Mt. 13:24-30 Jesus presented another parable to them, saying, “The kingdom of heaven may be compared to a man who sowed good seed in his field. But while his men were sleeping, his enemy came and sowed tares among the wheat, and went away. But when the wheat sprouted and bore grain, then the tares became evident also. The slaves of the landowner came and said to him, ‘Sir, did you not sow good seed in your field? How then does it have tares?’ And he said to them, ‘An enemy has done this!’ The slaves said to him, ‘Do you want us, then, to go and gather them up?’ But he said, ‘No; for while you are gathering up the tares, you may uproot the wheat with them. Allow both to grow together until the harvest; and in the time of the harvest I will say to the reapers, ‘First gather up the tares and bind them in bundles to burn them up; but gather the wheat into my barn.’”</p> <p>Composition: The main entities of the scenario projected to the blend are the landowner, the harvesters, wheat, weeds and the horticultural script from sowing to storing the grain.</p> <p>Completion: Because the roots of the wheat and the weeds are intertwined, it is impossible to remove the weeds without damaging the wheat.</p> <p>Elaboration: That the landowner has laborers both to tend his fields and harvest the grain renders it rather astonishing that the landowner himself, rather than his laborers, sows the seed. But this is necessary for the metonymic link between the landowner and the Son of Man. While his laborers sleep, also astonishingly, an enemy comes and sows weeds among the wheat. Because it was normal for weeds to grow among crops, the incredulity of the workers over the presence of the weeds seems rather exaggerated. That the wheat and weeds are intermingled entails that they not be separated until their life cycle is complete.</p> <p>Compression: The time until the advent of the kingdom is compressed into a single season.</p>		

Figure 6: Displayed Interpretation of the Parable of the Wheat and the Weeds.

The Parable of the Wheat and the Weeds is of particular interest to us as interpreters because Jesus supplied the metonymic links and applied it to the end of the ages. Those who share the perspective that a parable has a single main point generally agree that the point here is that the judgment day will be delayed until the end of the ages. Further inferences, however, are also sanctioned by the presence of the entities in the

blend. We will discuss further the question of how much of the content in the blend is subject to interpretation when we discuss the application of the optimality principles.

Jesus concludes this parable with the statement, “He who has ears, let him hear” (23:43b). It has often been assumed that Jesus spoke in parables in order to reveal matters to his disciples that others were not capable of understanding. The passage often cited is from Mt. 13:10-17. It appears likely, however, that when he told a parable, those who made the correct metonymic links and drew the appropriate inferences were usually those whom he was addressing. This is often the situation regarding the Pharisees. In Mark 12:1-11 Jesus tells the Pharisees the Parable of the Vine Growers, and Mark notes regarding the Pharisees, “And they were seeking to seize Him, and yet they feared the people, for they understood that He spoke the parable against them. And so they left Him and went away” (Mark 12:12).

There were occasions when the Pharisees understood a parable, but his own disciples did not. Both Mt. 15:10-12 and Mark 7:17-18a record Jesus’ response to the Pharisees and some scribes when they charged his disciples for breaking the tradition of the elders by not washing their hands before eating bread. Jesus rebutted them by telling the crowd a parable that made a point about purity. Apparently, the “crowd” included the Pharisees, Jesus’ disciples, and others. Of the three groups, only the Pharisees made the correct metonymic links, drew the right inferences, and recognized that Jesus was speaking to them. Matthew writes, “After Jesus called the crowd to Him, He said to them, ‘Hear and understand. It is not what enters into the mouth that defiles the man, but what proceeds out of the mouth, this defiles the man.’ Then the disciples came and said to Him, ‘Do you know that the Pharisees were offended when they heard this statement?’” (Mt. 15:10-12).

Mark indicates that Jesus’ disciples failed to get the point when he writes, “When he had left the crowd and entered the house, His disciples questioned Him about the parable. And He said to them, ‘Are you so lacking in understanding also?’” (Mark 7:17-18a). And then Jesus explained it to them as recorded in Mark 7:18b-23. So it seems that those to whom the parables were directed were the ones who were more likely to understand them.²⁸

It may be that the expression “If anyone has ears to hear, let him hear” (Mark 7:16) is directed to this group. Exactly what this expression means has been subject to considerable speculation. Some interpreters state that it is a call to his listeners to pay attention; others say that he wants them to appropriate the lesson taught in the parable and incorporate it into how they live. In this latter vein, Dodd (1961:11) writes, “...the parable has the character of an argument, in that it entices the hearer to a judgment upon the situation depicted, and then challenges him, directly or by implication, to apply that judgment to the matter in hand.” I suggest that Dodd’s interpretation is more likely. In the context of Jesus confronting the Pharisees and the scribes and expecting them to make the correct metonymic links and draw the appropriate inferences, a suitable translation ought to evoke inferences that are similar to those evoked by the original expression while maintaining a culturally acceptable form. English has an expression that likely captures the sense of the passage, but it is precluded by cultural differences. This expression is “If the shoe fits, wear it.”

7.2 Conceptual Blend: Parable of the Mustard Seed (Mt. 13:31-32)

In contrast to the Parable of the Wheat and the Weeds, there is no record of Jesus having supplied metonymic links to aid in interpreting this parable. Nevertheless, we begin with the parable as the expression of a metaphorical conceptual blend (Figure 7). Most interpreters suggest the metonymic links as supplied as being crucial to the interpretation. The entities projected to the blend are given in Source Space A. Most interpreters understand that the parable has a single meaning, namely, that the kingdom of God has very simple beginnings but expands to an incredible size in order to accommodate people from everywhere.

²⁸ Nevertheless, note that King David totally missed the point when Nathan confronted him with a metaphorical, conceptual blend of how a rich man took the solitary ewe lamb of a poor man to serve a visitor (2 Sam. 12:5). One would think that David’s common sense would have taken over where his own conscience apparently failed him, and that it would have prompted him to recognize that a prophet just does not drop in casually to speak of such an insignificant event as Nathan related to him.

Because many parables of the kingdom were created by Jesus to correct misconceptions of the nature of the kingdom, we may assume that this one was also created for that purpose. Accordingly, what Jesus may have wished to correct was the view that the kingdom would be a highly visible, geo-political kingdom. The inferences drawn from the blend and projected to the target space are that the kingdom of heaven would not be immediately highly visible but would have incremental growth. Moreover, it would not be a geo-political kingdom that would overthrow the Roman government and replace it with a new theocratic government.

There is much in the blended space that is atypical with regard to reality, but very typical with regard to how Jesus drew upon his imagination to create his blends. The need of many commentators to ground the events of the blends in reality motivates them to search extensively for any collateral evidence that would support such grounding. Recognizing the parables as blends should obviate any need to ground them in reality.

The most noticeably atypical features concern the mustard seed. First of all, Luz (2001:261) notes,

While black mustard seeds (*brassica nigra*) have a diameter of little more than one millimeter, the shrub may reach a height of two or three meters and thus, while it is not a large tree, it is one of the largest vegetable plants.... The Mishna regards the black mustard as a field plant and not a garden plant, but in Palestine, as elsewhere, it probably was planted in the garden. Somewhat strangely, a person sowed 'a' (single) mustard seed in his field.

Surprisingly, Jesus makes an unlikely comparison when he compares the kingdom of God with a garden variety mustard seed. Luz notes that a comparison with a large tree is understandable because of Ezek. 17:22-24 using a "proud cedar ... as an image for the future restoration of the kingdom of Israel" (ibid.). Morris (1992:352) and others (e.g., see Hagner 1993:386) resolve the problem of the mustard seed not being the smallest seed by seeing Jesus as having used it proverbially (see Mt. 17:20 "faith as small as a mustard seed").

As regards the act of sowing a single seed, Morris suggests that *Took and sowed* may be a Semitism or may express "an element of deliberation and purpose" (ibid.) He cites Bonnard's observation, "As often, the Matthean parable does violence to agricultural reality in order to bring out the unexpected and paradoxical character of Jesus' action." In other words, Jesus used it for its rhetorical effect. On the other hand, if one understands that in the blended space the mustard seed stands metonymically for the kingdom of heaven, then the sowing of a single seed is not unexpected. Indeed, it may be mandated in that there is only one kingdom of heaven.

Furthermore, it is sowed in a garden (κήπος), of which Marshall writes, "According to rabbinic sources, mustard was not cultivated in gardens, but in fields (cf. Mt. [ἀγρός 'field', with Mark having γῆ 'earth, soil']). That each of the synoptic authors use different words suggests that where it was sowed was likely inconsequential and not germane to the interpretation of the parable.

Many writers have struggled to account for the fact that the seed grew into a tree (δένδρον). Some commentators simply assign Jesus' statement to an act of hyperbole. Morris notes, however, "Jesus passes over the various stages of its growth; for this parable they are irrelevant. He is concerned with the contrast between the tiny seed and the mature majestic plant. (...) The kingdom may be considered insignificant in its beginnings and was doubtless despised by many in Jesus' day because of this. But in the end its growth would be extensive; it would be a very great kingdom indeed" (ibid).

There is a similarity between this parable and the billboard promoting the *Sounder* in that Jesus also may have created this parable to motivate people to change their behavior. Just as the creators of the *Sounder* billboard encouraged the billboard's viewers to leave the tension of driving in traffic and switch to commuting in the serenity of the *Sounder*, so also Jesus would have been encouraging his listeners to flee from the chaos that characterized Roman rule and to seek refuge and safety in the providential rule and care of God.




Figure 7: Displayed Interpretation of the Parable of the Mustard Seed

7.3 Conceptual Blend: Old Wineskins and New Wine (Mark 2:22)

This parable also constitutes a metaphorical conceptual blend. Those who are familiar with this parable and its usual interpretation will recognize the suggested metonymic links between the Source and Target spaces. Linked entities are indicated by broken lines in unique colors. Thus, *green* links the new wine with Jesus' message; *orange* links the fresh goat skins with the new frame of expression for Jesus' message; *blue* links the old goat skin with the forms and rituals of Judaism, and *red* links the bursting of the skins and loss of the new wine with the skewing or loss of Jesus' message.

Most interpreters understand that this parable, along with that about an old garment and a new patch of cloth, reinforces the sense of the previous context in which John's disciples and those of the Pharisees fast, but Jesus' disciples do not. The incompatibility of fasting with joyous wedding celebrations is parallel to the impossibility of combining Jesus' ministry with those of his predecessors and opponents, an impossibility that eventually led to his passion and the subsequent mourning by the "guests of the bridegroom" (Guelich 1989:117). Bock (1994:111) focuses on the incompatibility of Jesus' message and institutionalized Judaism, "There can be no syncretism between what Jesus brings and the old tradition of Judaism." A displayed interpretation of this parable is given in Figure 8.




Figure 8: Displayed Interpretation of the Parable of Old Wineskins and New Wine

7.4 Conceptual Blend: Joseph's Dream of the Sheaves of Wheat (Gen. 37:5-7)

This parable is a metaphorical conceptual blend with three input spaces (Figure 9), one of which represents a horticultural scenario as the source (A) that projects the sheaves of wheat and the brothers to the blend and structures the events in the blend. Because the sheaves stand for the brothers, both are indicated in *red*. The second input space (B) represents social behavior and supplies the acts of standing erect (indicated in *orange*) and bowing (indicated in *green*). The third input space (C) represents the abstract system of primogeniture that is based upon the birth order and determines which offspring inherits power and authority when the father dies. The sheaves of wheat in the horticultural scene (A) are linked metonymically with the brothers in the abstract system of primogeniture (C). New meaning emerges from the blended space through elaboration when the sheaves perform the human social actions of space (B). Joseph's sheaf suddenly straightens up and stands erect, thereby signifying power and authority, while those of his brothers gather around his and bow, thereby signifying their submission to him. These human-like actions (1) *prompt* the brothers to make metonymic links between the twelve sheaves and themselves individually and (2) *evoke* the abstract concept of family primogeniture of Input Space (C) in which Rueben is the first-born with Joseph number eleven. These actions also sanction the inferences that the order of primogeniture will be dramatically upended with Joseph moving from position eleven to position one, and all of his brothers being subject to his authority. This inference is projected back to Input Space C thereby transforming it to target space (C). When Joseph, through his dream, proclaims that the order of primogeniture will be reversed and they will be subject to him, they hate him more than ever. It is likely that no other meaning emerges in the blend so that this parable conforms to Jülicher's perspective that a parable has a single meaning. There is a potential compression in time that becomes more relevant if the harvest activity of the brothers is metonymic for their personal actions that contribute to Joseph's rise in power and authority. In that case decades are compressed into the brief span of time it takes to stand erect and bow. It is unlikely, however, that this inference is sanctioned in as much as it contributes little to the main thrust of the parable.




Figure 9: Displayed Interpretation of Joseph’s Dream of the Sheaves of Wheat.

In summary, conceptual blending is a process that combines real world and abstract scenarios to create a virtual (unreal) world of the blend (Langacker 1999). This virtual world has its own unique structure that allows unusual inferences to be drawn.

8. Optimality Principles for Constraining the Interpretation of Blends

Fauconnier and Turner (1998, 2002) suggested the following six *optimality principles* that provide constraints for interpreting the amazing worlds commonly found in conceptual blends. They are needed, first to avoid interpretive excesses such as have been taken over the centuries in the process of allegorizing the parables, and second to limit the range of interpretations that could be reasonably expected for a given blend. The latter mitigates the tendency towards “the multivalence of meaning and indeed the free

construction of meaning of the parable in relation to the personal situation of the reader [i.e., the deconstruction of the text]” (Hagner 1993:364).²⁹

The optimality principles answer questions raised by Longenecker (2000:144).

Furthermore, we need to ask: To what extent can the polyvalence of these parables be appealed to and expressed in our own contextualizing of them? Are we held to the plots, metaphors, perspectives, and applications that Jesus and the evangelists made in telling and recording these stories? Or are we free—perhaps even encouraged by the genre ‘parable’ itself—to play with the plots and metaphors and to apply them in almost unlimited ways to contemporary issues, events, and situations? Or to restate the question in a slightly different manner: In our use of Jesus’ parables, are we committed to what can be found *within* the parables themselves, or are we free to develop new plots and metaphors, discover new perspectives, and make new applications that go *beyond* the Gospel texts?

Optimality principles neither hold us “to the plots, metaphors, perspectives, and applications that Jesus and the evangelists made” nor allow us to be “free to develop new plots and metaphors, discover new perspectives, and make new applications that go *beyond* the Gospel texts.” What they do provide is a set of interpretive constraints that are grounded in attested human conceptual processes.

8.1 Integration: The blend must constitute a tightly integrated scene that can be manipulated as a single unit. More generally, every space in the network should have integration.

Fauconnier and Turner (1999:85) state that the “internal integration of the blend provides opportunities for some acceptable metonymies but not for others.” In the Parable of the Wheat and the Weeds, the landowner is portrayed as sowing the good seed. If the blend conformed more to the real horticultural scenario and stated that the landowner had hired sowers to spread the seed, the allowable inferences would have precluded the metonymic link that identifies the landowner as the Son of Man.

8.2 Web: Manipulating the blend as a unit must maintain the web of appropriate connections from the blend to the input spaces easily and without additional surveillance or computation.

If the links from the blend to the input spaces are not transparent, then the blend will not be readily understood. The greater the degree of opacity, the more difficult is the interpretation. This is clearest in comparing the conceptual blend of Joseph’s dream with that of the Parable of the Old Wine Skins and New Wine. The identities and the metonymic links within Joseph’s dream are transparent and so his brothers, to their dismay, immediately interpret the dream correctly. On the other hand, the metonymic links for the new wine and old wineskins are not so transparent, and the listener/reader has to infer the role of the new wine vis-à-vis the old wine skin. That the old wine skin will burst because of the ongoing fermentation of the new wine has to be inferred before the listener/reader can interpret the parable with the inference that Jesus’ message cannot be expressed by the forms and rituals of Judaism, but requires a new framework for its expression.

8.3 Unpacking: It is optimal for the blend alone to allow reconstruction of the inputs, the cross-space mapping, the generic space, and the network of connections between all these spaces.

Because it is the blend that confronts the reader/hearer, *interpretation necessarily begins with the blend*. The process of *unpacking* is that of *interpretation*. For a blend to communicate successfully, the reader/hearer has to be able to *unpack* the blend. Mapping backwards from the imagery of the blend to the scenario of the Source space assists in establishing the metonymic links between counterparts in the various

²⁹ Hagner’s statement correctly places the two concepts on a continuum, and there is no objective metric for determining when one theologian is practicing *multi- (or poly-) valent interpretation*, but another is doing *free (or de-)* construction of the meaning of the parable. Unfortunately, the difference may be reduced to whether one theologian agrees with another. Disagreement on the part of a theologian who is theologically conservative often results in the charge that the other, less conservative, theologian is practicing deconstruction.

spaces. This is evident in Joseph's dream where the sheaves of wheat may be readily mapped back to the horticultural scene. Furthermore, the association of each brother with a single sheaf of wheat and the acts of standing erect and bowing evokes the input space of human social behavior. With the addition of the space of social behavior the inferences are easily drawn.

Because the Source space projects a scenario to the blended space, it is easier to reconstruct the source space from the blend than it is to project the best inferences from the blended space to the target space. Mapping from the blended space *back to the input space(s)* constitutes reconstructing how the creator structured the blend. Drawing inferences from the blended space and mapping them *forward to the target space* is more difficult due to the abstract nature of the target space. Nevertheless, this mapping is crucial to recognizing how the inferences change our thoughts about the content expressed in the Target space. This is realized in how Jesus created conceptual blends so that his listeners could draw the appropriate inferences and correct their misconceptions of the kingdom of God.

8.4 Topology: For any input space and any element in that space projected into the blended space, it is best for the internal relations of the element in the world created in the blend to match the internal relations of its counterpart element in the input space scenario.

This is particularly crucial for the scenario that is projected from the source space to the blended space. Not only are the appropriate links between the blend and its input and target space(s) to be maintained, it is also important that the internal coherence of any input space be optimized within the blended space as well. This principle constrains how imaginatively the virtual world of the blend may be construed. It also accounts for how, in the Parable of the Wheat and Weeds, Jesus carefully identified all the appropriate metonymic links between the horticultural scenario and the world of his own ministry. Although he introduced the novel element of the landowner himself as the sower, it was necessary to do so in order to sanction both the metonymic link between the landowner and the Son of Man and the contrast between his role as the one who sowed the good seed and that of the devil as the enemy who sowed the weeds.

The caveat is that because the blend represents a virtual world, *integration* and *coherence* cannot be rigidly adhered to. Often, in any further running of the blend, there is a greater suspension of reality in order that additional inferences may be drawn.

8.5 Good Reason: All things being equal, if an element appears in the blend, there will be pressure to find significance for this element. Significance will include relevant links to other spaces and relevant functions in running the blend.

This pressure to find significance may account for the paucity of elements that are projected to the blend. The fewer the number of entities that are projected to the blended space, the greater the likelihood that the blend will be interpreted correctly. The Parable of the Wheat and the Weeds has a significant amount of detail and invites the drawing of additional inferences. The intermingling of the wheat and weeds is a significant feature of the blend and, according to the principle of *Good Reason*, suggests that the lives of the sons of the kingdom and of the sons of the evil ones are also intermingled. This intermingling likely suggests more than that these groups only happen to inhabit the same planet, since that would be expected. Rather, it suggests that religious communities consist of both groups of people. Furthermore, that the laborers request that they be granted permission to remove the weeds, rather than requesting that the Landowner remove them, and that this permission is denied, suggest that the sons of the kingdom should not decide who deserves or who does not deserve to be in the kingdom and then banish the undeserving. This, of course, is because in the act of banishing they will likely excommunicate some of the sons of the kingdom as well. Accordingly, the metonymic links specify that the reapers are the angels, not any of the laborers in the field, and that the separation will be at the end of the ages, not during the present era.³⁰

³⁰ Compare this scenario with that of the day of judgment (Mt. 25:31-33) in which the angels are with the Son of Man as he separates the sheep from the goats, tells the sheep to inherit the kingdom, and tells the goats to enter the eternal fire.

Principle Five does not preclude there being entities in the blend that have no other significance than to aid in the coherence of the blend.³¹ It is important to authenticate the inferences drawn from the blend with the teaching of Scripture in other texts. To do so may not only confirm the inferences but also the roles of the entities in the blend that sanction those inferences. By identifying the entities that sanction inferences one may distinguish between those that are essential to interpreting the blend from those that do no more than fill out the imagery in the blend. Thus, in the Parable of the Mustard Seed, the fact that it grows to the size of a tree is much more significant than that it is larger than the garden plants. With regard to Joseph's dream, we questioned whether or not the work of harvesting could be linked metonymically with the activities of Joseph and his brothers over the years that intervened before they came to him in Egypt. In this case, unless there is some collateral content from Joseph's life as reported in Scripture that reinforces the links and inferences, we may assume them not to be sanctioned for this blend. Listeners/readers have to use caution in "running" the blend beyond that which is warranted and thereby draw additional unwarranted inferences. Just as the metaphor belongs to its creator, so does the conceptual blend.

8.6 Metonymy projection constraint: When an element is projected from an input to the blend and a second element from that input is projected because of its metonymical link to the first, shorten the metonymic distance between them in the blend.

One may *shorten or tighten the metonymic distance* between entities by closely combining elements in the blend that have similar metonymic links. Such shortening is often evident in those elements that are rendered atypically in the blend and therefore are novel in the virtual world of the blend. I do not recognize an instance of *shortening* in these parables. In the standard representation of the grim reaper, as the individual who comes to take someone at the time of death, the reaper is represented with a skeleton as his body (i.e., what remains after the body decays) and wearing a cowl (as a religious symbol worn by monks). Shortening takes place in that whereas the cowls worn by monks are typically brown, the cowl worn by the reaper is black. Both the skeleton and the cowl are used metonymically to represent death. Death, moreover, is typically represented by the color black. By changing the color of the cowl from brown to black, the distance between the cowl and death is shortened and reinforced.

It seems that given the presence of *shortening* in the blend, we should not be surprised to find an opposite *lengthening*. Lengthening may be operating in the Parable of the Mustard Seed when Jesus added the detail "this is smaller than all other seeds." Theologians have struggled with the fact that Jesus said something that was not true, since there are seeds smaller than the mustard seed. In order to retain propositional truth for Jesus, they have suggested a number of *ad hoc* solutions, all of which are unnecessary if we simply grant that Jesus created a blend, suspended reality within that blend, and used normal principles of conceptualizing blends in doing so. The result of him so doing was the rhetorical effect of enhancing and contrasting the kingdom's initial insignificance with its final significance.

9. Translating Conceptual Blends

The theory of conceptual integration that we have considered thus far consists of one or more input spaces, one of which serves as the source space that projects the scenario that structures the content of the virtual world represented in the blended space, a target space to which inferences are projected from the blended space, and a generic space.

I am proposing that a model of translation based upon conceptual blending should incorporate a *translation* space. The content of this space will have metonymic links with the content of the SL blended space and

³¹ Dodd (1961:7) argues, "The typical parable, whether it be a simple metaphor, or a more elaborate similitude, or a full-length story, presents one single point of comparison. The details are not intended to have independent significance. In all allegory, on the other hand, each detail is a separate metaphor with a significance of its own." The ubiquity of conceptual blending, however, renders specious any such *a priori* claim that Jesus' parables constitute a unique genre of language. Such a claim is nothing more than an entailment of the strongest version of the perspicuity of Scripture and lacks sufficient empirical support. The constraints proposed by Fauconnier and Turner, on the other hand, have an empirical basis and provide useful guidelines for reasonably interpreting conceptual blends regardless of the genre of language in which they are embedded.

should allow for inferences to be projected from the translation space to the target space that are comparable to those projected from the SL blended space to the SL target space. A schematic display of this model would be essentially the same as that given in Figure 1 with the additional *translation space* linked metonymically to the blended space.³²

In elaborating on the model of translation we will consider first the conceptual blend in Joseph's dream (Figure 9) and then that in the Parable of Old Wine Skins and New Wine (Figure 8).

9.1 Translating the conceptual blend of Joseph's Dream of the Sheaves of Wheat

The translation proposed for this blend represents what is possible for the Selepet people of Papua New Guinea. These people are horticulturalists whose principal field crops are taro, yams, and sweet potatoes. They have had no experience with any grain crops. The crop that is used in this translation is that of taros. The taro plant at maturity stands about four feet tall. Its edible tubers grow in a mounded pile of earth, and the visible plant consists of a cluster of long stems with a common base. Each stem has a single, large leaf at its end that has a shape that could be compared to an elephant's ear.

There are a number of features of the taro plant that make it ideal for depicting Joseph's dream. First, taros are personified in traditional stories, one of which has taro plants in a group speaking to one another in the taro language as the wind blows, causing their leaves to strike one another and make a clacking sound. This personification allows for the taro to substitute for the sheaves of wheat that are also personified in the original. The taro story, of course, is a conceptual blend.

Second, the structural feature of the taro plant where the leaf is attached to the stem is known as the 'shoulder' of the plant. This allows a metonymic link between that part of the plant and a person's shoulder. Additionally, respect and submission in the Selepet language are indicated by the phrase "dip (one's chin) toward one's shoulder". The word for 'chin' is not in the phrase, but is implied by the verb 'dip' and the noun 'shoulder'. Although taro plants do not have a counterpart for the human 'chin', the absence of a word for 'chin' in the Selepet phrase precludes any dissonance in the imagery using taros in the translation.

It is particularly significant that the mental spaces in the original map consistently to those in the Selepet translation. This results in an almost total conformity to the optimality principles.

Figure 10 presents the displayed translation of Joseph's dream. The metonymic links between the entities in the column of boxes of data relevant to the original text and their counterparts in the data relevant to the translated text are indicated either by connecting arrows for the input spaces and by corresponding colors in the blended spaces. It may be helpful to refer to Figure 9 for the display of the interpretation of Joseph's dream.

The Selepet Source Input Space A-2 has no counterpart to the practice of binding wheat into sheaves and placing them on the ground as depicted in the Source Input Space A-1 of the original text. Introducing a comparable activity such as cutting off the leaves at the base of the stem and laying them to one side is not essential to the construal of the Selepet scenario. The stems of taro plants, due to the weight of the large leaves, always bend over slightly. Similarly, in Input Space C-2, although the strength of the fraternal relationships in the Selepet kinship system are not nearly as great as those in the Jewish system, the difference does not interfere with the message conveyed, that a younger brother assumes the power and authority that would have normally gone to the eldest.

³² It may eventuate that this model will have strong and weak versions. Whereas the strong version may allow for comparable inferences to be drawn, the weak version may simply facilitate the acceptance by the readers of the inferences attributed to the original conceptual blend.




Figure 10: Displayed Translation of Joseph’s Dream of the Sheaves of Wheat.

9.2 Translating the Parable of Old Wine Skins and New Wine

The Selepet people have no custom that is comparable to that of the Hebrew custom of preparing grape juice as wine for consumption. Their only beverages were water or the milk of freshly cut coconuts. Those who translated this passage into other languages of Papua New Guinea have substituted indigenous containers solely on their role as containers without any forethought about how well they may have fitted into the resulting scenario. I will comment further on this when we consider optimality principles for translation.

The Selepet have a custom for cooking vegetables that lends itself well to capturing the meaning of this parable. A man harvests a particular species of bamboo and cuts a 30-inch section that is about five inches in diameter with nodes about every fifteen inches of its length. The piece has three nodes and the top two are punched out to create a tube with a top opening. He packs the tube full of fresh vegetables and plugs the opening with banana or other leaves. Then he places the tube on an open fire and rotates it as the heat cooks the vegetables inside the tube. At the same time the fire dries out the tube and scorches it. No one packs fresh vegetables into a used bamboo cooking tube. If he does, the fire will consume the tube and the vegetables will be burned as well. Rather, one packs fresh vegetables in a freshly cut bamboo cooking tube.

In Figure 11 the metonymic links between the entities in the blended space relevant to the original text and the counterparts in the space relevant to the translated text are indicated by corresponding colors. It may be helpful to refer to Figure 8 for the display of the interpretation of the parable of the Old Wineskins and New Wine.

Although Selepet religious life is replete with form and ritual, ritual is practiced not to satisfy a deity or to meet standards of piety, but rather to influence the daily circumstances of life. Ritual is technology, and correct technology facilitates a better life. The Selepet men do fast, but the reason for doing so has nothing to do with their religious beliefs.

The blend as it is translated into the Selepet language sanctions the same references that are sanctioned by the blend in the original text. What is not transferred is the potential of drawing an additional inference from the fermentation process of the grape juice, namely, that Jesus' message is powerful. However, the main point of the parable is successfully communicated as the translated blend stands.




Figure 11: Displayed Translation of the Parable of the Old Wineskins and New Wine.

10. Optimality Principles for Translating Conceptual Blends

We have noted two roles for Fauconnier and Turner's suggested *optimality principles*. Such principles are needed, first to avoid interpretive excesses such as those related to the extreme allegorizing of the parables over the centuries. Secondly, they are needed to limit the range of interpretations that could be reasonably expected for a given blend. In as much as interpretation and translation are co-terminus in the context of the Bible as the text, I suggest that the six principles suggested by Fauconnier and Turner also constitute a principled basis for translating conceptual blends. It is likely that more will need to be added as the model is developed. The goal is to remain as close to the authorial intent and meaning as practical. Of course, what one regards as *practical* is a judgment call.

To illustrate how these principles constrain translation, I will discuss how they may apply to the various examples from Scripture presented above.

10.1 Integration: The blend must constitute a tightly integrated scene that can be manipulated as a single unit. More generally, every space in the network should have integration.

The value of this principle may be illustrated by the Parable of Old Wine Skins and New Wine as it has been translated into two languages of Papua New Guinea. Both of these alternative translations violate this principle by substituting a local container for the wineskins. The result is an incoherent scenario and a violation of network integration. The first translation, as it is translated into English, reads: "We do not pour new wine into old lime gourds. If we do, the wine bursts the gourd and both the wine and the gourd are ruined. Therefore, it is proper when we pour new wine into new lime gourds."

Men use lime gourds to store the lime that they mix with betel nuts when they wish to chew them for their intoxicating effect. In this translation, new wine is poured into a gourd that is intended only for the storage of dry lime powder. Whether the gourd is old or not is irrelevant, as also is the stage of fermentation attributed to the wine. Given sufficient time, the wine would eventually soften the gourd and seep out. The sad fact of this translation is that it is factually true. No one would ever pour new wine into an old lime gourd. Because it constitutes a statement of fact rather than a conceptual blend, there are no inferences to be drawn and no target space to which they may be projected. The translation results in a pointless assertion.

The second translation reads: "We do not pour new wine into old, well-used coconut-shell cups. If we do, the new wine will destroy the shell cups so that both the wine and the shell cups will be ruined. Rather, it is proper when we pour new wine into new shell cups." In this translation, a container that is no longer used for drinking is substituted for the wineskin. This is a coconut-shell cup made by cutting a coconut in half and removing the meat to make two hemispherical cups. Such cups were the traditional drinking vessels prior to the arrival of the Europeans in Papua New Guinea. Pouring wine into a coconut-shell cup is unlikely because communion is served to all participants from a single chalice, not from a coconut-shell cup. In fact, no one has used coconut-shell cups as drinking vessels since they were replaced by imported, enameled metal cups decades ago. Again, this translation constitutes a statement of fact rather than a conceptual blend. It is subject to the same difficulties as the translation that substituted a lime gourd.

10.2 Web: Manipulating the blend as a unit must maintain the web of appropriate connections from the blend to the input spaces easily and without additional surveillance or computation.

This principle is also violated by these alternative translations. Creating a blended space by importing wine apart from its usual container from one scenario and a lime gourd apart from its usual contents from another scenario presents a highly dissonant blended space. The incongruence results in confusion and an inordinate amount of attention being given to the bizarre act. Moreover, there is no way that the appropriate inferences can be drawn from the blended space. In the Selepet translation, however, the reader can maintain the appropriate connections because they map back to coherent input spaces. Moreover, the relationships of the entities in the blended space reflect those of their counterparts in the input spaces.

The goal of this principle is to facilitate the interpretive process. One must maintain the integrity of the links that project the scenario from the *source* space to the *blended space*. In mapping from the source space to the blended space, however, such mapping need not be invariant. In the Parable of the Wheat and the Weeds, for example, the concept of an enemy sowing weeds among the wheat is too specific for what needs to be expressed in the blended space of the translation. A key component of this activity is that it has to be something that is characteristic of the evil one, the devil. Therefore, as long as this requirement is met, the concept may be expressed in the target language by a comparable evil activity, or perhaps generically as something evil that is done to cause the weeds to appear among the wheat. Expressing the activity at an appropriate level of abstraction more readily maintains the integration within the blended space. If not, then the result is dissonance between the source and blended spaces.

10.3 Unpacking: It is optimal for the translation blend alone to allow reconstruction of the inputs, the cross-space mapping, the generic space, and the network of connections between all these spaces.

This reconstruction, of course, is crucial to the interpretation of the blend. With regard to the alternative translations of the parable, people from either of the ethnic groups for whom the translations were intended respectively are not be able to reconstruct the scenario of the source input, nor make the cross-space metonymic mappings from the blend alone, because the blend is composed of entities that are incoherent. This is particularly so in the case of the lime gourd that has no association with a beverage of any type.

10.4 Topology: For any input space and any element in that space projected into the blend, it is best for the internal relations of the element in the world created in the blend to match the internal relations of its counterpart element in the input-space scenario.

The focus here is on the internal relations, not on the elements. We have noted how in the Parable of the Wheat and Weeds Jesus introduced the landowner himself as the sower rather than the expected laborers of the landowner. This change does not affect the internal relations of the blend, but it does sanction a new inference from the blend, namely, that the landowner is the Son of Man.

In the suggested translations into Selepet for both Joseph's dream and the Parable of Old Wineskins and New Wine, there is a close match between the internal relations of the source and blended spaces.

10.5 Good Reason: All things being equal, if an element appears in the blend, there will be pressure to find significance for this element. Significance will include relevant links to other spaces and relevant functions in running the blend.

We have noted that the blending process optimizes the message by projecting from the input spaces to the blended space only those entities that are essential to communicate the point(s) of the message. The implication is that the translated blended space should have a comparably limited number of entities, and the translator should add to the translated blended space by completion or elaboration only as necessary. The more unnecessary detail that is added to the translated blended space, the greater the likelihood that the message will be skewed. This principle is relevant to the issue of allegorization, for some blends are likely to import from the source scenario entities that only assist in the layout of the scenario. Such extraneous entities are precisely those that are given a role in allegorizations. In the parable of the Old Wineskins and New Wine, we have noted that the power of fermentation is what causes the old wineskin to burst. The temptation is to project an inference to the target that sanctions a link between the power of fermentation and the power of Jesus' message. Jesus' message becomes more powerful than anything the rituals and forms of Judaism had to offer. On the other hand, however, few interpreters see any relevance to the potential loss of the wine should the rituals and forms of Judaism be used to express Jesus' message, apparently because this would constitute a clear allegorization. An implication for translation is that adding trivial elements would result in pressure to find significance for these elements, thereby promoting a potentially unconstrained allegorization.

This principle is demonstrated by the Selepet translations of both Joseph's dream and the Parable of Old Wine Skins and New Wine. In these translations the content of the various input spaces and the metonymic

links are preserved without the addition of any detail. The result is that the readers are able to draw comparable inferences and map them to the target space.

10.6 Metonymy projection constraint: When an element is projected from an input to the blend and a second element from that input is projected because of its metonymical link to the first, shorten the metonymic distance between them in the blend.

We have seen this in the scenario of the Grim Reaper when the monk's cowl is changed from brown to black, because black is more closely associated with death. This constraint seems similar to the process of *compression*, and total compression results in identity. Thus, in a blend of God as a potter (Is. 44:9; Rom. 9:20) there is a reluctance to compress the concepts of *God* and *potter* to the point of identity. In the case of *God as Father*, however, anyone who questions full compression is subject to being branded as less-than-orthodox, perhaps even heretical.

11. Areas for further Research

There are a number of issues related to analogical thought that we have not addressed nor related to the praxis of translation. An important one is the possibility that simple metaphors, conceptual metaphors and conceptual blends may be arrayed along a single continuum. It seems likely that an accumulation of simple metaphors may reach a point where that accumulation acquires characteristics of a conceptual metaphor. This possibility was implicit in an early observation by Lehrer (1978),

If there is a set of words that have semantic relationships in a semantic field, ... and if one or more items pattern in another semantic field, then the other items in the first field are available for extension to the second semantic field.

For example, *cook, bake, boil, broil, roast, fry, and grill* are members of the semantic domain of *cooking*, but *fry* and *grill* also have membership in the semantic domain of *inflicting discomfort or pain* as shown by statements such as

The police chief *grilled* the suspect.

He may have thought he was in trouble, but then he found he had gone *from the frying pan into the fire*.

The criminal will *fry* for his part in the crime.

The hypothesis predicts that once the pattern is set for extending expressions from the domain of *cooking* into that *inflicting discomfort or pain*, then it is relatively easy to extend the meaning of the other, hitherto, unused cooking expressions in this way. Thus we may find,

If he partners with him, he will get *burned*.

The interrogation really became intense as they began to *apply heat* to him.

When such connections lead to a consistent mapping between a concrete and an abstract domain, we find the characteristics of conventional conceptual metaphors: (1) *Generalizations governing polysemy* (that groups expressions together) and (2) *Generalizations governing inference patterns* (a pattern of inferences from one conceptual domain is used in another) (Lakoff 1990:209).

There is evidence that conceptual metaphors may take on the characteristics of conceptual blends. Lakoff (1990:205) notes an additional generalization, (3) *Generalizations governing novel metaphorical language*. This generalization and number (2) *Generalizations governing inference patterns* open the way for a conceptual blend to emerge from a conceptual metaphor. In a sermon about how God prepared people to be able to endure hardship, the speaker expressed it with an entirely novel metaphor *Prior to the trouble, they were marinated in grace*.

This sentence has the characteristics of a conceptual blend, in that it consists of more than two spaces. Potential spaces include (1) a source space projecting a scenario depicting the trouble, (2) an input space projecting the convention of preparing food for cooking, (3) an input space projecting events related to the intervention of God, and (4) a target space to which inferences are projected on how they were prepared for

the trouble. Further research is necessary to ascertain how this continuum may be reflected in the range of optimality principles for translation and how they are applied.

Another area that warrants research is that of deviant expressions. Generalizations governing novel metaphorical language noted above seem relevant to discerning the boundary between an unacceptable collocational clash and an acceptable metaphor. Similarly, we need some principle for discerning a conceptual blend from a deviant expression. This is problematic in as much as the world of the blended space is a virtual world in which reality is suspended. An example of this comes from James 5:1 “Your gold and your silver have rusted; and their rust will be a witness against you and will consume your flesh like fire.” We know that gold does not rust. Was James simply wrong? Or did he create a blend? The typical response of theologians is that James nuanced *κατιόομαι* ‘rust’ to mean ‘tarnish’, but gold does not tarnish either. So, the theologians further conclude that the gold of James’ readers had impurities in it. Thus, the rich were perhaps not as rich as they thought themselves to be. It will be useful to phrase a principle that will aid us in making our decisions.

Finally, a goal of this paper is to encourage readers to broaden their understanding of cognitive linguistics and refine what is presented here. The discoveries made within the discipline of cognitive science are of such significance that not to incorporate them in a principled basis for hermeneutics and translation would be unconscionable at best, derelict at worst.

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