

GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN THE OFFICER CORPS:  
SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS THAT IMPACT  
OFFICER RETENTION

A thesis presented to the Faculty of the U.S. Army  
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MASTER OF MILITARY ART AND SCIENCE  
General Studies

by

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The opinions and conclusions expressed herein are those of the student author and do not necessarily represent the views of the U.S. Army Command and General Staff College or any other governmental agency. (References to this study should include the foregoing statement.)

## ABSTRACT

GENERATIONAL DIFFERENCES IN THE OFFICER CORPS: SOCIOLOGICAL FACTORS THAT IMPACT OFFICER RETENTION, by MAJ Craig A. Triscari, 100 pages.

This research studied the generational differences between generation X and baby boomers and its relationship with retaining quality officers in the United States Army. Additionally it examined sociological differences consisting of values, career stages, economic trends, enemy threat, milestones, technology, and gender and race relationships that develop between the generations. By using content analysis, ground theory study and a power profile survey the study was able to analysis generational differences and similarities between Xers and boomers. Furthermore, the analysis provided links between the two groups of officers, which may be useful in understanding and retaining thoughts officers in the future force structure.

The analysis indicates that there is a relationship between generational differences and retention in the United States officer corps. This relationship was identified in five of the seven sociological differences that were listed above. These differences provided key information which contributed to the development of models that can be used by leaders to decrease the gap or differences between the two generations of officers.

It is recommended that senior officers develop a greater understanding of these generational differences in order to retain, train, and understand future junior officers in the United States Army.

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## ACRONYMS

ARI	Army Research Institute
DOD	Department of Defense
CGSC	Command and General Staff College
FM	Field Manual
OPTEMPO	Operational Tempo
PCS	Permanent Change Station
PX	Post Exchange
ROTC	Reserve Officer Training Course

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## CHAPTER 1

### INTRODUCTION

#### Background

In the last two or three years the Army has put a lot of money and time into studying junior officer's retention issues. Some of the research conducted recently includes statistical analysis, as well as a content analysis of current command climates between junior and senior officers. Some of the recent studies (Blue Ribbon Panel 2000, Army Research Institute (ARI) surveys 1998-2001, and a monograph) have illustrated generational rifts and differences between junior and senior officers in the Army. The rift or differences as explained in several studies listed above may be caused by a generational gap between these two groups of officers.

In 1999 the Chief of Staff of the Army, General Eric K. Shinseki, commissioned a Blue Ribbon Panel on Leadership and Training to explore reasons for officers leaving the force, as well as exploring Army culture and how it affects the retention of officers in the Army (Blue Ribbon Panel 2000, ii). The Blue Ribbon Panel conducted in 1999 is one of the most-comprehensive studies of officer culture, values, and training issues in the Army in the last thirty years.

Beyond a thirty-year time period, there has not been a significant number of military studies dedicated to learning the social differences between generations of officers. Several of the current studies (within the last ten years) focused on what was wrong with the military in general or on what needed to be done in the short term, but no comprehensive sociological study was conducted of Army officers. Very few past studies give insight into how or why generational differences impact retention or into

how generations can better understand and work with each other in the Army ranks.

Some research in the last thirty years only gives a basic understanding of the problem between junior and senior officers and provides no real solution to the issue. An example of this type of research is illustrated by the summary paragraph of Lieutenant Colonel Robert Nevins' War College thesis, which stated:

The Army must compete with all sectors of our society and economy for quality career personnel. Historically, it has been able to obtain an adequate share of the nation's more talented youth each year as junior officers. However, it has been the inability of the Army in recent years to retain many of the top quality ones as career officers that is causing its senior leadership increased concern. The major conclusions of this study are that for an increasing number of junior officers:

- Continuous over extension of the Army has permeated a "Mission Unlimited" attitude among top political and military leaders and created a turbulent career environment.
- The officer Corps as a whole no longer enjoys the status, prestige and national support of former times.
- The Army is unable to fulfill basic extrinsic and intrinsic needs to the same extent as the modern civilian sector.
- A real generation or empathy gap exists between today's junior officers and a significant number of senior officers. (1970, iii)

The above summary was written over three decades ago, yet it represents the same problems senior officers face in retaining junior officers today. As stated above no real solution or explanation of the cause and effect of junior and senior officers is given only that there is a general gap that exists between the two groups of generations. The ability to understand and connect to the different generations can be a vital function for retaining soldiers in the future. One can equate generational differences to two computers passing information from one terminal to another. In some circumstances the computers fail to understand the other systems language resulting in an error message being displayed. Only after a common language or a common link is imputed or connected into the computers can they function at their full capacity.

The links or connection between generational differences and retention in this paper are the sociological differences. The sociological differences that make up the character of a generation include: values, economic trends, changing enemy threats, milestone events, gender and race relationships, career stages and development, and technological advances. The means for integrating and controlling all these factors to bridge generational differences and achieve a successful retention rate is leadership.

Generational differences as it pertains to the model in figure 1 is defined as the physical (age), social, and cultural differences that separate one group of individuals from another. The leadership arrow in the middle of the model in figure 1 depicts the tool that can be used to tie together sociological differences and connect generational differences with retention of officers. The word retention as illustrated in the model indicates the goal of keeping and enlisting quality individuals. Figure 1 reflects generational differences as a retention model.




Figure 1. Generational Differences and Retention Model

As generational differences become more pronounced in the military, the leaders are faced with the challenge of motivating and retaining younger generations in the services. Senior officers begin to identify ways in which they can project a style of leadership that captures the core interest of the newer generations entering the service, while at the same time imparting classic values of sacrifice, duty, and responsibility in a manner that crosses the generation gap. Senior leadership has identified this need to a certain extent as it relates to recruiting younger soldiers in the Army. An example of this is seen in the current recruiting campaigns, which include the changing of the Army slogan from “Be All You Can Be” to “Army of One.”

The United States projects an all-volunteer Armed Force, which means that senior officers look for ways to meet the needs of the junior officers in the Army, in order to maintain a balanced manned force. As sociological differences develop between generations, there may be similarities that can be used to communicate traditional ideas in a comprehensible and easily accepted manner to the younger generation. Establishing cross-generational links is critical to how different generations of officers communicate with each another. This understanding between the generations will produce a common bond that connects junior and senior Army officers. This link between generations may provide a structure that can assure success and serve as a model for future transgenerational communication.

#### Statement of the Problem

“The Army has failed to build consensus and enthusiasm for its direction . . . soldiers are voting with their feet. The generational differences have a direct impact on the Army’s ability to provide direction and build consensus. These differences lead

senior leaders to minimize or ignore concerns and issues raised by junior officers” (Blue Ribbon Panel 2000, 25-26). Officers' sociological development can shape how they respond to these differences. Officers who can identify and understand these differences may be able to motivate younger generations and retain them in the volunteer force. The need to maintain a link between the senior officer and junior officer is a key goal in this study. Additionally, this study will attempt to interpret generational differences in the context of maintaining high retention. In order to understand differences in generations, this study must identify patterns of change between generations. These patterns of change may provide similarities as well as key differences between generations.

#### Primary and Secondary Research Question

Primary Research Question: Have generational differences in the Army affected retention in the U.S. Army Officer Corps?

#### Secondary Questions:

1. Have social factors been a driving force in the retention of officers in the Army.
2. What generations make up the respective senior and junior officer groups?
3. How has leadership and core values impacted generation differences in the Officer Corps?
4. Is there a correlation between generations and retention in the Army?

#### Generational Differences

There are two primary and distinct generations in the officer corps today: baby boomers and generation X. The generational differences or characteristics as listed in

this section are not meant to be an ironclad definition of the two generations. Instead it is meant to give a broad characterization of the two groups of generations in the Army.

There are no good or bad characteristics that each generation may possess, only different characteristics based on life experiences. These life experiences shape how one sees the world, peers, and oneself.

The first generation to be discussed is the baby boomers that can be defined as the generation born between 1946 and 1964. They have the greatest amount of power to enact change because they have served longer than any other generation currently in the Army. The baby boomers have gone through a very turbulent time in the military during the Vietnam War and the rebuilding of the hollow army of the seventies. Some of the assets baby boomers bring to the job include: a service-oriented attitude, driven, willing to go the extra mile, good at relationships, eager to please, and good team players. Some of their liabilities include that they are not naturally budget minded, uncomfortable with conflict, reluctant to challenge peers, may put process ahead of result, overly sensitive to feedback, judgmental of those who see things differently, and self-centered (Zemke, Raines, and Filipczak 2000, 76).

The second group is generation X or Xers, who are the midlevel managers in the military born between 1965 and 1982. This generation is the current workhorse of the armed forces. They are the generation that saw divorce rates climb and saw the definition of the term latchkey children develop. This generation is extremely independent since they often had to grow up watching their parents from afar while they took care of themselves at home. They are very independent thinkers who are not afraid of change. They have seen change all of their lives; changes in living locations, technology,

economy, and even parents. They feel the need for feedback on their performance on the job, but hate micromanagement of their work. The Xers may believe that the organization they work for today might be gone tomorrow. Their loyalty often lies more in the family than any institution. They are not afraid to move to different jobs, and they do not define themselves by evaluations and titles. Some of the assets the Xers bring to the job include: adaptability, technoliteracy, independence, creativity, and resistance to intimidation by authority. Some of their liabilities include: impatience, poor people skills, inexperience, and cynicism (Zemke, Raines, and Filipczak 2000, 110).

#### Officer Retention in the Army

Retention of officers is a critical function in the Army. Unlike civilian employers, the Army is not able to make up attrition by hiring people from outside of the organization. If retention is compromised, so is the experience and maturity level within the officer corps. The Army can react to retention needs by promoting people faster or slower depending on current retention trends. Many factors can affect retention; one of the key ones is societal issues. For example, the Army Research Institute (ARI) conducted a survey in 1998 that explored the attrition among active component Army captains. The Army Research Institute identified five items that are important in making career decisions for captains. These items included: job satisfaction, time for personal family life, integrity-professionalism, overall quality of life, and spouse's overall satisfaction. These issues may be influenced by societal changes based on values, economic trends, milestone events, gender and race relationship, career stages and development, and technological changes. These factors develop differently in each generation of officers.



By comparing the results of a 1970 research thesis on retention with those of the 2000 Blue Ribbon Panel, there are overlapping categories that seem to recur in the two generations. These categories may include pay, promotion, efficiency reports, education, retirement benefits, and family separation. These basic categories may be used as the foundation for defining the focus of the leadership in retaining officers in the Army. If the basic categories listed above remain stable throughout the Army from generation to generation then senior officers may be able to focus on the generational specific items that need to be addressed. The sociological link between generations is a starting point for identifying the similarities and the difference between the two generations. Additionally, the way by which the links between generations are modeled can be used by future senior officers for retaining quality junior officers in the Army.

#### Sociological Links between Generations and Retention Values

Most of the Army values are either espoused or operative. “Espoused values are what we say we value, regardless of what our actions indicate we value” (Blue Ribbon Panel 2000, 8). Some of these values are constant, like the seven Army values--loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage. Operative values are actions taken to show what values are important regardless of what is said. Examples of Army espoused compared to operative are illustrated in table 1 (Blue Ribbon Panel 2000, 8). These values can come in conflict with one another just as generational values may come in conflict with each other. For example, baby boomers core values include optimism, team orientation, personal gratification, health and wellness, personal growth, youth, work, and involvement (Zemke, Raines, and Flipczak 2000, 68). Generation X

core values include diversity, thinking globally, balance, technoliteracy, fun, informality, self-reliance, and pragmatism (Zemke, Raines, and Flipczak 2000, 98).

By comparing the two, where there may be friction between the two competing generations can be seen. Balance in generation X may come in conflict with the baby boomer's work value. Generation X's self-reliance may come in conflict with the baby boomer's team orientation. That one generation's values may be a weakness in current terms, while others may be strengths that can be used to the advantage of the Army may also be seen. Generation X's technoliteracy is an advantage on today's high technological battlefield, but the informality of this generation may come into conflict with the structure needed to wage modern war. These conflicts may bring about misunderstandings between the generations and as a result create animosity and mistrust between the two groups.

Currently the baby boomers in the Army set the espoused values were the Xers work and operate under thought values. As illustrated in table 1 the espoused values may not achieve the effect that senior officers wish to have on the junior officers. It is the interpretation between espoused and operative values that is critical in sending the right message between the two groups of officers. Highlighted within the table are the espoused values that are in line with the operative values. These similarities are critical since the values bring some balance and understanding between two groups of generations.

Table 1. Army Values

<b>ESPOUSED VALUES</b>	<b>OPERATIVE VALUES</b>
Soldiers are our credentials	Equipment and technology are our credentials
Loyalty to both leaders and soldiers	Loyalty to chain of command (up); obedience
<b>Duty</b>	<b>Duty</b>
Respect	Dependent upon individual and/or sub-culture
Selfless service	Dependent upon individual self-promotion
Honor	Dependent upon individual
Integrity	Dependent upon individual; situation
Personal courage in all of our actions	Bravery in combat
<b>Authority based on experience and respect; rank</b>	<b>Authority based on experience and respect; rank</b>
<b>Time in service/longevity</b>	<b>Time in service/longevity</b>
“Train as you fight”; functionality	Appearance; looking good
<b>Dedication</b>	<b>Dedication</b>
Balance work with family	Duty to Army above all
<b>Obedience</b>	<b>Obedience</b>
<b>Punctuality</b>	<b>Punctuality</b>
Warrior ethos	Sub-culture dependent
Education	Training to achieve short-term mission focus
<b>Sanctity of life</b>	<b>Sanctity of life</b>
<b>Mission accomplishment</b>	<b>Mission accomplishment</b>
Teamwork	Individual achievement
Open and honest communication	Communication vertically, but not necessarily laterally
Risk-taking	Don’t look stupid; play it safe
Constructive feedback/criticism	Constructive feedback/ criticism only about tactical exercises, not day-to-day operations
Take care of soldiers/families	Duty/needs of the Army rule
Taking the initiative; creativity	Conform; don’t look stupid; play it safe
<b>Attention to detail: uniform appearance; punctuality</b>	<b>Attention to detail: uniform appearance; punctuality</b>

Source: Blue Ribbon Panel, 2000, 8-9.

## Economic Trends

The economic trends of a generation are important to understand since it provides a general understanding of how that generation may react to economic changes during the course of their career. Generations may react differently to the economic trends of our country. The experiences they develop while maturing provide the tools to make career decisions based on fluctuations in the economy. For example, the majority of senior officers (lieutenant colonel and above) were exposed to positive economic growth in the military. This growth was apparent in the early to mid-1980s. Some of the senior general officers observed some difficult times in the 1970s, but for the majority of the baby boomers the problem was identified and addressed before, or right after, they entered the service. Additionally the baby boomers witnessed a steady increase in military spending from the mid-1970s to mid-1980s and a decline in funds in the early 1990s. By looking at the fluctuation of economic support to the military and at the fluctuation of the civilian economy the baby boomers experienced a steady rise in their progression through the ranks until they reached 1992. They then witnessed a steady decrease. The stability in the baby boomers' jobs was for the most part positive during their early development. This was quite different then for generation X, where the reverse is true about their experiences early on with the military.

When the Xers entered the job market and the military, the country was on the verge of a recession that began in the early 1990s. The funds for the military and the resources given the military were on a steady decrease culminating with junior officer cuts in the early-to-mid-1990s. Even after the civilian market was recovering, the military continued to see a decline in military spending, until 1998 when it began to

increase. Stability was not a major part in the Xer's early career experiences nor did the senior officers send positive messages. For example, during the drawdown severance packets were given to officers with over six years of military experience, all other junior officer who had less than six years were given notice and then released 90 to 120 days later. Junior officers at the time of the drawdown witnessed an Army that was willing to cut junior officers out of a job quickly, while receiving no rewards or compensation for the last six years of their commitment to the service. This lesson was not forgotten by generation X, which returned the same commitment to the service once the civilian economy improved. The baby boomers on the other hand may have had too many years invested into the service to leave with nothing to show for their sacrifice.

#### Changes in Enemy Threat

During the baby boomers' rise to power, they had a clear and dangerous enemy: communists. Generation X had a whole range of political and economically motivated enemies: Panama (drugs), Iraq (oil), Haiti (human rights), Somalia (humanitarian assistance and nation building), Bosnia (peacekeeping), Kosovo (human rights), and Afghanistan (terrorism). One generation's war was based on ideology while the other's was based on stability, support and economics. The baby boomers in the military grew up with antiwar protesters and little gratitude for their service. While generation X watched the wars and conflicts on television and received thanks from a grateful nation. Wars changed between the generations. No longer was there a one-dimensional view of war. Television was the medium that allowed involvement of all Americans.

The baby boomers were the first to experience the media effects on the population back home, and for the military it was a very negative time. For generation X, it was

different. The Gulf War was short in duration and technology was the big winner in that war.

A different type of mission became the mainstream in the force. Deployments to stabilize nations and humanitarian support took on new forms increasing the OPTEMPO by 300 percent within a seven-year period while decreasing the force by more than 40 percent (Trefry 2001, 41). The baby boomers may have felt better about the type of war they were waging. It was quicker and presented fewer casualties. It was not Vietnam and it addressed global instability. To generation X it meant unfinished conflicts that would linger like Korea did for the last fifty years. The Army became overworked and overextended. The baby boomers were just coming into positions of greater power and maintained their ideals throughout the force restructure, adjusting it to fit their world-view.

The below comments simplify the above statement into an easy defined equation:

Baby boomer's ideological = communism (versus) Xer's ideological threat = stability, support, and economics.

Baby boomers = USSR as a defining body of communism (vs) Xer's enemy = Hussein, Noriega, Milosovic, Bin Laden.

Baby boomers theater of operation = regional but one at a time (vs) Xer's theater of operation = regional but many simultaneously.

Conclusion:

The Baby boomer's better-defined enemy makes fighting that enemy more satisfying.

Xers poorly defined enemy makes it hard to see what personal sacrifices are justified. Perhaps none are justified so you vote with your feet.

## Milestone Events

In every generation there are certain events that shape individuals' lives. These events are so dramatic that they create a focal point around which to build and expand on their views and values. For the baby boomers these events were economic prosperity, Vietnam, Domino Effect (communism), civil rights, the Cold War, women's liberation, and the space race. For generation X, they were stagflation, Watergate, latchkey kids, single-parent homes, the fall of the Berlin Wall, Persian Gulf, and Glasnost (Zemke, Raines, and Flipczak 2000, 24).

How do these milestones shape lives? Who were the heroes? What was the mood in the country? What was the popular music of the day? All of these events played a milestone role in developing who we are today. "They affected our tastes, personal style, preferences, beliefs, and work ethics" (Raines and Hunt 2000, 26).

For example, the baby boomers felt deeply affected by the Vietnam War. Their feelings of being victimized by a political system that denied them the ability to win the war weighed heavily on their minds. The baby boomers were determined to not fight another Vietnam (Clark 2001, 436). The milestone event of the Vietnam War may have shaped the way the baby boomers would address force structure when they came into power.

The Xer's milestone experiences showed them to not trust power. They saw figures like President Nixon, Reverends Bakker and Swaggart, and even divorcing parents lose credibility in their eyes. As a result, generation X is less likely to be impressed by positions and titles (Raines and Hunt 2000, 33). This experience may bring about a very cynical side to the Xer's attitudes toward authority.

## Gender and Race Relationships

Based on studies conducted by Zemke, Raines, and Filipczak, baby boomers seem to have developed a greater sensitivity to race and gender relationships based on their life experiences. They have witnessed first hand how integration of gender and race has increased the capabilities of organizations and individuals within those organizations. The baby boomers were the generation that put Affirmative Action on the front burner of American politics and have a great amount of emotional energy invested in it. Generation X, on the other hand, grew up integrated. Race and gender equality was a fact of life and less of an issue for them.

Even though continued integration of the force is an important goal, it should be done in a way that is fair and impartial. A primary concern of white officers was the effect that affirmative action had on selection boards. This view transcends between generations. A captain stated in a 1999 survey taken from Swan Research, Incorporated, "Do not subject us to political correctness, nor the misguided, off-center aspirations of Affirmative Action. Let people be promoted/rewarded by their performance, not race/sex, etc." In the same survey a black lieutenant stated, "I think the Army should take a big look at the rating of all minority officers, compared to white officers. It is unfair in my eyes and a lot of eyes of other minority officers." Even though these views seem to transcend all generations in the military, they have a negative impact on retention and on the views of senior officers since they are the ones sitting on the boards. The senior officers in the military have made it clear that there are no quota systems, but current events would seem to conflict with that view. The Department of Defense (DOD) was sued and lost a case made by 1,000 white, male lieutenant colonels that were forced



out during the drawdown. Evidence in the case against DOD showed that there were instructions to the board giving minority and females an edge on selection. These types of events bring about a general mistrust between junior and senior officers. Junior officers view this as an espoused comment by senior officers with no operative truth. Generation X is more likely to see the integration of today's Army as nothing more than quotas and politically driven agendas. In this case the Xers skepticism may possibly be taking over their natural color blindness.

### Career Stages and Development

Army officers should develop some basic understanding of individual development and dimensions of career stages between generations. Traditionally, promotions and upward mobility within an organization define individual success. "Today they are defined in more holistic ways to include an individual's attitude and experiences" (Comings and Worley 1993, 429). These stages may be divided by age not rank. There are four basic stages of career progression that Army officers should consider (table 2). Within these four stages of development, senior officers have the opportunity to shape a young officer's career while setting the foundation for loyalty to the Army.

The significance of studying career stage development is that it provides insight to what an individual may need based on his age in an organization. For example, a strong mentor program might be extremely effective if started in the early stages of development in a young officer's career, but less effective if started at a later stage in the officer's career. The stages of development allow for the study of officers through the filters of stages, ages, and development expectations. These filters may assist senior leadership to

better understand what expectations each officer in each stage may seek to achieve in that age level. Additionally, it may provide a better delineation between what is expected by the generation of officers serving in that career stage.

Table 2. Four Stages of Development

<b>STAGES</b>	<b>AGES</b>	<b>DEVELOPMENT</b>
Established stage	21-26	People in this stage of their career depend on others for success. They are still uncertain about themselves and their ability.
Achievement stage	26-40	In this stage people become more independent and career oriented.
Maintenance stage	40-60	People level off and understand their potential for future growth in their organization.
Withdrawal stage	60- and above	In this final stage people are interested in leaving careers and starting retirement.

Source: Commings and Worley 1993, 429.

### Technological Advances

The advancement of technology in the last ten to fifteen years has been extensive. The impact of new technology should not be underestimated on the impact it has on officers in the Army today. Because of the extensive nature of technology in the last several years in the military, this study will not be able to provide a detailed look at technological changes overall in the military. Instead, it will focus on basic changes that affect generations as they performed their jobs in the Army. Two of the greatest innovations that impacted both the baby boomers and Xers are the Internet and electronic mail.

The Internet has provided the senior leadership with a powerful tool of quickly disseminating information to a large group of people at a very low cost to the Army. This rapid use of information has provided both an enhancer and a distracter to senior and junior officers in the service. The enhancer is that senior officers are able to provide a quick way of updating events to all soldiers in the Army who have access to the Internet. The distracter is that leadership may rely less on the chain of command to initiate the information. Instead leadership looks at the chain of command to enhance the information that is already out on the Internet.

The second form of technology that has impacted both the Xers and the Boomers is e-mail. The Army used electronic mail as a quick form of communication, which they used to link leaders together. In the past officers had to conduct face-to-face instruction or hand-carry written instruction to get their ideas across to their subordinates. With electronic mail the interaction between officers face to face may have decreased, while the interaction of communication between junior and senior officers over electronic-mail may have increased.

#### Assumptions

There are two statements that will be regarded as axiomatic for the purpose of this study. The first, generational differences can be measured by developing and receiving survey results, studying past research questionnaires, and conducting research on generational social differences. Secondly, the military has two basic generations in their officer corps to include the baby boomers and the Xers.

## Definitions

Key words used in this study.

Baby Boomers are defined as the generation born between 1946 and 1964 with an age group ranging from thirty-seven to fifty-five years of age. The baby boomers are the oldest generation in the military. They have the greatest amount of power to establish change because they have served longer than any other generation currently serving.

Generation X or Xers are the midlevel workers in the military. Their ages range from nineteen to thirty-six years old with birth dates from 1965 to 1982. This generation is the current workhorse of the Armed Forces and makes up the majority of company grade officers.

Mentoring “(in the Army) is the proactive development of each subordinate through observing, assessing, coaching, teaching, developmental counseling, and evaluating that results in people being treated with fairness and equal opportunity. Mentoring is an inclusive process (not an exclusive one) for everyone under a leader’s charge (FM 22-100 1999, 5-16).

Senior Officers and Leadership are the rank of lieutenant colonels and above. Note: since this study is focused on generations, the baby boomers are predominately lieutenant colonels and above, while generation Xers are predominately majors and below.

Sociological Differences: The learning of skills, knowledge, values, motives, and roles appropriate to the individual’s position in the group or society (Michener, DeLamater, and Schwartz 1986, 571).

Value: To rate in usefulness, importance, or general worth (*The Merriam Webster Dictionary* 1997, 806).

### Limitations

Limitations in this research include a minimum of detailed analysis of generational differences in the military. Even though this type of research is not new to the business world, it is not a well-defined research topic in the Army. It is critical that a clear explanation of generational differences is established up front. It is equally important to show how social change affects a generation in different ways. A possible equation that can be used as a tool is (social factors + generation + position (career stages) = positive output from junior and senior officer). This equation is a tool to study possible outcomes and not a final product to be validated at the end of the theses.

### Delimitations

The delimitations, which are established in this research paper, include studies of leadership and officer satisfaction in the service from 1970 to the present. The groups of officers that will be focused on are junior and senior officers from generation X to the baby boomers.

### Significance of the Study

Recently a Blue Ribbon Panel reported the problem leaders have with understanding the dynamics of leadership as it relates to generations. One of the findings stated, "The Army has failed to build consensus and enthusiasm for its direction . . . soldiers are voting with their feet. The generational differences have a direct impact on the Army's ability to provide direction and build consensus. These differences lead

senior leaders to minimize or ignore concerns and issues raised by junior officers.

Commonly voiced opinions that: it is not as bad as it was after Vietnam and that they are (junior officers) just whiners and complainers are patronizing to junior leaders and lead directly to problems with the credibility of senior leaders. This situation is further compounded by a band-aid or quick-fix mentality” (Blue Ribbon Panel 2000, 25-26).

### Summary

The concerns listed above have been echoed in many recent reports dealing with retention and the communication between senior and junior officers. This paper will highlight these differences and concerns and break them down into two major areas. As listed above, these areas include generational differences and effects on retention. By dissecting these issues, hopefully a significant contribution to understanding the link between the two generations of officers will be made. By understanding the differences, key similarities may be used to build the relationship between junior and senior officers. Generational change will be a key factor in leading, training, and retaining soldiers throughout the twenty-first century.

## CHAPTER 2

### LITERATURE REVIEW

Because of the social issues related to this topic, the thesis research will not be limited to studies conducted entirely by the military. The research will include a variety of studies conducted on generational differences, retention, values, changing in enemy threat, economic trends, milestone events, gender and race relationships, career stages and development, and technological advantages.

*Generations at Work, Managing the Clash of Veterans, Boomers, Xers, Nexters in Your Workplace* (2000), written by Ron Zemke, Claire Raines, and Bob Filipczak, explain generational differences between the baby boomers and Xers. One of the differences discussed includes the type of environment each generation grew up.

Zemke, Raines, and Filipczak provide examples of the environments in which the baby boomers and Xers developed. For example, baby boomer's grew up with economic prosperity, children in the spotlight, television, suburbia, assassinations, Vietnam, civil rights, cold war, women's liberation, and the space race. Generation Xers grew up with Watergate, Nixon's resignation, latchkey kids, stagflation, single-parent homes, MTV, AIDS, computers, the *Challenger* disaster, the fall of the Berlin Wall, Wall Street frenzy, Persian Gulf, Glasnost, and Perestroika. These differences between the generations may give some insight into developing links that will foster trust and growth between the generations. At the very least, they may provide the generations within officer forces an understanding of where the other is coming from.

The establishment of career stages and development in a generation may be critical to understanding the role leadership plays within the stages of development.

Thomas G. Comings and Christopher G. Worley explain some of the development stages within a career in their book, *Organization Development and Change*, fifth edition (1993). Comings and Worley explain that there are four major stages in career development: the established stage (age 21-26), the achievement stage (age 26-40), the maintenance stage (age 40-60), and the withdrawal stage (age 60 and above). The authors explain the developments that shape the individual during each of these stages. Even though the military officer does not fit exactly into this model, the model can be modified to show the growth of an officer in a twenty-to-thirty-year period. Comings and Worley established a framework, which may be universal in dealing with generations in each of these stages.

The stages of development give this study a model to shape how leadership styles may change based on the career stage of the leader; however, that is not enough to explain the differences that generations may have developed. In order to study the differences, how the differences occurred must be known.

In General (retired) Gordon R. Sullivan's and Michael V. Harper's book, *Hope is not a Method* (1996), there is some discussion on the effects of downsizing in the military. People tie their identity to their performance or position in a job. In comparison, the Army downsizing would influence the self-worth of the individuals that remained. The self-worth of an individual may be negatively impacted if leaders apply the wrong style of leadership at the wrong time in an officer's career stage development. An example may be a lack of mentoring of junior officers in the early stages of their career. Additionally, generations react differently to these changes based on different life experiences.



John W. Gardner discussed in his book, *On Leadership* (1990), that people look at leaders that inspire and help them meet their goals. Gardner explains the reasons for not confusing leadership with power. Most leaders have some sort of power, but not all-powerful people have any sense of leadership. Motivation tends to run down and values decay. The problems of today go unresolved while people mumble the slogans of yesterday. Group loyalties block self-examination. People look for leadership to guide them to the right answer. People will blame them if they are wrong. Creative leaders work to deduce complexity slid down central staff, eliminate excessive layers, and create units of manageable size (Gardner1990, 121-122).

Alfred Sloan, the main figure that helped General Motors into the industrial powerhouse, stated, "I worry about the General Motors executives scattered around the country whom I have never met. . . . I want to keep them awake and thinking about what they can contribute to the future of General Motors, and the only way to do that is to push some decisions in their direction" (Gardner 1990, 78).

Leadership and the changing of styles are important to keeping people interested in what they are doing in their job. John W. Gardner discusses some of the ways leaders can motivate and inspire their subordinates to do what is right for the organization. Gardner's book explains some of the relationships between power and leadership. This relationship is important in this study since power profiles between generations of officers may be different. This difference would under-cut the argument that values are the key differences between generations.

The base of power between generations is a key factor in understanding how one generation communicates with the other. If the leadership style reflects a negative

approach, as viewed by the receiving generation, the response will be different than what was expected by the senior generation. J. R. P. French Jr. and B. Raven conducted research and produced an article, *The Bases of Social Power*, which discusses reward, coercive power, and legitimate power, reference power, and expert power. The relationship and style of power a generation of officers may develop are based on their experiences and how they have seen it done in the past. This power relationship may be different between generations and result in friction between the two groups of officers.

The analysis of current command climate studies of junior officers and senior officers is critical to understand how relationships develop or evolve. *The Blue Ribbon Panel* (2000) on leadership and training was directed by the Army Chief of Staff, General Eric K. Shinseki. It documents a great deal of issues and concerns current officers have with leadership in the service. This document gives insight into what attitude, values, and perceptions junior officers have in the Army. Additionally, the study provides possible solutions that may be taken to reduce the amount of frustration within the ranks.

The US Army Research Institute for the behavior and social sciences has studied the issue of *Company Grade Officers Perspectives* (1999). The report reviewed the company grade officer's perspective to include: officer efficiency report, junior officer's development support form, leader development, Army values, and factors affecting career decisions.

Lewin's Change Model discusses planned changes in an organization. Lewin explains the balance needed to be maintained when an organization goes through change. "Lewin viewed this change process as consisting of three steps. 1. *Unfreezing*: This step usually involves reducing those forces maintaining the organization's behavior at its

present level. 2. *Moving*: This step shifts the behavior of the organization or department to a new level. And 3. *Refreezing*: This step stabilizes the organization at a new state of equilibrium” (Comings and Worley 1993, 53). This model is important to understand since the military has gone through and still is going through changes in structure.

William Cohen in his book, *The Stuff of Heroes*, discusses virtue and values in the military. He explains that military personnel are instructed that duty comes before self. The men and women that serve their country have always held this virtue in high esteem. When they see leaders putting self before duty and the soldiers they serve, the respect and commitment they once had for that virtue is tarnished. That respect by key leaders is hard to get back after the people in the organization experience betrayal. In a time of drawdown and change it becomes more critical that leaders are perceived as caring and looking out for the best interest of the organization and its people (Cohen 1998, 193).

The strategy of war, after the Gulf War and the fall of the Soviet Union, shifted from a large-standing force to a small-standing force, from a mobilization-based force to a contingency-based force, and from a short-warning time to engage the enemy to a long-warning time to engage the enemy (Trefry 2001, 41). This strategy, which was being defined in the early 1990s, had to be implemented by a new presidency. The first Bush administration called for a reduction of the active Army from 780,000 to 535,000, while the Clinton administration reduced that plan even greater to 480,000. During this period, the deployments and operations other than war increased 300 percent. During twenty years, conflicts rose from an average of one every four years to one conflict every fourteen months. This increase in deployments has caused a dramatic effect on retaining

soldiers in the Army. Relief for the soldiers came in the 1998 defense spending bill and addressed predominately pay raises for selected ranks (Trefry 2001, 41-42).

“An incentive is compensation that rewards an employee for efforts beyond normal performance expectations” (Mathis and Jackson 1991, 359). Different incentives have been used by military to keep people in its ranks: reenlistment incentives, personal rewards, schooling, and on-the-job training to mention a few.

In March 2000, an Army Research Institute (ARI) study, titled *Army Personnel Practices: What Officers Say They Need*, illustrated some critical thought on what senior leaders can do to improve the working relationship between junior and senior officers. Additionally, the Army Research Institute has published articles on “Career Intent” (October 1999), which discusses trends as to why junior officers are leaving the Army. Another Army Research Institute article “The Next Generation of Senior Army Leaders: The Battalion Commanders Perspective” (November 1999) highlights counseling at the battalion level and tools needed for success in retaining quality officers.

The Office of Economic and Manpower Analysis (9 December 1999) produced a briefing that highlighted how attitudes affect future behavior in the Army. For example, if officers said that they planned on getting out of the service they usually acted on that attitude. The same is true of officers who said that they would stay in the service.

*Business Week*, 3 November 1997 reported a survey conducted by Employee Benefit Research Institute that outlined the general attitude in saving for retirement between generation X and baby boomers. This comparison may provide insight into how each generation plans for the future goals. Additional surveys, conducted by Mutual Fund Shareholders: The People Behind the Growth, illustrate the patterns of growth in

funds between generation X and baby boomers. The differences include 38 percent saving in mutual funds by generation X and a 27 percent savings by baby boomers. This may be significant given the ability that one generation may be financially more independent at a younger age.

Swan Research, Incorporated, conducted a survey of 4,289 officers in the military. The results were published in a November 1999 executive summary which highlights various topics that includes: styles and effective leadership in the military, reasons for officers leaving the service, leadership, drawdown, morale, readiness, career matters, technology, and equal opportunity and discriminations. These topics predominately provide this study with a pool of information on why officers left the service.

A thesis written by Lieutenant Colonel Robert R. Nevins Jr. discussed the topic of retention of quality officers in March 1970. The initial review of this literature identifies some of the same key issues the Army is facing today with junior officers. This thesis is an important document since it provides the insight into what general officers today were asking for when they were junior officers. The thesis provides basic questions, which are being addressed today. Some of these topics include: pay and career opportunities, retirement benefits, fringe benefits, job fulfillment, counseling, and the Vietnam War. Additionally, Nevins alludes to the fact that there are differences between senior and junior officers that need to be addressed. These differences make up what in this thesis will be referred to as generational differences.

Rob Lebon and William L. Simon discuss eight basic shared values that will transform a work place. These values include truth, trust, mentoring, openness, risk

taking, giving credit, and caring. The definitions of these values are explained by the authors in general terms. The value truth is equated to lavishing trust onto your associates. Mentoring provided for teaching others unselfishly. Openness allowed others to be receptive to people's ideas regardless of their origin. Risk taking allowed for personal risks for the good of the organization. Giving credit illustrates how an organization gives credit where it is due. Honesty focuses on being honest in all dealings and caring puts the interest of another before one's own (Lebon and Simon 1997, 64). These values can be aligned with current Army values and help the Army understand if some comparisons between generations and retention based on society values can be drawn. Since a soldier is a product of society norms there are societal core values he brings into the Army. As society is constantly changing, so would the core values in that society and between the generations. The alignment between the different core values may shift due to the changing environment within society. Understanding these differences may help the Army understand what is important to other generations. As a result, meeting the needs of a generation may result in greater satisfaction in the job.

Change within the Army, due to enemy threat, has always been an ongoing challenge for the Army. In the book *Hope is not a Method*, General Sullivan explained this change in terms of a "sine curve." The sine curve explains military history in terms of effectiveness cycles. For example, the downsizing of forces after World War I, World War II, Korea, Vietnam, and Desert Storm having a tremendous impact on the Army's ability to sustain a highly effective force. In each of these cases, the military would face initial failure due to readiness. By understanding how change affects readiness due to different enemy threats, the Army can look how it effects its cycle of effectiveness from

generation to generation. Changes in enemy threat may mean a decrease or increase in readiness based on the priority of the threat to the welfare of the nation. If the threat is seen as low, the funding and attention to sustain or increase readiness are low. If the threat is high, money may be easily freed to increase readiness to meet the threat.

Field Manual (FM 22-100), *Army Leadership* (1999), discusses and explains the Army leadership framework, which includes: key values, attributes, skills, mentoring and actions leaders should live by during their military career. These characteristics and competence provide direction for any soldier who wants to be successful in the Army. Additionally the manual provides a guide to leadership skills that can be developed depending on the situation.

Claire Raines and Jim Hunt, authors of *The Xers and Boomers from Adversaries to Allies a Diplomat's Guide*, provide twelve delineators between Xers and baby boomers. These delineators are illustrated in table 3.

Table 3. Delineators between Xers and Baby Boomers

CATAGORIES	XERS	BOOMERS
Perspective on work	Job	Career
Communication	Blunt	Diplomatic
Authority	Unfazed	Impressed
Approval	Indifferent	Seek validation
Resources	Scares	Abundant
Policies and Procedures	Mistrustful	Protective
Reliance	Balanced	Driven
Work ethic	Task and results	Relationship and results
Technology	Assimilated	Acquired
Entitlement	Merit	Experience
Perspective on the future	Survival	A better world

Source: Raines and Hunt 2000, 51.

In *Modern Human Relations at Work, seventh edition*, Hodgetts explains Maslow Hierarchy of needs as it relates to human development. Maslow's hierarchy of needs arranged the motives of human development into five basic categories to include: physiological needs, safety and security, love and belongingness, self-esteem, and self-actualization. Maslow's theory explains that if an individual's physiological needs are violated that individual will not be able to obtain the next level of development - safety and security. The theory goes on to explain that once an individual has met each and every step of development, only then can an individual obtain the highest development of growth (self-actualization). If at any time a step is corrupted that individual will fall to that level of development that is violated.



## CHAPTER 3

### RESEARCH DESIGN

According to Nachmias (1976), a research design is a “program that guides the investigator in the process of collecting, analyzing, and interpreting observations.” It provides a model of proof that allows the researcher to draw inferences concerning relationships between the variables under investigation (Nachmias 1976, 29). The purpose of this research will work to answer one specific question. Have generational differences in the Army affected retention in the U.S. Army officer corps? In order to answer this question, other questions must be asked and answered first. These questions include: Have social factors been the driving force in the retention of officers in the Army? What generations make up the respective senior and junior officer groups? How have leadership and core values impacted generational differences in the officer corps? Is there a correlation between generations and retention in the Army?

The primary end state of this study is to determine links between two generations of officers and to provide a model for future officers to use as a guide to understanding generational differences and how it might affect retention. Additionally, the study will explore how generational links can be used to form a basic model for understanding the development between different generations.

The approach used to construct a model and theory to study these questions is the Grounded Theory Study approach. Additionally, the technique of content analysis and the tool of survey research will be used to bring continuity and current data into the study. The first approach, the Grounded Theory Study will be used to examine people’s actions and interactions in this study. The Grounded Theory Study approach has its roots

in sociology, but is now used in a variety of different fields to include anthropology, education, and psychology (Leedy and Ormrod 2001, 154). This approach will provide this study with the framework and procedures to construct, scrutinize, and verbalize the phenomenon in question.

The Grounded Theory Study involves four procedures (Leedy and Ormrod 2001, 155). The first is open coding, which scrutinizes data for commonalities that reflect themes and categories within the data. It assists in the process of breaking down categories into subcategories that have common links. For this study it will assist in providing common links between generations. The second procedure is axial coding, which determines more about each category that is developed by asking several questions. They are: “The conditions that give rise to it? The context in which it’s embedded? The strategies that people use to manage it or carry it out, and the consequences of those strategies?” (Leedy and Ormrod 2001, 155). The third procedure is selective coding which pieces together the categories to provide a story line of what happens in the phenomenon being studied. The last procedure is the development of the theory. A theory in the form of a verbal statement or visual model is produced based on the comparisons and links that are established in the earlier procedures. A cause and effect relationship is developed and explained during this procedure (Leedy and Ormrod 2001, 155).

The primary technique that will be used in this study will be content analysis. Leedy and Ormrod (2001) describe content analysis as a systematic examination of a particular body of material for the purpose of identifying patterns, biases, and themes that arise in different forms of human communication. This communication can come in the

form of books, newspapers, lectures, films, television, or a multitude of other communicating methods. For this study the use of books, magazines, newspapers, and past studies will be the primary resources for obtaining information. Since there is a large volume of information on officers' attitudes and values in print, the study must focus on a sampling unit that narrows the scope of the study. In this study the sampling unit will be dealing with generations and how it may affect retention. The generations will be narrowed to include two major groups of people--baby boomers and Xers. Additionally the period to be studied will be from 1970 to 2001.

Since this study focuses heavily on the different social and cultural changes in the Army officers Corps the technique of content analysis should be tested and proven in this basic field of study. According to David and Chara Nachmias, content analysis has been used in which inferences are made between societies or classes of people. "Berelson's study is perhaps the earliest attempt to examine the effects of messages on the recipient"(Nachmias and Nachmias 1976, 134). In this study Berelson explained the relationship of the way people accept political arguments by content analyzing public and private media. The frequency of terms being used by the media (newspapers and speeches) provided the categories to be studied and the effects they had on a class of individuals. In this study the sociological differences will provide the basic categories of study. The frequency of events in each generation's life will provide subcategories that may allow for common links or "frequency" of terms or issues being addressed in a generation's lifetime. Table 4 illustrates a comparison between ground theory study and content analysis. The comparison centers on the purpose, focus, method of data collection, and method of data analysis of each design.

Table 4. Distinguishing Characteristics of Qualitative Design

<b>Design</b>	<b>Purpose</b>	<b>Focus</b>	<b>Method of Data Collection</b>	<b>Method of Data Analysis</b>
<b>Ground Theory Study</b>	To derive a theory from data collected in a natural setting	Human actions and interactions, and how they result from and influence one another	<p>Review of past surveys (1970-2001)</p> <p>Review of ARI studies (1980-2001)</p> <p>Coding of material in terms of economic trends, milestone events, gender and race relationships and career stages and development</p>	<p>Prescribed and systematic method of coding the data into categories and identifying interrelationships</p> <p>Continual interweaving of data collection and data analysis</p>
<b>Content Analysis</b>	To identify the specific characteristics of a body of material	Any written, verbal, or behavioral form of communication	<p>Frequency of actions taken by generation X or Boomers in the officer corps</p> <p>Coding of material in terms of predetermined characteristics (Values, enemy threats, technology,</p>	Descriptive analysis as needed to answer the research question.

Source: Leedy and Ormrod 2001, 157.

### Data Collection Process

The process of data collection using ground theory study and content analysis design are based more on analytical review, observation, and conjecture, and not a statistical numerical computation of the variables. As shown in tables 5 and 6 the designs are unique in providing analytical data to this study. Content analysis focuses on description of characteristics, tabulation, and patterns. The ground theory study focuses on a coding process, which was outlined earlier in this chapter.

The primary method of research in this study was focused on the qualitative method of research (Ground Theory Study and Content Analysis) a quantitative approach was used to gather and analyze current information on a generation's power profile. A power profile as defined by Pierce and Newstrom is nothing more than an individual "style of influence." The style of influence in this study is broken down into five categories of power to include reward, coercive, legitimate, referent, and expert. According to French and Raven, authors of *The Base of Social Power*, "Power is the ability to exercise influence, and influence is the ability to bring about change (i.e., change in behavior, attitudes, goals and values). Power, therefore, can be seen as the ability to induce change in one's environment" (Pierce and Newstrom 1995, 21). The power profile survey will measure an individual's preferred style of influence over other people. The data collection for the survey will be both analytical and statistical. The means will be determined for each power profile in each generation of officers. A comparison may result in a better understanding of what leadership profile each generation of officers uses to get their views and issues across to their subordinates and superiors.

Table 5. Ground Theory Study

	<b>Open Coding</b>	<b>Axial Coding</b>	<b>Selective Coding</b>	<b>Development of a Theory</b>
<b>Values</b>	Espoused vs. Operative values	Interconnection between 7 core Army values and values that are being displayed by junior officers	Establish links between generation X and Boomers	Visual model  Description of phenomenon and impact on retention
<b>Change in Enemy Threat</b>	War vs. OOTW  Enemy state vs individual enemy  Defined mission between Xers and boomers	Impact of Vietnam vs. impact of Desert Storm and OOTW from 1990 to present	Boomers vs. Xers defined enemy threat  Sacrifice is understood, supported and justified	Description of phenomenon and impact on retention
<b>Technological Advantages</b>	Internal communication between officers  External communication between officers	E-mail and website used as communication tools	Effectiveness of communication between the generations using the new technological tools in the last 20 years	Impact on relationships between generations  Military social impact  Advantage or disadvantage in the communicating to junior officers in today's Army

Table 6. Content Analysis Collection Plan

	<b>Body Research</b>	<b>Description of Characteristics</b>	<b>Tabulation</b>	<b>Pattern</b>
<b>Economic Trends</b>	<p>Military budgets between 1970-2001</p> <p>Downsizing programs in 1970 and 1990</p> <p>Civilian economic comparison between Xers and Boomers</p>	<p>Positive vs. negative economy impact on military</p> <p>Impact of economy on Xers and Boomers social development</p> <p>Downsizing impact on Xers vs. Boomers</p>	<p>Graphic display (increase and decreases of military budget)</p>	<p>Retention increases and decreases in the Army based on economic trends</p>
<b>Milestone Events</b>	<p>Non fictional books generational differences</p>	<p>Introduction/ Background information ONLY</p>	<p>N/A</p>	<p>Base of knowledge and development between the generations</p>
<b>Gender/Race Relations</b>	<p>Blue Ribbon Panel 2001</p> <p>ARI research 1992-2001</p> <p>War college papers on race/gender programs</p> <p>Major congressional programs 1970-2001</p>	<p>Relationship in 1970 compared to 2001</p> <p>Percentages of minorities and women in the army</p> <p>Programs established to increase promotion/ recruitment</p>	<p>Graphic depiction of increase or decrease in the military as it relates to race and gender.</p> <p>Graphic depiction of programs that increased in the military from 1980 to 2000</p>	<p>Boomers and Xers acceptance to new policies on Race and Gender.</p> <p>Overall impact congressionally mandated programs that address only a specific race or Gender, but impacts the entire Army.</p>
<b>Career Stages/ Development</b>	<p>Leaders development programs between 1980-2000</p>	<p>Filters of development between (LT's and field grades)</p>	<p>Age of mentors in the 1980 and 2001</p> <p>Age of the mentee in the 1980 and 2001</p>	<p>Effectiveness of leaders programs in the 80's compared to the 90's</p>

The survey that will be used was developed in 1959 and reproduced in 1989 (French and Raven 1959). Individuals to be surveyed include only members located at Fort Leavenworth, Kansas. A validation from CGSC must be approved prior to distribution of the survey. A total of 210 majors, 90 lieutenant colonels will be petitioned to fill out and return the survey for analysis. The Mann-Whitney test will be used to measure and interpreting the raw data. A variable of .05 will be used to determine if there is a significant difference between the generation responses in the survey (See Appendix 1 for Survey).

#### Threat to Internal Validity

The internal validity that may pose a threat to the survey include: mono-method bias, which measures an individuals power profile dependent variable in only one why--survey questions. Additionally, evaluation apprehension may affect this survey in that the subjects may alter their answer based on their perceived view of their leadership profile (Isaac and Michael 1997, 82).

#### Conclusion

By using a variety of research design methods this study may draw out links and similarities between generations of officers. These links may then provide key indicators that result in the establishment of a generational model that can be used by both junior and senior officers. The understanding that is developed between junior and senior officers may provide a higher retention rate in the overall officer corps. The survey in this study provides a possible analysis on why officers' power profiles (style of



influence) may impact on a particular generation of officers. It also provides a snapshot of what type of power junior and senior leaders may be more responsive toward.

## CHAPTER 4

### ANALYSIS

In conducting the research on generational differences, the author analyzed seven sociological differences (values, economic trends, enemy threat, generational milestones, technology, career stages, gender and race relationships), in two generations of officers-- baby boomers and generation Xs. The analysis explored the differences between these two generations with the goal of answering the question: have generational differences in the Army affected retention in the U.S. Army Officer Corps? What this study has identified is that five of the seven sociological differences (value, economic trends, milestone events, enemy threat, and gender and race relationship); seem to have a direct impact on generational differences and retention in the Army officer corps. Additionally, career stages may have a limited impact on retention based on the leadership in an officer's unit. Finally, technology was inconclusive given the data that was analyzed in this study.

Based on the results above, one can make the analysis that social and cultural changes in our society have made an impact on how we address and react to sociological differences as they relate to generations in the Army. The reactions to these sociological differences by leaders may create the differing perceptions that may exist between generations of officers. Understanding the basic sociological differences between generations provides key insights into understanding and responding to each generation's needs. As illustrated in the Blue Ribbon Panel 2000 Survey, the needs or wants of one generation may not be aligned with those of the next generation. The ability of a leader

to understand, interpret, and respond to other generations needs may be useful in maintaining a balanced and ready force.

On 10 January 2001 Army leadership introduced a new Army Slogan--"Army of One," in order to appeal to a younger recruiting audience (McHugh 2001, 15). To a certain extent Army leadership attempted to react to generational differences as it relates to recruitment, but remains challenged with how to respond to those differences once recruits are indoctrinated into the force. By analyzing data from several survey reports to include: the Blue Ribbon Panel 2000, the Army Research Institute studies and Strategic Research Projects from the Army War College, I was able to identify several categories of needs common to both generations of officers in the Army. By identifying specific needs sought from work or family by each generation of officers, a common set of generational needs was established. From this collective picture I was able to isolate key factors shared by both generations of officers thus identifying the common needs of these two generations of officers in the Army.

#### Officers Needs in the Army

Abraham Maslow first introduced the concept of a hierarchy of needs, in his research of human development. Maslow's model provides a simplistic structure of human development and understanding. By using the basic concept of Maslow's theory I have developed a military hierarchy of needs that illustrates the key factors required in retaining both generations of officers in the Army. The needs, as shown in the next paragraph and figure 2, were developed after analyzing the frequency of dissatisfaction of generation X and baby boomer using the data from the Blue Ribbon Panel 2000, the Army Research Institute studies Company Grade Officers Perspectives (1999), the Army

Research Institute studies (Army Personal Practices: What Officers Say they need (Mar 2000), and Army War College studies. The results of the analysis identified patterns between generational needs as outlined below.

#### Results of Analysis of Generational Officer's Needs

1. Job security, stability, and satisfaction throughout the ranks (fair reporting system, promotion opportunities, balanced pay between civilian and military workers)
2. Benefits and bonuses which are stable (retirement, pay incentives, health benefits, and overall veteran benefits)
3. Responsive "Post" structure (housing, PX, Commissary, schools, and education opportunities)
4. A balanced work and private life that is responsive to the needs of our nation, but not intrusive to the individual (training and deployment).
5. Connection with senior leaders--mentors

In figure 2, the foundation of the pyramid represents the most frequent reasons for dissatisfaction in the military by generation X and baby boomers. The second level which primarily focuses on quality of life was the second group of most frequently requested needs Among baby boomer and generation X. Training and deployment were also concerns but they were less of an issue as it related to an officers basic need of staying in the service. Deployment OPTEMPO was viewed by officers more as a quality of life issue or a stability issue then a training or deployment need. Mentoring was used at the top of the pyramid to represent the highest level of basic need that has the potential to give an officer the greatest amount of self-worth. By itself it has limited impact, but if all other needs are met it can provide a powerful tool for retaining officers (see chapter 1

for definition of mentoring). I used Maslow's theory as a way of structuring the military hierarchy to represent the most basic needs of an officer (security, stability, satisfaction) and moved to a level of greater self worth, which I identified as mentoring. As you move up the pyramid you gain a greater sense of worth and confidence in the Army institution. By meeting all of the needs in figure 2, an officer may be more likely to project a positive outlook in the military resulting in a greater chance of retaining them in the force structure. If senior officers or civilian leadership violate the bottom portion of the pyramid, friction may begin to form between individuals and the Army institution. The friction is caused by a threat to those basic needs, resulting in anxiety and dissatisfaction between the officers (senior and junior) in the Army. As in Maslow theory, the top portion of the pyramid cannot offset the bottom portion. If the Army leadership conducts outstanding mentoring but fails to provide for security, stability, and job satisfaction the officer may still respond negatively since his basic needs are not yet met at the lower level. Unlike Maslow's theory of needs the military individual might not necessarily fall to the next level of the hierarchy, but instead leave the service in order to obtain satisfaction in a different work environment.

For example, a new lieutenant enters the Army and is assigned to an Infantry unit. He is satisfied with the leadership in his unit, which in turn establishes a strong sense of job satisfaction and job security in his chosen profession. Pay is not an issue since he believes he is receiving sufficient funds to meet his basic needs, which allows him to have a greater expectation of quality of life. His unit leadership created a balanced working environment that provides the lieutenant the confidence he needs to lead his soldiers in training and deployment. The lieutenant is not worried about his family while

deployed or training because he is confident that the community structure at home station will meet his family's needs in crisis. Finally, the lieutenant has built a strong relationship with his commanders based on professional counseling and a mentoring program within the unit. On the other hand, if the leadership fails to provide the lieutenant with a basic sense of security he will not be able to feel confident that his family is secure, or that his career is assured. The lieutenant and his family may then feel a decline of quality of life causing friction between him and the senior leaders. His options may be waiting until his next assignment or seek employment elsewhere.




Figure 2. Military Hierarchies of Developmental Needs

By analyzing Raines and Hunt's work on generational differences and by comparing numerous studies from 1970 to 2000 a definitive correlation between both generation of officers and the basic needs of the officers can be established. The military hierarchy of needs provide the first link in this study between generation X and baby

boomers. The needs of both generations provide a positive correlation between generations and retention in the officer corps. Correspondingly, the level and attitudes of junior and senior officers may differ slightly based on their life experiences as a generation. For example, generation X may be more attuned to quality of life issue, while boomers might be more interested in community structure. Even though there may be slight variations the overall concept seems to reflect the concern of both generations of officers.

#### Filtering External and Internal Differences between Generations

By addressing the hierarchy of developmental needs senior leaders may have a better understanding of the reactions that may occur if one of the levels in the military hierarchy of needs is violated. In order to impact or offset, the negative reactions between generation X and baby boomers a senior leader could develop programs that offset the differences between forces they can not directly control, which this study is defining as external impact and forces they can directly control, which this study is calling internal impacts. The buffer between the external and internal forces is leadership, which provides a filter of ideas between the two forces (Gardner 1990, 1-22). General Sullivan's principle of effectiveness cycle provided this research with the ability to conceptualize a model based on internal and external impacts on retention. Examples of internal impacts are: officers PCS moves, housing on post, education programs on post, training and deployment by local commanders. Some of the external factors included: Operational deployments, reduction of funds, downsizing of the force, increase deployments and cultural and social changes. The results of this research aided in

explaining how social factors can be a driving force in the retention of officer (figure 3), thus answering a secondary thesis question.




Figure 3. Internal and External Impact Model

In this model senior leaders provide a filter of decisions between external and internal forces. In order for the leader to provide this filter of ideas and policies to the force they should understand the basic sociological differences between the generations in the force structure. In today’s terms that means understanding the Sociological differences between generation X and baby boomers. By understanding the differences between the generations of officers senior military leaders may be able to provide a more



informed view to senior civilian leadership on the external impacts to the Army officer corps.

For example, if the external pressure requires an over-extension of deployments with the current force structure, the leadership has three leadership filtering options. First, they could allow the over extension of forces without discussion, which may results in further negative impact on internal stability and retention. Second they could deny change, which is unrealistic given the military and civilian chain of command. Third, senior military leaders could identify and explain the external impacts to the senior civilian leadership based on their understanding of the internal impacts of both generations of officers in the Army. Again the impact may be slightly different based on generational differences. Generation X might look for more stability in their family life, while baby boomers might rely more heavily on a team effort to get through the issue. If the leader is successful in avoiding impact to the needs of the officer no further action is needed. If they are not successful in mitigating impact on one or both of the generations then they should provide an alternative internal program to balance the needs and reduce the impact on that particular generation of officers.

#### Generational Value Alignment and Impacts

Since it is unrealistic to believe that the Army as a whole will be able to sustain all of the basic needs all the time, one must find additional ways of retaining and motivating subordinates to function through changes created by external impacts. Accordingly research completed by the Blue Ribbon Panel 2000, noted that the aligning of personal vales with organizational values is a critical function in retaining quality officers. Additionally the survey alludes to the fact that senior leadership could build its

credibility with junior leaders by aligning the organizations core values, norms and beliefs with junior officers. This process of indoctrination could be done through strong senior to junior mentoring programs. According to Bass and Stogdill's, "Mentors help in building an individuals self-esteem as well as, making a job more rewarding (Bass and Stogdill's 1990, 835). The result is that social interaction at an early stage in a junior officer's development may be needed in order for senior leaders to establish the credibility in making effective changes in values in the Army.

#### Transition in Values

It's not hard to make decisions when you know what your values are. (Cyber Nation International 1999)

Roy Disney

As illustrated in chapter 1, table 1, the Army projects two types of values-- espoused and operative values. And, as discussed in the Blue Ribbon Panel an alignment of values is needed in order to bring balance between junior and senior officer. As senior leadership identified different values, beliefs, and norms which evolved between the two generations of officers they began to implement, what seemed to the researcher as short term fixes. An example of a possible short-term fix program that senior leaders implemented was the issuing of identification tags and cards to soldiers and officers with values and definitions on them. As eluded to in the Blue Panel Ribbon 2000 Survey, this style of value awareness may have been lost on generation X since the espoused core Army values may not have been understood by the younger generation.

Consequently, quick fixes of value education may become more destructive in impacting the alignment of core values between the two generations as illustrated in the

Blue Ribbon Panel study. What may occur is an attitude of them verses us, or a feeling that the other generation does not understand core (generation specific) values, which can be even more destructive when dealing with generational differences. Additional comments and quotes from the Blue Ribbon Panel direct the researcher to believe that if a firm relationship is not established between generations, an atmosphere of resistance may prevail. Consequently, in the case of junior officers, they may simply leave the force and find a job with similar goals, values, and beliefs that are more aligned to their own. Senior officers may blame a lack of values in the younger generation of officers and implement more quick-fix programs with the hope that the younger generation will adopt their point of view.

The Army must evaluate and reevaluate its values, norms, and beliefs throughout the life cycle of the learning organization (Blue Ribbon Panel 2000, 26). The value differences between baby boomers and Generation X will only become more obvious if senior leadership isn't able to recognize the unique differences between the two generations. The similarities in values between the two generations should be used as the foundation to build a stronger relationship between junior and senior officers. Some of the aligned values that have been identified in the Blue Ribbon Panel between the generations include:

1. Duty
2. Time in service/longevity
3. Dedication
4. Obedience
5. Punctuality

6. Sanctity of life
7. Mission accomplishment
8. Attention to detail: uniform appearance

Among the aligned values listed above, only duty is represented and accepted as both an espoused and operative value by both generations of officers as it relates to the current seven core Army values. It is not my intention to suggest that the Army should change its seven core values (loyalty, duty, respect, selfless service, honor, integrity, and personal courage), but instead highlight the fact that senior leadership has a way of aligning generational values with organizational values. By using the similarities between the generations of officers (baby boomers and Xers) the Army can build consensus, direction, and continuity between the generations. If societal changes affect the Army internal force structure then alignment within the Army's norms, values and beliefs should reflect that shift in societal changes. That doesn't mean our values change, but their representation to a different generation of officers may need to change. Table 7 illustrates the alignment of Army values between generation X and baby boomers. By comparing the results of the operative and espoused values in the Blue Ribbon Panel, the researcher established eight operative values that are aligned between both generation officers. The aligned column in table 7 represents the seven Army core values. Given the alignment between the mutually agreeable operative values and the core Army values senior leaders can begin to communicate the organizations values with an understanding of how each generation views them.

Table 7. Value Alignment

<b>Operative Values</b>	<b>Aligned Values (Core Army Values)</b>
Duty	Duty
Time in Service Longevity	Loyalty
Dedication	Personal Courage / Integrity
Obedience	Honor
Punctuality	Duty
Sanctity of Life	Respect/Honor
Mission Accomplishment	Selfless Service
Attention to detail: uniform appearance	Duty

A review of several leadership surveys illustrates that values are one of the strongest tools the Army leadership has to direct change among its junior officers. The method in which senior officers choose to implement values can be equally important in changing behavior. For example, a quick fix reaction to values can prove to be destructive since senior leadership must first display the kind of values they are espousing. Only after senior leadership has created an environment that aligns espoused with operative values can the two generations be able to understand, agree, and function under a universal value system. Zemke, Raines, and Filipczak discuss the clashes that may occur between generations due to mistrust between generation X and baby boomers. Additionally noted by the authors is the importance to understand that generation X is less willing to tolerate values that are not displayed by their leaders, noting this may be due to their cynical makeup and general nature of mistrust of authority.

The strongest means of instilling core values in junior officers is early in their career as related in the research by Bass and Stodgill. Comments in the Blue Ribbon Panel indicate that, once an atmosphere of mistrust or misunderstanding develops

between a generation of officers, it will take extraordinary circumstances to bring that group of officers completely inline with the senior officers views. Values if applied honestly and truthfully may have the capability of offsetting external conditions those senior leaders cannot control. Additionally, if junior leaders trust senior leader values they may become more responsive and flexible to future change. The willingness to trust senior leaders' values by junior leaders may be based on the assumption that senior leaders will first do what is best for the Army, unit, soldiers, and themselves in that order.

### Generational Economic Impacts

Some of the external events or trends that may have an impact on retention are the economic condition of the country. The economic trends of any generation may provide key insight into how they may react to future gains and losses within an organization. If senior leadership does not apply current trends of economic growth to retention, they may miss the greater impact that may occur between generation X and the baby boomers.

Thau and Heflin point out in their book, that economic stability has not been a cornerstone experience in generation X's lifetime. This generation came of age in very difficult times in the development of our military and the commercial economy. Recession was at a high when generation X officers began to be commissioned onto active duty. Some of the junior officers in generation X experienced the downsizing of the armed forces from the ROTC classrooms as they witnessed captains, majors, and lieutenant Colonels being involuntarily released from the service in the 1990s. Correspondingly, many of these military instructors were the first contact that many upcoming Xers had with military life. They also were the first mentors-type people they had grown to respect and trust. The downsizing of the officer corps in the late 1980 and

early 1990 may have served to reinforce their social experiences of abandonment of authority figures. Economically, it showed them that stability and job security was not a permanent fixture in the military establishment. Generation X officers in the early 1990 faced lieutenant retention boards only after 18-24 months of service. Once again instability and job security was a major concern for this generation. Senior leadership implemented programs in the Army to decrease the impact of job loss, but only for officers with six or more years of service. For all other officers below that six-year line, no severance packet would be given. The majority of officers below the six-year window were generation X soldiers.

Thau and Heflin point out in their research that generation X already had a low expectation of government security as they observed a decline in social security funds in the 1990s. The general feeling that there would be little left of the social security system once they became old enough to receive benefits was a concern that would weigh heavily on the Xer's minds. As generation X entered the work force they began to look at future gains much farther out than the baby boomers did at their age. It was not that they were more economically savvy, but more a method of surviving future declines in the system. As a result generation X began to invest in retirement in record numbers. The results of *Business Week's* report on generational savings and retirement plans illustrate these concerns (refer to figures 4 and 5). It is clear from these studies that generation X was thinking more about retirement and putting more away at a younger age than the baby boomers.




Figure 4. Generational Savings. Data: Yankelovich Partners, Mathew Greenwald and Associates, Census Bureau Employee Beneat Research Institute.




Figure 5. 401 (k) Plans. Data: Yankelovich Partners, Mathew Greenwald and Associates, Census Bureau Employee Beneat Research Institute. Note: Diagrams 4 and 5 were produced and reported in 1997 *Business Week* archives, 3 November 1997, website.

Figure 6 compares generations as it relates to the household assets in mutual funds. This document was published over six years ago in 1996, but it illustrates the



early planning of generation X compared to the preceding generations. This fact should not be underestimated as it relates to junior officers making career decisions in the future.




Figure 6. Mutual Funds Savings. Data: Investment Company Institute, 1996

The economic trend in generation X is important for the military to explore for two main reasons. First, generation X may be more financially independent at an earlier age, which will allow for greater choices in career plans. Second, the independence of generation X is greater than that of baby boomers, so they may be more willing to leave the service at a younger age if they are vested in a retirement plan. These economic impacts are not going to be seen immediately but over time. One can draw some conclusion: Generation X is in a better financial position when they reach twenty years of service, they may be more likely to leave the military and to seek a more-stable environment for their families. This can develop into a real decline of lieutenant colonels and colonels in the next five to ten years.

Once again stability is a centerpiece in the development and reactions of generation X. If baby boomers interpret stability only in terms of training, deploying, and permanent change of station, they may miss a greater picture that could result in a further decline of leadership in the Army.

By reviewing figure 7 one can observe a real decline in military expenditures from 1985 to 1998, but the reactions to these changes by the generations have been different. By looking at a snapshot of defense outlays of both generation X and the baby boomers one could make an argument that both have seen economically tight times (see figure 7).




Figure 7. Defense Outlays. Source: Mehuron 2001, 78.

Additionally, one could also argue that generation X had witnessed a greater and longer decline at an earlier stage in their career. The link that binds both generations together is that both have witnessed some sort of decline, but one generation (baby boomers) has also witnessed a significant increase in resources. Generation X on the

other hand has not identified with a cycle of military prosperity. As a result generation X may be more skeptical of future military expansion.

### Generational Impacts and Changes of Enemy Threats

Never fight a battle when nothing is gained by winning. There must be a valid reason, a purpose for battle, and a qualified objective to be gained before submitting your soldiers to combat. (Province 1995, 61)

George S. Patton

Based on Dr. Hicks research on generational differences and Lieutenant General Trefry's insightful remarks on changing US doctrine, one is able to draw the analysis that, generational differences in enemy threat impacts each generation's understanding and definition of how to respond, shape, and defeat an enemy threat. Each generation in the Army today has witnessed or is in the process of witnessing a transformation based on changes in enemy threat. For example the baby boomers experienced the strategy of containment during their junior years in the military, which shaped their views of how to train, deploy, and respond to enemy threats. Generation X on the other hand witnessed a multitude of different strategies to include remnants of containment, engagement and enlargement (1993); shape-respond-prepare (1997); and enhance-bolster and promotes strategies (1999) that shaped their view of enemy threat.

Field Manual 3.0, chapter one, as well as, the Blue Ribbon Panel 2000 survey, pages 5-6 provided the supporting data that a clearly defined enemy threat is critical for the development, training, maintaining and financing of a peacetime and wartime army. It is the definition of that enemy threat that guides officers in the US Army to maintain a focus and a purpose of duty. A defined enemy threat makes it easier for the political

establishment to justify military financing and support for the military infrastructure. Kaplin, in his book *Warrior Politics*, adds to this analysis by illustrating the point that without a clearly defined enemy the military leadership is faced with a void in defending our national interest. The battle cry that we are prepared and ready to fight our nations battles, begs the question, what battles and against what enemy? Furthermore, Kaplin illustrates in his book the question, “Are we going to fight other soldiers or something else?” (Kaplin 2002, 118). As in any tactical operation in accordance with our operational manuals a clear defining of an enemy threat must be understood at the lowest level. If the enemy threat is not defined properly then junior and senior officers may be placed in a position of risk or compromise.

Analysis of Zemke, Raines, and Filipczak, as it relates to generations and their conflicts illustrate that a lack of definition of enemy threat is more prevalent in generation X then baby boomers. This lack of definition of enemy threat as observed in my research will be addressed in this section as a compromise of action.

General Sullivan’s book *Hope is Not a Method* and other survey documents have led me to believe that defining enemy threat through compromise of action could lead to two different negative outcomes. First, it could lead to senior military and political officials planning, developing, and equipping the Army with tools to fight the last American conflict. Second, it could result in a force that is required to fight unknown contingency conflicts resulting in over extension of resources. The over extension of resources is created by deploying forces from one crisis to another without a clear understanding of when the last one will end or when the next one will begin.

Additional analysis of General Sullivan's book directs this study to believe that compromises may lead us to the position that flexibility combined with rapid response could offset the unpredictability of enemy threat. This position is more closely aligned to a defensive posture. As we wait for events to unfold we will be ready to react to them because of our flexibility and deployability of forces. The war against terrorism has shown that we are flexible and deployable to respond to enemy threat but at a cost. Without initiative of action the Army may be reacting to instability, causing a sense of instability among the officer corps.

Jack McCuen, from the *Army Times*, and Bruce Blair, from the Center for Defense Information, suggest in their articles that the war on terrorism has become an enemy threat of the US Army, but it will be difficult to maintain that threat as a focal point of training, since terrorist do not act, fight, or react like conventional forces.

#### Baby Boomers Purpose for War

Based on Nevins research in the 1970s, one can formulate that baby boomers in the military experienced early in their career a definable purpose in defending this country against an enemy determined to defeat it (Soviet Union) and a philosophy that was alien to our core economic and philosophical beliefs (communism). This focus allowed the baby boomers to expend quality effort in training and fighting a defined and existing threat during the 60s, 70s and 80s. The baby boomers' missions as defined by senior leaders reflected the threat they would have to fight in a future war. The defining of the enemy provided the baby boomers with a reason for duty to their country. It might have even been more rewarding, since they understood whom they were to meet when they were called to battle. There may have been a sense of predictability that may have

provided a greater feeling of confidence in what an officer was expected to do in the service of his country. The predictability in enemy threat may have provided the baby boomers with the stability of fighting or destroying the threat, if engaged on the battlefield.

#### Baby Boomers and the Vietnam Factor

According to Nevins research, Vietnam had a tremendous impact on the baby boomers professional development and retention in the military. General Wesley Clark added to this by illustrating in his book that Vietnam would play a large role in the baby boomers lives as it pertained to defining a threat once they gained authority in the political and military system to impact policy. When the baby boomers came to power they took lessons learned from Vietnam and applied them to force structure, chain of commands, doctrine, and equipment.

The combination of General Clark and Nevins research highlight the fact that the baby boomers experienced a cause and effect relationship in the development of their training after the Vietnam War. The baby boomers realized that the presence of communism in other countries did not necessarily mean that there would be a “domino effect” throughout the world. A more-idealistic approach of dealing with other nations became the method and tool of dealing with conflict. Baby boomers learned that their country must support fully the wars they planned on waging against other nations. The baby boomers became determined and in some cases obsessed with not making the same mistakes as their leaders did in Vietnam. Additionally, General Clark pointed out that the baby boomers created an Army that was completely integrated with National Guard and Reserve forces. This integration would provide them the political safety net they were

missing in Vietnam. The baby boomers felt that if a war was to be conducted it would have to be conducted with the part-time warriors, which would result in an increased awareness of the war's purpose among the American people. The combination of casualties, political support, and integration of forces would shape the baby boomers decisions in fighting or engaging future conflicts.

### Generation X and Their Enemy

As alluded to in Zemke, Raines and Filipczack book, generation X spent their childhood under the cloud of the Cold War and Vietnam, but really did not understand the implications of the threat the baby boomers faced. Vietnam was not a milestone event in the Xer's lives. Some of the officers in Generation X entered military service at the very end of communist power. They saw a shift in how we defined our enemies very early in their career. It was no longer the evil empire, but evil individuals. They saw this evil in the faces of men like Saddam Hussein, Noriega, Milosevic, Adid, and Bin Laden. Generation X did not see just an evil government to be defeated, but evil leaders that need to be taken out of power.

The 1999 Swan Research survey, by Elczuk, as well as, several other generational sources indicated that generation X learned that they would have to fight for more than one philosophy or ideology. This generation was fighting for the protection of oil, destruction of drugs, human rights, disaster relief, terrorism, and democracy. The Xers had less of a defined enemy, but a greater level of enemy threat to defend against. The threat the Xers face is not predictable in the sense of communism versus democracy, but instead evil individuals versus global stability. Generation X witnessed operations grow year after year with little relief in closing out past conflicts. It became a snowball effect,

and the pressures of sustaining mission after mission became less satisfying to a generation that places a greater commitment to family. The unpredictability and instability of the new world order may have created a negative impact on generation X and their willingness to sacrifice their family commitment.

Generational expectations and balance on gender/race

It is though that justice is equality, and so it is, but not for all persons, only those who are equal. (D'souza 1991, 24)

Aristotle

The spectrum of misconduct and misapplied reforms as illustrated in the articles listed below directly affect the views of officers in the military to leave or stay in the force. The headlines in the *Army Times* in the 1990s and 2000s illustrate this point as a large amount of race and gender scandals impacted the Army. Some of the titles of these scandals included: "Dirty Details, the trial of Europe's Top sergeant major, Two-star Demoted for Sexual Misconduct" (McHugh 1999a, 8), "Survey: Racism Hasn't Gone" (Mathews 1999, 12), "Scandals Alter Scope of Harassment Policy" (McHugh 1999b, 22), "Busted Down One Star, Hale Vows a Fight" (McHugh 1999c, 14), and "1,000 involuntarily retired officers to be notified of class-action suit" (Tice 2001, 25). These scandals combined with the comments that were noted in the Swan Research survey on race and gender have provided this study with enough information to state that more than any other area of sociological differences in this thesis paper, race and gender have the potential to be the most divisive factors among generations

Raines and Hunt's research on generational differences may provide insight into why these differences may exist between generations. One reason for the divide in the



current generations may be that one generation has a more-practical view of life (Xers), while the other has a more idealistic view of life (baby boomers). The experiences in each generation's life give definition to the view of diversity and gender equality. For example generation X did not witness the brutal assault on minorities in the 1960s or 1970s or gender bias that ran strong and deep in the American workforce. Instead, generation X witnessed sensitivity to these causes as they grew up in integrated schools and workforces. As a result they place less emphasis in regard to training and development in this field.

As alluded to in D'souza's book, the applied approach to correcting the wrongs of racial and gender bias is noble in nature, but brutal in practice. As a result when certain programs are developed for a specific group in the Army the out come may be perceived negatively when applying reforms to certain generational groups.

#### Baby Boomers Race and Gender Expectation

One only has to read the want ads in a 1960 newspaper to understand the climate of race and gender relations during that time period. The injustice of discrimination was overwhelmingly evident to the majority of adults in this country. The baby boomers were the generation that took on this injustice and tried to level the equality in our country. Baby boomers fought hard and long to change the social and cultural view of race and gender bias in the United States. This issue was a milestone event in the baby boomers life and it was also a crowning achievement. They demanded an affirmative action approach to offsetting past differences, so that a balance may be created between the races and gender. They wanted fair and equal treatment for all. This legacy of balance is a tremendous gift to this country as long as it remains balanced and unbiased.

The growth of minorities and females in the military grew as affirmative action took root. In 1973 the female composition in the military equated to about 3 percent, in 1988 it grew to 11 percent and in 2000 it reached 15 percent. For minorities the growth in composition also grew in the military. In 1973 the Army was composed of 22 percent, in 1988 it grew to 36 percent and in 2000 it was 41 percent.

As pointed out by several comments in the Blue Ribbon Panel 2000, and other studies, in the past twenty years, affirmative action has taken on a new meaning. The establishment of goals and quotas by various organizations including the military were instituted to offset past disparities in the work force. However, this system has led to a new set of disparities and perceived unfairness. This fact is best illustrated by the current law suites against the military for race and gender quota setting during Army selection boards (Tice 2001, 22). This process was viewed as a necessity to balance the work force and expand diversity within the military.

After analyzing numerous comments from the Swan Research survey based on race and gender issues the approach of affirmative action seem to have given way to affirmative action with political correctness of words and actions attached to their meaning. Additionally, it is during this period of political correctness and affirmative action some programs and policies meant to improve conditions may have had negative impacts on the retention of generation X. The questioning of board results became more frequent, and trust in unbiased and equal view of selection for promotion, command, and schooling may have become questionable as illustrated in the Swan Research survey.

## Generation X Race and Gender Balance

Raines, Claire, and Hunt illustrate the point that generation X received a great number of benefits from the baby boomers quest for equality in race and gender. The Xers were the first full generation to experience fully integrated school systems as well as co-ed activities. Generation X grew up competing with different races and genders their entire life. They more than any other generation up to that time knew the strengths and weaknesses of affirmative action. Generation X was also the first to feel the impact of quotas and goal setting in our society as discussed in D'souza's book. Additionally, the early experiences include application to universities where grades and test scores became less of a factor to getting into school than the color or gender on your application.

As characterized by Raines and Hunt's, baby boomers view on race and gender is very idealistic in nature. Generation X's view is very practical based on their life experiences with race and gender issues. Here lies the conflict between the generations thus establishing the following analysis. The Xers may argue that ideology is no substitute for practicality in promoting, and selecting individuals for positions in the military. The balance between ideology and practicality is not easy to achieve without a clear purpose in an organization thus the conflict continues within the organization and between the generations.

Based on the analysis above, as well as, comments from the Swan Research Survey, the retention of officers is directly tied to the treatment those officers believe they will receive. If women in the military believe that they do not stand the same chances as males in succeeding in the military they may seek employment some place that provides them with that security. If a majority of officers views that they will be

selected on the bases of race and gender they may not be willing to risk a long-term commitment to an organization that will not treat them with equality when advancement is at issue. Additionally, the deserving minorities that are selected for advancement may have their self-esteem damaged due to the perception of favoritism. A careful balance between fairness, equality and meritocracy may be difficult to achieve, but it is in the Army's best interest to find a way of doing so.

#### Career Stages in an Officers Life

A modified version of Commings and Worley Career stage model has been created, in order to produce a military life cycle model based on four career stages within an officer career development. They include the established stage, achievement stage, maintenance stage, and withdrawal stage. As defined in chapter 1, table 2, these stages are structured by the age of an officer and by the developmental needs of an officer. The review of the developmental needs structure can provide senior officers with a snap shot of what the next generation of officers may expect from their military leaders.

During the established and achievement stages, senior leaders can begin to explore the alignment of values through strong mentoring programs as illustrated in Figure 8. This study has modified the ages in Commings and Worley's model to reflect an officer's development in the military. Additionally, mentoring has been added to illustrate the first stages when senior officer should provide mentoring input to junior officers. It also illustrates output from senior leaders that can be applied to the critical development of junior officers. The insertion of mentoring into the military model was based on Bass and Stogdill's research on mentoring. Their research demonstrates the point that mentoring seems to be received more effectively at a younger age




Figure 8. Life Cycle of Officer Career Development

Stages of Development

As discussed in the Commings and Worley model, each stage will maintain their original definition with the exception of age and military rank structure. The *Established Stage (military age 17-21)* includes ROTC cadets and recently promoted lieutenants. During this stage of military development the cadets or junior officers are unsure of themselves and look to leaders for strong standards that they can strive to achieve. Cadets and junior officers begin to develop a certain level of expectation and satisfaction within their training or job. If poor leadership neutralizes these expectations, the officers will look for an out. If officers are satisfied in establishing themselves in the Army, they move to the next stage which is the *Achievement Stage (military age 22-28)*.

During the achievement stage officers becomes more independent and begin to apply what they have learned from leaders. Officers in this stage begin to take on leadership positions and try to establish themselves in the organization. By analyzing Comming and Worley's model, the researcher noted that senior leaders should begin mentoring these officers so as not to discourage them from succeeding. Additionally, if a high level of micromanagement occurs at this stage, junior officers may become disinterested and may stagnate resulting in potential frustration and departure.

Officers' potentials are recognized and refined in the *Maintenance Stages* (military age 29-40). Officers at this stage should have a good idea of what they want to get out of the Army, as well as, what the Army wants to get out of them. A possible outcome based on Commings and Worley's model is that if military leaders display a lack of interest in the officers at this level they might leave the service in order to find a more rewarding experience or they might shift their priorities and redefine success for themselves in the Army. This redefinition might be selfish in nature depending on how they have been treated in the last ten to fifteen years. An observation made by the researcher based on Commings and Worleys research was that officers may learn from senior leadership how to react to failure or success in the military. If the only things they have been taught is that Army needs are first, they may redefine that view and translate it into a careless organization, which is only interested in using them. If they were taught that their opinion matters, they might be more reasonable in accepting adversity if it occurs.

Finally, the last stage of development is the *Withdraw Stage* (military age 41- military retirement). In this stage, soldiers begin to weigh the benefit of staying in the

service or retiring. If senior officers see no advantage in continuing a career in the military they will retire at an early age.

### Mentoring at the Right Time

Today's leadership seem to place a lot of emphasis on mentoring soldiers as demonstrated in the time and money spent teaching the topic at the officers' developmental schools. As a result, one may make an assumption that senior officers believe that mentoring subordinates may contribute to overall success of the unit and individuals involved. By analyzing Bass and Stodgill, one can come to the realization that the major outcome from a good military mentoring program is a feeling by subordinate officers that senior officers care. This feeling or attitude equates to subordinates having a higher level of confidence, security, and self-fulfillment in their job. What is not clear is how officers go about mentoring their subordinates and at what level is mentoring the most productive for the Army and the individuals involved.

Arguably, mentoring of officers should be applied during the first two stages of development in officers' careers to be productive. It is during this period where officers are the most open to understanding, interpreting, and applying the needs of the Army, unit, and superior officers. If senior officers fail to provide this type of guidance, advice, instruction, and validation, the officers may begin to use what they have learned on their own to be successful and apply it to the next phase of their life. If senior officers try and interject their views at a later part of an officers career (stage three of career development) the subordinate officer may be skeptical since their experiences may not be aligned with what senior officers are espousing.

### Generational Bases of Power

In chapter 1 leadership was depicted as the tool that could be used to tie together sociological differences and connect generational differences with retention of officers. The way in which a leader projects their power on subordinates may either enhance or detract their control on a subordinate leader (Gardner 1990, chapters 1-2). As discussed in chapter 3 of this thesis, a power profile survey was used to measure the possible variants between baby boomers and generation X's bases of power.

By using French and Raven's model on the bases of power, this study was able to focus on five leadership styles. They were (1) reward power, which is based on a leader's preference to project a perception to mediate rewards to their subordinate. This leadership style would prefer to reward others in order to motivate them to do what the leader directs. (2) Coercive Power, which is based on the perception that a leader uses punishment to control the actions of others. This type of leader may use coercive measures to motivate subordinates to act within the leader's control. (3) Legitimate power, based on the perception that a leader has a legitimate right to prescribe behavior for others. This style of leadership relies on rank alone to control subordinates. (4) Referent power, which is based on a leader's ability to project himself in a way that subordinates identify and compare themselves to the leader. (5) Expert power, which is based on the perception that a leader has some special knowledge or expertise that should be followed.

### Power Profile Survey results

As discussed in chapter 3 a population of 210 CGSC students and 90 faculty members were surveyed using a power profile survey, which was first developed by



French and Raven in 1959. The overall responses that were collected included 103 Generation X and 92 baby boomers. The ages and number of surveyed officers are illustrated in table 8.

Table 8. Age Cross-Tabulation Count

	Age	Generation	Generation	Total
		Gen-X	Boomer	
	32	2		2
	33	10		10
	34	25		25
	35	29		29
	36	26		26
	37	11		11
	38		12	12
	39		13	13
	40		17	17
	41		11	11
	42		8	8
	43		11	11
	44		8	8
	45		7	7
	46		3	3
	47		2	2
<b>Total</b>		103	92	195

Additionally, rank and status (student and faculty) have been provided to illustrate the total number of surveyed officers in each group (refer to tables 9 and 10).

Table 9. Rank and Generation Cross-Tabulation Count

	Rank	Generation	Generation	Total
		Gen-X	Boomer	
	LTC		59	59
	MAJ	103	31	134
	MAJ (P)		2	2
Total		103	92	195

Table 10. Status and Generation Cross-Tabulation Count

	Status	Generation	Generation	Total
		Gen-X	Boomer	
	Student	103	30	133
	Faculty		62	62
Total		103	92	195

The results of the survey suggest that there is no overall difference between generation of officers and the bases of power they choose to use. Additionally, the similarities suggest that both generation of officers in this study share closely all five of the bases of power nearly equally. These findings may indicate that both generations of officers may respond positively to each other's methods of leadership since they are shared by both generations. Further research, discussed in chapter 5, may be needed to prove these results. Even though there is no overall significant difference between generations and their bases of power, there were some significant differences based on individual questions with in the survey. The data suggests that generation X is more motivated by increases in pay. This is illustrated in table 11 and figure 8.

Table 11. Comparison by Generations on Question 1 of the Survey

	Generation	N	Mean Rank
Increase their pay level	Gen-X	103	106.22
	Boomer	92	90.66
	Total	195	




Figure 9. Question 1 Differences

Additionally, significant differences were identified in question eight and nine of the survey. The differences were not based on generational differences, but instead difference between student and faculty responses. The results indicate that CGSC students are more likely to strongly agree with the questions in table 12. This may be due to their current stage of development in the military.

Table 12. Status (Faculty vs. Students)  
Significant Differences in Questions 8 and 9

	STATUS	N	Mean Rank
Give them good technical suggestions	Student	133	109.48
	Faculty	62	92.65
	Total	195	
Make the work difficult for them	Student	133	111.09
	Faculty	62	91.90
	Total	195	

The study also suggests that CGSC students are more likely to use coercive power than the faculty. Even though the generations were nearly equal in response the students compared to the faculty showed a significant difference. Further study on why this occurred should be made to fully understand the differences in response between the two groups of officers. (Refer to table 13)

Table 13. Status (Faculty vs. Students)  
Significant Differences for Coercive Power

	STATUS	N	Mean Rank
COERCIVE	Student	133	83.36
	Faculty	62	104.82
	Total	195	

### Technological Impacts

This study has not found any direct link or connection to generational differences and the retention of officers as it relates to technology in the Army. Limited references

relating to the Internet were made in the Swan Research survey, but no detailed data could contribute to an analysis of technological impacts on generational differences.

### Summary

The analysis of generational differences and retention in this study indicate several key results. Generational differences in the Army appear to have some impact on officer retention. These differences manifested themselves in five of the seven sociological differences studied in this research paper (value, economic trends, milestone events, enemy threat, and gender and race relationship). Career stages indicate a possible impact on the relationship between generations of officers and retention, but further research is needed in order to fully understand that relationship. Technology is inconclusive given the research conducted in this study.

Additionally, this research attempted to identify connections between baby boomers and generation X officers. The results of the research produced several models to help officers understand the connection between both generations of officers and retention. The military hierarchy of needs illustrated the similar desires between the generations of officers as it relates to retention in the Army. The Internal and External model in this study demonstrates the necessity of leaders to understand how internal or external forces impact each generation differently in the officer corps. The model also illustrates the importance of leadership to filter decisions that impact both generations of officers. Finally, a modified version of Commings and Worley's model demonstrates the Army career development stages and the application of mentoring as a tool for assisting a younger generation of officers.

Based on the Blue Ribbon Panel study a table of operative and aligned values demonstrated how senior leaders may use core Army values to meet the current organizational needs as they relate to the current generations in the Army.

A power profile survey produced the results that the bases of power between the two generations of officers are similar. This led the researcher to believe that different generations in the officer corps may respond positively to each other's leadership styles since they are similar. Additionally, this may provide the overall connection that allows senior officers the ability to communicate their ideas to a younger generation resulting in a better understanding of generational differences and the effect it may have on retention.

## CHAPTER 5

### CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

#### Introduction

The purpose of this study was to answer the primary research question: Have generational differences in the Army affected retention in the U.S. Army officer corps. The two generations examined were: generation X and baby boomers. Similarities and differences between generations were explored by using seven sociological factors. These sociological factors include: values, economic trends, enemy threat, milestone events, technology, career stages, and gender and race relationships. The analysis of these sociological differences provided key insight into how each generation may interpret experiences and react to general life occurrences in the military. It was within the differences and similarities between the two generations that the researcher was able to formulate several models and tables which may provide ways of addressing the needs of both generations of officers in the Army.

#### Conclusions

The results of the research indicate that generational differences in the Army do affect retention in the US Army officer corps. Five of the seven sociological factors seem to impact and correlate to generational differences and retention in the Army officer corps.

The first two sociological factors that may impact retention are values and milestone events. The development of values between baby boomers and generation X may be at odds with one another due to different milestone events that occurred in their

lives. For example, the milestone events of the Vietnam War, civil rights movement, Cold War, and women's liberation movement may have had an impact on what baby boomers value and how they project their values. The same is true with generation X which experienced different milestones to include stagflation, fall of USSR, fall of Berlin wall, and increased levels of divorce rates in the United States. Since values may be slightly different due to life experiences, an understanding of values between the generations may be needed. Some of the common and or aligned values identified in this study include: duty, dedication, obedience, sanctity of life, mission accomplishment, and attention to detail. The aligned values between both generations can be used by the senior leadership to educate, reinforce, and internalize the Army's seven core values. The result of aligning generational values may create a greater sense of understanding, trust, and commitment by both generations which in turn may increase the level of retention in the Army officer corps.

Another sociological factor that may impact retention in the Army officer corps is the ability of a generation to identify with an enemy threat. The unpredictability and lack of definition of enemy threats in the nineties may have created a negative impact on generation X's willingness to commit long term to an organization that seems to lack a clear direction. The deployment of forces on peacekeeping or peace enforcing operations should not be confused with a clearly definable enemy like Iraq, Iran, China, or Korea.

Additionally, a lack of enemy threat contributes to the decrease in retention, based on the fact that senior leaders are unable to clearly articulate what enemy forces an officer may face in future battles. Consequently, generation X has been consumed with peacekeeping and wartime missions which have resulted in a lack of understanding of



when the next conflict will begin or the last one will end. This has an exhaustive effect on officers, which in turn may contribute to a decrease in willingness to stay in the service. Generation X Army officer corps is less likely to be retained if they do not see some relief by senior leaders as it relates to OPTEMPO. The terrorist attack on 11 September 2001 will provide some relief in defining an enemy threat, but it may only be temporary.

Economic impacts on society seem to have a direct influence on the retention in the Army officer corps. Two major factors that may impact a generation's decision to leave the Army are economic security and stability early in its career development. To generation X, economic security and stability meant one thing--survival. If generation X Army officer corps felt that their economic security and stability in the Army was threatened they would look for other jobs that allowed them to meet their needs. For baby boomers security and stability were having a career that allowed them to build relationships with peers and create a better life for themselves and family. For generation X officers, the downsizing in the early nineties may have reinforced a lack of security and stability in their military careers, resulting in a reduced willingness to be retained.

Finally, race and gender as it relates to affirmative action and equal opportunities seem to be perceived differently by the two generations, as they relate to promotions, schooling, and command opportunities. The result of these differences may build a general mistrust in the Army's system as it relates to upward mobility in the Army officer corps. Some of the similarities that exist between the generations are a high level of awareness and commitment to be fair and equal to all races and genders in the Army.

Career stages and or development and technology, had little impact on generational differences and retention in this research. Career stages and or development illustrated the point that each generation (Xers and baby boomers) shared the same concerns as they moved from one stage of their life to the next. For example generation X had the same concerns as baby boomers did when they were in the first stage of the career life cycle model. The only conclusive points made in the analysis chapter is that mentoring is needed in the early stages of an officers career and may have less of an impact as they enter their mid-level career cycle. Additionally, the study of technology and its impact on generational differences provided no key insight due to lack of conclusive finding/evidence showing way or the other on the topic.

The secondary questions that assisted in answering the primary question listed above include the following results:

Have social factors been a driving force in the retention of officers in the Army?

The answer according to the thesis research is yes. Social factors manifested themselves in race and gender relationships, as well as economic expansion or reduction among the officers in the Army. Additionally, values between the generations of officers may be directly related to the milestone events that shaped their lives. As a result, generations of officers may respond differently to the growing social factors that are created by society. These reactions may create friction between the two groups of officers, resulting in the potential loss of quality junior officers.

What generations make up the respective senior and junior officer groups?

This question was answered primarily based on the age groups between generation X and baby boomers. Generation X officers were defined as individuals born between 1965 and 1982. Baby boomers were defined as officers born between 1946 and 1964.

How has leadership and core values impacted generational differences in the officer corps?

In order to answer this secondary question the research explored espoused and operative values in the Army officer corps. The Blue Ribbon Panel 2000 provided the base line of data between the generations of officers as it relates to operative versus espoused values. The alignment of operative and espoused values demonstrates the importance of creating a common understanding as it relates to Army core values. Thus a connection was identified between leadership and values and their impacts on a generation of officers. The connection that was identified in this study included aligned values that were common to both generations.

Is there a correlation between generations and retention in the Army?

By addressing the differences and similarities in values, enemy threat, and race and gender relationships, the researcher was able to draw some correlation between generations and retention in the Army officer corps. For example, the race and gender issue of fair and equal treatment transcends between both generations. If this fundamental belief is violated, retention among generation X officers may suffer.

### Recommendation

This researcher divided recommendations into internal and external focus areas. Internal impacts as defined in this study are programs that senior leaders can directly manage, such as value education, housing on post, education programs on post, and deployments by local commanders. External impacts are programs or events that senior leaders in the military have little or no control over, such as national economy, reduction of force requirements by Congress, and cultural and social changes within society. A clear understanding of internal impacts on generations will allow senior officers to focus on the right programs for their command. Value alignment between generations might be a tool a commander uses to balance the needs of the officers under his command. The use of the inspector general to survey officers on their concerns and issues may provide the basic insight of what officers want in the command, as well as, what they value. If leaders understand generational views as they relates to values, the leaders may be able to respond by aligning generational group values with organizational core values. This alignment will establish better communication between the two groups of officers and may result in a higher retention rate.

Command messages of improving the PX, commissary, officer club, day care center, on-post health facilities, and on post housing were noted as issues that senior leaders can use to highlight their attempts of meeting both generation of officers quality of life issues. Action in these areas should be shown in order to validate and or support the command messages. Senior leaders should consider offsetting quality of life issues if the installation does not meet the needs of their officers. Examples of these findings as they relate to a specific generation of officers include: providing soldiers supplemental

pay for living in substandard quarters on post (generation X), increase tuition assistance based on individual unit availability during the training year (generation X), provide more time off for officers to meet family needs (both generations), provide stronger post support facilities (PX, commissary, and officers club) if the community is unable to support the soldiers basic needs (both generations), and create state-of-the-art day care center if off-post resources are limited (baby boomers).

Several external impacts also seem to have an effect on retaining quality officers in the Army. As noted in chapter 4 of this research, economy, social programs, and enemy threat seem to impact a generation's view on staying or leaving the force. According to the thesis analysis of generational differences as it pertains to savings and investments, generation X has the potential to be more financially independent at a younger age than baby boomers. Additionally, there seems to be a shift in how each generation commits to an organization, as it relates to their economic investments. Conversely, generation X may be much more willing to leave an organization once they are vested economically in that organization compared to baby boomers. These differences may be caused by the independent outlook of generation X, compared to the baby boomers. The results of these differences might be a generation that is less willing to commit for over twenty years of service. Additionally, periodic surveys on the intentions of current junior grade and midgrade officer's as they relates to their commitment to the Army may provide senior leaders with the projected out flow of those officers from the Army. It may also assist in determining if generation X is more willing to leave if they have some vested return on their service. The impact of generation X

leaving earlier may translate into a shortage of officers in the grade of lieutenant colonel and colonel within the next five to ten years.

Affirmative action and equal opportunity programs, as they relate to the impact on overall morale and trust of officers within the Army, should be reviewed. Additionally, clear messages that outline current policies on job opportunities, promotions, selection for schools, and selection for assignments should be communicated to officers of both generations. Together, these initiatives may provide senior leaders with tools to address these concerns and issues of affirmative action in the Army.

Officers need to have a clear understanding of what type of enemy threat they may face in the future. Baby boomers clearly had that opportunity to focus in on an enemy and train to defeat that enemy force (communism). Generation X and the next generation of officers need that clarity. It is the process of training to fight that enemy threat that trains the Army's officers to fight and win the nation's wars. A clearly defined enemy threat or training focus may provide a generation with a base structure of how it will fight and train to win future wars. It should be a long-term plan that can focus the Army's leaders on how to develop new ways of winning future battles.

#### Areas of Future Research

During the course of this research, there were several branches that may allow for future researchers to study. These topics and questions include:

1. Study of power profiles of generation X and the next generation of officer (Generation Y or nexters). This study may provide the Army with insight into the next generation of officers' power profile as it relates to baby boomers and generation X.

2. A study of career options and considerations of generation X when they reach eighteen years in service. This research may provide the Army leadership with what senior officers in generation X are considering as they enter retirement ages.

3. The study of values of the next generation and how they align with generation X's values and current Army core values. The values of the next generation of officers are not clear given the current time available for research. A study of a comparison of values of the next generation may provide a better understanding of aligning generation X and core Army values.

4. The study of the Army's ability to prepare for war comparing two threat approaches: known enemy threats versus contingency based threats. It may be helpful to officers to understand the relationship between these two threat models and the impact they have training and retaining a future force.

5. Do affirmative action programs in the military have to be redefined? A study of all affirmative action plans in the military may provide insights into its impacts on retention.

### Summary

The study of generational differences in the Army should be viewed as a window into its effect on retention of officers in the Army. With every change that occurs in our society and within the military there is an equal response from a generation of officers which may have an impact positively or negatively on retention. Without a firm understanding of potential responses to these changes to junior officers, a senior leader is left to guess what is important or simply falls back to what they have experienced in their lifetime. This approach may lead to quick fixes, misunderstandings, wasted money on

programs, and a general level of apathy for a group of officers. A clear understanding of these differences may assist leaders at all levels with the ability to prepare and to retain quality officers in the service. It will also assist in training and fighting a future force to win its nations wars.



APPENDIX A

PERSONAL POWER PROFILE SURVEY

Source: Modified version of T. R. Hinken and C. A. Schriesheim,  
 “Development and Application of New Scale to Measure the  
 French and Raven (1959) Base of Social Science.

Instructions: Below is a list of statements that may be used in describing behavior that supervisors (leaders) in an organization can direct toward their subordinates (followers). First, carefully read each descriptive statement, thinking in terms of how you prefer to influence others. Circle the number that most closely represents how you feel. Use the following numbers for your answers.

- 5= Strongly agree
- 4= Agree
- 3= Neither agree nor disagree
- 2= Disagree
- 1= Strongly disagree

RANK \_\_\_\_\_ AGE \_\_\_\_\_

To influence others, I would prefer to:

1. increase their pay level	1	2	3	4	5
2. make them feel valued	1	2	3	4	5
3. give undesirable job assignments	1	2	3	4	5
4. make them feel like I approve of them	1	2	3	4	5
5. make them feel that they have commitments to meet	1	2	3	4	5
6. make them feel personally accepted	1	2	3	4	5
7. make them feel important	1	2	3	4	5
8. give them good technical suggestions	1	2	3	4	5
9. make the work difficult for them	1	2	3	4	5
10. share my experience and/or training	1	2	3	4	5
11. make things unpleasant here	1	2	3	4	5

12. make being at work distasteful	1	2	3	4	5
13. influence their getting a pay increase	1	2	3	4	5
14. make them feel like they should satisfy their job requirements	1	2	3	4	5
15. provide them with sound job-related advice	1	2	3	4	5
16. provide them with special benefits	1	2	3	4	5
17. influence their getting a promotion	1	2	3	4	5
18. give them the feeling that they have responsibilities to fulfill	1	2	3	4	5
19. provide them with needed technical knowledge	1	2	3	4	5
20. make them recognize that they have tasks to accomplish	1	2	3	4	5

Scoring: Using the grid below, insert the number value in each block for the particular question. Add up the total and divide by four. A high score is 4 and greater on any of the five dimensions of power implies that you prefer to influence others by employing that particular form of power. A score of 2 and less implies that you prefer not employing that particular form of power over others.

Reward	Coercive	Legitimate	Referent	Expert
1__	3__	5__	2__	8__
13__	9__	14__	4__	10__
16__	11__	18__	6__	15__
17__	12__	20__	7__	19__
Total__	__	__	__	__
/ by 4__	__	__	__	__

## APPENDIX B

### THESIS CHAPTER REVIEW

Chapter 1 of this study provided the initial background as it relates to generations and retention in the U.S. Army officer corps. A basic explanation of each generation was provided, as well as, an explanation of sociological differences that may separate generations from one another. The sociological difference of values was explained in terms of operative versus espoused values in the Army officer corps. Economic trends in chapter 1 defined the possible reactions that may occur due to different economic experiences and expectations between the generations. Changes in enemy threat provided the initial framework on how each generation may define the enemy they may engage in the future. Milestone events in each generation's life provided the common bond that each generation experienced early in their lifetime. These experiences are at the core of how a group may react to changes in the future. Gender and race relationships explained the sensitivities that formed based on each generations life experiences as they relate to affirmative action and equal opportunities. The career stages of development in chapter 1 provided the framework of stages, ages and development in the Army developmental life cycle. The introduction of technology formed the foundation of discussion on Internet and e-mail, as innovations that may impact generations in the Army.

Chapter 2 provided the literature review of key research, surveys and books about leadership, generational differences, junior officer's expectations, and senior officer's view on the military when they were junior officers, and economic manpower studies and reports. Additionally, the chapter highlighted research and publications that could

provide key insight into explaining the relationship between generation X and baby boomers. Furthermore, this chapter focused on answers the questions dealing with power profiles, leadership concerns, values, attitudes, perceptions, career choices, change in the work environment, equal opportunity and discrimination, drawdown, enemy threat, rewards, incentives, retention, economics, mentoring, readiness, and generational differences.

Chapter 3 of this study discussed the method of gathering information as it related to generational differences and retention in the U.S. Army. Two of the primary methods used included the ground theory approach and content analysis. Additionally, a survey was conducted on power profiles with the goal of measuring current officer's bases of power.

The ground theory approach involved four procedures: open coding, axial coding, selective coding, and development of a theory. This approach was used to study three sociological differences between the two generations which included values, change in enemy threat, and technological advantages.

Content analysis collection plan consisted of four procedures which were body research, description of characteristics, tabulation, and pattern. This approach studied and collected data from four sociological differences which were economic trends, milestone events, gender/race relations, and career stages/development.

Finally, a power profile study was distributed and collected using CGSC students and CGSC faculty members. The Mann-Whitney model was used to compare and contrast the data collected. The variance of .05 was used to determine if there was a significant difference between the two groups of officers.

Chapter 4 analyzes the seven sociological differences listed in chapter 1 and provides figures, tables, and charts to illustrate differences and similarities within the officer corps. Additionally, this chapter analyzes basic officers needs in the Army and creates a hierarchy of needs to illustrate the differences and similarities that may exist in the current officer corps. Finally, it analyzes the power profile differences and similarities between generations X and baby boomers.

Chapter 5 provides brief conclusions, recommendations, areas of future research, and summary on the entire research conducted in this study

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