

1 Title:

2 Global urbanization projections for the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways

3 Abstract

4 The new scenario process for climate change research includes the creation of Shared Socioeconomic
5 Pathways (SSPs) describing alternative societal development trends over the coming decades.
6 Urbanization is a key aspect of development that is relevant to studies of mitigation, adaptation, and
7 impacts. Incorporating urbanization into the SSPs requires a consistent set of global urbanization
8 projections that cover long time horizons and span a full range of uncertainty. Existing urbanization
9 projections do not meet these needs, in particular providing only a single scenario over the next few
10 decades, a period during which urbanization is likely to be highly dynamic in many countries. We
11 present here a new, long-term, global set of urbanization projections at country level that cover a
12 plausible range of uncertainty. We create SSP-specific projections by choosing urbanization outcomes
13 consistent with each SSP narrative. Results show that the world continues to urbanize in each of the
14 SSPs but outcomes differ widely across them, with urbanization reaching 60%, 79%, and 92% by the end
15 of century in SSP3, SSP2, and SSP1/SSP4/SSP5 respectively. The degree of convergence in urbanization
16 across countries also differs substantially, with largely convergent outcomes by the end of the century in
17 SSP1 and SSP5 and persistent diversity in SSP3. This set of global, country-specific projections produces
18 urbanization pathways that are typical of regions in different stages of urbanization and development
19 levels, and can be extended to further elaborate assumptions about the styles of urban growth and
20 spatial distributions of urban people and land cover occurring in each SSP.

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37

1. Introduction

A new conceptual framework for the development of long-term scenarios that integrate alternative climate and socioeconomic futures has been developed (Ebi et al., 2013; van Vuuren et al., 2013). The framework is intended to facilitate research on response options to climate change and also to enable better assessment of scientific literature on the topic by fostering studies that share common assumptions about climate change outcomes and socioeconomic development pathways. A key component of the scenario framework is the Shared Socioeconomic Pathways (SSPs; O’Neill et al., 2013). The SSPs are intended to be qualitative and quantitative descriptions of alternative societal and environmental development pathways over the 21st century, which would then be combined with alternative climate change projections and assumptions about mitigation or adaptation policies (Kriegler et al., 2013) to produce integrated scenarios of climate change mitigation, adaptation, and impacts.

The SSPs are important to scenario-based climate change research because key questions about climate change, including how difficult it would be to reduce emissions enough to meet a given climate change target, or how difficult it may be to adapt to the resulting climate change, depend critically on societal development. Scenario research therefore aims to address these questions while accounting for a broad range of possible societal development outcomes. The SSPs consist of five different qualitative narratives describing broad patterns of possible future development at the level of large world regions (O’Neill et al., this issue). In addition, they include quantitative pathways for key elements that are typically inputs to models used to project future greenhouse gas emissions, emissions mitigation costs, climate change impacts, and adaptation possibilities. Quantitative pathways for national-level population and educational attainment, based on the five SSP narratives, are described in K.C. and Lutz (2014 and this issue), and national-level projections of GDP growth are described in three additional papers in this issue. Here, we describe the development of a new set of global, country-specific urbanization projections for each of the five SSPs that constitute an additional quantitative element of the SSPs.

Urbanization is a key component of societal and environmental development (Grimm et al. 2008; Montgomery 2008) and virtually all world population growth (National Research Council, 2003; United Nations, 2010) and most global economic growth (Martine et al., 2008) over the next several decades are expected to occur in the urban areas of developing countries. Yet urbanization has not been included in most previous global environmental scenarios, including those from the Special Report on Emissions Scenarios (SRES; Nakicenovic et al., 2001) of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) and from the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005). Climate change studies in particular require consistent sets of global urbanization projections to support analyses of emissions and mitigation options (Krey et al. 2012; O’Neill et al. 2012; O’Neill et al. 2010) as well as of vulnerability to impacts (McDonald et al. 2011; McGranahan Balk and Anderson 2007; Moss et al. 2010; Parrish and Zhu 2009; Zhou et al. 2004).

1 Urbanization has generally been associated with faster economic growth and higher emissions both in
2 analyses of historical data (Jones, 1989; Parikh and Shukla, 1995; Cole and Neumayer, 2004) and in
3 future global (O'Neill et al., 2010) and regional (O'Neill et al., 2012; Krey et al., 2012) projections. It is
4 important in interpreting the results of these analyses to define what is meant by "urbanization." The
5 historical analyses tend to control for income growth, so that urbanization effects are distinct from
6 income effects. In model-based projections, however, urbanization often has indirect effects on income
7 growth, consumption patterns, and the efficiency of energy use, so that urbanization is defined as a
8 broader socioeconomic phenomenon including not only the location of population in cities but also
9 changes in consumption and production structure that frequently occur with the urbanization transition.
10 This explains some of the differences in findings between these studies and arguments based on
11 individual city analyses that urbanization per se has benefits related to energy use and emissions
12 (Satterthwaite 2008; Dodman 2009).

13 The pace and form of future urbanization will also be a key factor in society's vulnerability to, and
14 capacity to respond to, various challenges of climate change (UN-Habitat, 2006) including water stress
15 (McDonald et al., 2011), flooding (McGranahan et al., 2007), heat waves (Zhang et al. 2009), and air
16 pollution (Parrich and Zhu, 2009; Grimm et al., 2008). Alternative urbanization pathways may yield
17 distinctive health consequences, given the tendency for rural populations in many developing countries
18 to rely more heavily on solid fuels, which are an important source of indoor and outdoor air pollution
19 (Jiang and O'Neill 2004; Pachauri and Jiang 2007; Krey et al. 2012). The large uncertainty in future urban
20 expansion into protected areas may be a key challenge to conservation of biodiversity in many regions,
21 and the substantial variation in the rate and amount of forecasted urban expansion across global regions
22 points to the need for more detailed national or regional analysis (Gunalp and Seto 2013).

23 Existing global urbanization projections do not meet the needs of the design of SSPs. That is, there is no
24 consistent set of global urbanization projections at the country level that extend over the whole 21st
25 century and span a full range of uncertainty. The most notable set of global, country-specific projections
26 is from the UN (United Nations, 2014) but has two main limitations: (1) it includes only a single
27 projection and therefore cannot support the development of alternative societal development pathways;
28 and (2) it extends only to 2050 and therefore cannot be used in longer-term analyses. Although the UN
29 has begun developing probabilistic urbanization projections to help communicate the uncertainty
30 associated with future urbanization (Alkema et al., 2011), these are not well suited to integrating
31 urbanization into the deterministic approach of alternative future scenarios represented by the SSPs.
32 The only other global urbanization projections, from the International Institute for Applied Systems
33 Analysis (IIASA; Gruebler et al., 2007), extrapolate UN projections to 2100 and provide three alternative
34 projections by making exogenous assumptions about long-term maximum urbanization levels. However,
35 these projections do not capture uncertainty over the next few decades, a period of critical importance
36 to urban transitions; are not clearly grounded in historical experience; and provide no information on
37 migration flows or changes in age compositions implied by a given urbanization projection (Rogers, 1982;
38 O'Neill and Scherbov, 2006), information that is important in integrated analyses of environmental
39 impacts.

1 The urbanization projections presented here are designed to meet the needs of the SSP development
2 process and interdisciplinary global climate change research more broadly. We produce alternative
3 urbanization projections that span a plausible range of uncertainty by extending and modifying the
4 method used by the UN (United Nations, 2010), which draws on historical experience with urbanization
5 at the national level to derive single urbanization projection for each country of the world. While there
6 are critiques of the UN's approach (Bocquire, 2005; Dyson, 2011; Becker and Morrison, 1999; Hardoy
7 and Satterthwaite 1986), our modifications to the methodology address several shortcomings. For
8 example, while the UN assumes that all countries eventually follow a single "global norm" relating
9 differences in urban and rural growth rates to the level of urbanization based on historical data (United
10 Nations, 1998), we define the "norm" separately for each country to allow for alternative outcomes and
11 the possibility that urbanization trends in the long run may not be direct extrapolations of their past
12 experiences due to different economic, demographic and institutional conditions (Satterthwaite 1996).
13 We also employ the historical data twice to carry out a two-stage projection to 2100, allowing for the
14 possibility of capturing multiple phases of the urbanization process over the century. Finally, we define
15 nine alternative urbanization pathways (rather than a single projection) for each country based on the
16 range of various historical urbanization experiences. We define urbanization projections for each SSP by
17 choosing from among these alternatives for each country of the world, based on the qualitative
18 descriptions of development pathways contained in the SSP narratives at the level of three categories of
19 countries grouped by income. Results show that the world continues to urbanize in each of the SSPs but
20 the degree of convergence in urbanization across countries differs substantially, with largely convergent
21 outcomes by the end of the century in SSP1 and SSP5 and persistent diversity in SSP3.

22 In the next section, we describe our projection methodology and in section 3 evaluate the results
23 relative to historical trends and other projections. Section 4 describes the results and our selection of
24 urbanization projections to match each of the five SSPs. Section 5 discusses conclusions and future
25 directions.

26 2. Data and Methods

27 The urbanization projections draw on a database of national-level urbanization that extends from 1950-
28 2010 for 232 countries of the world (United Nations 2010). The UN database has widely recognized
29 limitations; the principal one is that the UN retains the definition of urban used by each country, and
30 that definition is inconsistent across countries and in some cases over time as well (Jones 2002). In
31 addition, the database does not capture variations and changes in settlement patterns of intermediate
32 conditions beyond the conventional rural and urban dichotomy (Jones 2002). Nonetheless, the
33 database remains so far the most comprehensive and complete data source that can be used to draw
34 lessons from historical experience and inform projections of future urban growth. While inconsistency in
35 the urban definition across countries is an undesirable feature of the data, in our projections consistency
36 over time is more important, and is less prevalent in the database. Given the limits of the data, we
37 develop a relatively simple and aggregate approach to projection that is based on the UN's own
38 approach but modifies aspects that are particularly important to long-term global scenario analyses.

1 In the UN model, the urbanization level for each country (i.e., the proportion of the total population that
 2 is urban) is projected as a function of the difference between the urban and rural population growth
 3 rates. A linear relationship between this population growth rate difference and the urbanization level
 4 itself is defined based on historical data. More specifically, the urbanization level (PU_t) can be defined
 5 in terms of the urban-rural ratio (URR_t , the ratio of urban population to rural population),

$$6 \quad PU_t = URR_t / (1 + URR_t) \quad (1)$$

7 Changes in URR_t and therefore in the urbanization level can be modeled as a function of the difference
 8 between the urban and rural population growth rates urr_t , where the growth rate difference is itself a
 9 function of the urbanization level:

$$10 \quad URR_{t+1} = URR_t * e^{urr_t} \quad (2)$$

$$11 \quad urr_t = f(PU_t) \quad (3)$$

12 where f is the linear, empirical relation derived from the data (note that the fact that f is linear does
 13 not imply that the fraction of the population that is urban changes linearly over time). Countries are
 14 assumed to converge to this global relationship over a 20-year transition period.

15 We adopt the UN's approach of assuming a linear relationship between the difference in urban-rural
 16 population growth rates and urbanization level, but modify the UN methodology by defining the
 17 relationship separately for each country (rather than using a single global norm) and for fast, central,
 18 and slow urbanization projections (rather than a single projection). Relationships between the urban-
 19 rural population growth difference and urbanization level for each country and projection are defined
 20 based on a set of reference countries that are drawn from the historical data (United Nations, 2010).
 21 Data from small island or city countries whose land areas are smaller than 1000 km² and populations in
 22 2010 are less than 1 million persons are discarded, leaving 151 countries with urbanization records for
 23 the period of 1950-2010 as the core data set.

24 In order to select reference countries to develop the norm for a particular target country and projection,
 25 we take three steps (see Supplementary data for an illustration for the example of India). First, we
 26 choose from the database all countries that have ever achieved an urbanization level within 5
 27 percentage points of the current level in the target country. This step identifies countries that were
 28 similar to the target country in terms of urbanization level at some time in the past. Second, in most
 29 cases we eliminate from this sample the 25% of countries whose urbanization growth rates over the
 30 decade prior to reaching the target urbanization level differ the most from the target country's growth
 31 rate. This step ensures that reference countries were similar to the target country at a certain point in
 32 time not only in terms of urbanization level, but also in terms of how fast they were urbanizing at that
 33 time. We do not limit the selection of reference countries further, for example by choosing countries
 34 from similar regions or levels of development, because it would produce insufficient sample sizes. Third,
 35

1 we divide the remaining sample into three different groups: the 25% of countries with the highest
2 urbanization levels 30 years after they reached the target level, the 25% of countries with the lowest
3 urbanization levels at that point, and the 50% of the sample in between. These three groups serve as
4 the reference countries for defining the norm for the fast, slow, and central projections, respectively, for
5 the target country.

6 The choice to distinguish fast, slow, and central reference countries based on their urbanization level 30
7 years after the base year was made on the basis of an analysis of the rank correlation of their
8 urbanization levels over time (Supplementary Figure S2). The analysis indicates that a country's rank in
9 terms of urbanization level as compared to other reference countries is positively correlated over time
10 and is less likely to change significantly the farther into the future one looks. For example, for India's
11 group of reference countries after step 2, the rank five years after the base year does not predict well
12 the rank 25 years later (correlation coefficient = 0.65). In contrast, the rank 30 years after the base year
13 predicts rank 25 years after that much better (correlation coefficient = 0.92). Thus, it would be ideal to
14 distinguish fast, slow, and central reference countries using their urbanization level far beyond the base
15 year. However, the sample size of countries that have a long enough time series of data to support such
16 a distinction diminishes as the length of this time horizon increases. Considering both factors, we
17 decided to use 30 years of prospective data to distinguish among fast, central and slow reference
18 countries.

19 However, this set of reference countries is not sufficient to support a projection over a 90-year period,
20 given the relatively short (60-year) historical record. For example, a country currently at a low
21 urbanization level may go through several different regimes of growth: slow increases in urbanization, a
22 fast takeoff period, and then a slowing as urbanization converges to a long term level. Using a single set
23 of reference countries over a limited time period will frequently not be able to capture well these
24 multiple regimes. We therefore adopt a two-stage projection approach to generate additional reference
25 countries for use in the model (Supplementary Figure S3). Using the selected references countries from
26 both stage 1 and stage 2, we create nine possible combinations of reference countries (fast, central, and
27 slow in stage 1, and then in each case fast, central and slow in stage 2) and project the target country's
28 urbanization level regressing the difference in urban and rural growth rate against the urbanization level
29 (eq. (3); see Supplementary Figure S4a-b for examples of projections for India and China). From the nine
30 possible combinations of plausible urbanization paths, we define our three projections of primary
31 interest as the fast-fast, central-central, and slow-slow combinations over the two stages, which we
32 refer to as our "Fast," "Central," and "Slow" projections. In order to produce numbers of people in
33 urban and rural areas, these projections need to be combined with a population projection for each
34 country, which in this case are the SSP population projections (K.C. and Lutz, this issue).

35 3. Evaluation of Projection Results

36 Validating long-term projections of socioeconomic factors like urbanization is difficult (Berkhout et al.
37 2002; van Lieshout et al. 2004), but such projections can usefully be evaluated against historical
38 experience and other projections, and by evaluating the plausibility of outcomes for other variables (like
39 migration) implied by the projections.

1 The wide range of urbanization outcomes represented by these projections is consistent with historical
2 experience. Results for each country fall within the range of 90% of historical urbanization outcomes
3 when compared to countries that at some point in the past reached a level of urbanization similar to
4 that in the base year (Supplementary Figure S7a-d). Fast projections are below the 95th percentile, slow
5 projections above the 5th percentile, and central projections within the 50% interval. This consistency is
6 ensured by the methodology, which relates urbanization growth rates to urbanization levels for each
7 country and projection based on the historical experience of other countries selected to the reference
8 group. Figure 1 compares our projections to historical data for an average of one measure of the
9 urbanization growth rate, the urban-rural population growth difference (United Nations, 1980; Preston,
10 1979), as a function of urbanization level. The Central projection generally represents the overall
11 historical mean, while the Fast and Slow projection are near the upper and lower bounds of historical
12 experience.

13 Evaluation against other projections indicates some similarities but also key differences that represent
14 important improvements. For example, our Central projection is broadly similar to the UN projection
15 through 2050: differences for all countries are within -10 to +8 percentage points at all times (see
16 Supplementary Figure S6a-b). However, before 2030 our Central projection is generally higher than the
17 UN projection, and afterwards it is generally lower, as illustrated in Figure 2 for the example of India and
18 the World. The main reason for faster urbanization in our projection in the near term is that the UN
19 assumes a 20-year transition period in which each country urbanizes largely at its most recent
20 urbanization growth rate before converging to the “global norm”. In contrast, we assume each country
21 urbanizes according to a pathway defined by a set of similar reference countries (see Data and Methods).
22 The UN transition period approach has the benefit of ensuring a gradual evolution of urban growth, but
23 has a cost in that it excludes the possibility of the types of rapid short-term change observed in many
24 countries historically.

25 After the 20-year transition period, our Central projection produces generally lower urbanization than
26 the UN projection, with more than 70% of countries having lower urbanization in 2050 than in the UN
27 projection. Several existing studies have suggested that the UN projects urbanization growth rates that
28 are generally too high (National Research Council, 2003; Alkema et al., 2011; Bocquire, 2005;
29 Montgomery, 2008). We believe our Central projection is an improvement in this regard. The UN
30 produces higher urbanization because it assumes all countries urbanize following a global norm after
31 2030, which is weighted toward the experience of countries in the early decades of the historical record,
32 which generally experienced more rapid urbanization. In contrast, our projections use norms that are
33 tailored to the circumstances of each individual country, and are therefore less susceptible to this
34 unequal weighting. In addition, we use a second stage that allows for slow-down and saturation of the
35 urbanization level, an aspect missing from the UN methodology.

36 Our projections differ from IIASA in that they span a substantially wider range of uncertainty over the
37 next few decades (Figure 2). This is not only the case for individual countries such as India, but also true
38 for the world as a whole. The IIASA projections focused on uncertainty in long-term outcomes (Gruebler
39 et al., 2007) and were constrained to be close to a UN projection through 2030 (the horizon of UN
40 projections at that time).

1 To further evaluate the plausibility of the urbanization projections, we calculate the gross and net rural-
2 urban migrants for India and China implied by each of our urbanization projections. To carry out the
3 calculation we use a multiregional population/urbanization projection model (Jiang and O'Neill, 2009;
4 O'Neill et al., 2010) and the assumptions on total fertility rates and life expectancies under the medium
5 variant of the UN Population Projection (United Nations, 2004). Figure 3 shows that the implied number
6 of rural-urban net migrants in India and China differs significantly across different urbanization
7 projections, but they are all within plausible ranges. Moreover, this information is valuable for
8 integrating urbanization trends with corresponding migration flows as both causes and consequences of
9 environmental changes (de Sherbinin et al. 2012).

10

11 4. Urbanization Projections for SSPs

12 To create urbanization projections for the SSPs, we assign either the Fast, Central, or Slow projection to
13 the countries within each of three income-based country groups (see Supplementary data for definition
14 of the groups) for each SSP. Assignments are made based on the assumptions about urbanization
15 included in the SSP narratives (O'Neill et al., this issue) or based on reasoning we describe here that
16 relates our choice to assumptions about other aspects of societal development in the narratives.
17 Summaries of key features of each of the SSPs are included in the Supplementary Information.

18

19 SSP1 (Sustainability): Fast urbanization in all country groups, associated with high income
20 growth. Urbanization is driven in part by a desire for and promotion of environmentally friendly
21 living arrangements, and compact urban form contributes to resource efficiency (Gossop 2011;
22 Ewing and Cervero 2010).

23

24 SSP2 (Middle of the Road): Central urbanization in all country groups, associated with moderate
25 income growth. Consistent with the intent of the SSP2 storyline, urbanization proceeds at a
26 moderate pace in all parts of the world, relative to the experience of similar countries
27 historically.

28

29 SSP3 (Regional rivalry): Slow urbanization in all country groups. Urbanization is constrained by
30 slow economic growth in both rural and urban areas, the assumption in the narrative of limited
31 mobility across regions, and poor urban planning that makes cities unattractive destinations
32 (Mohan 1984).

33

34 SSP4 (Inequality): Central urbanization in high-income countries, and Fast urbanization in
35 medium- and low-income countries. Medium economic growth and attractive urban conditions
36 in cities with high concentrations of the elite support urbanization in high-income countries, but
37 rural-to-urban migration is moderated by rapid aging produced by low fertility rates (Kelley and
38 Williamson 1984; Skeldon 2008). In contrast, high fertility in medium and low income countries
39 produces age structures favorable to migration. In medium income countries, the assumption of
40 medium economic growth is associated with the development of cities as manufacturing centers

1 and engines of economic growth; therefore urbanization proceeds rapidly (Ledent 1982). In low
2 income countries, pressure from rapid population growth and shrinking land and other
3 resources act as push factors for rural outmigration (Oucho and Gould 1993; Abdel-Rahman et al.
4 2006). Meanwhile, the assumption of large income discrepancies within countries is assumed to
5 apply particularly between rural and urban areas, serving as a pull factor causing large city-ward
6 migration flows (Jiang 2014). Cities are subject to high inequality themselves, providing urban
7 amenities for the elite but poor housing and infrastructure for the rest of the population,
8 leading to massive expansion of slums and high unemployment (Fay and Opal, 1999).

9 SSP5 (Fossil-fueled development): Fast urbanization in all country groups. Urban areas become
10 attractive destinations due to rapid economic growth and technological change that allows for
11 large-scale engineering projects to develop desirable housing. Increasing agricultural
12 productivity and growing wealth leads to increased migration to cities and growth in urban labor,
13 even when population growth rates decrease (Mohan 1984).

14
15 Figure 4a shows global urbanization results for each SSP based on these assumptions, combining the
16 projections of urbanization level with the corresponding population projection for the SSP (K.C. and Lutz,
17 2014 and this issue). The world continues to urbanize in each of the SSPs relative to its current level of
18 50.4% urban, but outcomes vary widely. Urbanization is fast in SSPs 1, 4, and 5, reaching 92% (or nearly
19 so) by the end of the century. In contrast, urbanization is slow in SSP3, reaching only 60% by the end of
20 century, while in SSP2 the outcome lies between these two, at 79%.

21
22 The degree of convergence in urbanization also varies substantially across SSPs. Results aggregated into
23 High, Medium, and Low income country groups show that in the fast-urbanizing SSPs (1 and 5 for all
24 groups and also 4 for medium and low income groups), there is also substantial convergence with
25 urbanization levels for all income groups ending up in the 90-96% range by the end of the century.
26 However in the slow-urbanizing SSP3, urbanization levels remain as divergent as they are at the present
27 time, with the low and medium income countries reaching only about 50% and 60% urban respectively
28 in 2100, while the urbanization level for the high income group increases beyond 90%. SSP2 represents a
29 moderate case with some convergence but much less than in the fast urbanization pathways, reaching
30 73%, 82%, and 94% for the low, medium and high income region respectively.

31
32 Convergence outcomes are driven principally by urbanization in low and middle income countries.
33 Differences across SSPs by the end of century are within a range of only 6 percentage points in the high
34 income region where the urbanization level is already high and the uncertainty in future urbanization
35 trends is rather small (see Supplementary Figure S5). In contrast, many low income countries are at the
36 beginning or in the midst of the urbanization transition, and there is therefore substantially more
37 uncertainty in outcomes, reflected by a range of 46 percentage points in urbanization across SSPs in this
38 country group.

39
40 Results aggregated to the level of continents (Figure 4b) illustrate these outcomes in more detail.

41 Currently less urbanized Africa and Asia urbanize slowly under SSP3 and only reach 50% and 55% urban

1 respectively by 2100 but urbanize quickly under SSPs 1, 4 and 5, reaching about 90% urban by the end of
2 the century. For the more urbanized Europe and Latin America, the differences in urbanization across
3 SSPs are much smaller, in the ranges of 83-96% and 88-96% respectively. We produce only a single
4 projection for Australia/New Zealand and North America under all SSPs given their already very high
5 urbanization level (see Data and Methods). Neither Africa nor Asia reaches the current level of
6 urbanization in Europe or North America in SSP2 and SSP3, and in SSPs 1, 4, and 5 does so only after
7 2050.

8
9 Projections are distinctive across individual countries as well (Figure 4c). India has been one of the
10 slowest urbanizing countries for the past several decades and just reached 30% urban in 2010. Our
11 projections indicates a continuation of this slow pace in SSP3, implying that the country remains largely
12 rural (44% urban by 2100), but a rapid near-term take off in SSPs 1, 4 and 5, leading to a 90%
13 urbanization level in 2100. In contrast, China has been experiencing rapid urbanization and this trend
14 continues for another four to five decades in SSPs 1, 4 and 5, or levels off in the near term in SSP3,
15 leading to an urbanization level just over 60%. Nigeria, the most populous African country, reached a
16 somewhat higher urbanization level than China's in 2010, but has recently been urbanizing more slowly.
17 As a consequence, its projected urbanization proceeds somewhat slower, leading to similar outcomes to
18 China's in each SSP. Uganda is among the least urbanized countries and demonstrates a very large
19 variation in urbanization across different SSPs, by the end of century spanning outcomes of 25% in SSP3,
20 55% in SSP2, and 85% in SSPs 1, 4 and 5. Switzerland illustrates the opposite case. It had already
21 reached 74% urban in the early 1990s and its differences in long-term urbanization levels across SSPs are
22 much smaller.

23 Urbanization projection results for all countries can be downloaded from
24 www.cgd.ucar.edu/ccr/urbanization/urbproj_all.xlsx.

25

26 5. Discussion and Conclusion

27 We have produced global, country-specific urbanization projections consistent with the five SSPs that
28 can be used in scenario-based climate change analysis of mitigation, adaptation, and impacts. The
29 projection methodology builds on previous projections by refining the manner in which historical
30 experience is used to project future outcomes and by improving the characterization of uncertainty,
31 particularly over the next few decades. These projections produce urbanization pathways that are
32 typical of countries in different stages of urbanization, including outcomes in which urbanization stalls or
33 is substantially delayed, as well as outcomes in which it proceeds rapidly to high levels. Evaluating the
34 projections against historical data and other projections indicates that they are consistent with historical
35 experience and improve on currently available global projections. Evaluating their implied rural-urban
36 migration flows for two key countries (China and India) indicate that they result in plausible ranges of
37 migration.

1 Projection results cover a wide range of uncertainty in both the level of urbanization and in the degree
2 of convergence across countries, and these outcomes are consistent with the SSP narratives and
3 assumptions about other factors such as GDP and population growth (Jiang 2014).

4 Future research could usefully improve and extend this work in a number of ways. First, a new set of
5 projections could be produced using the same methodology but a new and improved data set from the
6 UN Urbanization Prospects 2014 Revision which draws on updated information from the 2010-11 round
7 censuses. Second, assumptions about the forms and patterns of urbanization occurring in each SSP
8 could be further elaborated, since these features are likely to be important determinants of the
9 challenges to adaptation implied by each development pathway. Third, spatial versions of these
10 projections could be produced that incorporate the distribution of population density; of people by
11 characteristics such as age, income, and educational status; and of urban land cover across the
12 landscape, all of which would be useful for research related both to emissions and to impacts and
13 vulnerability. And last, to explore the effect of urbanization on emissions or impacts and vulnerability,
14 variants of the SSPs with alternative (but still plausible) assumptions about urbanization could be
15 developed to compare to outcomes based on the original SSPs. The full set of nine alternative
16 urbanization projections presented here could be useful for that purpose.

17

18

1

2 References:

3 Abdel-Rahman AN, Safarzadeh MR, and Bottomley MB 2006 Economic growth and urbanization: a cross-
4 section and time-series analysis of thirty-five developing nations *RISEC* 53 334-348.

5 Alkema L, Gerland P, Buettner T 2011 Probabilistic Projection of Urbanization for All Countries (Poster
6 Session 2 at PAA Annual Meeting, 2011, Washington DC).

7 Becker CM. and Morrison AR 1999 Urbanization in transforming economies in Mills ES and Cheshire P
8 (eds.) *Handbook of Regional and Urban Economics* (Elsevier Science, Amsterdam).

9 Berkhout F, Hertin J, Jordan A 2002 Socioeconomic futures in climate change impact assessment: using
10 scenarios as 'learning machines' *Global Environmental Change* 12(2) 83-95.

11 Bocquire P 2005 World Urbanization Prospects: an alternative to the UN model of projection
12 compatible with the mobility transition theory *Demographic Research* 12(9) 197-236.

13 Cole MA and Neumayer E 2004 Examining the Impact of Demographic Factors on Air Pollution
14 *Population and Environment*, 26(1) 5-21.

15 Dodman D 2009 Blaming cities for climate change: an analysis of urban greenhouse gas emissions
16 inventories *Environment and Urbanization* 21(1) 185-202.

17 De Sherbinin A et al. 2012 Migration and risk: net migration in marginal ecosystems and hazardous
18 areas *Environ. Res. Lett.* 7(2012) 045602 (14pp).

19 Dyson T 2011 The role of the demographic transition in the process of urbanization *Population and
20 Development Review* 37(Supplement) 34-54.

21 Ewing R and Cervero R 2010 Travel and the building environment *Journal of the American Planning and
22 Association* 76 265-294.

23 Fay M and Opal C 1999 Urbanization without growth: a not-so-uncommon phenomenon In World Bank
24 Policy Research Working Paper No 21412 (Washington DC, World Bank).

25

26 GEA Writing Team 2012 *Global Energy Assessment – Toward a Sustainable Future* Cambridge University
27 Press.

28 Gossop C 2011 Low carbon cities: an introduction to the special issue *Cities* 28 495-497.

29 Grimm NB, Faeth SH, Golubiewski NE, Redman CL, Wu J, Bai X and Briggs JM 2008 Global Change and
30 the Ecology of cities *Science* 319 756-760.


- 1 Grübler A, O'Neill BC, Riahi K, Chirkov V, Goujon A, Kolp P, Prommer I, Scherbov S, Slentoe E
2 2007 Regional, national, and spatially explicit scenarios of demographic and economic change based on
3 SRES Technological Forecasting and Social Change 74 980-1029.
- 4 Guneralp B and Seto KC 2013 Futures of global urban expansion: uncertainties and implications for
5 biodiversity conservation Environ. Res. Lett. 8(2013) 014025 (10pp).
- 6 Hardoy JE and Satterthwaite 1986 Urban change in the third world: are recent trends a useful pointer
7 to the urban future Habitat International 10(3) 33-52.
- 8 Jiang L 2014 Internal consistency of demographic assumptions in the shared socioeconomic pathways.
9 Population and Environment. 35(3): 261-285.
- 10 Jiang L and O'Neill BC 2004 The energy transition in rural China International Journal of Global Energy
11 Series 21(1-2) 2-26.
- 12 Jiang L and O'Neill BC 2009 Household projections for rural and urban areas of major regions of the
13 world IIASA Interim Report IR-09-026 Laxenburg Austria: IIASA.
- 14 Jones DW 1989 Urbanization and Energy Use In Economic Development The Energy Journal 10(4) 29-44.
- 15 Jones G W 2002 Urbanization trends in Asia: the conceptual and definitional challenges in IUSSP
16 Working Group on Urbanization workshop on New Forms of Urbanization: Conceptualizing and
17 Measuring Human Settlement in the Twenty-First Century. Bellagio, Italy.
- 18 KC S and Lutz W 2014 The human core of the shared socioeconomic pathways: Population Scenarios by
19 age, sex and level of education for all countries to 2100. Global Environment Change, available online 4
20 July 2014.
- 21 Kelley AC and Williamson JG 1984 Population growth, industrial revolutions, and the urban transition
22 Population and Development Review 10 419-441.
- 23 Krey V, O'Neill BC, van Ruijven B, Chaturvedi V, Daioglou V, Eom J, Jiang L, Nagai Y, Pachauri S and Ren X
24 2012 Urban and rural energy use and carbon dioxide emissions in Asia Energy Economics 34(3) S272-83.
- 25 Ledent J 1982 Rural-urban migration, urbanization, and economic development Economic Development
26 and Cultural Change 30 507-538.
- 27 Martine G, McGranahan G, Montgomery M, Fernandez-Castilla R 2008 The New Global Frontier:
28 Urbanization, Poverty and Environment in the 21st Century (Earthscan, London).
- 29 Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (2005): Ecosystems and Human Wellbeing. Volume 2: Scenario
30 s. Washington, DC: Island Press
- 31 McDonald RI, Green P, Balk D, Fekete BM, Revenga C, Todd M, Montgomery M 2011 Urban growth,
32 climate change, and freshwater availability Proc Natl Acad Sci USA 108(15) 6312-7.
- 33 McGranahan G, Balk D, and Anderson B 2007 The rising risks of climate change: urban population
34 distribution and characteristics in low elevation zones Environment & Urbanization 19(1) 17-37.

- 1 McIntyre BD, Herren HR, Wakhungu J, Watson R 2009 International Assessment of Agricultural
2 Knowledge, Science and Technology for Development (IAASTD): Global Report (Island Press, Washington
3 DC).
- 4 Mohan R. 1984 The effect of population growth, the pattern of demand and of technology on the
5 process of urbanization *Journal of Urban Economics* 15 125-156.
- 6 Montgomery M 2008 The urban transformation of the developing world *Science* 319(5864) 761-764.
- 7 Moss RH et al. 2010 The next generation of scenarios for climate change research and assessment
8 *Nature* 463 747-56.
- 9 Nakićenović N et al. 2000 Special Report on Emissions Scenarios: A Special Report of Working Group III
10 of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge University Press, Cambridge).
- 11 National Research Council 2003 Cities Transformed – Demographic Change and its Implications in the
12 Developing World (The National Academy Sciences, Washington DC).
- 13 Oucho JO and Gould T 1993 Internal migration, urbanization, and population distribution In
14 Demographic Change in Sub-Saharan Africa Foote KA, Hill KH, and Martin L eds. (Washington DC,
15 National Academy Press).
- 16 O’Neill BC 2004 Conditional probabilistic population projections: an application to climate change
17 *International Statistical Review* 72(2) 167-84.
- 18 O’Neill BC, Dalton M, Fuchs R, Jiang L, Pachauri S, Zigova K 2010 Global demographic trends and future
19 carbon emissions *Proc Natl Acad Sci USA* 107(41) 17521-6
- 20 O’Neill BC and Scherbov S 2006 Interpreting UN urbanization projections using a multi-state model
21 Interim Report IR-05-037 Laxenburg Austria: IIASA
- 22 O’Neill BC, Ren X, Jiang L and Dalton M 2012 The effect of urbanization on energy use in India and
23 China in the iPETS model *Energy Economics* 34(S3) S339-45.
- 24 Pachauri S and Jiang L 2008 The household energy transition in India and China *Energy Policy* 36(11)
25 4022-35.
- 26 Parikh J and Shukla V 1995 Urbanization, energy use and greenhouse effects in economic development:
27 Results from a cross-national study of developing countries *Global Environmental Change* 5(2) 87-103.
- 28 Parrish DD and Zhu T 2009 Clean air for megacities *Science* 326 674-5.
- 29 Rogers A 1982 Sources of urban population growth and urbanization, 1950-2000: a demographic
30 accounting *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 30 483-506.
- 31 Satterthwaite D 2008 Cities’ contribution to global warming; notes on the allocation of greenhouse gas
32 emissions *Environment and Urbanization* 20(2) 539-50.

- 1 Satterthwaite D 1996 The scale and nature of urban change in the south IIED Working Paper, IIED.
- 2 Skeldon R 2008 Demographic and urban transition in a global system and policy responses in The New
3 Global Frontier: Urbanization, Poverty and Environment in the 21st Century edited by Martine G,
4 McGranahan G, Montgomery M, and Fernandez-Castilla R (UNFPA and Earthscan Publications, New
5 York).
- 6 UN-Habitat 2006 The State of the World's Cities 2006/7 (Earthscan, London).
- 7 United Nations 1998 World Urbanization Prospects The 1996 Revisions, Estimates and Projections of
8 Urban and Rural Populations and of Urban Agglomerations (United Nations Publication, New York).
- 9 United Nations 2004 World Population to 2300 (United Nations Publications, New York).
- 10 United Nations 2007 The Millennium Development Goals Report 2007 (United Nations, New York)
- 11 United Nations 2010 World Urbanization Prospects The 2009 Revision (United Nations Publication, New
12 York).
- 13 United Nations 2014 World Urbanization Prospects The 2014 Revision (United Nations Publication, New
14 York).
- 15 van Lieshout M., Kovats RS, Livermore MTJ and Martens P 2004 Climate change and malaria: analysis of
16 the SRES climate and socioeconomic scenarios Global Environmental Change 14 87-99.
- 17 Zhang DL, Shou YX, and Dickerson RR 2009 Upstream urbanization exacerbates urban heat island
18 effects Geophysical Research Letters 36, L24401.
- 19


1	
2	Figure Legends
3	
4	Figure 1 Mean differences in projected country-level urbanization between the Fast and Slow scenarios
5	over time
6	Figure 2 Urbanization projections from NCAR (purple), the UN (black) and IIASA (orange dashed)
7	Figure 3 Implied net rural-urban migrants (solid lines) and projected urbanization level (dashed lines)
8	under Fast (purple), Central (orange), and Slow (green) urbanization scenarios for India and China
9	Figure 4 Urbanization projections for regions by level of development (a), continent (b), and selected
10	countries (c) under the SSPs.
11	

1




2

3




1

2




1



2

3

1



2

3 Note: For high income countries in Panel a, Europe in Panel b, and Switzerland in Panel c, SSP5 and SSP1
4 lie on top of each other, as do SSP2 and SSP4; for medium and low income countries in Panel a; Latin
5 America & the Caribbean, Asia, and Africa in Panel b; and Nigeria, China, India, and Uganda in Panel
6 c, SSP1, SSP4, and SSP5 lie on top of each other. North America and Australia & New Zealand in Panel b
7 have the same urbanization trend in all SSPs.

8