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
Global Politics in the Human Interest

FIFTH EDITION

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ISBN: 978-1-58826-484-8 pb



LYNNE RIENNER PUBLISHERS

1800 30th Street, Ste. 314

Boulder, CO 80301

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This excerpt was downloaded from the
Lynne Rienner Publishers website
www.rienner.com

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Crisis and Interdependence in Contemporary World Politics

This dominant culture set the tone and standard for most of Shikasta. For regardless of the ideological label attaching to each national area, they all had in common that technology was the key to all good, and that good was always material increase, gain, comfort, pleasure. . . . And all this time the earth was being despoiled. The minerals were being ripped out, the fuels wasted, the soils depleted by an improvident and short-sighted agriculture, the animals and plants slaughtered and destroyed, the seas being filled with filth and poison, the atmosphere was corrupted. . . . These were maddened creatures, and the small voices that rose in protest were not enough to halt the processes that had been set in motion and were sustained by greed. By the lack of substance-of-we-feeling.

—Doris Lessing, *Re: Colonised Planet 5, Shikasta*, 1979

Global Insecurity

Someone once defined fanaticism as “redoubling your efforts when you have lost sight of your original objective.” The blind pursuit of national security fits this definition of fanaticism perfectly. As state leaders invest more and more political, human, and economic resources in weapons, aid programs, alliances, and the exploitation of resources, the security of persons, societies, and the planet as a whole actually seems to decline. In the industrialized, technologically advanced countries of the First and Second Worlds, insecurity is mainly reflected in acute anxiety about the efficacy of political systems and frustrations about any system’s ability to deliver the “good life” except at very high social and ecological costs. In the underdeveloped countries of the Third and Fourth Worlds, where three-fourths of the world’s population lives, insecurity takes a more basic form: the daily quest for survival. (The four “worlds” are depicted in Table 1.1.)

The causes and consequences of this pervasive insecurity, and the extent to which its different forms are interrelated and mutually reinforcing—the degree, for example, to which the quest for security in the industrialized world takes place largely at the expense of the underdeveloped

Table 1.1 The Reshaping of World Politics

	Cold War Era (1945–1990)	Post–Cold War Era (1990–)
First World	US, USSR	US—“superpower” EU, Japan—economic superpowers
Second World	Industrialized Europe, Japan, Canada, Australia, New Zealand	Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Russia (first tier); industrialized Eastern Europe (e.g., Hungary, Poland, Ukraine), Israel (second tier)
Third World	Oil-exporting economies High-income economies Middle-income economies Low-income economies Fourth World economies	Oil-exporting economies East Asian NICs, e.g., South Korea, Singapore China, Mexico, Brazil, Turkey Cambodia, India, Afghanistan, Angola Other former USSR republics, Africa/other Latin American, South Asian, Middle Eastern states
Fourth World		Extremely impoverished countries, e.g., Haiti, Somalia, Bangladesh, North Korea, Chad

world, yet also has profound economic and social impact at home—are the principal subjects of this study. The reasons are simple: The human costs of global insecurity are staggering; the narrow understanding of national security by most state leaders keeps these costs high and mounting; the penetration of every aspect of world politics (such as alliances, the ecosystem, global finance and trade, and people’s movements and exchanges) by this global crisis has created great foreboding but equally great hesitancy to take bold remedial action; and, as a result, the prospects for planetary survival itself are not optimistic.

State leaders everywhere invariably seek to put the best possible face on their own situations, and many serious scholars persist in arguing that humankind will resolve today’s problems just as it resolved yesterday’s. After the Berlin Wall came down on November 9, 1989, there was cause for some optimism. German reunification was completed less than a year later. Massive demonstrations challenged the legitimacy of single-party states from China to Czechoslovakia and, in most cases, toppled them. The creation of a single market among the twelve countries of the European Community (EC), now the European Union (EU), was set to start in 1993. This radical alteration of the map of Europe took place against the background of revolutionary changes in Soviet-US relations. Soviet president Mikhail Gorbachev, whose “new thinking” essentially discarded the old rules of the Cold War game, was the single most important figure. His mid-1990 summit meeting in Washington, DC, with President George H. W. Bush continued US-Soviet arms talks that had already led to the first actual reductions, and destruction, of nuclear weapons in the postwar period. The peacekeeping role of the United Nations revived, with missions in diverse

locations such as Afghanistan, Cambodia, and Namibia. Prominent human-rights activists were freed from captivity, including Nelson Mandela after twenty-seven years in South African prisons.

These events, when compared with the baleful character of international relations only a decade earlier, appeared to herald a new era of peace and security. Then, war and preparations for war dominated world politics, topped by the intense nuclear arms competition between the United States and the Soviet Union and a long list of civil and interstate conflicts in Africa, the Middle East, and Southeast Asia. Driven by this short-term comparison, some commentators were quick to proclaim the “end of history,” in the sense that the demise of the Soviet empire and the seeming victory of Western liberalism in Eastern Europe had opened the way to a stable, if rather boring, epoch devoted mainly to technological development.¹

The end of history? The breakup of the Soviet Union and the resurgence of ethnic and religious nationalism in central Europe and central Asia quickly revived history. A new world order? So President Bush declared at the conclusion of Gulf War I—Iraq’s invasion and annexation of Kuwait in August 1990. Unfortunately, although the ideological battles of the Cold War were largely replaced by economic competition and led to a lessening of international tensions, there was no cause for celebration. When international and national security issues are evaluated from a planetary and long-term perspective, it remains that the quality of life in the underdeveloped world has barely improved and threats to global environmental security are more apparent than ever. As we will see in the remainder of this chapter, global insecurity is deepening and is beyond quick technological or diplomatic fixes, all the more so since the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States and the onset of President George W. Bush’s “war on terror.”

The urgency of developing a global approach to security was first pressed by U Thant, then secretary-general of the United Nations, in 1969:

I do not wish to seem overdramatic, but I can only conclude from the information that is available to me as Secretary-General, that the Members of the United Nations have perhaps ten years left in which to subordinate their ancient quarrels and launch a global partnership to curb the arms race, to improve the human environment, to defuse the population explosion, and to supply the required momentum to development efforts. If such a global partnership is not forged within the next decade, then I very much fear that the problems I have mentioned will have reached such staggering proportions that they will be beyond our capacity to control.²

In its essentials, the secretary-general’s warning has come true. Although planetary extinction has thus far been averted, the depth and scale of the problems U Thant cited have indeed increased to nearly unmanageable proportions. In 1992 over 1,600 scientists from around the world,

including 102 Nobel laureates, signed a “Warning to Humanity” that focused on the destructive environmental practices that threaten the planet’s viability. They appealed for a new global ethic, including a commitment to eliminate poverty, war, and other causes of “social, economic, and environmental collapse.”³ Or, again in 2000, concerned that “our world is plagued by violence, war and destruction,” religious and spiritual leaders of every faith published a “Commitment to Global Peace.” It appealed not just for “agreement on fundamental ethical values” but also for “an attitude of reverence for life, freedom and justice, the eradication of poverty, and the protection of the environment for present and future generations.”⁴ Few government or major corporate leaders have shared these urgent calls; most have acknowledged one or another aspect of a global crisis but have not considered that the problems are symptomatic of a contagious and potentially fatal disease. Life and politics go on as before.

It is indeed strange that, at one and the same time, monumental leaps of scientific creativity occur for the benefit of humankind while political leaders stick to tired formulas and outdated rituals in pursuit of self-interest. The practice of politics has not kept pace either with scientific advances or with global ecological, economic, military, and social changes. U Thant appealed for a global partnership because he believed the future of the human species itself was imperiled. But the governments he addressed were not (and clearly still are not) ready to integrate global changes into narrowly national perspectives. And therein lies a crisis of our times that is equally as burdensome as any U Thant described: a crisis of political will in the nation-state system.

The emphasis throughout this book is on information, explanation, and argument. This chapter begins with some basic facts about the global crisis that are essential to understanding and interpreting the changed shape of world politics—its interdependence during, and globalization after, the Cold War. I introduce the two schools of thought that dominate writing and thinking about world politics—realism and globalism—along with a third school, global humanism, the values and analytical method of which I use throughout the present study. Chapter 2 is a critical examination of realism and globalism, especially the globalism practiced by transnational corporations. Three case studies of efforts to reshape the world order back up the discussion of how realism and globalism both compete and collaborate in the real world. Chapter 3 elaborates on global humanism as an alternative perspective—alternative with respect to meanings of development—*human* development—and meanings of security—*human* and *common* security. This discussion sets the stage for a more specific investigation of insecurity from a human-interest point of view, in the Third and Fourth Worlds (Chapter 4), in the United States and China (Chapter 5), and in Europe, Russia, and Japan (Chapter 6). The concluding chapter is policy oriented: It lays out an agenda for changes addressed to the main features of the global crisis.

A Brief Report on the State of the Planet

The global crisis is apparent from the following facts and figures:

- Despite advances in world literacy, there remain thirty-four countries with over 80 percent illiteracy.⁵

- Approximately 1.1 billion people, overwhelmingly in sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia, and East Asia, were living in absolute poverty (usually defined as \$1 a day) in 2001. The figure represents an improvement over the previous twenty years, when it was 1.5 billion people; but when added to the number of people living on between \$1 and \$2 a day, the total is a staggering 2.7 billion.⁶ Put in terms of share of world income, in 2000 the poorest 20 percent of the global population accounted for a mere 1.57 percent, whereas people in the wealthiest countries, representing 15 percent of world population, accounted for 79 percent.⁷

- The world population, according to the World Bank, is expected to be over 8 billion by 2025, even though fertility rates are declining everywhere. In the mid-1980s it was commonplace to say that world population was growing by “another Mexico” (80 million) annually, whereas by 1990 the phrase had changed to “another Bangladesh,” or about 100 million people every year.⁸

- At current rates of depletion, the Third World’s forests, especially in tropical zones, will be reduced by one-half (thus intensifying an already serious shortage of firewood for fuel). Approximately one plant species of every eight—12.5 percent of approximately 270,000 species so far identified—is threatened with extinction.⁹

- Military spending worldwide roughly doubled in twenty years, reaching \$940 billion in 1985—well over \$2 billion a day. Over 80 percent of that amount was spent by the two superpowers. Global arms spending declined beginning in the late 1980s, but by 2005 it was soaring again. The United States accounts for nearly half the world total, over \$1.1 trillion in current dollars.¹⁰

- Alternative uses of tiny fractions of the world’s military spending could produce meaningful change in education, health care, and nutrition. For example, the cost of one new nuclear submarine (about \$1.5 billion) could educate 160 million schoolchildren in twenty-three developing countries. World hunger affects over 850 million people; but only about \$3 billion is estimated to be enough to enable the poorest countries to begin moving toward food self-sufficiency. Similar small amounts could probably prevent the deaths each year of about 15 million children from malnutrition, dehydration, and other easily curable conditions.¹¹

- More and more people are moving into cities. The UN forecast that 47 percent of the world’s population would be urbanized by 2000. Third World cities will grow 160 percent between 1990 and 2030 and will include seventeen of the twenty-one largest cities in the world.¹²

- The world's displaced population is rising at an astounding rate. About 2,700 people become "political refugees," refugees in their own country, or economic migrants every day.¹³ Migration of workers has risen from 155 million in 1990 to around 191 million in 2005. Migrant workers are major contributors to their home as well as their host countries' economies, sending back \$167 billion to developing countries in 2005.¹⁴

- Malaria, once thought to have been wiped out, is on the rise again. "Between 300 million and 500 million people now get malaria each year, and someone dies of it about every 15 seconds—mostly children and pregnant women. During the last decade, malaria has killed about ten times as many children as all wars combined have in that period." A \$5 mosquito net, beyond the reach of most poor people who suffer from malaria, is considered to be the single best preventive measure.¹⁵

- AIDS infects an estimated 60 million people and has caused about 25 million deaths, making it "the greatest challenge of our generation," according to UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan. About \$8 billion was spent to combat AIDS in 2005, a significant increase; but a UN General Assembly declaration said \$23 billion would have to be spent annually by 2010.¹⁶

- About 1.1 billion people worldwide do not have access to clean water, 2.6 billion lack toilets or latrines, and diseases caused by impure water account for over 3 million deaths a year, mostly of children. Yet efforts continue to privatize water supplies, raising its costs and denying even more people access to quality water. The good news is that such efforts are failing as citizens and governments have rallied to vest water management in communities.¹⁷

- One large-scale study of global warming, by the US National Academy of Sciences, concludes that "recent warmth is unprecedented for at least the last 400 years and potentially the last several millennia."¹⁸ As had been widely concluded in numerous earlier scientific reports, the new study attributed the dramatic temperature rise to carbon dioxide and methane, the principal greenhouse gases.

- Slave trafficking that forces women and children into brothels and sweatshops victimizes anywhere from 700,000 to 4 million people a year, and as many as nineteen countries reportedly are doing nothing to stop it.¹⁹

Statistics and facts of these magnitudes may be difficult to absorb at one sitting. But they give an immediate sense of what a global perspective on world politics does: It highlights the multidimensional and transnational character of a common crisis. And that is why we turn next to the phenomena of interdependence and globalization.

From Interdependence to Globalization

Citizens in one country demonstrate for human rights in another. Genocidal wars in Cambodia, the former Yugoslavia, and Rwanda prompt proposals

for a permanent UN court to prosecute crimes against humanity. The Indian government briefly arrests the chair of the board of Union Carbide, then sues the company in a US court, after a catastrophic gas leak from the company's branch plant in Bhopal kills over 3,700 people and injures 20,000. A worldwide emergency food relief effort begins in Ethiopia and Sudan after a BBC broadcast dramatizes the fact that several million people are starving to death. An Islamic terrorist group proclaims: "Let them know that sooner or later we shall reach the heart of the White House, the Kremlin, the Elysée, 10 Downing Street." A Japanese study of the effects of a major earthquake in downtown Tokyo predicts catastrophic consequences for the world's finances, inasmuch as Japan becomes the top creditor nation in the world.

These events of the 1980s and 1990s have one thing in common: They reflect the increasingly complex and transnational character of world politics. The line that once so neatly divided domestic from foreign affairs and foreign from global affairs is now much harder to find. Issues that once were the exclusive prerogative of governments, such as air and water pollution, now are matters of international diplomacy and sometimes social activism. Large numbers of ordinary people are being affected by world affairs as never before. Not only are advances in global information technology helping to create awareness of that fact, but, as the cost of acquiring information dwindles, far greater numbers of people have opportunities to affect world affairs.

Even the older patterns of inter- and intranational relations, in which conflict is the dominant feature, have new meaning today. Whether we are talking about wars between states, military and political interventions by one country in the affairs of another, nationalist and separatist struggles, or territorial disputes, the consequences of such conflicts carry well beyond their place of origin. As the two recent wars involving Iraq show, the impact transcends national boundaries to involve other economies, ways of life (consumer prices, cultures, food supplies, civil liberties, jobs), and international law and institutions.

The global agenda has become larger, more diverse, and more ominous. We need additional tools to analyze it. International affairs is still politics and economics, of course; but of special importance today is international political economy, the study of the ways certain systems (such as global capitalism) and structures (such as transnational corporations and military-industrial complexes) often decisively influence the distribution of wealth and power within and between nations, and therefore the character of national and international security.²⁰ In addition, biology (studying, for example, acid rain), anthropology (the demise of native cultures in the face of modernization), sociology (the international division of labor), feminist studies (women on the global assembly lines of transnational corporations), religion (the universal values of diverse spiritual paths), even sports (from

US-China ping-pong diplomacy to terrorism and fraternalism at the Munich and Los Angeles Olympic Games)—all have a place in the study of world politics. The transnational phenomenon requires an interdisciplinary approach to do justice to world politics.

And that is the approach of this book. I use the tools and insights of many disciplines in order to explore world politics in its fullest, global sense: across national boundaries, inside as well as outside societies, at many different levels of social activity (governing elites, races, ecological systems, economic classes, and bureaucracies, for example). Since the United States, despite all its vulnerabilities occasioned by global political-economic changes, is still the world's most influential actor, I emphasize its policies and behavior more so than any other state's. But most important are the humane values and norms that guide my analysis of national policies, social forces, and international institutions.²¹ The point of departure here is that of the global citizen who looks at the world from the standpoint of the needs and interests of the planet, considered as a human community and as an ecological system, and makes assessments based on political and ethical standards that can be applied to all social systems.

This Global Humanist framework identifies inequality as the most prominent feature of world politics in our time. How the world works to the detriment of the disadvantaged, who benefits from that process, and what the disequilibrium means for the human condition are central to this study.

"We are stranded . . . between the inadequacy of the nation-state and the emerging imperative of global community," former US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger once said.²² World politics today might be characterized as proceeding simultaneously along two tracks, with the distance between them getting wider all the time. The first track consists of the traditional statecraft of power politics, of which Kissinger has long been a highly visible exponent. The "engine" that propels movement along this track is commonly known as realism, a philosophy or paradigm of national interest and power politics that we will critically examine shortly. Running along the second track is globalism, which interprets world politics in terms of transnational forces. Globalism takes two politically quite distinct forms, one idealist and increasingly focused on corporate interests, and one humanist, reflecting the human interest within a global community. Both forms of globalism contend that politics-as-usual within the framework of competing national interests cannot cope with planet-wide problems. But whereas corporate globalism sees the world coming together on the basis of markets and the harmonizing of product and labor standards, global humanism sees the way forward in international cooperation that advances human rights, disarmament, and environmental protection.

All perspectives agree that world politics is highly interdependent and becoming more so all the time. No event in recent memory brought home this evolving perception more than the nuclear power plant disaster at

Chernobyl, near Kiev, in the former Soviet Union (now Ukraine), in April 1986. The Soviet leadership had to answer to the world, as well as to its own citizens, for the accident, the worst in the history of nuclear power. Leaders of individual states of course looked to their own interests in commenting on Chernobyl—either out of concern about radioactive fallout or out of a desire to exploit Soviet troubles for their own political benefit. But no one, including Soviet and US leaders, could avoid Chernobyl's global meaning. General Secretary (later president) Mikhail Gorbachev said it created the need for international monitoring and reporting of nuclear accidents. President Ronald Reagan said Chernobyl showed that some issues have implications that transcend the national interest. They and other state leaders seemed to accept that when it comes to species survival realist politics is severely handicapped.

“Interdependence” is shorthand for the transnationalization of world politics—not just events but also ideas, institutions, and decisions. It is a phenomenon that draws societies, and particular groups within societies, closer together, with both positive and negative consequences. There are at least six ways global interdependence may occur. One is through mutual dependence. The US economy, for example, is no longer as autonomous and uniquely powerful as it was at the end of World War II, when the dollar, backed by gold, was the only international currency. In 1985 the United States became a debtor nation for the first time since 1914: Its financial obligations to foreigners—from such things as investments and securities holdings—exceeded foreign obligations to the United States. Second, interdependence describes the integration of the world economy into a single unit. No longer are we talking about capitalist versus socialist (or market versus nonmarket) systems. Today, virtually all the major socialist economies, starting with China, are deeply enmeshed in the global capitalist system of trade, investments, and lending. Even an economy as closed as North Korea's depends heavily on imported food and other international aid.²³

A third way of defining interdependence is in terms of global threats that seem beyond the capacity of states to control through traditional diplomacy. Terrorism, famine, ecological disasters, nuclear proliferation, and the eradication of whole species of plants and animals are examples. Fourth, interdependence may also be thought of as the spillover, typically unintended, of one country's (or region's) problems into another. Domestic issues become transnational ones. The Chernobyl disaster raised Soviet requirements for imported food, reduced Soviet food exports, pushed up world oil prices, put a damper on nuclear arms talks, and caused the biggest one-day drop in stock prices Wall Street had ever experienced. The accident also continues killing and poisoning people in Ukraine and other countries.²⁴

Fifth, interdependence is the interrelationship of seemingly disconnected political-economic phenomena. The so-called greenhouse effect is commonly cited to illustrate this type of interdependence. The rapid buildup of

carbon dioxide in the earth's atmosphere as the result of unprecedented large-scale use of fossil fuels (coal, petroleum, and natural gas), combined with the destruction of forests, is now widely accepted as being responsible for a warming of the earth's temperature. A leading scientific panel in 2007 reported "unequivocal" evidence that climate changes are profoundly altering sea levels and will have serious consequences for food production, world trade, human health, population movement, and even the stability of the polar ice cap.²⁵

Finally, interdependence is manifest in the growing number and political importance of transnational movements and institutions. State-to-state diplomacy remains a fixture in international politics. But it is now supplemented, and in some cases even displaced or upstaged, by the activities of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), for example, to promote human rights and people-to-people assistance; by popular movements for social change (such as the antinuclear, ecological, and women's movements that coordinate efforts around the world); by transnational religious, worker, and political movements (such as Catholic liberation theology, labor unions, and Green parties in Europe and North America); by powerful transnational corporations (TNCs), banks, and financial institutions (such as the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund [IMF]); and occasionally by individuals who act as transnational agents—world citizens, in effect—such as former US President Jimmy Carter when he traveled to North Korea in 1994 in hopes of short-circuiting a nuclear crisis.

Interdependence of whatever variety has one common consequence: It limits the nation-state's ability to conduct business without reference to any but its own interests. When that limitation cuts deeply enough to have lasting effects on, for example, a country's culture, language (speak English, please!),²⁶ social values, tastes, political processes, public policies, treatment of minorities, and market behavior, we have globalization.²⁷ Though the word itself (and equally, internationalization) is now so widely used that it may indeed amount to "globaloney,"²⁸ its intention is to describe a serious matter: the integrating and homogenizing effects that occur when national boundaries are penetrated by powerful forces acting above the state level. These forces are usually economic, driven by the TNCs and multilateral lending institutions such as the IMF that seek to regularize and stabilize world finance and trade in their own interests. But globalization is also technological, political and social, biological, and of course environmental, as we all know from the Internet revolution, the rise of civil society, and the rapid spread of viruses.²⁹

In the abstract, globalization is neutral. It can promote social justice and cooperation within and between countries, such as public-private and international alliances on education, job retraining, unionization, energy conservation, and technology sharing. Through globalization, or in response to it, social forces such as protest movements, ethnic minorities, and NGOs

can gain in their ability to combat or moderate economic, environmental, majoritarian, and other threats from above.³⁰ Or, globalization can primarily be the “global shopping mall,” offering ever-greater opportunities for the richest countries and corporations to marketize the world at the expense of the poorest economies and social groups, the state, and whole cultures.³¹ At the extreme, the consequences can be dire. Benjamin R. Barber captured these in “Jihad vs. McWorld”: jihad being fundamentalist, violent, and opposed to any intrusion of the modern world (such as the Taliban in Afghanistan) and McWorld being universalist, commercial, and devoted to market conformism.³²

The question becomes one of values as much as economics. From a dominant-culture perspective, globalization may appear to be an irresistible and righteous force capable of propelling societies into modernity—the contemporary equivalent of making “backward” societies “advanced,” which was fashionable in the 1950s and 1960s. In fact, the new global way of life sounds suspiciously like a homogenization of US culture and values, fit only for people with money to burn. Maurice Strong said in 1992 as he opened the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED, the so-called Earth Summit) in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil:

The globalisation of capitalism is producing a new and universalising culture symbolised by CNN, brand-name consumer products like Coca-Cola, McDonald’s and Levis, pop music, shopping malls, international airports, hotel chains and conferences. For the privileged minority who participate fully in this culture, it provides an exciting and expanding range of new opportunities and experiences. But for the majority, particularly in the non-Western world who live on its margins, and feed on its crumbs, it is often seen as alien and intimidating. Caught up in the dynamics of modernisation of which they are more victims than beneficiaries, it is no wonder that many react with anxiety and rejection, seeking refuge and identity in their own traditional values and cultures.³³

Such a lopsided division of the fruits of globalization promises a future no more democratic, pluralist, equitable, or environmentally sustainable than that offered by globalization’s fundamentalist opponents. If, instead, commonplace global values such as equal justice for all, the sanctity of life, respect for cultural diversity, and nonviolence were universalized, interdependence and globalization would probably look quite different from “Jihad vs. McWorld.” And that was indeed the promise of the end of the Cold War and a “new world order.”

Trend Line 1: The New Structure of World Affairs

It seems an eternity ago that the first President Bush characterized Gulf War I as an “opportunity to forge for ourselves and for future generations a new world order, a world where the rule of law, not the law of the jun-

gle, governs the conduct of nations.”³⁴ Soon afterward, however, civil strife and humanitarian crises around the world revealed just how disorderly the post–Cold War world was going to be. Nevertheless, the end of the Cold War did result in important rearrangements of the world political economy.

What are these rearrangements? How new and substantial are they?³⁵

Structurally, world politics is increasingly multipolar but with the United States first among equals, as Table 1.1 indicates. Political and economic power is more widely dispersed than at any time since the end of World War II, but not military power. Russia remains a major military power, but its political system, economy, and society suffer from a multitude of problems (see Chapter 6). The EU and China are now the primary other shapers of the global map, and “emerging market” economies (such as Hungary, Brazil, and Turkey) have political clout for the first time. Beyond the Second World and the top layers of the Third World, however, lie over sixty countries representing a majority of the world’s population. For them there is no new order, and some in the Fourth World—states such as Somalia, Haiti, and Afghanistan—are considered “failed” or “quasi” states (see Chapter 4). Fourth World countries have virtually no influence over regional or global decisions unless, like North Korea, they develop a nuclear weapon.

A critical political reality of the post–Cold War world is the struggle for global authority between (US) unipolarity and multipolarity. As the only superpower, the views and actions of the United States are often decisive in determining the capacity and willingness of the international community to respond to crises such as Iraq’s attack on Kuwait, genocide in Bosnia and Rwanda, and financial chaos in Mexico and Asia between 1994 and 1998. At the same time, only the United States is so consistently prepared to act unilaterally on major international issues regardless of other countries’ views—such as the waging of preventive war against Iraq in 2003 and the rejection of an international treaty (the 1998 Rome Treaty that created the International Criminal Court) that a previous president had signed. No other country lectures other governments on how they should run their economies (as the United States did to Japan and Indonesia in 1998); how they should define and implement human rights (from China to Nigeria); or where their (Europe’s) companies should not invest (Iran and Cuba). Yet when it comes to intractable disputes, such as between Israel and the Palestinian Authority (PA) and in Northern Ireland, it is the United States that is the essential broker. In short, one superpower dominates the international stage, and does so without worrying about double standards, such as not paying a good part of its UN dues while making full use of the UN’s peacekeeping operations,³⁶ and preaching arms control while being the world’s leading arms seller. But the United States cannot do as it pleases without consequences: The rest of the world went ahead with international agreements on global warming (the

Kyoto Protocol) and the International Criminal Court, and refused to provide funds or soldiers for the Iraq war.

A second essential new political reality is the tension between globalization and nationalism. The demise of nationalism has been regularly predicted by experts ever since the industrial age. Instead, we see that the more integrated the world economy becomes, the more frequently do nationalism and its offshoots, localism, ethnic nationalism, and transnationalism, assert themselves—for example, in weakened border security, restrictions on immigration and the entry of genetically modified organisms (GMOs) into the food chain, government takeovers of foreign companies, and formation of regional economic groups such as the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA). “They” prefer not to become more like “us” or to play by globalization’s rules. Globalization can overwhelm cultures and economies, producing (in Kofi Annan’s words) “greater vulnerability to unfamiliar and unpredictable forces that can bring on economic instability and social dislocation.”³⁷ Angered by threats to sovereignty, indigenous rights, and cultural traditions, impotent to deal with the power of the global marketplace, or facing loss of one-time glory, nationalists of all stripes seek alternatives to globalization.³⁸

Powerful economic and social forces are eroding the sovereignty and power of the nation-state, yet the state remains the essential actor in world affairs. On one hand, the nation-state is again under assault from “nations” demanding ethnic or cultural autonomy, and, less frequently, statehood. Literally hundreds of ethnic groups confront states that are determined to impose their authority at any cost. The opportunity for these groups came with two developments as the 1980s ended: the collapse of socialism, which (as a unifying vision that inspired the Russian Revolution) had sought to provide a new basis of national loyalty and international legitimacy; and sharp economic decline in much of the world. These forces unleashed long-suppressed ethnic and cultural antagonisms and aspirations capable of being seized upon by unscrupulous politicians, such as the former Yugoslavia’s Slobodan Milosevic.

Transnational loyalties have also undermined the state, very much in response to globalization. Civil-society NGOs, one kind of transnational organization, act as watchdogs of human rights, the environment, gender equity, and many other social areas impacted by globalization. NGOs are said not only to be influencing debate on these issues; they often also provide settings for diversifying and universalizing the values and ideas that underlie such debate.³⁹ Terror networks such as Al-Qaida, on the other hand, rely on often arbitrary violence to destroy what is believed to have been imposed. Thus, while President Bush asked, “Why do they [Al-Qaida] hate us?” it seems clear that US policies and not US freedoms were the issue: policies that supported Israel and corrupt, faithless monarchies in the

Middle East. The multinational corporation is a third type of transnational organization. Leading corporate globalists see the nation-state as an anachronism in an interdependent world economy. Only the global corporation, they say, can deliver the goods and security people want. But the economic prominence of the Chinese, Jews, Indians, and other geographically dispersed groups demonstrates a fourth transnational loyalty—to “tribes” and networks that have staked their futures on values such as educational excellence, thrift, and family.⁴⁰

The appeal and forcefulness of sovereign statehood remains substantial, however. After the Cold War ended, fifteen new states were carved out of the former Soviet Union (FSU) alone, such as Georgia, Ukraine, and Belarus. There were 167 states in 1988 (compared with 51 in 1945); today, there are 192. Even though nationalism turned against the multicultural state, bringing down the USSR and Yugoslavia in 1991, new political leaderships created new states or reestablished old ones, often on the basis of shared ethnicity. In the Baltic states of Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, the Soviet collapse permitted the recovery of lost sovereignty and led to attempts to kick out Russian minorities. Elsewhere, the quest for statehood, or at least greater autonomy from the state, found Chechens at war with Russia, Uighurs in conflict with China, and East Timorese successfully gaining independence from Indonesia.

Unprecedented opportunities are available for national economic renewal because of increased global interdependence in science, technology, trade, and investment. The world economy is a single capitalist system. At least in theory, with economic competition replacing Cold War competition, interdependence and globalization of markets ought to be able to propel national economies to higher levels of performance.

But several countertrends are apparent. Trade protectionism has intensified, making global trade arrangements more difficult to negotiate and enforce. Regional trading areas mentioned earlier, such as NAFTA, have become preferred routes to national prosperity. Moreover, real economic power in world affairs has not dispersed. It remains vested in the North—North America, Japan, and Europe—measured not just in terms of output and income levels but equally in terms of worldwide cultural influence, authorship of scientific papers and methods, technological solutions, telecommunications ownership, and political practices. Hence, the prospects for economic renewal continue to leave most of the underdeveloped South, especially Africa, out of the picture.

The intensifying competition for markets and profits has redefined the national interest. In the name of globalization, national economic policy has become synonymous with the downsizing of work forces and corporate megamergers. German businesses, in defiance of traditional practice, are increasingly exporting jobs to sustain “growth”; US and European businesses are casting off workers to satisfy stockholders and stay competitive; and

corporate mergers between and among Japanese, European, and US firms are at record levels, greatly reducing competition in virtually every industrial and service sector. Meanwhile, “economic diplomacy” has supplanted ordinary diplomacy: Energy, technology, and investment interests, and opportunities to earn hard currency now dominate over strategic calculations in high-level decisionmaking, even when the transactions have military applications. (These matters are detailed in Chapters 2 and 5.)

Notwithstanding ongoing wars, military power, particularly in nuclear and other nonconventional weapons, is growing less salient to national and international security as other, global factors come into play. These include protection of land, water, and other natural resources; energy needs; economic management and productivity; scientific and technological innovation; and access to information. The ability to invest in these other sources of power was greatly enhanced by the end of the Cold War. Important reductions in national military-industrial complexes were made beginning in 1990, such as in the active-duty forces of the United States, its European allies, Russia, and China; in US and Russian nuclear-weapon stockpiles; in the real defense spending of those forces (China excepted); in employment at the world’s largest arms-manufacturing firms; and in the value of conventional arms exports worldwide.

But these developments are a far cry from demilitarization and the abolition of war. Wars on every scale continue to be fought at enormous cost, for even though the number of wars and armed conflicts has gone down (from 62 in 1993 to 42 in 2003),⁴¹ access to small arms and the resources (such as gems and timber) with which to purchase them has expanded. UN peacekeeping missions have sometimes been able to assist in bringing about cease-fires and temporary political settlements (in, for example, Cambodia, Mozambique, Haiti, and Angola), and accords have been reached in a few long-lasting conflicts, such as in Guatemala (1961–1996), Northern Ireland (1969–1998), and East Timor (1975–1999).⁴² But many intractable conflicts remain so; the peacekeeping map is littered with examples of agreements that failed to become settlements. The most prominent is Israel and Palestine, despite agreements reached since the Oslo accords in 1993 that briefly held out hope of a land-for-peace agreement. (The 2003 “road map” pieced together by the United States, the UN, the EU, and Russia, we might recall, was supposed to lead to a “final and comprehensive settlement” by 2005.⁴³) Other failed peace accords include North and South Korea, Sri Lanka’s civil war, India-Pakistan, and Greek-Turkish Cyprus, all of which have seen minimal progress in genuine conflict resolution.

Since the 1990s, civil wars have resumed or escalated in Somalia, Afghanistan, Liberia, the Democratic Republic of Congo (formerly Zaire), and Sudan. Losses of life in these conflicts are enormous, and most of them continue whether or not there is UN mediation or monitoring.⁴⁴ But the most typical, and even more deadly, internal conflicts of recent times are

along ethnic lines: the Turkish and Iraqi wars on the Kurds (over 100,000 deaths since 1961); Russia's intervention in Chechnya to prevent secession (around 50,000 deaths from 1994 to 1996); the Hutu slaughter of over a half-million Tutsis and moderate Hutus in Rwanda (1994–1995); the Tutsi slaughter of about 170,000 Hutus in Burundi (1988–1995); and “ethnic cleansing” in the former Yugoslavia, for the most part by Serbian forces against Muslims in Bosnia.⁴⁵

As in the old order, too, international violence has been fueled by the spread of nuclear-weapons and missile technology and by a hyperactive international arms market. Led by the United States, the five permanent members of the Security Council—the very governments whose leadership is essential to a new military order—remain the major arms sellers. One circumstance that has changed, as Asia demonstrates, is the extent to which economic opportunities now drive arms spending and sales. Military budgets have risen along with gross national product (GNP) in several Asian states, starting with China but now including Japan. The Middle East, meanwhile, remains the largest market for arms by far.⁴⁶

International approaches to global problems are increasing, but the insistence on state sovereignty continues to be a formidable obstacle to the realization of human and common security. Peacekeeping operations (PKOs) are an example. In 2005 the UN was carrying out seventeen PKOs, at a cost of roughly \$4.5 billion. Altogether, of sixty peacekeeping operations since 1948, twenty-nine began in the 1990s and twelve are still in place (see Table 1.2). Their functions range from observation of cease-fires (such as between India and Pakistan) and monitoring of internal wars (Sudan) to support of political processes (East Timor) and “stabilization” of chaotic conditions (Haiti). The figures reflect a huge post-Cold War upsurge in resort to the UN.⁴⁷

But the peacekeeping function has rarely evolved into the kind of collective security envisioned by the UN's founders, with the exception of the international coalition formed against Iraq in 1991. One reason is the end of the Cold War: Even though great-power interests no longer collide over territory or ideology, the stakes—particularly in civil wars—are usually insufficient to attract collective action. In this twilight zone, there is room for outrageous international behavior by petty zealots and terrorist organizations to pursue their objectives, which are often narrowly nationalistic and delusional. Among many examples, we may cite the Bosnian Serb leader, Radovan Karadzic, who sought to dismember Bosnia and went so far as to capture hundreds of UN peacekeepers in mid-1995 in response to the UN mission's efforts to stop the bombing of civilians; the campaign of the Armed Islamic Group in Algeria to kill allegedly pro-Western journalists (forty-six were killed in the course of civil warfare that claimed around 30,000 lives between 1992 and 1995);⁴⁸ Burma's junta, SLORC (the State Law and Order Restoration Council),⁴⁹ helped along with Chinese arms and

Table 1.2 UN Peacekeeping Operations (2005)

<p>UNTSO Since May 1948 United Nations Truce Supervision Organization</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Total strength (military and civilian): 384 •Appropriation 2005: \$29.04 million 	<p>MONUC Since November 1999 United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Total strength (military and civilian): 18,903 •Approved budget 07/04–06/05: \$957.83 million
<p>UNMOGIP Since January 1949 United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Total strength (military and civilian): 114 •Appropriation 2005: \$8.37 million 	<p>UNMEE Since July 2000 United Nations Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Total strength (military and civilian): 3,917 •Approved budget 07/04–06/05: \$205.33 million
<p>UNFICYP Since March 1964 United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Total strength (military and civilian): 1,198 •Approved budget 07/04–06/05: \$50.69 million (gross) including voluntary contributions of one-third from Cyprus and \$6.5 million from Greece 	<p>UNMISSET Since May 2002 United Nations Mission of Support in East Timor</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Total strength (military and civilian): 1,540 •Approved budget 07/04–06/05: \$82.21 million
<p>UNDOF Since June 1974 United Nations Disengagement Observer Force</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Total strength (military and civilian): 1,174 •Approved budget 07/04–06/05: \$40.90 million 	<p>UNMIL Since September 2003 United Nations Mission in Liberia</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Total strength (military and civilian): 17,558 •Approved budget 07/04–06/05: \$822.11 million
<p>UNIFIL Since March 1978 United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Total strength (military and civilian): 2,387 •Approved budget 07/04–06/05: \$92.96 million 	<p>UNOCI Since April 2004 United Nations Operation in Côte d'Ivoire</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Total strength (military and civilian): 6,864 •Approved budget 07/04–06/05: \$378.47 million
<p>MINURSO Since April 1991 United Nations Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Total strength (military and civilian): 465 •Approved budget 07/04–06/05: \$44.00 million 	<p>MINUSTAH Since June 2004 United Nations Stabilization Mission in Haiti</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Authorized strength (military and civilian): 8,322 •Total current strength (military and civilian): 8,939 •Approved budget 07/04–06/05: \$379.05 million
<p>UNOMIG Since August 1993 United Nations Observer Mission in Georgia</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Total strength (military and civilian): 414 •Approved budget 07/04–06/05: \$31.93 million 	<p>ONUB Since June 2004 United Nations Operation in Burundi</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Total strength (military and civilian): 6,254 •Approved budget 07/04–06/05: \$329.71 million
<p>UNMIK Since June 1999 United Nations Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Total strength (military and civilian): 6,830 •Approved budget 07/04–06/05: \$294.63 million 	<p>UNMIS Since March 2005 United Nations Mission in the Sudan</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Authorized strength (military and civilian): 14,579 •Total current strength (military and civilian): 645 •Commitment authority 07/04–06/05: \$279.50 million
<p>UNAMSIL Since October 1999 United Nations Mission in Sierra Leone</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> •Total strength (military and civilian): 4,245 •Approved budget 07/04–06/05: \$291.60 million 	

Source: United Nations Department of Public Information, DPI/1634/Rev.46, April 2005.

kept afloat with opium and heroin profits; Laurent Kabila, the Democratic Republic of Congo's leader, whose forces probably massacred Rwandan Hutu refugees and then prevented various UN missions from investigating the massacres; and the various terrorist groups that exploded a bomb under the World Trade Center in New York in February 1993, released sarin nerve gas (while also researching biological weapons) in the Tokyo subway in March 1995, in April 1995 planted a bomb that destroyed the federal office building in Oklahoma City, and flew airplanes into the World Trade Center and the Pentagon in 2001.

When it comes to the two most demanding kinds of peacekeeping—conflict prevention and response to genocide and mass murder—the UN (which is to say, the member states) has been found wanting. If Secretary-General Kofi Annan had had his way, that would have changed. During his tenure, Annan was on a personal crusade to redefine state sovereignty so as to open the door to preventive UN interventions in cases of crimes against humanity. Clearly motivated by the humanitarian disasters in Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia, he said: “Where such crimes occur and peaceful attempts to halt them have been exhausted, the Security Council has a moral duty to act on behalf of the international community. The fact that we cannot protect people everywhere is no reason for doing nothing when we can.”⁵⁰ He also urged the acceptance of “an international norm against the violent repression of minorities that will and must take precedence over concerns of State sovereignty.”⁵¹ Annan was not calling for the authority immediately to order peacekeeping units into battle. But he *was* insisting that “in the face of mass murder [armed intervention] is an option that cannot be relinquished.”⁵²

The problems with responding positively to Annan's call rest more with the so-called international community. Cost aside, the idea of giving the Security Council authority to intervene in internal wars is unappealing to all three sets of actors: the countries where civil wars have already brought about a humanitarian crisis, the countries where internal fighting might lead to a humanitarian crisis, and the countries that would have to provide troops and logistical support. None is excited at the prospect of a foreign intervention that would probably last for several years. The international failure to respond to the genocide in Sudan's Darfur region—a case in which the Security Council voted for intervention but failed to dispatch forces when the president of Sudan protested—or to mass murder in the Democratic Republic of Congo is testimony to the lack of commitment to act.

Real peacekeeping, where blood as well as treasure might have to be expended on behalf of international security, either preventively or after the fact, is thus becoming more difficult to organize and requires more personnel at precisely the moment when there are so many communal and other types of internal wars—around twenty-five today. When it comes down to a choice between “respecting state sovereignty” and incurring moral and

material responsibility to act, state leaders will choose sovereignty every time. National interests prevail today as they always have, so that even when states (notably the richest ones) agree to support PKOs, they are careful to limit their commitments. As a result, we find that whereas Third World countries have contributed the bulk of soldiers to UN-authorized PKOs—led by Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan—the United States and the EU have provided money and logistical help but usually deployed troops only in support of operations (wars in Bosnia, Kosovo, Iraq, and Afghanistan, and along the Israel-Egypt and Israel-Lebanon borders) *outside* UN control.⁵³

“Civil societies” committed to democratic practices have become important in the politics of a number of formerly authoritarian governments, notably in the FSU and Eastern Europe, but also in some Third World countries.⁵⁴ In a few instances popular protests and civil-society groups have led directly to positive political change. In November 2005 Ukraine’s “Orange Revolution” toppled an unpopular ruler who tried to steal an election.⁵⁵ In Nepal, after King Gyanendra seized power in 2005 and put an end to parliamentary government, arguing that tight control was needed in order to defeat a Maoist insurgency, young people took the lead in protests aimed at restoring democracy—and won to the extent that the king agreed to restore parliament and political parties. The Maoists will now compete for power by lawful methods. On the other side of Latin American corruption are heartening developments in the rule of law. In Mexico a team of researchers under the special prosecutor’s office drafted a detailed account of a “genocide plan” carried out by the army from the late 1960s to the early 1970s against government critics.⁵⁶ The government of Luis Echeverría instigated the plan, and he was arrested in July 2006 despite the Fox administration’s initial unwillingness to release their findings. The report on Mexico’s “dirty war” follows on similar official admissions by the Argentine and Chilean governments, and on a greater willingness across Latin America to respond to the demands of human-rights groups for recognition of official crimes and the granting of compensation to victims.⁵⁷

But the existence of civil society does not ensure that politics will be conducted in accordance with democratic norms. In fact, democratically elected governments in the post-Cold War era have often acted with total disregard for constitutional liberal traditions such as the rule of law, shared powers, and respect for civil liberties.⁵⁸ Thus, our second time line is on the limits of global democratization.

Trend Line 2: Democratization’s Rise and Fall

In a number of countries since the 1990s, dictators were replaced and the worst abuses of power were eliminated, but elements of democratic governance failed to materialize. From post-Soviet central Europe (such as

Latvia, Lithuania, Armenia, Azerbaijan, the former Yugoslavia, and Belarus) to Latin America (Mexico, Venezuela, Peru, Guatemala), Africa (including Côte d'Ivoire, Zambia, Kenya, Algeria, and Nigeria), and Asia (Cambodia), democratic experiments were overwhelmed by a multitude of pressures. One of them was the persistence of authoritarian political cultures and traditions. In Africa, for instance, the failure of democratization was attributed to "incumbents [who] have been rewriting the rules of the game, bullying opponents and restricting the press so as to be able to hold onto power regardless of their popularity or the success of their programs."⁵⁹ In the case of the FSU, former communists returned to power on the heels of separatism and civil war. Where political and economic reforms were promised, such as in Poland, Slovakia, and Hungary, the failure to deliver has led to populist reactions and the potential for a dangerous drift to the right.

One thing has become clear: Democracy understood narrowly in terms of elections is flawed. Rigged elections of presidents and parliaments are all too common; so are elections that merely confirm one-party rule, as in Singapore, or that are used by leaders to eliminate their opponents. Nearly all of Ukraine's and Russia's closest neighbors, such as Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, Belarus, and Azerbaijan, have elected leaders who run their countries like dictators and expect to be presidents-for-life.⁶⁰ Or consider the Philippines, where the legacy of people power that drove Ferdinand Marcos from power in 1986 has not, despite all the elections since then, caused any real change in that country's pattern of elite domination.⁶¹ After President Joseph Estrada was forced from office in January 2001 under questionable constitutional procedures, his vice president and successor, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo, was able to mobilize street demonstrations and the military's support. As president, she ordered Estrada's arrest, which prompted his supporters to take to the streets in what she chose to call a "state of rebellion." That allowed for further arrests of her opponents. In 2005 and into 2006, however, she too faced pressure to resign after she apparently tried to fix an election result.

Free elections have experienced numerous setbacks in the new millennium: presidents in Indonesia (Abdurrahman Wahid), Argentina (Fernando de la Rúa), Peru (Alberto Fujimori in November 2000), Ecuador (Jamil Mahuad, 2000), Thailand (Thaksin Shinawatra, 2006), and Georgia (Eduard Shevardnadze, 2003) were beset by charges of corruption, cronyism, unconstitutional conduct, or incompetence; all were forced from office, though only one (Fujimori) was actually convicted of a crime. Haiti's elected president, Jean-Bertrand Aristide, was forced out in 2005 by mob violence and US pressure. Elections have occurred periodically in Cambodia, but under Hun Sen, the country's opposition parties and independent organizations have been intimidated and their leaders jailed or forced into exile.⁶² In Mongolia, one of the few countries bordering Russia and China that seemed

to have a successful democratic transition, leading democratic voices were strong-armed out of the parliament early in 2006 by former communists.

More than any factor, corruption sinks democratic hopes. Opinion polls show that widespread corruption has created a dramatic loss of confidence in democratic rule throughout Latin America.⁶³ Efforts to democratize (particularly if measured mainly in terms of free elections) cannot compete with official patronage, nepotism, and bribery. Both populist governments on the left, such as Luiz Inácio “Lula” da Silva in Brazil, and free-market regimes such as in Vicente Fox’s Mexico and Alejandro Toledo’s Peru, have been equally vulnerable to corruption on a grand scale. And these were reformists who came to power with the usual promises to clean up corruption.

To some extent corruption is in turn a consequence of economic globalization. Newfound wealth has turned political leaders into oligarchs, and vice-versa. Between 1995 and 1998, for instance, financial scandals in officialdom caused political upheavals in Italy, France, Japan, South Korea, Thailand, Colombia, Venezuela, and Peru. Russian politics, as pointed out in Chapter 6, has become overwhelmed by moneyed interests. Bribery and kickbacks are standard practices in international business, and experts say that large-scale foreign investment in emerging economies is a major reason that corruption in general costs an astounding \$167 billion a year.⁶⁴ Even some of China’s notorious “princelings,” the sons and daughters of senior party and military leaders, could not be spared when payoffs to them were exposed. Old-time and new leaders alike, such as Mobutu of Zaire, the Salinas family in Mexico, President Suharto in Indonesia, Franjo Tudjman (president of Croatia), and the Bhutto family in Pakistan, exploited their power to amass great fortunes.⁶⁵ Trafficking and smuggling in drugs, nuclear materials, and weapons, and the virtual enslavement of women, children, and migrant workers were frequently in the news thanks to an expanding number of drug cartels, crime syndicates, and (in Burma, China, and Mexico) the military’s involvement.⁶⁶ The Mafia now goes by many names, with Japanese, Russian, Chinese, Indian, and other national variations. Not surprisingly, the countries considered by international businesses to be the most corrupt are also prominent among those where democracy has failed.⁶⁷

What such stories also tell us is that the barriers to exporting democracy, which is a fixture in US foreign policy, are very high. US-funded organizations that have sought to assist opposition politicians in the former Soviet Union—organizations that had a hand in successful pro-democracy movements in Ukraine, Georgia, and Kyrgyzstan—have been harassed, apparently with Russia’s full support.⁶⁸ NGOs that seek to promote democracy are being restricted or forced to leave in Latin America and Africa as well.⁶⁹ On the other hand, exporting the US style of electoral politics, with its emphasis on telemarketing, political consultants, and image making, may have unfortunate consequences for democracy. As one study has found, the commercialization

and engineering of elections means that a competition of ideas and genuine popular choice is seriously circumscribed.⁷⁰ Second, supporting democratization in a political system unused to it may be a waste of money that could be better spent on human-development projects. Third, governments that restrict foreign NGOs may sometimes be right in doing so. Just as the US government regards foreign involvement in its electoral process as intolerable, and makes it illegal, so other governments consider US-backed NGOs merely fronts for interfering in their political processes. As we will see in the Haiti and Venezuela cases (Chapter 4), supposedly pro-democracy organizations backed by the United States did interfere, and in destructive ways.

The growth of democracy and civil society is invariably impeded by political violence, whether carried out in the name of the state and “national security” or by terrorist and other anti-state groups. Studying the US war on terror is thus a suitable closing topic, for it reveals much about what the post-Cold War order has come to mean, for democracy building within countries, for the structure of international relations, and for the prospects of creating a humane world order.

Case Study 1: 9/11 and the War on Terror

After the 9/11 attacks, US leaders launched the kind of crusade they had embarked on once before, against “international communism.” But while “terrorism” was intended to concretize the main enemy, it actually distorted the nature and magnified the capabilities of terrorist organizations, which are not at all like those of regular armies encountered on battlefields.⁷¹ The response to the attacks, the invasion of Afghanistan in pursuit of Al-Qaida’s leaders, had near-universal support for the simple reason that it focused on destroying a particular terrorist organization that boasted of its responsibility for the attacks. But what should have been an international police action to kill or capture Al-Qaida criminals, in the manner of an Interpol operation against drug dealers or human traffickers, became merely prelude to—and justification for—the invasion and occupation of Iraq. With the invasion, the United States rapidly lost international support and the legitimacy of its response.

Since the 9/11 attacks terrorism has leaped to the top of the list of international security problems. But a clear understanding of terrorism is clouded by political biases. State leaders consider terrorists to be those groups, foreign or domestic, that use violence against them, as well as other states (typically labeled “rogues”) that may support such violence. They thus omit not only terrorist acts that those same state leaders may sponsor, but also homegrown political violence by individuals. Such partial definitions are actually an old story that traces back to Europe immediately after World War II and throughout the Cold War, when debate focused on the violence of revolutionary parties and movements, as well as the states that opposed

them.⁷² Were Algerian and Vietnamese revolutionaries terrorists or nationalists? Or were the Algerian and Vietnamese governments the real terrorists for suppressing genuinely popular uprisings? Were the Nicaraguan *contras* and the Afghani *mujahedeen* freedom fighters or terrorists? Was the Soviet Union guilty of terrorism when it invaded Czechoslovakia and Afghanistan? Was the United States guilty of terrorism when it bombed Libya and helped overthrow governments from Guatemala to Iran? These questions had little to do with clarifying the nature of terrorism; they were answered mainly in accordance with one's political preferences in relation to acts of violence, whether by groups or states.

The terrorism issue became further muddled by the character of Al-Qaida, a transnational organization without a distinct headquarters or political program, but with a fundamentalist message and millenarian aims. Washington contributed to the confusion not only by portraying Al-Qaida as a monolithic entity, but also by exaggerating its links with other Islamic groups and "rogue" governments in and beyond the Middle East. All militant groups were painted with the same brush, and the diverse causes of political instability were conflated into one. Ignored were early warnings from regional specialists that relying on military means risked having the war on terrorism perceived as a war on Islam.⁷³ George W. Bush denied that aim; but speeches by members of his administration consistently equated terrorism with Islamic fundamentalism, thus dismissing the need to examine dispassionately Al-Qaida's motives. As Chris Hedges has so eloquently observed:

By accepting the facile cliché that the battle under way against terrorism is a battle against evil, by easily branding those who fight us as the barbarians, we, like them, refuse to acknowledge our own culpability. We ignore real injustices that have led many of those arrayed against us to their rage and despair.⁷⁴

The implications of these distortions of the terror issue are consequential for world politics. No sooner had Bush classified the search for Osama bin Laden, Al-Qaida's leader, as part of an endless war on terror than other state leaders began reframing their own wars. China's ethnic minority separatists; Chechnya fighters in Russia; Kashmiris challenging India; antigovernment groups from Saudi Arabia to Colombia; and Hamas, Hezbollah, and Palestinian groups fighting Israel—all were reclassified as terrorists by those out to destroy them. (As Israel's minister of public security said, at a time when Yasser Arafat headed the Palestinian Authority: "Arafat is of course no different than bin Laden. The PLO [Palestine Liberation Organization] and the Palestinian Authority are equal to the al Qaeda."⁷⁵) This is not to say that terrorists are a figment of the imagination in these or many other conflicts. But these conflicts predated the war on terror and are highly likely to go on regardless of when or whether the war on terror ends.

They reflect national conditions, not some global master plan, just as did leftist revolutions during the Cold War.

The debate about what to do about terrorism proved equally as confounding and misleading as the debate about terrorism's identity. If counterterrorism meant war, what were the war's boundaries, which states were appropriate allies, and how long might the war last and cost? Bush promised that the war on terror "will not end until every terrorist group of global reach has been found, stopped, and defeated."⁷⁶ Some top US officials put forth a new interpretation of sovereignty that allowed the United States and others the right to intervene against states that "support terrorism."⁷⁷ That goal set an extraordinary agenda: launching military strikes against certain states (not just Iraq and Afghanistan but perhaps Iran and North Korea as well); financing unsavory groups that sought to overthrow "pro-terrorist" governments, as in Somalia;⁷⁸ or providing military assistance to governments that proclaimed their need of help against home-grown terrorists, as in Central and Southeast Asia. These approaches entailed large and oftentimes dysfunctional commitments, such as to undemocratic governments in Indonesia and Pakistan.⁷⁹

The new US doctrine of "limited sovereignty" also spelled trouble for international security generally. If the United States gave itself permission to intervene against terrorists, so might other governments. A terrorist assault on the Indian parliament by gunmen who evidently belonged to an organization based in Pakistan brought the two countries to the brink of war as 2001 ended.⁸⁰ Further, "limited sovereignty" meant a limited role for the United Nations, since under the Bush Doctrine (see Chapter 2) the United States did not regard Security Council endorsement as essential to fighting terrorism or anything else. The United States did obtain the Security Council's passage of Resolution 1368 shortly after 9/11; it required all states to block the financing, recruitment, arming, and freedom of movement of terrorist groups. However, the document did not define "terrorist," and its lack of specific endorsement of action against countries believed to be harboring or abetting terrorists made it easier for Bush to justify unilateral intervention in both Afghanistan and Iraq.

The war on terrorism was containment redux. From Yemen to the Philippines to Colombia, the United States used the opportunity of the war to create the impression that internal conflicts of widely varying histories were somehow linked. The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC)'s drug-financed war against the Colombian government, the thirty-year-old Muslim rebellion of Abu Sayyaf in the southern Philippines, and antigovernment violence in Yemen all were classified as terrorist conflicts. No credible effort was made to prove a relationship between any of these conflicts and Al-Qaida; it was simply stated by the Bush administration and generally reported as fact in the mainstream media. Yet, as a former chief of

counterintelligence in the US Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) wrote, spreading the war increased the risks: “There is a difference between retaliating against Al-Qaida and its sponsors or affiliates, which can be understood as self-defense, and confronting a somewhat random series of armed groups. The difference may be that between finding enemies and making them.”⁸¹ By 2006 the assessment that the Iraq war had worsened the struggle against terrorism had gained acceptance throughout the US intelligence community.⁸² Hezbollah’s fight with Israel in mid-2006 may create another such situation.⁸³

All the attention devoted to terrorism as a new threat to global security has come at a price: attention taken away from the more enduring sources of misery, conflict, and consequent despair that plague impoverished societies and peoples, certainly including Palestine.⁸⁴ This, despite the widespread view, to which top US government officials subscribe, that terrorism (in the words of Secretary of State Colin Powell) “really flourishes in areas of poverty, despair and hopelessness, where people see no future.”⁸⁵ But the Bush administration evidently preferred the use of force to financing a war on poverty. Secretary-General Annan put the priority correctly when he said in 2003, with clear reference to US policy in Iraq:

All of us know there are new threats that must be faced or, perhaps, old threats in new and dangerous combinations, new forms of terrorism and the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction. But while some consider these threats as self-evidently the main challenge to world peace and security, others feel more immediately menaced by small arms employed in civil conflict or by so-called soft threats such as the persistence of extreme poverty, the disparity of income between and within societies, and the spread of infectious diseases, or climate change and environmental degradation. . . . We now see, with chilling clarity, that a world where many millions of people endure brutal oppression and extreme misery will never be fully secure, even for its most privileged inhabitants.⁸⁶

At one level Annan was sending the message that the immediate security concerns of the United States are not necessarily those of other countries. But at a deeper level, he was trying to gain perspective on the 9/11 attacks by reminding world leaders that come what may in the use of force to defeat terrorism, the root causes of international insecurity will still be with us and will require more sophisticated and long-term responses. And on that point he has been joined by a host of development experts who warn that if the United States and other major powers persist in “empower[ing] weak, autocratic, and corrupt states” rather than working to strengthen their legitimacy and effectiveness, such as by meeting people’s basic needs, political violence is likely to spread.⁸⁷ That is a point worth remembering as we consider how differently realists, globalists, and global humanists evaluate world politics in general and the Third World in particular.

Notes

1. Francis Fukuyama, "The End of History?" *The National Interest*.
2. U Thant, Address of May 9, 1969, "Ten Crucial Years," *United Nations Monthly Chronicle*, p. ii.
3. "World Scientists' Warning to Humanity," pamphlet produced by the Union of Concerned Scientists, 1992.
4. *New York Times* (hereafter, *NYT*), September 5, 2000, p. A13.
5. Willy Brandt et al., *North-South, A Program for Survival*, p. 58.
6. Jeffrey D. Sachs, *The End of Poverty: Economic Possibilities for Our Time* (New York: Penguin, 2005), pp. 20–21.
7. Yuri Dikhanov, *Trends in Global Income Distribution, 1970–2000, and Scenarios for 2015*, pp. 43, 47.
8. Ivan L. Head, "South-North Dangers," *Foreign Affairs*, p. 77.
9. According to a long-term worldwide assessment that concluded in 1998; see *NYT*, April 9, 1998, p. 1.
10. "Recent Trends in Military Expenditures," Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI), at www.sipri.org/contents/milap/milex/mex_trends.html (2006).
11. The estimate on world hunger is from a United Nations report cited in *NYT*, December 8, 2004, p. A5. On the spending alternatives, see Ruth Leger-Sivard, ed., *World Military and Social Expenditures 1983: An Annual Report on World Priorities*, p. 5; Brandt et al., p. 14.
12. World Bank, *World Development Report 1992: Development and the Environment*, p. 27 (hereafter, *World Development Report 1992*); study by the World Health Organization and the UN Environment Program reported in *The Oregonian*, December 2, 1992, p. A7.
13. David Keen, *Refugees: Rationing the Right to Life*, p. 3.
14. Warren Hoge, "Nations Benefit From Migration, U.N. Study Says," *NYT*, June 7, 2006, p. A8.
15. Nicholas D. Kristof, "Malaria Makes a Comeback, and Is More Deadly Than Before," *NYT*, January 8, 1997, p. A7.
16. Lawrence K. Altman and Elisabeth Rosenthal, "U.N. Strengthens Call for a Global Battle Against AIDS," *NYT*, June 3, 2006, online ed. at www.nytimes.com.
17. Elisabeth Malkin, "At World Forum, Support Erodes for Private Management of Water," *NYT*, March 20, 2006, p. A11.
18. John Heilprin (Associated Press), "Earth's Temperature Is Highest in Centuries," AOL News, June 23, 2006, online at <http://news.aol.com>.
19. Todd S. Purdum, "Several U.S. Allies Criticized in Powell Report on Slave Trading," *NYT*, June 6, 2002, p. A13.
20. See Robert A. Isaak, *International Political Economy: Managing World Economic Change*, p. 2. There are several different emphases to "international political economy," reflecting narrower or broader understandings of what "politics" comprises. For a sense of the diversity, see R. Dan Walleri, "The Political Economy Literature on North-South Relations: Alternative Approaches and Empirical Evidence," *International Studies Quarterly*; James Petras, *Critical Perspectives on Imperialism and Social Class in the Third World*, ch. 1; and Robert J. Gilpin, *U.S. Power and the Multinational Corporations*, ch. 1.
21. Humane values and norms, as key elements in the global-humanist (or "world order") perspective, are discussed in the following major works: Richard A. Falk, *A Study of Future Worlds* (the introduction includes discussion of the World Order Models Project); Richard A. Falk, Samuel S. Kim, and Saul H. Mendlovitz, eds., *Toward a Just World Order*, vol. 1; Samuel S. Kim, *The Quest for a Just World*

Order; Saul H. Mendlovitz, ed., *On the Creation of a Just World Order*; and Johan Galtung, *The True Worlds: A Transnational Perspective*.

22. Kissinger, quoted in Charles W. Kegley Jr., and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trend and Transformation* (1981 ed.), p. 29.

23. About 90 percent of North Korea's total imports in 2003 consisted of food and other foreign aid. See Stephan Haggard and Marcus Noland, *Hunger and Human Rights: The Politics of Famine in North Korea*, fig. 2, p. 15.

24. Total deaths from the accident may be in the range of several thousand. The impact of radiation on children, notably a high incidence of thyroid cancer, has been particularly severe. "Chernobyl will be with us forever," said Ukraine's health minister (*NYT*, April 23, 1998, p. A5), although the plant itself was shut down for good in 2006. Medical sources from around the world can only guess how many additional people will die, become ill, or suffer genetic disorders, in Ukraine, neighboring Belarus, and worldwide, from the radiation. See Harvey Wasserman, "In the Dead Zone: Aftermath of the Apocalypse," *The Nation*.

25. This is the report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. See *NYT*, February 3, 2007, p. 1. The full report is expected to be released in late 2007, and will be available at www.ipcc.ch.

26. For a European view of English as the language of globalization, including on the World Wide Web, see Jeanne Peiffer, "The Plurilingual European Tradition as a Challenge to Globalization," in Inoue Nobutaka, ed., *Globalization and Indigenous Culture*.

27. Wolfgang H. Reinicke, "Global Public Policy," *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 127–38. With reference to economics, Reinicke proposes that interdependence is macroeconomic in its consequences, and globalization is microeconomic.

28. Richard J. Barnet and John Cavanagh, *Global Dreams: Imperial Corporations and the New World Order*, pp. 13–14.

29. Two other excellent sources on the meaning of globalization are P.J. Simmons and Chantal de Jonge Oudraat, eds., *Managing Global Issues: Lessons Learned*, and David Held et al., *Global Transformations: Politics, Economics, and Culture*.

30. One example is the cooperation between US and Mexican labor unions that has occurred as a direct result of NAFTA. Global environmental changes have also enhanced the influence of NGOs and other social activists vis-à-vis the state; see Ronnie D. Lipschutz and Ken Conca, eds., *The State and Social Power in Global Environmental Politics*. Grassroots responses to economic globalization are documented by Jeremy Brecher and Tim Costello, *Global Village or Global Pillage: Economic Reconstruction from the Bottom Up*.

31. As in Barnet and Cavanagh, *Global Dreams*.

32. Benjamin R. Barber, "Jihad vs. McWorld," *The Atlantic*, pp. 53–63.

33. Maurice Strong, "The 'New South,'" *The World Today*, pp. 215–19.

34. Speech of January 16, 1991, in Micah L. Sifry and Christopher Cerf, eds., *The Gulf War Reader: History, Documents, Opinions*, p. 313.

35. For an excellent summary and evaluation of the issues, see Richard Falk, "In Search of a New World Model," *Current History*, pp. 145–49.

36. In mid-1998, the United States was in arrears by between \$1 billion and \$1.5 billion in payments to the regular and special (peacekeeping) budgets of the UN. Consequently, under the UN Charter, it was in danger of losing its vote in the General Assembly. *NYT*, June 28, 1998, online. Once the George W. Bush administration took office, a deal with Senator Jesse Helms freed up funds for repayment.

37. Annan, "'We the Peoples': The Role of the United Nations in the 21st Century," chapter 3 of his Millennium Report to the UN, at www.un.org/millennium/sg/report/ch3.htm (hereafter cited as Annan, *Millennium Report*).

38. William Pfaff, "Ideology Still Looms Large in the World," *International Herald Tribune*, January 6, 2000, online ed. at www.iht.com; John Ralston Saul, "The Collapse of Globalism," *Harper's*, March 2004, pp. 33–43.

39. This is the argument of Elise Boulding, "The Old and New Transnationalism: An Evolutionary Perspective," *Human Relations*, pp. 789–805.

40. See Joel Kotkin, *Tribes: How Race, Religion and Identity Determine Success in the New Global Economy*.

41. Michael Renner, "Violent Conflicts Unchanged," in Lisa Mastny et al., *Vital Signs 2005: The Trends That Are Shaping Our Future*, pp. 74–75.

42. In Guatemala, the war was largely the work of a ruthless military apparatus. About 150,000 people, mostly of Indian ethnicity, lost their lives, and another 50,000 people disappeared (*NYT*, April 28, 1998, p. A8). Approximately 3,200 people were killed in Northern Ireland's violence, which may finally have ended with the signing of a power-sharing agreement in March 2007.

43. Text in *NYT*, May 1, 2003, p. A7.

44. The civil war in Somalia (1988–1995) caused around 355,000 deaths; in Afghanistan since 1991, over 1 million; in Liberia (1990–1995), about 100,000; in Congo (since 1998), about 3.8 million; and in Sudan (since 1984), upwards of 2 million, including about 200,000 in the Darfur region from 2003 to the present. Milton Leitenberg, "Deaths in Wars and Conflicts"; Sivard et al., *World Military and Social Expenditures 1996*, pp. 18–19; Philip Christenson, "Fall of Mobutu Is No Guarantee of Peace," *Los Angeles Times World Report*, May 24, 1997, p. 5; Marc Lacey, "Beyond the Bullets and Blades," *NYT*, March 20, 2005, sec. 4, p. 1; Renner, "Violent Conflicts Unchanged," p. 74.

45. Figures from Sivard et al., *World Military and Social Expenditures 1996*, pp. 18–19, and Center for Defense Information, "The World at War," *The Defense Monitor*, table 3, p. 4.

46. Stockholm International Peace Research Institute, ed., *SIPRI Yearbook 1992: World Armaments and Disarmament*, tables 8.1 and 8.2, pp. 272–73. Since 1987 China has been the fifth largest arms exporter, and Japan the fourth largest arms importer in the world.

47. By contrast, in 1988 the UN's annual peacekeeping budget was \$230 million for five operations; and in 1992 the budget was about \$1.7 billion for eleven peacekeeping operations. *NYT*, January 6, 1995, p. A3.

48. *NYT*, May 31, 1995, p. A6.

49. SLORC, which has governed since 1988, redesignated itself the State Peace and Development Council. I use the original name to avoid confusion, and out of deference to the Burmese peace forces (which also prefer "Burma" to SLORC's creation, Myanmar).

50. Annan, *Millennium Report*.

51. Speech at the University of Michigan, April 30, 1999, at www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1999/19990430.SGSM6977.html.

52. Annan, *Millennium Report*, ch. 3.

53. For example, in 2002 the United States had a total of 9,166 military and civilian personnel assigned to international peacekeeping. Of those, only about 700 were under UN command, including a single soldier. See the chart in *NYT*, July 3, 2002, p. A4.

54. As a shorthand definition, we may think of civil society as "a political space, or arena, where voluntary associations seek to shape the rules that govern one or the other aspect of social life. . . . Civil society associations bring together people who share concerns about a particular policy area or problem." It should be noted that by no means are all civil-society groups devoted to progressive causes. See Jan Aart Scholte et al., *Democratizing the Global Economy: The Role of Civil Society*.

55. See Adrian Karatnycky, "Ukraine's Orange Revolution," *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 35–52. The ousted president, Leonid Kuchma, had once been tape-recorded ordering the elimination of various political enemies. He also engineered the removal from office of his reform-minded prime minister, was implicated in the murder of a reform-minded journalist, came under fire for vote rigging and illegal arms exports, and manipulated the country's supreme court to secure a third term in office. Even so, Ukraine's new leadership fell on hard economic times and charges of corruption. President Viktor Yushchenko's reform government suffered heavy losses in parliamentary elections that were widely hailed, including by the president himself, as exceptionally free.

56. See Ginger Thompson, "Report on Mexican 'Dirty War' Details Abuse by Military," *NYT*, February 27, 2006, p. A3. For the draft report, see the National Security Archive for February 2006 at www.nsarchive.org.

57. Larry Rohter, "After Decades, Nations Focus on Rights Abuses," *NYT*, September 1, 2005, p. A4.

58. Fareed Zakaria, "The Rise of Illiberal Democracy," *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 22–43.

59. Howard W. French, "Africa's Ballot Box: Look Out for Sleight of Hand," *NYT*, October 24, 1995, p. A3. See also French's later report, "Sure, Africa's Troubled; But There Is Good News," *NYT*, June 15, 1997, online.

60. Douglas Frantz, "Fresh Dynasties Sprout in Post-Soviet Lands as Democratic Succession Withers," *NYT*, February 20, 2001, online ed.

61. Seth Mydans, "Political Turmoil Again Thwarts Progress in Philippines," *NYT*, February 26, 2006, p. 3.

62. Mydans, "Cambodian Leader Cracks Down in Bid to Solidify Power," *NYT*, January 9, 2006, online ed.

63. Two excellent surveys are by Juan Forero, "Latin America Graft and Poverty Trying Patience with Democracy," *NYT*, June 24, 2004, online ed., and Larry Rohter and Juan Forero, "Unending Graft Is Threatening Latin America," *NYT*, July 30, 2005, p. A1.

64. Paul Lewis, "International Community Takes Steps to Curb Corruption," *NYT*, November 28, 1996, online.

65. Mobutu became exceptionally wealthy during his thirty-odd years as the unchallenged ruler of Zaire. A civil war finally forced him into exile, and led to his death, at one of his French estates in 1997. Raúl Salinas, brother of Mexico's president (Carlos Salinas de Gotari) in the mid-1990s, evidently received payoffs by cocaine traffickers in return for political favors. He was later arrested on corruption charges and found to have stashed millions of dollars in overseas bank accounts (Sam Dillon, "Fugitive Lawman Speaks: How Mexico Mixes Narcotics and Politics," *NYT*, December 23, 1996, p. 1). Suharto, who was forced to step down in May 1998 after thirty-two years in office, was an exemplar of crony capitalism, which enabled him and his family to amass a fortune once estimated at \$30 billion (Philip Shenon, "For Asian Nation's First Family, Financial Empire Is in Peril," *NYT*, January 16, 1998, p. 1). Karadzic and Tudjman, as various newspapers reported in 1997, were essentially war profiteers who enriched themselves and their supporters through control of the government-run alcohol and cigarette market, and through prostitution and drug trafficking. Their "governments" more closely resembled a Chicago mob. As for the Bhutto family (see John F. Burns, "Bhutto Clan Leaves Trail of Corruption," *NYT*, January 9, 1998, p. 1), Benazir Bhutto, whose father had served as Pakistan's prime minister until his execution, twice was prime minister herself—the first female to head a Muslim country. She and her husband seem to have profited from a number of multimillion-dollar bribes paid by foreign companies and then banked abroad to facilitate deals with the Pakistani government.

66. On the involvement of organized crime in illegal immigration, see *NYT*, June 14, 1995, p. A8.

67. Voted most corrupt in 1996 were Nigeria, Pakistan, Kenya, Bangladesh, China, Cameroon, Venezuela, Russia, India, and Indonesia. Barbara Crossette, "Yearly Survey of Businesses Rates Nigeria Most Corrupt," *NYT*, June 2, 1996, online, and *NYT*, June 3, 1996, p. A4. The other face of the corruption problem, however, is that businesses have continued to *pay* bribes as an ordinary cost of doing business.

68. Joel Brinkley, "Pro-Democracy Groups Are Harassed in Central Asia," *NYT*, December 4, 2005, p. 3.

69. Thomas Carothers, "The Backlash Against Democracy Promotion," *Foreign Affairs*, pp. 55–56.

70. See Gerald Sussman and Lawrence Galizio, "The Global Reproduction of American Politics," *Political Communication*, pp. 309–28.

71. For an excellent critique along these lines, see Jeffrey Record, *Bounding the Global War on Terrorism*.

72. See, for example, Maurice Merleau-Ponty, *Humanism and Terror: An Essay on the Communist Problem*.

73. See Ahmed Rashid, "New Wars to Fight" (on Central and South Asia) and Bruce Wain, "Unfriendly Fire" (on Southeast Asia), both in *Far Eastern Economic Review*, September 12, 2001, pp. 14–22.

74. Chris Hedges, *War Is a Force That Gives Us Meaning*.

75. *NYT*, June 19, 2002, p. 1.

76. Speech to Congress of September 20, 2001, in *NYT*, September 21, 2001, p. B4.

77. See Nicholas Lemann, "The Next World Order," *The New Yorker*, pp. 45–46.

78. The groups in question were warlords whose efforts, funded by the CIA, were defeated by an Islamic government that took power in Mogadishu in June 2006. See John Prendergast, "Our Failure in Somalia," *Washington Post*, June 7, 2006, online ed. at www.washingtonpost.com.

79. In Indonesia, US counterterrorism aid was accompanied by pressure to arrest local Muslim leaders, creating perceptions of undue interference in the country's internal affairs. See, for instance, Michael R. Gordon, "Indonesian Scolds U.S. on Terrorism Fight," *NYT*, June 7, 2006, online ed. US aid to Pakistan's army in order to contain the presumed danger of radical Islamists not only exaggerated that danger; it also overlooked the assistance the Pakistan military has itself provided to violent Islamic groups in Afghanistan and Kashmir. See Frédéric Grare, "Pakistan: The Myth of an Islamist Peril," *Policy Brief*, pp. 1–7.

80. See the account of Steve Coll, "The Stand-Off," *The New Yorker*, pp. 126–39. The attack put enormous pressure on President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan to take direct action against extremist groups as well as against the religious schools (*madrasas*) that were believed to be training terrorists. Facing a huge Indian military buildup along the border, and under US pressure to take strong action against domestic sources of terrorism, Musharraf announced in January a ban on all such organizations and schools.

81. Vince M. Cannistraro, "The War on Terror Enters Phase 2," *NYT*, May 2, 2002, p. A27.

82. A classified National Intelligence Estimate of April 2006, leaked to the press, states: "The Iraq conflict has become the cause célèbre for jihadists, breeding a deep resentment of U.S. involvement in the Muslim world and cultivating supporters for the global jihadist movement." *NYT*, September 27, 2006, p. A6.

83. By supporting Israel's bombing of Lebanon in retaliation for Hezbollah raids, the United States is likely to face a new round of suicide bombings and other violent acts of retribution by new recruits.

84. A report in 2001 by Terje Roed-Larsen, the United Nations Special Coordinator for the Middle East Peace Process, indicated the numerous signs of decline and inequity in Palestine: an economy that was losing \$8.6 million a day; about 250,000 Palestinians, representing 38 percent of the workforce, unemployed; 32 percent of the population living in poverty; and a fiscal crisis for the Palestinian Authority (PA), due in large part to Israel's withholding of revenues that it collects for the PA. Roed-Larsen made the prescient argument that it was "in the interest of Israel that the Palestinian Authority doesn't collapse, because that will produce a situation of anarchy that will make a difficult security situation." He went on to say: "People have lost faith not only in the peace process but in any dialogue with Israel, which is fueling now a support for and participation in violence." *NYT*, February 13, 2001, online ed.

85. *NYT*, February 2, 2002, p. A8.

86. *NYT*, September 24, 2003, p. A11.

87. This is the major conclusion of a study commissioned by the Center for Global Development in Washington, DC. See Commission on Weak States and US National Security, *On the Brink: Weak States and US National Security* (June 8, 2004), at www.cgdev.org.