

# **Global Forces, Local Contexts: Facets of Police Work in Ukraine**

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## **Abstract**

This thesis, broadly speaking, deals with ontological security and the ways it is managed through multiple local Ukrainian enchantments with the “Western” and the “normal.” Starting with an analysis of media representations of police reform in Ukraine, I then follow hegemonic discourses on their journey to the everyday working life-world of police officers. While “thinking what others have thought before,” I argue that officers adapt existing concepts and ideas to talk about their everyday experiences, anxieties, and discontents, effectively creating a no-place inscribed with desirable qualities of material abundance, respect, authority, and state protection. I continue by contrasting what was imagined (by the public and the officers) to the daily realities of police work, particularly highlighting the patterns of authority functioning in two Ukrainian cities. Last but not least, I investigate the performative dimensions of police work, claiming that symbolic of the Ukrainian police reform, could be well explained as a particular local response to the paradoxes of formal policing created by modernity.

## **Preface**

This thesis is an original work by Ivan Shmatko. The research project, of which this thesis is a part, received research ethics approval from the University of Alberta Research Ethics Board, Project Name "Big Questions, Quick Answers: Police Officers and Everyday Decision Making in a Ukrainian City", No. Pro00078901\_REN1, May 28, 2018.

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Dr. John-Paul Himka and Chrystia Chomiak were very kind to let me stay at their home while I was writing this thesis. I would like to extend my sincere gratitude to those warm and charismatic people whom I am happy to know.

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## Introduction

### **To Explore Strange New Worlds: Negotiating Access to the Ukrainian Police**

It was a warm summer day when I yet again looked inside my mailbox. The letter that I found in there made me both relieved and worried: on the one hand, I finally obtained an answer that I have been waiting for quite a while... and on the other, I felt that everything could go wrong very easily. After all, police institutions are not well known for being particularly open to outsiders (Fassin 2013). Not to mention suspicious post-Soviet Ukrainian law enforcement that is neither accustomed to social researchers nor knows anything about strange beings called “anthropologists” and “ethnographers.” I understood well that a student asking for the prolonged accompaniment of police officers could easily receive a “no” for an answer.

And indeed, that is precisely what happened. I found myself reading a typical post-Soviet formal letter that mostly consisted of totally irrelevant legal information. The author informed me about everything except what I wanted to know: in particular, the letter informed me that the Ukrainian police is subject to regulations of the Ukrainian constitution, international agreements and other legal acts produced by the President, the Parliament and the Cabinet of Ministers;<sup>1</sup> explained to me Ukrainian legal definition of the “policeman”; and even described the conditions under which a “Ukrainian citizen that expressed the desire to join the police” can become an officer. Only closer to the end there was the answer to my question: “Patrol Police Department does not consider it possible to conduct a participant observation research given the high workload of the officers and around-the-clock patrolling [of the streets].”<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> The Cabinet of Ministers, according to the Article 113 of the Constitution, is “the highest body of state executive power in Ukraine.”

<sup>2</sup> All translations are mine unless indicated otherwise.



Of course, neither the workload nor the round-the-clock nature of the police work was the real reason for a “no.” Even the additional mention of a security concern—“we cannot take responsibility for your life and health”—was, of course, a fake. It was later revealed to me during my research that the real reason was the fear of internal secrets spilling outside, facilitated by the environment the police force found itself in: the Ukrainian public has grown disenchanted and suspicious towards the national police reform, just as Ukrainians have become disappointed in the results of the Maidan revolution (2013–2014).

The Maidan protest was a mass political unrest in the country that concluded with extreme violence. Protesters won the street war that erupted during the Maidan protests and then-President Viktor Yanukovich eventually fled the country. Yet, just few years after the events, the mass feeling was that the Maidan and Ukrainians had lost their battle against the “oligarchic regime.” “Nothing has really changed,”—one could frequently hear and read from Ukrainians. That phrase, of course, applied to the main reform of the post-Maidan government—the police reform.

Since I suspected from the very beginning that my official research request could be refused, I was prepared. I knew well that in Ukraine one could solve many if not most bureaucratic conundrums with the help of “mutual help practices” (Barsukova and Ledeneva 2018, 490) or what I prefer to call “network capital”<sup>3</sup>—if one is engaged in

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<sup>3</sup> If there is an “economy of favour,” (Ledeneva 1998) then there should be capital that fuels it. Network capital is a capital that is accumulated through the development of networks. The bigger and the stronger the network is—the more capital the person possesses. Power of the network is measured through the number of established relations and the quality of those relations (social distance between actors in the network). In other words, the more relations are established and the closer social distance between the actors is—the more capital there is. However, the capital has a recursive nature as it includes not just the elements discussed, but also the networks of other actors (with whom relations are established). Furthermore, access of actors to different resources (actual possibility to provide a “favor”) should also be included.

informal interconnected and interdependent network of acquaintances, friends, relatives, and if someone from that network has an ability to “solve the issue,” then there is a great chance that it would be solved. As a joke goes: “you have to know people who know the people [who can help you].”

It happened so that I had just what I needed. In the next few months, I became engaged in constant calls and meetings with people who could help me negotiate access: police officers of different standing, workers of international missions that fund Ukrainian police reform, think tank and NGO employees and even some representatives of the regional influential elites. Once, during one of the meetings, I complained about how hard it is to get an access to the Ukrainian police. The answer that followed was revealing: “See, you became too Canadian while studying in there!” the man chastised me. “Things work differently in Ukraine. You had to make an arrangement first and only then write your letter,” my interlocutor told me. Later on, I would repeatedly hear the same argument both from the officers and from the people who helped me get inside the police force: Ukraine was again and again contrasted to “the West”—the place where the law is obeyed (and thus you can rely on formal procedures), the state cares about its citizens, and an ethnographer easily gets her access. Ukraine, on the contrary, was portrayed as a deviant place—a space where everything does not work “normally.”

While reading this thesis, an attentive reader will most certainly notice that the themes outlined above weld together the whole text. Because I was constantly reminded that “things work differently” in the Ukrainian police, I eventually decided to answer the simple question: are they indeed so different? And if not, I thought, why do people keep insisting that they are? After a while, those general questions transformed into the investigation of the following: How does the work that the police do (and what they are imagined to do) depend on the anxieties produced by various contexts?; How

do specific contexts shape the ideas about what 'normal' policing is?; And how do those ideas fit with the daily realities of policing in Ukraine? Chapter One, Part One discusses the discourses that were publicly used by journalists, politicians and newly hired officers at the beginning of the police reform. I show how self-orientalizing occidentalist "Europe" and "the West" became a part of the hegemonic binary frame that was utilized to describe "the new police." In Part Two, I analyze the police officers' occupational adaptations of the hegemonic discourse of "Imaginary Europe." I argue that police officers reverse the Ukrainian utopia of Imaginary Europe in order to talk about their professional anxieties and express their deep discontent with the working conditions they face, as well as with the fact that their authority is constantly contested. Chapter Two deals with informalities and extralegalities of police work in Ukraine. I borrow the concept of "provisional authority" to talk about the limits of the Ukrainian state (Jauregui 2016). I also compare the extralegalities of Ukrainian and Western police work and argue that in both cases authority is a contextual phenomenon—it is a variable that increases or decreases depending on "when," "where" and "to whom" the authority is applied (Black 1976). Finally, Chapter Three discusses some of the popular notions about the modern state and the police. I suggest that the modern police participate in performances—a stage play that has been developed as a reaction to the promises made by modernity that it could not keep. I argue that the assumed "ineffectiveness" and "corruption" of the Ukrainian police is a result of poor acting much more than it is a sign of its deviance from the (Western) norm.

Without any doubt my positionality enormously shaped this thesis. Yet, it was not so much my gender, or race, as my education in a "Western" academic institution. Once my participants heard that I was studying in Canada, it was almost impossible to avoid talking about it. Police officers in a small city Bezrobotne were particularly

interested in a range of topics and almost no day went by without a question about the Canadian police service and the salaries of the local officers, the standards of living in Canada, or just my experience of the Canadian education. Sometimes I was asked a question out of a genuine desire to know, whereas at other times a question would be voiced just as an opportunity to tell me (or others) a story, to express an opinion. or to blow off negative feelings about their recent experience, working conditions, etc.

My gender and ethnicity, of course, were always present during the research. However, they always seemed to be unmarked. Being a white Ukrainian man in the Ukrainian police force means being perceived as a neutral default by the officers. Though women became much better represented in the police force after the reform, the majority of the officers in service are still men. As for the officers from Ukrainian ethnic minorities, one would be surprised to find any in the region I have conducted my fieldwork in.

It is no secret that who a researcher is and how she is perceived defines what she notices. It seems quite obvious to me that without all those questions, stories and complaints, I would not be able to write this thesis in the way I did. Yet, in addition to the discussion of positionality, it seems important to discuss the general approach to the research that I applied. This work is as much a result of unchosen social positions and assigned identities of the researcher as it is of a bigger conscious attempt to see behind the staged façade: I was constantly on a lookout for what is hidden. Just as I have much valued the emic perspectives of my participants, I recognize that any culture in general and its concrete performances in particular moments and places have a tendency to shade out certain "uncomfortable" aspects of reality (Douglas 1976). To look both at the (front)staged performance and through it, to accept the culture on its

own terms, and yet to be able to read through its text into the deeper layers, the layers that are not immediately revealed, is, I believe, the work of the ethnographer.

A few words must be said about the places of my fieldwork. In effect, I conducted a multisited ethnography in two cities that I will call **Central'ne** and **Bezrobitne**.<sup>4</sup> Central'ne is a big Ukrainian city with the population of more than a million. As many such cities, it attracts resources and people from all over the region and the country. Thus, the city is relatively rich when compared with the rest of the (otherwise poor) Ukrainian state. Bezrobitne, on the other hand, is a small city with the approximate population of 15,000. It is located in Central'ne district (*oblast'*) and tells a rather typical Ukrainian story: it was growing quickly during the Soviet times and was heavily industrialized. Yet, after the collapse of the USSR and its interconnected production chains, most of the factories closed. One of the main resources still operating in the city—the railway—historically constructed to deliver locally produced goods all over the country, is now used to deliver people to Central'ne in old crowded electric trains. Inhabitants of Bezrobitne go to Central'ne in search of work or, if they can not work anymore because of their age, just to sell their homegrown vegetables. Bezrobitne, like many other small cities in Ukraine, is subsidised by the state as it can not cover its needs.

Unsurprisingly, the police force in Central'ne is much better funded than the one in Bezrobitne. One could easily spot this just by looking at such visible markers of the police well-being as cars and uniforms. This means that officers in Central'ne, while

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<sup>4</sup> These are not the real names of the cities. In this text, I engage in what Beatrice Jauregui calls "strategic misrepresentation" (Jauregui 2016). In order to protect the people I worked with, I will change not only the names of the participants, but also some of the details I use in descriptions of the places or events. I am perfectly aware that while I may not see some of the episodes described as problematic, deviant or otherwise punishable, others may not perceive the reality this way.

struggling with low salaries and a lack of all needed resources, do not encounter such everyday problems as their Bezrobotne colleagues face. For instance, they do not have to develop strategies to obtain gas to make their cars run and thus do not have to engage in informal relations to secure these valuable resources.

What is even more important is that the police force in Central'ne is a showpiece of the reform: working in a big city under the close scrutiny of journalists, politicians, international donors and social activists means working with many more restrictions than would be found in a province. If we imagine formality and informality on a continuum, we would probably see that police officers in Central'ne, while still influenced by extralegal considerations, operate closer to the formal end of the spectrum.

It must be mentioned that I also made use of the extensive media attention towards the police that erupted right after the start of the reform in 2014. Ukrainian newspapers and TV channels produced dozens of hours of morning shows, news pieces and extensive reports. All this provided me with highly valuable information on how journalists themselves, as well as newly-recruited members of the police force committed to the post-Maidan ideals, experts of various kinds, and even the general public understood and interpreted the police reform.

## Chapter 1. Representations, Imaginations, and Realities of Police Work in Ukraine

“The (imaginative) setting up of the divide between East and West went hand in hand with the domination of the newly defined other...”

**Lila Abu-Lughod**, “Can There Be A Feminist Ethnography?”

“Peoples of Europe, they don’t know how dear to us they are.”  
**Fyodor Dostoevsky**

Why are the streets and squares emptying so rapidly,  
everyone going home lost in thought?

Because night has fallen and the barbarians haven't come.  
And some of our men just in from the border say  
there are no barbarians any longer.

Now what’s going to happen to us without barbarians?  
Those people were a kind of solution.

**Constantine P. Cavafy**, “Waiting for the Barbarians”

Social sciences seem to tell us a lot about the representations of the Other in Western cultures. Edward Said’s *Orientalism* (2003)—one of the most influential books of the XX century—inspired a number of authors to delve into studying how “the West” constructs and defines those who live outside the (always changing and contextual<sup>5</sup>) borders of “the Western culture.” “Eastern Europe” was not an exception. Historian Larry Wolff, for example, left a very thorough description of how Eastern Europe was invented by the Western authors in the XVIII century. As Wolff shows, Enlightenment philosophers, who often had not visited Eastern Europe, portrayed it as uncivilized, wild and barbaric

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<sup>5</sup> W. H. Parker beautifully called it “‘tidal Europe’ whose frontiers ebb and flow” (Davies 1997, 9).

space. That space was designed not for its own sake but to create a binary: inventing the unevolved Eastern allowed the Western Europe to become its opposition—the measuring rod of civilization itself (Wolff 2010).

It can be argued that Eastern Europe is still largely perceived as a place of deviance from the Western “norm.” Famous Western media outlets and influential NGOs routinely describe the region with a language of pessimism and disillusionment: countries like Ukraine are imagined to fail their post-Soviet “transition” and thus lose the chance to build a stable liberal democratic society. Numerous reports portray post-Soviet Eastern European countries as filled with endemic corruption, non-functional institutions, irrational violence; they are generally portrayed as chaotic and at best problematic. Influential anti-corruption organization Transparency International, for instance, diagnoses Eastern Europe as a place on a brink of a catastrophe: regional countries, according to the famous anti-corruption player, have “weak checks and balances” that threaten their “anti-corruption efforts.” Presumably, in an attempt to impress the reader, the organization compares Eastern Europe’s failure to combat corruption to the misfortunes of Sub-Saharan Africa (Transparency International 2019).

A *Politico* journalist Philip Kaleta, citing “a study by the German Economic Institute,” paints a dark picture of the falling “support for democracy” in Eastern Europe. According to Kaleta, the researchers from “a Cologne-based think tank” claim that “the increased experiences of corruption in these states ... undermine the support for democracy.” “Eastern European countries need to improve the quality of their democratic institutions,” the journalist warns the reader, because otherwise, in the words of the researchers, “all the hard-fought accomplishments could easily dwindle again” (Kaleta 2018). Finally, *The Economist* pleads the West not to give up on Ukraine.



The article with an extremely telling cross heading (“Ukraine must not be allowed to fail”) seems to invite the long citation:

After the Maidan revolution and the start of the Russian war against Ukraine in 2014, Western policy had two aims: to halt and punish Russian aggression and to help Ukraine become a democratic state governed by the rule of law. America imposed sanctions on Russia, ordered the president, Petro Poroshenko, to establish an anti-corruption force and sent Joe Biden, then vice-president, on repeated visits to insist on fighting graft. The EU imposed sanctions on Russia, and made support for civil-society and the rule of law a linchpin of the association agreement it signed with Ukraine in 2014.

In that light, the news out of Ukraine over the past few weeks has been dire... To some Europeans and Americans, this picture suggests that their efforts to persuade Ukraine to turn over a new leaf were always doomed to fail. That is a misreading. In fact, the recent chaos in Ukraine comes in part because in the past year, especially since the inauguration of President Donald Trump, Europe and America have eased the pressure (*The Economist* 2017).

The reader is warned that unless the West is back in the game of pressuring the country to become democratic and governed by “the rule of law,” “Ukraine risks sinking back into the morass from which it tried to extricate itself with Maidan” (*The Economist* 2017).

Western media, international organizations, and governments often see the dysfunctioning state as a locus of the Eastern European problems. Thus, special attention is directed at the top-down reforms of Eastern European societies: most of the funding of the European Union, Canada and the US is allocated to reforming crucial state institutions, adopting new and better laws and regulations, etc. A crucial part of that state-reshaping effort in Ukraine was the police reform—the central showpiece of the post-Maidan country and one of the major attempts to build a “democratic state” in the region. While, as softly implied above, it could be used to tell a story about some of the Western notions of how the “proper” modern society should be organized and function, it also helps to understand a slightly less studied phenomenon, namely, the

travelling of the ideas, visions, perceptions and concepts produced by the West about the West (and different imagined opposing “Others”) when they are exported to the places of imagined dysfunctionality and abnormality. That, in turn, allows to understand how the “normal” state, and thus “normal” law enforcement, are seen in countries like Ukraine and elsewhere.

Samuel Beckett’s absurdist tragicomedy *Waiting for Godot* seems to be the ideal metaphor for the situation in which many Ukrainians have found themselves. I argue that during the period of police reform in Ukraine, the process was largely accomplished by the location of such a state in a place that has Godot-like qualities: it is constantly expected and yet never comes. Except that it is not Godot that they are waiting for, but Europe. Or, to be precise, Imaginary Europe, to paraphrase Alexei Yurchak (2006).

In this chapter, I will talk about Imaginary Europe in Ukraine and the way it was used to frame the police reform after the Euromaidan<sup>6</sup> protests. I will first look at the general history of the “Imagined West” in Ukraine and will give a short explanation of the concept itself. After that I will discuss the spaces that it operates in and show that it is not only macro-political events (such as Maidan protests) that are influenced by Imaginary Europe, but also day-to-day activities and choices of Ukrainians (such as consumer choices). The discussion about the micro influences of the “Imagined West” will be important to the analysis of the police reform as it will show how Imaginary Europe transcends the boundaries of what is traditionally perceived to be “political” and makes seemingly apolitical spheres filled with “political” meanings. At the end of this part of the chapter, which is based on my study of the media representation of the

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<sup>6</sup> Though the events that took place in 2013–2014 are now commonly called Maidan, at first the name Euromaidan was much more widespread. I am using the name “Euromaidan” on purpose here. Given the argument of this chapter, I believe that Europe, or, to be precise, “Imaginary Europe” played an important role during the protests.

police reform, I will talk about how this reform was represented and understood. Specifically, I will talk about the frame of Imaginary Europe in this process and how it was connected to the ideas of the normal state and the normal police force.

## **1.1 Waiting for Europe: Media Representation of the Police Reform in Ukraine**

### **Emergence of the Imaginary Europe in Ukraine**

An anthropologist Alexei Yurchak was the first who introduced the term "Imaginary West." According to him, despite the fact that most of the Soviet men and women never left the country, people had a strong identity constructed in relation to the "West." Because the "real" West was not known, it was actively "imagined."

Yurchak describes the "abroad" (*zagranytsa*; *заграница*) in the following way:

[The West was] [S]ignifying an imaginary place that was simultaneously knowable and unattainable, tangible and abstract, mundane and exotic [...] *zagranytsa* as a Soviet imaginary 'elsewhere' [...] was not necessarily about any real place. The 'West' (*zapad*) was its archetypal manifestation. It was produced locally and existed only at the time when the real West could not be encountered. We will call this version of the elsewhere, the Imaginary West (Yurchak 2006, 159).

That imagining of the West was often seen in the way people consumed products, performed their fashion desires or listened to music. Yet, according to the author, it had political consequences and, in the end, contributed to the collapse of the USSR.

Ukraine's own Imaginary West appears at the end of the 1980s, when the Soviet Union was already collapsing. The so-called National Democratic movement appeared in the country. The ultimate goal of the movement was the independence of Ukraine. Following Karl Mannheim's ideas, one could say that a newly emerged anti-status quo movement needed a Utopia, a powerful image that would mobilize people against an existing order (Mannheim 1991). One of those images was the idea that Ukraine has to achieve independence, and when it does, it quickly and inevitably will become a part of

the “Europe,” which was mainly thought of as a place where people have high standards of life. For example, one of the leaflets produced by the pro-independence movement claimed that “Ukraine has European potential, yet in reality it lives like a colony.” Under that slogan a reader was provided with numbers of produced goods in Ukraine, France, Germany, and Italy: sugar, milk, potato, oil, gas, etc. If the reader would read further, she would see the comparison in purchasing capacity between Ukrainians and “Europeans” (see Fig. 1).

# УКРАЇНА:

**європейська держава –  
за можливостями, безправна  
колонія – в дійсності**

[www.istpravda.com.ua](http://www.istpravda.com.ua)

Так працюємо: **історична правда**

виробництво основних видів продукції  
на душу населення в рік:

	Україна	Німеччина	Франція	Італія
Електроенергія, квт	5700	7200	7400	3600
Нафта, кг	104	60	60	80
Газ, м <sup>3</sup>	607	26	59	302
Вугілля, кг	3400	3900	2390	2000
Сталь, кг	1060	691	344	430
Цement, кг	454	489	469	690
Зерно, кг	1033	445	1058	295
Картопля, кг	378	118	85	42
М'ясо, кг	155	96	112	63
Молоко, кг	469	450	519	204
Цукор, кг	118	50	67	18

Так маємо:

середньомісячна зарплата працюючих  
та купівельна спроможність:

		Україна	Німеччина	Франція	Італія
Місячна зарплата		210 крб.	4200 марок 1400 крб.	6000 франків 670 крб.	15 млн. лір 750 крб.
За місячну зарплату можна придбати	м'яса, кг	40	180	100	110
	костюмів, шт.	1	8	6	7
	чобіт, пар	1,5	10	7	12
	колготок, шт.	40	800	900	1700
	кольорових телевізорів, шт.	0,25	3	2	2
	холодильників, шт.	0,7	2	1,5	2
На купівлю одного автомобіля треба працювати		4 роки	10 міс.	10 міс.	9 міс.

Fig. 1. A leaflet produced by the Ukrainian pro-independence movement-1  
Source: [istpravda.com.ua](http://istpravda.com.ua)

Another leaflet compared numbers in the same fashion and also asked "Why doesn't that kind of production make us rich? Isn't it because most of what we produce goes to the Center?" The implication was more than obvious: Russia (the Centre here refers to Moscow) robs Ukrainians of the goods that they produce (see Fig. 2). If Ukraine becomes independent, Ukrainians will live like people in France, Germany, and Italy. "Europe," thus, was inseparably connected to the "Soviet" and "Russian." Those concepts existed as binaries and oppositions in the Ukrainian imaginary.

In general, "during the 1991 referendum campaign, optimism was widespread about Ukraine exploiting its position 'in the centre of Europe' to catch up with France and Germany within five years and join the European community. 'Nasha meta—Evropa' (Our goal is Europe) was the slogan of many nationalist politicians," observes John Morrison about that time in Ukraine (1993, 691).



## Ні — Союзному договору!

КРЕМЛЬ ВВАЖАЄ, ЩО БЕЗ СОЮЗУ УКРАЇНА ПРОПАДЕ. ЧИ ВІДПОВІДАЄ ЦЕ ДІСНОСТІ?

ПРОЧИТАЙТЕ НАВЕДЕНІ НИЖЧЕ ДАНІ І ЗРОБІТЬ ВЛАСНИЙ ВИСНОВОК:

### ВИРОБНИЦТВО НАЙВАЖЛИВІШИХ ВИДІВ ПРОМИСЛОВОСТІ І СІЛЬСЬКОГОСПОДАРСЬКОЇ ПРОДУКЦІЇ НА ДУШУ НАСЕЛЕННЯ В 1989 РОЦІ

Країна. продукт	Великобри- танія	Італія	Франція	ФРН	Україна	Місце
Електроенергія квт-рік	5383	3650	7431	7215	5706	3
Нафта вклуч. газ. кон- ден. кг.	1486	78	64	57	104	2
Газ природ. м <sup>3</sup>	846	302	59	26	607	2
Вугіл. товар. кг.	1757	24	239	3970	3475	1
Заліз. руда кг.	4	—	167	2,0	2126	1
Сталь	329	436	344	691	1060	1
Цемент кг.	245	690	469	489	454	4
Зерно і зернобобові кг.	405	295	1058	445	1033	2
Картопля кг.	121	42	85	118	378	1
М'ясо кг.	66*	63*	112*	96*	86	3
Молоко кг.	262*	204*	519*	450*	469	2
Цукор кг.	22*	28*	67*	50*	118,6	1
Масло кг.	2,5*	1,3*	9,2*	6,9*	8,5	2

\* — дані на 1988 рік.

ЧОМУ ТАКИЙ РІВЕНЬ ВИРОБНИЦТВА НІЯК НЕ ПОЗНАЧАЄТЬСЯ  
НА НАШОМУ ДОБРОБУТІ? ЧИ НЕ ТОМУ, ЩО БІЛЬШІСТЬ НАШОЇ ПРО-  
ДУКЦІЇ ІДЕ ДО ЦЕНТРУ?

ТО КОМУ ПОТРІБЕН СОЮЗНИЙ ДОГОВІР?

Fig. 2. A leaflet produced by the Ukrainian pro-independence movement-2

Source: istpravda.com.ua

## **A nothing that could be filled with everything: the deeply meaningful void of the Ukrainian society**

Imaginary Europe never ceased to exist. After Ukraine received its independence, Imaginary Europe spread through the Ukrainian society, claiming hegemony. It was used (and abused) by almost everyone: politicians in power and in opposition, nationalists and moderates, different professional groups, “lay people,” etc. The “secret of success” behind the Imaginary Europe, the reason why it became an extremely popular and powerful image, lay in the fact that it was blurred. Imaginary Europe never existed; it was a non-place, had no strict boundaries, no exact meaning and thus, could be relatively easy filled with any agenda and interests. “Europe” and “the West” outlived Soviet society with its specific conflicts and meanings because they were so flexible and adaptable. In other words, Imaginary Europe was what Claude Lévi-Strauss described as a “floating signifier”: it “represented an undetermined quantity of signification” and became a “void of meaning”—a void that was “apt to receive any meaning” that one would want it to (Lévi-Strauss 1987, 63–64).

In 1999, for example, Leonid Kuchma, the at-the-time president of Ukraine who wanted to be re-elected, used “Europe” against his rival: “How will the elections end up? Will we build socialism and communism again or will we move further in the direction of Europe?” he asked rhetorically (Telebachennia Toronto 2019). A few years later, in 2004, during the so-called Orange Revolution, the image of Europe was used by the opposition. Only this time Ukrainians were mobilized against Kuchma and his successor, Viktor Yanukovich. Events that happened from November 2004 to January 2005 were framed as a “geopolitical” struggle: the choice between the West and Russia. Viktor Yanukovich was presented as a pro-Russian candidate, while Viktor Yushchenko was presented as a pro-Western one. Indeed, the binary of West-Russia



was so pervasive during that time that even those people who claimed expertise in critical thinking, the Ukrainian intellectuals, described the Orange Revolution in terms of “civilizational conflict.” For example, Ukrainian historian Yaroslav Hrytsak claimed that “one of the main results of the Orange Revolution was the radical [desirable] division between Ukraine and Russia” (2010). Mykola Ryabchuk (2009), on the other hand, went so far as to describe the Orange Revolution as a struggle between the “civilization of kalashnikovs” (i.e., Soviet “civilization”) and the “civilization of Mercedeses and laptops” (i.e., the West).

Yet another major political explosion happened in 2013–2014. This time it was connected to the Ukrainian image of Europe in a way that was rather evident to many observers. The name of the events that happened during that winter was telling in itself — the Euromaidan — literally, the European Square. Its history begins with a group of activists coming to the main square, Independence Square, of the Ukrainian capital to protest against the decision of the government to delay the signing of an association agreement with the European Union. Soon enough, after the protesters were dispersed by the riot police, the Euromaidan grew into civil unrest that ended up with more than 100 people dead. The former president of Ukraine, Viktor Yanukovich, fled the country. Ironically, he was the same person that people protested against during the Orange Revolution.

Yet, it was not just Yanukovich that connected the protests. As a Ukrainian sociologist Anastasiya Ryabchuk argues, both the Orange Revolution and the Euromaidan were focused on “ideological and geo-political issues that seem to divide the country into two roughly equal parts, where the choice is presented as ‘Europe vs. Russia’ or as ‘forward to the West vs. back to the USSR’” (2014, 127–128). She claims that the Euromaidan protests were not sparked because of the agreement itself; the

latter played more of a symbolic role. What people wanted, she explains, is “a better life” that was associated with “Europe” and “the West” in general. In fact, many protesters knew almost nothing about the technicalities of the association agreement or the recent political history of European countries and had very vague ideas about the EU institutions (to the point where “association” with and “membership” in the EU were confused). “‘Democracy’ and ‘Europe’ form part of a utopian project that guides the hopes and aspirations of ordinary citizens... The utopian image of Europe for many is reinforced by the anti-utopian image of Russia looming as a warning of the ‘worse evil’ of authoritarianism,” Ryabchuk concludes (2014,129).<sup>7</sup>

### ***Evroremont* and The Omnipresence of Imaginary Europe**

The image of Europe not only defined the crucial political events of Ukrainian history since the collapse of the Soviet Union but also invaded “private” and seemingly apolitical spheres. For instance, consignment shops were often called “*Odiat z Evropy*,” which literally means “clothes from Europe.” Corn and maize,<sup>8</sup> furniture, higher education, lamps, seeds, bicycles, fuel, swimming pools, windows, cars, agricultural equipment, vegetables, elevators, roofing and even micronutrient fertilizers were advertised with mottos like “European quality—Ukrainian price.” One of the newly appeared private universities—universities that predominantly provide education of debatable quality—was given an official name, “European University.” The capital of

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<sup>7</sup> For a perspective on the othering of Russia in Ukraine, see Molchanov 2015.

<sup>8</sup> For corn and maize see, for example, <https://mais.ua/zah-17/>; for furniture: <http://versii.if.ua/novunu/yevropeyska-yakist-za-dostupnimi-tsinami-v-ivano-frankivsku-vidkrili-meblevu-fabriku-foto/>; university: <http://lutsk.rayon.in.ua/news/62778-lutskii-vish-proponue-otrimati-evropeiskii-diplom-za-ukrayinskimi-tsinami-i-bez-sertifikativ-zno>; lamps: <https://rau.ua/uk/personalii/aleksej-shherbina-elx-led/>; bicycles: <http://www.velobike.kiev.ua/?pid=50&newsid=2056>; fuel: <http://www.unn.com.ua/uk/news/1672015-palivo-yevropeyskoyi-yakosti-sogodni-dostupne-dlya-ukrayintsiv-na-brendovikh-azk-ekspert>; swimming pools: <http://lempools.com.ua/>; micronutrient fertilizers <https://makosh-group.com.ua/>.

Ukraine conducted public campaigns under the slogan “Kyiv—is a European Capital.” Politicians who were trying to become mayors had campaigns with mottos like “A European Mayor for a European City.” Moreover, people started to talk about “European standards” of living and “European values.”<sup>9</sup> Even far-right groups became involved in discussions about the “true Europe” by which they meant “traditional Europe” — an image created in opposition to the “tolerant and liberal” one. After all, many of them say that “to recognize oneself as a part of European civilization and to be subjected to Brussels is not the same” (Pravyi Sector 2017).

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<sup>9</sup> In 2011, a formerly famous Ukrainian boxer and then a politician and a mayor of Kyiv wrote: “European success in economic and social spheres is based, above all, on culture and civilization. It was Europe that created the modern world as we know it, and it was Europe that developed the basic principles of modern state governance, of modern civil society, effective market economy, and social security... European history... is, above all, a history of the development of ideas, values, and glorious culture. This is why Europe looks so pretty for ‘other worlds’” (Klychko 2011).

**СЕКОНД  
ХЕНД**

★Одяг з Європи

**НА ВАГУ**

Магазин  
знаходиться за адресою  
пр. Жовтневий 5  
(біля відділення поліції)

Кожну п'ятницю  
оновлення товару

Графік роботи

Пн.	8:00 - 13:00
Вт.	8:00 - 13:00
Ср, Пт, НД	8:00 - 15:00
Чт.	8:00 - 13:00
Сб.	8:00 - 13:00

Fig. 3. Second-hand clothes “from Europe”.

Source: <http://bratske.mk.ua/>

The idea of Europe, thus, penetrated not only the “geopolitical” and the macro level of the Ukrainian imaginary, but the day-to-day lives of Ukrainians, as well: the seemingly “apolitical” relations of Ukrainians with other citizens, their consumer choices (Bulakh 2018) and their homes. The best example of this phenomenon is *Evroremont* (European renovation)—a certain way of renovating apartments that became popular in the 1990s.<sup>10</sup>

<sup>10</sup> For more on the issue see Seliverstova 2017.

Here is how a group of contemporary artists, known as R.E.P.,<sup>11</sup> that worked with the topic of *evroremont*, described it:

a number of advertisements offered to make evroremont in your house or office, to change Soviet interior that you got tired of with a modern miracle—a miracle that was composed of gyp boards and dry ceiling, built-in lamps, white plastic linings, covering of surfaces with pressure-sensitive adhesive that resembled marble, granite or wood... (Ukraiins'ka pravda 2010).

While it was obviously a local peculiarity, it was still considered “European.” It was not because people renovated their houses in Europe this way, but because it was associated with the way that a new, modern, non-Soviet and prosperous life should look like.

At the same time, as sociologist Anastasiya Ryabchuk argues: “Floating ceilings allowed [owners] to temporarily hide wet stains from leaking roofs... and gyp boards, plastic linings, and tiles to conceal walls full of fungus and cracks” (2013). She defines *evroremont* as an “ideology of the transitional period” and argues that it symbolically represented the binaries of Ukrainian post-Soviet culture: “Soviet was associated with gray, static life, with the lines [that you had to stand in, in order to get] scarce goods and with a declining infrastructure, but the capitalist West appeared as the opposite: as a bright and dynamic [place] that had huge amounts of goods and services for everyone” (Ryabchuk 2013).

Private and public, political and nonpolitical, squares and living rooms were invaded by the powerful image of the “Europe.” Europe, however, was a tool that allowed the concealment of “wet stains from leaking roofs.” The image of the Europe trespassed the borders between the pervasive binaries of the public and the private

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<sup>11</sup> R.E.P. acronym comes from the groups' Ukrainian name *Revoliutsiinyi Eksperymental'nyi Prostir* (Revolutionary Experimental Space).

only to establish another powerful binary of the "European" versus the "Russian" and the "Soviet."

### **"The Biggest Enemy of Civilization is Putin": Russia and Europe as Binaries During the Police Reform**

After the Euromaidan protests, when president Yanukovich fled the country and the new government was formed, it promised to radically reshape Ukraine. Then-Prime Minister of Ukraine Arseniy Yatsenyuk (27 February 2014 – 14 April 2016) was giving an inspirational speech and clearly associated the police reform with the big "change" that is coming to Ukraine: "Kyiv is just the first city. We will go further and we will come not only to the big cities, but to every district center, to every town! [We will do it] in order for people to feel—the country is changing. Glory to Ukraine!" (Fakty ICTV 2015). He added that the new police force is consistent with "all European standards" and contrasted it with the "old," "Soviet militia" that was, according to the politician, "corrupted and worked only for its own good and good of its superiors" (Department informatsii 2016). Khatiia Dekanoidze, then-chief of the Ukrainian National Police (4 November 2015 until 16 November 2016), also promised that in 3 years "we will have a normal, European police that works according to the modern standards" (Hromads'ke telebachennia 2016).

A famous Ukrainian journalist, Anastasiya Stanko, was among those many who claimed that there is a connection between the police reform, modernization and Europeanization of Ukraine, as well as other, seemingly unrelated issues. "We [Ukrainians] have to change together with the police," she argued. She continued, "our cities have to become clean, garbage has to be removed from the streets in time, problems with alcoholics and parking lots in Kyiv must be resolved" (Hromads'ke

telebachennia 2015a). An inspector of the newly created police, Oleksandr Kharchenko supported the journalist and claimed in addition that the new patrol police are “the soldiers of the cultural war” (Hromads’ke telebachennia 2015a). By saying that he suggested as well that the police reform was not (only) about police, it was about something bigger.

The enemy in this “cultural war” was well known. Russia and the Soviet were repeatedly named by politicians, journalists and even newly recruited police officers as things that have to be defeated. For example, a man who was trying to become a police officer said: “Every person wants to change his own country. When militia officers passed people from the CIS<sup>12</sup> [countries], [people] thought ‘I wish he passes and does not harass me.’ In Europe, everything is vice versa: people think and feel that they are safe when they see police officers” (Hromads’ke telebachennia 2015b).

Khatiia Dekanoidze was even more explicit in naming the enemy. She contrasted not just Europe, but “civilization,” with Russia. “Do you know who knew the reforms that we conducted in Georgia the best? Putin! It is the same with Ukraine. He knows for sure that if you make reforms, if you remodel the country, if you are successful, then he will, of course, lose Ukraine... The biggest enemy of Civilization is Putin!” (Hromads’ke telebachennia 2014).

At the beginning of the reform numerous (and almost always praiseful) posts appeared on social media as well. Many Facebook and Instagram users emotionally

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<sup>12</sup> CIS—Commonwealth of Independent States. It is an organization of post-Soviet countries that was created after the collapse of the Soviet Union. In May 2018 at-the-time president Petro Poroshenko terminated the participation of Ukraine in “statutory bodies” of the organization. Tellingly, the president decided to announce it “at a celebration on the occasion of the Europe Day”: “We have nothing to do there. We are moving together to Europe,” he said to the audience (UNIAN 2018).

expressed their feelings towards the new police and emphasized the connection between reform, the Soviet past and an independent Ukraine. “We have waited for you since the beginning of the Maidan, we have waited for you since 1991. And at last you came to our yard,” one Facebook user, Mykola Yermolenko, wrote on his page (BBC News Ukraine 2015).



Fig. 4. A photo taken from the demonstration held in defense of the new police force.<sup>13</sup>

Source of the photo: <https://lb.ua>

<sup>13</sup> The demonstration gathered around 1000 people and was organized under the general hashtag “#savepolice.” On February 2, 2016, two officers were involved in a car chase in Kyiv and eventually opened fire. While officers managed to stop the car that was running away, one of the passengers was shot dead. An officer who was responsible for the shooting was arrested and charged by the prosecutors. Groups of Ukrainians organized demonstrations in Kyiv and Lviv to protest against what they perceived to be not an impartial case against the officer involved but a political attack on the police reform in general. On the photo: Children are holding a banner that literally reads: “Do not destroy a seven-months-old child that was given birth in pain by her 25-year old mother-Ukraine.” The “seven-months-old child” refers to the new police and hence presents it as a truly



## **“We will have no more problems with those people who grew up in the Soviet Union”: Corruption, Europe and Honest Cops**

The orientalist discourse of Europe was tightly symbolically connected to the idea of decontextualized corruption.<sup>14</sup> Journalists, politicians, experts and even passersby repeatedly claimed that the “old” Ukrainian police was “corrupt” and emphasized the importance of the officers’ “honesty” much more often than other issues. A woman from Chernivtsi, for example, told a small local media group INFO KEY the following: “I have been abroad a lot. I’ve been to different countries and saw how the local police act there; how local people feel about the police; and how authoritative the police are there. Our people have treated policemen without respect. The police are important abroad [to the society] and we had just bribery and fleecing” (INFO KEY—informatsiinyi kliuch 2015). Applicants to the new police force in the same city also mentioned that it was anti-corruption believes and efforts that made them try to get a job in a reformed police. One person said: “First of all, this is a possibility to fight corruption” (INFO KEY—

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Ukrainian institution. The “old” police that functioned in the independent Ukrainian state for the previous 24 years were portrayed, therefore, as a child of the Soviet system.

<sup>14</sup> Numerous NGOs and international organizations imported the discourse of corruption to Ukraine (as well as other post-Soviet states) after the collapse of the Soviet Union. It became extremely popular later both at the West and in Ukraine when the failure of the post-Soviet countries to “transition” into stable liberal democracies became apparent: a frame of corruption came in handy to explain that failure while not undermining the trust in a possibility of transition. In a way, it became an analogue of self-help produced for the use of the post-Soviet nations: every nation can become a successful “developed” country if they try hard enough, as the reason is to be found inside and has nothing to do with the external factors. In the words of one Ukrainian journalist who summarized a studio discussion about the police: “Yes, friends, no one is doomed to anything, and there is no historical disposition to anything. In reality, all the barriers [are] internal—they are in our heads.” As such, the discourse of corruption helps to conceal the structural factors that prevent many peripheral countries from producing models of governing and living that characterize some of the core countries of the World-system. For more on the history of transition as well as on the corruption discourse in Ukraine and generally, see Yurchenko 2017; Polzer 2001; Nuijten and Gerhard 2007; Bukovansky 2006.

informatsiinyi kliuch 2015). "I was motivated by the desire to make our city a more honest one, to make the police to not take bribes anymore," explained another one (INFO KEY—informatsiinyi kliuch 2015).

A policewoman who came to work in a new police force, expressed a similar opinion: "I want the police to have more honest people. Even if it will be just one more honest person—it will be better than nothing" (Segodnia 2015). The national TV channel 1+1 produced yet another story that covered the reform. In this piece journalists resorted to the same language of "honesty," claiming that "there are more and more demands for the honest uniformed services as the crime rate is getting worse" (Snidanok z 1+1 2015). Finally, the wife of an old policeman who nevertheless managed to get a job in a reformed police force also emphasized precisely that aspect over the others: she was assuring the journalists that her husband "is one of the most honest police officers that there could ever be. I guarantee that!" (1+1 2015).

The discourse of corruption occupied the minds not only of the journalists and reformed police officers. One could find that even the workers of the "old" police who were going to be replaced by the "new" officers were using the same vocabulary and concepts. When a voice-over in the video of one of the reports said, "In the meantime, 'old militia men' are expecting from the 'new cops' the things that they couldn't always give themselves" (Espresso TV 2015), an "old" police officer appeared on the screen at that moment and said that he wanted the reformed police to be "honest" and "decent" (Espresso TV 2015).

Decontextualized corruption discourse was typically coupled with individualized notions of social change. Officers often defined "corruption" as a "problem" and marked individual change as a way to fight that problem. Consider, for example, what one policewoman said about her motivation to work in a reformed police force. It is

especially telling how she links the idea of internal personal change to the political outcomes and the state of the country itself:

Why not to try? Why not to show with my own example that everything depends on us? If the person wants something, she can achieve that... As for me, we have an ideal country. The country is built by the people. So, until the worldview is changed, until our habits are changed, until every person starts [changing] within itself—up to such things as throwing a cigarette butt to the trash bin and not on the street—... the country will not change (24 Kanal 2015).

Another policewoman noticed that Ukrainians “demand change without actually wanting to change themselves” and that “they do not want to do something good at their own places” (24 Kanal 2016). Yet another woman who was preparing to become a police officer at the time told the journalist that she decided to apply for a police job because she “wanted to change something, and to start those changes from herself” (Hromads’ke telebachennia 2015b). Her colleague remembered the conversation with his friends about him becoming a police officer. They told him “So, you are gonna be a *ment*” (an offensive way to call police that was common in Ukraine). He answered in a very distinctive way, “Oh, no. I am a totally different person. You know me” (Hromads’ke telebachennia 2015b).

This “I am a totally different person” statement is telling. It indexes the notion that in order to be a “bad” cop one would have to be a specific type of person, presumably “bad,” “corrupt” and “dishonest.” On the contrary, “different people,” as in people that are “honest,” will not become those “old” types of cop that were disparagingly called *menty*. Thus, inner and personal qualities of “honesty” or “dishonesty” are seen to define the kind of a police officer a person will be. This decontextualization of “corruption” helped to create the notion that the main way to “reform” the police is to replace “bad” officers with “good” ones. This way of thinking

was consistent with actual actions that the Ministry of Interior Affairs and the formally independent National Police of Ukraine performed in order to “reform” the police force: most of the reform was directed at a transparent procedure of drafting the new officers based on their merits and a national re-evaluation and re-attestation process of the already working officers.

And yet, despite the fact that the reform was framed through this decontextualized discourse of honesty and corruption, it was still connected to linear and teleological thinking: discussions about the reform frequently triggered arguments about the past of the European countries. It was frequently implied that the problems that Ukrainians face nowadays had been successfully overcome by the Western countries in the distant past. When explaining why the Georgian experts (and not experts from Western European countries) were invited to Ukraine to share their experience of reforms, one activist claimed: “Why Georgia? Of course, we say that we need Poles, Germans—well, representatives of the civilized world that all have passed these reforms already. [However,] we have many things in common with Georgia. We [both Ukrainians and Georgians] have not made those reforms in 1990s, when we had that opportunity” (Hromads’ke telebachennia 2014).

In line with this linear reasoning, it was sometimes implied that the Soviet past somehow disrupted the development of Ukraine and contaminated “the mentality” of the people. Thus, numerous journalists and the new police officers explained the prevalence of corruption in the police force by tracing the origins to the Soviet heritage (and Russian influence, since Russia was seen as a successor of the USSR). The “young generation,” accordingly, became the bearer of hope for the future. The above mentioned Khatiia Dekanoidze, for example, made that clear: “The new generation, and I speak as a mother... Because I see my son and know it for certain. He speaks perfect

English, and he does not speak Russian so well. The new generation, the generation that does not know corruption, that has not seen how police officers take bribes—it is a generation that knows well how to build a new state” (Hromads’ke telebachennia 2014). A little bit later she added that she loves Ukraine and wants “everything to be well” there: “I believe that the moment will come... when we won’t have problems coming from the North [Russia], when we won’t have problems with the Soviet past... We will have no more problems with those people who grew up in the Soviet Union and [still] want to rule the state” (Hromads’ke telebachennia 2014).

### **An Ideological No-Place**

The word “reform” connotes change, a change that leads to improving institutions, living standards or the state in general. And yet, as the case of the police reform in Ukraine shows, at least sometimes reform leads to a paralysis of society. The reform that is framed through the lens of decontextualized “honesty” and Imaginary Europe precludes meaningful discussion about concrete problems of the police force in Ukraine, as well as possible and practical fixes of the latter. Instead, it focuses the attention of the public on unachievable objectives.

The Europe that has been imagined by Ukrainian journalists, experts and politicians will never come if it has never existed as imagined. In this sense it is a utopia—a non-place that tells more about the forms of consciousness of the society that created it than about the foreign lands that it presumably describes. However, as such, this utopia functions much more closely to what Karl Mannheim would describe as an opposition to utopia—ideology. According to him, a certain worldview is utopian when it criticizes the existing order, when it tries to undermine the latter by portraying a non-place. Yet, when the same worldview becomes dominant—or as Gramsci would say,

hegemonic—and serves to protect a new order, then it becomes ideological (Mannheim 1991).

After all, Vladimir and Estragon—the main characters of the play referenced at the beginning of the chapter—after waiting for a while, have their doubts about Godot. It is then that they meet the boy who promises: Godot will not come today "but surely tomorrow" (Beckett 2011). Vladimir and Estragon talk about finding a shelter for the night but do not move from the spot. Nothing really happens. The next day it is almost the same scene. The characters wait for Godot, but he never comes. The boy arrives and says with the same words as yesterday that Godot will not come today but "surely tomorrow." Vladimir and Estragon decide to hang themselves but fail. They decide to hang themselves tomorrow. Meanwhile, they talk about finding a shelter. Yet, once again remain standing on the same spot.

In the next part of the chapter, I will describe how police officers adapted the hegemonic discourse of the Imaginary West to fit their needs and reflect their own professional desires, hopes, fears and visions. I will argue that "the West" that they construct has stronger critical potential and thus reflects what could be called a utopia with much more ground.

## **1.2 Stories about Nowhere: Police Officers' Adaptations of the Discourse of the Imaginary West**

What happens with the hegemonic discourse when it travels through different social spaces? How does it change when it penetrates various classes, professions, age and gender groups, etc.? Despite the fact that hegemony by definition tends to transgress social borders, creating the same unquestioned language, logic and modes of thought, it would be unreasonable to claim that hegemonic ideological discourses do not change

during their journey. It seems quite safe to say that groups of various sorts are conditioned by their surroundings and use linguistic and cognitive tools that are available to them, yet they adapt those tools to their own experiences, values and practices (Roseberry 1994, Williams 1977, 112–113).

Ukrainian police officers, of course, are not an exception. While I was spending time with them, I frequently heard officers talking about the West in a number of different ways: sometimes it would be just a phrase dropped by a frustrated officer while getting into a car, sometimes a piece of advice given to me with the benefit of their professional wisdom,<sup>15</sup> and sometimes it would be a long anecdotal story told with a clear intention to amuse everybody around them. The ways they talked about the West, without any doubt, were conditioned by the officers' professional experiences: long periods of boredom<sup>16</sup> that accompanied nothing-is-really-happening chunks of time provided a perfect opportunity to share entertaining anecdotes, while the abundance of their frustrating encounters with the public produced quick emotional responses that usually were freely expressed whenever the officers were far enough away from the annoying civilians, that the latter could not overhear them.

Listening to numerous stories officers told, I could not help but notice that their representations of the West resembled a variation of a utopia. Firstly, their stories about exotic Western lands often were based on the information they reportedly received from a traveler of some kind: usually a friend or a relative (sometimes

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<sup>15</sup> It seemed that some of the officers developed a particular attitude towards reality, perceiving themselves as those who know the real harsh truth about the society and how it operates—the truth that was taken to be hidden from “ordinary” citizens. Some of the officers saw themselves fit to share that wisdom with outsiders like me. It also may be that I was perceived as a person who was particularly ignorant about the real horrors of the world—I generally have a look that is usually associated with people who spend a lot of time at home with books, thus avoiding the “real life.”

<sup>16</sup> For the ethnographically based discussion on the role of boredom in police officers' work see Fassin (2013, 2017).

referred to as *kum*<sup>17</sup>) who has visited those places and was amazed by the ways those natives lived. Secondly, the stories they told often described not just the order of things in Western societies, but also different exotic details about the lives of the people there: habits of leisure and work, attitudes and values that were designed to make those who listened to those stories shocked. Those details, like in most utopias, were almost always about “painting pleasing pictures of daily life”<sup>18</sup> (Kumar 2003)—pictures that would make everybody who heard the story want to live in those incredible lands. And, most importantly, just as in Thomas More's *Utopia* or William Morris' *News from Nowhere*, stories about foreign exotic places were used to criticize an existing order of things.

The stories they told, thus, were not so much about the West per se, as about the officers themselves. That *occupational utopia*, I argue, provides a perfect opportunity to look at anxieties, values, beliefs and perceptions of the officers. Combined with direct observation of the officers' working conditions and their interactions with the public, it also allows to gain insight into the specific environment that shaped desires and fears lying at the basis of their utopia.

It was one of those long days when nothing was really happening. District officer Pavlo was doing his paperwork, while another officer and I were deeply consumed by our mobile phones. One word led to another and I found myself listening to the district officer. He was telling one of his many stories about foreign lands and foreign exotic customs. “Do you know how much time Italians spend on food every day?” the officer

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<sup>17</sup> *Kum* in Ukrainian originally means a godparent. However, it also started to be used as a reference to friends or close acquaintances. At least partly Ukrainian *kum* bears similarities to how *compadre* is used in some Spanish, Portuguese and English-speaking countries (with large Spanish-speaking minorities).

<sup>18</sup> Kumar's full quote may give an edge to the reader that is important for the understanding of the argument that I am making: “The utopian mode of persuasion is ‘to paint pleasing pictures of daily life,’ such that we are impelled to want to make the world that is thus portrayed” (Kumar 2003, 70).



made a theatrical pause. "Three to four hours! They have breakfast, then some pre-lunch, then some lunch... They just sit for hour and a half, sipping 3–4 cups of coffee [one after another] and talk!" As if it was not shocking enough, he continued: "They are not allowed to work monotonous jobs for more than 4 hours a day, so they work their 4 hours, take their 20 euros per hour and leave. They often rent out their properties. Everybody rents out there! They are lazy, don't want to work, so they prefer to move to the attic and rent out the rest of their houses." For Ukrainian officers who usually work for more than 40 hours a week and still have troubles sustaining themselves and their families (see discussion in Chapter Two), this story about Italians probably sounded no less impressive than Tommaso Campanella's *The City of the Sun* to his readers in the XVII century.

The stories the officers tell were full of wonders: they described places with unusual landscapes, extreme climates and fantastic diets, people with incredible behaviors and remarkable morals. "My friend rented a hostel [he meant a villa—a big house with, as he said, "four rooms"] on a beach in Italy," an officer narrated once. "They had conditioners working inside, so it was like 22 degrees Celsius. But should you walk outside on the porch to smoke, under the sun, it was 45 or even 52 degrees! You quickly run back into the house. [After you've been under this kind of sun,] you don't even want to smoke anymore!" On a different occasion, he talked about weird food that people in the West consume: "Have you heard about Norwegian Surströmming?" he asked another officer about the fermented fish. "It is traditional there! 25 euros for a can! 750 hryvnias! And they eat it!"

The heroes of those stories do not just live in incredible climates and consume weird food, but also they sometimes behave unusually nobly. One story, for example, was told about some acquaintances of the officer who missed their train in London. It

so happened that there also was a student on a railway station who missed the same train as the officer's friends. The student was so upset that she broke into tears, he told everyone. Much to the surprise of those Ukrainians, the workers of the station comforted the woman, changed the tickets for everyone who was late without demanding even a penny and provided free coffee for everyone.

Another story that I heard was also about the United Kingdom. It described the West as a place of unimaginable abundance. Acquaintances of one of the officers arrived to London and immediately went to a wrecking yard where they found a car in incredibly good condition. It only had few thousand kilometers on it and needed so little in the way of repairs that they could do those right on the spot. They used a small Swiss Army knife that they happened to carry with them and detached a detail that they needed from a van standing not far away. After some quick fixing, they left the wrecking yard driving an almost new Ford—a Ford that cost them “almost nothing.”

The West was sometimes portrayed as a place of weird mores and customs. For example, the way Westerners deal with the issue of racism was described in overly exaggerated terms. Once, I was told, a woman who was an acquaintance of the officer, traveled to Barcelona. At some point her purse was stolen and she called the police. The local officer who came to investigate was not convinced in the truth of the story and said something like: “I know all of your kind. I know all you Russians!” The friends of my interlocutor filed a complaint. Almost immediately the prefect of the city and other local influential people arrived. To avoid the scandal and to protect themselves from being sued for racism, they not only apologized but also bought a new purse (made out of even better—this time “natural”—materials) and all of the cosmetics that the woman reported missing. In addition to that, they also paid for the stay of the

woman and her friends in the house, for the rent of their car and even provided them with free food.

Even though some stories were designed only to entertain fellow officers while waiting in an office or driving endlessly in a car, most of them, as I soon began to notice, contained elements that spoke to the occupational realities the officers faced: perceived lack of authority and respect from the public as well as the harsh working conditions of the police officers.

One of my fieldnotes is revealing of how dissatisfaction with the working conditions was expressed through the stories about the West:

“Don’t you have anything else to do?” one of the investigative officers<sup>19</sup> asked me when we were greeting each other. The implication of his question was that it was Saturday and I was standing in the courtyard of the police department instead of relaxing somewhere at home—a very unusual choice of activities for a young Ukrainian man. “Note this!” he said, pointing at the old car with an open hood. “Show those Canadian policemen that we live here in a Stone Age” he joked sadly.

Artem, another officer with strong, sinewy and hardened hands, blackened because of all the oil, was repairing that car, masterfully changing wires: taking the insulation off of one wire, extending it and joining it with others. He joined our conversation and commented that Canadian policemen, unlike Ukrainian officers, probably have a “normal job” and do not work during the weekends. Others around agreed and observed that officers in Canada do not repair their police cars themselves.

Artem told about his younger brother who emigrated. According to Artem, after his brother came to Canada, he was able to secure the job at a construction site. “Just few months [of work] in construction and he is already driving an SUV!” he was bragging. “When he came to work for the first time, he did what we all do [in Ukraine]: he was wearing whatever [he had]. He entered [the construction site] and all his colleagues shouted at him: ‘No, no, no!!!’” He showed with his hands how construction workers were trying to stop his brother from entering the site. He also reported that after the incident his brother received special uniform and

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<sup>19</sup> Ukrainian police do not have detectives. Instead, there are *slidchi* and *operatyvni spivrobotnyky*—investigative and operative officers. It was imagined that operative officers would deal with getting all the needed information about the criminal act, while investigative officers will transform the information gathered into the form presentable in court/required by the law. There are talks now about substituting both with detectives.

construction work boots, explained to all the officers around how work boots are designed and finally added: "So that nothing would be injured." One of the district officers gave a rationale to that Canadian behaviour: "Yes, it works that way in there. If something falls on his foot, they would have to provide for him til the end of his life."

Artem also remembered the old days, how he had been trying to find jobs for himself and his brother anywhere he could: they were working as builders, car mechanics—whatever Artem could find for both of them. His body, manner of speaking, job history—everything indicated lower class position. Despite that, I was told that he was not impressed by the stability of the police work in Ukraine—this Saturday was his last day at work, he was quitting.

On a number of occasions various officers asked me about the salaries of the Canadian police officers, their uniforms, cars, etc. They also made statements about other countries themselves. For example, one of the officers claimed that he has a friend who became a police officer in Israel. When he told that she is paid "50 000 dollars a year now," another officer evidently compared it to their own situation: if Ukrainian officers in Bezrobotne had the same salaries, he sadly remarked that they "wouldn't have to grow potatoes."<sup>20</sup> On another occasion, one of the officers inquired about the cost of the police uniforms in Canada. I answered that the uniforms are most

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<sup>20</sup> Ukrainians (as well as citizens of many other post-Soviet republics) resorted to small-scale private gardening in the 1990s as a way to supplement their income and deal with the economic downturn. Potatoes became one of the main vegetables grown on *dachas* and private gardens at that time. Whole families, including children, often were involved in the work required to grow, retrieve and move potatoes to apartments, garages and other storage facilities. Since then, the economic situation stabilized for some: people of approximately my age (30 years old) sometimes could be heard sharing jokes and memories about gardening during the school and university years. However, for many others, "growing potatoes" is still a reality. According to the poll conducted in May 2013, 66.2% of Ukrainians admitted working in their gardens during the spring of the same year. 59.7% of all polled claimed that they had been involved in planting potatoes (Dzerkalo Tyzhnia 2013b). In 2011, even then-Prime Minister of Ukraine, Mykola Azarov (in)famously referred to this phenomenon when he criticized Ukrainians for excessive complaining: "I sometimes say that [Ukrainians] have to stop whining. Take a shovel and grow some potatoes, cabbage. [This way] you will actually help yourself and make your life easier. For example, I have a garden at home I grow everything that I need there." (This particular quote is from 2013 when Azarov explained the same thought in more detail (Dzerkalo Tyzhnia 2013a). For more on domestic food production in Ukraine as a survival strategy see, for example, Round, Williams, and Rodgers (2010).

probably provided for free there, but, I guessed, it is possible that Edmonton police officers are buying their shoes. I was almost finished, when he interrupted: "Of course, they receive it for free! And they receive shoes for free as well!"

Police officers universally tend to spend a lot of time with low-status populations, thus frequently encountering diseases of various sorts, given that they often have to come into a close (sometimes physical) contact with the above mentioned groups, either arresting homeless and poor people, transporting them, visiting them in their homes, or just spending prolonged time at the police stations with those whose fluids and breath are perceived to contain danger. As a result, they often tend to develop specific occupational anxieties related to the issues of health. It is especially true in peripheral countries like Ukraine where the number of people with tuberculosis, HIV and hepatitis is either one of the highest, or, sometimes, even the highest in Europe and among the former post-Soviet states. Recent outbreaks of (long-thought to be eliminated) diseases such as measles, diphtheria, and poliomyelitis, as well as general poor situation with healthcare services in Ukraine only contribute to those fears (Khetsuriani et al. 2017; Minizterstvo Ohorony Zdorovia 2018a; Minizterstvo Ohorony Zdorovia 2018b).

Fears of the officers were reflected in both their behaviors and the discussions that they had among themselves. Patrol officers, for instance, tried to carry a hand sanitizer with them all the time, applying it after the majority of the encounters with the public that involved physical contact.<sup>21</sup> If someone had forgotten to use it, others

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<sup>21</sup> When I conducted my short observation with Edmonton Police Service, I noticed a similar phenomenon. My notes from that period describe officers' behavior in the city hospital. While waiting for the detective to arrive (once again, rather long period of idleness caused by the procedure imposed on the officers), patrol policemen frequently made use of the hand sanitizer located in the hallway of the University of Alberta Hospital. Given the nature of the incident that made us visit the hospital (a stabbing), I speculated in my notes that the professional need to deal with such "dangerous" fluids as blood, could produce health anxieties among officers.

would remind her about it; if someone had left their own at home or had run out of it, others would readily share their own with the colleague. I also observed on numerous occasions how more experienced officers trained younger ones to use gloves and protect themselves from possible germs and needles.

Some of the officers discussed dangers of different diseases and one even claimed that a colleague he knew was stuck with a needle by a “drug addict,” and received hepatitis as a result. However, just as with other anxieties, this one was also expressed through the means of the Imaginary West utopia. The same officer, for example, launched into a narrative about his visit to a training session with Canadian police officers. He claimed that Canadian officers told him that they have a special pill able to protect them from almost all diseases, infections, etc. If, he maintained, they scratched their skin “in some drug den,” they would just go to the hospital and receive that pill. They reportedly stay in a hospital for three days, “feeling themselves like shit.” “But after those three days their bodies emerge as fully cleaned,” he claimed.

Professional health anxieties, however, were clearly connected to the specific context of the poor and weak state. The latter was often seen as a state that can not/is not willing to protect the officers. When officers in Central’ne, for example, discussed a “hot” topic of that day—their colleague who was shot while chasing a man—they emphasized how vulnerable they felt about their social protection: they talked extensively among themselves about how their colleagues have to chip in for the medical needs of the one injured and thus to perform the functions that normally are expected of the state. During these kinds of talks I frequently heard phrases like *nikomu ty tut ne potriben* (literally means “nobody really needs you here” where “needs” would be better translated as “cares about you” and where “nobody” mostly

means “the state”) and sometimes even *gosudarstvu na tebia plevat* (“the state spits on you” if translated literally).

This helps to make sense of other stories that officers repeatedly told me and each other—stories about Western countries and the way those states support their police forces. Western police officers were portrayed to be 1) trusted by the state 2) provided with all the needed authority to do their job 3) and protected from those who challenged that authority. Once, for example, when we were driving in a car with an investigative officer named Sergiy, attesting witness Roman, and one of the district officers to conduct an investigative experiment, Roman told that he recently saw a broadcast about the Latvian police. He claimed that the Latvian police were depicted as uncompromisingly and effectively fighting impaired driving. The investigator almost immediately jumped into the conversation with an explanation: “The thing is that the police there... you know, if a police officer saw something and then reported it—he will be trusted [about the issue]. His word [in Latvia] is the law!”

Trust of the state allows officers in Western countries, according to numerous stories, to use their authority without any fear of repercussions. Western officers, it was believed, do not play games with those who break the law or disturb the order—Western officers use the force whenever it seems needed. The following story told by one of the district officers is quite representative: some acquaintances of his reportedly were working in Poland on the construction of the house. They managed to build it earlier than was expected, so they decided to celebrate. While having a party they got drunk and ended up starting a fight. Polish police eventually came and, as the district inspector said, “knocked the hell out of” his acquaintances. The latter were reportedly also deported from Poland right after the incident.

Another story touched upon the Canadian sheriffs. It went as follows: they were called by the neighbors of the people who were fighting with each other. When the sheriff came, the people refused to let him in. "And you know," the officer who narrated the story said, "it is not hard to get an order there. You just send all the paperwork by email and that is all." The sheriff quickly got an order, knocked out the door and entered into the house. The "Husband and wife that were fighting told the sheriff that they don't have any complaints towards each other, that those were their sexual games. The sheriff did not care! 'Ok, you have no complaints, that is fine. But your neighbors do because of all the noise [you make]! So please get your 500 dollar ticket and you are welcome to continue with your games. I don't care!'" the Canadian sheriff reportedly said.

The remark about the order that was easily attained via email seemed to me not to be accidental. In Bezrobotne, for instance, I spent many days that officers usually labeled as "nothing interesting will happen today." I often stayed and observed them doing paperwork or just hanging around while waiting for the higher-ranking officer/prosecutor to appear and provide the permission to make one legal action or another. Once, when the officers were conducting "investigative measures" over the case of the serial robber—let us call him Ivan—we had to wait the whole day for the right person to come and sign the document that would allow to proceed with the next steps. Under such conditions, receiving such an important and hard-to-get document as an order via simple email looks as alluring as anything can be.

Utopian Western states, therefore, were seen as not just protective of the police officers, but as supportive in a wide number of different ways. For one, a number of stories were about the places where officers do not have to fill so many papers, do not have to spend a lot of time searching and apprehending criminals, or dealing with



annoying and unjustified requests from the public. Professional utopia was painted as a picture of the state that protects the officers not only from the consequences of their actions, but from the work that was perceived to be excessive and useless. In other words, utopian Western states were imagined to be creating the conditions under which officers would not be overburdened with non-essential duties and could concentrate on the “real work.”

Yet another story was told by one of the officers about Singapore. According to the narrator, his acquaintances went there for vacation: “they lived in a place where you stay in this small cabin. This cabin moves you: to the shower, to other services, wherever you need. And all this ‘happiness’ [services] costs 56 Euro a night. I asked them: what if it gets jammed or something? So, they were already [at the airport] returning from the trip, when 4 out of 7 were asked to “come with the officers.” A small woman [in uniform] comes into the room and calmly shows them the video where they litter, then the video where they cross the road on the red light and so on. They [Singaporeans] have installed cameras everywhere and the police [thus] do not have to chase the tourists. They know that you will come to the airport [eventually]. So she said to them: “[Choose,] 1500 dollars of fine or 3 years in jail for everyone.” Of course, they called the consul, however, he only told them that “if you, guys, go to prison, you will serve your term there till the very end, there will be no pardon and no parole.” So, they paid their fine, well, their company paid, and they got a travel ban for 5 years. “Thank you and good bye!” the officer narrated the last words of the ruthless Singaporean colleague. To show how severe the Republic of Singapore is, he added later on: “There also was an American there that was caught with a bag of weed. The [same] woman quickly came, and said that he is convicted to death and in two hours he was executed.”

## Conclusions

Karl Mannheim in his classical *Ideology and Utopia* insisted that people “participate in thinking further what other men have thought before [them]” (1991, 3). He claimed that we always find ourselves “in an inherited situation with patterns of thought” that we neither have developed, nor have chosen (1991, 3). We tend to “elaborate further” on those inherited concepts, ideas, and views, adapting them to our own, always shifting and changing, historical-social situations—our collectively shared repetitive experiences (Mannheim 1991).

What could better describe Ukrainian police officers and their “forms of consciousness”? They found themselves living, feeling, and thinking in a world of meanings that none of them has created—the world built on a complicated Soviet love-hate and admiration-fear relationship with the West that is perceptively described by Alexey Yurchak in his study of the late-Soviet generation; the world that arose out of and is still rooted in World-system inequalities that gave birth to the uncivilized Other of Eastern Europe and its inverse concept of the “developed” West; the world that, contrary to Yurchak’s claims, never ceased to exist with the collapse of the Soviet Union, but evolved to be filled with new meanings, new (local) Others (such as Russia and the “Soviet past”), and new desires; the world, finally, that shaped how Ukrainians framed police reform, how they understood its goals, and how they evaluated its successes and failures. Ukrainian police officers used that (already available) language created by dozens of intersections between various contexts, struggles, epochs, and inequalities to express their own fears and desires rooted in their shared everyday experiences of police work on a European periphery. They used that language to talk about anxieties they had over limited and constantly contested authority, harsh working

conditions, a perceived lack of state protection and support as well as their deeply felt vulnerability over the always looming professional dangers and threats.

While adapting the inherited discourse of the West, police officers managed to reverse it almost completely: instead of using the West to disguise certain problematic realities of the Ukrainian state, they redeveloped the former to criticize what they deemed to see as a failure of the state and society to be “normal.” Police officers created their own professional utopia of the exotic and yet idealized West and thus were able to accentuate the deviance of the state they worked for in general and their working conditions in particular.

## Chapter 2. Contextual Authority: Informalities and Extralegalities of Police Work in Ukraine

### 2.1 "I wish I didn't have to grow potatoes": on Shortages, Overtime and Patterns of Authority Distribution

One day a man was arrested. He was so poor that he did not really have a place to live—in effect, he was homeless. Investigators that were handling the matter decided to let him stay at the police station... for a while, and then again for a while, and then again. While all the necessary papers for his case were prepared (undoubtedly slowly), the man started to live permanently on the premises and, in exchange for that opportunity, began doing some renovation work on the station. When an old police uniform was found, everybody was so accustomed to the man that no one objected when someone proposed to give it to the offender. He put it on and went with other officers to talk with an old lady about her case and was very successful in his performance—the lady never figured out that she was talking to the "criminal" and not the officer. He quickly liked the new role. Soon enough he was working on the road during the nights, stopping cars for the breach of the driving regulations and "earning some extra cash for himself" [taking bribes]. "When he first got to our station, he had nothing, and when he left, he had a cell phone, he was dressed up and everything... Everybody liked him at the station and everyone was sad that he had to leave us for prison,"—an officer recounted "old days" during one summer afternoon.

(Adapted and shortened from my fieldnotes)

It would not be an exaggeration to say that observers from Canada would be horrified by the working conditions of police officers in Ukraine. Although one would see a different picture in Central'ne and Bezrobotne, as resources are not equally distributed among large and small cities, it would be generally true to say the following: the *police force in Ukraine does not have enough resources to provide officers with everything they need in order to perform their functions.*

For instance, police departments in provincial cities often face a lack of cars and the gasoline needed for the officers to drive around. During my fieldwork in Bezrobotne I frequently used my car to help the officers on their daily routines: accompanying

victims of domestic violence to the medical expert review (which was located in a different area, as the state can not afford to have one in Bezrobotne), delivering documents to a neighboring city or even transporting investigators and forensic specialists to the place of investigative experiment (crime re-enactment).

As uniforms are rarely issued and generally seem to be of poor quality, officers frequently have to spend their own money either to redesign and modify provided clothes or just to supplement the latter with their own apparel. For example, if one pays attention to the shoes police officers wear in Ukraine, she would see that they are almost always not the standard-issue-state-provided ones but differ from one officer to the next. Other pieces of equipment, such as sweaters, shirts and even body armour may vary as well. Officers in the province would often have worn-down, discolored and out-of-shape pants and shirts that indicated both the quality and the age of the clothes provided by the state.

In addition, officers habitually work overtime hours during their ordinary shifts. More as a rule than as an exception, I observed how patrol officers worked longer than their required 12-hour shifts. District officers officially have non-fixed working times. However, I observed them (as well as investigative and operative officers) staying at their work for a long time after their working day should had reasonably ended. All the officers are required to work during their weekends from time to time in what is often officially referred to as *zahody z ohorony hromads'koho poriadku* (measures in protection of the public order)—police mobilizations for different public gatherings like demonstrations, concerts, mass celebrations, elections, etc. Officers are mostly not paid for the overtime hours and extra work conducted during the weekends.

As if that were not enough, despite all of the promises that were made during the reform, officers in Ukraine are extremely underpaid. As far as I could tell, an

approximate monthly wage an officer at the lower end of a hierarchy receives equals about 8.000 to 10.000 UAH (approx. 400–500 CAD). Yet, it must be noted that even the above-mentioned sum is not guaranteed.<sup>22</sup> For patrol officers, for example, most of money received is technically not a salary but a “reward” determined by the Cabinet of Ministers. In consequence, a large portion of the monthly payments that police officers receive is not protected by the law and could be easily decreased by a simple decision of the government. As far as I could tell, rewards are also used as a tool in the disciplining the officers by their superiors.

All of the mentioned above circumstances contributed to the general dissatisfaction of the officers with their work. As far as I was told on many occasions and by numerous participants, the police force in Ukraine is extremely undermanned on almost every level:<sup>23</sup> patrol officers, district inspectors, investigative inspectors, etc. Moreover, it seemed quite clear that personnel turnover was another daily reality that the National Police of Ukraine had to face. It seemed that many officers used any good-enough opportunity to leave their work for something else: either another job in the private or public sector or, no less frequently, emigration. As a result of all this, the National Police was largely comprised of inexperienced and sometimes unqualified (or visibly unfit) personnel. As one of the officers summed up his work experience: “You always come out as a loser [on this job] ... The state takes more from you than it gives

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<sup>22</sup> In 2019 salary of the patrol officers was increased to: 1) 10,100 UAH in cities with populations of less than a million; 2) 12,100 UAH in cities with a population of more than a million and 3) 13,100 UAH in Kyiv (658 CAD) (Dzerkalo Tyzhnia 2019). The official average salary in Ukraine (as of March 2019) was 10,269 UAH (according to Derzhavna sluzhba statystyky Ukrainy).

<sup>23</sup> According to official June figures provided by the National Police of Ukraine to Ukrainian National News, the police had a severe shortage of officers. They lacked 19,400 people, or a staggering 15.3% of all required personnel. The Department of Patrol Police had an even bigger shortage; it lacked 3,800 personnel (20.9% of the total number of people they needed) (Mamaieva 2019).

you [back]. You have no holidays, no weekends, and you see no family and no children!”

### **Provisional Authority and Police Work in Ukraine**

We went to see a village priest who was robbed few months ago. The man who committed the crime was already in custody and cooperated with the investigation. Nonetheless, in order to prosecute him, the victim had to sign a few papers that would then be essential to the case. We came, waited for a while and soon the priest arrived. He was wearing a new dark blue robe and a small neat beard. He slowly moved his head from one side to the other, examining everyone and not changing his face as if it was stiffened forever in a slick smile. “I will not sign anything!” he said to everyone present. His visibly artificial smile felt even more unpleasant after he started talking. “If there is no [legal] claim, then there is no case, am I right?” He again examined the officers with cunning confident eyes. District inspectors and an investigator were silent and it seemed that it made the priest even more sure of himself. “So what, am I right? While driving here, I consulted my friend who works as a judge and he told me that I do not need all of this... I know our justice system, had to deal with it [few times]. [If I sign], I will have to attend hearings all the time... I will not sign anything! I have no claims towards that man!” the priest was still wearing his fuck-you smile.

—Maybe your wife can sign then?—a district officer tried to convince him falteringly.

—And who will drive her to Bezrobotne?—the priest parried the question, interrupting the officer.

I was struck by the silence that fell for a moment. The officers have never seemed so helpless before.

—So what, guys, do I need to sign the document that I do not have any claims towards the guy or what? I have only half an hour for my lunch and then I intend to leave,—the priest broke uneasiness brought by the previously failed interaction.

—No, you don’t,—a perplexed short answer followed. The officers and I left.

Later on, I talked with officers about the incident. I was thinking aloud that what the officers can do is to bring up those charges without the priest, using just the confession of the robber and their own testimonies. It seemed that the officers were not convinced by my arguments even for a second. They told me that the priest was an influential figure in the neighborhood and that he had a lot of “connections.” “Have you heard what kind of friends he has?” one of the officers asked me. They moved on to discussing the priest, coping with frustration.

This vignette from my fieldnotes well illustrates what an anthropologist Beatrice Jauregui calls “provisional authority” (2016)—authority that is often challenged and thus tends to be non constant and temporal in its nature. Emanation of authority from the Ukrainian state to the police is by no means uninterrupted by the complex social environment as well. Numerous powerful actors often disrupt detached interplay between the law and its interpretation by enforcers, intruding into the process that many imagine to be preferably divorced from extralegal social influences (equal treatment, after all, is the ideal that is built into the Ukrainian society as much as it is built into many others).

While Ukrainian officers’ behavior is clearly influenced by intentional interventions of outside actors, I would like to try to broaden the discussion. Isonomy remains only the imagined ideal, and not the reality, not only because outside actors intrude into the law enforcement process but because of far more complex causes as well. Incentives that institutions create, societal classifications of different spaces and places, infrastructural shortages and other seemingly unrelated (and certainly not premeditated) circumstances may create the same result—authority will be unevenly distributed among citizens.

The theoretical premise behind the fieldwork data described below is that authority should be seen as a variable that fluctuates depending on a large variety of contexts: it can appear or disappear depending on the circumstances as well as increase or decrease in certain spaces rather than the others. Building on Donald Black’s idea of the social geometry of law (1976; 1998; 2011)—the idea that law



“behaves” when it travels through different social dimensions—I am proposing that police authority should primarily be understood as a **contextual authority**.<sup>24</sup>

Authority should be understood here as any interaction that involves commanding elements, and not as an attribute of the police institution. Authority, therefore, is understood not as a permanent and constant quality of the police, but something that either arises or not depending on a particular context. Authority, thus, appears when: 1) police officers decide to engage a person in an interaction, and 2) when the behavior of that person is a result of a command (expressed either verbally or otherwise or tacitly understood by both parties of the interaction), or, in other words, as a result of a decision made by an officer much more than by a person engaged. This means that authority appears whenever an officer signals a person to stop the car, to show his/her pockets, to move in a certain direction, etc. An interaction does not involve authority whenever an officer buys his/her coffee on a coffee break or just stops to chit-chat with someone.

Authority that is understood in this way crucially differs from typical definitions in at least one element. It rests not on the absolute legalistic “right to command and control,” (Collins Dictionary Online) but on the particular environments that permit authority to appear in one place or another. In particular, it rests on situational legitimacy—situational perception of “appropriateness of particular intervention” (Wortley 2002, 223). The premise here is that the police have never had an absolute mandate to command: some behaviors of the police officers in some particular contexts

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<sup>24</sup> Because of my attempt to rethink the concept of authority, I will use a slightly unusual language. I will use phrases like “authority appears,” “authority decreases,” etc. The reader should know that it was my conscious decision to treat English in such an unconventional manner.

could be seen as legitimate (by the public, officers' superiors or officers themselves) and some are not. That authority mandate converges with the law only intermittently.

Using these optics, I will discuss some of the informalities I observed in the work of the district officers in Bezrobitne in the first part of the chapter. In the second part of the chapter I will talk about some of the patterns of extralegalities in the police work. This time, however, the discussion will be based on the information gathered with patrol officers in Central'ne. Finally, in the conclusion to the chapter I will argue that the conceptualization of authority as a contextual variable is useful in solving both some practical policing issues and theoretical social science problems that sociology and social anthropology currently face.

### **Avoiding Formalities**

The first day I started my actual observation of the police work, I was invited to follow two district officers in the middle of what was bombastically called "Operation 'Migrant'." One of the officers and I left the police station and, to my surprise, immediately went in the direction of a Volkswagen van with a Polish license plate. Chunks of light blue paint were already replaced with rust and the remaining paint faded—the van seemed to be as old as I was.<sup>25</sup> It was most clearly not an official police car.

We drove this van for the rest of the day, visiting people on the list provided by the local registration officer. People on the list were of non-Ukrainian citizenship and, in addition, were suspected of having problems with their migration documents. However, the list was horribly inaccurate (it consisted of wrong addresses, listed the wrong people, etc). We drove from one address to the next without getting any results, that is

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<sup>25</sup> I double checked later and figured out that this model was produced in early 1990s.

without actual “hits.” The officers started to worry that they would not produce any quota for the day and that their supervisor would not be happy about that. Finally, we stopped for a break and one of the officers started complaining: “We once counted that the police has 17 subdivisions with authority to conduct inspections of our work. In fact, we have different kinds of inspections all the time! They tell me, for example, that the car we are using is private, that it runs on gas of unknown origin—and nowadays such a practice is considered to be ‘corrupt.’ I just asked them to leave me alone! We [he meant the district inspectors] have only one official car for the whole station, so we drive our own. At least, they have started to give us some gas these days - not enough gas, but it is already much better than before.” I inquired further about the car and was informed that it belongs to his father. It was a so-called *ievrobliaha*—a car that was bought in a European Union country (Poland in this case) and brought to Ukraine without actually paying any customs clearance taxes or changing the official owner. In other words, *de jure* it was a Polish car owned by an unknown Polish citizen. *De facto*, though, it was owned by the father of one of the officers. And in reality, it was used by the police officers for official state purposes.

This story is a good entry point into a discussion about the complexities of the police work in Ukraine. Namely, it provides a context that may be crucial in understanding the role that informalities play in the Ukrainian police work. Finally but not less importantly, it hints at how police authority can operate under the specific circumstances of a weak state with heavily underfunded institutions.

It must be noted that when I say informality I mean practices (often known only to insiders) both illegal and those not outrightly illegal and that are aimed at achieving certain desirable outcomes. Those outcomes may be partially or fully motivated by private gain or may be motivated principally by concerns about other individuals, group

interests, the well-being of an institution or even of the state itself. Put simply, informality could be defined as a way of “getting things done” (Ledeneva 2018, viii) that is not determined by the written rules.

It must be also noted that the term “weak state” is usually heavily loaded with negative connotations. The weak state most often is perceived as a state that is not functioning properly and lacks so-called “domestic sovereignty,” i.e., a state that is dysfunctional, or even in some way deviant. Even more so, in various policy and academic papers it goes toe to toe with the term “failed state.” It is often automatically assumed that such states must be “saved” by what is known as the “international community.” In practice, though, this need for saving mostly boils down to Western ideas about the “proper modern state.” It is imagined, for instance, that a “normal” modern state has the “rule of law,” “civil society” and usually a “functional” representative liberal democracy that is able to protect “the rights and freedoms” of the citizens, as well as their private property. When I use the term “weak state,” though, I do not ever aim to imply those connotations. What I mean instead is that Ukraine is a poor state that can not and is not providing enough resources for its institutions to function according to: 1) its own standards and laws; 2) the demands of international donors and institutions; 3) public expectations of how the Ukrainian state (and a state in general) should work and behave. I by no means perceive this situation as deviant from some arguably imagined norm of the modern state.

As I have attempted to illustrate through the opening story of this chapter, the informal practices of the police officers that I observed were largely connected to the scarcity of state-provided resources. The shortage of cars, and of gasoline to make them run, spare parts to repair them, as well as the lack of personnel, uniforms, sufficiently renovated detention facilities, etc., put the officers under conditions where

they had not only to adapt but to creatively innovate in order to get their job done. Sometimes to “get their job done” meant going to visit the victim of a non-serious crime in order to procure an official statement and sometimes the stakes were much higher. The following story<sup>26</sup> that was recounted by an officer illustrates the point I am making rather well:

The Sanitary & Epidemiological Service once came to our station to inspect our *kletka*<sup>27</sup>. They said that it did not match the standards and thus must be closed. So, the head of the police station at that time called me and asked if we “have something on them.” I said: “Sure, of course we do.” We went to their laboratory with our own inspection. I said to the SES guys: “Here is the door that must be different according to the regulations. You have substances here that must be specifically secured and they are not. You must also have such and such license for what you are doing as well as a person with a such and such training. Do you have all of it? I thought so!” I told them that we had to close their laboratory for all the violations they had there. In the end, they went to the head of the regional administration and he resolved the conflict between us - he told them to write down in their report that everything was just fine with our *kletka*. The guys from the SES came and asked us to at least disinfect everything with chlorine. “We don’t have any, fellas. If you wish, you can do it yourselves,” we told them. So they did: just came and spilled a lot of chlorine everywhere.

If decontextualized, this story could be read as an example of negative power dynamics (abuse of power by the police) or even a lawlessness that permeates all aspects of Ukrainian society (the lack of the rule of law). However, continuous observation of police work leads me to believe that it would be much more productive to see such practices as a relatively efficient way to enable the operation of governmental institutions in the world of extremely limited resources. In this example, for instance,

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<sup>26</sup> Adapted and rephrased for clarity from my fieldnotes.

<sup>27</sup> Officially called *Izoliator Tymchasovoho Trymannia* (Preliminary Detention Cell) or, as sometimes the officers abbreviated, ITT.

that job was done on the basis of the commonly shared vulnerability of both institutions to the law. SES, the local police department, and the head of the regional administration knew very well that neither institution could satisfy all formal provisions that regulated their functioning. The conflict, thus, could either result in paralysing their work or, alternatively, in solving the problem informally.<sup>28</sup>

Interestingly, it seemed that the same logic shaped many interactions of the police officers with citizens. A shared desire to avoid formal procedures often pushed both the police and the citizens to continuously negotiate informal solutions. Once one of the police officers—I will call him Vadym—and I went to see a doctor from the local hospital who claimed that he was attacked by a young man. He told us that they were participating in a local pool tournament together when the younger man started to get cocky. One word led to another and the younger man punched the doctor right in the face. Finally, after the doctor told his story, the officer laid out the options available to him: he described in detail what the doctor had to do in order to frame the event in the harshest way possible. The idea was that the doctor had to arrange for his own hospitalization for a few days. That would have allowed the police to qualify the event

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<sup>28</sup> It must be noted that when I arrived to do my fieldwork in Bezrobitne, jail had not been functioning for few years already. However, I had a chance to observe it from the inside—one of the officers was kind enough to make a tour for me through the hallway and cells of the (empty) building. It was a rather typical old post-Soviet holding facility marked by passive indifference towards the well-being of people it supposed to keep inside and conditioned by the poor state that largely lives out of infrastructure inherited from the Soviet predecessor. Horizontally painted in green (bottom two-thirds of the wall) and white (upper one-third) walls, heavy metal doors and beds (painted by the same cheap green paint) attached to the walls as well small windows with bars, a tiny sink and a toilet, all decaying because of the age – not a very inviting and friendly, and yet probably not the worst holding facility in Ukraine. The closure of the facility benefited some, especially people who committed minor law violations and would have spent up to 15 days in the jail as a punishment. Officers, as I was told, increasingly started to let many of those people go freely. On the other hand, however, apparently there were some losers as well. People who had to be temporarily separated from their potential victims (for example, in cases of domestic violence), now increasingly stayed in places where their presence was potentially harmful.

as the “minor assault that led to one’s loss of the ability to work”—the part of the criminal code article that results in the maximum penalty. Finally, he prepared some documents and gave them to the doctor to sign. Interestingly enough, however, when we came back to the station, the officer called the older brother of the accused. “What are you thinking there?” the officer said. “Do you understand that there is a potential criminal case in my hands?” He proceeded to tell the brother of the accused to arrange for some *mohorych*<sup>29</sup> and immediately go with it to see the doctor.

Later that day the same officer returned to the hospital in order to close the case due to the absence of complaints from the victim and I, in turn, finally understood why on our way back to the station the officer continued to mutter under his breath that “the police have become a legal extortion tool.” He knew from the very beginning that the doctor was not really interested in putting the assaulter in jail or achieving any other formal punishment. What the doctor really wanted is to create the conditions that would have encouraged the attacker to “come with a *mohorych*”—make an informal ritualized compensation that would restore their relationships and the normal symbolic order. The younger man had to bring presents, admit by it that he was wrong in transgressing an important social norm, and, possibly, drink some alcohol together with the doctor, as the *mohorych* ritual suggests, thus sealing the deal and recovering the (proper) relationship between the two.

When I later looked at my notes from the hospital, I saw that the doctor, in fact, emphasized the younger age of the assailant and repeatedly claimed that the accused

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<sup>29</sup> The word *mohorych* came to Ukrainian from Arabic. In Arabic it means costs, expenses. However, what Ukrainians usually mean by it is the social ritual when one person brings food and alcohol to consume with others. The ritual is very widespread and almost always is directed at maintaining or restoring relations with others. When one is promoted or buys a new car—it is often believed, for instance, that he (usually it is he) has to arrange for *mohorych* and consume it with people that are socially close to him. When, on the other hand, there is a conflict, *mohorych* is used to heal the wounds and social relations that were disrupted by a transgression of boundaries.

man was not “respectful enough.” It was quite clear from my notes that the doctor wanted the younger man to apologize for what he had done. The law was just a formal tool that was instrumentally used to achieve that informal result: to scare the assailant with the possibility of formal proceedings—while the doctor knew perfectly well that the assailant will try to avoid them—so that the space of informal conflict resolution could be opened. The officer, in turn, knew well what had to be done and immediately told me this when we got back into the car. I could only fully understand his words later, when I was reading through my notes, that what seemed at first glance to be cruel collusion used to manipulate the law and to generate a disproportionate punishment for the assailant, later appeared to be a rather effective and humane informal practice aimed at achieving restorative justice.<sup>30</sup>

The law, in fact, was often used as a method to push sides at odds into negotiating a consensual informal solution to their conflict. The law was repeatedly postulated by the officers and commonly understood by the public as *the worst option available*—formal proceedings were incredibly slow, believed to be extremely ineffective and, probably most importantly, demanded the mobilization of incredible resources at the place where few members of the public possessed much. Officers, on the other hand, were overburdened with work, and were thus in an environment that created a strong incentive to avoid any potential additional burdens.<sup>31</sup> Thus, the potential of

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<sup>30</sup> Restorative justice is a method of justice popular in many Western countries. It is conceptualized largely in opposition to retributive justice - the idea that an offender must feel pain (Christie 2007) as a result of his actions. Instead of punishment, restorative justice focuses on reparation and the healing of the victim as well as healing of the relations between the offender and the one hurt. Usually it involves a meeting between the victim and the offender. During the meeting the offender and the victim discuss what happened between them and the offender makes monetary or symbolic amends to compensate for what s/he has done. One of the advantages of the method is that the victim becomes active in the process. It is believed to have a positive effect on how the victim feels after the “justice process” is over (Sherman and Strang 2007; Wright 1991).

<sup>31</sup> I would compare it with the argument Black (1976) makes. According to him, organizations usually possess more resources than individuals and thus are more inclined to



formal proceedings and state involvement made both the public and the officers more inclined to negotiate mutually beneficial agreements. This shared desire to avoid formalities often pushed both the police and citizens to continuously negotiate informal solutions—solutions that (at least sometimes) were empowering for the victims and were based on the restoration of social relations, rather than on simple retribution.

Even more paradoxically, it was not just the lack of resources (such as time and most importantly, money) among the citizens, but the shortages (of gas, cars, time, etc.) experienced by police officers that prevented the retributive scenario. In other words, paradoxically, it was the dysfunctioning of the state, its inability to supply law enforcement institutions with all the needed resources that pushed officers to design restorative strategies. The following story seems to offer a particularly good example.

On a warm bright morning two officers and I went to a nearby village. We came to talk with two women (I will call them Tamara and Oksana) who had a longstanding conflict about their shared territory: Tamara claimed that Oksana was using the space near the stairs of their apartment building to store a baby stroller. According to Tamara, that stroller has been standing near the stairs for a long time and was used by local stray cats to defecate, give birth to kittens, etc. She also complained that Oksana did not clean after those animals and did not want to move the stroller somewhere else. However, the way Tamara talked suggested that the stroller was rather a symbol of a bigger conflict and distrust between the two. At some point Tamara even admitted that she fears Oksana is using that stroller as a first step at occupying the common territory of their house for her, Oksana's, permanent private use.

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mobilize law. While his argument seems to be generally correct, it seems also reasonable to add that behavior of different agents inside an organization—agents that ultimately decide if organization will choose to use the formal proceedings—may vary depending on internal organizational incentives, thus modifying the organizational behavior in conflict resolution matters.

The officers spent a considerable amount of time talking to the women and trying to calm them down. They repeatedly insisted that both Tamara and Oksana would be better to negotiate with each other and find a common solution to their problem. Otherwise, the officers argued, the women would have to split their common territory—a process that the officers portrayed as a complicated journey that neither Tamara or Oksana would want to go through. Ironically enough, when we finally left the premises and were on our journey to another place, we received a call from the same house. The two women had started a fight with each other. It later appeared that the early morning arrival of the police had escalated the conflict into a fight—as soon as we left, Oksana met Tamara on a street: she was furious that the latter had called the police on her and did not hesitate to let Tamara know about it. Soon enough they were exchanging insults and few moments after that even managed to gather the crowd; the neighbors assembled to look at the two women clinched in a brawl.

When we arrived, Tamara and Oksana were already separated by a husband of one of them. The other husband, though, was still very agitated; he was shouting a barrage of accusations at Oksana and was repeatedly insisting that the two women had to be allowed to finish their fight. Numerous neighbors were split in their loyalties and occasionally cursed or damned someone, sometimes cursing the police officers for allowing the fight to happen and “not doing their job,” and sometimes calling out Oksana’s or Tamara’s family for some old (yet, apparently well-remembered) transgression. Officers stoically ignored all the attacks directed at them and patiently waited for their turn to speak. They inquired as to the circumstances of the fight and, instead of arresting anyone, started a long—probably, more than forty minutes long—persuasion process directed at Tamara, Oksana and their husbands. They went on to explain to both families that they are living as neighbors and thus rely on each other.

"A day may come," one officer said, "when you will need some help from each other. Say, the roof will leak or something." If they continue, one of the officers who was interrupted time and again claimed, they would have no one to turn to. "Sure, you can stand your ground and leave your stroller near the stairs," officers were telling Oksana, "one day it will just disappear or it will mysteriously catch on fire... Take some vodka, sit together in the yard, drink and talk," they continued trying to persuade the families to informally negotiate and compromise.

However, two families had a difficult time calming down. After a while, when the officers saw that their appeals to the potential negative consequences of the conflict would not have any real impact, they used another strategy. They started to appeal to *the worst option available* - the law. They said to Tamara and Oksana that an alternative to the informal conflict resolutions is the following: 1. To go and "take a record of bodily injuries" incurred as a result of their fight. In order to do that, they would have to drive about 80 kilometres to another city where the closest official doctor with authority to make such a record works. 2. As a next step, they have to bring the whole case before the court. It would cost, the officers claimed, "a few thousand *hryvnias*<sup>32</sup> only to file a complaint and pay all the taxes." Officers also argued that the "judge will not babysit" either Tamara or Oksana and, if they behaved the way they did in the presence of the officers, s/he would quickly fine both of them for "contempt of court." The policemen also reminded the women that it would take a lot of time for the court to make a decision and that in order to pay for a lawyer, both Tamara and Oksana would probably have to "sell their apartments altogether." Thus, formal conflict resolution, it seemed, was not a real option.

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<sup>32</sup> Ukrainian currency. One Canadian Dollar equals approximately twenty *hryvnias*.

When we finally left the village, I talked with the officers and observed that, as far as I understood, they did not have many options. The answer of one officer was the following: "We could, of course, ticket both of those women and they would pay a fifty-one *hryvnia* fine. Yet, we would spend more time and effort writing those tickets than those women would pay." Fifty-one *hryvnia* equals approximately two dollars and fifty cents Canadian, and, of course, is not considered a sum of money that would deter anyone from any offense, even in Ukraine.

No less important was that police station did not have a functioning holding facility. The "cage," as they often called it, was built during Soviet times and did not meet the new standards put in place by the state. As such, despite some fighting from the local police (a part of the struggle was captured in a story at the beginning of the chapter), it was eventually closed following an inspection. Due to lack of funds, the police station could not remodel or renovate and thus reopen its holding facility. For the officers, losing the "cage" effectively meant losing the possibility to detain people. Formally, of course, they had not lost the right to do so, however, the new circumstances clearly influenced their behaviour. To legally detain a person, they had to drive about seventy kilometers to the nearest city that still had the required functioning holding facility. Given that they experienced a permanent lack of gas and time, the lack of holding facilities dissuaded them from choosing this option. In other words, the lack of needed infrastructure influenced the pattern of authority exertion—it decreased the amount of their authority in police-citizens relations and pushed officers towards informal consensus-based solutions.

All situations discussed in the first part of this chapter have a common quality: in all of them officers preferred to avoid commands and restrained themselves from even hinting at any use of coercion or force. In other words, they chose not to engage in

authority-type interactions in their dealings with the public or other institutions, instead favouring informal ways of managing the conflicts. Some of the comments officers made, as well as my own observations, suggest that one of the important factors pushing officers towards those strategies was the weak stance of the Ukrainian state, namely its inability to provide essential resources. Shortages in the supply of material resources, the need to constantly work overtime, the lack of personnel and extreme workload created incentives for the officers to avoid formal proceedings and instead design consensus-based strategies of conflict regulation, effectively decreasing the amount of authority citizens experienced.

Informal strategies of conflict management, as the vignettes concerning the doctor and the fighting women seem to suggest, were largely based on manipulations of social distance. Suggestions to engage in *mohorych* (ritual), was primarily designed to maintain or restore social relations, as well as was the giving of a piece of advice “to drink some vodka” to the women in conflict. All indicated that the officers skillfully navigated local social realities, using existing norms to achieve their desired goals. The officers seemed to generally understand (without conceptualizing it in the following terms, of course) that, everything else being equal, a smaller (relational) social distance would usually reduce the odds that formal law would have to be mobilized (Black 1976, 40-46, 73-78; 1989, 12-13). The lower probability of mobilization of the law, as one would expect, could also mean lower involvement of the police in conflict management, thus reducing their burden of the workload in the environment where a lesser amount of work seemed to be a fervently desired outcome of the professional group.

## 2.2 “This is a case where you have to follow the law”: Extralegality in Everyday Police Work

I always say: “You can tell a man’s intentions by the way he walks!”  
**Constable Odo**  
Star Trek: Deep Space 9

Police officers develop what I call “the police eye,” that is, the knowledge that helps them to effectively navigate their job. That knowledge, as in many other professions, notably including that of historians and ethnographers of various kinds, is mostly about noticing clues (Ginzburg and Davin 1980), or, to put it in other words, police officers learn to know where to look and how to interpret what they have chosen, or were trained, to see. The techniques that police officers develop, as with any techniques and practices connected to ways of seeing and unseeing, are, of course, ultimately about classification.

However, much public discussion<sup>33</sup> and a lot of research on the topic have been primarily devoted to aspects of (racial and ethnic) profiling (e.g., Pierson et al. 2019; Kramer and Remster 2018) and have usually remained in almost total disconnection from a nuanced investigation of the ways different environments shape authority. It may well be the case, though, that patterns of profiling, discretion and extralegality in general would be much better studied if they were seen through the lens of the

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<sup>33</sup> As Morrow et al. claim, for example, “the scrutiny of SQF [Stop, Question, and Frisk] in New York and elsewhere has focused almost exclusively on the role of race or ethnicity in the stop-and-frisk decisions; that is, whether the police have engaged in racial profiling. Investigations of racial profiling in SQF activities have occurred across the country, including in Newark (NJ), Detroit (MI), Philadelphia (PA), Chicago (IL), and Miami Gardens (FL). SQF and racial profiling have arguably become indistinguishable in the minds of many citizens, leading in some cases, to media and public backlash against efforts to even implement an SQF program” (2017, 3). By no means I am trying to say, of course, that issues of police profiling are not important to investigate. My point here is that we will understand the interplay of race and ethnicity in officers’ decision-making much better if we study it as a part of a larger dynamic context of authority production and behavior.

dynamic system of contextual authority—authority that can appear (when it is mobilized) or disappear, increase or decrease depending on the context, “from one time and place to another” (Black 1976, 2). To put it more simply, race, class, gender, age and other characteristics of a person who has been “profiled” could at best reveal only part of the truth of why he or she was stopped, questioned or searched. Depending on the change in other contextual factors (including space, time, social relational distance, etc.) police officers can see black/poor/young/male (as typical groups that are discussed as attracting the attention of police officers) as either worthy of attention, or not.

For example, Forrest Stuart in *Down, Out & Under Arrest*, convincingly shows that when shifts in national economic policies and poverty governance intersected with specific local decisions in Los Angeles city, the ways police officers treated the public on the streets of Skid Row were reshaped. However, it also created the space where gender and race of passersby worked differently than in most other places: contrary to general tendencies in the US, being “white” and a “woman” in LA’s Skid Row often meant attracting more authority from the officers than would being “black” and a “man” (2016). And indeed, it has been known for a while that police officers often tend to perceive people located “out of place” as suspicious (Alpert et al. 2005; Gould and Mastrofski 2004). Multiple other studies of police behavior also emphasize the importance of various other situational factors (e.g., Friedrich 1980, Reiss 1968, specifically 17-18; Garner, Maxwell, and Heraux 2002; Worden and Shepard 1996).

In this part of the chapter, I will single out some of the factors<sup>34</sup> that seemed to influence Central’ne patrol officers’ decisions to stop, search, arrest or otherwise use

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<sup>34</sup> Some of the factors are well-known to police researchers., For example, the influence of ticket and arrest quotas on the behavior of police officers. What I am primarily trying to do

their authority with one member of the public or another. It must be noted that the following text is primarily an attempt (and by necessity only partial) to apply the framework that seemed to explain more of what I observed than other approaches that I am familiar with. It is by no means a full and comprehensive description of the contexts that led to the emergence of authority in the daily routines of the Ukrainian police.

### **Places and Spaces**

One of the main factors that seemed to influence the mobilization of authority by the officers was space. On the one hand, some spaces were informally marked by the officers as 'hot spots.'<sup>35</sup> That primarily meant that officers expected to find people doing certain kinds of illegal activities (mostly drug related offences and thefts from cars) in those spaces with a greater probability than in other spaces. Therefore, officers have spent a considerable amount of time learning, teaching, and sharing information about such spaces either by communicating with each other or by studying their own assigned terrain: I repeatedly heard how more experienced officers taught younger ones to pay special attention to certain courtyards, patches of land surrounded by the trees, etc. I was also able to observe how officers were adjusting their routes to drive through areas and roads that they did not know very well or just wanted to re-evaluate. Those exploratory trips almost always were accompanied by vocalized reflections and evaluations of the area that officers shared with each other.

Designating a space as a hotspot meant that officers took more time driving through the area, visited it more often than others, and were more suspicious of

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in this part of the chapter is to introduce a new frame of looking at all the factors mentioned, no matter how well they are already known.

<sup>35</sup> It must be noted that officers never used the term themselves.



people hanging around the place. That also meant that there was a higher probability that a person would be stopped, questioned, and searched in hot spots than they would be in other places. Consider, for example, an excerpt from one of my fieldnotes:

It was the second night shift and one of the first really cold fall days. There were almost no calls and streets were largely empty. A policeman, a policewoman, and I were endlessly driving in a patrol car back and forth, without really engaging anyone, and I immediately started to think about Fassin's and Ericson's description of how boredom often accompanies and defines the work of police officers (Fassin 2013, 2017; Ericson 1982). "Yesterday at least there were some people [on the streets]," one officer exclaimed. "And today there is no one! [It is so boring] that one could die [because of it], I cannot keep my eyes open anymore. It was really nice yesterday: we were constantly on the move, threw one [person] into the car here, arrested another one there, did this, did that!" the same officer complained. "And now you have cold weather! And now the cold has come!" the other officer answered, implying that cold weather dissuaded people from spending time on the streets. During that shift they often became involved into discussions of the places where they could find someone to check and ultimately arrest: "We could turn inside the forest over there. When it is warm, drug addicts and various 'interesting people' like to drive there [to use drugs]. It has been raining lately, but when it is dry, one can drive much further inside"; "There is nothing to do in that area—even Gypsies do not hang out over there now"; "Let's go to the slot machines place... ATB [supermarket]<sup>36</sup>? No, there is nothing interesting [happening], we can make an arrest only for drinking binges and rowdiness there. Nothing that would really go for a crime, it is not really interesting." The officer added that it is unlikely that they will arrest anyone at that supermarket for the drug-related crimes, mugging or car theft and thus they were not interested.

There were also indications that officers felt responsible for the spaces informally marked as hot spots. One day, when we received information about a mugging on the street (a rather typical crime in Ukraine: a man tore off a gold chain from a woman's neck and ran away), the officers immediately recognized that it was one of the hot spots—a place associated with high probability of crime, or, as they used to say, "a place that may *vystrelit*" (literally, to shoot out). Officers started to behave agitatedly and a company officer angrily said that she had repeatedly told another crew to monitor

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<sup>36</sup> Ukrainian supermarket that has a reputation of a place poor people use.

that place attentively, now holding them accountable for their inability to control the area. Though I cannot prove it in any way, I had a feeling that officers were more motivated to find a mugger than was usual, precisely because of the feeling of failure to effectively control the place known as a hot spot.

### **Temporality**

I found that both day of the week and time of day influenced the distribution of authority throughout space. Namely, during the shifts that were busy with calls, officers had less time to observe the streets or to stop and frisk those who seemed suspicious. Therefore, the day shifts mostly had a very distinct dynamics that contrasted with those of the night shifts.

The night shifts from Sunday to Monday would differ greatly from the night shifts from Friday to Saturday. One of the outcomes was that authority fluctuated between private and public spaces—the more calls officers received, the more authority moved to private spaces (officers were often invited inside apartments by the complainants and thus were able to access places that they can normally neither observe nor enter); the fewer calls officers received, the more they concentrated on the public spaces, proactively looking for wrongdoing on the streets and in the courtyards.

Those fluctuations also meant that different groups of people felt authority differently depending on the time of day: young men, for example, were the main target of proactive stop-and-frisks, while the group of people who were subjected to police authority as a result of calls was more varied in gender and age. It must be noted as well that authority was mobilized in different ways and proportions during the calls and proactive stop-and-frisks: while the latter by definition required mobilization of some authority (people were effectively detained, made to show their belongings and

frisked), the former rarely resulted in any mobilization of authority on the part of the officers (in most cases, people just filed their complaints, officers resolved the conflict without mobilizing authority or the perpetrators were just not found). Thus, both the quantity and the spatial distribution of authority depended on temporal context.

There is also another way that the temporal context influenced authority. Unsurprisingly, overworked Ukrainian police officers who were not paid for overtime had a strong incentive to end their shifts on schedule. That fact had a significant and easily observable influence on the distribution of authority. Officers were more eager to ignore transgressions they encountered during the time that immediately preceded the end of the twelve-hour shifts. In fact, on few occasions they would openly joke about this. For instance, when we were driving towards “the base” at the end of one of the day shifts, officers started to count cars that had no illumination on license plates (a typical reason that they used to stop cars). “We could give out four tickets already,” one officer said. “Remember those [cars] for tomorrow,” his partner joked in response. On the next day, officers ended their shift later than hoped. We were driving towards the station in a hurry when one of the officers exclaimed: “Look, there is a Bimmer without lights!” “What the fuck do we need it for?” his partner quickly answered and added ironically: “You really like to find something at the last moment, hey?” Needless to say, that they did not stop the car.

Officers often discussed how they were afraid of getting stuck dealing with an accident and inevitably complained whenever they received a call during the last half of an hour or hour of their shift. In their attempts to avoid such a fate, officers would sometimes drive to the parts of the city where they felt there was a smaller probability of encountering transgressions of the kind they would not be able to ignore. On other

occasions, they would take a break (“go for a coffee”) during the last half an hour of the shift in an attempt to avoid calls.

### **Quotas: Informal and Institutional Incentives**

During one of the shifts our patrol car picked up an officer who had just returned from one of the southern regions of Ukraine. While describing his experience to the fellow policemen, he recalled: “We really had nothing to do there, to the extent that we fined people just for honking! We had to write tickets [like other officers] anyway, so... there was this place where everybody crossed the rail-tracks—you just stand there and write down warnings<sup>37</sup> for everybody until you have enough.” The words of the officer perfectly illustrate the way that quotas for tickets and arrests influence the unequal distribution of authority throughout social space: officers in Central’ne would not even have thought of giving warnings for such a trivial matter as crossing rail-tracks in the wrong place. And even if they had, this behavior most probably would have been disapproved of by their colleagues and superiors.<sup>38</sup> After all, in the eyes of the officers in Central’ne, there are plenty of much more serious offenses around them. However,

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<sup>37</sup> Warning are tickets without actual fines that a person has to pay. These are documents that contains an official warning from an officer to a person that broke the law.

<sup>38</sup> Officially quotas were cancelled as a part of the police reform. However, it seemed that there was a complex dynamic between semi-formal demands to produce tickets and arrests from the top managers of the National Police and the informal beliefs of police officers that actually patrol the streets about what constitutes “good work.” The ideas of the latter were closely connected with “numbers” that officers produced. However, the simple scheme of “the more tickets and arrests—the better” cannot explain the workings of the informal professional control. An officer that is ticketing everyone whom he sees would most probably face strong disapproval. In other words, there were notions about legitimate and illegitimate tickets as well as disapproval of people who overproduced “numbers.” Compare it, for example, with the situation in the US. According to a study conducted by the Pew Research Center, “few officers (3%) say that they are formally expected to meet a predetermined number of tickets, arrests, citations or summonses in their unit, about a third (34%) of officers say there are informal expectations for meeting a predetermined number of arrests or tickets” (Morin et al. 2017). Note, however, that the Ukrainian police force is a much more centralized institution than the US one.

and this was the very reason why the story about the rail-tracks was told, that provincial place in southern Ukraine was so calm that officers had to mobilize authority where they would not ordinarily do so.

Quota incentives, however, often interplayed with other contextual factors. For instance, with temporality: when officers worked for a long time without making any arrests or distributing any fines, they would usually start examining their surroundings a little more closely and looking for any breaches of the law they could find. Also, it seemed that the closer it was to the end of the shift and the fewer arrests the officers performed and the fewer tickets they issued, the less and less forgiving the officers became should they encounter an offense.

If a unit of patrol officers had a low number of arrests and tickets closer to the end of the shift, and if, for some reason, they had not cared enough to distribute their authority in a way that would have allowed them to improve the situation, they would have been reminded by their superiors to do so. I saw once, for example, how superior officers stopped near one of the police cars and asked how many tickets policemen had produced during that day. When the superiors were informed that the officers issued only one ticket, they immediately told the officers to go to one of the places known for constant driving violations, stay there and write as many tickets as needed.

The constant need to produce “numbers” socialized officers in a certain manner. In other words, more experienced officers exhibited dispositions that often could not be found among their less experienced colleagues. The latter were gradually “taught” to interpret the reality around them in a manner that would increase the amount of tickets and arrests, often through the frustration their superiors demonstrated whenever the less experienced policemen failed to properly use ticket- and arrest-prospective situations. Consider the following fieldnote:

One of the superior officers whom I accompany talks on the phone with an inexperienced policeman that serves under his command. The superior officer is told by the person on the other end that they just saw a drunken man getting into his car and trying to drive away. The policeman on the other end also reports that he and his partner managed to stop the driver from driving while being intoxicated. Immediately after the conversation ends, the superior officer starts to move angrily back and forth with the upper part of the body, hitting the back of the car seat. "Idiots!" the other officer in the car says, apparently perfectly understanding the reason for his superior's frustration. They discuss for a while how the officers that just reported preventing an offence messed everything up: inexperienced officers could let the driver go and then stop him. The officers in the car agree that the policemen that just reported preventing an offence missed the perfect opportunity to write a ticket for the impaired driving.

### **Contextual Legitimacy**

While conducting her ethnographic fieldwork in Ukraine, Dafna Rachok noted that police officers were sometimes "taken aback" when sex workers talked back to them, refused "to sign incriminating protocols" and demanded "that they [sex workers] call a lawyer" (Rachok 2019). She claims that when some of the sex workers started to resist, officers were so unused to that kind of behavior that did not "always know how to react" and soon developed an adaptation: they started to avoid sex workers who they knew would resist (Rachok 2019).

Nina, who has been in sex work for a few years already, recounted how around a year ago she was getting off a minibus on a highway to start her working day, when her mother suddenly called her on a cell. Getting off a bus, with a phone near her ear and closing the busdoor, Nina noticed a police car not far away from the bus. According to Nina, at the moment she was preparing for yet another encounter with the police, however, to her own astonishment, the car left. Being one of those sex workers who were often talking back to the officers and calling the organization's hot line at the smallest sign of a trouble, Nina hypothesized that the police decided that she was on the phone with Nataliia (whom many officers strongly disliked for her activism regarding sex workers' rights) or somebody else from the organization and, not ready to deal with Nina's resistance, left. Nina's hypothesis was confirmed some time after this incident, when

the police officers suddenly appeared on the highway again and managed to catch sex workers off guard, so the latter had no time to call anyone. Police officers jokingly asked Nina whom she was talking to on the phone that day and when she told that it was her mother, they replied with quite some irony and suspicion that they did not know Nataliia had already become her mother (Rachok 2019).

This example illustrates the place that contextual legitimacy may play in officers' decision-making. Regular and predictable opposition to accept authority in contexts where it had been accepted before, made police officers re-evaluate their behavior: if previously the officers would have initiated an authority-type interaction (taking sex workers to the station and issuing tickets for the "activity of prostitution"), now the officers preferred avoidance. Without any laws changed, the patterns of authority distribution shifted dramatically.

Yet, sometimes factors are clustered in a configuration that pushes officers to overcome their desire to avoid an authority-type-interaction. The high value of drug-possession arrests among policemen and their superiors was often stronger than an expected conflict with people stopped on the street. Young men often challenged the right of the officers to stop-and-frisk them when the officers failed to provide a reason that would appear legitimate.<sup>39</sup> Thus, initiation of authority by officers often ended up in heated conflicts on the streets of Central'ne.

There were clear indications that officers felt strong discomfort about drug-related stop-and-frisks. On numerous occasions policemen would start telling each other rather emotional stories about people that they engaged with in the past, usually peppering these stories with sarcasm and ridicule. Those stories almost always ended with the officers successfully overcoming the resistance of people frisked.

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<sup>39</sup> Officers often provided a very generic reason for the stop to protect themselves legally. Yet, many people felt that the formal reason that was given concealed the true motivations of the officers.

On one particular occasion that I observed, officers stopped two young men to search for cannabis. Those two quickly started to question officers' actions. Despite the eventual success of the officers (they managed to make young people comply with their commands), the officers returned to the car extremely frustrated. "[Have you seen?] We make a legal frisk and those sissies try to take advantage of us? It is 3 in the morning, they walk with backpacks [and think that we do not have the right to stop them]," an officer said angrily. "One needs to have them by the short and curlies first and then one can talk [normally]. Why do they think they can take advantage of us?" He went on to tell numerous anecdotes about similar experiences he had. "Once we drive and see the guy who matches the description. We approach and he starts to purr:<sup>40</sup> 'What is going oooooon? What is the reaaaaason?'" he lampooned the hero of his story. "We warned him twice and [when it did not work] just put irons on him. Now we could really talk with him!" "On another occurrence, we decided to check the guys in *zhygul*."<sup>41</sup> It is more than clear that they could have some weed. And this passerby comes around and starts all this what-is-the-reason-for-the-stop crap. And that car, you know, stop-for-all-you-want car—it has no plate lights, nothing at all." The officer again finished his narrative with a story of success: they managed to get rid of the passerby and accomplish their task.

Yet, despite the prestige of the drug-possession arrests, some of the officers apparently avoided doing stop-and-frisks and had to be additionally pressured to be more proactive on the streets of Central'ne. Additionally, superior officers sometimes complained about subordinates and their lack of desire to stop and frisk people on the

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<sup>40</sup> Originally *murlykat'* (to purr) is a verb that probably travelled from the prison slang (it means to belong to the criminal world/subculture, to be a member of it). In this case the verb was used as a sarcastic equivalent for complain.

<sup>41</sup> A Russian car that is officially called "Lada."



street. Interestingly, one of the rhetorical strategies used to legitimize proactive stop-and-frisks was the comparison of “old” police officers with the “new.” Once, after one of the inexperienced officers performed the frisk under the supervision of a more experienced one, the latter said: “This [soft treatment of people who were frisked] reminds me of the old road police<sup>42</sup>—the main concern is to avoid trouble, avoid trouble at any cost.”

However, even more experienced police officers used the opportunity to “avoid trouble” when they faced situations perceived to be unworthy of their attention. Those situations were often connected to the officers’ perceptions of what constitutes their work and what does not: the association of police work with crime fighting seemed to shape the perception of many service calls and a number of “non-serious” offenses as a distraction from “real work.” When policemen received calls about such events, they could postpone their arrival, sometimes even choosing to have a break before driving to the caller’s address. Officers’ attitudes towards many such calls were clear from the sarcastic comments that they made<sup>43</sup> or just outright complaints about uninformed citizens who burden officers with everything from saving cats stuck in a pipe to fixing broken city infrastructure on the street.

Furthermore, police officers could even ignore some of the events or behaviours they observed on the streets on the basis that those were not worthy of their attention. During one shift, for example, officers and I were driving by two people who at first sight looked homeless: they were on the ground fighting with each other. One of the officers asked his partner: “Should we stop?” The answer was a cold “no, let’s continue

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<sup>42</sup> Arguably, the road police had the worst reputation among “old” police officers.

<sup>43</sup> Once officers and I were driving in a car, when one of the officers read the call from the tablet: “Neighbors burn the leaves in their yard.” His partner exclaimed sarcastically: “Oh, my God!”

driving” and indeed we drove away. Though it is hard to say what the motivation was, I would speculate that the social status of the men fighting made police involvement look illegitimate to the officers.

There were indications that relational distance between people in conflict played an important role in officers’ decision-making. Perhaps unsurprisingly, officers seemed to dismiss conflicts between people who are related or otherwise socially close as something not particularly worthy of their attention. During one of the night shifts, for example, officers read the information about the call that was eventually taken by their colleagues: a woman claimed that her brother attacked her in one of the Central’s malls. “Good luck [with that]!” the officer sarcastically and sceptically said. Officers started to speculate on what really happened in the mall and finally came up with a version that trivialized the call as something “not really serious”: they suggested that the sister and the brother probably had a fight and the woman bluffed that she would call the cops. The brother, they hypothesized, called her bluff, so she called just not to lose face.

### **Reading People**

One of the officers once told me: “You have to know how to read people, Ivan: to know when the man who is walking down the street just had his beer and does not really bother anyone. You may stop him, but everything you will accomplish with it is just a waste of both your time and his. But, you know, there are those [officers serving] who stop everyone... There are those that have been working now for three years in the police and still do not know how to read people.”

Indeed, police officers develop a certain gaze that helps them to approximate the probability of a ticket or an arrest just by looking at how people look and behave.

Consider the following dialogues and comments made by the officers:

- “Drive closer, someone is hanging around over there.” The police car slowed down and a young man—about 18 years old, short haircut, dark clothes—passed by. “This is some kind of punk, old school, punk ‘oi’,” an officer joked. The officers resumed their patrolling.
- It is dark and late, we pass by a group of men that hang around near the supermarket. An officer looks at them and says: “And these are typical beer bellied men: [they drink some] beer and have some fish jerky to bite after... You know, people who go to *ATB* [supermarket].”
- One of the officers froze and carefully looked at two people. In a moment she summarized: “A dude and a girl.” We were driving for a while, when she said: “We had to stop that fellow with a cigarette. He had a very specific face.”
- “Stop, those are our clients over there!” Another officer turns the car around and we quickly reach two young men in hoods. They are holding open beer bottles. Officers find nothing and when we leave, policewoman says: “I thought those were our clients and they appeared to be just some wusses.” During that shift, officers also exchanged the following short phrases while looking for people to stop and frisk: “Look at that guy. He is already raising his hood—he knows that we will check him”; “Who is that?” “Or, no, he is normal.”

Did class, gender and age of people on the streets of Central’ne influence the officers’ judgement? Did they stop certain people more often than others? Despite the fact that my study is by no means representative, it was clear that generally young and not very wealthy (though not always extremely poor as well) men were looked upon as more promising targets for the officers than middle-aged or older women. Authority, therefore, was unevenly distributed among those groups.

However, it must be noted that class, age and gender were highly contextual as well. In most cases, Ukrainian officers were looking for drivers with high concentrations of alcohol in their blood (article 130 of the Administrative Violations Code) or people carrying drugs (article 309 of the Criminal Code) and most of their (proactive) efforts

were directed towards detection of those wrongdoings. Gender, age and class<sup>44</sup> played out differently, however, in the officers' activities directed at the production of arrests and tickets related to those two above mentioned offenses. In case of drug possession, it was quite clear that authority was distributed extremely unevenly: young men of different classes (predominantly either poor or middle-class, no rich kids or people so poor that they could not afford housing were frisked) and young and middle-aged men with an appearance of *robotiaha*<sup>45</sup> (predominantly construction workers in my observation) being the main targets.<sup>46</sup> However, in the case of intoxicated driving, class and gender, while still significant, did not seem to play such an important role: authority seemed to be less unevenly distributed along those lines. What seemed to be the main factor, however, was the way people moved through the city. People who walked were much more likely to be stopped-and-frisked for drugs,<sup>47</sup> while people who were driving a car were more likely to be checked for intoxication.

## **Behaviour**

The behavior of people who policemen encounter has long been defined as an important factor in the officers' decision-making process (e.g. Reiss 1968, 18; Friedrich 1980; Garner et al. 2002). And indeed, I observed during my fieldwork in Central'ne that both

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<sup>44</sup> Of course, I dealt with what Brubaker and Cooper call "external identification" (2000, 15–16). Officers and I usually did not have information on how people who were stopped or searched identified themselves. It must also be noted that identification itself is also a "fundamentally situational and contextual" process (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, 14). A more profound discussion of the issues, unfortunately, lies outside the scope of this work.

<sup>45</sup> It is a slang term that some officers used. It literally means a "working man" and in fact is used to connote a man working an old-style working-class job (that is often perceived as not being prestigious anymore), e.g. a factory job or a job on a construction site. Usually this word is used to refer to people who exhibit visible signs of heavy physical work on their bodies and clothes.

<sup>46</sup> A woman was stopped and frisked only once during my observations. In addition, the main suspect in that case was the man who accompanied her.

<sup>47</sup> While I know about cases when officers searched private cars for cannabis, for example, I did not observe any during my fieldwork in Central'ne.

speech and body language of people with whom officers interacted or kept an eye on had significant influence on the behavior of authority. For example, authority could easily appear in situations where officers would see indications of people becoming nervous at the arrival of a police car. A sudden change of direction, attempts to hide the face, visible discomfort with police presence, displays of intense and unusual attention to the police car or the officers themselves—all of these caught the officers' eyes and sometimes made them stop-and-frisk a person.

Consider the following notes I made: 1) "It is a middle of the night. We pass the guy in the hood. I notice that he turns around and looks at the police car. Once. And then again. And again. "Look how he gazes!" One officer says. Another quickly admits that the guy does not look like he is heading anywhere in particular." 2) "Two young men move towards our car. An officer says to the partner to observe if they will turn around." 3) "We drive through one of the courtyards. One officer says, carefully observing a young man: "What will the guy even see in that hood?" Another answers: "If he needs, he will see whatever he needs. Juvies usually expose themselves without [anyone's help]."

The behaviour of people police officers encountered, however, influenced not only whether authority would emerge at all, but also the amount of authority that would be mobilized. During my fieldwork, one of the patterns that I observed the most, was the divide between what the officers called "normal behaviour" and "a behaviour of a pig." For instance, during one of the night shifts officers that I accompanied received a request from their colleagues to help deal with a man that was stopped on a street. When we came and officers searched the man, they easily found a small package with a dark green dried-up substance inside. Despite the fact that everybody knew what kind of substance officers found, the owner of the package immediately started to say that it

was “Chinese tea” he bought at a market around the corner. Officers opened the package and smelled the inside. After making sure that it was cannabis, they wrapped it back up and tried to give it back to the owner. “Put it back into your jacket,” one of the officers calmly said and extended his hand with the cannabis. To the officers’ dissatisfaction, the man refused and suddenly announced to everybody that it was not his. “Very well! Handcuff him,” an irritated officer said. “If you don’t want to proceed normally, we will do it according to the law.” After the man was handcuffed, the cannabis was simply put back into his jacket. No one cared to take of the cuffs afterwards.

On many occasions police officers not only voiced the mentioned distinction but clearly used it as a guiding principle. After many conflicting interactions with people who either challenged the officers’ authority, were perceived to disrespect the officers or, most importantly, did not follow informal requests made by the officers, the latter would tell me something along the lines of “you have to treat people humanely and pigs... [you treat like dirt].” However, before hearing this justification, I would usually observe them making the lives of dissenting people harder in one way or another: officers would use their discretion to impose more inconveniences on the unruly. In short, the indeterminacy of the police mandate and the law allowed the officers to increase or decrease authority according to the changing context of the behaviour of the people they encountered.

### **Conclusions**

To know how to filter out an enormous quantity of stimuli, of course, is a police officers’ skill that has enormous consequences regarding who is approached, arrested, and ultimately punished. However, that skill is first and foremost professional. It is

“professional” in the sense that police officers, as a result of their work, share (localized) experiences that develop and sustain certain kinds of patterned filters—filters that are then applied in different circumstances and under varying pressures. That means, in turn, that authority becomes consistently unevenly spread through space, time and other social dimensions—it is repeatedly mobilized in some contexts and not in others. Therefore, police authority (and arguably, state authority in general) should be seen as a contextual variable.

To say the latter means also to acknowledge that authority can be potentially mapped and measured. Authority can become the subject of conscious societal intervention: we can look, for example, at how (police) authority is spread around the society and intervene to either decrease or increase its presence at one point or another, during one time-period or another, etc. It also helps to solve a number of other puzzles. For example, acknowledging that authority is contextual helps to compare the quantities of (police) authority among different cities, regions, and countries. The rather ideological political discussion about “democracies” and so-called “police states” could finally become grounded in reliable evidence.

What is even more important, we, as researchers, can achieve a new perspective in studies of informalities and other extralegalities by connecting them to the issue of (contextual) authority. Largely informal societies, in this case, lose the stigma of deviance that intentionally or unintentionally is often laid on them (especially when connected to the discourse of corruption or to modernization theories) and are studied instead on the same terms as supposedly more formal ones—as highly dynamic contexts that tend to either mobilize (or not) police authority. In this sense, studies of the police (and arguably other state institutions) in countries of the so-called “First” and “Second” worlds could finally overcome a rather evident epistemological obstacle

(Bachelard 2002) that has haunted social sciences since its emergence as a way to reflect on what it means to be modern in contrast to being “traditional” (Nisbet 2007, xviii–xix)—an unconscious and rather ideological persistent division of societies and states into “developing” and “developed,” “modern” and “in need of modernization” (Alexander 1994) and, ultimately, into “normal” and “deviant.”

Finally, the definition of authority as a contextual phenomenon may ultimately help social sciences to break free from the tradition that understands the state as a “human community that (successfully) claims the monopoly of the legitimate use of physical force within a given territory” (Gerth and Wright Mills 1946, 1). The state as a whole (or its separate institutions) have never possessed a legitimacy that transcends all contexts—this legitimacy is sometimes challenged, sometimes undermined, often evaded and seldom fully supported when it appears as an appropriate thing to do for one set of actors or another.

The limits of the modern state, as well as of modernity itself, will become an important issue in the discussion that unfolds in the next chapter.



### Chapter 3. “Now I am not afraid of anything!”: Aesthetics, Modernity, and the Police Reform

It is in this spirit of provocation and productivity that the present study is offered to its readers.

**David Garland**, *The Culture of Control*

Social control, like other social processes, begins with imagery and imagination.

**Peter K. Manning**, *Policing Contingencies*

#### 3.1 The Promise and the Paradox of Modernity

Modernity brought an incredible change in how people started to control crime and deviance. On the one hand, it unprecedentedly formalized crime control, gradually taking it away from the *gemeinschaft* communities and putting it into the hands of the centralized state (Black 1976, 147), thus displacing “traditional forms of autonomous conflict resolution” and “relegating the latter to the status of auxiliary or *informal* social control” (Lea 2002, 21, emphasis original). On the other, however, modernity produced the process that was aptly named “governmentality” by Michel Foucault—the process of governing not just with force, but through the “rational” production of disciplined self-regulating citizens (Foucault 1988). The latter was based on what I call **the promise of modernity**. Modernity recreates individuals that voluntarily and actively take part in their own policing, disciplining and governance by producing widely shared, naturalized and, as a result, rarely questioned expectations. Those hegemonic expectations are often framed with the bricks of “social contract” theory, human rights and citizenship discourses—all painting the pleasing picture of the state that exists to serve the interests of its own people. The modern state, thus, is seen as an entity that must be engaged in a “good governance” endeavor—it is expected to take care of its citizens,

their happiness, prosperity, health, and, most importantly for my argument, security. States or governments are primarily criticized for their inability to “protect,” “defend” and “provide” and could be easily seen losing their legitimacy whenever they fail to comply with the above-mentioned expectations.

However, it is also not hard to see that modern states encounter “numerous resistances and obstacles” (Lea 2002, 20–21) on their way to the good governance ideal. The **paradox of modernity** lies in the fact that at least part of those obstacles and resistances are not the result of the remnants left by previous formations, not something that will die out whenever we finish the process of modernization as it is often imagined, but are inseparable from modernity itself: they are reproduced by the condition of modernity exactly to the same extent as the demands for the security and “good governance” are—the essence of modernity, as John Lea rightly points out, “is contradictory from the outset” (Lea 2002). The dialectical development of formal control and policing is arguably the most illustrative case of how promises to provide and protect met the obstacle modernity had to face—its inability to overcome itself.

Take the “problem” of crime, for example. Modernity produces crime in at least two senses. First of all, it creates and then constantly reproduces the environment that breeds the practices and actions that we call “crime.” The development of private property as the foundation of the society and increasing commodification open up space not just for perpetuating conflict and inequality, but also for the myth of meritocracy and the desire for success—factors that have been associated with both property and violent crime for a long time (Merton 1938; Agnew 2010; Messner and Rosenfeld 2013, for economic inequality and crime see, for example, Wilkinson and Pickett 2011, 145–157; Black 1976, 14–15). Furthermore, modernity is almost synonymous with urbanization and the resulting atomization processes: the creation of “society of

strangers” leads not only to weaker informal social control and feelings of alienation (Mijuskovic 1992). It also provides conditions under which anonymity is probable and possible, thus creating a breeding ground for multiple types of fears<sup>48</sup> and crimes, some of which carry a face that we may not immediately recognize as the face of modernity (Haggerty 2009). Secondly, modernity constructs crime as a distinguishable issue—a social phenomenon of crime is named, and is therefore created as a matter of public and state concern. Multiple behaviours, actions and practices that were seen as separate events, conflicts, or transgressions during the pre-modern times gradually started to be seen as having a common nature (Rawlings 2002, 8–9). It is no wonder that it is under these circumstances that ideas about “universal human rights” and “the rule of law” start to form and spread—modern law and justice are coupled with notions about crime as a conduct of an “individual”—an individual that is detached and abstracted from the social position she is occupying. This notion that seems so conventional today, the notion that “all killers from the king to the merchant to the landless peasant will be treated as murderers in the same way by the courts” (Lea 2002, 24-31) does make sense only in a modern world.

What is no less important, modernity sets up not just the conditions under which crime is reproduced (as a number of behaviours labeled “crime” and as a

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<sup>48</sup> Fear of strangers and their association with crime, of course, existed long before the modern times. Existing regulations in pre-modern Europe often dealt explicitly with this category. Rawlings, for example, describes The Statute of Winchester (1285): “The gates of towns were to be closed from sunset to sunrise and a watch posted during the summer months to arrest strangers where ‘they find Cause for Suspicion’ and deliver them to the sheriff... Strangers were not forbidden entry into a town, but the bailiffs were to ensure that any resident who gave lodging to a stranger was to ‘answer to him’” (2002, 23-24). Modernity inherits many of those fears and modifies them with a new environment of large cities and increased mobility. For the more recent examples of how urbanization is connected to senses of insecurity, see Julien Bonhomme insightful research on “penis snatchers” in sub-Saharan Africa. According to him, widespread rumors of “genital theft”—almost exclusively an urban phenomenon in sub-Saharan Africa—“appear to be intimately connected with African metropolises...” where a “climate of generalized mistrust” presides (2016, 37).

distinguishable phenomenon we call "crime"), but also environment that fosters public concern over this "social problem." When the nation is imagined and thus created, what was predominantly a private or a local community matter of no interest to the other part of the country, regulated to "maintain local harmony" (Rawlings 2002, 43; also see 1995), now is "'lifted out' from [the] local context" (Giddens 2010, 19; Giddens 1991, 21) and becomes a national event. The proliferation of general education, common national language(s), printed national media (and later radio and television) creates what Benedict Anderson called "homogeneous, empty time" (2006; see also Giddens 2010, 17-19, 25-28; Giddens 1991, 16-26)—the nation now could be imagined as a community, a unit that travels through time and can be "worse" or "better," can "live" and "die." The use of this conceptual metaphor allows the nations to be described as being "ill,"<sup>49</sup> "infested" (by "drugs," "criminals," "illegal immigrants," etc.).

It is no surprise, therefore, that modern citizens, unlike their forebears, are usually intensely concerned about what is going on with "our nation" and are emotionally invested in the lives of "our people"—people that they have never seen or known. It causes not just the desire to "purify," "clean" and "treat" the nation's body, but also creates the fear for what is sometimes called "the state of the union." Crime, thus, becomes a matter of national moral panics not only because of the widespread access to national media (Cohen 2015) that comes with modernity (Lea 2002, 44-45), but also because modernity produces a specific mix of feelings in its populations: experiences of commonness, affinity, solidarity and sympathy towards fellow citizens. As Jock Young once wrote: "The formation of a moral panic is a thing of energy and emotion rather than a simple mistake in rationality and information" (2011, 255). What

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<sup>49</sup> It is telling that the concept of "social problem(s)" and its revealing synonym—"social ills"—appear precisely during the Industrial Age (Schwartz 1997).

is important not to forget, however, is that emotions are socially patterned—different social structures produce not just different experiences, but sort and interpret those experiences into different kinds of collective traumas and dramas. Modernity, despite its assurances about rationality, is no different (Mazzarella 2009, 294-300).

It is no surprise, therefore, that the emergence of the modern police was tightly connected to periodically reproduced moral panics of growing industrial societies. Rawlings, for example, describes how the moral crime panic of 1748 created a perfect background for the maturing ideas about the police as a state-controlled impartial expert-run institution (1995). Lea also claims that the XIX century also was characterized by numerous moral panics. In fact, he says, it became a feature of urban life. Two biggest waves took place in 1862 (“the garroting panic”) and 1888 (the famous Jack the Ripper murders) (Lea 2002). It must be certainly noted that it is also the time when crime thrillers emerge as a popular genre (Pepper 2016), indicating the place fascination and fear of crime has taken in the life of modern people (Comaroff and Comaroff 2016).

### **Equal Rights and Certainty of Punishment**

The need of modern state to take care of its citizens, individualism and embedded in it hegemonic ideology of “equal rights” and “equal treatment” lead to the legalistic nature of the modern period.<sup>50</sup> Laws that bound state and police conduct evolve in parallel to the maturing of those institutions: the more omnipresent, dendroid, complicated and powerful the state and the police were becoming, the more the legal apparatus that regulated their conduct was growing as well. Rights and liberties of the citizens, among

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<sup>50</sup> As Thompson claims, law was increasingly becoming a “medium within which ... social conflicts have been fought out” (1975, 267) and thus a matter “to struggle about” (1975, 266).

many other things, grew together with the power of the state to regulate the conduct of its population.

The rationale for the regulation of the police was and is convincing: an institution with the legal authority to use force against its own citizens should be tightly controlled. And yet, this type of control leads to what Skolnick defines as a “value conflict” at the basis of the police institution. Law, he claims, is not just the “instrument of order,” but frequently can be “its adversary” (Skolnick 2011). What should the officer choose should the opportunity present itself? Should she bend the rules to catch the “criminal” or follow the formal procedure no matter the cost? Skolnick claims that the need of the police to “maintain social order” and to be committed to the principle of legality at the same time defines the institution. In other words, it is this “strain between the two ideas” that creates the police as we know it (Skolnick 2011, 1-9).

Public debates over the police in modern societies should always be put in this context. It makes it easier to empathize and thus to understand the “truths” of both the critics of the police and the police force itself. For instance, it helps to explain an almost universal belief of the officers that numerous legal restrictions on what they can do make it harder for them to deliver on their mandate. “If you want us to do our job, untie our hands,” one can often hear from the officers. And yet, it also makes it easier to understand the widespread suspicion toward the police—suspicion built on the largely correct speculation that police regularly break the law.

Consider, for example, a situation from my fieldwork that illustrates the point in question:

During one of the dark evenings, we were cruising between the late-Soviet apartment buildings of Central’ne. In an otherwise calm and quiet courtyard we stumbled upon a group of young people who caught the attention of the officers: even I could see that there was something “weird” in how they behaved. Despite that “weirdness,” however, the group did not look like people who would

ordinarily be stopped and questioned by the officers. Thus, when officers decided to slow down and look closer at the group, they did not seem to be very cautious.

Everything quickly changed when a young man suddenly started to run, followed by two others. Officers reacted rapidly, stopping the car and following the group. In almost no time, officers had the young man in their hands, bringing him to the car. They roughly placed him in a face-to-the-car manner right in front of the back seat where I was located. While one of the officers was controlling the young man, the other went to search the area behind the small building where they overtook the runner. Soon enough, the bag of drugs was found in the grass, brought to the car and, eventually, placed in the pocket of the runner right in front of my eyes.

The runner started to call for help and soon enough a young passerby approached to see if everything was alright. He asked the officers and the runner about the circumstances and finally concluded that officers did not do anything illegal or harmful to the man in custody. Despite that, the passerby decided to stay and observe the situation. It was the time when the runner suddenly changed his behavior: after the man who approached repeatedly refused to call another patrol car and took the officers' side, the runner started to threaten him. "I will fuck you in your mouth! Do you understand, bitch? I will hold your head with my left hand and use my right to move my dick all over your lips, shit-face!!" he was shouting all over the courtyard.

From the way he talked and behaved in the time following, it was clear that many "respectable citizens" would probably define him as a person in need of state intervention. Most of them would probably withdraw their sympathy towards him and would take the officers' side had they observed the situation that evening. After the man in custody ended his ranting towards the passerby, he soon enough engaged in an almost friendly conversation with the officers, telling them about different drugs and people who sell them, informing about ways of unlocking stolen iPhones and in general showing that he is indeed involved in criminal activities on a regular basis and that he does not really feel sorry about it. However, I wonder what the same "respectable citizens" would say if they learned how the drugs went into his pocket? Would they choose the procedure and the law or the "bad guy gets what he deserves?" After all, it happens all the time in Ukrainian cities: guys with drugs throw them away the moment they see cops. They know well enough that because of practical and procedural reasons officers will not be able to prove their ownership of the drugs unless those drugs are found in their pockets by the later arriving crime scene investigation team.

It is even easier to empathise with the officers when one thinks about how mounting regulations leads to unimaginable bureaucratization of the police work. Indeed, if one spends a sizable portion of time with officers, she will immediately notice how much work they perform that could be easily called “useless”: waiting for hours and sometimes days for the needed authorizations to be signed and brought; conducting time-consuming procedures that should testify to the facts that no one, including the offender, doubts or denies; writing numerous reports and filling out a number of forms just in case someone would complain (a.k.a. to “cover their asses”)—all that takes so much time and resources, that one would find it hard not to wonder if there could be a more effective system put in place.

The paradox lies in the fact, that the system probably could not be more “effective.” There is a distinct pattern in how police work has been regulated for most of its history. Modern societies treat the police with hostility, suspicion and distrust, pumping the system with advocacy (largely fueled by repeated outbursts of scandals) for the establishment of new limits on officers’ power and behavior that mostly end with new regulations, oversight commissions and the introduction of additional documentation and forms that should be filled in by the officers. Short repeated mass outbursts of emotion rarely lead to well-thought-through effective reforms and instead produce a system of “top-down control mechanisms” that is arguably harmful both to the police officers and to society as a whole (Sklansky 2007).

However, what is important for us here is that the foundation of that process lies in the “contradictory values” embedded by modernity in the image of proper state policing: the police should provide both “procedural guarantees for all and the swift and certain punishment of the guilty” (Manning 1977, 326). Police, thus, are stuck between the devil and the deep blue sea of contradictory demands that extremely rarely fit well



into the daily realities that police officers experience. The paradox lies, though, in the very fact that those were precisely the enlightened ideals of impartial, bureaucratic and rule-governed formal policing and rational crime-control that made the creation of the modern police possible in the first place.

### **The Public/Private Divide**

Ideas about what should be policed and how, and what should be protected from the interventions of the state, were largely based on a very distinct public/private divide created by modernity (Pateman 1988). It could be clearly seen in the development of the police—an institution that from the very beginning has been much more concentrated on policing of public spaces, leaving discipline and social control at the working place to business owners or managers, and control and discipline within the family to fathers or parents respectively (Lea 2002, 52-53). Indeed, one can easily see that a police officer almost exclusively patrols public spaces like streets, parks, etc. and usually has difficulties accessing business establishments, apartments, personal phones and other places and spaces defined as “private” (Black 1976, 132). It is almost exclusively when he is invited in that the officer enters those spaces, not when he deems appropriate.

Interestingly, most of the conflicts between the public and the police that I observed arose precisely from that distinction. They could be roughly separated into two types:

On the one hand, conflicts often appeared when officers tried to broaden boundaries and intervene into what people considered to be outside of their legitimate reach, or, in other words, “private.” Regular conflicts, for example, happened when officers tried to stop and frisk people on the street in their attempts to find drugs. It

was easy to see how the frisked became annoyed when officers asked them to empty their pockets: people who were searched often raised their voices and demanded explanations from the officers, rather aggressive arguments between the law-enforcers and the stopped usually followed.

Another type of conflict, ironically, used to happen when officers refused to cross the boundary of the private. It is not uncommon, for example, for officers to receive a night call about noisy neighbors: they often arrive and face the closed door. Despite all the pleading from the complainants, officers eventually answer that, no matter how much they sympathize with the complainants, they can not just break the door to enter a private apartment. Often, they try to help by tricking the owner to open the door, but when unsuccessful, then face the frustration and anger of those who relied on their help.

More serious conflicts with the public also arise from the inability of the police to enter "private" spaces. Consider, for example, the following abstract from my fieldnotes:

During one of the evenings we got a call from a woman who was claiming that someone is restricting her access to the apartment. When we arrived, it appeared that it was a family conflict—her husband was refusing to let her and her son in. The woman argued that the apartment was in their common ownership with the husband and begged officers to let her in. As officers answered that they can not break inside, the conflict between the woman and the officers arose: "Are you suggesting that me and my son sleep on the street? Are you suggesting that we just leave our IDs and our stuff there and go away?" the woman passionately expressed her displeasure with the officers. "I am not suggesting anything!" a visibly annoyed officer finally answered. "He is the owner and I have a legal procedure [that I have to follow]," he added. In few minutes, however, officers managed to persuade the man to open the doors: they promised him that it is only for the woman to take her documents and clothes, and that once she takes her belongings, she will leave him alone. The woman entered the apartment and then refused to leave. "Take her away, please! You promised that she would leave!" now the husband was clearly frustrated. "Unfortunately, we can not do that, She is the owner of

the apartment as well," officers answered and we quickly left the apartment building to take the next call.

Officers very well know that their inability to freely access private spaces incredibly complicates their work. It not only makes them objects of hate and anger (as described above), but makes them less effective in "fighting crime" (which makes them objects of public criticism in return). As one officer mused to Jonathan Rubinstein when watching a mailman "making his deliveries": "See that guy? If I knew what he does about the people here, I'd be the best cop in the district. I been here twelve years and I don't know what he knows. And I know more than most. Goin' in their houses every day, seein' what kinda mail they get, checks and stuff" (1973, 200).

Much has been written about the importance of information for the officers (see a detailed and beautiful description of the matter in Rubinstein 1973, 202-216). They can not be everywhere all the time and thus have to make priorities based on carefully crafted knowledge about space and the people that occupy that space: they study their "turf," (as discussion in Chapter Two) and people in order to know how to read them properly, assign labels to certain places and adjust their knowledge with the changing environment of the city, as they gradually learn how to read the clues, when to trust what they are told and, eventually, how to make quick decisions in the multidimensional circumstances of a highly complicated social life (Jauregui 2016). And yet, the work of the officers is constructed in a way that they can observe only a limited number of places and spaces needed for this "intel" and thus performing of their declared function of "fighting crime" and "maintaining order."

As was already mentioned, what the officer does and what he sees could be partly explained by the specific distinctions between public and private constructed by modernity. And yet, there is more to it than just this division. The police were created

in order to control “public spaces” in part because of the fear of strangers inherited by modernity from the older times and yet reshaped by the rapid rise of large industrial cities. A growing number of people had to face the reality of living among those whom they had been habituated to fear and distrust (Tonnies 1974; Lofland 1973). The result is woven into modern societies—despite the evidence that domestic space can be as dangerous to the person as the street, the fear of street crime, the image of the crime as something that is committed by strangers on a dark street, etc., still permeates the public imagination.<sup>51</sup>

The police were at least partly shaped by those fears of the stranger and thus received a mandate to control the street. It is this mandate that created modern policing—policing that is predominantly oriented towards patrolling the streets in cars and, sometimes, on foot. Yet another paradox of modernity lies in the fact that crimes causing the most agitation among the modern public happen predominantly in “private” settings, hidden from the eyes of police officers: in fact, most of the homicides and rapes, and a substantial part of aggravated assaults, are committed by husbands, wives, friends and acquaintances in the domestic “comfort” of their homes and apartments (Harrell 2012).

The mandate of the police to control the streets and to control the crime, thus, has a self-exclusionary nature: the same process that created the modern city and the division between public and private, created the police, and yet, the very same process also excluded the possibility for the police to control what it was thought and is constantly expected to control.

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<sup>51</sup> For the evidence on how ties between community members influence fear of crime see, for example, Sampson, Raudenbush, and Earls 1997.

## **Social Geometry of Police Work**

Modernity produces a very distinctive *social geometry* with specific patterns of behaviour of such variables as stratification, morphology, organization, etc. (Black 1976). It is in this multidimensional *social space* that police function and thus it is this social space that influences police enforcement. Simply put, police officers' decisions are predictably contingent on social class, relational distance and the power of the organization that stands behind one action or another. (In a radical form, this logic leads to the conclusion that such a social fact as discretion, understood as the performance of legal officials' duties "according to the dictates of their own judgement and conscience, uncontrolled by the judgement and conscience of others," does not exist (see Baumgartner 1992, 129)).

The influence of social space as created by modernity on the police behaviour is easiest to show with the example of stratification. From its very inception, the police were an institution that was created to work with certain classes of society. Even more than that—as Michael Brogden noted, its very survival was contingent on selective policing:

The expansion of police powers at the end of the 1860s narrowly focused on a specific group, a focus which in Liverpool, as elsewhere, seems to have had the assent of both working-class and bourgeoisie. Organizational factors within the police institution contributed to an easier relation with the respectable working-class and to the institutionalized exclusion of the lower classes. The antagonistic milieu of the street for patrolling police officers resulted in practical compromises. If police officers as individuals wished to survive and if the police institution as a corporate body aimed to gain a measure of consent, tolerance was necessary. Discretionary law enforcement led to a truce with one class at the cost of joint criminalization of the lower orders (Brogden 1982, 190–1, emphasis original, cited in Waddington 1999, 300–301).

Nowadays, not much has changed in this sense. Even though not to the same extent, the police are still dependent on the approval of the "respectable" part of the nation

(Ericson 1982) and do predominantly work with lower classes (Black 1976, 141; Reiner 1992, 770), unevenly distributing authority and law. Simply put, there is a greater probability that the police will stop, ticket, arrest and charge a person from the lower classes of society (e.g. Baumgartner 1992, 142-144; Black 1980, 32-36; Goffman 2014; Ericson 1982; Rubinstein 1973, 264; Waddington 1999). Given the constant need of police officers to “to draw distinctions speedily and authoritatively between people they encounter” (Waddington 1999, 301), visible distinctions, such as skin color, become useful<sup>52</sup> to police officers in navigating the social terrain and locating those people who deserve special attention. In fact, the vocabulary of the patrol officers that I have observed contained a very telling expression that required no explanation whatsoever: when we were passing a person who caught the eye of one of the officers, he/she would often concentrate, look attentively at that person through the window of the passing patrol car and question the partner: “*Nash contingent?*” (Is this [person from] our population?).

It is in this context of professional craft to use readily available visible distinctions that Waddington describes practices of racial and ethnic discrimination: “In societies characterized more by racial and ethnic divisions the distinction between ‘citizens’ and others is ready-made for exploitation by the police. Even in Britain, groups such as Irish ‘navvies’ were identified as a sub-citizenry of ‘police property’. As black immigration grew after the second world war there was created a distinct section of the population who, as ‘outsiders’, were by definition ‘police property’—a situation

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<sup>52</sup> As Holdaway claims: “Typifications are the stock in trade of police work and their relationship to stereotypes is a close one ... In this setting, I argue, the use of stereotypes and the racialization of relationships within the police workforce are enhanced. The stereotypical thinking also common to police work is formed and sustained within a work context that continually demands the immediate summarizing of ambiguous situations and where the consequences of having been found to have acted improperly may be calamitous” (1997, 24).

replicated in Holland with the Surinamers (Punch 1979a) and in Japan in relation to Koreans (Ames 1981). In the United States ethnic and racial divisions have always predominated and that is reflected in police practice, as it is in Australia with regard to aboriginal peoples" (Waddington 1999, 301).

Rubinstein, on the other hand, noticed that the demands of the police job to use visible markers contribute to the same result (more frequent stops) for poor and low-status groups:

"Many of the cues the police look for in assessing people are associated with poor people and people who are indifferent to the *mores* dominating our public life. Poor people drive the most battered cars, and are least likely to keep them up or to have them insured against the damage. ... For these reasons they are the most frequently stopped. But they also commit the most street crimes, steal the most cars, and are most often the victims of their neighbors' depredations. Similarly, people who do not care to shave, i.e. who wear shabby clothes, and who walk about at night must put up with the possibility that they will be scrutinized and occasionally stopped by a patrolman" (1973, 264).

This uneven treatment of citizens usually is one of the main concerns among the public and, additionally, one of the main lines of criticism of the police forces in the world. Universally present pattern of unequal policing well-illustrates another dimension of the paradox of modernity: the police force is both created by the strive towards impartial and equal treatment of citizens and is, at the same time, placed in such social geometry that precludes behaviour that would correspond to such ideals.

### **Tainted Professionals**

Modernity, as was already mentioned, distinguishes and appropriates social control, unprecedentedly allocating it to formal state institutions. Inspired by ideas about "rational" and "effective" bureaucratic governance, it **disengages social control from "organic communities,"** making it a separate job of experts and professionals.

“Policing,” from now on, becomes not a job for everyone, but the job of the few—“their job.”

While reshaping the field of social control, however, modernity produces a number of consequences that were largely unforeseen by enlightened modern reformers. For one, allocation of previously dispersed social control functions (and thus violence that goes with it) in one institution (*the police*), allowed the latter to be “contaminated” and, as a result, marked as a “dirty job” (Jauregui 2016, 67). As Waddington describes in his incredibly empathetic article on “canteen talk,” the association of the police with coercive authority that is exercised against fellow citizens created what he calls an “essential fragility of what appears at first sight to be a robustly powerful social institution” (Waddington 1999, 302). The modern aversion towards overt visible violence (Collins 1974, Foucault 2011), the extension of the social boundaries of community—and thus the area of legitimate sympathy—to the heretofore unseen amount of people by the creation of “citizenship” (Parsons 1971; Durkheim 2013), the indeterminacy of law (Jauregui 2016, 68-82; Altman 1986) and the fluidity of social norms—all of that puts officers in an incredibly vulnerable and often easily compromisable position.

As Waddington mentions, “Policing is a ‘punishment-centred bureaucracy’ in which officers are rarely praised for good practice, often because it is invisible to the organization, but face draconian penalties if they are deemed to have behaved improperly.” And what is proper, he claims, “might not become apparent until long after it took place. The use of force is a good illustration of this: in Britain, the police are entitled to use ‘as much force as is reasonable in the circumstances’ to effect a lawful purpose, but what is ‘reasonable in the circumstances’ can only be ascertained after-the-fact” (Waddington 1999, 301-302).



Even when officers do not use any (physical) violence, they work under the constant white noise of background pressure. The work they do is the work that constantly generates frustration among the public: a driver whose car is stopped when he is in a hurry; a young man whose pockets are searched on the street; a lady who is given the ticket; a victim of a crime that never receives her property back—police officers meet people in those roles and situations all the time and, rather expectedly, are involved in arguments and conflicts on a daily basis. Police work is the work of intrusion into private lives that often results in the disruption of the latter: plans could be ruined because one got stopped or even had to go to the station instead of home, his car was confiscated, she received the ticket that became an unplanned extra burden on the budget, etc. No one likes and plans to be stopped on the way to work, no one wants to spend the night in the cell, and nobody is happy, finally, when some outsiders start telling them what to do with an imminent threat of force.

No less importantly, police work is often **work with the frustrated populations**. Police are often called for during conflicts, especially when one side is trying to get the upper hand over the other. It is particularly true for the conflicts that are already extremely emotional and conflicts that could not be resolved informally—police, after all, are the last resort for many people, the resort that one uses having exhausted all other options (Black 1976, 134). When officers arrive, they often hear requests to “get him away from here,” to “let me inside,” and “make them stop.” When officers, for one reason or another, refuse to comply with the request of the complainant, they quickly become a new object of anger and hatred.

It was easily noticeable during the observation that anger, frustration, and hatred accompanied the daily routines of the officers that I observed. Complaints about officers’ conduct (that seemed sometimes just and sometimes only the product of the

frustrations described above) came in droves. At the same time, it was extremely evident that most of the negativity and complaints were faced with the ingrained professional adaptations of the officers—distrust and cynicism.

Police are positioned by modernity to produce frustration and thus to be faced with public hatred, anger and, eventually, hostility. The latter, in turn, is pushing the police force towards isolation, defensive solidarity and fencing themselves off in collective secrecy (Westley, 1970; Manning 1977, 117-122; Waddington 1999). The more this process is unraveling, the more the public learns to meet the police with suspicion, the more the officers learn that “they occupy a marginal position” in society (Waddington 1999, 302). Police officers in modern states, therefore, become not just the specialists in “dirty work” and “tainted” professionals (Bittner, 1970), but also the representatives of the institution from which the public is alienated.

A classic of the police research, Egon Bittner, famously described the public view of the police as follows:

For in modern folklore, too, he [the police officer] is a character who is ambivalently feared and admired, and no amount of public relations work can entirely abolish the sense that there is something of the dragon in the dragon-slayer. Because they are posted on the perimeters of order and justice in the hope that their presence will deter the forces of darkness and chaos, because they are meant to spare the rest of the people direct confrontations with the dreadful, perverse, lurid, and dangerous, police officers are perceived to have powers and secrets no one else shares. Their interest in and competence to deal with the untoward surrounds their activities with mystery and distrust. One needs only to consider the thoughts that come to mind at the sight of policemen moving into action: here they go to do something the rest of us have no stomach for! And most people naturally experience a slight tinge of panic when approached by a policeman, a feeling against which the awareness of innocence provides no adequate protection. Indeed, the innocent in particular typically do not know what to expect and thus have added, even when unjustified, reasons for fear. On a more mundane level, the mixture of fear and fascination that the police elicit is often enriched by the addition of contempt. Depending on one's position in society, the contempt may draw on a variety of sources. To some the leading reason for disparaging

police work derives from the suspicion that those who do battle against evil cannot themselves live up fully to the ideals they presumably defend (Bittner, 1970, 7).

Given the importance of public cooperation in the police work (see, for example, Rubinstein 1973, especially 202-216; Black 1976, 132-133), the stigma and alienation of the occupation become roadblocks in police functioning that are almost impossible to overcome. It is no surprise, thus, that since its creation the police had to face incredible obstacles: citizens do not report most of crimes to the police<sup>53</sup> and, even when the police learn about one and investigate it, the public often reluctantly provides them with essential information on the circumstances of the event.<sup>54</sup>

Separated from the community, the police become a deeply suspicious institution for the public. Driven by sympathy towards fellow citizens and concerned about police abuse of power, the public more and more sees the police as an institution that should be tightly controlled and thus calls for "increasing responsibility." As Chan argues, however, recent attempts to make police officers accountable through top-down administrative oversight created "organizational pressure" that only enhanced the self-protection orientation of the officers' habitus and anchored such aspects of police culture as cynicism (2007).

Therefore, no less important than the outcome of alienation and stigma that modernity imposes on formal policing is the stress that it creates for the officers

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<sup>53</sup> Black words it in a very strong manner: "Much illegality is unknown because so many citizens fail to call upon the law when they experience law violations. The reluctance of citizens to mobilize the law is so widespread, indeed, that it may be appropriate to view legal inaction as the dominant pattern in empirical legal life" (1973, 133).

<sup>54</sup> It is precisely this problem of the alienation of the police and policing from the public that so called "community policing" was designed to solve. Based on what I describe in this chapter, my argument, however, would be that the problem lies in a deeper paradox of modernity - namely, in disengagement of legitimate social control from organic communities and its concentration (though, arguably, not even close to full concentration) in the hands of the state.

(Lieberman et al. 2002; Maguen et al. 2009; Violanti et al. 2018) and such professional adaptations as orientation towards psychological self-protection and so called “avoidance of trouble.” In addition, the hostility of the public pushes officers towards secrecy, the development of strong mutual solidarity and, as a result, an orientation towards the protection of one another against the hostile public. The code of silence, for which the police are well known and frequently criticized, arises precisely from this environment.

It probably will not be an exaggeration to claim that the more intensified the described above phenomena are, the more suspicious towards the police the public becomes. It could be argued, therefore, that the disengagement of social control from the “organic community,” created a self-sustained spiral of alienation around police work: from the very onset, the police force was created as “tainted” professionals, surrounded by the stigma of “dirty work”; the need to use violence against fellow citizens and to work with frustrated populations produced suspicion and hatred; and the more there was suspicion, the more calls for state-oriented measures of bureaucratic control and “accountability” there were.<sup>55</sup> The latter, in turn, can hardly produce much more than bureaucracy and hardened police officers who are not responsive towards the needs and demands of the citizens.

All of the above mentioned paradoxes create roadblocks for the police to become what they have been imagined to be. The police can not fulfill the promise of being law-abiding, responsive to public needs, equal in their treatment of citizens and, at the same time, effective in fighting crime. What the police can do, however, is to engage in

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<sup>55</sup> It would be foolish not to acknowledge that this process is mitigated by other factors that prevent police-public relations from gradual deterioration towards total disrepair. My aim here is to show that there is a deeper logic to the problems the police face in their everyday work—problems that arguably could not be easily solved as they are embedded in the paradoxes of modernity.

presentations of self to the public (Manning 1977; 2003; Ericson 1982). The role of the public, in response, is to evaluate those presentations as trustworthy or not. However, the question looms: what if performances of the police are deemed not persuasive enough? Based on the data I have gathered in Ukraine, I will allow myself to speculate on what happens in that case.

### **3.2 When the Police Themselves are Deviant**

#### **“Oh! It must be so exciting!”: An Ordinary Police Shift**

Almost immediately after the police officers and I left the station, we stopped the car that we were following. It turned from the side road and was driving in a bus lane right in front of us. The driver seemed not to be trying hard enough to get out of the wrong lane, and the police woman had had enough of it: “Ok, we are stopping him!” she told her young partner. Officers turned on the lights and gave a special “quack” sound, as they called it, for the driver to stop the vehicle. They talked to the driver for a minute, checked his documents, and finally decided not to give him a ticket.

The officers headed towards the police car. They were met by an old man with clear signs of alcohol addiction. “Folks, folks! May I ask you to open the vodka?!” the man said either asking or presenting officers with their fate. “What... what did you say?” one of the officers could not hide his surprise. “Could I ask you to open the vodka?” the old man was sure of himself this time. “But it is already opened!” the officer pointed at the bottle and I saw a very cheap vodka in the hands of the old man. “Ah, yes!” the man looked down at the bottle and said as if he just threw away some burden from his shoulders. He looked again at the officer. “You’d better go while you can!” said the officer, turned around and noted to the partner: “Have you seen this? [A man] actually had the balls to come to us with such a question!”

Later on, the officers received a call about the fire in one of the garages of the “garage cooperative.” While driving there, officers noticed the fire truck and decided that it was going to the place we needed. We followed it for about five minutes until the officers finally understood that we were getting further and further from the co-op. Officers suggested that the fire truck actually had already been at the address and now was moving away from it. Officers turned the car around again and soon stopped to check the route on their phone maps. In about ten more minutes (about twenty in total) we finally reached the point, though we could not find any smoke or fire of any kind. After driving back and forth in search of signs, the officers decided to call the fire station. A moment later we were to know that it was not a fire, but, rather a shorted out circuit that, in addition, had already been dealt with.

Frustrated with such a start to the day, the officers decided to take a break. They both were sick after the last night shift and wanted to buy some hot tea to warm up a little. While the policeman was driving towards our destination, the police woman was looking at the tablet, monitoring information. Soon enough, I found her reading a report about the burglary: as it was claimed, someone broke the window, entered the house and stole mobile phones and laptops. “Good luck!” she said sarcastically. Her sarcasm stemmed from the fact that it will be almost impossible to find either the person who committed the crime or the devices that were stolen, and certainly not after the ten hours that had passed after the incident.

While the officers had their tea, another patrol car arrived at the gas station. After ten–fifteen minutes of chat with them, we left. Soon enough the officers noticed the car that we had already seen last night—it was parked far from the curb when we passed it the last time and now seemed to stand in the same position again. The officers stopped to check on whether it was abandoned; they analyzed it from all sides,

shone a flashlight inside, exchanged hypotheses on what could have happened and finally looked for the official information on the car in the database. We moved along...

Later on, we noticed a drunken man who was fighting his own body: he was unsuccessfully trying to stand up. We stepped out of the car and came closer. Officers inquired about the name and the address of the man who was now calmly resting near the bushes, however they did not receive an answer: the man was having trouble understanding the question for a while, his tongue faltered. A few more tries and finally the officers could run his name through the database—he was “clean.” They made sure that he lived close by, helped the man back on his feet and told him to go home. A few ironic smiles were exchanged between the officers and we were back inside the warm car again. However, precisely because of its coziness and warmth, we became unbearably sleepy.

It was about 4 a.m. when the officers noticed two teenagers walking down the street with an open beer. The car stopped and officers quickly approached the two: “Good night! Do you possess anything stitchy or cutting? Do you have drugs on you?” Officers started what often is unofficially called “*shmon*” (a shakedown) in post-Soviet countries—a frisk. Officers patted down the teenagers and told them to empty their pockets and bags. Frustrated, as often happened with those people who were stopped for the frisk, the teenagers started to ask questions about the reasons for the stop and to argue with the police officers. The officers told them one of the officially acceptable reasons for the stop, however, they left the real motivation undisclosed: the officers often stopped young people proactively to make *shmon* mostly because they suspected that they possessed drugs (primarily cannabis). It was regarded as a big success among officers to make an arrest for drug possession and, together with the ticket for

the intoxicated driving, was seen as a sign that officers were “really working” during their shift.

Closer to the end of the shift, the officers received another call. It was claimed that someone broke the window of a car and stole a dashcam from there. We drove to the place of the incident, circled around the place in an attempt to find the person who committed the crime. Officers thought that there was a small chance that the person could still be operating in the neighborhood. In the end, we did not find anyone suspicious and the victim refused to write an official complaint about the accident, so we ended our shift and returned to the station.

During that day, the officers also went to a few car accidents, roamed the streets without anything actually happening, went to a few places in attempts to familiarize themselves with the new territory, visited gas stations a few times, joked, checked on their colleagues, and wrote countless reports about the calls that they have received with valuable information on how they dealt with the issues that they faced, etc.

Almost every time I am asked about my studies, I encounter the same reaction: upon hearing that I do police ethnography, people with very different backgrounds who I met under very different circumstances, exclaim exactly the same thing: “Oh! It must be so exciting!” Those people also usually mention that “it must be dangerous,” apparently expecting stories about car chases and shootings. However, the “uneventful” and long description of the shift that I decided to put at the beginning of this part is such precisely because it reflects the “uneventfulness” of the shift itself. Most of the time, it seemed, police officers had more trouble fighting boredom and their desire to sleep, and not the crime of any kind. Not to mention “serious” crime of the kind people seem to imagine when they talk about the police.



In fact, during the months of my fieldwork I did not see police officers capturing a single burglar, robber, rapist or murderer. Of course, I am not trying to say that it does not happen at all. One need only look at the official numbers of arrests and prosecutions to know that it is a daily reality. Moreover, in these days there is no lack of information on the matter on social media—Ukrainian police Facebook pages as well as officers-bloggers regularly post about the criminals that they were able to apprehend while the crime was committed and the people that they were able to save or the property they were able to return to the legal owners.

The police, as I mentioned, are well known to portray themselves as an effective crime-fighting institution and emphasize those events that suit that image (Ericson 1982 Manning 1997). Ukrainian police (both “new” and “old”) have never been an exception. Almost every criticism of the police reform in Ukraine as well as almost every public speech of the Minister of Interior Affairs listing the successes of the reform were centered around recorded crime. Befittingly, public disenchantment in the reform produced an adjective “plastic” that is applied to the police every time a commentator tries to point out that new officers are unable to do their job, can not really catch and punish those who break the law.

However, my observations indicate that Ukrainian police officers were engaged in crime-fighting activities unevenly, leaving most of the crime committed effectively uninfluenced and unmanaged. Most of the time, as was mentioned, officers either proactively stopped cars to check if the driver was intoxicated or stopped-and-frisked young men when they suspected them of possessing drugs. Officers were also regularly engaged in running car plates through the database in search of stolen vehicles (none were found during my observation) and the patrolling of courtyards of apartment buildings (usually during the night) in search of people who break the windows of cars

and steal dashcams (none were seen or captured during my observation). Other crimes were almost totally excluded from what could be called preventive policing.

Other crime-fighting activities of the police officers had a reactive character—they answered the calls. The latter were rarely crime- or even law-relevant (see for similar observations Black 1971 and Manning 1997, 12) and mostly consisted of matters like noisy neighbors, car accidents, drunk people trying to enter the wrong apartments and the like. However, even when a call was actually about an actual crime-related matter, as the following rather representative story from my fieldnotes shows, it rarely ended up in anything that could be seen as a “success” by either the victims or the police:

Today we received a call. It was stated that 5 minutes ago some man tore off a gold chain necklace from a woman's neck and ran away. We drove as fast as we could to the address that was given and soon joined at least two other police cars that had been already searching for the “unknown person in a hood.” In a minute or so officers stopped a man that seemed suspicious, but quickly understood that it was not him and let the man go. In 15 more minutes new, improved information was reported: the color of the hood was black and the man appeared to be “short.” We drove through the courtyards, sometimes slowing down to look more attentively at someone suspicious, sometimes quickly turning around and driving in the opposite direction to catch up with a man that looked like the vague description that was given to us. We listened to the report coming through the radio and at some point heard that one of the units actually found and stopped “a man in a black hood.” In few minutes information came that they searched him and found no gold chain necklace. Moreover, it was told, the victim could not recognize the man as everything she had seen during the accident was the back of the perpetrator. Guided by constantly changing theories like “I think he hasn't left the neighborhood yet,” “He will not be hiding, he will just calmly walk on the street,” “He probably crossed the road over there already,” et cetera, we searched the neighborhood both on foot and in the car for almost an hour when finally officers decided to give up. They were as close to an actual arrest of the robber as I have ever seen, yet still too far from it: even though the victim was able to call the police immediately, the information was quickly transferred to the patrol officers and we arrived as soon as one possibly could, it seemed the chances of catching the perpetrator “in the black hood” were still extremely slim.

## **One of the Best Kept Secrets of Modern Life**

Paradoxes discussed in the first part of the chapter help us to understand why the role of the “crime fighters” is ill-suited for the police. It is not a problem of “democratic society,” as some thought (see, for example, Skolnick 2011), or a problem of ineffective policing of the “developing world,” (see Chapter One) but modernity itself. It could therefore be argued that police force in “non-democratic” societies would have much more in common with, for example, the police “service” in the “democratic” US than one usually imagines—police officers in “non-democratic” and “democratic” states face similar unresolvable dilemmas and pressures of private–public division of space, demands that they maintain order, provide security, while, at the same time, strictly following procedures and the laws. All these and others contradictory demands shape the officers’ routines in “non-democratic” societies even though elections are sometimes not held and the “effective” democratic governance is not present.

In fact, if one looks at existing ethnographic descriptions of police work, she would see that the basic structure of policing in the “Western” world does not differ much from what I observed in Central’ne. Anthropologist Didier Fassin, for instance, provides the reader with an extremely telling example of how actual police work is connected to the “fight against crime.” Fassin conducted an ethnography of the special anticrime quick response squad that was created in France “precisely to catch criminals in the act.” While conducting his research, he noticed that his participants encountered crime and criminals extremely rarely:

The senior officer who explained their job to me when I started my research used an expression I was to hear often: these special units were supposed to “pounce.” Their purportedly discreet appearance and vehicle, their well-tested training in running and self-defense techniques, their knowledge of local geography acquired through long hours of patrol, and their speedy intervention, grounded in courses taken by some for fast driving, all these elements brought together in virtually elite squads were

supposed to rid the banlieues of petty and major criminals... But the reality I witnessed day-to-day, and that my companions on patrol confirmed to me, was altogether different. As one of them stated after an especially quiet night: "What's frustrating is that tomorrow, we'll hear that several crimes were committed during the night, but the police were only informed after the event." And as he was speaking of the recent increase in burglaries in the district, I asked him how many times he had caught a burglar in the act. "To catch a burglar, you have to get damned lucky," he replied; "You need luck's own luck." Another day, discussing the same topic, one of his colleagues even quantified this "luck": "It's simple. I've been in the squad seven years, and it's only ever happened to me once. And even then the stupid asshole had got himself shut into the house he broke into and couldn't get out. All we had to do was pick him up (Fassin 2013, 63).

Indeed, numerous police researchers either documented or made similar observations about the "Western" "democratic" police services (Ericson 1982; Fassin 2013; Manning 1977; Rubinstein 1973; Vitale 2017; Wilson 1974) or at least carefully noted that the impact of the police on crime is extremely limited (Eck and Maguire 2000; Paternoster 2010). David Bayley, who studied police all over the world, from Australia and the United States to Japan and Britain, even went as far as to call the police's inability to fight crime "one of the best kept secrets of modern life" (1994, 3).

And yet, it is widely documented that both the public and the police themselves continue to see the institution through the lens of crime control. As Ericson puts it:

Conventional wisdom—fuelled by the police themselves along with the media, some academics, and other instruments of social reproduction—equates police work with crime work. In television 'cop shows', in news reports on individual criminal cases, in police annual reports listing levels of crime and clearance rates, and in the research literature dealing with the effectiveness of police as crime fighters, the image is constantly reinforced that crime is, after all, almost everything the police are about (Ericson 1982, 5).

British scholar, Waddington, when talking about the self-perception of the police, also does not sugar-coat the matter. He calls the association of police work with a "crime-fighting" image "a collective [professional] delusion":

There is little doubt that the occupational self-image of the police is that of 'crime-fighters' and this is not just a distortion of what they do, it is virtually a collective delusion. A mountain of research has indicated that police have little impact on crime rates, are responsible for discovering few crimes and detecting fewer offenders, do not spend much duty-time on crime-related tasks and so forth (1999, 299).

So how is this "secret" of modern life kept alive? What exists in modern social life that allows for this belief not just to thrive despite being unsupported by the evidence, but to exist as a knowledge taken for granted by the public? An enduring and widespread belief that is sustained for a long time is, of course, a textbook example of a phenomenon that must be explained by social sciences. In what follows, I will try to do just that. However, as my eventual goal is to explain the particular, and not the general, I will try to link both phenomena: the theoretical part of this chapter should explain police reform in Ukraine and the way it was imagined; at the same time, the data from Ukraine, I hope, will be able to produce a new general understanding of modern societies and the role that police play in them.

### **A Dramaturgical Approach Towards the Police**

Police researcher Peter K. Manning has been known for a long time for his development of the dramaturgical perspective in relation to the police (Manning 1977, 2001, 2003). According to him, the uncertainties of police work as well as their "impossible mandate" create an environment in which "dramatic performances" become the only option for the police to maintain "the illusion of formal control" in modern societies. According to Manning, the effect is achieved through the selection process, under which the information is carefully filtered and shaped to "give official imprint to versions of reality" (Goffman 1983b cited in Manning 2003, ix). In other words, police organizations and

individual officers are involved in “front stage” performances—performances that allow us to leave in the shadows certain aspects of reality while bringing others to light.

That said, one starts to think about the importance of public relations departments in modern police organizations or the use of official crime statistics. And it is indeed true (and symptomatic) of modern police organizations that they expend considerable resources trying to present the public with their interpretations, views, and selectively crafted information. Yet, it seems that there is more to this process than mere conscious attempts to win the public’s approval. There are two important propositions that I would like to make here. First is that “front stage” performance of police organizations is deeply ingrained in a wide variety of activities that police do, starting with the choice of uniforms, cars and gear, and ending with the behavior of the officers in their daily interactions with the public. The second is that the public, driven by ideas produced by hegemonic modernity about the role of the state generally express not just suspicion towards the police, but also expectations and hopes for the improvement (a.k.a. “reform”) of the institution. Whenever criticism of the police arises, it is generally normally assumed that there is something wrong with “our police,” not with the idea of formal social control, and thus, modernity, in general. That is where the space for utopia appears: there must be someplace else where the police are “normal.”

The dramaturgical perspective emphasizes “the use of symbols to convey impressions to an audience” (Manning 2001, 316). However, it is important to understand that these symbols are deeply dependent on the abovementioned existing public expectations. As discussed in Chapter One, in the Ukrainian context, public expectations were framed with respect to the Imaginary West—a place that represented the desirable normality of the state in general and the police in particular.

### **Old, Overweight, and Ineffective**

When police reform started in Ukraine, its aesthetic aspect stood aside from others: it was the appearance of police officers that mattered the most. In fact, if an ordinary Ukrainian had been interested in the details of the reform, it would have been hard for that person to learn any of these from the media coverage. Instead, one could hear a lot about the new uniforms—and how beautiful they are. About the cars – and how modern they are. About new police officers—and how “young” and “handsome” they are. New police officers started to parade in the streets of Kyiv as if it was a fashion show. People started to take selfies with young rookies and soon the Internet was flooded with photos like this one:



Fig. 5. At the beginning of the reform people were making selfies with the new police officers.

Source: <http://hubs.ua/>

Journalists and the public were clearly caught up in the discussion about aesthetics and not about structural changes in the police. For example, during one morning news program one could view the following piece: a journalist went out in the streets to talk with the “new” police officers. During the few minutes of the video shown one could



hear questions like “How many photographs do you take during the day?” and statements directed at viewers such as this: “I want to work in the police. I want the same clothes [as they have].” Later in the same episode, the journalist also decides to ask a local driver about his impression of the new police and the following dialog as loosely translated here plays out:

Reporter: How do you like the new police?

Person in car: I didn't have any issues with them yet (the driver answers calmly).

Reporter: But do they look good? Do they look beautiful?

Person in car: Well, probably police are not about beauty (the driver was still skeptical).

Reporter: No, it matters as well. I, as a woman, pay real attention to those beautiful guys! - the journalist exclaims and looks around at cops.

The news piece ended with the reporter’s conclusion: “I am happy that we have such a strong and beautiful police. *Now I am not afraid of anything!*” (Telekanal ICTV 2015, emphasis mine). “Beauty” of the officers, therefore, was conceptually connected to the journalist’s feelings of being secure.

While the news piece was a playful one, more serious television shows and news programs were all full of comments about “young” and “handsome” cops and their “beautiful” cars and uniforms. Yet, it was not about pure aesthetics. Young, beautiful and handsome were associated with a more broad category of the “modern.” And that, in turn, with “European” or “Western.” Of course, it demanded something to be “old” and “ugly.” These ideas about the Soviet and the Russian—as oppositional to “Western” and “European”—came in handy to become the new “ugly” in this dichotomy.

As it becomes clear from news pieces, uniforms and cars were also designed to make such an impression. Cars were painted and police uniforms were sewed to imitate what was perceived to be "Western." Journalists of one of the channels were open about it when they claimed that the new patrol officers are "strong-voiced, young, well-groomed and remind [us] of American cops." They added later that the new police are supplied with "real new cars" from Japan and "stylish uniforms" from the USA (TSN 2015a). Just two days later the same channel presented another news story about the new police. Once again, journalists discussed the new officers as, first and foremost, handsome, however this time they explicitly connected aesthetics and security. They argued that police rookies look as if they came directly from an "American film": "They are already in Kyiv: smiling, ambitious and in control" (TSN 2015b).

How do the smile and the beauty of the officers contribute to security and being in control? The answer to that question is not evident. And yet, it may be inferred from the visualizations comparing "old" and "new" police officers that appeared on the Internet at the beginning of the reform.



Fig. 6. Folk art comparing "old" and "new" police.

Source: <https://iamir.info/>

When the "new police officers" first appeared on the streets of Kyiv, this inspired not just the journalists but also the public. Ukrainians started not just to take selfies and engage in discussions on social media, but also embarked on the production of creative folk art such as in the figure shown above. This visual comparison created by an unknown author shows two well-groomed smiling police officers in "American-style" uniforms and postures. They stand in contrast to the officer from the "old" police force: his off-size pants fit his jacket neither in colour nor in style, he has a visible belly and a round face and is demonstrably out of shape. Officers on the right represent a so-called "service police force" that is open to the people and is ready to help them, while the

“old” officer is clearly associated with something outdated and represented as unfit to perform the duties required by his position: when one looks at the picture, it is extremely hard to imagine the “old” officer to be effective in maintaining order, providing security or fighting crime. His car is too old to chase criminals, he is out of shape to capture the “bad guys,” and he obviously does not make the impression that the police force has to make on the citizens. He is not “in control.”

Visual fitness and unfitness are not the only things that differ between the people on the two sides of the picture. The policeman on the left side represents not just the “old” police unable to control crime and protect citizens, but also an “old” system of Soviet heritage. He is unfit, his pants do not match the jacket and his face does not smile exactly because he is “Soviet” in his essence (see Chapter One). Beauty is connected to security, and thus, because it uses established binaries of Ukrainian imagination—“old,” outdated Soviet police are ineffective because they are the things of the past, non-modern, and unshaped for contemporary challenges. In contrast, the “new” police force will be able to “serve and protect” because it is modernized. When the “new” police officers paraded in the streets of Kyiv, they were not doing so just for the sake of pure aesthetics, but because they were relaying the message—their “Western-style” bodies, uniforms and cars prophesied a coming transformation of the Ukrainian police institution into a “Western-style” police force.

However, it is important to note that “Western-style” cars and uniforms, and young fit officers do not relay the message of the coming future, rather, the message is that *this future is possible in principle*. “Normal” police that are able to control crime and provide security exist somewhere else (in the West), and thus can be brought to Ukraine, precisely because the dysfunctional resides in the country and in the region. The difficulties faced by modern police to control crime are thus inverted to legitimize

modern policing: paradoxes that are essentially modern in character are presented as features of the underdeveloped, not-modern-enough world. Modernity, thus, is treated as a solution to the problem it itself created and the remedy to the paradoxes of modern policing, paradoxically then, becomes police modernization.

This inversion arguably could not be possible without the desire produced by the interplay between and the co-construction of normal and deviant (Foucault 1988; Pashukanis 1983). Marking their state and police as “deviant,” Ukrainians, as shown in Chapter One, above all wanted their police to become “normal.” Thus, they created the demand and built an environment for the police performance of “Western-type” modernity. Uniforms, cars and young fit bodies were used as signs to communicate the coming “normality” in which security and the rule of law would guide police conduct. This seemed to be the reason for the original enchantment of many Ukrainian who burst onto streets taking selfies with the new cops. Yet, this also must explain the following disenchantment when suddenly it became clear that crime still exists, people are not secure and officers are occasionally rude, unhelpful and break the law.

Richard Ericson wrote that: “Crime control is an impossible task for the police alone. They are expected to handle a phenomenon caused by social, political, economic, and cultural forces beyond their control and to give the *appearance* that things are (more or less) under control” (Ericson 1982, 11, emphasis original). Indeed, Ukrainian police tried to give that appearance as best as they could in a changing environment of rapid political changes and correspondingly high hopes among Ukrainians. What could be reasonably predicted, however, is that this story is doomed to be repeated: “That which we experience as our desire... is always thwarted. But precisely this failure is the condition of our continued engagement” (Mazzarella 2009, 299). The desire to be

normal, possibly expressed in different forms, will define public expectations in Ukraine and arguably in many other “deviant” places for a long time to come.

## Conclusions

Max Weber once described modernity as a world of *Entzauberung* – the de-magic-ated world (Encyclopædia Britannica 2016). To put it simply, the modern world, according to Weber, became transparent and demystified when science and rational explanations replaced the mystery of religion. This condition, usually translated into English as *disenchantment*, was characterized by Weber as rather ambiguous: science could provide explanations, he claimed, but not deeper meanings that people strive to achieve (Weber et. al 2004). Reality, thus, becomes dried out, banal, disenchanted.

However, given the snapshot of the police work provided on the pages above, it would be reasonable to ask the following: has not modernity replaced religion with magic spells and enchantments of its own creation? Has not the idea of rational state management of populations that arguably culminated in lofty hopes and the dramatic tragedies of high modernism (Scott 2008)—including the idea of the state crime control—evolved as something to substitute for that void of meaning? Or, to look at the problem from a different perspective—is it possible that instead of actually rationally eradicating crime of different sorts, modernity has created a theater of rationality, control and security that we all bewitchingly fastened our eyes on?

Jeffrey C. Alexander argues that modernity should be seen as a Janus-faced condition where “good and evil are tensely intertwined”: it is both blocking and facilitating, normalizing and othering, “barbaric” and “civilized,” rational and irrational, destructive and creative. Therefore, he warns: “it is a dangerous delusion to think modernity can eliminate evil” (Alexander 2013, 2-4). And indeed, as it has been discussed here, modernity itself produces crime in a twofold way: as a physical reality of acts that we call “criminal” and as a category of concern and management for the state and imaginary communities of “citizens” that we call “the public.” Can, thus,

modernity dialectically become the gravedigger for its own child? Or, paraphrasing again the same unfashionable classic, can modernity ever manage society into security given that it produces insecurity by its own existence?<sup>56</sup> And if not, what can it do? How does it deal with the hegemonic expectations of the public—produced by modernity itself—that as a result of continuous development, evil will be, if not eliminated, then at least tightly controlled? It seems that the very legitimacy of modernity as a rational progressive enterprise is at stake, is potentially scrutinized and, eventually could be lost, until one allows herself to think that the whole ever-perpetuating theater of development and security is exactly what keeps the modern man in a neverending cycle of hope and disbelief, enchantment and disenchantment that are yet again substituted for the new promises and potentials for “development” that, in turn, bring new hopes and new enchantments.

James Clifford was famously wondering: “If ethnography produces cultural interpretations through intense research experiences, how is unruly experience transformed into an authoritative written account” (Clifford 1983, 120) During my fieldwork I eventually decided to follow the enchantments of my participants and then connect them with the realities of their life experiences and practices that I observed. This thesis, thus, eventually came to be not quite a text about what my participants thought of their world or how their thoughts influenced what they did; it became largely a story about their enchantment with what they imagined as a possible better future located elsewhere, (as discussed in Chapter One) and how that imaginative work related to the world they lived in: to their functioning in localized contexts of everyday

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<sup>56</sup> “The customary rights of the aristocracy conflict by their *content* with the form of universal law. They cannot be given the form of law because they are formations of lawlessness” (Marx 1996, 131, emphasis in original).



policing in Ukrainian cities (set out in Chapter Two) and, functions in structures of modern society (as laid out in Chapter Three).

Stylistically varying chapters of this thesis that seemed to be talking about barely related aspects of police work were in fact connected by this overarching concern with enchantments and the daily realities of my participants. How, for example, does the officers' desire to be respected by the public, inscribed in the "Western" non-place (Chapter One, Part Two), fit with the daily realities of authority functioning in Ukrainian cities? And how does it fit with the contextual dimension of police authority in general (Chapter Two)? How are the Ukrainian public's desire for a police that provide security and this same public's enchantment with "normal" "Western" states (Chapter One, Part One) relate to functions of the police in modern society (Chapter Three, Part One)? How does this, finally, fit into what the police actually do in relation to crime in Ukraine and how does this influence the self-presentations that police perform to the demanding public (Chapter Three, Part Two)?

Methods used and questions asked largely influenced the styles of writing in the preceding chapters. Self-orientalising enchantments of the public, experts and journalists with "Western" states and police institutions have mostly been studied via the analysis of media and thus predominantly lacked ethnographic descriptions of particular situations, instead focusing on short phrases, opinions, diagnoses and evaluations of which typical media news-pieces and morning-shows consist. Second chapter, to the contrary, is rich with ethnographic descriptions. It is largely so because of my interest in daily routines of the officers and patterns of their dealings with the public: almost everything in the chapter is the description of what I saw and not what I heard. And finally, the third chapter was built largely on a description of the history and theory of police work in modern society that was eventually aimed at explaining my

observations. Thus, it is relatively heavy loaded with descriptions of the existing literature and knowledge.

I am aware of certain weaknesses of this thesis. The biggest of them, it seems, had to do with my positionality. I was surprised at first by the behaviour of the officers, behaviour that I have pushed to the periphery of my fieldnotes for a long time, continuously thinking that it had no real value, and yet again and again writing it down because of its repetitive nature. As many of us do, officers liked to use a strong word here and there and despite no apparent indications that I was uncomfortable with that, continued to apologize for their swearing. I was puzzled at first. After all, my friends and I use foul language all the time and no one even thinks of being apologetic about that. However, the behavior of the officers made perfect sense if one thinks of how policemen perceived me—a spindly young man in glasses who studies at a Western university. Above all, my body and appearance indexed a non-working class childhood and upbringing, or, to be more precise, a belonging to the *intelligentsiya*—a group that post-Soviet people still tend to imagine as possessors of “high culture.” And among many other things, high cultured people are seen as those who abstain from “uncultured” swearing.

Without any doubt, ascribing of *intelligentsiya* background to the ethnographer unavoidably distances her from working-class participants. This is precisely what happened in my case. Despite the fact that all the officers were pleasant and nice to me, I would argue that my prescribed status precluded many personal discussions that otherwise would have arisen. Above all, I was the type of outsider that is not necessarily seen as a threat, and yet is not allowed to go deep into the hidden and the private. No matter how unusual it may sound, I believe that my lack of access to the intimate and personal lives of the officers imposed restrictions that I would mostly

prefer not to have. How do officers cope with everyday stress and public disapproval? Does it influence their relations with their families? And how exactly? What do they feel about that? What do they feel about their jobs and the fact that they often encounter their fellow citizens at their worst? If I were to do my research all over again, I would prefer to position myself in a way that might open those doors and unbinds that information.

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