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NEW EVIDENCE ON THE MIDDLE-INCOME TRAP

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Working Paper 18673
<http://www.nber.org/papers/w18673>

NATIONAL BUREAU OF ECONOMIC RESEARCH
1050 Massachusetts Avenue
Cambridge, MA 02138
January 2013

Research and financial support from the Asian Development Bank is gratefully acknowledged. The views expressed herein are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the National Bureau of Economic Research.

At least one co-author has disclosed a financial relationship of potential relevance for this research. Further information is available online at <http://www.nber.org/papers/w18673.ack>

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NBER Working Paper No. 18673
January 2013
JEL No. E0,F0,N1

ABSTRACT

We analyze the incidence and correlates of growth slowdowns in fast-growing middle-income countries, extending the analysis of an earlier paper (Eichengreen, Park and Shin 2012). We continue to find dispersion in the per capita income at which slowdowns occur. But in contrast to our earlier analysis which pointed to the existence of a single mode at which slowdowns occur in the neighborhood of \$15,000-\$16,000 2005 purchasing power parity dollars, new data point to two modes, one in the \$10,000-\$11,000 range and another at \$15,000-\$16,000. A number of countries appear to have experienced two slowdowns, consistent with the existence of multiple modes. We conclude that high growth in middle-income countries may decelerate in steps rather than at a single point in time. This implies that a larger group of countries is at risk of a growth slowdown and that middle-income countries may find themselves slowing down at lower income levels than implied by our earlier estimates. We also find that slowdowns are less likely in countries where the population has a relatively high level of secondary and tertiary education and where high-technology products account for a relatively large share of exports, consistent with our earlier emphasis of the importance of moving up the technology ladder in order to avoid the middle-income trap.

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1 Introduction

The rapid economic growth of so-called emerging markets is one of the leading storylines of our age and arguably the most important economic development affecting the world's population in the first decade of the 21st century. It has lifted millions of households out of poverty. It has accounted for the vast majority of global growth in a period when the advanced countries have been economically challenged and financially troubled.

For some time now the question on everyone's mind has been how long this rapid growth can continue, in emerging markets in general and the group's largest and most economically dynamic member, China, in particular. Attempts to answer that question have given rise to a literature on what is referred to, alternatively, as "growth slowdowns" and "the middle-income trap." At the time of writing, Google identifies more than 7,000 page references to the first term and nearly 400,000 to the second.

In an earlier paper (Eichengreen, Park and Shin 2012), we analyzed historical experience with growth slowdowns as a way of shedding light on future prospects. We considered post-1956 cases of fast-growing countries (where GDP per capita had been growing for seven or more years at an average annual rate of 3.5 per cent) where growth then slowed significantly (where the growth rate of GDP per capita stepped down by at least two percentage points between successive seven year periods).¹ We found that while there was considerable dispersion in the per capita income at which slowdowns occurred, the mean GDP per capita was \$16,540 in 2005 constant U.S. dollars at purchasing power parity, the median \$15,085. At this point the growth of per capita income slowed on average from 5.6 to 2.1 per cent per annum. By comparison, China's per capita GDP in constant 2005 purchasing-power-parity dollars was \$8,511 in 2007, when the data in our source, Penn World Tables 6.3, ended.

In analyzing the correlates of growth slowdowns, we found that slowdowns were positively associated with high growth in the earlier period (suggestive of mean reversion), with unfavorable demographics (high old-age dependency ratios in particular), with very high investment ratios (as if growth fueled by brute-force capital formation eventually becomes unsustainable), and with an undervalued exchange rate (as if countries with undervalued currencies have less incentive to move up the technological ladder out of unskilled-labor-intensive, low-value-added sectors and thus find it more difficult to sustain rapid growth). These results were suggestive, and they were suggestive for China in particular.

In this paper we revisit these questions, updating and extending our previous results. There are several reasons for doing so. Concern about slowdowns and therefore the literature on this subject have continued to grow. China's growth rate has meanwhile decelerated from more than 10 per cent in 2010 to less than 8 per cent in 2012, meeting our slowdown threshold, although how much of this change is cyclical and how much is secular remains to be seen. Recall that our criterion for a growth slowdown is that the reduction in the growth rate must be sustained for seven years. For what it is worth, the International Monetary Fund's forecasts for the rate of growth of gross domestic product at constant prices have

¹ We excluded low income countries – those with a per capita GDP of less than \$10,000 US at purchasing power parity – on the grounds that their experience was not really salient to the question at hand. In most of our analysis we also excluded countries that rely for export revenues primarily on petroleum products on the grounds that their experience, for obvious reasons, is special.

Chinese growth accelerating to more than 8.2 per cent in 2013 and remaining above 8.5 for a string of subsequent years. Others (e.g. Pettis 2012), in contrast, suggest that the current deceleration in China is likely to be permanent and that, if anything, more is coming.

In addition, we now have more and better data on slowdown cases. Our earlier data ended in 2007, the last year covered by the then most recent release of the Penn World Tables. Now, courtesy of Penn World Tables 7.1 we have data through 2010. This allows us to identify a number of growth slowdowns after the turn of the century that did not show up in our earlier data set because we could not yet determine whether the deceleration was durable. The new release also revises earlier estimates of per capita GDP for a number of countries – not least for China, whose 2010 per capita GDP at 2005 PPP prices is now estimated to have been only \$7,129. In some cases where previously erratic series on the growth of GDP per capita have been smoothed, what appeared to be slowdowns no longer qualify. In other cases where once smooth series are now more volatile, episodes not previously identified as slowdowns can now be added to the list.

Finally, discussions of our previous paper pointed to a number of further potential determinants of growth slowdowns whose importance might be analyzed. These include the level and structure of human capital formation, the level and structure of exports (specifically the importance of low- and high-tech exports), financial and political stability, and external shocks.

Our new results are broadly consistent with what we found before, albeit with important differences. While we still find that slowdowns are still most likely when per capita GDP in year-2005 constant dollars reaches the \$15,000 range, the distribution of slowdowns is no longer as obviously uni-modal. In fact, the new data point to the existence of two modes, one around \$15,000 and another around \$11,000.

We find that increasing the share of the population with at least a secondary level of education (secondary, university and higher) reduces the probability of a slowdown, other things equal. But holding constant the share of graduates of secondary schools and universities, we do not find the same thing for education in general. “High quality” human capital matters more than “low quality” human capital for avoiding growth slowdowns, or so it would appear.

In addition, we now find some evidence that financial crises and changes in political regime raise the likelihood of growth slowdowns, although we are reluctant to push this evidence too far. What is less intuitive is that “positive” regime changes – from autocracy to democracy – increase the likelihood of slowdowns. We use case-study evidence to develop some intuition for what might be driving this result.

Section 2 reviews our data and methods. In Section 3 we present our new list of growth slowdowns and compare it with its predecessor. Section 4 then replicates our earlier regression analysis and complements it with new findings. Section 5, in concluding, draws out the implications for emerging markets and China in particular.

2 Data and Methods

Our analysis of growth slowdowns follows Eichengreen, Park and Shin (2012), which in turn builds on a symmetrical analysis of growth accelerations by Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005). We identify an episode as a growth slowdown if the rate of GDP growth satisfies three conditions:

$$g_{t,t-n} \geq 0.035 \quad (1)$$

$$g_{t,t-n} - g_{t,t+n} \geq 0.02 \quad (2)$$

$$y_t > 10,000 \quad (3)$$

where y_t is per capita GDP in 2005 constant international purchasing power parity (PPP) prices, and $g_{t,t+n}$ and $g_{t,t-n}$ are the average growth rate between year t and $t+n$ and the average growth rate between $t-n$ and t , respectively. Following Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005), we set $n=7$. Data on per capital incomes are from Penn World Tables (PWT) Version 7.1 which covers the period 1957-2010. Sources for the other variables are described in the data appendix.

Equation (1) requires that the seven-year average growth rate of per capita GDP is 3.5 percent or greater prior to the slowdown (earlier growth was fast). Equation (2) identifies a growth slowdown as a decline in the seven-year average growth rate of per capital GDP by at least by 2 percentage points (the slowdown is non-negligible). The third condition limits slowdowns to cases in which per capita GDP is greater than \$10,000 in 2005 constant international PPP prices. In other words, we exclude very low income countries experiencing increasingly serious economic difficulties, our focus being on the so-called middle-income trap.

Table 1 lists all the slowdowns identified by this approach. The first column shows the slowdown episodes selected only by our earlier paper (Eichengreen, Park and Shin 2012). The second column then presents additional slowdown episodes identified as a result of switching to Penn World Table 7.1. The slowdown episodes in the third column, finally, are those found in both data sets.

In some cases, as before, our methodology identifies a string of consecutive years as growth slowdowns. For example, for Israel all years between 1970 and 1976 are identified as a slowdown. One way of dealing with this is to employ a Chow test for structural breaks to select one year out of the consecutive years identified (the year when the data point to the greatest likelihood of a structural break). For Israel, for example, we identify 1976 as the year of growth slowdown because the Chow test is most significant for that year. In Table 1, the years chosen by the Chow test are denoted in bold.

With this break point in hand, we assign a value of 1 to the three years centered on the year of the growth slowdown, i.e. the dummy equals 1 for $t = t - 1, t$ and $t + 1$ and zero otherwise.² This is done to allow for the possibility of some imprecision in identifying

² Again, this directly follows Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005).

slowdown years. The comparison group then consists of all countries that did not experience a growth slowdown in that same year. The sample for the regression includes all countries for which the relevant data are available including both slowdown countries and others that have never experienced a slowdown. We drop all data pertaining to years $t + 2, \dots, t + 7$ of the growth slowdown as a way of removing the transition period to which either a 0 or 1 cannot not be clearly assigned.³

In addition to focusing on the dates identified above, we also report the results when we do not employ the Chow test and leave the consecutive years as they are, i.e. the dummy indicating a slowdown is set equal to one for the entire run of consecutive years. Finally, since oil-exporting countries exhibit volatile behavior and show growth slowdowns at per capita incomes differently than other countries, we also report the results when oil countries are removed. (In Table 1, oil exporters are shaded.) Throughout, we report cluster-robust standard errors that account for the panel structure of the data set.

3 Slowdowns

A number of the slowdown cases in column 2 of Table 1 are new. Austria and Mexico were not included previously because their per capita incomes were less than \$10,000 in 1960 and 1980, respectively, according to PWT6.3; their per capita incomes were just above that threshold according to the more recent release. Where the new tables indicate sharper downshifts in growth than their predecessors, our methodology picks out additional slowdowns at higher per capita incomes, in Sweden in the mid-1960s, Hong Kong in 1981-2, and Oman in the mid-1980s

In other cases, the new version of the Penn World Tables has smoothed previously erratic growth rates so that what were identified as slowdowns no longer qualify. These cases include Argentina both in 1970 and at the end of the 1990s, Chile in the mid-1990s, Israel in 1996, Lebanon in 1985, Libya in the late 1970s (according to the more recent release, that country's slowdown instead occurred in the mid-1990s), Malaysia in the mid-1990s, Mauritius in 1992, Portugal in 2000, Spain in 1990, and Uruguay in the second half of the 1990s.

Extending the data for three additional years through 2010 allows us to analyze a number of recent slowdowns that previously went undetected (due to our successive-seven-year-period criteria). These include Estonia in 2002-3, Greece in 2003, Hungary in 2003, Spain in 2001 and the UK in 2002-3. That these are all European countries is revealing in light of recent events.

In all but one case where the methodology picked out a string of successive slowdown years and these now remain the same, the Chow Test continues to identify the same unique break point as before. The one exception is South Korea. While our methodology identifies the same string of years from 1989 through 1997 when Korean growth was at least two percentage points slower in the second of two successive seven year periods, the Chow Test previously identified 1997 as the single most significant slowdown year; now, in contrast, it picks out 1989. Other work (Eichengreen, Perkins and Shin 2012) has documented how the Korean economy slowed down in two stages, one at the end of the 1980s and one around the

³ This is also the approach taken by Hausmann, Pritchett and Rodrik (2005).

time of the financial crisis of 1997-8 and argued that 1989 was the more economically significant structural break in the growth process. The current dating is more consistent with that view.

Slowdowns, when they occur, are large. In the new data set the per capita growth rate slows by 3.6 percentage points between successive seven year periods (oil exporters excluded). This is slightly larger than the average slowdown in the earlier data set.

Figure 1 shows the per capita incomes at which growth rates slowed according to the Chow-Test break points. Now, in contrast to before, there appear to be two modes in the distribution of slowdown cases, one at a per capita GDP of approximately \$11,000 and another at a per capita GDP of approximately \$15,000.

The mode around \$15,000 is familiar; cases clustered there include New Zealand in 1960, Greece in 1972, Spain in 1975, Ireland in 1978, and Portugal in 1990 but also Cyprus in 1989, Gabon in 1974, Israel in 1976, Oman in 1986, and Singapore in 1980. Countries experiencing slowdown at the modal per capita income we identified previously are, clearly, a heterogeneous lot.

In contrast, the mode at \$11,000 is new. In part, it reflects the new dating for Korea, with the country's growth slowdown estimated to have occurred in 1989 (at a per capita income of \$10,570) rather than in 1997 (at a per capita income of \$17,843), as noted above. In part it reflects the fact, also already noted, that Austria in 1960 and Mexico in 1980 were not considered previously because their per capita incomes were below the \$10,000 cutoff according to PWT 6.3 but are now slightly above according to the subsequent revision. A number of other cases at what is now this second mode, Hungary in 1978-9 and Puerto Rico in 1969 for example, were picked up previously, as were two oil exporters, Venezuela in (1974 and Iran in 1977. The countries clustered at this second mode are, again, quite heterogeneous.

While growth in some of the countries in our sample appears, according to these figures, to slow down at a unique point in time, quite a few experience multiple slowdowns. Examples of the latter include Austria (1960 and 1974), Hungary (1977 and 2003), Greece (the 1970s and 2003), Japan (the early 1970s and early 1990s), New Zealand (1960 and 1965-6), Norway (1976 and 1997-8), Portugal (1973-4 and 1990-2), Puerto Rico (1970-2, 1988-91 and 2000-3), Singapore (post 1978 and post-1993), Spain (mid-1970s and 2001), and the UK (1988-9 and 2002-3). This substantial list suggests that two-step slowdowns are not uncommon.

4 Correlates

Table 2 summarizes the behavior of the independent variables in the full sample and the slowdown cases. At the time of their growth slowdowns, "slowdown countries" have a higher than average GDP per capita. Their per capita incomes average two thirds those of the lead country (for most of the sample period the United States), compared to only one third for the control group of non-slowdown cases. They are growing faster than average, suggesting that growth slowdowns may have an element of mean reversion.

In addition, while the country-year observations qualifying as slowdown cases are more open to trade than average, it does not appear that they are subject to larger or more variable terms-of-trade shocks. Slowdown countries are less likely than average to experience political changes, both positive (from autocracy to democracy) and negative (from democracy to autocracy). Our slowdown cases seem to have moved further up the technological ladder into the production and export of high tech products compared to the control group of countries.

Consistent with this, our slowdown cases have higher average levels of education, both overall and in terms of average years completed of secondary and tertiary schooling. In contrast, there is not much of a difference in the simple incidence of financial crises between slowdown cases and the control group, although the frequency of financial crises either in the first year of the slowdown or one of the two years preceding is slightly higher in slowdown cases.

5 Determinants

Throughout, we report regression results both identifying strings of consecutive slowdown years and individual Chow-Test dates. We also report regressions including both the level of per capita GDP and its ratio relative to the United States (some people preferring the latter). While oil exporters are excluded in what follows, most of the results are, in fact, robust to their inclusion.⁴

Baseline Results

Table 3 replicates our earlier baseline regressions of the occurrence of a slowdown on per capita GDP and its square, expressed in levels and alternatively as a ratio to U.S. GDP per capita on the pre-slowdown growth rate in percentage points and additional control. These are probit regressions, where in Table 3.1 all slowdown years identified by our criteria are coded as one, while in Table 3.2 we so code only the break point identified by the Chow Test.

As before, both per capita GDP and its square enter with coefficients significantly different from zero at the 1 per cent level, the level positively, the square negatively. When we include only the level and square of per capita GDP (column 1), the likelihood of a slowdown peaks at \$17,900 US dollars (year 2005), a higher level than in the raw data and higher than we found in our previous work. When we include other control variables, the peak is even higher, just over \$20,000.

In addition, the probability of a slowdown is significantly greater the higher pre-slowdown growth. Expressed in ratio form, the probability of a slowdown peaks when per capita GDP is roughly three-quarters that in the lead country (column 2).

As before, we still find that a high investment ratio increases the likelihood of a slowdown over the relevant range. This relationship is even stronger when we include just the linear term in the investment ratio. In the raw data there is a tendency for the investment

⁴ The result that is most notably altered by their inclusion is the effect of political regime change, which becomes even more significantly positive. This difference will appear even more plausible following the Arab Spring and associated economic difficulties (not included in our data). See the appendix for details.

ratio to rise further from relatively high levels in the lead-up to slowdowns and to decline thereafter.⁵

Similarly, we again find that slowdowns are more likely in countries with undervalued exchange rates, other things equal (here, as before, undervaluation is calculated by regressing the real exchange rate on per capita GDP to account for Balassa-Samuelson effects, and taking the residual). A high old-age dependency ratio similarly increases the likelihood of a slowdown, although this result is no longer statistically significant at conventional confidence levels (it was only marginally significant in our earlier paper). Again as before, we find that slowdowns are less likely in more open economies over the relevant range, where this effect now registers at a higher level of statistical significance than previously, especially when we code as one the entire sequence of consecutive slowdown years. That this last effect is not consistent across alternative coding schemes will lead us to revisit its significance below.

Human Capital

Next, we consider the association of slowdowns with years of schooling. We use data from Barro and Lee (2011), who calculate average number of years of schooling for the population aged 15 and above. As shown in Table 4, years of schooling in total displays no evident association with slowdowns. But when we include both total years of schooling and years of schooling at the secondary level and higher as separate variables, the latter is strongly negative: the more university attendees and graduates, on average, the less the likelihood of a slowdown.

That the number of graduates of secondary schools and universities exerts this negative effect is intuitive: more advanced education may be especially valuable for middle-income countries seeking to avoid a slowdown by moving into more the production of more technologically sophisticated goods and services. But why total years of schooling is positively (and in most cases significantly) associated with the probability of a slowdown after controlling separately for higher education is less intuitive. A conjecture would be that countries with some educational attainment that falls short of secondary are better able to move into relatively low-value added industries and activities (assembly operations and the like), leading to an acceleration of growth, but then find it harder to move up market when challenged from below by other late-industrializing, low-labor cost countries. This renders them vulnerable to the so-called middle-income trap.

Political Regime Changes

In Tables 5 and 6 we consider the effect of political regime changes. We distinguish countries with positive political changes (movements away from autocracy and toward democracy) and negative political changes (movements away from democracy and toward autocracy). Our data on political regimes are drawing from the Polity IV data set, which codes countries on a one-to-ten scale (full autocracy to full democracy).

In Table 5 we list slowdown cases where there was a political regime change in the preceding five years. We see a large predominance of positive regime change cases,

⁵ These results are not reported but available upon request.

reflecting the secular move in the direction of democratization in the final decades of the 20th century. Among our slowdown cases, only Bahrain, Greece and Israel go the other way.⁶

Table 6 shows the associated regressions. Political change overall (both positive and negative) has no significant association with the probability of a slowdown. But when we distinguish positive and negative changes, positive changes significantly increase the likelihood of a slowdown in one of our two specifications.

Movements in the direction of democracy are sometimes associated increases in labor action and production costs – in Korea following democratization in 1987 and around the time of the country's 1989 slowdown, for example. Park (2007) shows in the Korean case that nominal wage rates, having tracked nominal labor productivity closely before 1987, diverged sharply in that country in the aftermath of democratization. Sharp increases in labor costs as previously successful efforts by authoritarian governments to suppress labor demands come to an end with the transition to political democratization, as in Korea, may more generally explain the association between positive political change and the increased likelihood of a slowdown. As explained in section 2, for Korea our methodology identifies a growth slowdown in 1989.

External Factors

Table 7 looks more broadly at the role of external factors in precipitating growth slowdowns, distinguishing trade openness from terms-of-trade shocks and global GDP growth. We enter both variables in levels and interacted with trade openness on the grounds that external shocks might have a more powerful impact on the probability of a slowdown in more open economies.

As noted above, the effect of trade openness is not consistent across specifications. For what they are worth, the specifications yielding the most precisely estimated coefficients suggest that the likelihood of a slowdown is minimized at a trade (export plus import)-to-GDP ratio of approximately 1.3.

We define the terms of trade shock as a dummy variable that takes on a value of one if the growth rate of the terms of trade from $t-1$ to t is in the lowest 10 per cent of the sample distribution. The coefficient on this variable varies in sign and is generally insignificant. The coefficient on global GDP growth also differs insignificantly from zero in most specifications, but where it is significant it is always negative, consistent with intuition. Note also that when we control for terms of trade and global growth shocks the impact of openness is now spottier than before. But if levels of statistical significance on this variable differ by column, we continue to find that the likelihood of a slowdown is minimized at a trade (import-plus-export) to GDP ratio of approximately 1.3.

This more careful look at external factors thus confirms that these matter for growth slowdowns in the expected way, although precise effects are sensitive to sample and specification.

⁶ We are not sure why Polity down-codes Israel from 10 (the highest level of democracy) to 9 in 1967. This period saw the prime minister strengthen his authority over the entire range of cabinet activity (Asher, Nachmias and Amir 2002, pp.52, 55-6), which Polity may interpret as a modest decline in checks on the executive..

Technology Content of Exports

An important challenge for middle-income countries seeking to maintain their customary high growth rates is to move up the technological ladder into the production of more technologically sophisticated goods, in part in order to get out of the way of lower-cost developing countries beginning to penetrate global markets for low-tech products (assembly operations and the like).

In Tables 8.1 and 8.2 we therefore report regressions that include the share of high tech exports as a share of total manufactured exports. In Table 8.2, where we use the Chow-Test approach to identify unique slowdown years, the results suggest that middle-income countries with a relatively large share of high-tech exports are less susceptible to slowdowns. The results in Table 8.1, where we code as slowdowns the entire sequence of slowdown years, are less supportive of the hypothesis. But even there the interaction of the share of high-tech exports with global growth is negative, suggesting that middle income countries that have moved out of assembly operations are less vulnerable to global demand shocks.

Financial Instability

Tables 9 and 10 consider the association of crises with slowdown risk. We create a dummy variable that equals one for all years in which Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) identify a banking crisis, a currency crisis, a domestic default, an external default, an inflationary crisis, a stock market crash, or several of the above.

Table 9 shows the distribution of crises around our Chow Test slowdown dates. Most types of crises – currency crises, banking crises, debt crises, inflation crises – accompany only a relatively small minority of our slowdown cases. Stock market crises or crashes are clearly different; there is a relatively high incidence of these both before and after our slowdown episodes. It makes sense that stock markets should react negatively to slowdowns and that, to the extent that they look forward, they should react negatively in advance of slowdowns. Whether this negative association deserves a causal interpretation is an open question.

Table 10 reports the associated regression results. The crisis dummy lagged one year is positive and consistently significant at a relatively high level of confidence when we consider the entire sequence of slowdown years. The other results reported previously remain intact. In Table 11 we exclude stock market crises-cum-crises. The significant positive association of crises lagged one year with slowdowns remains in Table 11.1.⁷

To shed some light on the channels through which crises may lead to slowdowns, we added the investment ratio both before and after the year of the observation to this specification. Specifically, we added two variables, one the average investment-to-GDP ratio over the preceding seven years, the other the average investment-to-GDP ratio over the subsequent seven years. In this augmented specification, the investment ratio tends to enter positively before the slowdown (as before) but negatively thereafter; both measures are generally statistically significant at the ten per cent confidence level or better.⁸ Importantly,

⁷ In the final column, however, there is also a peculiar negative and significant coefficient on crises lagged two years, which renders us cautious about pushing this finding too far.

⁸ Results available from the authors on request.

the crisis variable no longer differs from zero at conventional confidence levels. This suggests that crises may lead to slowdowns by depressing investment for an extended period. This pattern is well known from, inter alia, the Asian crisis. These results suggest that the mechanism may be more general.

6 Conclusion and Additional Thoughts

Rapid growth in emerging markets is perhaps the single most important economic development affecting the world's population in the last quarter century. An important question is therefore "How long will it last?" Interest in this question has intensified with the deterioration in the global outlook following the onset of the global financial crisis. Even China, the largest and most dynamic emerging market, has seen slower growth since the crisis, although opinion is divided over what this implies for the future.

Much of the literature on this topic flies under the heading of "the middle income trap." A number of emerging markets have grown rapidly at low income levels but were ultimately unable to move beyond middle income status. The troubled global outlook now poses a risk that even dynamic middle income economies like China that are unable to adapt may similarly find themselves trapped, as it were.⁹

In this paper we have again considered what history has to say about this question, revisiting the incidence and correlates of growth slowdowns. We continue to find considerable dispersion in the per capita incomes at which slowdowns occur. But, in contrast to our earlier results, which pointed to the existence of a single mode around \$15,000-\$16,000 purchasing power parity 2005 dollars at which slowdowns typically occur, our new analysis points to the existence of two modes, one in the \$10,000-\$11,000 range and another around \$15,000-\$16,000. A substantial number of countries in our sample appear to experience two slowdowns, consistent with the existence of multiple modes. This is suggestive of the idea that growth in middle-income countries slows in several steps. It implies that a larger group of middle-income countries may be at risk of slowdowns than suggested by our earlier estimates and that middle-income countries may find their growth slowing at lower levels of income.

The new analysis again confirms that slowdowns are more likely in economies with high old age dependency ratios, high investment rates that may translate into low future returns on capital, and undervalued real exchange rates that provide a disincentive to move up the technology ladder. These patterns will presumably remind readers of current conditions and recent policies in China, the case motivating much of the slowdown literature.

In addition, we find that slowdowns are less likely in countries with high levels of secondary and tertiary education and where high-tech products account for a large share of exports, consistent with our earlier emphasis of the importance of moving up the technology ladder in order to avoid the middle income trap.

What do these new results imply for China? China has slightly higher average years of schooling at the secondary level than the median for our slowdown cases (3.17 years in China versus 2.72 years in our slowdown cases). It has a higher share of high-tech goods in

⁹ See, for example, ADB (2012a).

exports (27.5 per cent in China versus 24.1 in our slowdown cases). In this sense China appears to be doing slightly better than average in moving up the technology ladder in order to avoid the middle-income trap.

Our finding that high quality human capital reduces the probability of a slowdown seems intuitive. Skilled workers are needed to move up the value chain from low value-added industries and activities. High quality human capital is especially important for modern high value-added activities like business services. ADB (2012b) finds that the underdevelopment of the service sector in China and other Asian emerging markets is attributable partly to the dominance of traditional low value-added services. It identifies shortages of appropriate human capital as an important explanation for the weakness of modern high value-added services.

Even emerging markets that have achieved rapid improvement in overall education attainment can suffer from shortages of specific kinds of skilled workers. ADB (2008) warns that such shortages are sufficiently prevalent to pose a risk to growth in China and other parts of emerging Asia. Surveys of employers in China and emerging Asia regularly identify shortages of qualified staff as a top business concern. For example, lack of high quality human capital helps to explain why Malaysia and Thailand have become synonymous with the middle income trap. In contrast, the rapid expansion of secondary and then tertiary education helps to explain Korea's successful transition from middle to high income status. Whether China can avoid the middle income trap will presumably depend, in part, on whether it develops an education system that successfully produces graduates with skills that employers require.

That a large share of high-tech exports is negatively associated with the likelihood of a slowdown points to the same conclusion. Intuitively, the inherited stock of human capital shapes a country's ability to move up the technology ladder and its capacity export products embodying advanced technology. As they reach middle income status, emerging markets typically import advanced technology from more advanced countries. Taking the next step, which involves adapting imported technology to local conditions and embodying it in exports with high local content, requires a pool of highly skilled workers.

Other variables, from political regime changes and financial instability to trade openness and terms-of-trade shocks, also show some association with growth slowdowns. But compared to educational attainment and the structure of exports, they are less robustly related. The insignificance of global growth offers some hope that China and other emerging markets can continue to grow at healthy rates despite an unfavorable global environment. Finally, the apparent correlation between political regime change and growth slowdowns may in fact reflect the influence of common underlying drivers of both political change and growth slowdowns. Social factors like those responsible for the Arab Spring may bring about both economic and political changes, in other words.

At some point, high growth in middle-income countries will come to an end. The low hanging fruit will have been picked, and high-return investments will have been completed. Underemployed labor will have been transferred from rural to urban sectors, while the demographic dividend will become a demographic drag. But this does not mean that a slowdown at a specific income level is inevitable. Not all countries are equally

susceptible. Countries accumulating high quality human capital and moving into the production of higher tech exports stand a better chance of avoiding the middle income trap.

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Data Appendix

1. Growth Slowdowns

Per capita GDP: PPP Converted GDP Per Capita (Chain Series), at 2005 constant prices

Source: Penn World Tables 7.1

2. Probit Regressions

(1) Demography

Age Dependency Ratio, Young: Percentage ratio of younger dependents (younger than 15) to the working-age population (15-64 years old).

Source: World Development Indicators 2010

Age Dependency Ratio, Old: Percentage ratio of older dependents (older than 64) to the working-age population.

Source: World Development Indicators 2010

(2) Expenditure shares

Consumption share of GDP: Consumption Share of PPP Converted GDP Per Capita at 2005 constant prices.

Source: Penn World Tables 7.1

Investment share of GDP: Investment Share of PPP Converted GDP Per Capita at 2005 constant prices.

Source: Penn World Tables 7.1

Government consumption share of GDP: Government Consumption Share of PPP Converted GDP Per Capita at 2005 constant prices.

Source: Penn World Tables 7.1

(3) Human Capital

Educational Attainment for Population aged 15 and over.

Source: Barro and Lee (2011) Educational Attainment Dataset

(4) External sector

Terms of Trade: Net barter terms of trade index calculated as the percentage ratio of the export unit value index to the import unit value index, measured relative to the base year 2000

Source: World Development Indicators 2010. The data before 1980 were obtained from Hiro Ito.

Trade openness in 2005 constant prices: The total trade (exports and imports) as a percentage of GDP.

Source: Penn World Tables 7.1

World GDP Growth: Annual percentage growth rate of GDP based on constant 2000 U.S. dollars.

Source: World Development Indicators 2012

High technology export ratio: Percentage ratio of High-technology exports to manufactured exports.

Source: World Development Indicators 2012.

(5) Political regimes

Polity Index: Polity score captures the regime authority spectrum on a scale ranging from -10 (hereditary monarchy) to 10 (consolidated democracy).

Source: Center for Systemic Peace

(6) Policy Variables

Inflation: CPI change over corresponding period of previous year

Source: IFS line 64XZF

Exchange Rate: US=1

Source: Penn World Tables 7.1

(7) Date of Crises

Dummy for crises: Dummy for crisis takes a value of 1 if any of six crises occurs. Six crises refer to inflation, currency, stock, domestic debt, external debt, and banking crises.

Source: Reinhart and Rogoff (2010)

Table 1. Old and New Slowdown Episodes

Country	Year			Growth before slowdown (t-7 through t)	Growth after slowdown (t through t+7)	Difference in growth	Per capita GDP at t
	Penn World Table 6.3	Penn World Table 7.1	Both				
Argentina	1970*			3.6	1.5	-2.2	10,927
	1997*			4.3	-0.1	-4.5	12,778
	1998*			3.7	0.5	-3.2	13,132
Australia			1968	4.0	-0.1	-4.0	19,553
			1969	3.9	-0.2	-4.1	20,409
Austria		1960		6.4	3.5	-2.9	10,537
			1961	5.9	3.4	-2.5	11,042
			1974	4.8	2.5	-2.4	18,860
	1976			4.2	2.1	-2.1	18,615
			1977	4.0	1.6	-2.5	20,875
Bahrain			1977	4.7	-3.0	-7.7	30,133
		1978		3.9	-6.2	-10.1	28,339
Belgium			1973	4.7	2.5	-2.2	18,091
			1974	4.9	1.6	-3.3	18,852
			1976	3.9	1.1	-2.8	19,415
Chile	1994*			5.9	3.9	-2.0	11,145
	1995*			6.5	2.8	-3.7	12,223
	1996*			6.1	2.3	-3.8	13,004
	1997*			6.6	2.3	-4.3	13,736
	1998*			6.1	2.7	-3.4	14,011
Cyprus		1989		5.1	2.0	-3.1	13,501
			1990	5.1	1.4	-3.7	14,000
			1992	4.4	1.7	-2.7	14,579
Denmark	1964			5.0	2.9	-2.1	13,450
	1965			5.4	2.8	-2.6	13,944
			1968	4.1	1.9	-2.2	16,336
		1969		4.3	2.0	-2.3	17,417
			1970	4.5	2.0	-2.5	17,681
Estonia			1973	3.8	1.3	-2.5	19,349
			2002	7.1	3.9	-3.2	12,525
			2003	7.4	3.2	-4.1	13,591
Finland			1970	4.5	2.5	-2.0	13,884
	1971			4.1	2.0	-2.1	13,481
	1973			4.6	2.5	-2.1	14,996
			1974	5.2	2.1	-3.1	16,594
			1975	4.9	2.5	-2.4	16,545
		2002		3.7	0.9	-2.8	29,781

Unit:%, \$

		2003	3.6	1.3	-2.3	30,151
France		1973	4.5	2.3	-2.2	18,225
		1974	4.4	1.8	-2.6	18,876
Gabon		1973	5.4	2.9	-2.5	10,184
		1974	9.5	-1.3	-10.8	13,865
		1975	10.6	-3.6	-14.2	15,193
		1976	13.1	-7.0	-20.1	19,395
		1977	9.7	-3.8	-13.5	16,333
		1978	4.4	-0.3	-4.7	12,122
		1994	3.8	-1.7	-5.5	11,828
	1995		3.5	-2.9	-6.4	10,161
Greece		1969	8.3	4.8	-3.5	11,282
		1970	7.9	3.8	-4.1	12,271
		1971	7.6	3.5	-4.1	13,194
		1972	7.5	2.4	-5.1	14,480
		1973	7.8	1.3	-6.5	15,617
		1974	6.0	2.1	-3.9	14,304
		1975	5.6	1.2	-4.4	14,988
		1976	4.8	0.1	-4.7	15,819
		1977	3.8	0.2	-3.5	15,955
		1978	3.5	-0.3	-3.9	16,910
		2003	3.9	0.7	-3.2	23,988
Hong Kong		1978	6.8	4.3	-2.4	11,924
		1981	7.5	5.2	-2.2	14,659
		1982	7.6	5.1	-2.4	14,855
	1988		5.6	3.2	-2.4	24,523
	1989		5.5	3.2	-2.4	24,867
		1990	5.5	3.3	-2.2	22,241
		1991	5.3	1.5	-3.8	23,374
		1992	6.0	0.9	-5.1	24,540
		1993	5.3	1.4	-3.8	25,348
		1994	4.4	0.7	-3.7	26,562
Hungary		1977	4.6	1.4	-3.2	10,747
		1978	4.4	0.8	-3.6	11,327
		1979	4.0	1.2	-2.8	11,276
		2003	4.1	1.3	-2.8	15,133
Iran		1972	9.9	-3.2	-13.1	10,791
		1973	10.1	-6.8	-16.9	11,439
		1974	9.6	-10.2	-19.8	12,012
		1975	7.4	-8.2	-15.6	11,324
		1976	8.5	-9.1	-17.6	13,330

Iraq		1977	4.3	-6.9	-11.2	11,459	
	1979*		10.9	-6.6	-17.5	11,823	
	1980*		7.9	-3.5	-11.5	11,129	
Ireland		1969	4.4	2.2	-2.2	10,784	
		1973	5.1	2.2	-2.9	12,564	
		1974	4.5	2.5	-2.0	12,641	
		1978	3.7	0.4	-3.3	14,437	
	1979		3.5	-0.3	-3.8	14,091	
		1999	7.4	3.9	-3.5	31,344	
		2000	8.4	3.0	-5.4	34,199	
		2001	8.1	1.8	-6.3	35,353	
		2002	7.2	-0.5	-7.7	36,875	
		2003	6.6	-1.3	-7.9	38,254	
	Israel		1970	5.5	2.3	-3.2	12,275
		1971	5.7	1.9	-3.8	13,114	
		1972	6.0	1.3	-4.7	13,931	
		1973	7.5	0.1	-7.4	15,030	
		1974	7.6	0.3	-7.2	15,320	
		1975	5.9	0.0	-5.9	15,726	
		1976	3.7	0.9	-2.8	15,048	
1996			3.7	-0.1	-3.8	20,973	
1974			4.4	2.3	-2.1	15,629	
Japan			1967	8.5	6.4	-2.1	10,096
		1968	8.5	4.9	-3.6	11,292	
		1969	8.9	3.8	-5.2	12,558	
		1970	9.2	2.9	-6.3	13,773	
		1971	8.2	3.1	-5.1	14,183	
		1972	8.6	2.8	-5.8	15,202	
		1973	8.2	2.0	-6.2	16,254	
		1974	6.4	2.9	-3.5	15,758	
	1975		5.0	2.9	-2.1	15,965	
		1989	4.1	1.7	-2.4	26,324	
		1990	4.6	1.1	-3.5	27,718	
		1991	4.5	0.3	-4.2	28,524	
		1992	3.8	0.2	-3.6	28,578	
	Korea, Republic of		1989	8.8	6.7	-2.1	10,570
			1990	8.8	5.7	-3.1	11,643
			1991	9.0	2.8	-6.2	12,713
		1992	8.5	4.0	-4.5	13,077	
		1993	7.9	4.4	-3.5	13,722	
		1994	7.6	3.7	-3.9	14,826	

			1995	7.1	3.7	-3.4	15,889	
			1996	6.7	3.1	-3.6	16,904	
			1997	5.7	3.2	-2.5	17,395	
Kuwait			1993	6.4	-2.8	-9.2	45,376	
			1994	6.1	-2.5	-8.6	43,825	
			1995	6.3	-2.8	-9.1	43,893	
			1996	3.9	-0.3	-4.2	43,346	
			1997	8.5	1.5	-7.0	41,131	
	Lebanon	1983			9.3	-6.8	-16.1	10,081
1984				6.3	-10.1	-16.4	15,107	
1985*				6.2	-13.8	-20.0	16,192	
			1987	6.3	-3.2	-9.5	10,323	
Libya	1977			5.8	-11.3	-17.1	56,246	
	1978			6.4	-10.0	-16.4	53,273	
	1979			7.1	-12.0	-19.1	55,200	
	1980			5.2	-12.4	-17.5	46,139	
			1994	3.6	-1.6	-5.2	16,889	
Malaysia	1994*			6.7	3.4	-3.3	10,987	
	1995*			6.8	2.9	-4.0	11,835	
	1996*			6.9	2.4	-4.5	12,741	
	1997*			6.5	2.5	-4.0	13,297	
Mauritius	1992*			5.3	3.3	-2.0	11,183	
Mexico		1980		4.1	-2.0	-6.0	10,208	
		1981		4.4	-2.9	-7.4	10,882	
Netherlands	1970			4.5	2.1	-2.4	17,387	
			1973	3.8	1.8	-2.0	21,107	
			1974	3.7	0.7	-3.0	21,830	
New Zealand			1960	3.7	1.7	-2.1	14,264	
			1965	4.2	1.1	-3.1	16,431	
			1966	4.5	1.2	-3.3	17,148	
Norway			1976	4.2	2.2	-2.1	23,463	
			1997	3.9	1.7	-2.3	42,838	
			1998	4.0	1.6	-2.3	43,927	
			1977	7.1	4.5	-2.6	10,044	
Oman				1978	8.4	4.9	-3.4	11,124
				1979	7.6	5.3	-2.3	10,641
				1980	10.4	3.4	-7.0	10,439
				1981	7.8	2.0	-5.9	11,671
			1982	5.1	1.2	-3.8	12,236	
			1983	4.4	0.9	-3.5	12,852	
		1984	4.5	0.4	-4.1	13,736		

		1985	4.9	-0.6	-5.6	15,722
		1986	5.3	0.2	-5.0	15,374
Portugal		1973	8.2	1.3	-6.9	10,156
		1974	7.4	1.5	-6.0	10,238
		1977	3.8	0.9	-2.9	10,086
		1990	4.3	2.1	-2.2	15,201
		1991	5.3	2.4	-2.9	15,628
		1992	5.3	2.7	-2.6	15,882
	2000		3.6	0.4	-3.2	19,606
Puerto Rico	1969*		5.7	2.1	-3.6	10,094
		1970	5.9	2.1	-3.8	10,380
		1971	5.6	2.3	-3.3	10,887
		1972	5.5	1.5	-4.0	11,412
		1973	4.4	1.5	-2.9	11,282
		1988	4.6	2.3	-2.4	16,537
		1989	5.7	1.9	-3.8	17,396
		1990	4.9	2.4	-2.5	17,828
		1991	5.0	2.9	-2.1	18,171
		2000	4.1	-0.4	-4.5	25,286
		2002	3.9	-1.3	-5.3	25,531
		2003	4.0	-2.0	-6.0	26,246
Saudi Arabia	1977		9.4	-8.8	-18.2	43,032
	1978		5.5	-8.3	-13.8	37,541
	1979		3.7	-9.7	-13.4	40,696
Singapore		1974	9.8	5.8	-4.0	10,553
	1978		6.9	4.8	-2.1	11,429
		1979	6.5	3.7	-2.8	13,904
		1980	6.7	3.3	-3.5	15,393
		1981	5.8	3.7	-2.1	15,838
		1982	6.4	4.0	-2.4	16,537
		1983	6.7	4.0	-2.7	17,832
		1984	7.1	3.7	-3.3	18,843
		1993	6.3	4.1	-2.2	27,942
		1994	5.9	2.8	-3.2	29,288
		1995	6.1	2.2	-3.9	31,250
		1996	5.8	1.4	-4.4	32,875
		1997	5.7	1.8	-3.8	35,097
Spain		1966	8.1	5.2	-2.9	10,074
		1969	5.9	3.9	-2.1	11,806
		1972	5.1	1.9	-3.2	13,500
		1973	5.2	1.1	-4.1	14,495


		1974	5.5	0.2	-5.3	15,241
		1975	4.7	0.4	-4.3	15,123
		1976	3.9	0.2	-3.6	15,463
	1977		3.5	0.3	-3.2	15,549
	1990		3.8	1.6	-2.1	19,112
	2001		3.5	1.2	-2.3	26,713
Sweden	1964		3.9	1.7	-2.2	17,235
	1965		4.1	1.7	-2.4	17,729
Taiwan	1992		7.5	4.8	-2.6	15,609
	1993		6.9	4.8	-2.1	16,512
		1994	6.4	3.4	-3.0	17,581
		1995	6.5	3.3	-3.2	18,542
		1996	5.9	3.1	-2.8	19,361
		1997	5.7	3.3	-2.4	20,330
	1998		5.6	3.3	-2.3	19,526
	1999		5.4	3.2	-2.2	20,562
Trinidad & Tobago		1976	4.8	1.5	-3.2	14,834
		1977	4.6	-0.2	-4.8	15,300
		1978	6.2	-3.3	-9.6	17,309
		1979	5.1	-5.2	-10.4	17,436
		1980	6.6	-7.5	-14.1	19,110
		1981	5.0	-8.0	-13.0	18,617
		1982	4.5	-8.3	-12.8	18,639
United Arab Emirates	1977		22.6	-4.9	-27.6	76,701
	1978		20.8	-4.1	-24.9	65,394
	1979		21.4	-8.1	-29.6	69,445
	1980		16.1	-9.5	-25.5	74,229
United Kingdom		1988	4.4	1.3	-3.1	22,564
		1989	4.3	1.4	-3.0	23,079
	2002		3.6	0.6	-2.9	31,713
	2003		3.6	0.7	-3.0	32,704
United States		1968	3.9	1.2	-2.7	20,334
Uruguay	1996*		3.6	-2.0	-5.6	11,044
	1997*		4.3	-1.2	-5.5	11,559
	1998*		4.4	-1.2	-5.6	12,097
Venezuela		1974	4.2	-1.8	-6.1	10,997
	1976		3.5	-4.4	-7.9	11,210

Source: Authors' calculation.

Note: The per capita GDP data are collected from Penn World Table 6.3 (old episodes) and 7.1 (new episodes). Both refers to the cases where the slowdown episodes are identified by both Penn World Table 6.3 and 7.1. We limit slowdowns to cases in which per capita GDP is greater than US\$ 10,000 in 2005 constant international PPP

prices to rule out growth crises in not yet successfully developing economies. Slowdown years marked by * in old episodes indicate that they are excluded in new episodes because per capita GDP is not over US\$10,000 in Penn World Table 7.1. Shaded countries are oil exporters. When we identify a string of consecutive years as growth slowdowns, we employ a Chow test for structural breaks to select only one year that is most significant. The selected years by the Chow test are denoted in bold.

Figure 1. Frequency Distribution of Growth Slowdowns



Source: Authors' calculation.

Note: The bars indicate the frequency distribution of actual growth slowdowns by per capita income, and the smooth line is the predicted values of growth slowdowns derived from a probit model.

Table 2.1. Summary Statistics, Full Sample

Variable	Observation	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Per capita GDP	5,028	7,024	8,475	161	46,318
Ratio	5,028	0.26	0.30	0.00	1.44
Pre-slowdown growth	4,207	0.04	0.03	-0.28	0.23
Old dependency	4,739	9.96	5.91	2.35	28.87
Young dependency	4,739	66.2	23.6	21.0	112.4
Consumption share of GDP	5,028	0.71	0.13	0.04	1.00
Investment share of GDP	5,028	0.22	0.10	-0.11	0.80
Government share of GDP	5,028	0.10	0.07	0.01	0.59
Inflation	3,904	0.47	2.79	-0.04	47.54
Inflation variability	3,497	0.58	4.62	0.00	82.01
Exchange rate variability	4,207	39.0	244.9	0.0	4846.2
Undervaluation of real exchange rate	4,680	0.00	0.51	-6.92	2.27
total years of schooling	4,593	5.48	3.00	0.13	12.71
years of schooling, secondary and higher	4,593	1.75	1.43	0.02	7.35
political change	4,578	0.36	0.48	0	1
Positive political change	4,578	0.26	0.44	0	1
Negative political change	4,578	0.15	0.36	0	1
Trade Openness	5,028	0.54	0.39	0.012	3.740
Lower 10% growth of terms of trade from t to t-1	3,584	0.10	0.30	0	1
World GDP growth	3,922	3.17	1.34	0.42	6.58
High technology export ratio	1,254	10.77	12.94	0.00	83.64
Dummy for crisis (t)	5,028	0.30	0.46	0	1
Dummy for crisis (t-1)	5,028	0.30	0.46	0	1
Dummy for crisis (t-2)	5,028	0.29	0.45	0	1

Source: see text.

Table 2.2. Summary Statistics, Slowdown Countries

Variable	Observation	Mean	Std. Dev.	Min	Max
Per capita GDP	146	18,234	7,140	10,074	43,927
Ratio	146	0.67	0.18	0.31	1.20
Pre-slowdown growth	143	0.07	0.02	0.04	0.12
Old dependency	129	15.60	5.31	6.41	25.74
Young dependency	129	38.00	10.32	21.35	86.80
Consumption share of GDP	146	0.62	0.09	0.33	0.78
Investment share of GDP	146	0.31	0.08	0.14	0.50
Government share of GDP	146	0.08	0.04	0.02	0.25
Inflation	126	0.06	0.04	0.01	0.21
Inflation variability	123	0.03	0.03	0.00	0.14
Exchange rate variability	143	5.90	16.49	0.00	76.99
Undervaluation of real exchange rate	138	0.06	0.31	-0.45	1.02
total years of schooling	135	8.17	1.90	3.86	11.50
years of schooling, secondary and higher	135	2.91	1.19	0.71	5.53
political change	127	0.24	0.43	0	1
Positive political change	127	0.20	0.40	0	1
Negative political change	127	0.04	0.20	0	1
Trade Openness	146	0.75	0.71	0.09	3.23
Lower 10% growth of terms of trade from t to t-1	121	0.04	0.20	0.00	1.00
World GDP growth	127	3.25	1.60	0.42	6.58
High technology export ratio	45	24.60	15.00	3.53	57.02
Dummy for crisis (t)	146	0.42	0.50	0	1
Dummy for crisis (t-1)	146	0.32	0.47	0	1
Dummy for crisis (t-2)	146	0.27	0.45	0	1

Source: see text.

Table 3. Determinants of growth slowdowns: Replication of earlier results**Table 3.1 Consecutive points**

	Growth Slowdown						
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]
per capita GDP	39.485**		64.958**	67.286**	71.185**	55.932**	52.107**
	[10.333]		[16.169]	[12.908]	[14.055]	[14.253]	[14.456]
per capita GDP ²	-2.016**		-3.261**	-3.335**	-3.539**	-2.755**	-2.564**
	[0.542]		[0.831]	[0.667]	[0.727]	[0.745]	[0.755]
Pre-slowdown growth			78.846**	71.578**	73.313**	68.414**	69.454**
			[9.839]	[9.987]	[9.935]	[6.813]	[6.546]
Ratio		12.291**					
		[2.591]					
Ratio ²		-8.685**					
		[2.238]					
Old dependency			0.166				
			[0.139]				
Old dependency ²			-0.003				
			[0.004]				
Young dependency			-0.08				
			[0.060]				
Young dependency ²			0.001				
			[0.000]				
Trade openness in constant prices					-1.023		
					[0.553]		
Trade openness in constant prices ²					0.364*		
					[0.157]		
Consumption share of per capita GDP				-44.530**	-48.200**		
				[15.648]	[16.774]		
Consumption share of per capita GDP ²				40.634**	42.728**		
				[12.028]	[13.143]		
Investment share of per capita GDP				37.539**	39.345**		
				[14.452]	[15.020]		
Investment share of per capita GDP ²				-54.363*	-58.811*		
				[23.865]	[24.773]		
Government share of per capita GDP				-17.082	-14.58		
				[14.691]	[15.147]		
Government share of per capita GDP ²				57.75	49.201		

				[60.746]	[62.734]		
Inflation						1.573	
						[1.669]	
Inflation variability						-2.615	
						[1.551]	
Exchange rate variability						0.004**	
						[0.001]	
Undervaluation of real exchange rate						1.640*	1.513*
						[0.645]	[0.681]
Observations	4659	4659	3835	3876	3876	3842	2914

Source: Authors' calculation.

Note: Column [3] is a replication of column [6] in Table 6.2. Columns [4] and [5] are replications of column [12] and [13] in Table 6.2. Columns [6] and [7] are replications of column [4] and [5] in Table 7.2. All the tables refer to the ones in Eichengreen et al. (2012). The sample excludes oil exporting countries. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. ** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 3.2 Chow test points

	Growth Slowdown						
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]
per capita GDP	26.001**		25.893**	25.872**	26.288**	22.874**	21.100*
	[9.620]		[9.000]	[8.495]	[8.826]	[6.707]	[8.736]
per capita GDP ²	-1.313**		-1.276**	-1.275**	-1.298**	-1.121**	-1.028*
	[0.508]		[0.473]	[0.446]	[0.464]	[0.353]	[0.462]
Pre-slowdown growth			24.371**	15.890**	15.832**	23.867**	28.133**
			[5.835]	[5.975]	[6.131]	[3.883]	[5.303]
Ratio		7.608**					
		[1.444]					
Ratio ²		-4.593**					
		[1.279]					
Old dependency			0.127				
			[0.088]				
Old dependency ²			-0.003				
			[0.003]				
Young dependency			0.06				
			[0.041]				
Young dependency ²			0				
			[0.000]				
Trade openness in constant prices					-0.702		
					[0.416]		
Trade openness in constant prices ²					0.198		
					[0.153]		
Consumption share of per capita GDP				-11.240*	-11.486*		
				[4.916]	[5.111]		
Consumption share of per capita GDP ²				10.152*	10.015*		
				[4.586]	[4.764]		
Investment share of per capita GDP				5.121	4.934		
				[7.404]	[7.459]		
Investment share of per capita GDP ²				-3.087	-2.192		
				[11.497]	[11.721]		
Government share of per capita GDP				-7.886	-7.416		
				[5.735]	[5.489]		
Government share of per capita GDP ²				35.200*	34.302*		
				[15.826]	[14.881]		

Inflation							-0.394
							[0.671]
Inflation variability							0.268
							[0.309]
Exchange rate variability							0.002**
							[0.000]
Undervaluation of real exchange rate						0.632	0.457
						[0.366]	[0.432]
Observations	3819	3819	3707	3745	3745	3713	2671

Source: Authors' calculation.

Note: Column [1] is a replication of column [6] in Table 6.1. Columns [2] and [3] are replications of column [12] and [13] in Table 6.1. Columns [4] and [5] are replications of column [4] and [5] in Table 7.1. All the tables refer to the ones in Eichengreen et. al. (2012). The sample excludes oil exporting countries. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. ** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 4. The impact of human capital structure on growth slowdowns**Table 4.1. Probit regressions using consecutive points**

	Growth Slowdown			
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
per capita GDP	63.411**		62.769**	
	[13.940]		[13.943]	
per capita GDP ²	-3.165**		-3.100**	
	[0.723]		[0.717]	
Pre-slowdown growth	62.008**	47.338**	69.881**	51.194**
	[6.843]	[6.456]	[7.786]	[6.577]
Ratio		20.094**		20.899**
		[3.958]		[3.572]
Ratio ²		-13.077**		-13.161**
		[3.115]		[2.690]
total years of schooling	-0.09	0.049	0.16	0.292**
	[0.089]	[0.086]	[0.116]	[0.102]
years of schooling, secondary and higher			-0.594**	-0.551**
			[0.171]	[0.157]
Observations	3565	3565	3565	3565

Source: Authors' calculation.

Note: The sample excludes oil exporting countries. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors.* Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. ** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 4.2. Probit regressions using Chow test points

	Growth Slowdown			
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
per capita GDP	34.410**		34.237**	
	[11.892]		[11.423]	
per capita GDP ²	-1.698**		-1.669**	
	[0.623]		[0.594]	
Pre-slowdown growth	32.530**	30.113**	36.630**	33.587**
	[5.961]	[5.419]	[6.332]	[5.734]
Ratio		9.972**		10.393**
		[1.569]		[1.584]
Ratio ²		-5.273**		-5.141**
		[1.217]		[1.040]
total years of schooling	-0.024	0.007	0.240**	0.266**
	[0.067]	[0.065]	[0.091]	[0.092]
years of schooling, secondary and higher			-0.554**	-0.556**
			[0.145]	[0.144]
Observations	2970	2970	2970	2970

Source: Authors' calculation.

Note: The sample excludes oil exporting countries. If a string of consecutive years are identified as growth slowdowns, we employ a Chow test for structural breaks to select only one for which the Chow test is most significant. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. ** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 5. Dating of Institutional Changes and Slowdowns

country	year	per capita GDP	pre growth rate (t-7 to 0)	post growth rate (0 to t+7)	Growth difference	positive regime change	negative regime change
Bahrain	1977	30,133	4.7	-3	-7.7	1	1
	1978	28,339	3.9	-6.2	-10.1	0	1
Greece	1969	11,282	8.3	4.8	-3.5	0	1
	1970	12,271	7.9	3.8	-4.1	0	1
	1971	13,194	7.6	3.5	-4.1	0	1
Israel	1970	12,275	5.5	2.3	-3.2	0	1
	1971	13,115	5.7	1.9	-3.8	0	1
Estonia	2002	12,526	7.1	3.9	-3.2	1	0
	2003	13,591	7.4	3.2	-4.2	1	0
France	1973	18,225	4.5	2.3	-2.2	1	0
Gabon	1994	11,828	3.8	-1.7	-5.5	1	0
Greece	1974	14,304	6	2.1	-3.9	1	0
	1975	14,988	5.6	1.2	-4.4	1	0
	1976	15,819	4.8	0.1	-4.7	1	0
	1977	15,955	3.8	0.2	-3.6	1	0
	1978	16,910	3.5	-0.3	-3.8	1	0
Korea, Republic of	1989	10,570	8.8	6.7	-2.1	1	0
	1990	11,643	8.8	5.7	-3.1	1	0
	1991	12,714	9	2.8	-6.2	1	0
	1992	13,077	8.5	4	-4.5	1	0
Kuwait	1993	45,376	6.4	-2.8	-9.2	1	0
	1994	43,825	6.1	-2.5	-8.6	1	0
	1995	43,893	6.3	-2.8	-9.1	1	0
	1996	43,346	3.9	-0.3	-4.2	1	0
Mexico	1980	10,208	4.1	-2	-6.1	1	0
	1981	10,882	4.4	-2.9	-7.3	1	0
Portugal	1974	10,238	7.4	1.5	-5.9	1	0
	1977	10,086	3.8	0.9	-2.9	1	0
Spain	1975	15,123	4.7	0.4	-4.3	1	0
	1976	15,463	3.9	0.2	-3.7	1	0
	1977	15,549	3.5	0.3	-3.2	1	0
Taiwan	1992	15,609	7.5	4.8	-2.7	1	0
	1993	16,512	6.9	4.8	-2.1	1	0
	1994	17,581	6.4	3.4	-3	1	0
	1995	18,542	6.5	3.3	-3.2	1	0
	1996	19,361	5.9	3.1	-2.8	1	0
	1997	20,330	5.7	3.3	-2.4	1	0

Source: Authors' calculation based on Penn World Table 7.1 and Polity IV.

Note: Bahrain, Gabon, and Kuwait (shaded) are classified as oil exporting countries. The slowdown points identified by

Chow test points are denoted in bold. Positive regime change” takes a value of 1 if a regime change increases the polity score (meaning more democracy) during the past 5 year period when a slowdown occurs. “Negative regime change” is defined analogously for a decrease in the polity score during the same time period.

Table 6. The impact of political changes on growth slowdowns**Table 6.1. Probit regressions using consecutive points**

	Growth Slowdown			
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
per capita GDP	60.405**		59.503**	
	[13.946]		[13.512]	
per capita GDP ²	-3.023**		-2.976**	
	[0.724]		[0.702]	
Pre-slowdown growth	60.802**	44.898**	62.266**	45.903**
	[6.901]	[5.952]	[6.878]	[6.061]
Ratio		19.838**		19.989**
		[3.718]		[3.806]
Ratio ²		-12.629**		-12.719**
		[2.957]		[3.010]
political change	0.061	0.523		
	[0.263]	[0.280]		
Positive political change			0.196	0.698*
			[0.283]	[0.311]
Negative political change			-0.643	-0.368
			[0.492]	[0.376]
Observations	3677	3677	3677	3677

Source: Authors' calculations.

Note: The sample excludes oil exporting countries. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. **Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 6.2. Probit regressions using Chow test points

	Growth Slowdown			
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
per capita GDP	40.603**		39.390**	
	[13.282]		[12.573]	
per capita GDP ²	-2.005**		-1.942**	
	[0.693]		[0.658]	
Pre-slowdown growth	37.337**	33.033**	38.118**	33.977**
	[6.525]	[5.829]	[6.541]	[5.977]
Ratio		11.554**		11.719**
		[1.924]		[1.976]
Ratio ²		-6.089**		-6.184**
		[1.365]		[1.392]
political change	0.388	0.484		
	[0.281]	[0.272]		
Positive political change			0.580	0.704*
			[0.300]	[0.292]
Negative political change			-0.505	-0.503
			[0.455]	[0.402]
Observations	2848	2848	2848	2848

Source: Authors' calculations.

Note: The sample excludes oil exporting countries. If a string of consecutive years are identified as growth slowdowns, we employ a Chow test for structural breaks to select only one for which the Chow test is most significant. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *Statistically significant at the 5 percent level.

**Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 7. The Impact of external shocks on growth slowdowns
Table 7.1 Probit regressions using consecutive points

	Growth Slowdown			
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
per capita GDP	61.393**		60.946**	
	[16.799]		[17.620]	
per capita GDP ²	-3.076**		-3.045**	
	[0.874]		[0.915]	
Pre-slowdown growth	68.133**	58.029**	71.487**	61.564**
	[8.269]	[8.341]	[9.429]	[9.649]
Ratio		18.388**		20.283**
		[3.502]		[4.563]
Ratio ²		-11.366**		-13.011**
		[2.761]		[3.763]
Trade openness	-1.414*	-0.970*	-1.127	-0.653
	[0.581]	[0.493]	[0.653]	[0.570]
Trade openness ²	0.509**	0.363*	0.416*	0.254
	[0.188]	[0.157]	[0.204]	[0.177]
Lower 10% growth of terms of trade from t to t-1	0.006	-0.234	0.169	-0.156
	[0.429]	[0.363]	[0.446]	[0.363]
World GDP growth			-0.107	-0.159
			[0.146]	[0.121]
Observations	3083	3083	2726	2726

Source: Authors' calculations.

Note: The sample excludes oil exporting countries. "Terms of trade shock" is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the growth rate of terms of trade from t-1 to t is in the lower 10%. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. **Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 7.2 Probit regressions using Chow test points

	Growth Slowdown			
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
per capita GDP	31.081*		27.964*	
	[13.431]		[12.850]	
per capita GDP ²	-1.527*		-1.374*	
	[0.710]		[0.683]	
Pre-slowdown growth	36.121**	34.553**	38.622**	36.679**
	[7.785]	[7.467]	[8.291]	[7.884]
Ratio		9.061**		10.016**
		[1.546]		[2.127]
Ratio ²		-4.460**		-5.497**
		[1.124]		[1.937]
Trade openness	-1.338*	-1.132*	-1.326	-1.135
	[0.583]	[0.541]	[0.677]	[0.619]
Trade openness ²	0.469	0.405	0.452	0.386
	[0.245]	[0.229]	[0.268]	[0.245]
Lower 10% growth of terms of trade from t to t-1	0.446	0.26	0.418	0.216
	[0.390]	[0.308]	[0.389]	[0.313]
World GDP growth			-0.224	-0.24
			[0.129]	[0.128]
Observations	2458	2458	2102	2102

Source: Authors' calculations.

Note: The sample excludes oil exporting countries. If a string of consecutive years are identified as growth slowdowns, we employ a Chow test for structural breaks to select only one for which the Chow test is most significant. "Terms of trade shock" is a dummy variable that takes a value of 1 if the growth rate of terms of trade from t-1 to t is in the lower 10%. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. **Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 8. The Impact of the high-technology exports ratio on growth slowdowns

Table 8.1 Probit regressions using consecutive points

	Growth Slowdown							
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
per capita GDP	52.635*	50.624*	55.220*	52.809*				
	[25.025]	[24.253]	[26.674]	[25.603]				
per capita GDP ²	-2.563*	-2.474*	-2.692*	-2.583*				
	[1.275]	[1.243]	[1.356]	[1.309]				
Pre-slowdown growth	89.331**	89.517**	92.160**	92.304**	68.676**	70.432**	69.835**	71.232**
	[15.265]	[15.633]	[16.100]	[16.578]	[11.094]	[12.722]	[11.329]	[13.090]
Ratio					13.757**	14.392**	13.984**	14.572**
					[3.802]	[4.118]	[3.868]	[4.187]
Ratio ²					-8.112*	-8.673*	-8.266*	-8.788*
					[3.199]	[3.492]	[3.239]	[3.522]
High technology export ratio	-0.009	0.04	0.031	0.076	-0.008	0.045	0.011	0.058
	[0.019]	[0.048]	[0.025]	[0.053]	[0.017]	[0.035]	[0.019]	[0.031]
Trade openness		0.772		0.759		1.887		1.866
		[1.760]		[1.788]		[1.457]		[1.458]
Trade openness ²		-0.049		-0.045		-0.444		-0.439
		[0.470]		[0.473]		[0.404]		[0.404]
Trade openness*high technology export ratio		-0.075		-0.074		-0.1		-0.098
		[0.064]		[0.064]		[0.056]		[0.056]
Trade openness ² *high technology export ratio		0.017		0.017		0.029		0.028
		[0.016]		[0.016]		[0.018]		[0.018]
World GDP growth			0.053	0.033			-0.002	0.011

			[0.157]	[0.161]			[0.118]	[0.112]
World GDP growth*high technology export ratio			-0.014*	-0.013*			-0.007	-0.005
			[0.007]	[0.006]			[0.005]	[0.005]
Observations	1187	1187	1187	1187	1187	1187	1187	1187

Note: High technology exports ratio is the ratio of the high technology exports to the manufactured exports. The ratio was obtained from the World Development Indicators.

Table 8.2 Probit regressions using Chow test points

	Growth Slowdown							
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]
per capita GDP	10.468	12.416	10.306	12.26				
	[15.741]	[15.314]	[15.847]	[15.193]				
per capita GDP ²	-0.375	-0.476	-0.366	-0.469				
	[0.829]	[0.809]	[0.835]	[0.802]				
Pre-slowdown growth	98.818**	104.585**	98.375**	103.612**	93.260**	96.438**	92.930**	95.290**
	[16.528]	[23.665]	[17.501]	[24.929]	[18.727]	[25.929]	[19.566]	[27.030]
Ratio					12.889**	13.557**	12.877**	13.392**
					[3.623]	[4.802]	[3.641]	[4.903]
Ratio ²					-5.618*	-6.105*	-5.590*	-6.007*
					[2.359]	[2.890]	[2.332]	[2.907]
High technology export ratio	-0.055**	-0.005	-0.091**	-0.018	-0.054**	-0.006	-0.091**	-0.026
	[0.018]	[0.062]	[0.033]	[0.068]	[0.020]	[0.060]	[0.033]	[0.071]
Trade openness		0.037		0.028		0.563		0.514
		[2.927]		[2.916]		[2.744]		[2.758]
Trade openness ²		0.677		0.669		0.44		0.44
		[0.960]		[0.958]		[0.898]		[0.899]
Trade openness*high technology export ratio		-0.068		-0.066		-0.069		-0.066
		[0.095]		[0.095]		[0.096]		[0.097]
Trade openness ² *high technology export ratio		0.005		0.005		0.007		0.007
		[0.026]		[0.026]		[0.026]		[0.026]
World GDP growth			-0.976*	-0.716*			-0.878*	-0.664*
			[0.455]	[0.319]			[0.434]	[0.335]

World GDP growth*high technology export ratio			0.012	0.004			0.013	0.006
			[0.010]	[0.008]			[0.010]	[0.009]
Observations	800	800	800	800	800	800	800	800

Note: High technology exports ratio is the ratio of the high technology exports to the manufactured exports. The ratio was obtained from the World Development Indicators.

Table 9. Crises and slowdowns

	Consecutive Slowdown Points						Chow Test Slowdown Points					
	t-2	t-1	t	t+1	t+2	Not during t-2~t+2	t-2	t-1	t	t+1	t+2	Not during t-2~t+2
Currency Crisis	7	3	5	9	12	76	2	1	1	2	4	19
Banking Crisis	4	4	8	12	15	83	1	1	2	1	4	21
Stock Crisis	3	41	5	58	46	19	4	8	14	15	12	5
Inflation Crisis	3	3	7	7	5	93	0	1	3	1	2	23
Domestic debt Crisis	1	2	5	6	5	93	0	1	3	1	2	23
External debt Crisis	0	0	0	1	1	105	0	0	0	1	0	26
Any of the sixcrises	0	0	0	1	2	105	0	0	0	1	1	26
	4	47	6	67	59	15	6	1	15	16	16	3
	0	0	2	2	2		0	0	0	0	0	

Source: Authors' calculations.

Note: The six crises are those identified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010). "t" refers to the slowdown years. If we exclude oil exporting countries, total of 146 and 32 slowdown episodes are identified in consecutive and Chow-test points respectively. If we exclude the episodes with missing data for crises, total of 115 and 27 episodes remained for consecutive and Chow-test points respectively. The last column in each panel counts slowdown episodes that did not experience the crisis denoted in the first column.

Table 10. The impact of crises on growth slowdowns I
Table 10.1. Probit regressions using consecutive points

	Growth Slowdown									
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]
per capita GDP	65.374**		63.375**		61.242**		61.800**		59.391**	
	[14.265]		[14.020]		[14.228]		[17.462]		[14.584]	
per capita GDP ²	-3.279**		-3.134**		-3.066**		-3.095**		-2.892**	
	[0.740]		[0.722]		[0.740]		[0.908]		[0.751]	
Pre-slowdown growth	63.376**	47.694**	71.331**	52.495**	63.865**	46.388**	72.269**	61.807**	89.489**	76.742**
	[6.520]	[6.143]	[8.082]	[6.792]	[6.737]	[6.051]	[9.763]	[9.898]	[10.555]	[9.427]
Ratio		20.877**		20.725**		19.801**		20.096**		22.868**
		[3.982]		[3.497]		[3.690]		[4.570]		[3.851]
Ratio ²		-13.669**		-13.112**		-12.614**		-12.992**		-13.667**
		[3.160]		[2.641]		[2.930]		[3.790]		[2.998]
Dummy for crisis (t)	0.012	0.047	0.074	0.163	0.12	0.092	-0.013	0.062	-0.029	0.055
	[0.165]	[0.145]	[0.138]	[0.126]	[0.151]	[0.130]	[0.168]	[0.158]	[0.175]	[0.166]
Dummy for crisis (t-1)	0.300**	0.165	0.300**	0.2	0.333**	0.192	0.380**	0.350**	0.387**	0.380**
	[0.094]	[0.109]	[0.099]	[0.113]	[0.094]	[0.112]	[0.086]	[0.104]	[0.094]	[0.091]
Dummy for crisis (t-2)	-0.028	0.006	-0.022	0.038	-0.015	-0.009	-0.094	0.127	-0.119	0.123
	[0.127]	[0.125]	[0.135]	[0.144]	[0.128]	[0.123]	[0.112]	[0.142]	[0.144]	[0.196]
total years of schooling			0.178	0.310**					0.363*	0.492**
			[0.119]	[0.107]					[0.166]	[0.161]
years of schooling, secondary and higher			-0.587**	-0.547**					-1.095**	-1.113**
			[0.168]	[0.156]					[0.227]	[0.207]
Positive political change					0.158	0.665*			0.111	0.268
					[0.292]	[0.313]			[0.413]	[0.325]
Negative political change					-0.63	-0.342			0.405	-0.125
					[0.508]	[0.372]			[0.572]	[0.429]

Trade openness							-0.96	-0.101	-2.094	-1.646
							[1.286]	[1.075]	[1.626]	[1.544]
Trade openness ²							0.256	-0.1	0.552	0.469
							[0.726]	[0.632]	[0.889]	[0.919]
Lower 10% growth of terms of trade from t to t-1							0.048	-0.22	-0.026	-0.315
							[0.430]	[0.347]	[0.477]	[0.464]
World GDP growth							-0.011	-0.037	-0.081	-0.022
							[0.169]	[0.148]	[0.193]	[0.167]
Observations	3903	3903	3565	3565	3677	3677	2698	2698	2450	2450

Source: Authors' calculations.

Note: The sample excludes oil exporting countries. Dummy for crisis takes a value of 1 if any of six crises identified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) occurs. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. ** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 10.2. Probit regressions using Chow test points

	Growth Slowdown									
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]
per capita GDP	35.238**		35.359**		40.335**		28.230*		35.151**	
	[11.642]		[11.673]		[12.606]		[12.534]		[10.304]	
per capita GDP ²	-1.751**		-1.726**		-1.992**		-1.387*		-1.634**	
	[0.610]		[0.607]		[0.660]		[0.667]		[0.532]	
Pre-slowdown growth	31.535**	28.628**	37.718**	34.334**	38.472**	34.006**	40.254**	37.880**	68.074**	59.791**
	[5.714]	[5.226]	[6.441]	[5.895]	[6.525]	[6.017]	[8.728]	[8.237]	[12.327]	[10.915]
Ratio		10.086**		10.559**		11.806**		10.078**		15.008**
		[1.614]		[1.583]		[1.958]		[2.303]		[2.663]
Ratio ²		-5.518**		-5.255**		-6.257**		-5.495**		-7.025**
		[1.314]		[1.057]		[1.400]		[2.042]		[1.678]
Dummy for crisis (t)	0.291	0.251	0.385*	0.344*	0.31	0.246	0.188	0.167	0.201	0.12
	[0.165]	[0.162]	[0.167]	[0.165]	[0.161]	[0.157]	[0.209]	[0.196]	[0.231]	[0.232]
Dummy for crisis (t-1)	-0.003	0.011	0.01	0.022	-0.008	0.012	0.154	0.182	0.173	0.162
	[0.136]	[0.129]	[0.139]	[0.135]	[0.143]	[0.138]	[0.164]	[0.162]	[0.211]	[0.196]
Dummy for crisis (t-2)	-0.292	-0.276	-0.312	-0.303	-0.335	-0.312	-0.357	-0.278	-0.480*	-0.366
	[0.175]	[0.177]	[0.195]	[0.196]	[0.175]	[0.179]	[0.229]	[0.237]	[0.235]	[0.239]
total years of schooling			0.248**	0.274**					0.409**	0.466**
			[0.091]	[0.091]					[0.109]	[0.109]
years of schooling, secondary and higher			-0.561**	-0.563**					-1.233**	-1.233**
			[0.140]	[0.140]					[0.203]	[0.200]
Positive political change					0.554	0.689*			0.612	0.518
					[0.284]	[0.274]			[0.325]	[0.311]
Negative political change					-0.446	-0.482			0.633	0.088
					[0.475]	[0.422]			[0.585]	[0.467]

Trade openness							-1.108	-0.965	-0.491	-1.546
							[1.181]	[1.048]	[1.473]	[1.342]
Trade openness ²							0.248	0.226	-0.276	0.425
							[0.614]	[0.545]	[0.809]	[0.694]
Lower 10% growth of terms of trade from t to t-1							0.412	0.214	0.664	0.386
							[0.385]	[0.303]	[0.463]	[0.398]
World GDP growth							-0.458*	-0.452*	-0.892**	-0.807**
							[0.186]	[0.185]	[0.220]	[0.194]
Observations	3243	3243	2970	2970	2848	2848	1817	1817	1647	1647

Source: Authors' calculations.

Note: The sample excludes oil exporting countries. If a string of consecutive years are identified as growth slowdowns, we employ a Chowtest for structural breaks to select only one for which the Chow test is most significant. The dummy for crises takes a value of 1 if any of six crises identified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) occurs. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. ** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 11. The impact of crises on growth slowdowns II: Stock market crisis excluded

Table 11.1. Probit regressions using consecutive points

	Growth Slowdown									
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]
per capita GDP	65.500**		64.743**		61.443**		54.375**		54.771**	
	[14.303]		[14.294]		[14.335]		[16.056]		[14.898]	
per capita GDP ²	-3.282**		-3.196**		-3.073**		-2.716**		-2.647**	
	[0.742]		[0.734]		[0.745]		[0.836]		[0.763]	
Pre-slowdown growth	63.605**	47.353**	73.057**	52.111**	64.256**	46.000**	74.005**	67.000**	93.776**	81.139**
	[6.287]	[6.329]	[7.819]	[6.875]	[6.584]	[6.273]	[11.436]	[10.843]	[10.711]	[9.806]
Ratio		20.989**		21.138**		20.011**		20.034**		23.782**
		[4.128]		[3.718]		[3.879]		[4.694]		[4.060]
Ratio ²		-13.717**		-13.293**		-12.731**		-12.719**		-13.966**
		[3.238]		[2.761]		[3.044]		[3.775]		[3.078]
Dummy for crisis (t)	0.017	-0.057	0.097	0.03	0.091	-0.075	-0.104	-0.197	-0.067	-0.187
	[0.197]	[0.174]	[0.216]	[0.172]	[0.210]	[0.180]	[0.214]	[0.198]	[0.312]	[0.258]
Dummy for crisis (t-1)	0.294*	0.151	0.361*	0.192	0.308*	0.114	0.113	0.107	0.177	0.121
	[0.128]	[0.122]	[0.143]	[0.129]	[0.132]	[0.118]	[0.114]	[0.135]	[0.181]	[0.160]
Dummy for crisis (t-2)	0.016	-0.061	0.082	-0.004	0.046	-0.034	-0.302	-0.191	-0.396	-0.26
	[0.162]	[0.152]	[0.155]	[0.145]	[0.173]	[0.169]	[0.215]	[0.219]	[0.253]	[0.254]
total years of schooling			0.174	0.297**					0.356*	0.448**
			[0.118]	[0.103]					[0.170]	[0.156]
years of schooling, secondary and higher			-0.614**	-0.557**					-1.119**	-1.096**
			[0.174]	[0.159]					[0.243]	[0.221]
Positive political change					0.132	0.697*			0.343	0.675
					[0.291]	[0.315]			[0.462]	[0.413]
Negative political change					-0.647	-0.368			0.932*	0.008
					[0.498]	[0.380]			[0.460]	[0.470]

Trade openness							0.902	2.274	-0.824	0.913
							[3.120]	[2.585]	[3.502]	[3.341]
Trade openness ²							-1.919	-2.966	-0.598	-2.107
							[3.149]	[2.549]	[3.555]	[3.310]
Lower 10% growth of terms of trade from t to t-1							0.047	-0.156	0.003	-0.222
							[0.417]	[0.336]	[0.469]	[0.455]
World GDP growth							-0.1	-0.203	-0.136	-0.182
							[0.193]	[0.195]	[0.280]	[0.260]
Observations	3903	3903	3565	3565	3677	3677	2212	2212	2003	2003

Source: Authors' calculations.

Note: The sample excludes oil exporting countries. Dummy for crisis takes a value of 1 if any of five crises other than stock market crisis identified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) occurs. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. **Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 11.2. Probit regressions using Chow test points

	Growth Slowdown									
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]	[5]	[6]	[7]	[8]	[9]	[10]
per capita GDP	35.127**		35.458**		39.866**		26.740*		36.252**	
	[12.152]		[12.127]		[13.338]		[13.481]		[12.092]	
per capita GDP ²	-1.744**		-1.729**		-1.966**		-1.323		-1.702**	
	[0.635]		[0.628]		[0.695]		[0.720]		[0.616]	
Pre-slowdown growth	31.767**	28.775**	37.419**	33.968**	38.371**	34.001**	39.882**	38.416**	68.668**	61.568**
	[5.747]	[5.233]	[6.413]	[5.865]	[6.652]	[6.151]	[10.861]	[9.887]	[14.053]	[12.196]
Ratio		10.043**		10.517**		11.711**		9.462**		15.018**
		[1.731]		[1.724]		[2.131]		[2.232]		[3.273]
Ratio ²		-5.465**		-5.202**		-6.172**		-5.204**		-7.199**
		[1.350]		[1.098]		[1.452]		[1.947]		[2.046]
Dummy for crisis (t)	-0.036	-0.08	0.059	0.008	-0.05	-0.117	-0.366	-0.408	-0.491*	-0.570*
	[0.235]	[0.229]	[0.247]	[0.242]	[0.233]	[0.227]	[0.250]	[0.243]	[0.235]	[0.247]
Dummy for crisis (t-1)	0.148	0.123	0.134	0.114	0.138	0.117	0.094	0.097	0.052	0.032
	[0.163]	[0.163]	[0.171]	[0.173]	[0.180]	[0.170]	[0.143]	[0.149]	[0.250]	[0.209]
Dummy for crisis (t-2)	0.035	-0.004	0.089	0.025	0.048	0.018	0.021	0.04	0.05	0.112
	[0.261]	[0.259]	[0.264]	[0.266]	[0.266]	[0.265]	[0.336]	[0.315]	[0.321]	[0.305]
total years of schooling			0.237*	0.264**					0.399**	0.470**
			[0.093]	[0.092]					[0.109]	[0.108]
years of schooling, secondary and higher			-0.553**	-0.554**					-1.278**	-1.271**
			[0.145]	[0.144]					[0.233]	[0.211]
Positive political change					0.567	0.705*			0.609	0.602*
					[0.306]	[0.286]			[0.318]	[0.284]
Negative political change					-0.492	-0.5			0.384	-0.124
					[0.461]	[0.405]			[0.568]	[0.457]
Trade openness							0.602	0.71	-3.223	-2.588

Trade openness ²							[2.685]	[2.504]	[2.682]	[2.722]
							-1.53	-1.624	3.556	2.161
							[3.074]	[2.780]	[2.902]	[3.084]
Lower 10% growth of terms of trade from t to t-1							0.402	0.243	0.69	0.431
							[0.370]	[0.286]	[0.484]	[0.409]
World GDP growth							0.026	0.08	0.175	0.147
							[0.094]	[0.071]	[0.124]	[0.089]
Observations	3243	3243	2970	2970	2848	2848	1507	1507	1361	1361

Source: Authors' calculations.

Note: The sample excludes oil exporting countries. If a string of consecutive years are identified as growth slowdowns, we employ a Chow test for structural breaks to select only one for which the Chow test is most significant. Dummy for crisis takes a value of 1 if any of five crises other than stock market crisis identified by Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) occurs. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. **Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

<Appendix Tables>

Table 6 A. The impact of institutional changes on growth slowdowns (including oil-exporting countries)

Table 6.1A. Probit regressions using consecutive points

	Growth Slowdown			
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
per capita GDP	43.754** [8.813]		43.251** [8.568]	
per capita GDP ²	-2.173** [0.459]		-2.147** [0.446]	
Pre-slowdown growth	48.552** [5.073]	37.706** [4.793]	49.716** [5.072]	38.590** [4.904]
Ratio		14.399** [2.446]		14.440** [2.471]
Ratio ²		-8.421** [1.914]		-8.441** [1.899]
political change	0.255 [0.271]	0.580* [0.251]		
Positive political change			0.364 [0.292]	0.730** [0.278]
Negative political change			-0.375 [0.391]	-0.227 [0.285]
Observations	4013	4013	4013	4013

Source: Authors' calculations.

Note: The sample includes oil exporting countries. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. *Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. **Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.

Table 6.2A. Probit regressions using Chow test points

	Growth Slowdown			
	[1]	[2]	[3]	[4]
per capita GDP	26.445** [7.124]		25.768** [6.939]	
per capita GDP ²	-1.306** [0.372]		-1.271** [0.362]	
Pre-slowdown growth	23.564** [3.906]	22.449** [3.337]	24.124** [4.060]	23.113** [3.491]
Ratio		7.943** [1.194]		7.885** [1.204]
Ratio ²		-4.038** [0.871]		-3.976** [0.853]
political change	0.452* [0.214]	0.492* [0.198]		
Positive political change			0.572* [0.236]	0.653** [0.222]
Negative political change			-0.122 [0.319]	-0.279 [0.280]
Observations	3442	3442	3442	3442

Source: Authors' calculations.

Note: The sample includes oil exporting countries. If a string of consecutive years are identified as growth slowdowns, we employ a Chowtest for structural breaks to select only one for which the Chow test is most significant. Numbers in parentheses are standard errors. * Statistically significant at the 5 percent level. ** Statistically significant at the 1 percent level.