Good and bad nationalisms: A critique of dualism

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Good and bad nationalisms: a critique of dualism

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ABSTRACT *A constant theme running through much of the literature on nationalism is the dualistic attempt to make clear and sharp distinctions between two kinds of nationalism, one progressive and benign, the other reactionary and malign. Examples include attempts to distinguish between Western and Eastern, political and cultural, civic and ethnic, liberal and illiberal types. This article examines the roots of these dualistic approaches and subjects their claims to critical scrutiny, arguing that apparently fundamental differences may be better understood as differences of degree and emphasis rather than principle. It suggests that all forms of nationalism have to confront and may be vitiated by the fundamental difficulty of what to do about the other, in relation to which the nation has to be both defined and constructed.*

Introduction

In a famous and influential article, written more than 20 years ago, Tom Nairn wrote about the Janus-face of nationalism. Nationalism, for him, looked both forward and backward. 'All nationalism is both healthy and morbid. Both progress and regress are inscribed in its genetic code from the start'.[1] Nairn was perhaps unusual at the time in trying to deal with the complexity and at times baffling variety of nationalist movements by seeing nationalism as at one and the same time both positive and negative, a legacy perhaps of his background in Marxism. Most other writers have adopted a more dualistic approach, distinguishing more sharply between different kinds of nationalism, marking out more clearly positive and negative poles of reference.[2]

This tendency, to split nationalism into two fundamentally different types, has a long history in the literature, going back at least to the seminal work of Hans Kohn. It can take, as we shall see, a number of different forms, not all of them necessarily consistent or compatible with each other. Whilst this may not in itself be an insuperable problem (although it scarcely inspires confidence), there are in

our view a number of major difficulties with the dualistic approach. In particular, there seem to us to be related methodological and empirical difficulties which cannot be easily resolved.

Methodologically, distinctions are often formulated in terms of some sort of dichotomous Weberian ideal types, not existing in a pure form in practice, but useful for comparing against the complexity of political and historical reality. Too often this seems to lead to the complexity being lost sight of in the heat of analysis and to the ideal type or model coming to stand itself for the reality. An analytical distinction (itself problematic) thus comes to be treated as real. At the same time, it can allow for, if not actively encourage, a certain slipperiness in argument, as writers attacked for overdoing a distinction between, say, civic and ethnic nationalism can retreat into a defence that they are only making analytical distinctions and that of course most nationalisms are a combination of both. Thus Anthony Smith writes in a recent work 'Modern nations are simultaneously and necessarily civic and ethnic'.[3] Meanwhile the dichotomy establishes itself thoroughly in the literature.[4]

Empirically, certain sharp distinctions do not in our view stand up to close scrutiny. Some of the often cited classic historical examples appear to fall rather less than clearly into one side or other of a dichotomy than is often claimed. In the contemporary world too, and perhaps especially, a number of the distinctions are difficult to apply with any conviction. In relation to Western liberal democracies in particular there is, we suggest, a tendency to downplay certain features of nationalism and the nation state whilst maintaining a full critical stance towards other manifestations of nationalism. This is partly due to an ethnocentric bias or blindness which privileges the West, and partly due to a blindness to some of the contradictions in liberal nationalism itself. As a result, it seems to us, there is a kind of utopian character to the work especially (though not exclusively) of some liberal political theorists as they fail to take account of (to borrow Bogdan Denitch's telling phrase) 'really existing nationalism'.[5]

Ultimately this dualistic approach, we argue, raises more problems than it solves. Whilst it would clearly be mistaken to assert that nationalisms are all exactly the same, or to deny that nationalism can take different forms across time and space, it may be more serious to underestimate what apparently different forms of nationalism have in common and the dangers they may all pose. For at the heart of the nationalism as a political project, whatever form it takes, is an essentially exclusionary logic. There must after all always be people who are not part of the nation, the nation is always framed with the presumption of the existence of the outsider, the Other, against which the nation is itself defined and constructed. The problem of the Other is common to all forms of nationalism, constantly creating and recreating the conditions in which supposedly 'good' forms of nationalism turn bad. The problem of dualism is that it obscures and cannot explain this continual slippage, and creates the illusion that somehow or other it can be avoided, when so much of the evidence points the other way.

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One, two, many dualisms

It is possible to identify a large number of dualistic distinctions in the literature that we believe have the characteristics which we have mentioned. A cursory list would include all or some of the following:

Western	Eastern
Political	Cultural
Staatsnation	Kulturnation
Civic	Ethnic
Liberal	Illiberal
Individualistic	Collectivist
Voluntarist	Organic
Rational	Mystical/emotional
Universalistic	Particularistic
Patriotism	Chauvinism
Moderate patriotism	Extreme patriotism
French enlightenment	German romanticism
Contracts	Volk
Constitutional	Authoritarian
National identity	Nationalism
Gesellschaft	Gemeinschaft
Legal-rational	Traditional
Historic nations	Non-historic nations
Nationalism of the oppressed	Nationalism of the oppressor
National liberation	Imperialism

Some of these distinctions in the literature are more influential than others; some are overlapping; some refer to specific writers; others refer to more general tendencies. Whilst there is clearly not space here to provide an exhaustive treatment of all of these, it seems appropriate to highlight a central set which are closely related in terms of their foci of concern, and which may be understood in a sense as part of the same basic matrix. The contrasts specifically between West and East, between the political and the cultural, between the civic and ethnic, between the liberal and illiberal, are all, we may argue, hewn from the same rock. They emerge to some degree sequentially and to some degree as successive reformulations. Separately and collectively they are arguably at the core of the dualistic enterprise, seeking to arrive at the same point, at a clear and unambiguous point of distinction and contrast. If this point cannot in fact be reached, even by these routes, it may be argued, perhaps it cannot be reached at all.

West and East

One of the earliest distinctions may be thought of on the face of it as more geographical than conceptual. This is the distinction between nationalism in its Western and its Eastern forms. Although less obviously in vogue today, it has played a prominent role in the work of some major writers on nationalism, from Kohn to Plamenatz and the late Ernest Gellner, writers whose work has spanned

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some 60 years and still remains influential today. Of course, this distinction could never be, and was never intended to be merely geographical. Rather the words West and East functioned as containers of a sort, to be filled with a particular (and heavily value-laden) content. According to Kohn, nationalism developed in the West first and along singular lines. It was the product of the Enlightenment, of the age of reason, an essential expression of the confidence of rational (and especially) bourgeois individuals wishing to pursue their legitimate interests. Eastern nationalism by contrast developed in a profoundly different environment, along quite different lines and, importantly, in reaction to the success and confidence of the West.[6] Plamenatz in turn identifies in the West a:

> nationalism of peoples who for some reason feel themselves at a disadvantage but who are nevertheless culturally equipped in ways that favour success and excellence measured by standards which are widely accepted and fast spreading, and which first arose among them and other peoples culturally akin to them

In contrast to this, the Eastern model represents:

> the nationalism of peoples recently drawn into a civilisation hitherto alien to them and whose ancestral cultures are not adapted to success and excellence by these cosmopolitan and increasingly dominant standards. This is the 'nationalism' of peoples who feel the need to transform themselves, and in so doing to raise themselves; of peoples who come to be called 'backward', and who would not be nationalists of this kind unless they both recognised this backwardness and wanted to overcome it.[7]

Both writers seem to suggest that the Eastern model is characterized by an inferiority complex which produces an impatience and intolerance that is a far cry from the rationalistic, constitutional Western model. A similar sense that the West is the model to which others aspire (or ought to) and to which they will sooner or later gravitate, underpins Gellner's notion of the different nationalisms of different time zones steadily moving westward as they go (or perhaps as he went).[8]

There are a number of perhaps obvious objections to this whole approach. The West/East dichotomy may perhaps be only a metaphor, but it is, even on its own terms, a somewhat crude and inaccurate one, and liable to cause disagreements even among its proponents. Is Germany located in the East? It may be, if one starts in Britain or France. For Kohn it is Eastern, while for Plamenatz it is Western! But what then of Ireland, which even Kohn puts in the Eastern camp? Even France on one account falls into the non-Western camp if one follows Liah Greenfeld's recent attempt to identify resentment against the West (in this case Great Britain) as a key element on the formation of French nationalism.[9]

More serious than any difficulties in acknowledging that the world is after all round not flat, or, more accurately, a globe, is the problem of the set of heavily value-laden assumptions that underpin the use of the concepts of backwardness (Plamenatz), inferiority (Kohn) and incompleteness (Gellner). These may be rooted in what Stuart Hall has called the discourse of the 'West and the Rest', developed over hundreds of years of unequal contact, imperialism and colonial-

ism, founded on elements of power and coercion.[10] This discourse has deep historical origins in the form of the opposition between East and West, going back to Roman and Greek hostility to the barbarian Others from the East, to the schism in Christianity between Eastern Orthodoxy and Western Catholicism, to Christianity's struggle with Islam and the contempt of some Enlightenment thinkers for the East.[11] This perception of cultural backwardness has been a major factor in the importance many nations give to being 'European', and in being as near to Western or at least Central Europe as possible. (It may be noted that the term 'East-central Europe' has become more popular since the fall of communism as one way of carving out more differentiation among the countries of Eastern Europe.[12]) Further still to the East from Western Europe there has long been a similar underestimation of Chinese or Indian civilization which puts these even deeper into this state of Eastern 'idiocy'.

The profoundly ethnocentric sense of Western superiority which informs this particular dualism can then all too easily blind writers to the deficiencies of Western nationalism as they rush to denounce that of the East. For it is not too difficult to point to a number of the characteristics of supposedly 'Eastern' nationalism which appear to feature in Western nationalism, enough to make the distinction very murky. Waves of resentment against others (for stealing 'our' jobs, or swamping 'our' culture) have been a staple feature of right-wing (both extreme and mainstream) nationalist discourse in France, Britain and the USA for many years; the fruits of intolerance have produced the widespread occurrence of acts of racial violence in many parts of the 'West' now for decades or more. Even the emotionality attributed to Eastern nationalism has been clearly visible in the West, whether in situations such as the manufactured nationalism of the Falklands War in Britain, or the more routine celebrations of the nation in sporting triumphs and national commemorations.

Political versus cultural nationalism

One of the primary distinctions that filled the East–West containers was the contrast between (Western) political and (Eastern) cultural forms of nationalism. In locating the origins of Western nationalism in the Enlightenment project, Kohn saw it as a part of a more general movement 'to limit governmental power and to secure civic rights. Its purpose was to create a liberal and rational civil society'. Thus for example 'English and American nationalism was in its origin, connected with the concepts of individual liberty and represented nations firmly constituted in their political life'. Intimately connected then with the liberal revolt against absolutism, with the opening up of society, and (as we shall see) with democracy, Western political nationalism was progressive, modern, the creation of the present if not oriented to the future. The cultural form of nationalism, which according to Kohn emerged in the East, was a reaction to this, opposed to its core values and driven by a quite different dynamic. It emerged

in lands which were in political ideas and social structure less advanced than the modern

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> West. There was only a weak middle class: the nation was split between a feudal aristocracy and a rural proletariat. Thus nationalism became ... a cultural movement ... {led} to oppose the 'alien' example and its liberal and rational outlook[13]

Cultural nationalism looked elsewhere for its justification, finding it not in reason but in emotion, not in the present but in the past, turning inwards, to the imagination, to tradition, to history and to nature.

The sharpness of the contrast between the political and the cultural roots of different forms of nationalism is, however, hard to sustain when we seek to apply it to particular cases. Nations that are purportedly models of the political form of nationalism appear both (positively) to exhibit a signal pride in the achievements of 'their' own culture, and (negatively) to experience recurring anxieties about its health, security, even viability. On the one hand this kind of pride may be seen to underpin the assimilationist assumptions of for instance the French model of citizenship. As Mitchell and Russell have argued, referring explicitly to the French model, 'a logic of assimilation clearly underpins {this} ideal type. Cultural assimilation is the price that must be paid ... for integration into the political community'.[14] On the other hand, pride may be replaced by something more negative, to fears that this culture is vulnerable, under attack, threatened by the diluting and sapping presence of particular minorities. Movements have thus arisen (such as the Front National), which (however disingenuously) explicitly eschew the overt racism of predecessors such as the Action Française in asserting the need to defend French culture.[15]

Whether this amounts to a new form of racism is not (yet) the issue here.[16] Rather it is necessary to point to the importance of cultural underpinnings for supposedly political nationalisms, underpinnings which have to be fortified and sustained against both external and internal threats. Thus for some the existence of supposedly distinct and different national cultures underpinning the identity of West European states poses a serious barrier to moves in the direction of further European integration.[17] For others, such as David Miller, it is vital to mount a sustained argument for the existence and defence of a distinct (if not static) national culture against the disintegrating appeals of radical multiculturalists. This may also involve the imposition of significant restrictions on immigration (as Miller seems to suggest may be needed to deal with Mexicans arriving in California) in order not to stretch the education system and other mechanisms of cultural integration beyond their capacity.[18] At this point the line between 'open' political and 'closed' cultural nationalism may seem blurred indeed.

Defence may of course also turn into attack. Pride need not necessarily be confined to the perhaps haughty presumption for assimilation within the (culturally given) nation but may also, under some circumstances, be converted into a more arrogant, externally directed impulse. John Schaar has argued for example for an American form of political nationalism (or patriotism) founded on the political principles of liberty, equality and self-government. As Margaret Canovan has observed, however, this can all too easily turn into talk of a mission

to educate others, to inculcate the values of one particular ('our') culture.[19] How different is this from old-fashioned imperialism or the particular pedagogic missions which British (or French) nationalism felt in their day to be their destiny or duty?

Such dynamics of pride, fear and arrogance may all derive from a profound sense that political nationalism cannot itself exist without a vivid and strong sense of its own cultural identity. They may lead to forms of nationalist politics which bear little resemblance to Kohn's optimistic picture, but in which given states seek either to impose their culture on others internally (through assimilation) or externally (as imperialism), or, in order to defend its purportedly intrinsic identity, exclude or raise barriers against others.

Civic versus ethnic nationalism

If the distinction between a good political and a bad cultural form of nationalism is then problematic, one alternative may be to distinguish between a civic and an ethnic form. In some ways, this can be seen as an extension or reformulation of the political/cultural distinction, drawing out more fully the implications of the civic element in Kohn's original formulation and, following him, locating this firmly in the West. Thus for Smith

> historic territory, legal–political community, legal–political equality of members, and common civic culture and ideology; these are the components of the standard Western model of the nation.[20]

Or in Ignatieff's more popular work,

> civic nationalism maintains that the nation should be composed of all those—regardless of race, colour, creed, gender, language or ethnicity—who subscribe to the nation's political creed. This nationalism is called civic because it envisages the nation as a community of equal, rights bearing citizens, united in patriotic attachment to a shared set of political practices and values.[21]

In this civic model, the nation is seen to be constructed freely as 'an association of citizens', to borrow Schwarzmantel's formulation.[22] The national polity comes into being on a voluntary, willed basis; it is the product of agreement, of consent. The polity is thus simultaneously national and democratic. 'This nationalism is necessarily democratic since it vests sovereignty in all of the people'.[23] The members of the civic nation are those who have rights and obligations as citizens of this polity. Within the borders of the nation, on its soil, all may be citizens, according to the principle of *ius soli*. Membership is thus in some sense open, or at least not closed off in any *a priori* way.

In the ethnic model by contrast, the nation is, as Smith again defines it, 'first and foremost a community of common descent'.[24] Nations are the product of history and to the extent that people are born into them, in a sense of nature too. 'Rather than free associations based on residence, they {are} historically determined entities based on ancestry'.[25] The nation is thus a given, a fate, from

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which none may escape. As Smith puts it, 'whether you stayed in your community or emigrated to another, you remained ineluctably, organically a member of the community of your birth, and were for ever stamped by it'.[26] One cannot at the most basic level choose to join this or that nation. The nation is overtly exclusive, closed rather than open. 'No one can become Kurd, Latvian or Tamil through adopting Kurdish etc. ways'.[27] Citizenship is acquired by birth, through blood, determined by *ius sanguinis* not by *ius soli*.

The classic European examples of civic and ethnic nations, again placed along West–East lines, are generally held to be France and Germany. There is a long tradition in the literature, going back to Kohn and forward to the recent work of Rogers Brubaker, for whom even today 'the opposition between the French and German understandings of nationhood and forms of nationalism remains indispensable'.[28]

The intellectual origins of this distinction may be traced back to German intellectuals such as Meinecke on the one side and French writers such as Michelet and Renan on the other. In Renan's famous formulation, 'a nation is the actual consent, the desire to live together ... The existence of a nation is an everyday plebiscite'.[29] It is not, however, wholly clear how seriously we are intended to or can take the notion of a daily plebiscite. This seems more of a romantic gesture, part of a rhetoric which, on closer inspection, has closer affinities than might at first appear with the object of its own critique. As Silverman has argued, the division between (French, Western) rationalism and (German, Eastern) romanticism is problematic.

> An analysis of Renan's lecture shows that his concept of the nation is informed by ideas of the spirit and tradition. Much of the imagery he uses is in keeping with the so-called Germanist tradition ... his reference to the nation as a 'spiritual' principle invokes the counter-revolutionary discourse informed by the romanticism of Herder.[30]

As Silverman suggests, this may help to explain the ease with which the racist ideologue Maurice Barres and the racist movement Action Française claimed Renan as one of their own (apart from the often forgotten fact that Renan was initially quite enthusiastic about racist ideas himself).[31]

It may be possible to dismiss the appropriation of this classic expression of civic nationalism by the 'other side' as something of an exception, or as an instance of the way in which, in the history of ideas, arguments can be twisted and turned in unpredictable ways, caught up in currents and shifts which have their own peculiar logic. The difficulties, however, do not stop there.

A key element in the civic nationalism argument is the idea of association, the notion that the nation is brought into being, or sustained by the agreement of its members. It may, however, be more difficult than is often claimed either to point with any certainty to such a defining moment or to entirely convincing evidence for freely given consent. Many writers refer rather uncritically to the French revolution as one such moment, a time in which a nation (France) was created by, as Alter puts it, 'an act of will [with] the nation as a community of responsible citizens expressing a common political will through the state ...

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constituted, in theory at least, by individual commitment to the ideas of 1789 and to the grande patrie'.[32]

Leaving aside the argument that the French revolution was not one event but several, it has to be said that the number of individuals who in 1789 were in a position to commit themselves to the nation, and certainly to receive in turn equal political recognition was somewhat limited. Even at its democratic high point, there were after all rather severe restrictions on democratic inclusion in revolutionary France, not least in terms of gender. (The fact that women only gained the right to vote in France in 1945 is all too often glossed over in this context.[33]) Indeed it could be argued that in certain respects, the dynamics of democratic participation and nationalist mobilization came into conflict. Florence Gauthier has pointed to the way in which a more aggressive nationalism at any rate went along with significant restrictions on democratic rights. As Thermidor both curtailed the popular movement, entrenching power in fewer, richer hands, it also opened the way to wars of conquest. Thus, so far from it being the case that 'nationalism was in its origins an idea of revolutionary democracy',[34] it may well be more accurate as Gauthier argues to say that 'the nationalism of the French as conquerors was due to ... the **failure** of the rights of man and the citizen'.[35]

The English example, favoured by other writers, may be no more persuasive. Liah Greenfeld for instance, who has developed a version of the civic–ethnic contrast, connected to the opposition between individualism and collectivism, uses England as her favoured example (or one might say that she gives England most favoured nation status!). For her, the transformation in the meaning of the word nation, linked to profound structural transformations in 15th and 16th century English society, produced a form of nationalism which 'elevated every member of the community which it made sovereign'.[36] Within this civic individualist version of the nation, in principle all could be members of a homogeneously noble nation. In reality, as even Greenfield recognizes, this principle was rather heavily compromised, historically, by the systematic exclusion of the vast majority of the population (such as women, servants, Catholics, the poor) from the exercise of civic or democratic rights and thus the possibility of actively and politically expressing their assent to the nation.[37] The democratic ideal of the civic conception of the nation may then have been honoured more in the breach than in the performance. The same was true for the ideals of the American Revolution ('life, liberty, and the pursuit of happiness'), which did not apply to Black slaves, native Americans, or, again, women. The point here is not to apply anachronistic standards to the radical democrats of past times, but to point out the flaws, limitations and exclusions that were present at the birth of Western democracy and the democratic nation. The problem is that these flaws are not simply of historical interest; problems of exclusion from rights of citizenship continue to haunt the liberal, democratic nations, and the problem of the alien other is still a feature of civic nationalism.

Active, political consent has also been a continuing concern as much in cited examples of civic as well as ethnic nations. In reality, few states have counted

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on the spontaneous loyalty of their populations to the nation without regularly intervening in various ways. Billig has drawn attention to the 'banal nationalism' which is flagged daily in ways that often go unrecognized or unremarked, and indeed which become so routine that they are hardly noticed at all or seem to become internalized, to use a psychological term.[38] Although there are important ceremonial and ritual occasions where the collective, the nation, is celebrated, these are only occasional. The 'flagged signs of nationhood' are encountered daily. Thus national identity is not repressed into the unconscious; it remains daily reproduced. Nationalist flagging provides the framework for contemporary politics. The daily rhetoric of 'we', 'us', 'society', etc., constantly invokes, by implication, the nation. Even weather forecasting in newspapers and broadcasting is implicitly national. Sport too is a central site of this daily flagging, often emphasizing masculinity and sharing an affinity with war, and its metaphors, with similar themes of heroism and sacrifice. Battling for honour against foreigners is a preparation for more serious conflicts and it is enacted daily. One important feature of Billig's contribution is to remind us that nationalism is not simply confined to extreme movements or to ethnically based ones or to movements aspiring to new state or autonomous status. Banal (and sometimes not so banal) nationalism also forms an important component of legitimation for, and the manufacturing of consent in, established modern states.

Without confidence in the loyalty of its citizens, even the civic nation state may not rest easy. When it comes to deciding who may or may not be the citizens, this anxiety may be so powerful that it renders the contrast between civil and ethnic nationalisms altogether more problematic than it first appears.

It is often argued that civic nationhood is more open, more inclusive, more expansive than ethnic nationhood. Since ethnic nationhood is defined in terms of birth, it is only open to those born into the ethnos and closed to those who are not. Different legal principles underpin these different conceptions of nationhood. Under *ius soli*, citizenship may be ascribed to all persons residing within a given set of borders. Under *ius sanguinis*, citizenship can only be ascribed to children of citizens. It is, however, difficult to find clear, unambiguous and consistent applications of the principle of *ius soli* in many Western civic nations. Neither France, nor Britain (held up by Brubaker as an even better case in this regard, along with the USA), have held consistently and confidently to the principle of *ius soli* for complex reasons that in many ways go to the heart of the problem of the dualistic approach.

According to Brubaker, although based to some degree on the principle of *ius sanguinis*, citizenship law in France has supplemented this with significant elements of *ius soli*. Thus,

> France and Germany represent polar cases: French citizenship law includes a substantial territorial component, German citizenship law none at all. Most other Western European *ius sanguinis* countries include some complementary elements of *ius soli*, without going as far as France.[39]

However, whilst this has been the case for much of this century, it was not

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always so, or always for the same reasons, and has in recent years come under severe and prolonged pressure, as Brubaker himself noted already at the beginning of the decade.

Historically *ius soli* in France, far from being the product of democratization, was the dominant principle in France before the revolution, under the ancient regime. It was then pushed back under Napoleon. As Weil notes, 'it was decided that birth within the borders of the country was **not enough to guarantee the loyalty** of the children of those foreigners born in France'.[40] Simple *ius soli* was then rejected and replaced by citizenship based on blood ties. It was not until much later, in the Third Republic, that *ius soli* was readopted, and again concerns about loyalty were uppermost in the minds of policy-makers. Now, in a context of sustained enmity between France and Germany, the presence on French soil of residents who did not possess French citizenship and were therefore not obliged to do military service, was seen to be both unfair to French citizens who were burdened by this duty, and potentially dangerous. The re-adoption of *ius soli*, accompanied by a rigorous programme of socialization, involving what Brubaker himself calls 'moral and civic indoctrination' in a national educational system, could make loyal citizens of them all.[41] *Ius soli* in these circumstances may be better understood as a state project to ensure citizenship for the potentially recalcitrant, to instil republican loyalties where they did not spontaneously exist, as a measure imposed from above on the politically powerless if not passive, than as a product of political mobilization from below, as an outcome of active democratic participation and consent.

Since then, the ascription of citizenship on these grounds has been periodically but powerfully attacked. Anti-Semitic movements of various kinds sought to strip Jews of their citizenship, as Pierre Birnbaum has strikingly documented.[42] More recently, hostility has shifted or widened to take in other targets identified variously as Muslims, North Africans, Arabs but always as alien others. Whilst this has been the primary focus of the Front National, mainstream politicians, particularly on the Right, have articulated similar themes and pushed (with some success now) for legislation which would revise French citizenship laws in a more ethnic and exclusivist direction. In a recent work, Anthony Smith, drawing on the French example, has argued, similarly, that civic nationalisms of the Western European variety can be 'every bit as severe and uncompromising as ethnic nationalisms'. In an extraordinary passage, which seems to undermine the whole distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism, he writes

> So the pedagogical narrative of Western democracies turns out to be every bit as demanding and rigorous—and in practice ethnically one-sided—as are those of non-Western authoritarian state-nations, since it assumes the assimilation of ethnic minorities within the borders of the nation state through acculturation to a hegemonic majority ethnic culture.[43]

In Britain, as Cesarani has pointed out, citizenship laws have developed in a confused and uncertain manner, tied up with shifting definitions of national identity and the object of struggles over rights and obligations.[44] Caryl Phillips has argued that 'the once great colonial power that is Britain has always sought

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to define her people and by extension the nation itself by identifying those who don't belong'.[45] This has taken various forms, from attempts to construct models of the 'true- born Englishman' to the forging of 'Britons', analysed by Linda Colley, in the course of prolonged conflict with France.[46] Whether English or British, this identity has been premised on the existence of a dangerous other, to be suppressed, fought or excluded.[47]

The war with revolutionary France, central to Colley's account, was, it may be noted, with another civic nation, itself, as we have seen, often taken to prove the intrinsic connection between nationalism and democracy. To the extent then that the 'British nation' was forged in a violent counter-revolutionary project aimed at precisely this hostile Other, one might argue that its civic character is at best contradictory, rooted in conflict not just with another civic nation but with large sections of its own population.[48]

Perhaps more seriously, the fiction of a tolerant, open British nation, willing to accord citizenship to all residing within its borders has little basis in the historical record. The desire and imperative to exclude from the nation has been a constant motif in debates about citizenship ever since the mid-18th century agitation against the so-called 'Jew Bill', if not before.[49] This century in particular there has been an insistent drift to the adoption of more and more racist criteria, from the Aliens Act of 1905 (directed primarily against Jews from Eastern Europe) to the British Nationality Act of 1981 (directed primarily against non-whites) and which, in Cesarani's words

> exceeded all previous legislation ... by abrogating the principle of *ius soli* ... Such legislation exposed the racialised character of British nationality, reflecting the bitterly polarised and at one extreme, racist understanding of British nationality in the mid-1980s.[50]

Citizenship in these 'civic' nations is thus no longer (if it ever was) so open. There are real and harsh restrictions on joining these nations, which may be matched by a parallel lack of civility in their internal life, in so far as racist campaigns against potential immigrants are accompanied and fortified by racist attacks on particular and defined others within. It would surely be difficult to sustain with any great confidence the claim that racism in either of these connected forms is weaker today in the civic nations of France and Britain (not to mention the USA) than in the ethnic nation of Germany (although differences remain in criteria for citizenship).

The increasingly overt racism of such civic nations may be rooted in a recurring anxiety about the Other, however defined and wherever located, responses to which expose fundamental difficulties with the construction of civic rather than ethnic foundations for the nation. This anxiety may focus on the presence of 'foreigners' of dubious loyalty who may have to have citizenship forced upon them, or from whom it may have to be forcibly wrested. It may generate denial, whether that 'others' have always been 'here', or of 'their' rights once here. It may lead to the erection of barriers to keep 'them' out. However, as long as the Other is perceived in inherently hostile terms that are also in a fundamental sense constitutive and defining of the identity of the nation

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itself, the distinction between civic and ethnic is hard to sustain or apply. To see recent policies in particular as merely contingent, the result of specific historically atypical political pressures in the present forcing hitherto impeccably civic nations to abandon or retreat from long-held beliefs or deeply cherished traditions, seems unconvincing. Rather they may be better understood in terms of a shifting repertoire of responses to a problem for which there is, within the nationalist frame of reference, no easy or 'good' answer. The drift to ethnic criteria, to *ius sanguinis*, may be understood as (at best?) a search for firmer ground, a more certain answer to a question that will not go away. For once we strip away some of the rhetoric surrounding the civic model, the notion that it is a wholly free association of citizens, simultaneously national and democratic, sustained by daily plebiscites, open and welcoming to actual and potential citizens, we are faced with the issue of how nations (even civic ones) are bounded, limited and defined. What, above all, is to be done about the other, against whom even the civic nation must in some fundamental sense define itself?

Liberal versus illiberal nationalism

One answer to this question, in its own way a further reformulation of the political–cultural civic–ethnic dualism, is that there is a good form of nationalism which, anchored in or tied to liberal beliefs and values, can indeed tolerate the existence of the other perfectly well. In this liberal version, nationalism recognizes the rights of other nations to exist. It is moderate in ambition and temperament, valuing loyalty to and identification with the nation but not in excess, and not to the extent that this would override other values and commitments. It sees national commitments as understandable and legitimate, not merely emotional, but, since it recognizes the rights of other nations to self-determination, it balances particularism (loyalty to this nation) with universalism (all may be loyal to their nation).

The contrast here, often more implicit than explicit, would be with an illiberal form of nationalism. This would be wary of, if not actively hostile to other nations, suspicious of the claims of others to (new) rights, jealous of its own, keen to pursue ancient (or rediscovered) claims (and thus potentially irredentist). It could be more demanding of the commitment of its members, especially emotionally, seeing loyalty to the nation as the supreme good, overriding other commitments, demanding if necessary the supreme sacrifice. It would thus be particularist rather than universalist.

One of the first proponents of liberal nationalism was Mazzini, for whom it was not an aggressive doctrine but an open and generous one. His heart stirred at the success of other struggles for self-determination which would lead to the creation of a world (or at least a Europe) made up of a number of free and independent nations, each with its own distinguishing characteristics and calling, or mission. Relationships between these nations would be entirely harmonious as a result, as each nation would recognize the freedom of others to pursue their

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destiny, but also because the different missions in some sense complemented each other. Thus, as Alter notes, 'England's calling was to industrialise and create overseas colonies, Russia's to civilise Asia and Italy's to lead the world as a new Rome'.[51] Whether past, present or future colonies, Asia or indeed the rest of the world could share Mazzini's enthusiasm for these various missions may perhaps be doubted. In any case, when it came to specifying which or how many nations were to be included in his 1857 map of the new Europe, it appeared that space was rather restricted. The Irish, Danish and Portuguese for instance were to be denied entry, according to his biographer Mack Smith, on the grounds that they lacked a positive mission for humanity.[52]

It may of course be argued that the particular prejudices of this or that thinker do not in themselves invalidate the general line of argument. Conversely, it is difficult to see how much purchase Mazzini's vision, were we to make allowances for the odd if revealing inconsistency, has ever had on reality, or tells us very much about really existing nationalism, past or present. In the real world, nationalist movements which, if they may originally have found some inspiration in these ideas, did so in terms of their own particular causes (and *a fortiori* nations states once established), do not appear to have shown any great interest in recognizing the rights of others to pursue claims and rights like their own. These seem always to have had to be fought for, wrested as the outcome of violent conflict, rather than accorded in a context of discussion, negotiation, or in tribunals, as Margaret Canovan has pointed out.[53]

This, it has to be said, was apparent almost from the outset. English nationalism, Greenfeld's preferred model was, as David Kaiser has commented, under Cromwell brutally imperial in its treatment of Ireland, and suppressed other nationalist movements (notably the Indian) with similar ferocity throughout the following centuries.[54] French nationalism became overtly annexationist, as we have noted, quite soon during the revolution, certainly from Thermidor onwards. Later in 1848, German liberals distinguished themselves in the Frankfurt assembly with what Woolf describes as their 'contemptuous dismissal of the claims of other nationalities'.[55] The so-called 'Spring of the Peoples' was a severe disappointment for many, not just because of the failure of the liberal revolutionaries to defeat the forces of reaction but because it became rapidly apparent that more powerful nationalist movements could not resist the temptation to impose their will on weaker ones. Later, after the first world war, many of the newly recognized nation states of Eastern Europe proved intolerant of nationalist movements in their own areas, Polish treatment of Ukrainians being a case in point.[56] Even most recently, the assertion of national rights in post-communist Eastern Europe has generated further instances of intolerance and suppression, most appallingly in the case of Bosnia, where Serbian and Croatian nationalist leaders have done their utmost to deny the right of national self-determination to others in both word and deed.[57]

It may not be enough to see all these instances as either failures of principle or as examples of another (illiberal) kind of nationalism. There may be more profound reasons why liberal principles may have such little purchase on

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nationalist movements, especially once these have gained control of their own states. Giddens has argued that the nation state is above all 'the pre-eminent power container of the modern era', which in successfully achieving the formalized monopoly over the means of violence within its own territory, necessarily engages in sustained processes of internal pacification.[58] Given this, it is hard to see how or why nation states would ever have any incentive to accord the right of self-determination to groups defining themselves as national within their own borders. It may be easier to accord this right to others elsewhere of course, but this may well be to do with rather different considerations in which recognition may itself be a lever to gain more power for one's own nation.[59]

Leaving this aside, it is in any case not clear that the liberal belief that loyalty to the nation should not and need not override other values can be sustained either theoretically or empirically. For some indeed, it is precisely this exclusivity of claim that defines nationalism. Thus for Hroch nationalism is 'that outlook which gives an absolute priority to the values of the nation over all other values and interests',[60] whilst for Gellner, nationalism promotes the view that 'obligations to the nation override all other public obligations'.[61]

However, a number of writers recently have sought to challenge this argument from within a liberal or progressive frame of reference. Neil MacCormick argues that it is morally intolerable to claim that the 'nation' overrides all other claims on the individual, and he argues against those who have taken nationalism to mean precisely that.[62] Yael Tamir claims that 'the main characteristic of liberal nationalism is that it fosters national ideals without losing sight of other human values against which national ideals ought to be weighed'. Indeed Tamir argues that without national identification, it would be difficult to develop the capacity to make such choices. For Tamir, 'membership in a national culture is part of the essence of being human'. The nation provides a context or framework in which it becomes possible for individuals to become autonomous self-determining human agents. 'Life in a cultural environment that is familiar, understandable and thus predictable is a necessary precondition for making rational choices and becoming self-governing'.[63] It is not clear, however, why this 'cultural environment' has to be a national one. It might be argued indeed that Tamir here assumes precisely what needs to be argued for. As Canovan has pointed out, 'We cannot use sharing the same culture as a criterion of nationhood, because it is precisely the fact that features are specific to a particular nation that makes these features count as "culture" '.[64]

The tension that might then be set up between loyalty to the nation and other values also tends to be too easily dismissed within this frame of reference. For Tamir,

> liberal nationalism thus celebrates the particularity of culture together with the universality of human rights, the social and cultural embeddedness of individuals together with their personal autonomy.[65]

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Similarly, Neil MacCormick seeks to turn this argument on its head. 'Could one learn to love mankind universally if one had not first learned to love people in the concrete in the narrower range?'[66] The weight of empirical evidence seems, however, to point very much in the opposite direction. Loyalty to the nation has all too often blocked sympathy for others defined as belonging to a different nation, often grotesquely and barbarically. In the recent war over Bosnia, part of the horror stemmed from the sight of people butchering former neighbours with whom they had appeared to live comfortably and amicably for decades, a slaughter 'legitimated' by the belief that these were now members of another 'nation' and thus had to be 'cleansed'.[67]

It seems more honest to acknowledge that there may rather be a clash between particular and universal commitments. David Miller, in his recent attempt to defend nationalism, argues indeed that it is right that loyalty to the nation should take precedence.[68] For him not only is universalism incompatible with nationalism but we have special responsibilities to our fellow nationals, which in some sense ought to come first. National identity here is taken as inescapable, a given, as real, and thus 'a legitimate way of understanding your place in the world'. We cannot follow what he derides as a 'radical chooser' model (which is favoured by Tamir) but are born in some profound way into national identities. Partly as a result, or in any case, universalism is, he argues, simply too heroic to inspire the behaviour of ordinary people. Here, we have the inverse of the utopianism of a Tamir or a MacCormick, a purported realism which rules out alternatives to nationalism as impractical, as impossibly demanding. Whether his pessimism is wholly justified is not a question we have space to discuss here. What is crucial is the argument that because national identity is 'real', the different duties we owe to our fellow nationals can be (have to be?) justified. In restricting choice to a limited reflection on identity within the framework of the national, however, Miller assumes we cannot choose to reject the fundamental dichotomy of national and other which may be the source of the problem.

For what Miller and Tamir have in common may be as important as what divides them. Both the potentially naive utopianism of the one and the seemingly harsh realism of the other are premised on the need to distinguish between the national and the other, a distinction which in the end seems to undermine the crucial premises of the liberal nationalist position. Either the problem of what to do about the other is elided or ignored in a wholly utopian fashion, so that the balance between the universal and the particular is asserted against the evidence; or that balance cannot in fact be sustained, and one value does in the end override others.

Either way seems problematic. Rather than liberal nationalism representing a good coherent alternative to a bad illiberal one, it seems that it is an unstable amalgam, a hybrid of incompatible elements, which may fall apart, as in the above cases, under the particular pressure of what to do about the other who, if not actively denigrated or denied, is always of secondary concern, and whose rights, if not suppressed are downplayed, and whose fundamental status is always inferior.

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Conclusion—the problem of the other

We have tried in this paper to examine some of the deficiencies in the tradition of dividing nationalisms into two distinct types. The dualistic models that we have discussed are highly interlinked and depend on implicit or explicit assumptions that there are good and bad (or bad and tolerable) forms of nationalism. Many writers continue to insist that there is a clear choice only between different forms of nationalism. whether this is (as for Ignatieff) to guarantee 'the security and rights we all need to lead cosmopolitan rights'[69] or to construct what Nairn calls a 'a durable and bearable disorder'.[70] There are, as we have sought to show here, a number of ways in which this sort of approach is flawed. As we move from west to east, from political to cultural, from civic to ethnic, from liberal to illiberal—and back again—we see the recurrence of a pattern that is common to all of them. That pattern is the problem of the Other, against which all definitions of the nation are constructed. Nationalism, however benign in form, must always seek to define the nation by reference to something else that it is not. The problem of forming boundaries and defining who falls in one side and who fall in the other is still at the heart of the nationalist.project.[71]

The use of binary oppositions seems ubiquitous in many areas of social and cultural analysis. However, if we are to grasp the realities of nationalism, we may need to transcend the sort of dualistic approaches we have sought to analyse here and their search for a good nationalism, a search which we believe is likely to prove chimerical.

Notes and references

1. T. Nairn, *The Break-up of Britain* (London: New Left Books, 1977), pp. 347–8.
2. There are of course some prominent exceptions to this. Carleton Hayes moved from a simpler division into good and bad forms to a six-fold classification of forms of nationalism see L. Snyder (Ed.) *Encyclopaedia of Nationalism* (Chicago: St. James Press, 1990). Giddens and Kellas provide threefold classifications. See A. Giddens, *Sociology* (Cambridge: Polity, 1993) and J. Kellas, *The Politics of Nationalism and Ethnicity* (London: Macmillan, 1991).
3. A. Smith, *Nations and Nationalism in Global Era* (Cambridge: Polity, 1995), p. 99.
4. See, for example, Michael Ignatieff's popular book and television series, *Blood and Belonging: journeys into the new nationalism* (London: Vintage, 1994) or Raymond Breton's analysis of nationalism among French and English speaking inhabitants of Canada. 'From ethnic to civic nationalism—English Canada and Quebec', *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 11 (1988), pp. 85–102.
5. B. Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism—The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
6. H. Kohn, *Nationalism: Its Meaning and History* (New York: Anvil, 1965).
7. J. Plamenatz, 'Two types of Nationalism' in E. Kamenka (Ed.) *Nationalism: The Nature and Evolution of an Idea* (London: Edward Arnold, 1976), pp. 33–4.
8. E. Gellner, *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and its Rivals* (London, Hamish Hamilton: 1994).
9. L. Greenfeld, *Nationalism. Five Roads to Modernity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992).
10. S. Hall, 'The West and the Rest', in *Formation of Modernity* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1992).
11. Davies has further pointed out how this led to a distorted undervaluing or ignoring of the achievements of (say) Polish culture, with its ancient university at Cracow (1364) long before most of the great German universities were founded. N. Davies, 'West Best, East Beast?', *Oxford Today*, 9 (1997).
12. Thus, for example, Holy, in an interesting recent account of Czech national identity from an anthropological perspective, has shown that the Czech view of the Slovaks associates them with the East rather than the West, and that this is associated with a whole set of binary opposites which sees the Czechs as associated with modernity, history, progress, culture and rationality, while Slovaks are associated with

traditionalism, lack of history, underdevelopment, nature and the emotions. L. Holy, *The Little Czech and the Great Czech Nation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p. 106.

13. Kohn *op. cit.*, Ref. 6, pp. 29–30.
14. M. Mitchell and D. Russell, 'Immigration, Citizenship and the Nation-State in the New Europe', in B. Jenkins and A. Sofos, *Nation and Identity in Contemporary Europe* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 67. This has been seen most clearly in recent years in the so-called 'foulard' or headscarves affair. This cause célèbre, which arose out of the desire of three female Muslim school students to wear headscarves in school, was treated by both left and right in France as an affront to French culture. Left intellectuals such as Regis Debray wrote a letter to the French education minister warning of 'the Munich of Republican education'—an extraordinary analogy! In this dispute, as Moruzzi suggests 'any insistence on serious cultural difference' was seen 'as a perverse refusal of French values, French identity, and the French republican tradition'. Thus the assertion of political, secular and Republican values was at the same time an assertion of a homogeneous French culture. See N. Moruzzi, 'A Problem with headscarves: Contemporary Complexities of Political and Social Identity', *Political Theory*, 22 (1994), p. 660.
15. See W. Safran, 'The National Front in France—from lunatic fringe to limited respectability', in P. Merkl and L. Weinberg (Eds) *Encounters with the Contemporary Radical Right* (Oxford: Westview, 1993), pp. 21–2.
16. But see Martin Barker's analysis of the 'new racism' that affirms the inevitable (and 'natural') divisions arising from cultural differences, whilst avoiding the crudity of more overt assertions of inferiority and superiority. See M. Barker, *The New Racism* (London: Junction Books, 1981). A critique of Barker's arguments can be found in R. Miles, 'Recent Marxist theories of nationalism and the issue of racism', *British Journal of Sociology*, 38 (1987).
17. Z. Zetterholm, *National Cultures and European Integration* (Oxford: Berg, 1994).
18. D. Miller, *On Nationality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 128.
19. M. Canovan, *Nationhood and Political Theory* (Cheltenham: Edward Elgar, 1996).
20. A.D. Smith, *National Identity* (Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1991), p. 11.
21. Ignatieff, *op. cit.*, Ref. 3, pp. 3–4.
22. J. Schwarzmantel, *Socialism and the Idea of the Nation* (London: Harvester, 1991), p. 207.
23. Ignatieff, *op. cit.*, Ref. 3, p. 4.
24. Smith, *op. cit.*, Ref. 20, p. 11.
25. Jenkins and Sofos, *op. cit.*, Ref. 14, p. 15.
26. Smith, *op. cit.*, Ref. 20, p. 11.
27. Kellas, *op. cit.*, p. 51.
28. R. Brubaker, *Citizenship and Nationhood in France and Germany* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1992), p. 3.
29. E. Renan, 'What is the Nation?', in Smith and Hutchinson (Eds), *Nationalism* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994), p. 17.
30. M. Silverman, *Deconstructing the Nation: Immigration, Racism and Citizenship in Modern France* (London: Routledge, 1992), pp. 20–21.
31. Not just initially too, according to Zeev Sternhell who suggests that in Renan's case political nationalism constituted an elaboration of the premises of a cultural determinism strongly influenced by racial determinism. See his 'The Political Culture of Nationalism' in R. Tombs (Ed.) *Nationhood and Nationalism in France—from Boulangism to the Great War* (London: Harper, 1994). It should also be noted that Renan's arguments were developed in a particular and highly charged political context, in which French nationalists were seething with resentment at the German annexation of Alsace-Lorraine. His invocation of plebiscites may have been intended to bolster French claims by calling attention to their purportedly democratic and progressive character as against an implicitly authoritarian and hence reactionary German model (see P. Weil, 'Nationalities and Citizenships: The lessons of the French Experience for Germany and Europe' in D. Cesarani and M. Fulbrooke (Eds) *Citizenship, Nationality, and Identity in Europe* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 77.
32. P. Alter, *Nationalism* (London: Edward Arnold, 1989), p. 15.
33. But see Jenkins and Copsey, who make some suggestive comparisons between the historic position of women and the contemporary position of immigrants in this context (Jenkins and N. Copsey, 'Nation, Nationalism and National Identity in France' in Jenkins and Sofos, *op. cit.*, Ref. 14, p. 104.
34. Schwarzmantel, *op. cit.*, Ref. 22, p. 27.
35. F. Gauthier, 'Universal Rights and National Interest in the French Revolution' in O. Dann and J. Dunwoody, *Nationalism in the Age of the French Revolution* (London: Hambledon, 1988). Our emphasis.
36. L. Greenfeld, *op. cit.*, Ref. 9, p. 487.
37. Llobera, whose concern is to assert that the concept of a nation is much older than some modernists suggest, claims a consensus among historians 'that by the end of the medieval period there was a clear

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sense of national identity in England, even if it was shared perhaps by only five percent of the population'!
(J. Llobera, *The God of Modernity—The Development of Nationalism in Western Europe* (Oxford: Berg, 1994), p. 39.

38. M. Billig, *Banal Nationalism* (London: Sage, 1995).
39. Brubaker, *op. cit.*, Ref. 28, p. 81.
40. Weil, *op. cit.*, Ref. 31, p. 77. Our emphasis.
41. Brubaker, *op. cit.*, Ref. 28, p. 109.
42. P. Birnbaum, *Antisemitism in France: A Political History from Leon Blum to the Present* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1992).
43. Smith, *op. cit.*, Ref. 3, p. 101.
44. D. Cesarani, 'The Changing Character of Citizenship in Britain and Europe' in Cesarani and Fulbrooke, *op. cit.*, Ref. 40.
45. C. Phillips (Ed.) *Extravagant Strangers—A Literature of Belonging* (London: Faber, 1997), p. x.
46. L. Colley, *Britons: Forging the Nation 1707–1837* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1992).
47. Miles goes further and claims that 'Englishness has been defined and developed from an early date utilising a changing idea of "race" to identify and exclude "others" ' (Miles, *op. cit.*, Ref. 16, pp. 24–5. He cites MacDougall in support of the view that English national identity was based by the mid seventeenth century on ideas of the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon 'race'. For many of the followers of the Parliamentary side in the English Civil War this was easily constructed into opposition to oppression by a foreign 'race'—the Normans—after 1066.
48. See Williams for a discussion of the political repression of the 1790s which was directed against radical groups such as the London Corresponding Society, although more bloodily against the insurrection in Ireland (G.A. Williams, *Artisans and Sans-Culottes: Popular Movements in France and Britain during the French Revolution* (London: Edward Arnold, 1968).
49. Cesarani, *op. cit.*, Ref. 44.
50. Cesarani, *op. cit.*, Ref. 44. The changing definition of British nationality must of course be understood against a background of empire. In 1948, with the beginnings of the dismantling of the empire, the British Nationality Act invented the status of a 'citizen of the UK and Colonies' separate from that of a 'British subject'. It was the ideology of empire and 'mother country' which encouraged many citizens of that empire to seek employment opportunities in post-war Britain. It was then the rush to exclude these citizens of the British empire which inspired firstly, ever more stringent immigration controls against Common-wealth citizens after 1962 and secondly, the new definitions of nationality in the 1991 Act. See R. Cohen, *Frontiers of Identity* (London: Longman, 1994).
51. Alter, *op. cit.*, Ref. 32, p. 30. See also the writings cited by D. Mack Smith, *Mazzini* (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1994), p. 219.
52. D. Mack Smith, *ibid.*, p. 157.
53. Canovan, *op. cit.*, Ref. 19.
54. D. Kaiser, 'Lessons of the History of Nationalism', *Theory and Society*, 23 (1994), p. 147.
55. S. Woolf (Ed.), *Nationalism in Europe—1815 to the present* (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 15.
56. R. Brubaker, 'Nationalizing states in the old "new Europe"—and the new', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, 19 (1996), pp. 411–37.
57. B. Denitch, *Ethnic Nationalism—The Tragic Death of Yugoslavia* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1996).
58. A. Giddens, *The Nation State and Violence* (Cambridge: Polity, 1985).
59. The way, for instance, in which the Allies invoked the principle of self-determination during the First World War had perhaps rather more to do with the strategic advantages that might be accrued in an inter-imperialist conflict with more vulnerable multi-national rivals than anything else. The risks to their Russian ally on their own side may also have delayed them in adopting this principle until later on in the conflict when the states had been raised still higher. See C. A. Macartney, 'National States and National Minorities', in S. Woolf, *op. cit.*, Ref. 55.
60. M. Hroch, 'How Nations are Formed', *New Left Review*, 198 (1996), p. 6.
61. E. Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1983), p. 1.
62. N. MacCormick, *Legal Right and Social Democracy* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982).
63. Y. Tamir, *Liberal Nationalism* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1993), pp. 79, 36, 84.
64. Canovan, *op. cit.*, Ref. 19, p. 53.
65. Tamir, *op. cit.*, p. 79.
66. MacKormick, *op. cit.*, p. 253.
67. Denitch, *op. cit.*, Ref. 57.
68. D. Miller, *On Nationality* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995).
69. Ignatieff, *op. cit.*, Ref. 4, p. 9.

70. T. Nairn, 'Internationalism and the Second Coming', in G. Balakrishnan (Ed.) *Mapping the Nation* (London: Verso, 1996).
71. This seems also to be the burden of recent anthropological approaches to the debate, as Jenkins has argued. 'National identity and nationalism involve, almost by definition, group identification and social categorisation: inclusion and exclusion'. R. Jenkins, *Rethinking Ethnicity: Arguments and Explorations* (London: Sage, 1992), p. 84.

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