

1 **Title**

2 Global patterns and correlates in the emergence of antimicrobial resistance in humans

3 **Authors**

4 Emma Mendelsohn^{1*}, Noam Ross¹, Carlos Zambrana-Torrel^{1,#a}, T. P. Van Boeckel^{2,3}, Ramanan
5 Laxminarayan^{3,4}, Peter Daszak^{1*}

6 **Affiliations**

7 1. EcoHealth Alliance, New York, New York, United States of America

8 2. ETH Zurich, Zurich, Switzerland

9 3. One Health Trust, Washington DC, United States of America

10 4. Princeton University, Princeton NJ

11 ^{#a} Current Address: Department of Environmental Science and Policy, George Mason University,
12 Fairfax, VA

13 *Corresponding author(s): Emma Mendelsohn (mendelsohn@ecohealthalliance.org) and Peter
14 Daszak (daszak@ecohealthalliance.org)

15 **Abstract**

16 Antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a critical global health threat, and drivers of the emergence of
17 novel strains of antibiotic-resistant bacteria in humans are poorly understood at the global
18 scale. We examined correlates of AMR emergence in humans using global data on the origins of
19 novel strains of AMR bacteria from 2006 to 2017, human and livestock antibiotic use, country
20 economic activity, and reporting bias indicators. We found that AMR emergence is positively
21 correlated with antibiotic consumption in humans, whereas the relationship with antibiotic
22 consumption in livestock is modified by gross domestic product (GDP), with only higher GDP
23 countries showing a slight positive association. We also found that human travel may play a
24 role in AMR emergence, likely driving the spread of novel AMR strains into countries where
25 they are subsequently detected for the first time. Finally, we produced predictive models and
26 country-level maps of the global distribution of AMR risk. We assessed these against spatial
27 patterns of reported AMR emergence, to identify gaps in surveillance that can be used to direct
28 prevention and intervention policies.

29 **Introduction**

30 The emergence of antimicrobial resistance (AMR) is a critical global health challenge. AMR
31 bacterial strains have been associated with increased mortality, longer illnesses, medical
32 complications in surgery, barriers to chemotherapy, and higher health care costs (Cosgrove
33 2006; World Health Organization 2014, 2015; Interagency Coordination Group on Antimicrobial
34 Resistance 2019). Global human use of antibiotics has increased substantially over the last two
35 decades, with an alarming uptick in last-resort compounds that are administered when other
36 treatments fail (Klein et al. 2020). Rates of human use of antibiotics correlate with resistance
37 rates in pathogenic bacteria at multiple scales and locations (Goossens et al. 2005; Riedel et al.
38 2007; Bell et al. 2014; Llor and Bjerrum 2014). Combating AMR has become a priority for
39 governments (e.g., the United States National Action Plan for Combating Antibiotic-Resistant
40 Bacteria; UK Five-Year National Action Plan for Tackling Antimicrobial Resistance; Australia’s
41 National Antimicrobial Resistance Strategy) and intergovernmental organizations (e.g.,
42 Tripartite-Plus Alliance on AMR, Food and Agriculture Organization, World Organisation for
43 Animal Health, United Nations Environment Programme, and World Health Organization) and
44 multi-lateral development banks and financing facilities (e.g., World Bank).

45 Antibiotics are used routinely in livestock to prevent and treat bacterial diseases, and as growth
46 promoters to expedite weight gain (Newell et al. 2010; Van Boeckel et al. 2019). Antibiotic use
47 in livestock—which vastly exceeds their use in humans—has enabled intensive husbandry, and
48 is projected to increase by 67% globally, and to nearly double in Brazil, Russia, India, China, and
49 South Africa by 2030 (Van Boeckel et al. 2015; Van Boeckel et al. 2019). Resistance genes, AMR

50 bacterial strains, and plasmids including some of human clinical relevance, such as MRSA
51 (Methicillin-resistant *Staphylococcus aureus*), have been reported from livestock, wildlife, and
52 environmental samples (Van Boeckel et al. 2019; Wellington et al. 2013; Papadopoulos et al.
53 2018; European Food Safety et al. 2019; Tsai et al. 2020). These findings have led to policy
54 efforts to reduce antibiotic use in livestock (World Health Organization 2015; Interagency
55 Coordination Group on Antimicrobial Resistance 2019). However, the relative roles of antibiotic
56 use in animals or humans in driving AMR emergence of clinical relevance to humans, has not
57 yet been thoroughly assessed.

58 To our knowledge, there are no published analyses on the relative roles of human and livestock
59 consumption of antibiotics in driving the emergence of novel strains of antibiotic-resistant
60 bacteria in human clinical cases. In the current study, we use a database that we assembled of
61 global AMR emergence events containing 1,604 records of the first clinical reports of novel
62 bacterial resistance over 11 years from 2006 to 2017, to examine global patterns in the
63 emergence of new AMR strains in humans (Mendelsohn et al. 2021). We model how observed
64 AMR emergence events are correlated with human and livestock consumption of antibiotics;
65 human population and mobility (migrant population and tourism); economic activity (gross
66 domestic product [GDP] and healthcare expenditure); antibiotic exports as a proxy for
67 production; and biomedical surveillance efforts. We then use these correlations to produce
68 predictive models of the global distribution of AMR emergence risk.

69 A key challenge in interpreting global patterns of AMR emergence is variation in AMR
70 surveillance and reporting. Underreporting in lower-income countries is a persistent problem in

71 AMR datasets (World Health Organization 2014; ResistanceMap 2017), and may be particularly
72 important given that many lower-income countries are most affected by resistant infections
73 (e.g., malaria, tuberculosis, neonatal sepsis) (Byarugaba 2004; World Health Organization 2015;
74 Laxminarayan et al. 2016) and are experiencing the greatest increases in consumption of
75 antibiotics in humans and livestock (Klein et al. 2018; Van Boeckel et al. 2019). In this study, we
76 apply methods used in our previous work analyzing the emergence of zoonoses (Allen et al.
77 2017) to correct for underlying biases in reporting novel emergence by using quantitative
78 metrics of AMR surveillance.

79 **Results**

80 Our AMR emergence database contains 1,604 records of first clinical reports of novel bacterial
81 resistance occurring in 59 countries from 2006 to 2017, extracted from biomedical literature.
82 The United States had the greatest number of reported events ($n = 132$), followed by India ($n =$
83 127), China ($n = 120$), Canada ($n = 98$) and Japan ($n = 75$). For more detail on the database, see
84 Mendelsohn et al. 2021.

85 We modeled the frequency of reported AMR emergence as a function of human antibiotic
86 consumption, animal antibiotic consumption, per capita GDP, health care expenditure (% of
87 GDP), population, inbound tourism and migrant population, and measures of reporting and
88 publication bias. Our model explained 63% (standard deviation = 5.1%) of country-level
89 variance in AMR emergence rates.

90 Human antibiotic consumption was positively associated with AMR emergence rates (odds ratio
91 [OR] = 1.04 per defined daily dose [DDD]; 89% credible interval [89CI] = 1.00-1.10) (**Figure 1**).

92 We use 89% as the range for credible intervals because it is considered more stable than higher
93 ranges, such as the commonly used 95% intervals (Makowski et al. 2019). For a country in
94 which AMR emergence is expected (i.e., non-zero prediction), a 33% ($\pm 6\%$) greater than
95 average AMR emergence rate is expected at twice the average human antibiotic consumption
96 (mean human antibiotic consumption = 7.5 DDD), with all other variables held at average.

97 The interaction between livestock antibiotic consumption and GDP, both normalized to the
98 human population, was a consistent predictor of AMR emergence rates (OR = 1.9; 89CI = 1.4-
99 2.3) (**Figure 1**). This interaction term indicates that the effect of livestock antibiotic
100 consumption on AMR emergence increases at increasing levels of GDP (**Figure 2**). Specifically,
101 for every unit increase in GDP (log-dollars per human capita), the log-odds of the effect of
102 livestock antibiotic consumption (logged, kg per human capita) increases by $\log(1.9)$. The main
103 (non-interaction) effect of livestock antibiotic consumption was consistently inversely
104 associated with AMR emergence (OR = 0.0014 per log of kg antibiotics consumed by livestock
105 per human capita; 89CI = 0.00016-0.028), which accounts for the negative relationship between
106 livestock antibiotic consumption and AMR emergence observed at lower GDP levels. The overall
107 effect of GDP (log-dollars per human capita) was highly associated with AMR emergence (OR =
108 31; 89CI = 7.2-97).

109 Inbound tourism volume per country, normalized to population, was positively associated with
110 AMR emergence (OR = 1.4 per log of inbound tourists per capita; 89CI = 1.2-1.6). For a country

111 in which AMR emergence is expected (i.e., non-zero prediction), a 26% ($\pm 5\%$) greater than
112 average AMR emergence rate is expected at twice the average inbound tourism (mean inbound
113 tourism per capita = 1.4), with all other variables held at average. Migrant population,
114 normalized to total population, was not a consistent predictor of the outcome (OR = 0.92 per
115 log of migrant population per capita; 89CI = 0.76-1.1). The dollar value of antibiotic exports,
116 normalized to the human population, was consistently inversely associated with AMR
117 emergence (OR = 0.89 per log of antibiotic exports per capita; 89CI = 0.87-0.93). Healthcare
118 expenditure was also consistently inversely associated with AMR emergence (OR = 0.85 per
119 percent of GDP; 89CI = 0.83-0.90).

120 We used several variables to quantify reporting bias in AMR reports: The number of times a
121 report of an AMR disease on ProMED related to a country (ProMED mentions) was consistently
122 positively associated with AMR emergence (OR = 1.7 per log of ProMED mentions per capita;
123 89CI = 1.2-2.1), while speaking English in a country was inversely related (OR = 0.71; 89CI =
124 0.53-0.96), and the publication bias index was not a consistent predictor (OR = 0.91, 89CI =
125 0.81-1.0). Partial effect plots in both parts of the hurdle model are shown in **Figure S1**.

126 Due to lack of data on human and livestock antibiotic consumption for many, especially low-
127 income countries, (**Table S1**), we used model-imputed values for these correlates. To test
128 robustness of results, we evaluated results under four imputation scenarios: 1) no imputation
129 of antibiotic consumption (n = 36), 2) imputation of either human or livestock antibiotic
130 consumption (n = 73), 3) imputation of human and livestock antibiotic consumption for
131 countries within GDP range of countries with complete human and animal antimicrobial

132 consumption data (n = 88), and 4) full imputation (n = 190). While odds ratios differed among
133 the models, the overall direction of effects was consistent, and interpretation did not vary
134 drastically between models (**Figure S2**). For reporting model results here, we use the third
135 scenario—imputation of human and livestock antibiotic consumption for countries within the
136 GDP range of countries with complete human and animal antimicrobial consumption data. This
137 scenario was selected because it maximizes data coverage without predicting beyond the
138 conditions of the observed data. Results for all other scenarios are reported in the
139 Supplementary Information.

140 We also tested alternative formulations of the model to assess the robustness of results.
141 Because the United States is a singular outlier in the number of reported events, GDP,
142 publication bias index, ProMED mentions, and antibiotic exports, we ran a model without the
143 United States. In this scenario, use of the English language in a country and healthcare
144 expenditure were no longer associated with AMR emergence, the publication bias index
145 became inversely associated, and other results remained largely the same (**Figure S2**). In a
146 separate scenario, we replaced per-human-capita livestock antibiotic consumption with per-
147 livestock biomass antibiotic consumption and found that per-livestock biomass antibiotic
148 consumption was not associated with AMR emergence while livestock population on its own
149 was inversely associated with emergence. Finally, we repeated the analysis on a subset of
150 emergence data representing the first global appearances of unique drug-pathogen
151 combinations (i.e., including only the first country in which resistance of a pathogen to a drug is
152 observed). Results were largely consistent with the main model, with the use of the English

153 speaking in a country becoming no longer associated with AMR emergence and the publication
154 bias index becoming positively associated.

155 We used our model to estimate zero-corrected AMR emergence rates for each country, that is,
156 predicted rates conditional on equal reporting variables across countries (**Figure 3**). These
157 results show higher predicted rates for 77% of countries, including those that have the highest
158 counts in our database (United States, China) and in countries that previously reported few or
159 zero events. Countries with the greatest increase in predicted AMR counts were Russia (95th
160 percentile range = 109-367), Saudi Arabia (91-379), and Turkmenistan (19-96), all of which had
161 zero reported events in our database.

162 **Discussion**

163 This paper reports the first global analysis of drivers of the emergence of antimicrobial
164 resistance (AMR) in humans, with efforts to correct for reporting bias and inconsistencies in
165 data on antibiotic use. Previous studies have described the presence, prevalence of, and trends
166 in caseloads over time for specific resistant strains (Riedel et al. 2007; Song et al. 2011; Smith et
167 al. 2013; Llor and Bjerrum 2014; Paterson et al. 2014; Papadopoulos et al. 2018). Others have
168 reviewed broad patterns in the emergence of AMR based on trends in the literature without
169 correcting for underlying ascertainment bias, or testing hypotheses on underlying causal factors
170 (Byarugaba 2004; Bonn 2007; Bell et al. 2014; World Health Organization 2014). Some studies
171 have analyzed patterns of use or sale of antibiotics for human or livestock use in specific
172 regions or globally (Goossens et al. 2005; Van Boeckel et al. 2015; Klein et al. 2018). There is a

173 previous analysis of broad patterns of global AMR emergence in livestock that evaluated
174 surveillance bias but did not test hypotheses on the relative significance of different drivers
175 (Van Boeckel et al. 2019). Efforts to identify trends and drivers of emerging infectious diseases
176 are hampered by a lack of clarity on the origins of past events, and by spatial and temporal
177 biases in surveillance (Jones et al. 2008; Allen et al. 2017). Here, we used records of first clinical
178 reports of unique bacterial-drug cases from 2006 to 2017 (Mendelsohn et al. 2021), datasets of
179 antimicrobial drug sales for human and livestock use, and published strategies for dealing with
180 reporting bias, to analyze the origins, trends, and likely drivers of global emergence of AMR.

181 Our analysis showed that human use of antimicrobials is positively correlated with the origins
182 of AMR events in people, and that this scales with defined daily dose (DDD). Previous analyses
183 of AMR trends have modeled the presence or prevalence of specific resistant strains and
184 provided evidence that antibiotic use in people directly contributes to AMR in hospitals and
185 clinics, communities, and countries (Goossens et al. 2005; Riedel et al. 2007; Koningstein et al.
186 2010; Bell et al. 2014; Llor and Bjerrum 2014). However, this correlation has not previously
187 been demonstrated on a global scale, controlling for reporting biases, and over a broad swath
188 of AMR pathogen/drug combinations. Another prior study assessed how socioeconomic and
189 demographic factors correlate with an index of antimicrobial resistance in 103 countries and
190 found that human antimicrobial drug use was not correlated with resistance (Collignon et al.
191 2018). However, the current study analyzes the drivers of the first known clinical cases of a
192 novel AMR emergence, whereas (Collignon et al. 2018) analyzed the level of resistance to
193 several drug classes in three pathogens encountered in clinics in a country. Our analysis is
194 consistent with the findings of (Collignon et al. 2018) that the prevalence of AMR in a country is

195 likely driven also by contagion – the spread of antimicrobial resistance after its emergence –
196 and that this occurs independently to the degree of antibiotic consumption. Together, these
197 papers provide a more detailed explanation of what drives the origins, spread and impact of
198 AMR, and are therefore of value in developing policy to control each aspect of emergence.

199 We found that the relationship between antibiotic consumption for animal husbandry and the
200 origins of new AMR strains in people is modified by GDP, with the highest GDP countries having
201 a slight positive association, and lower GDP countries having a neutral or negative association.
202 Under a separate formulation, in which we normalized livestock antibiotic consumption to
203 livestock biomass instead of human population, no consistent association with AMR emergence
204 was observed. Given the limited number of data points for livestock antibiotic consumption (n =
205 41), additional data collection is needed to better understand the relationship between animal
206 husbandry and AMR emergence. Nonetheless, our findings suggest that the relationship
207 between antibiotic use in livestock and the emergence of novel AMR strains in humans may be
208 complex or mediated by other factors.

209 Other research has demonstrated that antibiotic use for animal husbandry is a significant public
210 health threat in contributing to the spread of specific existing resistance strains in humans
211 (Vieira et al. 2011; Smith et al. 2013). A meta-analysis of antimicrobial use in animals that
212 includes a small number (n=21) of human AMR cases, found that reduced animal use of
213 antimicrobials led to a reduction in the pooled prevalence of AMR cases in people (Tang et al.
214 2017). We conclude that, while our analysis indicates that human use of antibiotics is likely
215 more important for human AMR emergence than animal use, further research is needed to

216 better understand the patterns of transmission of AMR strains among livestock and people
217 (Vieira et al. 2011; Smith et al. 2013; Muloi et al. 2018). We hypothesize that dense populations
218 of livestock may act as maintenance or amplifying hosts for known AMR strains, a scenario
219 similar to the role of intermediate livestock hosts in the emergence of novel zoonoses such as
220 Nipah virus disease, MERS and SARS (Morse et al. 2012).

221 In recent years, environmental contamination by antibiotics has been increasingly linked to the
222 emergence and spread of AMR (Wellington et al. 2013; Singer et al. 2016). In our analysis, we
223 assumed that countries with higher levels of production (and therefore export) of antibiotics
224 would have higher environmental contamination. Countries with antibiotic export had lower
225 rates of AMR emergence, suggesting that either this is a poor proxy, or that environmental
226 contamination is not a significant driver of novel strain emergence. This does exclude the
227 possibility of environmental contamination being a factor in maintaining or spreading AMR
228 strains once they have emerged.

229 To assess if the emergence of a novel strain is caused by the spread of infection (bacterium or
230 gene transmission) into a country rather than its *de facto* evolution and origin, we included
231 measures of human population movement in our model. Inbound tourism, normalized to
232 population, was a predictor of AMR emergence, while inbound migration, normalized to
233 population, was not. These results suggest that first emergences in a country may be driven, in
234 part, by the spread of existing resistant strains from other countries. We repeated the analysis
235 on a subset of emergence data representing first global appearances of unique drug-pathogen
236 combinations (i.e., including only the first country in which resistance of a pathogen to a drug is

237 observed). This analysis did not alter our findings related to tourism and migration, suggesting
238 that mechanisms of spread (e.g., gene transfer) in addition to mutation may also drive first
239 global emergences.

240 More developed public infrastructure and higher metrics of good governance inversely
241 correlate with AMR rates (Collignon et al. 2018). In our study, we used data on GDP per capita
242 and healthcare expenditure as proxies for the ability of countries to control AMR, identify cases,
243 and manage consumption patterns through education programs. GDP per capita was
244 consistently positively associated with AMR emergence in a country. Healthcare expenditure
245 was consistently inversely associated with AMR emergence in a country, but this relationship
246 was no longer consistent when we removed the United States from the dataset. These findings
247 likely reflect the fact that our outcome measure is not the level of resistance seen in clinics in a
248 country (e.g. prevalence, incidence, occurrence of known or novel AMR strains), but the
249 number of novel AMR strains originating in a country. The latter may be more strongly
250 correlated with human antibiotic drug use as a driver of the evolution and emergence of novel
251 strains, while the former is linked to ability to control these strains once they have emerged.

252 In previous work, we analyzed global trends and identified predictive hotspots of emerging
253 infectious diseases (Jones et al. 2008), and emerging zoonoses (Allen et al. 2017) by correcting
254 for underlying biases in reporting of novel emergence. In the current study, we accounted for
255 country-level surveillance and reporting effort by including use of English language in a country
256 (as the database was limited to English-language literature), number of ProMED mentions, and
257 a publication bias index produced previously (Allen et al. 2017). We used our model to estimate

258 predicted (zero-corrected) AMR rates of emergence for each country, and found the greatest
259 increase in predicted rates in Russia, Saudi Arabia, and Turkmenistan, all of which had zero
260 reported events. These findings point to significant reporting gaps in these countries and the
261 need to apply surveillance beyond the relatively limited number of countries where surveillance
262 currently occurs.

263 There are several limitations to this study. First, it analyzes trends in novel AMR strains
264 reported in the literature from 2006 to 2017 against data on potential drivers from different
265 time periods within this range. Variation in these factors over the 11 years of AMR reporting
266 may reduce the accuracy of the analysis. This may be further confounded if countries that
267 identify novel AMR events have then significantly reduced or modified antimicrobial use.
268 Second, it uses published data on novel AMR strains. While we included several measures of
269 reporting and publication bias, the changes in interest or capacity to diagnose and identify AMR
270 over this period may have varied among countries irrespective of economic capacity, due to
271 trends in research fields. Third, data availability of some of the correlates are skewed to richer
272 countries. Livestock antibiotic consumption data, estimated from country-reported antibiotic
273 sales from livestock (Van Boeckel et al. 2019), is especially sparse (available for 41 countries)
274 and biased towards developed economies. Finally, it is important to emphasize that the
275 relationships discussed in this paper are associative, and causality can only be hypothesized
276 through this type of global analysis. Further work on the mechanisms of what drives the origin
277 of new strains, and what drives their maintenance, amplification and spread is urgently needed.

278 **Methods**

279 *Data*

280 We used AMR emergence data from the database described in (Mendelsohn et al. (2021),
281 (<https://zenodo.org/record/4924992>) which contains records of first clinical reports of unique
282 bacterial-drug AMR detections from 1998-2017, drawn from scientific literature and disease
283 surveillance reports. We filtered the database for events starting in 2006 and later, as database
284 coverage prior to 2006 is limited to disease surveillance reports. To perform analyses at the
285 country level, we summed the count of emergence events by country. This approach allows the
286 same drug-bacteria combination to be represented in multiple country counts. As part of our
287 robustness analysis (below), we also ran the model using first reported global emergences as an
288 alternate outcome (i.e., each drug-bacteria combination reported only once).

289 Predictor variables are from multiple sources, listed in **Table S1**. We included data on human
290 and livestock consumption of antibiotics, human population and mobility (migrant population
291 and tourism), economic activity (GDP and healthcare expenditure), and antibiotic exports as a
292 proxy for production. In addition, we included five variables representing reporting bias:
293 population, GDP, English language spoken, ProMED mentions, and publication bias index. The
294 publication bias index is based on total biomedical publications originating from or referring to
295 geographic regions, (Allen et al. 2017), an approach used for a variety of global-scale disease
296 detection studies (Huff et al. 2016; Olival et al. 2017; Carlson et al. 2022).

297 Prior to modeling, lognormally distributed continuous variables were natural log transformed,
298 and some variables were normalized to GDP or population, as indicated in the *measurement*
299 *units* field of **Table S1**. Livestock antibiotic consumption was normalized to human population,
300 rather than livestock population, as we are interested in the potential contribution of antibiotic
301 use in agriculture to AMR emergence in humans. In our robustness analysis (below), we ran an
302 alternate version of the model with livestock antibiotic consumption normalized to livestock
303 biomass. Because initial data exploration found that the relationship between livestock
304 antibiotic consumption and AMR emergence differed between low- and high-income countries,
305 we included an interaction term for livestock antibiotic consumption and country GDP.

306 *Missing data handling*

307 We limited the total number of countries in the dataset to those that have population and GDP
308 data available (n = 190). As shown in **Table S1**, data availability was not consistent across other
309 variables. We inferred zeros for missing values for the AMR emergence field, and one half the
310 minimum value for the publication bias index, ProMED mentions, and antibiotic export fields.

311 The following remaining variables were unavailable for some countries, with a distinct bias of
312 missing data in low-income countries: human antibiotic consumption, livestock antibiotic
313 consumption, health expenditure, and inbound tourism. We imputed missing values for these
314 variables, using four approaches of to check for robustness:

- 315 1) *No imputation of antibiotic consumption* – Dataset limited to countries with values
316 for both human *and* animal antimicrobial consumption (n = 36).

- 317 2) *Imputation of either human or livestock antibiotic consumption* – Dataset includes
318 countries with values for human *and/or* animal antibiotic consumption (n = 73).
- 319 3) *Imputation of human and livestock antibiotic consumption for countries within GDP*
320 *range* – Dataset includes countries that are missing both human and livestock
321 antibiotic consumption *if* the country has a GDP within the range of GDPs of
322 countries from scenario 1 (\$5,870/capita [Thailand] - \$101,417/capita
323 [Luxembourg]), which have both human *and* animal antimicrobial consumption data
324 (n = 88).
- 325 4) *Full imputation* – Includes all countries in the dataset (n = 190).

326 We used a Multivariate Imputation by Chained Equations (MICE) algorithm with classification
327 and regression trees (CART) to model missing values based on the available data (Buuren 2018).
328 CARTs are commonly used for imputation for their robustness against outliers and ability to
329 handle multicollinearity and skewed distributions (Buuren 2018). For each variable we
330 generated 30 imputations, each with 40 iterations. We visually examined diagnostic plots to
331 confirm convergence. We included two additional variables—antibiotic imports and livestock
332 biomass—in the MICE routine to better estimate missing consumption data. We did not include
333 these variables in the model itself, however, as consumption is a better estimate of direct
334 antibiotic exposure.

335 *Robustness scenarios*

336 We tested several alternative formulations of our model to determine robustness of results.

337 We used scenario 3 for missing data handling (see above; $n = 88$) for all robustness scenarios.

338 First, because the United States is a singular outlier in the number of reported events, GDP,

339 publication bias index, ProMED mentions, and antibiotic sales (which informs the human and

340 livestock antibiotic consumption variables), we ran a model with the United States removed.

341 Second, we used an alternative scaling of livestock antibiotic consumption, replacing per-

342 human-capita livestock antibiotic consumption with per-livestock biomass antibiotic

343 consumption. In this formulation, we also included livestock biomass, defined as the total mass

344 of cattle, pig, and chicken populations within a country (Van Boeckel et al. 2015), as a separate

345 feature to allow disaggregation of the effects of livestock antibiotic consumption and livestock

346 biomass. Finally, we used an alternate outcome variable representing the first global

347 emergence of antibiotic strains within countries, rather than first national emergences. This

348 way, a drug-bacteria combination is counted only in the single country in which it first emerged

349 in our dataset.

350 *Statistical approach*

351 We first examined data for collinearity, and spearman rank coefficients were less than 0.7 for

352 all variable pairs. We used a Poisson-hurdle model, in which the response is a function of two

353 components: a logistic component representing the probability of observing any reported

354 cases, and a Poisson component of the number of AMR emergence events in the period,

355 conditional on observed reporting. For the logistic equation, we included our five reporting bias
356 variables (population, GDP, English language spoken, ProMED mentions, and publication bias
357 index). All variables were included in the Poisson component, with population treated as an
358 offset variable.

359 We took a Bayesian approach to estimating model parameters, using a No-U-Turn Hamiltonian
360 Monte Carlo implemented in Stan and assuming a wide student's t-distribution ($\nu = 3$, $\mu = 0$,
361 $\sigma = 10$) for all coefficient priors (Hoffman and Gelman 2014; Stan Development Team
362 2018). We used four Markov chains with 2000 iterations per chain to fit the model on each of
363 the multiple imputed datasets. Posterior samples were then combined across all imputed
364 datasets to generate posterior distributions.

365 We visually examined Markov chain trace plots and used effective sample convergence
366 statistics (R-hat convergence < 1.05) to confirm convergence across chains (Vehtari et al. 2019).
367 We compared posterior predictions to the empirical distribution of AMR events with density
368 overlay plots and interval plots. In addition, we compared the proportion of zeros in the
369 posterior predictions to the empirical proportion to confirm that hurdle model accurately
370 captured the excess zeros in the dataset (**Figure S3**).

371 *Model Predictions*

372 We generated zero-corrected predictions of AMR emergence counts by calculating predictions
373 for all countries our raw dataset (including imputed values) using only the Poisson component
374 of the model, assuming a reporting probability of 1. By removing the logistic equation from the

375 hurdle model, we were able to estimate AMR emergence counts corrected for excess zeros due
376 to underreporting. We used a sample of 500 beta coefficients generated from our model for
377 each variable to be able to produce median and 95th percentile count estimates for each
378 country.

379 *Software and reproducibility*


380 Data analysis was performed in R version 4.0.4 (R Core Team 2021), using the tidyverse
381 framework for data manipulation (Wickham 2017) and the drake package for workflow design
382 (Landau 2018). We used the mice package (Groothuis-Oudshoorn 2011) for the MICE
383 imputation routine and the brms package (Bürkner 2017), built on the Stan language (Stan
384 Development Team 2018) for Bayesian model fitting. Visual model diagnostics were generated
385 with the bayesplot package (Gabry and Mahr 2019).

386 All code and data used in this project are available for download at
387 <https://github.com/ecohealthalliance/amr-analysis> and on Zenodo
388 (<https://zenodo.org/record/7051952>).

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390 Figures

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392

393 **Figure 1.** Odds ratios and 89% credible intervals of features in the main model. Asterisks

394 indicate that the variable is a consistent predictor of the outcome (i.e., 89% credible intervals

395 do not include 1).

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




Figure 2. Additive change in counts (marginal effects) of AMR emergence for each model variable. Faded lines represent individual model iterations; solid line is average model. Rug ticks show raw values. Asterisks indicate that the variable is a consistent predictor of the outcome (i.e., 89% credible intervals of odds ratios do not include 1).

420



421

C



422

423 **Figure 3.** Reported and median predicted AMR emergence event counts for 88 countries (A).

424 Difference between predicted and reported counts (B). 10 countries with largest absolute

425 difference between reported and median predicted counts, with 95th percentile predicted

426 range in parenthesis (C).

427 **Author contributions**

428 C.Z-T. and P.D. conceived the study. E.M. and N.R. developed the model and wrote code. E.M.,
429 N.R., and P.D. drafted the manuscript. R.L. and TVB provided expert review. All authors were
430 involved in editing and approving the manuscript.

431 **Competing Interests**

432 The authors declare no competing interests.

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