Governance and State Power: A Network Analysis of European Security*

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Abstract

A growing number of scholars argue that the development of the common security and defence policy (CSDP) should be analysed as the institutionalization of a system of security governance. Although governance approaches carry the promise of a sophisticated, empirically grounded picture of CSDP, they have been criticized for their lack of attention to power. This is because governance approaches focus on institutional rules and ideas rather than the social structure that underpins them. To refine the notion of security governance, this article analyses co-operation patterns through social network analysis. Confirming the governance image, it maps out a complex constellation of CSDP actors that features cross-border and cross-level ties between different national and EU policy actors. It is also found, however, that CSDP is dominated by a handful of traditional state actors – in particular, Brussels-based national ambassadors – who retain strategic positions *vis-à-vis* weaker supranational and non-state actors. These actors are not giving up on state power, but reconstituting it at the supranational level.

Introduction

The development of the common security and defence policy (CSDP) can be analysed as the institutionalization of a system of governance with ever more constraining rules of behaviour over a large number of actors (Smith, 2004; Webber *et al*., 2004; Schroeder, 2006; Kirchner, 2006; Kirchner and Sperling, 2007; Norheim-Martinsen, 2010). Adopting a governance approach to CSDP means going beyond state-centric assumptions to uncover the complex ways in which contemporary European security institutions have become enmeshed. The state is not considered as a unitary actor, but rather as a structure in and around which different kinds of actors, from Commission officials and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) to Member State diplomats, interact at several levels of the political and administrative system to produce security policy outcomes (on unpacking the concept of the state, see also Bickerton, in this issue). The growing richness of this institutional landscape is what makes CSDP comparable to other EU policies – for instance, those that deal with agriculture, the environment or the internal market.

Although governance approaches carry the promise of a sophisticated, empirically grounded picture of CSDP, they have been criticized for their lack of attention to power. Scholars have argued that governance approaches do not really propose a theory of how decisions are made, who rules a policy domain or even how these flexible and inclusive systems of governance come into existence (Jachtenfuchs, 2007). Political sociologists add that the governance image tends to conceal power asymmetries (Smith, 2010; Georgakakis and Weisbein, 2010). One reason for its neglect of power, we believe, is that the governance literature focuses on institutional rules and ideas rather than the social structure that underpins them. Institutions and ideas obfuscate the power asymmetries that inevitably characterize concrete social relations. To address this gap in the governance literature, this article proposes a social structural approach. Our basic argument is that, despite its rules-based nature and sense of collective purpose, a governance system is also a vector of power in which some actors dominate others.

To operationalize this argument, we use social network analysis – a methodology that can detect patterns of formal and informal social relations within a social space (De Nooy, 2003). Confirming the governance image, we find a complex constellation of cross-border and cross-level ties between CSDP actors. We also reveal, however, that a handful of traditional state actors retain strategic positions *vis-à-vis* weaker supranational and non-state actors. The picture we draw of CSDP governance is, therefore, one in which state actors – and in particular Brussels-based national diplomats – remain the key players. We conclude that state power is neither projected nor diluted, but

rather is being reconstituted by state actors beyond the nation-state (Juncos and Reynolds, 2007; Cross, 2008). The article ends by sketching out the advantages of incorporating power relations in governance approaches.

I. CSDP and Security Governance

The popularity of governance approaches in EU studies can be traced back to a seminal piece: 'European Integration in the 1990s: State-Centric vs. Multi-level Governance' (Marks *et al.*, 1996). In this article, Gary Marks, Liesbet Hooghe and Kermit Blank argue that collective decision-making and supranational institutions dilute the sovereignty of European states. While acknowledging the role of Member State actors, they suggest that it has become impossible to analyse EU processes without reference to regional and supranational actors as well. Influenced by Fritz Scharpf's (1988) work on the joint decision-trap, this argument posits an analytical similitude between the EU and Germany's institutional framework wherein *Länder* and the federal state are strongly interdependent. European governance, they argue, is characterized by the inclusion of different kinds of public and private actors, such as regional governments, policy networks and interest groups, who can help, but also undermine, each other in the policy process. Europe, in essence, has moved beyond the era of state authority. As a result, scholars and practitioners must reconsider the way in which they define political legitimacy and policy effectiveness.

This approach has blossomed over the past decade, leading Beate Kohler-Koch and Berthold Rittberger to speak of a 'governance turn in EU studies' (Kohler-Koch and Rittberger, 2006). Governance became a rallying point for scholars who acknowledge the failure of the Community approach but will not succumb to the siren call of intergovernmentalism. Several EU-funded research programmes (Connex, Eurogov, Newgov) were established to analyse and/or promote the steering of public policy through flexible modes of co-ordination that include public and private actors at different levels of the political system. This 'new governance' was also embraced by the European Commission in the context of its White Paper on European Governance and the Lisbon Agenda's Open Method of Co-ordination. While some are analytical and others more normative, governance approaches are all based on the empirical observation that horizontal, informal forms of policy co-ordination are replacing vertical government in several policy areas.

Governance describes an inclusive decision-making environment in which several entry points coexist alongside one another, allowing strategic policy entrepreneurs to intervene where they are most effective. The resulting

institutional system is more complex because these actors, who are semi-detached from traditional state hierarchies, have to be co-ordinated towards a common policy goal (Héritier, 1999; Kohler-Koch and Eising, 1999). This system tends to exacerbate collective action and accountability problems. Without a clearly delineated space of authority known as the state, incentives and constraints are more diffuse, and it becomes difficult to know who is responsible to whom and for what. The intensity of these problems will vary depending on the quality of co-ordination mechanisms, which range from socialization to economic incentives.

While defence policy is often considered to be the last bastion of state sovereignty, scholars have recently imported the term 'governance' into European security studies, where the shift from state-centric high politics to 'security governance' is attributed to three transformations that took place since the end of the cold war: the rise of non-state security threats, the proliferation of non-state security actors and the emergence of new forms of co-ordination (Krahmann, 2005, p. 16). The concept of security governance describes how a growing number of state and non-state actors interact with each other to produce security policy in overlapping institutional configurations (Krahmann, 2003). The European continent is the most often cited locus of security governance, one in which a variety of security actors co-operate in multiple, often ad hoc ways to produce a stable security architecture (Kirchner and Sperling, 2007).

More specifically, Mark Webber *et al.* (2004, p. 4) define 'European security governance' as 'the co-ordinated management and regulation of issues by multiple and separate authorities, the interventions of both public and private actors (depending upon the issue), formal and informal arrangements, in turn structured by discourse and norms, and purposefully directed toward particular policy outcomes'. A key aspect of this definition is the dilution of state authority by transnational institutions and ideas. Whereas state-centric approaches describe a decision-making environment that is hierarchical (shaped at the top by heads of government), one-level (national) and exclusive (populated by state actors), European security governance is *heterarchical* (shaped by a variety of administrative and political actors), *multi-level* (supranational, national and perhaps even local) and *inclusive* (involving state and private actors). Some actors can be effective at shaping the policy agenda because they hold intense preferences, regardless of whether they occupy a formal decision-making position in the state apparatus. In the context of CSDP, these actors may include the French president, but also the EU High Representative or the International Crisis Group. This, Per Norheim-Martinsen (2010) argues, means that CSDP has moved 'beyond intergovernmentalism'.

Indeed, some authors believe that supranational elements are creeping into the second pillar's intergovernmental logic (Howorth, 2007; Cross, 2008; Juncos and Pomorska, 2006). Two reasons can be identified. First, a growing number of security officials are privileging multilateral negotiation in Brussels over bilateral ties. These actors include Member States representatives, but also Brussels-based institutions such as the Political and Security Committee (PSC), EU institutions such as the Council Secretariat, interest groups such as the Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe (ASD), think tanks such as the European Policy Centre, and external organizations such as Nato. Regelsberger and Wessels (2005) speak of a ratcheting-up effect whereby personnel and political resources are shifted to the EU level, producing ever more EU rules. This institutionalization process is also akin to what David Allen (1998) calls 'Brusselsization'.

Second, CSDP's formal intergovernmental decision-making procedures are tempered by flexible modes of co-ordination – for example, informal directorates such as the EU-3 (France, United Kingdom and Germany) or the Quint (Gegout, 2002; Giegerich, 2006; Diedrich and Jopp, 2003). Furthermore, in the absence of Community law, actors make constant references to formal or informal benchmarks. Whether or not they are fulfilled, such benchmarks become templates for security policy-makers across Europe and induce a dynamic of Europeanization (Irondelle, 2003). Prominent examples are the Headline Goal for crisis management capabilities, on which defence ministries worked for years, or a possible defence convergence criterion to be part of structured co-operation initiatives (Reynolds, 2006).

II. Governance as a Social Structure

Our objective in this article is to go beyond the institutions, norms and ideas that hold governance systems together by adopting a social structural approach. We look at social relations to see whether they can enrich, nuance or eventually refute the governance image of CSDP. To do so, we translate what we see as the three core propositions on CSDP governance (heterarchy, multi-levelness, inclusiveness) into the language of social network analysis. It is important to stress that we use network analysis not as a theoretical concept, but as a methodological tool to organize relational data. As a theoretical concept, networks refer either to a specific mode of policy co-ordination or to a form of collective action (Krahmann, 2005; Eilstrup-Sangiovanni, 2009). In the study of the EU's external relations, some authors use the term 'network governance' to describe how actors co-ordinate their institutional behaviour in the absence of a hierarchical structure (Lavenex and Schimmelfenning, 2010;

Filtenborg *et al.*, 2002). By contrast, we use network analysis here not as the depiction of policy co-ordination or collective action, but as the *formal representation of any kind of social structure* – that is, any set of social relations (Knoke, 1990, p. 8). With roots in graph theory, social network analysis is not linked to any particular theory of International Relations or European Integration. In EU studies, for example, network methods have been used to analyse influence in the common agricultural policy (Pappi and Henning, 1999), the transfer of social policy to eastern Europe (Sissenich, 2008) and Intergovernmental Conferences (Thuner and Pappi, 2008).

To draw the CSDP network (that is, the set of social relations surrounding CSDP), we use the Pajek software package for social network analysis. The data used to graph the network structure were collected through a standardized questionnaire circulated to 'key' CSDP actors in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and in Brussels. This included the many divisions in a government department that deal with European security (for example, the EU, CFSP and Nato desks as well as the political directorate and political staff in a foreign ministry) but also interest groups and think tanks that focus on CSDP. There are in our view sound reasons to begin with these three countries (in addition to the two European security organizations). First, they are the most consequential military powers in the EU and have been the most involved in shaping CSDP since the late 1990s. Second, each has a distinct strategic outlook with which other EU Member States tend to align (Mérand, 2008; Jones, 2007; Howorth, 2007). If the governance image holds in this network, it should be generalizable to CSDP as a whole.

Delineating the boundaries of a social network depends on analytical criteria and not on random sampling. Based on Kriesi and Jegen's (2001) systematic method, three criteria were used to identify the population of key CSDP actors: first, we scanned the organizational chart of every government department or interest group interested in security policy with a view to identifying decision-making units and observers in France, Germany, the United Kingdom and in Brussels-based institutions (*positional criterion*); second, we did an in-depth study of CSDP-related conferences, seminars and summits in order to extract actors who took a stand on CSDP issues on behalf of their organization (*participative criterion*); and third, we submitted the resulting list containing several hundred actors to a small group of CSDP experts, who added key actors they thought were missing, but also subtracted those they thought were too marginal to CSDP debates (*reputational criterion*). A final list of 100 key CSDP actors was created.[1]

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[1] Consistent with governance approaches, our three criteria ensure that these actors are united by a sense of collective purpose – that is, shaping CSDP.

These actors were contacted and interviewed on the basis of a common standardized questionnaire between October 2007 and May 2009. Most interviews were face-to-face but, in a limited number of cases, questionnaires were left for the interviewee to fill out. The latter option was only used to minimize missing data as we preferred to err in the direction of increasing the response rate, which is 73 per cent (73 actors). The network is based on a social relation of co-operation: respondents were asked whom they had co-operated with in the past two years (from the date of the interview) on CSDP files. We defined 'co-operation' as the *intensive exchange of important information and joint work towards the development of common positions*.

Only 43 of the questionnaires could be used to perform network analysis, but symmetrization produced a network of 117 actors.[2] The reader can find the list of actors and the acronyms we use in the Appendix. Taken together, French, British and German actors represented 89 per cent of our interviewees; 30 per cent were career diplomats; 24 per cent military officers; 16 per cent EU or national members of parliament; 18 per cent academics, interest group or representatives of NGOs; and 12 per cent civilian officials (for example, a civilian official working in a defence ministry or an EU *fonctionnaire*). Some diplomats and military officers were seconded to EU institutions, usually the Council Secretariat, or to the executive branch. Some 31 per cent of our respondents worked in Brussels and the remainder in national capitals. All the interviewees held positions of responsibility in organizational units. While names cannot be divulged for reasons of confidentiality, we are confident that this sample provides an accurate picture of CSDP so far as France, Germany and the United Kingdom are concerned.

Three methodological limitations should be stressed. First, because data collection was limited to three EU Member States (in addition to Brussels-based institutions), it is likely that we were not able to capture social

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[2] Some respondents did not fill out the network matrix, or did not fill it out properly, which generated missing data. During the interviews, we asked respondents to identify potential collaborators we could have forgotten in the list, which yielded a few additional actors. Rather than trying to interview these actors (snowballing method), we used symmetrization, which means producing a network in which any identified co-operation, regardless of whether it was reported by only one of the two actors involved, is considered to be a tie. In other words, in the symmetrized matrix, we assume that self-reported co-operative ties are necessarily reciprocal. A non-symmetrical matrix would report only ties that were acknowledged by the two participants. In a relatively large network such as ours, this would impose a very strict criterion and potentially exclude important actors from the network whom we could not interview. Symmetrization is a common procedure in social network analysis to address the problem of missing data but it does induce a potential bias. For example, an actor who identified a large number of collaborative ties could end up being central even though this actor was not necessarily identified as a collaborator by others. To correct this potential bias, we eliminated from the network actors who reported an unreasonably high number of co-operative ties relative to the number of times they were themselves identified as collaborators. We also performed each analysis that follows on the non-symmetrical matrix, but except in a few individual cases the results were not markedly different.

structural patterns that are more prevalent in countries with different security traditions – notably neutral countries. The weakness of civilian and non-state actors in our analysis may be a result of the fact that we selected three military powers, while countries like Sweden and Finland have been more involved in civilian files (Jakobsen, 2008). This is an invitation to expand the analysis in future studies. Second, using co-operation as an indicator may minimize the role of executives, who subordinates will hesitate to describe as 'collaborators'. When asked who the key decision-makers were in CSDP, most respondents answered the German Chancellery, 10 Downing Street and the Elysée Palace, even though they had little actual interaction with them. Another potential bias is related to the time frame of the study. Fieldwork was conducted during four successive EU Presidencies: Portugal, Slovenia, France and the Czech Republic. Also, the main activity during this period was EUFOR Chad – an operation with a strong military component led by the French. As a result, the role of French and military actors in our analysis may have been altered somewhat since they may have been more solicited than is usually the case. Note, however, that we did not conduct a disproportionate number of interviews under any of these four Presidencies, so the bias should be modest.

III. Governance by Governments

In this section we present and discuss our results for the three core propositions found in the security governance literature: heterarchy in co-operation patterns, the interpenetration of multiple levels of governance, and the inclusiveness of public and private actors.

Heterarchy

A first implication of security governance is that social relations should be heterarchical – that is, co-operation should take place among multiple and separate administrative and political authorities, as opposed to top-down social relations. Using Pajek, we propose two different measures to explore this proposition: centrality and brokerage. Typically, social network analysis relies on the assumption that power is situational – that is, it depends on one's position in the social structure (Knoke, 1990, p. 2). In particular, certain actors occupy strategic positions in the network based on their ability to control the flow of information or co-operation (Burt, 2008; Hafner-Burton and Montgomery, 2006; Scott, 2000). Centrality and brokerage measure social power, which 'depends on the extent to which it is needed as a link in the chain of contacts that facilitate the spread of information' (De Nooy *et al.*,

2005, p. 131). A *central* actor is powerful because he or she has a large number of social ties in the network, while a *broker* is powerful because he or she connects different parts of the network.

We first use *in-degree centrality*, which computes the number of ties that flow to an actor in the network. Table 1 shows the centrality ranking of CSDP actors. A higher score for national executives suggests, *ceteris paribus*, that the social structure is dominated by intergovernmental co-operation; conversely, an even distribution of scores indicates heterarchy. Note that the top six centrality positions are held by Council Secretariat actors: Directorate-General E of the Council Secretariat, the Political and Security Committee, the EU Military Staff, the European Defence Agency, the High Representative's office and the EU Military Committee, in that order. DG RELEX and prominent national actors come next: Downing Street, the British Foreign Secretary's staff, the British Defence Minister's staff, the Foreign Office's international security branch, the French Defence Ministry's delegation for strategic affairs, the German PSC ambassador, the German Chancellery, the German Defence Ministry's EU division, and so on.

Although it remains the simplest indicator of social power, one problem with in-degree centrality is that it captures in part one's belonging to a dense subgroup rather than one's reach across the whole network. And indeed we observe (see Figure 2 below) that EU actors are strongly connected to each other, which boosts each EU actor's centrality score even though they may have little social power outside Brussels. To help remedy this problem, we look at brokerage, which is a measure of the importance of one's ties in bridging different components of the network – that is, in keeping the social structure together. Brokerage suggests that some actors become key points of contact because they control access to specific subgroups. The disappearance of these brokers would break the network into its constituent parts.[3]

Pajek produces a structural index of brokerage, called *gatekeeping*, which captures the ability to control the flow of co-operation towards one's subgroup (De Nooy *et al.*, 2005, p. 151). A gatekeeper is situated on the path from an actor from another group (say, France) towards an actor from his or her own group (say, Germany), provided that these actors are not themselves directly connected.[4] Whereas a hierarchical network structure should be composed of only one gatekeeper per group (with a high gatekeeping score) – for

[3] Technically, a broker is a vertex (here an actor) whose removal creates a structural hole and thus increases the number of separate components in the network.

[4] Gatekeepers are ranked according to the number of incomplete triads (that is, sub-networks containing three actors) in which the actor is a broker. Measuring gatekeeping requires that we assign each actor to a predetermined partition. We defined six groups in the network: France, UK, Germany, EU, Nato and interest groups/think tanks. In our view, these three governmental, two intergovernmental and one private partitions correspond to the expected hierarchical groups in CSDP.

Table 1: Centrality Scores in the CSDP Network

Ranking	In-degree centrality
1. Council Secretariat DG-E External	20
2. Political and Security Committee	17
3. EU Military Staff	15
4. European Defence Agency	14
5. High Representative's Office	14
6. EU Military Committee	13
7. German PR (PSC Ambassador)	10
DG RELEX	
Downing Street	
UK Foreign Secretary's Cabinet	
10. French Defence Ministry DAS	9
12. German Chancellery	8
German Defence Ministry Fü S III EU	
German Foreign Ministry's Policy Staff	
European Parliament SEDE	
German Defence Ministry Rü III	
UK Defence Procurement Agency	
UK Defence Minister's Cabinet	
Foreign Office's Security Branch	
21. UK PR (PSC Ambassador)	7
French PR (PSC Ambassador)	
24. French Defence Minister's Cabinet	6
DG Industry	
German Defence Minister's Cabinet	
German PermRep Nato	
French Defence Staff's Euroatlantic Division	
UK Foreign Office's CFSP Unit	
EU Institute for Security Studies	
UK Defence Ministry's Policy Staff	
33. German Defence Ministry's Policy Staff	5
German Foreign Ministry's Political Directorate	
French Foreign Ministry's Political Directorate	
French Defence Staff	
UK Defence Ministry's EU/Nato Division	
French Presidency	
Nato Secretary General	
Nato International Staff	
German Foreign Ministry's EU Correspondent	
Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik	
German Foreign Minister's Cabinet	

Source: ESDP Network Project.

Table 2: Gatekeeping Scores in the CSDP Network (Partitions: Germany, France, UK, EU, Nato, Interest Groups/Think Tanks)

Ranking	Gatekeeping score
UKPR (PSC Ambassador)	36
German PR (PSC Ambassador)	35
European Parliament SEDE	30
German Defence Ministry Fü S III EU	28
French PR (PSC Ambassador)	24
ASD	21
EU Military Committee	20
German Foreign Ministry's Policy Staff	19
French Defence Ministry DAS	19
EU Military Staff	19
Centre for European Reform	16
European Defence Agency	15
German Foreign Ministry's Political Directorate	12
French Foreign Ministry's Political Directorate	3
UK Defence Staff	1

Source: ESDP Network Project.

example, the executive branch of a country – a heterarchical structure should be composed of several gatekeepers, reflecting the relative fluidity of co-operation patterns.

Table 2 displays the list of gatekeepers in the CSDP network. We find that the number of gatekeepers in the CSDP network is small and that the three PSC ambassadors come up in the six top gatekeeping positions. This means that formal diplomatic representatives are the main point of contact between their domestic colleagues and other CSDP actors, and they generally occupy key strategic positions in the CSDP network. Yet, in contrast to the pre-CSDP era when capital-based political directors controlled the agenda, these actors are permanently based in Brussels where they interact on a bi-weekly basis (Howorth, 2010; Cross, 2010). Furthermore, PSC ambassadors share their gatekeeping role with a limited number of state actors who also act as brokers. Other national gatekeepers include: in Germany, the Defence Staff's EU division, the Foreign Ministry's policy staff and the political directorate; in France, the Defence Ministry's strategic affairs delegation and the Foreign Ministry's political director; and, in the United Kingdom, but to a much lesser extent, the Defence Staff. Seasoned observers of the CSDP scene will have instinctively recognized these actors as very plausible brokers in the CSDP domain, but social network analysis produces results that are grounded in systematic patterns of co-operation.

Overall, this suggests that gatekeeping by Brussels-based state actors is strong across the CSDP domain. Gatekeeping among EU institutions is more diffuse. Indeed, several political-military bodies seem to play a minor brokering role: the EU Military Committee, the EU Military Staff and the European Defence Agency, to which one should add the unexpectedly prominent European Parliament's Security and Defence Subcommittee. This can be attributed to the fact that, by virtue of their co-ordination mandate, each of these organizational units has to cultivate relations with a fairly wide range of actors from different EU Member States. Among interest groups, the Aerospace and Defence Industry Association of Europe stands out: this is not surprising given that it represents 30 industry associations in Brussels. Also of interest is the gatekeeping role played by the Centre for European Reform, which despite the fact that it is based in London, has been arguably the most active think tank with regard to CSDP since 2000, with several noteworthy publications and events.

In sum, centrality and brokerage provide some evidence for heterarchy. To be sure, the core of the CSDP network is made up of national actors with high positions in the formal state hierarchy. However, the most prominent national actors are the Brussels-based PSC ambassadors. They share social power with a limited number of capital-based bureaucratic actors and, depending on which measure we use, the EU Military Staff, the EU Military Committee, the European Defence Agency and DG E also occupy strategic positions. In this social structure, we also find that different administrations are organized differently, gatekeeping being more diffuse in Berlin and Brussels than in London. In general, PSC ambassadors and the ASD derive a prominent gatekeeping role from their mandate as government or industry *representatives*, while EU institutions, which are supposed to act as *co-ordinators*, exhibit weaker gatekeeping strength.

How Many Levels of Governance?

In addition to heterarchy, governance approaches assert that both the domestic and the EU level of governance are consequential and porous; to some extent, they may even have merged with each other. In social network language, this proposition can be operationalized as follows: (1) the CSDP policy field is criss-crossed by co-operative ties that transcend national boundaries; (2) the density of co-operative ties within each nation-state is not substantially greater than the density of co-operative ties across the whole network. Note that (2) is much more constraining than (1). An impressionistic but reasonable first approximation for (1) can be given by drawing a graph of the CSDP network. Figure 1 depicts the whole CSDP network, which consists

Figure 1: The CSDP Co-operation Network

Source: ESDP Network Project.

of 117 actors from France, Germany, the United Kingdom and Brussels-based institutions. For visualization purposes, actors are clustered in five groups, representing France, Germany, the United Kingdom, the EU and 'others'. This sociogram depicts who co-operates with whom on CSDP files: each line corresponds to a social relation of co-operation. The sociogram suggests that the CSDP policy field is indeed criss-crossed by co-operative ties, a minority of whom go through the traditional diplomatic channel of heads of government and permanent representations. As argued by Mérand *et al*. (2010), we thus find in the CSDP network clear elements of transgovernmental and transnational co-operation alongside narrow intergovernmental relations.

Whereas Figure 1 illustrates the social density of CSDP as a whole, Figure 2 provides a contextual view of the Brussels-based sub-network. Permanent Representations are included in this detailed sub-network, which is embedded in the larger CSDP network. For visualization purposes, we collapse each non-Brussels-based sub-network into one domestic 'node': France, Germany and the United Kingdom. To come up on the graph, at least three co-operative ties must exist between a Brussels-based actor and the domestic level. What this contextual view shows clearly is, first, that EU

Figure 2: Brussels-Based Sub-network

bodies are tightly connected to each other and, second, that none of them enjoy privileged access to domestic actors. Closer inspection of the Brussels sub-network also reveals that the formal diplomatic channel between the EU level and the domestic level (the Permanent Representation) is not the only one. Several EU actors (EU Military Staff, EU Military Committee, Political and Security Committee, Council Secretariat DG-E) have collaborated directly with Member State actors without necessarily going through the Permanent Representation. (Other Brussels actors, however – and in particular the Commission and think tanks – are weakly connected to the national level.) While most links between British and EU actors still go through the UK PermRep, the French and German domestic sub-networks are strikingly more open: there are many paths a French or a German actor can take to get around their PSC ambassador. This, in our view, is evidence of multi-level governance.

To address (2), or the degree of intra-domestic co-operation relative to cross-border and cross-level co-operation, we compare different measures of network density (Table 3), which is indicative of the degree of connectedness of a social structure. Network density measures the number of lines in a

Table 3: Network Density in the CSDP Network

| Network	Density
German sub-network	0.1111111
French sub-network	0.0434028
UK sub-network	0.0793951
Franco–German sub-network	0.0529514
Franco–British sub-network	0.0389316
German–British sub-network	0.0556813
Brussels sub-network	0.0733793
Full CSDP network	0.0380598

Source: ESDP Network Project.

network expressed as a proportion of the maximum possible number of lines. Density is relative unless it is 0 (no line connects actors) or 1 (all possible lines between actors are drawn). While state-centric approaches assume that cross-border and cross-level co-operation ties are sparse, the governance image evokes a dense cross-border and cross-level network (further from 0). Among the 117 actors of our network, a density of 1 would be very unlikely for it would mean that every actor has collaborated closely with all the others over the past two years. We find indeed that the total density of the CSDP network is 0.038, which means that close to 4 per cent of all possible collaborative ties are enacted. If we only take German actors, however, density among them rises to 0.111. This means that the German sub-network is almost three times denser than the whole CSDP network. Interestingly, however, the French sub-network has a much lower density of 0.043, while the United Kingdom sub-network lies in between at 0.079. Although this is a matter of qualitative judgement, these results suggest that even though co-operation is more prevalent within than across national borders, the difference is not huge, especially in the case of France.

The Role of Non-state Actors

So far, we have seen that CSDP can be described as a modestly heterarchical and two-level social structure. Although we have also seen evidence of hierarchy that fits uneasily with the horizontal image of governance, this provides support to the claim that CSDP scholars should disaggregate the national state. However, the governance literature argues further that private actors are playing an increasingly important role in policy formulation. To explore this proposition, we define two groups: state and non-state actors (Figure 3). The question we ask is: how many and which non-state actors are connected to state actors? We define 'state actors' as those who are

Figure 3: State Sub-network versus Non-state Sub-network

Source: ESDP Network Project.

traditionally invested with the ability to speak on behalf of the state. This would include a diplomatic or a military actor, regardless of whether they are based in Brussels (Council Secretariat, Permanent Representation) or in one of the capitals. We include Commission officials or parliamentarians among non-state actors because they are not part of the nation-state apparatus. Again, the centrality and brokerage tables provide us with a ranking of influential actors in the CSDP structure to evaluate the position of non-state actors *vis-à-vis* state actors. Tables 1 and 2 already suggest that non-state actors do not occupy many strategic positions in the CSDP network. Using our definition of non-state actors, DG RELEX, DG Industry, the European Parliament's Security and Defence Subcommittee (SEDE), the EU Institute for Security Studies and SWP are the only non-state actors in the centrality top 45.

This is confirmed in Figure 3, which shows that relatively few non-state actors collaborate with state actors, while most collaborative ties among state

Table 4: Gatekeeping Scores in the CSDP Network (Partitions: State, Non-state)

Ranking	Gatekeeping score
1. European Defence Agency	26
2. European Parliament SEDE	25
3. ASD	23
4. German Foreign Ministry's Policy Staff	23
5. German PR (PSC Ambassador)	20
6. Council for European Reform	16
7. Chancellery	14
8. DG RELEX	9
9. DGAP	5
10. EU Military Staff	5
11. European Parliament DG External	4
12. CDU	3
13. EU Military Committee	3
14. Centre for European Policy Studies	3

Source: ESDP Network Project.

actors are in fact confined to their peers. The density of the state sub-network is 0.0993, while overall density (including non-state actors) is three times lower at 0.0345. As Table 4 shows, gatekeepers in the non-state group include the European Parliament's SEDE, the Aerospace and Defence Industries Association, the Centre for European Reform, the European Parliament's DG for External Relations, DG RELEX, the German Christian Democratic Party, the Centre for European Policy Studies (CEPS) and the German Council on Foreign Relations (DGAP). SEDE's higher gatekeeping score means that it has a greater control over access from state actors to non-state actors than, say, DGAP. But both SEDE and DGAP occupy more strategic positions than the dozens of non-state actors who are weakly or not connected to the sub-network of state actors. The state actors that seem to act as a bridge with non-state actors are mostly based in the EU Council. The European Defence Agency stands out, which makes sense given that it must have formal ties with industry representatives. Conversely, French and British state actors who deal with crisis management, such as the PSC ambassadors or the defence ministries, are weakly connected to non-state actors; the state group seems more open in Germany where the PSC ambassador, the Foreign Ministry's policy staff and the Chancellery occupy gatekeeping positions in regard to the state/non-state divide.

Based on these indicators, the inclusiveness of CSDP governance is not fully substantiated. While a certain number of non-state actors do occupy central positions in the CSDP structure, these positions seem attributable to

the fact that they control access to their own sub-network. Yet this sub-network itself is marginal. They are not really outside the CSDP structure but cannot be said to occupy a strategic position in it either. This final cut in the network yields a picture that is both nuanced and faithful to CSDP's terms of reference, one in which formal state representatives more or less monopolize strategic positions. They do not fully control the dense flow of co-operation that criss-crosses the network and transcends institutional borders. Other state actors, especially the Council Secretariat, also play key roles in domestic sub-networks. But this system of governance remains dominated by government officials.

IV. Institutions, Ideas and Power

The main contribution of governance approaches is to show that European security co-operation has become deeply institutionalized on at least two levels: the national and the supranational. This in and of itself represents a remarkable shift since the 1990s, when European security institutions were weaker and defence policy was fully in the hands of the capitals. 'Intergovernmentalism' is too narrow a term to describe the heterarchical and two-level governance of CSDP, but the evidence accumulated so far in the governance literature has been limited to the formal rules of security co-operation and/or the convergence of ideas, also known as strategic cultures (Meyer, 2006). Governance scholars have argued that institutions and ideas hold state and non-state actors together, giving the impression of a fairly horizontal, post-modern CSDP (Webber *et al.*, 2004; Norheim-Martinsen, 2010).

   In this article we followed the injunction of Norheim-Martinsen (2010), who recently advocated using network analysis to 'better our understanding of the dynamics of [CSDP] by providing the analytical tools for measuring who are the most powerful and influential actors within a particularly governance structure, and by showing what material and other resources one actor may mobilize'. Rather than institutions or ideas, social network analysis offers a systematic methodology that focuses on social relations among policy actors – the social structure of CSDP. A social structural approach is more appropriate to detect power asymmetries beneath the veneer of formal institutions and shared discourses among public and private, EU and national actors. These asymmetries are difficult to observe when one looks solely at formal rules and shared ideas. In particular, we have seen that, despite the talk that surrounds the inclusion of civil society, non-state actors in the CSDP network remain fairly marginal. A PSC ambassador and a British senior military officer have far more leverage than a Commission *fonctionnaire* or a

French parliamentarian, let alone an NGO. The structure of social relations shows that specific state actors are better connected than others. The fact that a policy has become Europeanized or that state actors agree to co-operate and even share authority with others does not mean that there is no state sediment in supranational governance structures.

Our analysis leaves little doubt that European security co-operation has produced a social structure with a fairly large and densely connected population of actors who orient themselves towards the goal of shaping CSDP. Over time, a group of diplomats and military officers have invested more and more energy in European security co-operation. The governance structure they have contributed to create is made up of actors related to each other, not just formal institutions. In that sense, CSDP is one among several policy fields that make up European governance (Rasmussen, 2009; Fligstein, 2008). While they reach out beyond the state and play the European game in earnest, however, state actors do not give up their state-like attributes. On the contrary, they occupy strategic positions at the European level precisely because they embody the power of the state. National diplomats and military officers have not given up state power, but have rather reconstituted it on a new level (Mérand, 2008; Bickerton, 2010). While security and defence policy may turn out to be a special case, our study should warrant a better appreciation of the incorporation of traditional power structures in European governance.

While network analysis is a useful methodology to objectify the social structure of CSDP, it does not tell us much about agency. The purpose of this article was not to reconstruct the strategies deployed by state actors to reproduce their position and impose their world views (Berenskoetter and Giegerich, 2010; Mérand, 2010; Hofmann, 2009). However, it does tell us about the structural conditions under which these actors will likely operate. As De Nooy (2003) argues, social network analysis can map out the emergent structure, and in particular relations between incumbents and challengers. Linking social power with detailed studies of collective action, it should be possible to analyse preferences (for example, Atlanticists versus European-ists) or the formation of transgovernmental coalitions (for example, ideational and social affinities between British and Council Secretariat officials) in terms of the social position of actors in the CSDP network structure (Howorth, 2010; Mérand *et al.*, 2009).

Conclusions

Whether CSDP fits the security governance image or not matters for the study of the EU's role in international security. Existing in a governance

configuration means that national governments have partly lost their control over security and defence policy. Our empirical findings suggest that CSDP governance is indeed more heterarchical and two-level than intergovernmentalists acknowledge. Especially around EU institutions, the network is quite dense and contains a number of transversal links between bureaucratic actors from Brussels and different countries, some of whom also provide access to important sections of the network. Yet state actors keep the upper hand. Using co-operation as an indicator, we observe that the actors who are formally responsible for speaking on behalf of their state – namely PSC ambassadors – occupy a strategic position at the core of the network. These actors act as gatekeepers for their respective domestic government arena. By and large, interest groups and think tanks are marginal. In other words, state power is not diluted but reconstituted at the European level. To shape CSDP, state actors have moved from Paris or London to Brussels but, even in this new field of interaction, they continue to rule.

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Appendix 1: List of CSDP Actors

Chancellery	German Chancellery
BMVg Cabinet	German Federal Minister of Defence Cabinet
BMVg Rü III	German Federal Ministry of Defence Directorate General of Armaments Rü III International Armaments Affairs
BMVg Fü S III EU	German Federal Ministry of Defence Chief of Staff, Bundeswehr Fü S III EU Division
BMVg Policy	German Federal Ministry of Defence Policy Planning and Advisory Staff
Bundestag Def Comm	German Parliament Defence Committee
Bundestag FA Comm	German Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee
CDU	German Christian Democratic Union
FDP	German Free Democratic Party
SPD	German Social Democratic Party
AA Cabinet	German Federal Foreign Minister's Cabinet

AA Policy	German Federal Foreign Office Policy Planning Staff
AA Political	German Federal Foreign Office Political Directorate-General
AA Africa	German Federal Foreign Office Directorate-General for Africa
AA EUKOR	German Federal Foreign Office Directorate-General EU-KOR CFSP Unit
GPR	German Permanent Representation EU-PSC
GPR NATO	German Permanent Representation Nato
Cabinet PM	French Prime Minister Cabinet
Presidency	French Presidency
MAE Cabinet	French Foreign Minister's Cabinet
MAE CE	French Foreign Ministry European Co-operation
MAE Political	French Foreign Ministry Directorate General for Policy and Security Department of Strategic Affairs, Security and Disarmament
MAE CAP	French Foreign Ministry Analysis and Forecast Centre
MDN Cabinet	French National Defence Minister's Cabinet
MDN DAS	French National Defence Ministry Delegation for Strategic Affairs
MDN Armament	French National Defence Ministry Armament General Delegation
NatAss FA Comm	French National Assembly Foreign Affairs Committee
NatAss Def Comm	French National Assembly Defence and Armed Forces Committee
PS	French Socialist Party
UMP	French Union Pour Un Mouvement Populaire Party
SGDN	French National Defence General Secretariat
FPR	French Permanent Representation EU-PSC
FPR NATO	French Permanent Representation Nato
EMIA	French Defence Staff Euro-Atlantic Division
Downing Street	UK Prime Minister's Cabinet
Conservative	UK Conservative Party
Labour	UK Labour Party
Liberal Democratic	UK Liberal Democratic Party
FCO Cabinet	UK Foreign Secretary's Cabinet

FCO CFSP	UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office EU Directorate-General CFSP Unit
FCO Asia	UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Asia Directorate
FCO Policy	UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Policy Staff
FCO Africa	UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Africa Directorate
FCO Security	UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office Political International Security Directorate
MoD EU/NATO	UK Ministry of Defence EU/Nato
MoD Policy Staff	UK Ministry of Defence Policy Staff
MoD Cabinet	UK Defence Minister's Cabinet
MoD CHOD	UK Ministry of Defence Chief of the Defence Staff
MoD DPA	UK Ministry of Defence Defence Procurement Agency
Parliament FA Ctee	UK Parliament Foreign Affairs Committee
Parliament Def Ctee	UK Parliament Defence Committee
UKPR	UK Permanent Representation EU-PSC
DFID	Department for International Development
EUMC	European Union Military Committee
BEPA	Bureau of European Policy Advisers
COPS	Political and Security Committee
PES	Party of European Socialists
PPE	European People's Party
ALDE	Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe
EP	European Parliament
SEDE	European Parliament AFET-Committee on Foreign Affairs SEDE-Sub-committee on Security and Defence
DNAT	European Parliament DNAT-Delegation for Relations with Nato Parliamentary Assembly
SG/HR Cabinet	EU High Representative/Secretary General's Cabinet
DG E-External	Council of EU Directorate General E-External Relations and Political-Military Affairs
DG Industry	European Commission Enterprise and Industry Directorate General
EDA	European Defence Agency

DG RELEX	European Commission External Relations Directorate General
DG Development	European Commission Development Directorate General
EUMS	European Union Military Staff
ESDC	European Security and Defence College
ASD	Aerospace and Defence Industries Association of Europe
EUROMIL	European Organisation of Military Associations
AgustaWestland	AgustaWestland
BAE Systems	BAE Systems
Coface	Coface
Dassault Aviation	Dassault Aviation
DCN	DCN
Diehl Stiftung	Diehl Stiftung
EADS	EADS
Finmeccanica	Finnemeccanica
Krauss-Maffei Wegmann	Krauss-Maffei Wegmann
Lockheed Martin	Lockheed Martin
Rheinmetall AG	Rheinmetall AG
Rhode & Schwarz	Rhode & Schwarz
Thales	Thales
NATO PA	Nato Parliamentary Assembly
NATO Sec Gen	Nato Secretary General
NATO Political	Nato EU Defence Policy Affairs
NATO IS	Nato International Staff
NATO IMS	Nato International Military Staff
NATO MC	Nato Military Committee
NATO SHAPE	Nato Shape
WEU	Western European Union
CEPS	Centre for European Policy Studies
GMFUS	German Marshall Fund of the United States
DGAP	Deutsche Gesellschaft für auswärtige Politik
FPC	Foreign Policy Centre
CER	Centre for European Reform
Chatham	Chatham House
ECFR	European Council on Foreign Relations
EUISS	European Union Institute for Security Studies

FRS	Fondation pour la recherche stratégique
Friedrich Ebert Stiftung	Friedrich Ebert Stiftung
IFRI	Institut français des relations internationales
IRIS	Institut de relations internationales et stratégiques
ICG	International Crisis Group
SWP	Stiftung Wissenschaft und Politik
SDA	Security and Defence Agenda
IISS	International Institute for Strategic Studies
RUSI	Royal United Services Institute
Défense Conseil International	Défense Conseil International
Konrad Adenauer Stiftung	Konrad Adenauer Stiftung
MCSP	Munich Conference on Security Policy
ISIS	International Security Information Service-Europe
EPC	European Policy Centre

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