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Guidelines on PDA Forensics

**Recommendations of the National Institute
of Standards and Technology**

Wayne Jansen

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NIST Special Publication 800-72

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C O M P U T E R S E C U R I T Y

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Executive Summary

Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) are a relatively recent phenomenon, not usually covered in classical computer forensics. This guide attempts to bridge that gap by providing an in-depth look into PDAs and explaining the technologies involved and their relationship to forensic procedures. It covers three families of devices – *Pocket PC*, *Palm OS*, and *Linux-based PDAs* – and the characteristics of their associated operating system. This guide also discusses procedures for the preservation, acquisition, examination, analysis, and reporting of digital information present on PDAs, as well as available forensic software tools that support those activities.

The objective of the guide is twofold: to help organizations evolve appropriate policies and procedures for dealing with PDAs, and to prepare forensic specialists to deal with new situations involving PDAs, when they are encountered. The guide is not all-inclusive nor is it a mandate for the law enforcement and incident response communities. However, from the principles outlined and other information provided, organizations should nevertheless find the guide helpful in setting policies and procedures.

The information in this guide is best applied in the context of current technology and practices. Every situation is unique, as are the experiences of the forensic specialists and the tools and facilities at their disposal. The judgment of the forensic specialists should be given deference in the implementation of the procedures suggested in this guide. Circumstances of individual cases and International, Federal, State, local laws/rules and organization-specific policies may also require actions other than those described in this guide. As always, close and continuing consultation with legal council is advised.

1. Introduction

1.1 Authority

The National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) developed this guide in furtherance of its statutory responsibilities under the Federal Information Security Management Act (FISMA) of 2002, Public Law 107-347.

NIST is responsible for developing standards and guidelines, including minimum requirements, for providing adequate information security for all Federal agency operations and assets; but such standards and guidelines shall not apply to national security systems. This guideline is consistent with the requirements of the Office of Management and Budget (OMB) Circular A-130, Section 8b(3), "Securing Agency Information Systems," as analyzed in A-130, Appendix IV: Analysis of Key Sections. Supplemental information is provided in A-130, Appendix III.

This guide has been prepared for use by Federal agencies. It may be used by nongovernmental organizations on a voluntary basis and is not subject to copyright, though attribution is desired.

Nothing in this guide should be taken to contradict standards and guidelines made mandatory and binding on Federal agencies by the Secretary of Commerce under statutory authority, nor should these guidelines be interpreted as altering or superseding the existing authorities of the Secretary of Commerce, Director of the OMB, or any other Federal official.

1.2 Purpose and Scope

This guide provides basic information on the preservation, examination, and analysis of digital evidence on PDAs, relevant to law enforcement, incident response, and other types of investigations. The guide focuses mainly on the characteristics of the following families of PDAs: Pocket PC, Palm OS, and Linux-based PDAs. It also covers provisions to be taken into consideration during the course of an incident investigation, including evidence handling, device identification, content acquisition, documentation, and reporting.

The guide is intended to address common circumstances that may be encountered by organizational security staff and law enforcement investigators, involving digital electronic data residing on PDAs and associated electronic media. It is also intended to compliment existing guidelines and delve more deeply into issues related to PDAs and their examination and analysis.

Procedures and techniques presented in this document are a compilation of the authors' opinions and references taken from existing forensic guidelines. The publication is not to be used as a step-by-step guide for executing a proper forensic investigation when dealing with new technologies such as PDAs or construed as legal advice. Its purpose is to inform readers of various technologies and potential ways to approach them from a forensic point of view. Readers are advised to apply the recommended practices only after consultation with management and legal officials for compliance with laws and regulations (i.e., local, state, federal, and international) that pertain to their situation.

1.3 Audience and Assumptions

The intended audience is varied and ranges from response team members handling a computer security incident to organizational security officials investigating an employee-related situation to forensic examiners involved in criminal investigations. The practices recommended in this guide are designed to highlight key principles associated with the handling and examination of electronic evidence, in general, and PDAs in particular. Readers are assumed to have a basic grounding in classical computer forensics involving individual computer systems (e.g., personal computers) and network servers. Because of the constantly changing nature of handheld devices and related forensic procedures and tools, readers are expected to take advantage of other resources, including those listed in this guide, for more current and detailed information.

1.4 Document Structure

The guide is divided into the following nine sections:

- Section 1 (this section) explains the authority, purpose and scope, audience and assumptions of the document, and outlines its structure.
- Section 2 is an overview on PDAs, including an overview of common operating systems and generic operating states.
- Section 3 discusses present-day PDA forensic tools and with which types of devices they work.
- Section 4 provides general information on procedures and principles that apply to PDA forensics.
- Section 5 discusses considerations for preserving digital evidence associated with PDAs.
- Section 6 examines the process of acquisition of digital evidence from PDAs, as well as from common types of peripheral equipment.
- Section 7 outlines common sources of evidence on PDAs and the features and capabilities of tools for examination.
- Section 8 discusses the reporting of findings.
- Section 9 contains a list of references used in this guide.
- Appendix A contains a list of acronyms used in this guide.
- Appendix B contains a glossary defining terms used in this guide.

2. Background

The digital forensic community faces a constant challenge to stay on top of the latest technologies that may be used to reveal relevant clues in an investigation. Personal Digital Assistants (PDAs) are commonplace in today's society, used by many individuals for both personal and professional purposes. PDAs vary in design and are continually undergoing change as existing technologies improve and new technologies are introduced. When a PDA is encountered during an investigation, many questions arise: What should be done about maintaining power? How should the PDA be handled? How should valuable or potentially relevant data contained on the device be examined? The key to answering these questions is an understanding of the hardware and software characteristics of PDAs.

This section gives an overview of the hardware and software capabilities of Palm OS, Pocket PC, and Linux-based PDAs. The overview provides a summary of general characteristics and, where useful, focuses on a particular model or software version that best illustrates key features of such products. Developing an understanding of the components and inner workings of these devices (e.g., memory organization and use) is a prerequisite to understanding the criticalities involved when dealing with them forensically. For example, PDA memory used to store user data is usually volatile (i.e., RAM) and requires continuous power to maintain content, unlike data residing on a personal computer's hard disk. Handheld device technologies are changing rapidly, with new products and features being introduced regularly. Because of the fast pace with which handheld device technologies are evolving, this discussion represents a snapshot of the handheld area at the present time.

2.1 Device Characteristics

Most types of PDAs have comparable features and capabilities. They house a microprocessor, read only memory (ROM), random access memory (RAM), a variety of hardware keys and interfaces, and a touch sensitive, liquid crystal display. The operating system (OS) of the device is held in ROM. Several varieties of ROM are used, including Flash ROM, which can be erased and reprogrammed electronically with OS updates or an entirely different OS. RAM, which normally contains user data, is kept active by batteries whose failure or exhaustion causes all information to be lost.

The latest PDAs come equipped with system-level microprocessors that reduce the number of supporting chips required and include considerable memory capacity. Built-in Compact Flash (CF) and combination Secure Digital (SD)¹/MultiMedia Card (MMC)² slots support memory cards and peripherals, such as a digital camera or wireless communications card. Wireless communications such as infrared (i.e., IrDA), Bluetooth, and WiFi may also be built in. Figure 1 illustrates a system-level processor chip and the generic core components of most PDAs.

¹ The Secure Digital home page can be found at: <http://www.sdcard.org>

² The MultiMediaCard home page can be found at: <http://www.mmca.org>




Figure 1: Generic Hardware Diagram

Different devices have different technical and physical characteristics (e.g., size, weight, processor speed, memory capacity). Devices may also use different types of expansion capabilities (e.g., I/O and memory card slots, device expansion sleeves, and external hardware interfaces) to provide additional functionality. Furthermore, PDA capabilities are sometimes combined with those of other devices such as cell phones, global positioning systems, and cameras to form new types of hybrid devices. Table 1 highlights the general characteristics of selected Palm OS, Pocket PC (rebranded as Windows Mobile in 2003), and Linux PDA models, which highlight this diversity. Characteristics of a wider range of PDAs can be found on manufacturer and vendor Web sites, as well as product review sites.^{3,4}

Table 1: An Overview of Representative PDA Models

	Tungsten T2	iPAQ H5555	Zaurus SL-5600
OS	Palm OS 5.2.1	Windows Mobile 2003 Premium	Linux Embedix v2.4.18, Qtopia v1.5.0
Processor	144 MHz TI OMAP 1510 Dual core 192 Mhz DSP enhanced ARM-based	400 MHz Intel PXA-255 XScale	400 MHz Intel PXA-250 Xscale

³ For an online comparison of older PDA models see: <http://www.davespda.com/resources/compare/>

⁴ For PDA product reviews and prices of current models see <http://www.cnet.com>

	Tungsten T2	iPAQ H5555	Zaurus SL-5600
ROM	8 MB Flash ROM	48 MB Flash ROM (17 MB available for user storage)	64 MB Flash ROM (approx. 30-35 MB for user filesystem)
RAM	32 MB SDRAM	128 MB SDRAM	32 MB SDRAM
Size	4.0" x 3.0" x 0.6"	5.43" x 3.3" x .63"	5.4" x 2.9" x 0.9"
Display	320x320, transfective Thin Film Transistor (TFT) LCD, 65,536 colors	240x320, transfective TFT LCD, 65,536 colors	240x320, reflective TFT LCD, 65,536 colors
Text Input	Touch-screen, Handwriting recognition, Soft keyboard	Touch-screen, Handwriting recognition, Soft keyboard	Touch screen, Handwriting recognition, Built-in QWERTY-style keyboard
Wireless	IrDA, Bluetooth	IrDA, CIR, Bluetooth, Wi-Fi	IrDA
Card Slots	SD/MMC slot	SD/MMC slot Type II CF slot	SD/MMC slot Type II CF slot
Expansion	None	Optional expansion sleeves for PCMCIA cards, CF cards, and accessories	Expansion jacket with CF slot and battery USB 1.1 host connector (mini type A)
Battery	1 fixed, rechargeable Lithium Ion Polymer	1 removable, rechargeable Lithium Ion Polymer	1 removable, rechargeable Lithium Ion

Despite the PDA family, all devices support a set of basic Personal Information Management (PIM) applications, which provide Address Book, Appointment, Mailbox, and Memo Management capabilities. Most devices also provide the ability to communicate wirelessly, review electronic documents, and surf the Web. PIM data residing on a PDA can be synchronized with a desktop computer and automatically reconciled and replicated between the two devices, using synchronization protocols such as Microsoft's Pocket PC ActiveSync protocol and Palm's HotSync protocol. Synchronization protocols can also be used to exchange other kinds of data (e.g., individual text, images, and archive file formats). Information not obtainable directly from the PDA can often be retrieved from a personal computer to which the device has been synchronized [Cas04].

2.2 Palm OS

Palm established itself early in the PDA market with devices built around its operating system, Palm OS. Early Palm OS devices use 16- and 32-bit processors based on the Motorola DragonBall MC68328-family of microprocessors. More recent devices use StrongArm and XScale microprocessors.⁵ Older Palm OS devices tend to be driven by alkaline batteries instead of lithium-ion batteries, used in new models.

The Palm OS and built-in applications are stored in ROM, while application and user data are stored in RAM. Add-on utilities also exist to back up PIM data (e.g., Address Book, Date Book, To Do List, Memo Pad) onto available ROM [Bob04, Pie99]. Palm OS system

⁵ For Palm OS and device related material see <http://www.palmsource.com/palmos/>

software logically organizes ROM and RAM for a handheld device into one or more memory modules known as a card. Each memory card can contain ROM, RAM, or both. A handheld device can have one card, multiple cards, or no cards. The main suite of applications provided with each Palm OS powered handheld is built into ROM. This design permits the user to replace the operating system and the entire application suite by installing a single replacement module. Additional or replacement applications and system extensions can be loaded into RAM.

The Palm OS divides the total available RAM store into two logical areas: dynamic RAM and storage RAM. Dynamic RAM is used as working space for temporary allocations, and is analogous to the RAM installed in a typical desktop system. The remainder of the available RAM on the card is designated as storage RAM and is analogous to disk storage on a typical desktop system. Because power is always applied to the memory system, both areas of RAM preserve their contents when the device is turned "off" (i.e., is in low-power sleep mode). All of the storage memory is preserved even when the device is reset explicitly (i.e., manually pressing the reset button to perform a warm boot). As part of the warm boot sequence (i.e., a soft reset), the system software reinitializes the dynamic area, and leaves the storage area intact. The entire area of dynamic RAM is used to implement a single collection of free storage or heap that provides memory for dynamic allocations such as global variables, system buffers (e.g., TCP/IP, IrDA communications), and application stacks. Storage RAM is configured as one or more storage heaps used to hold non-volatile user data. Storage heaps may also be ROM-based. As part of the cold boot sequence (i.e., a hard reset), in addition to reinitializing the dynamic area of RAM, the storage area is erased [PPC04].

Palm OS storage memory is arranged in chunks called "records," which are grouped into "databases." The Palm OS "databases" can be thought of as files. The Palm file format (PFF) conforms to one of the three types defined below [Hil03]:

- **Palm Database** – A record database used to store application data, such as contact lists, or user specific data.
- **Palm Resource** – A database similar to the Palm Database that contains application code and user interface objects.
- **Palm Query Application** – A database that contains world-wide-web content for use with Palm OS wireless devices.⁶

With Palm OS, because all applications share the same dynamic RAM, they can interfere with each other's data. Buffer overflow attacks are also easily implemented [Ket00].

The latest Palm OS PDAs offer two expansion modes for providing an increase in functionality: the Palm Universal Connector System and Palm Expansion Card Slot. The Universal Connector System allows GPS receivers, wireless modems, keyboards, and other peripherals to interact with the device via a USB enabled connection. The Palm Expansion Card Slot accommodates MultiMediaCard (MMC) and Secure Digital (SD) cards. MMC card modules are removable solid-state memory of similar size and design to SD memory Cards.

⁶ Support for Palm Query Application has recently been discontinued; information about its status can be found at: [http://kb.palmone.com/SRVS/CGI-BIN/WEBCGI.EXE?New_Kb=PalmSupportKB.ts=Palm_External2001.case=obj\(10646\)#pqa](http://kb.palmone.com/SRVS/CGI-BIN/WEBCGI.EXE?New_Kb=PalmSupportKB.ts=Palm_External2001.case=obj(10646)#pqa)

Besides memory, SD cards may also incorporate other types of peripherals such as wireless communications or camera cards.

The architecture for Palm OS devices is organized into the following layers: Application, Operating System, Software API and Hardware Drivers, and Hardware. Figure 2 illustrates the relationship between layers. The software Application Programming Interface (API) gives software developers a degree of hardware independence, allowing applications to execute under different hardware environments by recompiling the application. Developers have the freedom to bypass the API and directly access the processor, providing more control of the processor and its functionality. However, this comes at the expense of increased security risks due to malicious applications. The Palm OS does not implement permissions on code and data. Therefore, any application can access and modify data [Kin01].




Figure 2: Palm OS Architecture

Other handheld device manufacturers have licensed the Palm OS for use in their own line of equipment. Versions of the Palm OS can be divided into three ranges: those before version 4.0, those from version 4.0 to 5.0, and those from 5.0 onward to version 6. Initially Palm OS supported simple multitasking whereby applications could run only one at a time, and were single-threaded. More recent versions support full multitasking and multi-threaded applications. A number of vulnerabilities were identified in versions before 4.0 and subsequently fixed. In particular, the user login password was shown to be vulnerable and easily reversed [Kin01]. Version 4.0 also introduced initial support for filesystems on removable memory cards. Versions before 5.0 execute only a single program at a time, while 5.0 and after support multiprocessing. Versions 5.0 and above switched emphasis away from the DragonBall family of microprocessors to the StrongArm family⁷, with emulation support of legacy applications previously developed for DragonBall.

Palm OS devices offer built-in security features to provide protection for individual entries/records and the ability to lock the device when the user turns the device off. Locking individual records allow users to mark records as private and not be displayed unless the proper password is provided. However, records marked private can be accessed, read, and copied through other means [Ket00]. The ability to lock a device requires users to enter the correct password before access is granted to the application screen. In early versions of Palm OS, weak password encoding is easily reversed and the encoded block of data that contains the

⁷ For Palm OS and device related material see <http://www.palmsource.com/palmos/>

password during a HotSync can be intercepted [Kin01]. Third party products exist that give users the ability to encrypt sensitive data and enhance overall security [Pmd02].

Palm OS devices include an RS232-based “Palm Debugger” providing source and assembly level debugging, entered by issuing a keystroke combination. Two interfaces exist that monitor the serial port for communication. “Console Mode” interacts with a high-level debugger and is used mostly for manipulation of databases. “Debug Mode” is typically used for assembly and register-level debugging [Kin01].

2.3 Pocket PC

Pocket PC grew out of the success of the Palm PDA and the growing demand for similar devices that had more processing power and networking capabilities. Microsoft entered the handheld device market with the Windows CE (WinCE) operating system, which was later augmented with additional functionality to produce Pocket PC (PPC).⁸ Windows CE supports a multitasking, multithreaded environment, which is inherited by Pocket PC. Applications running under Windows CE are protected from interfering with each other through memory management [Ket00]. Windows CE and PPC have evolved in tandem from versions WinCE 2.0/PPC 2000 to WinCE 3.0/PPC 2002 to WinCE 4.2/PPC 2003 (PPC 2003 was rebranded as Windows Mobile 2003), through a number of feature upgrades. For example, early versions of ActiveSync were susceptible to brute force password attacks and denial of service attacks when synchronizing over a network [Meu02] and subsequently corrected. Vulnerabilities present on earlier devices may provide a means of bypassing security mechanisms, allowing forensic investigators access to data.

Pocket PC runs on a number of processors, but primarily appears on devices having Xscale, ARM, or SHx processors. Various Pocket PC devices have ROM ranging from 32 to 64MB and RAM ranging from 32 to 128MB. PIM and other user data normally reside in RAM, while the operating system and support applications reside in ROM. An additional filestore can be allocated in unused ROM and made available for backing up files from RAM. One or more card slots, such as a Compact Flash (CF) or Secure Digital (SD) card slot, are typically supported. Additionally, some manufactures provide expansion capabilities, such as extension sleeves or modules that allow other technologies to be incorporated. Most Pocket PC devices use a lithium-ion battery. To prevent data loss when battery power is low, the lithium-ion battery must be recharged via the cradle, a power cable, or removed and replaced with a charged battery.

The architecture for Windows CE devices consists of four layers: Application, Operating System, Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM), and Hardware. A simplified diagram of the architecture of Windows CE is shown in Figure 3 below. Services are organized into modules, which can be included or excluded when building an image for a specific target system [Ges03]. Because most of the Windows CE operating system is written in the C language, the kernel and other modules can be ported to different processors by recompiling the code for a specific hardware architecture (e.g., StrongArm, XScale, etc.).

The Original Equipment Manufacturer (OEM) Layer is the layer between the Operating System Layer and the Hardware Layer. It contains the OEM Adaptation Layer (OAL), which

⁸ For Windows CE/PPC device related material see <http://www.microsoft.com/mobile/pocketpc/default.asp>

consists of a set of functions related to system startup, interrupt handling, power management, profiling, timer and clock. The OAL allows an OEM to adapt Windows CE to a specific platform. An OEM must write the OAL for any custom hardware present.




Figure 3: Windows CE Architecture

Within the Operating System Layer are the Windows CE kernel and device drivers, whose purpose is to manage and interface with hardware devices. Device drivers provide the linkage for the kernel to recognize the device and to allow communications to be established between hardware and applications. A device driver can be either monolithic or layered. Monolithic drivers implement their interface directly in terms of actions on the device they control. Layered drivers separate the implementation into two layers – an upper layer, which exposes the driver’s native or stream interface, and a lower layer that performs the hardware interactions.

The Graphics, Windowing, and Events Subsystem (GWES) is also part of the Operating System Layer and provides the interface between the user, the application, and the operating system. GWES is an integrated graphics device interface (GDI), window manager, and event manager. The GWES module has two subcomponents: User and GDI. User refers to the part of GWES that handles messages, events, and user input from keyboard and mouse or stylus. GDI refers to the part of GWES that controls how text and graphics are displayed. GDI is used to draw lines, curves, closed figures, text, and bitmap images.

The object store refers to three types of persistent storage supported by Windows CE within the Operating System Layer: file system, registry, and property databases. Standard Win32 functions provide access to files and the registry, while new Windows CE-specific API functions provide access to property databases and certain registry features. The subset of Win32 and other Microsoft APIs implemented in Pocket PC allows a system to fulfill the requirements of an embedded application, yet keep the programmability similar to that of Windows PCs. The maximum size of the object store is 256MB in Windows CE. The object store is built on an internal heap that resides in RAM, ROM, or both. The internal heap provides a transaction model that uses logging to ensure the integrity of the object store data.

The Windows CE file system allows a file to be stored both in RAM and ROM. When a file stored in RAM has the same name as a file stored in ROM, the actual RAM file shadows the ROM file. A user who tries to access a shadowed file gains access to only the RAM version. However, when the RAM version is deleted, the ROM version of the file is accessible. This feature is useful for upgrading files that come with a device as ROM files.

Property databases are repositories of information that can be stored, searched, and retrieved by associated applications. To reduce space, compression techniques are also applied automatically. These databases provide a common way to manage persistent information on the device.

The Windows CE registry is a database that stores information about applications, drivers, system configuration, user preferences, and other data. The purpose of the registry is to provide a single place for storing all the settings for the system, applications, and user. The registry is always stored in RAM and consequently is volatile. If no registry is available in RAM, Windows CE can regenerate a default one from a file stored in ROM.

The Windows CE operating system supports four types of memory:

- **RAM** – RAM is allocated into two separate areas: the object store where data is kept and program memory where programs execute. The partitioning of main memory can be controlled by the end-user via an application level control and can be adjusted without rebooting. A paged virtual-memory management system is used to allocate program memory.
- **Expansion RAM** – Expansion RAM is supported in addition to main system RAM to provide users with extra storage. The Expansion RAM is mapped into virtual memory after a cold boot and appears identical in the virtual memory map to the OS as system RAM.
- **ROM** – The ROM memory space contains miscellaneous data files like audio files, fonts and bitmaps. These are generally compressed and decompressed when brought into system RAM for usage. The ROM memory space also contains support for uncompressed executables, applications, and DLLs for XIP (eXecute In Place) operation. During the image build process, individual elements can be designated for either XIP or paged on demand operation.
- **Persistent Storage** – Much of the support for persistent storage is oriented around removable storage cards. For example, files (executables, data, users files) stored in persistent storage are memory mapped into system RAM for use.

Pocket PC devices offer users the ability to set a power-on password that can be made up of a 4-digit numeric or a stronger alphanumeric password up to 29 characters long. Additionally, users can set a timeout that locks the device when not in use for the predefined specified amount of time. If a password entry attempt is incorrect, the subsequent attempt is penalized and takes longer to process, to discourage brute force attacks. If a password is forgotten, the only way to unlock the device is by performing a hard-reset and resynching data. Some recent models of Pocket PC devices have integrated a fingerprint biometric for additional security that can be used in tandem with 4-digit or alphanumeric passwords.

Pocket PC permits the hardware developer, system integrator, or developer to decide which services are incorporated in their Pocket PC version. Pocket PC devices can incorporate trusted environments where the OS kernel verifies applications and libraries before loading them. Three possibilities exist: the software module may be trusted without restrictions, trusted with the restriction that no privileged function calls or registry access can be done, or not trusted at all [Aho01].

Pocket PC devices can have significantly different bootloader⁹ functionality. The device manufacturer determines the range of functionality with two exceptions – the bootloader must be able to load the OS and to upgrade it to a more recent version. Some early versions of Pocket PC devices provided documentation on specific key chord sequences (e.g., simultaneously pressing buttons 2 and 4, the power button, and the reset button on iPaq 38xx models) that would boot into a specific mode known as “Parrot mode.” The device must be connected via the serial connector and a terminal emulator is used to establish communications with the bootloader and issue commands. Parrot mode has a rich command set that includes the ability to set register values, display memory contents, set memory contents, display the virtual address mapping table, backup memory to storage cards (CF/SD), and restore memory from storage.

2.4 Linux

Linux, a popular open source operating system for servers and desktop computers, has also appeared on several PDA devices [Fae03]. Linux is a true multitasking, 32-bit operating system that supports multithreading. Besides commercial distributions that come preinstalled by PDA manufacturers, Linux distributions are also available for a range of Pocket PC and Palm OS devices. The success of Linux-based PDAs rests on the open source model and its ability to engage the software development community to produce useful applications.

The most common Linux PDA in the U.S. is the Sharp Zaurus. The first Zaurus model, the SL-5500, was introduced in 2002. It uses Embedix¹⁰, an embedded Linux kernel from Lineo, and Qtopia desktop environment from Trolltech for the windowing and presentation technology. Embedix is based on a networked kernel with built-in support for WiFi, Bluetooth, and wireless modem technologies, as well as associated security and encryption modules. The device has a StrongARM processor, 16 MB of ROM, 64MB of RAM, and a 3.5-inch 240x320-pixel color LCD. As with Palm OS and Pocket PC devices, the Zaurus’ power source is a lithium-ion battery. Both Compact Flash (CF) and SD slots are present (the SD slot also accepts MMC). A small QWERTY-style keyboard is integrated into the device and becomes visible by sliding down the thumb pad and application button panel.

Embedix Linux refers to a commercial distribution. While most Linux distributions include the same utilities, libraries, drivers, and windowing frameworks, differences occur in what patches, modules, and utilities are included, and how the installation, configuration, and upgrade are performed. A minimal embedded Linux system¹¹ requires three crucial elements: a boot utility, the Linux micro-kernel, and an initialization process. User applications based upon personal use can be added for self-customization of the device.

Linux distributions are also available for HP’s iPAQ, Dell’s Axim, and other PDAs but require the user to install over the existing OS. For example, iPAQ devices come preinstalled with Microsoft’s Windows for Pocket PC. Linux can replace the Microsoft OS in the unit’s flash ROM [Fae01, Hal01, Zwi02]. A popular Linux distribution for the iPAQ is the Familiar

⁹ The bootloader is responsible for loading the run-time image into memory and jumping to the OS startup routine.

¹⁰ For more information on Embedix see <http://www.lineo.com>

¹¹ For more information on Embedded Linux Systems see <http://www-106.ibm.com/developerworks/linux/library/l-embl.html>

Distribution [Hon04].¹² Familiar includes a packaging system called ipkg (Itsy package), which installs, updates, removes, and manages packages similarly to the Redhat or Debian package facility for desktop Linux.¹³ For current information about Linux-based handheld devices, related Web sites should be monitored regularly.¹⁴

Figure 4 gives a conceptual architecture for the Linux operating system. The Linux operating system is responsible for memory management, process and thread creation, interprocess communication mechanisms, interrupt handling, execute-in-place (XIP) ROM filesystems, RAM filesystems, flash management, and TCP/IP networking.




Figure 4: Linux Architecture

The Linux kernel is composed of modular components and subsystems that include device drivers, protocols, and other component types. The kernel also includes the scheduler, the memory manager, the virtual filesystem, and the resource allocator. Programming interfaces provide a standard method by which the Linux kernel can be expanded. Processing proceeds from the system call interface to request service, for example, from the file or process control subsystem, which in turn requests service(s) from the hardware. The hardware then provides the service to the kernel, returning results through the kernel to the system call interface.

Linux offers comprehensive support for security that has been part of the operating system from its onset. Features include user identification and authentication, access control on files and directories based on owner (user/group/all), logging of security-relevant activities, and various levels of network encryption (Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol (PPTP), Internet Protocol Security (IPsec), Secure Shell (SSH), etc.). Processes running under Linux on the same machine are also protected from interfering with one another [Ket00]. Linux operating systems tailored for PDAs have on occasion been found to contain security vulnerabilities in design and implementation that affect system security. For example, the screen-locking passcode on the Zaurus that provides user authentication, created the same random value (i.e., salt value¹⁵) every time the passcode was set. This oversight weakened security by allowing

¹² For more information on the Familiar OS see <http://familiar.handhelds.org>

¹³ A package is a file containing all the files needed to install an application.

¹⁴ For the latest on Linux devices see <http://www.linuxdevices.com>

¹⁵ Salt values are random numbers used to make password values unique.

an attacker to generate a passcode table and find consistent values to uncover the device password, and required correction [Cha02]. Besides its built-in security features, third-party security solutions also exist for Linux, to provide additional security measures for device and file access.

The bootloader is firmware that is responsible for initializing hardware and physical memory, and loading and transferring control to the kernel. Linux-based bootloaders on embedded devices usually can accept kernel images transferred over one or more different interfaces, including serial connections, Ethernet connections, and memory cards. They also may provide a rich command set. For instance, the flash bootloader for Linux on iPAQ devices is a full-featured program that includes commands to read and write arbitrary RAM locations and write arbitrary flash ROM locations.¹⁶

2.5 Generic States

The simplest view of a computing device, such as a desktop computer, is that it is in either an “on” or “off” state. However, further amplification is needed, particularly for PDAs, whose behavior is more complex. Figure 5 gives a high-level diagram that illustrates the various states in which a PDA can be at any time, along with the transitions that can occur to cause a change of state. While a more detailed state diagram is possible, the following four states provide a simple but comprehensive generic model that applies to most PDAs:

- **Nascent State** – Devices are in the nascent state when received from the manufacturer – the device contains no user data and observes factory configuration settings. The PDA must be charged to a minimum voltage level to be usable and to gain initial entry to the nascent state, which is attained when the device is first powered on by pressing the power button. Any user action transitions the device out of this state. This state can be attained again by performing a hard reset or letting the battery drain, which clears both the filesystem and dynamic working memory and restores factory settings.
- **Active State** – Devices that are in the active state are powered on, performing tasks, and able to be customized by the user and have their filesystems populated with data. If a soft reset is performed, the device returns back to the active state after clearing working memory. If user authentication mechanisms are enabled, they are asserted on a power on or soft reset transition to this state.
- **Quiescent State** – The quiescent state is a dormant mode that conserves battery life while maintaining user data and performing other background functions. Context information for the device is preserved in memory to allow a quick resumption of processing when returning to the active state. Pressing the power button when in the active or semi-active state (i.e., to power off the device), or having an inactivity timer expire when in the semi-active state, causes a transition to the quiescent state.
- **Semi-Active State** – The semi-active state is a state partway between active and quiescent. The state is reached by a timer, which is triggered after a period of inactivity allowing battery life to be preserved by dimming the display and taking other appropriate actions. The semi-active state returns to the active state when a

¹⁶ Code is available at <http://www.handhelds.org/sources.html>.

screen-tap, button press, or soft reset occurs. Devices that do not support a semi-active state need only a single inactivity timer to transition directly from the active to quiescent state.




Figure 5: Generic State Diagram

Simply stated – a PDA device with sufficient battery power is never really turned off, since processes are active even when no visible cues are present.

For simplicity, a device is said to be “off” or “powered off” if it is in the quiescent state, and “on” or “powered on” if it is in any of the remaining states. Similarly, a device is said to be “cleared” and devoid of data when in the nascent state. Note, however, deviations can occur should devices utilize flash memory for purposes other than exclusively housing the operating system. For example, applications exist for the Palm OS that allow data to be stored on flash memory in space unused by the operating system. Similarly, some recent Pocket PC PDAs are beginning to include a feature to backup important PIM data on flash memory, where it can be retained and restored if a hard reset is performed on the device. Finally, Linux handheld distributions, such as the Familiar Distribution from handhelds.org, often use flash memory in lieu of RAM for user data to avoid loss when a hard reset occurs. In these situations, the nascent state must be interpreted accordingly.

3. Forensic Tools

Unlike the situation with personal computers, the number and variety of toolkits for PDAs and other handheld devices are considerably limited. Not only are there fewer specialized tools and toolkits, but also the range of devices over which they operate is typically narrowed to only the most popular families of PDA devices – those based on the Pocket PC and Palm OS. Linux-based devices can be imaged with the `dd` utility, somewhat analogously to a Linux desktop, and analyzed with the use of a compatible tool (e.g., EnCase). Since Palm OS devices have been around the longest, more forensic tools are available for them than for other device families. Table 2 lists open-source and commercially available tools known to the authors and the facilities they provide: acquisition, examination, or reporting. The abbreviation NA means that the tool at the left of the row is not applicable to the device at top of the column. With one exception (i.e., versions of Palm OS prior to 4.0), these tools require that the examiner have unobstructed access to acquire contents (i.e., no authentication technique need be satisfied to gain access).

Table 2: PDA Forensic Tools

	Palm OS	Pocket PC	Linux PDA
pdd	Acquisition	NA	NA
Pilot-Link	Acquisition	NA	NA
POSE	Examination, Reporting	NA	NA
PDA Seizure	Acquisition, Examination, Reporting	Acquisition, Examination, Reporting	NA
EnCase	Acquisition, Examination, Reporting	NA	Examination, Reporting
dd	NA	NA	Acquisition

Forensic tools acquire data from a device in one of two ways: physical acquisition or logical acquisition. Physical acquisition implies a bit-by-bit copy of an entire physical store (e.g., a disk drive or RAM chip), while logical acquisition implies a bit-by-bit copy of logical storage objects (e.g., directories and files) that reside on a logical store (e.g., a filesystem partition). The difference lies in the distinction between memory as seen by a process through the operating system facilities (i.e., a logical view), versus memory as seen in raw form by the processor and other related hardware components (i.e., a physical view).

Physical acquisition has advantages over logical acquisition, since it allows deleted files and any data remnants present (e.g., unallocated RAM or unused filesystem space) to be examined, which otherwise would go unaccounted. Physical device images are generally more easily imported into another tool for examination and reporting. However, a logical structure has the advantage that it is a more natural organization to understand and use during examination. Thus, if possible, doing both types of acquisition on PDAs is preferable.

Tools not designed specifically for forensic purposes are questionable and should be thoroughly evaluated before use. In some situations, they might be the only means to retrieve information that could be relevant as evidence.

3.1 Palm dd (pdd)

Palm dd (pdd)¹⁷ is a Windows-based command line tool that performs a physical acquisition of information from Palm OS devices [Gra02]. pdd is designed to work with most PDAs running the Palm OS in console mode. During the acquisition stage, a bit-for-bit image of the device's memory can be obtained. The data retrieved by pdd includes all user applications and databases. pdd is strictly a command line driven application without features such as graphics libraries, report generation, search facilities, and bookmarking capabilities. Once the information has been acquired, two files are generated: one that contains device-specific information (e.g., OS version, processor type, sizes of RAM and ROM), and another that contains a bit-by-bit image of the device. Examiners face the challenge of carefully examining the output, which is in binary form, some of which happens to be ASCII characters. Files created from pdd can be imported into a forensic tool, such as EnCase, to aid analysis; otherwise, the default tool is a hex editor. pdd does not provide hash values for the information acquired. However, a separate procedure can be used to obtain needed hash values. As of January 2003, pdd is no longer supported, however, version 1.11 source code is available and should remain available for use, as defined in the included license. Paraben has integrated elements of the pdd engine into PDA Seizure [Cas04].

3.2 Pilot-Link

Pilot-link is an open source software suite originally developed for the Linux community to allow information to be transferred between Linux hosts and Palm OS devices.¹⁸ It runs on other desktop operating systems besides Linux, including Windows and Mac OS. About thirty command line programs comprise the software suite. Unlike pdd, which uses the Palm debugger protocol for acquisition, pilot-link uses the Hotsync protocol. The two programs of interest to forensic specialists are pi-getram and pi-getrom, which respectively retrieve the contents of RAM and ROM from a device, similar to the physical acquisition done by pdd. Another useful program is pilot-xfer, which allows the installation of programs and the backup and restoration of databases. pilot-xfer provides a means to acquire the contents of a device logically. The contents retrieved with these utilities can be manually examined with either POSE, a compatible forensic tool such as EnCase, or a hex editor. Pilot-link does not provide hash values of the information acquired. A separate step must be carried out to obtain needed hash values.

3.3 POSE

POSE (Palm OS Emulator)¹⁹ is a software program that runs on a desktop computer under a variety of operating systems, and behaves exactly as a Palm OS hardware device, once an appropriate ROM is loaded into it. The free emulator program imitates the hardware of a

¹⁷ Additional information on pdd can be found at: <http://www.atstake.com/research/tools/forensic/>

¹⁸ Additional information on pilot-link can be found at: <http://www.pilot-link.org>

¹⁹ Additional information on POSE can be found at: <http://www.palmos.com/dev/tools/emulator/>

DragonBall processor. Built-in PIM applications (e.g., Datebook, Address Book, To Do, etc.) run properly and the hardware buttons and display react accurately. ROM images can be obtained from the PalmSource Web site or by copying the contents of ROM from an actual device, using pdd, Pilot-Link, or a companion tool provided with the emulator. POSE is limited to Palm OS versions 4.x and below.

Loading actual RAM-based databases into the emulator, extracted using pilot-link or another tool, allows an examiner to view and operate the emulated device in a similar fashion as having the original. Though originally developed to run, test, and debug Palm OS applications without having to download them to an actual device, POSE also serves as a useful tool for doing presentations or capturing screen shots of evidence found on the emulated device from within the databases loaded from a seized device. POSE can be configured to map the Palm OS serial port to one of the available serial ports on the desktop computer or to redirect any TCP/IP calls to the TCP/IP stack on the desktop. With some experimentation, the HotSync protocol can even be run between the desktop computer and device it is emulating, over a looped back serial connection or a redirected TCP/IP connection.

3.4 PDA Seizure

Paraben's PDA Seizure is a commercially available forensic software toolkit that allows forensic examiners to acquire and examine information on PDAs for both the Pocket PC (PPC) and Palm OS platforms.²⁰ Paraben's product currently supports Palm OS up to version 5, Pocket PC 2000-2003 (up to Windows CE 4.2), ActiveSync 3.7, and HotSync. PDA Seizure's features include the ability to acquire a forensic image of Palm OS and Pocket PC devices, to perform examiner-defined searches on data contained within acquired files, generate hash values of individual files and to generate a report of the findings. PDA Seizure also provides book-marking capabilities to organize information, along with a graphics library that automatically assembles found images under a single facility, based on the graphics file extension of the acquired files.

During the acquisition stage of a PPC device, the connectivity of the device via ActiveSync is required. A guest account must be used to create a connection. Before acquisition begins, PDA Seizure places a small program on the device in the first available block of memory to access unallocated regions of memory. To access the remaining information, PDA Seizure utilizes the Remote API (RAPI) protocol, which provides a set of functions for desktop applications to communicate with a device and logically access information. For Palm OS devices, the PDA must first be put into a debug mode, commonly referred to as console mode, and all active HotSync applications must be closed. Once the memory image of a Palm OS device is acquired, the user is prompted to select the HotSync button on the device to acquire the logical data separately. The logical data is also represented in the RAM image file that was acquired through the physical acquisition.

3.5 EnCase

EnCase is a commercially available forensic software toolkit that provides acquisition of suspect media, search and analytical tools, hash generation of individual files, data capture and

²⁰ Additional information on PDA Seizure can be found at: <http://www.paraben-forensics.com/pda.html>

documentation features.²¹ Although more widely used for examining PCs, EnCase also supports Palm OS devices. Currently, support for Pocket PC is not available, but the ability to import a data dump of Linux-based PDAs exists. EnCase allows for the creation of a complete physical bit-stream image of a Palm OS device. Throughout the process, the integrity of the bit-stream image is continually verified by CRC (Cyclical Redundancy Check) values, which are calculated concurrent to acquisition. The resulting bit-stream image, called an EnCase evidence file, is mounted as a read-only file or “virtual drive” from which EnCase proceeds to reconstruct the file structure using the logical data in the bit-stream image. This allows the examiner to search and examine the contents of the device using either a logical or physical perspective.

EnCase allows for files, folders, or sections of a file to be highlighted and saved for later reference. These marks are called bookmarks. All bookmarks are saved in case files, with each case having its own bookmark file. Bookmarks can be viewed anytime and can be made from anywhere data or folders exist. Reporting features allows examiners to view information from a number of perspectives: all acquired files, single files, results of a string search, a report, or the entire case file created.

3.6 Duplicate Disk (dd)

The duplicate disk (dd) utility is similar to pdd insofar as it allows examiners to create a bit-by-bit image of the device. As one of the original Unix utilities, dd has been around in one form or another for decades. Unlike the other tools described above, dd executes directly on the PDA. An image of the device can be obtained by connecting to the PDA, issuing the dd command, and dumping the contents elsewhere, for example, to auxiliary media such as a memory card or across a network session to a forensic workstation. Caution should be exercised, since dd may destroy parts of the filesystem (e.g., overwriting data) if used incorrectly. As with pdd, dd produces binary data output, some of which contains ASCII character information. Images created from dd may be imported for examination into a forensic tool, such as EnCase, if the filesystem is supported. A dd created image may also be mounted in loopback mode on a filesystem-compatible Linux machine for analysis. The standard version of dd does not provide hash values for the information acquired. However, a separate procedure can be used to obtain needed hash values. Modified versions of dd exist that incorporate hash value computation, but would require cross compilation and installation to use.

3.7 Miscellaneous Tools

Other tools available from a hardware or software manufacturer to backup data or develop software for a device or device family may aid an investigation. For example, Microsoft has developed a tool called ActiveSync Remote Display (ASRDisp) that allows ActiveSync to connect to a Pocket PC device and display its full functionality in a virtual device window on the desktop, as if one were performing actions on the physical device itself. After data has been acquired from the target device, a full backup via ActiveSync could be done to restore the

²¹ Additional information on EnCase can be found at:
<http://www.guidancesoftware.com/products/EnCaseForensic/productinfo.shtml>

backed up data on an identical device, which is used with ASRDisp for presentation purposes. The ASRDisp utility is part of the Windows Mobile Developer Power Toys suite.²²

Another means of presenting data is to use a Pocket PC emulator and the shared folder functionality available. Again, after device acquisition has taken place, examiners can export out individual files gleaned from the device to a specific folder present on the forensic workstation. The shared folder allows information to be imported and displayed via the emulator, giving examiners the ability to present relevant information virtually. Emulators for all versions of the Pocket PC operating system are available for downloading at the Microsoft site.²³

3.8 Custom Tools

Where possible, established procedures should guide the technical process of acquisition, as well as the examination of evidence. However, some situations demand that specialized procedures and methods be applied. Procedures must be tested to ensure that the results obtained are valid and independently reproducible. The development and validation of the procedures should be documented and include the following steps [DOJ04]:

- Identifying the task or problem
- Proposing possible solutions
- Testing each solution on an identical test device and under known control conditions
- Evaluating the results of the test
- Finalizing the procedure

²² The Windows Mobile Developer Power Toys suite can be downloaded at:
<http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyId=74473FD6-1DCC-47AA-AB28-6A2B006EDFE9&displaylang=en>

²³ The Pocket PC 2003 Emulator can be downloaded at:
<http://www.microsoft.com/downloads/details.aspx?FamilyId=5c53e3b5-f2a2-47d7-a41d-825fd68ebb6c&displaylang=en>

4. Procedures and Principles

Investigations and incidents are handled in various ways depending upon the circumstances of the incident, the gravity of the incident, and the preparation and experience of the investigation team. Digital investigations are comparable to crime scenes where investigative techniques used by law enforcement have been applied as a foundation for the creation of procedures used when dealing with digital evidence. This section provides an overview of various procedural models and principles that have been proposed.

4.1 Roles and Responsibilities

Whatever the type of incident, the various types of roles involved are similar. Planning for incidents should address how existing personnel fulfill these roles when responding and conducting an investigation. A generic set of roles and associated responsibilities can be identified. They include First Responders, Investigators, Technicians, Forensic Examiners, and Forensic Analysts. In a given situation, a single individual may perform more than one role. Nevertheless, distinguishing distinct roles and their associated responsibilities is useful.

First Responders are trained personnel who arrive first on the scene of an incident, provide an initial assessment, and begin the appropriate level of response. The responsibilities of First Responders are to secure the incident scene, call for the appropriate support needed, and assist with evidence collection.

Investigators plan and manage preservation, acquisition, examination, analysis, and reporting of electronic evidence. The Lead Investigator is in charge of making sure that activities at the scene of an incident are executed in the right order and at the right time. The Lead Investigator may be responsible for developing the evidence, preparing a case report, and briefing any findings and determinations to senior officials.

Technicians carry out actions at the direction of the Lead Investigator. Technicians are responsible for identifying and collecting evidence and documenting the incident scene. They are specially trained personnel who seize electronic equipment and acquire digital images resident within memory. More than one technician is typically involved in an incident, because different skills and knowledge are needed. Sufficient expertise should be available at the scene to address all distinct digital apparatus involved in the incident.

Evidence Custodians protect all evidence gathered that is stored in a central location. They accept evidence collected by Technicians, ensure it is properly tagged, check it into and out of protective custody, and maintain a strict chain of custody.

Forensic Examiners are specially trained personnel who reproduce images acquired from seized equipment and recover digital data. Examiners make the information on the device visible. Examiners may also acquire more elusive data using highly specialized equipment, intensive reverse engineering, or other appropriate means unavailable to Forensic Technicians.

Forensic Analysts evaluate the product of the Forensic Examiner for its significance and probative value to the case.

4.2 Evidential Principles

As a backdrop to any investigation basic principals have been proposed for dealing with digital evidence. Digital evidence has both physical and logical aspects. The physical side of it involves hardware components, peripherals, and media, which may contain data or the means to access it, while the logical side deals with the raw data extracted from a relevant information source. The Good Practice Guide for Computer based Electronic Evidence [ACPO2] suggests four principles when dealing with digital evidence.

- No actions performed by investigators should change data contained on digital devices or storage media.
- Individuals accessing original data must be competent to do so and have the ability to explain their actions.
- An audit trail or other record of applied processes, suitable for independent third-party review, must be created and preserved, accurately documenting each investigative step.
- The person in charge of the investigation has overall responsibility for ensuring the above-mentioned procedures are followed and in compliance with governing laws.

The Proposed Standards for the Exchange of Digital Evidence [IOCE], suggest a similar set of principals for the standardized recovery of computer-based evidence:

- Upon seizing digital evidence, actions taken should not change that evidence.
- When it is necessary for a person to access original digital evidence, that person must be forensically competent.
- All activity relating to the seizure, access, storage, or transfer of digital evidence must be fully documented, preserved, and available for review.
- An individual is responsible for all actions taken with respect to digital evidence while the digital evidence is in their possession.
- Any agency that is responsible for seizing, accessing, storing, or transferring digital evidence is responsible for compliance with these principles.

The above sets of principles aim to ensure the integrity and accountability of digital evidence through its entire life cycle. Proper handling of evidence is always vital for it to be admissible in judicial proceedings. However, different standards may apply to different types of investigations. The degree of training and expertise required to execute a forensic task largely depends on the level of evidence required in the case [Pur].

The Daubert method, a set of standards that serve as a guide when dealing with evidence in a court of law, proposes several reliability factors, which should be kept in mind when applying and reporting on a scientific technique being used in a forensic examination [Oco04]:

- **Testability** – Has the scientific theory or technique been empirically tested? According to K. Popper (1989) in *The Growth of Scientific Knowledge*, "the criterion on the scientific status of a theory is its falsifiability, refutability, and testability."
- **Acceptance** – Has the scientific theory or technique been subjected to peer review and publication? This ensures that flaws in the methodology would have been detected and that the technique is finding its way into use via the literature.
- **Error Rate** – What is the known or potential error rate? Scientific measures generally have associated error rates, which can be estimated with a fair amount of precision. Known threats exist against the validity and reliability in any test (experimental and quasi-experimental) of a theory.
- **Credibility** – What is the expert's qualifications and stature in the scientific community? Does the technique rely upon the special skills and equipment of one expert, or can it be replicated by other experts elsewhere?
- **Clarity** – Can the technique and its results be explained with sufficient clarity and simplicity so that the court and the jury can understand its plain meaning? This criterion is assumed to be incorporated in Daubert implicitly.

In general, even outside of law enforcement investigations, evidence should be collected in a manner that makes it likely the evidence could be admissible in court. It may not be obvious when an investigation is initiated, for example, when a computer security incident is first detected, that a court action will ensue. Important evidence might be overlooked, improperly handled, or accidentally destroyed before the seriousness of the incident is realized.

4.3 Procedural Models

The Electronic Crime Scene Investigation – A Guide for First Responders, produced by the U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ01], offers the following suggestions when approaching a digital crime scene.

- **Securing and Evaluating the Scene** – Steps should be taken to ensure the safety of individuals and to identify and protect the integrity of potential evidence.
- **Documenting the Scene** – Create a permanent record of the scene, accurately recording both digital-related and conventional evidence.
- **Evidence Collection** – Collect traditional and digital evidence in a manner that preserves their evidentiary value.
- **Packaging, Transportation, and Storage** – Take adequate precautions when packaging, transporting, and storing evidence, maintaining chain of custody.

Incident Response [Man01], an "Incident Response Methodology" proposes the following phases when encountering an incident or performing a digital investigation.

- **Pre-incident preparation** – Through training and education, gain an understanding on how to respond to an incident.

- **Detection of incidents** – Develop techniques on how to detect suspect activities.
- **Initial Response** – Confirm that an incident has occurred and obtain volatile evidence.
- **Response strategy formulation** – Respond to incident based upon knowledge of all known facts collected from the Initial Response phase.
- **Duplication (forensic backups)** – Based upon the scenario, either create a physical forensic image or do a live retrieval of evidence.
- **Investigation** – Determine what happened, who did it and how the incident can be prevented in the future.
- **Security measure implementation** – Apply security measures to isolate and contain infected systems.
- **Network monitoring** – Monitor network traffic for ongoing or additional attacks.
- **Recovery** – Restore the affected system to a secure, operational state.
- **Reporting** – Document all of the details and investigative steps taken throughout the incident.
- **Follow-up** – Learn from the incident by reviewing how and why it happened and make necessary adjustments.

Research conducted at the U.S. Air Force proposes the following steps when dealing with a forensic investigation [Rei02].

- **Identification** – Recognize and determine the type of incident.
- **Preparation** – Prepare tools, techniques, search warrants, authorizations, and management approval.
- **Approach Strategy** – Maximize untainted evidence collection while minimizing the impact upon the victim.
- **Preservation** – Isolate, secure, and preserve the state of physical and digital evidence.
- **Collection** – Record the physical scene and duplicate digital evidence.
- **Examination** – Search for evidence relating to the suspected crime.
- **Analysis** – Determine significance, reconstruct fragments of data, and draw conclusions based on the evidence found. The Analysis phase may go through numerous iterations until a theory has been supported.
- **Presentation** – Summarize and provide an explanation of conclusions.

- **Return Evidence** – Ensure physical and digital property is returned to the proper owner.

Each of the above procedural models and evidential principals contains key points that should be considered when dealing with digital evidence. Because every incident investigation is distinct with its own unique set of circumstances, a single definitive procedural approach is difficult to prescribe. Nevertheless, most models touch on the same key areas, though stressing different aspects. The remaining sections follow a simple framework of four topical areas: obtaining an exhibit, making a forensic copy of its contents, obtaining evidence from the forensic copy, and reporting on the evidence obtained and process used. They are respectively referred to within this document as *preservation*, *acquisition*, *examination and analysis*, and *reporting*.

5. Preservation

Evidence preservation is the process of seizing suspect property without altering or changing the contents of data that reside on devices and removable media. It is the first step in digital evidence recovery. The section begins with a generic introduction to preservation then provides a more in-depth look at PDA-specific guidance.

Preservation involves the search, recognition, documentation, and collection of electronic-based evidence. In order to use evidence successfully, whether in a court of law or a less formal proceeding, it must be preserved. Failure to preserve evidence in its original state could jeopardize an entire investigation, potentially losing valuable information about an incident permanently.

The DOJ's Electronic Crime Scene Investigation report covers this subject in detail [DOJ01]. The guide offers principles, policies, and procedures to follow when encountering a digital evidence scene. The reader is directed to that report for additional information. The following is a summary of the key points to observe.

■ Securing and Evaluating the Scene

- Ensure the safety of all individuals at the scene.
- Protect the integrity of traditional and electronic evidence.
- Evaluate the scene and formulate a search plan.
- Identify potential evidence.
- All potential evidence should be secured, documented, and/or photographed.
- Conduct interviews.

■ Documenting the Scene

- Create a permanent historical record of the scene.
- Accurately record the location and condition of computers, storage media, other digital devices, and conventional evidence.
- Document the condition and location of the computer system, including power status of the computer (on, off, or in sleep mode).
- Identify and document related electronic components that will not be collected.
- Photograph the entire scene to create a visual record as noted by the first responder.

■ **Collecting Evidence**

- Handle computer evidence, whether physical or digital, in a manner that preserves its evidentiary value.
- Recover non-electronic evidence (e.g., written passwords, handwritten notes, blank pads of paper with indented writing, hardware and software manuals, calendars, literature, text or graphical computer printouts, and photographs).

■ **Packaging, Transporting, and Storing Evidence**

- Take no actions to add, modify, or destroy data stored on a computer or other media.
- Avoid high temperatures and humidity, physical shock, static electricity, and magnetic sources.
- Maintain chain of custody of electronic evidence, documenting its packaging, transportation and storage.
 - ***Packaging Procedure***
 - Properly document, label, and inventory evidence before packaging.
 - Pack magnetic media in antistatic packaging (paper or antistatic plastic bags).
 - Avoid folding, bending, or scratching computer media such as diskettes, CD-ROMs, removable media, etc.
 - Properly label evidence containers.
 - ***Transportation Procedure***
 - Avoid magnetic sources (e.g., radio transmitters, speaker magnets).
 - Avoid conditions of excessive heat, cold, or humidity while in transit.
 - Avoid shock and excessive vibrations.
 - ***Storage Procedures***
 - Ensure evidence is inventoried in accordance with authoritative policies.
 - Store evidence material in a secure area away from temperature and humidity extremes.
 - Protect evidence material from magnetic sources, moisture, dust, and other harmful particles or contaminants.

The remaining subsections provide supplemental information related to PDAs, following the paradigm of search, recognition, documentation, and collection.

5.1 Search

When an investigative team arrives at the scene with the appropriate authorization to examine a suspect's surroundings (e.g., a search warrant, consent from the owner), they should proceed cautiously and follow the necessary steps to ensure that the device arrives at the forensics laboratory without data depletion. Incorrect procedures during the seizure can cause critical information to be lost. Awareness of device specific issues and an understanding of various families of devices and their characteristics and accessories (e.g., power consumption, battery type, cradles, and power supplies) are essential.

For PDAs, evidence sources include the device, device cradle, power supply, and associated peripherals, media, and accessories. Removable media varies from the size of a stamp to a stick of gum, which can be hidden and extremely difficult to find. Most often removable media can be identified through the number and placement of pins or pin receptacles located on the media that establish an interface with the device. The surrounding area and rooms other than where the device was found should be searched to ensure related evidence is not overlooked. Equipment associated with the PDA, such as memory cards or personal computers synched with the PDA, may be more valuable than the PDA itself.

By accident or deliberate action, electronic equipment may be found in a damaged state. Devices or media with visible external damage do not necessarily prevent data from being extracted from them. Damaged equipment should be taken back to the lab for further investigation. Repairing damaged components on a device and restoring it to working order for examination and analysis may be possible. The memory components may also be repaired/examined locally, or removed and examined by a specially trained examiner.

Legal advisors should be contacted for assistance, if needed, with the following two critical legal considerations [DOJ04]:

- Determining the extent of the authority to search and what additional legal process may be necessary to continue the search (e.g., warrant, amended consent form), if evidence is located that was not authorized in the original search authority.
- Identifying possible concerns related to applicable local policies and laws, and International, Federal, or State statutes, such as the Electronic Communications Privacy Act of 1986 (ECPA) and the Cable Communications Policy Act (CCPA).

5.2 Recognition

To proceed effectively, the exact type of device must be identified. Individuals may attempt to thwart specialists by altering the device to conceal its true identity. Device alteration could range from removing manufacturer labels to filing off logos. In addition, the operating system may be modified or completely replaced and appear differently, as well as behave differently than before.

If digital devices such as PDAs are in the "on" state the type of device can be identified by the operating system, which is more consistent in device identity rather than a logo. Though the

two dominant operating systems are Pocket PC and Palm OS, PDAs manufactured to run one operating system can frequently run an alternative operating system. For example, distributions of Linux available from handhelds.org can be loaded and run on a variety of Pocket PC devices.²⁴ Similarly, versions of Linux, such as Linux DA, exist for Palm OS devices.²⁵

Each operating system has particular applications intertwined within the main graphical user interface (i.e., icons such as Word, Explorer, Memo Pad, Terminal, etc.). Other clues that allow identification of a device are the following: the cradle interface, manufacturer serial number, the cradle type, power supply, etc. Any synchronization software discovered on an associated PC also helps to differentiate among operating system families.

5.3 Documentation

Evidence must be accurately accounted for and identified. The labeling process should document the case number, a brief description, signature, and the date and time the evidence was collected. Additionally, the crime scene should be photographed alongside a report documenting the state of each digital device/personal computer (personal computers may contain useful data that has not been synchronized with the owner's PDA). This is helpful if questioned about the environment later [Kru01].

A record of all visible data should be created. All digital devices (PDAs) that may possibly store data should be photographed with all peripherals cables, cradles, power connectors, removable media, and connections. If the device is in an active or semi-active state, the screen's contents should be photographed and, if necessary, recorded manually. Other characteristics such as any LED activity (e.g., blinking) or physical connectivity should also be noted. Having an individual in charge to perform evidence custodian duties at the scene, alongside a partner responsible for documentation of evidence, is desirable during the collection phase [Kru01].

Actions taken on the system to view and record other volatile data not displayed at the time affect the remaining evidence. For example, running an application to view memory allocation or running processes will overwrite parts of memory. Moreover, it risks activating Trojan horse code hidden within the application.

The chain of custody procedure is a simple yet effective process of documenting the complete journey of evidence through the lifecycle of the case. Carefully maintaining the chain of custody not only protects the integrity of evidence, but also makes it difficult for someone to argue that the evidence was tampered with [Kru01]. The documentation should answer the following questions:

- Who collected it? (i.e., devices, media, associated peripherals, etc.)
- How and where? (i.e., how was the evidence collected and where it was located)

²⁴ Additional information on current projects can be found at: <http://www.handhelds.org/geeklog/links.php?category=Handheld+Porting+Projects>

²⁵ Additional information on Linux DA can be found at: <http://www.linuxda.com/>

- Who took possession of it? (i.e., individual in charge of seizing evidence)
- How was it stored and protected in storage? (i.e., evidence-custodian procedures)
- Who took it out of storage and why? (i.e., on-going documentation of individual's name and purpose for checking-out evidence)

Documentation to all of the above questions must be maintained and filed in a secure location for current and future reference.

5.4 Collection

Where PDAs are concerned, the collection process normally involves dynamic and volatile information that may be lost unless precautions are taken at the scene of the incident or crime. The "Good Practice Guide for Computer Based Electronic Evidence" [ACPO] suggests the following procedures when dealing with PDAs:

- On seizure, the PDA should not be switched on, if already off.
- The PDA should be placed in an envelope then sealed before being put into an evidence bag, to restrict physical access while it is still sealed in the evidence bag.
- Where the PDA is fitted with only a single rechargeable battery, the appropriate power adaptor should be connected to the device with the cable passing through the evidence bag so that it can be kept on charge.
- If the PDA is switched on when found, the device should be kept in an active running mode (e.g., by tapping on a blank section of the screen) and supplied with power until an expert can examine it, to avoid the consequences of activating security mechanisms such as user authentication and content encryption. If sufficient power cannot be supplied, consideration should be given to switching off the PDA to preserve battery life, documenting the current device state and noting the time and date of the shutdown.
- A search should be conducted for associated memory devices, such as SD, MMC, or CF semiconductor cards, microdrives, and USB tokens.
- Any power leads, cables, or cradles relating to the PDA should also be seized, as well as manuals.
- Anyone handling PDAs before their examination should treat them in such a manner that gives the best opportunity for any recovered data to be admissible as evidence in any later proceedings.

PDAs maintain user data in a volatile state powered by either an alkaline or lithium ion battery source. The device design determines the type of battery source provided; batteries may be rechargeable or replaceable. If devices lose power for too long a time, the chance of recovering all data from the seized device is unlikely. Before a technician can bag and tag a PDA, the present power state must be considered. For example, the device may be receiving power from a cradle plugged into an outlet and fully charged, the batteries may have recently

removed from the device to clear memory, or the device may be extremely low on battery power.

In cases where devices are powered by alkaline batteries, fresh batteries should be inserted as soon as possible to lessen the chance of data loss before evidence can be acquired. Installing fresh batteries is a normal activity for PDAs, especially those that run alkaline-based devices. However, pulling the batteries out and installing replacement batteries changes the state of the device; therefore, the technician should take note of the current state of the device beforehand, along with any needed photographs.

Devices powered by a lithium-ion battery source should either be plugged into a compatible cradle with a power source, or have a fully charged replacement battery inserted. If a cradle found at the scene is occupied with the device, the cradle should first be disconnected from any computer to which it is attached. During battery replacement, PDAs keep a small capacitance charge to the device to maintain volatile data for a short amount of time. Thus, batteries must be replaced quickly to prevent loss of data.

To conserve power, PDAs are normally configured to shut themselves off after a short period of inactivity. Therefore, they are mostly likely to be powered off when found. If a PDA is powered on when found, maintaining a device in an active running mode causes it to consume more power than if it were powered off and inactive, making battery replacement and charging considerations even more important. Anecdotal evidence suggests that built-in user authentication and content encryption capabilities are not employed for the vast majority of PDAs seized. Therefore, if additional power cannot be supplied to a device, and it is turned off to conserve power and preserve memory contents, the risk of activating such security mechanisms when the device is turned on again should be low. Keeping a device in the active state is also troublesome. Moreover, authentication mechanisms, such as passwords, typically cannot be turned off without first satisfying the mechanism (e.g., supplying the correct password). For these reasons, procedures for some organizations may recommend turning off certain classes of PDAs or letting them turn off automatically, if found powered on.

5.4.1 Exacerbating Conditions

Besides the battery level, other factors can influence the actions a technician takes in a given situation to preserve evidence when the device is found in the on state. For example, some devices can receive data through wireless networks that might provide new evidence, but might overwrite existing data. Therefore, a calculated decision must be made whether to prevent or allow further wireless communications [Cas04]. Other factors include whether the device is cradled, is synchronizing with or communicating through a host computer, or has a memory card inserted. Table 3 provides a list of common conditions and associated actions for the forensic technician to consider in meeting the identified goal.

Table 3: Action Matrix

Index	Condition/Goal	Actions
1	Device on	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Leave the device on and keep active ▪ If the power level is low, immediately replace batteries with fresh ones or charge with the proper device power adaptor, as appropriate²⁶ ▪ Maintain an adequate power level with the device power adaptor or periodic replacement of batteries ▪ Create an image of the device, when circumstances permit
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Maintain device in active state and with an adequate power level ▪ Acquire image at earliest opportunity 	
2	Device off	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Leave the device off ▪ Immediately replace batteries with fresh ones, periodically renewing them, or charge with the proper device power adaptor, as appropriate ▪ Create an image of the device, when circumstances permit
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Maintain an adequate power level for the device ▪ Acquire image at earliest opportunity 	
3	Device in cradle²⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Pull the USB/serial interface connection from the PC ▪ If the device is on, see condition 1 ▪ If the device is off, see condition 2 ▪ Seize the cradle and cords
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Eliminate the possibility of further communication activity 	
4	Device out of cradle²⁷	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ If the device is on, see condition 1 ▪ If the device is off, see condition 2 ▪ Seize the cradle and cords
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Collect related evidence material 	
5	Wireless (WiFi, Bluetooth, etc.) on	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ See condition 1 ▪ Properly package the device in an envelope, anti-static bag, and a radio frequency isolation container, eliminating the possibility of connectivity from another machine/device²⁸
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Eliminate the possibility of further communication activity 	
6	Wireless (WiFi, Bluetooth, etc.) off	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ See condition 1 ▪ Properly package the device to eliminate wireless activity from occurring
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Collect related evidence material 	
7	Card in expansion card slot(s)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Avoid removing any peripheral/media cards (e.g., CF, SD, MMC)
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Avoid triggering further activity within the device 	
8	Card not in expansion card slot(s)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Seize any associated peripheral/media cards (e.g., CF, SD, MMC)

²⁶ As mentioned in section 5.4, if additional power cannot be supplied, consideration should be given to switching off the device.

²⁷ Some devices connect to a PC through the cradle connector, but without a cradle per se, and also fall under this condition.

²⁸ This action normally causes the battery to deplete more quickly as the device continually tries to reestablish communications. Alternatively, consideration may be given to turning off communications through the device configuration settings, to preserve battery life.

Index	Condition/Goal	Actions
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Collect related evidence material 	
9	<p>Expansion sleeve attached</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Avoid triggering further activity within the device 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Avoid removing the expansion sleeve ▪ Avoid removing any peripheral/media cards (e.g., CF, SD, MMC) from the sleeve ▪ If wireless/networked connectivity is occurring see condition 5
10	<p>Expansion sleeve removed</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Collect related evidence material 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> ▪ Seize the expansion sleeve ▪ Seize any associated peripherals/media cards (e.g., CF, SD, MMC)

5.4.2 Modified Devices

A number of considerations need to be made when handling a device. For example, pressing the power button, synchronization button, or the PIM-related contacts, calendar, to-do list, and tasks buttons on the device could potentially trigger an alteration of state. More interesting, however, are modifications to the software applications and operating system that may have been made to the device, which could be triggered from these actions. The following is a list of common classes of modifications that can occur:

- **Key Remapping** – It is relatively straightforward to remap a hardware key to perform a different function than the default. Overall, a key press or combination of key presses can be made to launch an arbitrary program.
- **Malicious Programs** – Common utilities or functions can be replaced with versions that contain a Trojan horse designed to alter or damage data present on the device. For example, tools exist that allow users to capture, update, and replace ROM images with preferred applications, such as improved Web browsers. Trojan-bearing programs could conditionally be activated or suppressed based on conditions such as input parameters or hardware key interrupts. Watchdog applications could also be written to listen for specific key chord events and carry out actions such as wiping the device clean.
- **Security Enhancements** – Many organizations and individuals enhance their handheld devices with add-on security mechanisms. A variety of visual login, biometric, and token-based authentication mechanisms are available for use as replacements or supplements to password mechanisms. Improper interaction with a mechanism could cause the device to lock down and even destroy its contents. This is particularly a concern with security tokens whose presence is constantly monitored and whose removal from a card slot or other device interface is immediately acted upon.

5.4.3 Transport and Storage

Once the device is ready to be seized, the forensic specialists should seal the device in a static proof bag and tag it. The individual who seizes the device must sign and date the tag to initiate a chain of custody. A hard case, in which the internal padding can conform to various device shapes, would be preferable to using an envelop within the evidence bag to prevent keys from being pressed accidentally. Radio frequency isolation bags exist for cutting off a device's

radio transmission and reception and should be used where appropriate with PDAs having wireless capabilities. An independent external power charger may be connected and placed in the bag with the device to keep the power level full during transit. The device may also be packaged to allow a power adaptor to be connected to the device through a hole in the bag, as a means for keeping the power level high. Lithium-ion devices can usually be powered through a compatible cigarette-lighter cable to keep charge to the device while in transit. If a cable is used with a radio frequency isolation bag, the cable must be properly shielded to prevent it from serving as an antenna and nullifying the effect of the isolation bag.

Digital devices are fragile and easily damaged. When a device is transported, it should be handled carefully and adequately protected from shock, breakage, and extreme temperature. Due to the volatile state of PDAs, they should immediately be checked into a forensic laboratory to be processed and the evidence custodian be made aware of the situation regarding power requirements. Battery powered devices held in storage for more than a few days risk power depletion and data loss, unless a process is in place to avoid this outcome.

Storage facilities that hold evidence should provide a cool, dry environment appropriate for valuable electronic equipment. All evidence should be in sealed containers, in a secure area with controlled access.

6. Acquisition

Acquisition is the process of imaging or otherwise obtaining information from a digital device and its peripheral equipment and media. Acquisition should occur at a forensics laboratory once the seized information has been safely checked in. The advantage of performing acquisition at the scene is that loss of information due to battery depletion, damage, etc. is avoided. However, finding a controlled setting in which to work, having the appropriate equipment, and satisfying other prerequisites may not occur at the scene, but instead be available within a laboratory setting. For the purpose of discussion, in this section a laboratory environment is assumed.

Once the device has arrived at the forensic laboratory, the forensic examiner begins the acquisition with identification of the device. The type of device and operating system present on the device determines the route to take for the creation of a sound bit-for-bit image or otherwise acquiring the contents of the device. Only a few different forensic software tools that image PDAs currently exist and no one application presently handles the full range of devices on the market [Aye04]. The type of PDA and operating system, therefore, generally dictates which application to use in an investigation.

Normally, the forensic toolkit used for acquisition is also the one used for examination and analysis. Where there is a choice among several tools, such as with Palm OS devices, interoperability among acquisition and examination facilities may exist, as shown in Table 4. The entries therein show the results of data acquired with one tool, indicated by the row header, analyzed by another, indicated by the column header. Interoperability is an important aspect for consideration, since some tools may be limited to specific operating system versions or may not support certain device models. Moreover, occasionally one forensic tool may fail to acquire information from a specific device, while another tool works without problems.

Table 4: Interoperability Among Palm OS Tools

	POSE	PDA Seizure	EnCase
pdd	Accepts ROM image, but pdd does not output individual databases	Accepts ROM and RAM images produced, with only partial functionality	Accepts ROM and RAM images produced
Pilot-Link	Accepts ROM image and individual databases created respectively with pi-getrom and pilot-xfer	Accepts ROM, RAM and individual databases created respectively with pi-getrom, pi-getram and pilot-xfer	Accepts ROM, RAM and individual databases created respectively with pi-getrom, pi-getram and pilot-xfer
PDA Seizure	Built-in version of POSE accepts acquisition output implicitly	Works implicitly	Accepts ROM and RAM images produced
EnCase	Accepts individual databases produced	Accepts ROM and RAM images produced, with only partial functionality	Works implicitly

Forensic examiners are advised to experiment with various toolkits on test devices to find out which acquisition tools work efficiently with particular device types, and to determine the degree of interoperability among different acquisition and examination tools for a device family. Besides gaining familiarity with the capabilities of the tool, experimentation allows special purpose search filters and custom configurations to be set up before use in an actual case. In addition, software updates from the manufacturer can be installed.

No matter whether the device is Pocket PC, Palm OS, or Linux-based, to acquire data from it, a connection must be established from the specialist's forensic workstation to the device. Before performing an acquisition, the version of the tool being used should be documented, along with any applicable patches or errata from the manufacturer applied to the tool. Once the connection has been established, the forensic software suite can proceed to acquire data from the device properly.

Unlike desktop machines or network servers, present day PDAs have no hard disk and rely instead completely on semiconductor memory. Specialized software exists for producing an image of the device, as well as performing a logical acquisition of PIM data. However, the contents of a PDA are dynamic and continually changing, even when switched off (i.e., in the quiescent state). Two back-to-back acquisitions of a device using the same tool produce different results overall, though the majority of information, such as PIM data, remains unchanged. To image a PDA device's memory, the device has to be switched on, which is a major difference from personal computers. This effectively means that the first evidentiary principle mentioned in section 4 – *actions taken should not modify data contained on the device* – cannot be complied with, strictly speaking. Therefore, the goal with PDA acquisition is to affect memory contents as little as possible and then only in the knowledge of what is happening internally, placing more importance on ensuring adherence to the second and third evidentiary principles, which stress the competence of the specialist and the generation of a detailed audit trail [ACPO].

After an acquisition is finished, the forensic specialist should always confirm that the entire contents of a device were captured correctly (i.e., verify RAM/ROM size ensuring consistency with the device). On occasion, a tool may fail its task without any error notification and require the specialist to reattempt it with either the same tool or another tool. Similarly, some tools do not work well with certain devices as others do, and may fail with an error notification. Thus, when possible, it is advisable to have multiple tools available.

6.1 Unobstructed Devices

An unobstructed device is a device that does not require a password or other authentication technique to be satisfied to be granted access to the device. From anecdotal information, most devices seized in investigations appear to fall into this category. As mentioned earlier, when seizing an "Unobstructed Device" caution should be utilized to avoid, for example, altering the state of the device by pressing key chord sequences that have the potential to corrupt or erase valuable evidence.

In general, a PDA has four main categories of storage to consider: the operating system code, including the kernel, device drivers, and system libraries; dynamically allocated memory for executing operating system applications and storing and executing additional user applications loaded onto the device, user storage for various types of data files, including text, images, and

sounds; and critical data backup of important PIM application information and data files. The characteristics of these four categories range from highly stable to extremely volatile. These differences combined with the characteristics of a specific operating system, determine how ROM and RAM are used to support each storage category.

Figure 6 illustrates the most typical arrangement. Flash ROM is used mainly to hold the operating system code and optionally, any PIM data or files backed up by the user into the remaining space. Flash memory has a limited life of approximately 100,000 erase cycles. RAM is used for dynamic storage and user file storage. A soft reset (i.e., warm boot) typically reinitializes the dynamic storage in RAM, but leaves user file storage untouched, while a hard reset (i.e., cold boot) reinitializes both. Completely draining power from the PDA has the same effect as a hard reset. ROM is unaffected by either a soft or hard reset.




Figure 6: ROM/RAM Storage Assignments

A common alternative memory arrangement is shown in Figure 7. Here user file storage resides in Flash ROM with the operating system code, which avoids the need for backup utilities, since the storage is persistent and unaffected by resets and power drainage. The relative sizes of ROM and RAM are normally sized differently (i.e., more ROM and less RAM) when compared with the earlier arrangement to provide commensurate capacity. To keep user file storage in ROM versus RAM, a specialized filesystem is required to avoid quickly reaching the lifetime of that media. File systems such as JFFS2 (The Journaling Flash File System, version 2) are designed specifically to manage flash memory usage carefully [Woo01]. For example, JFFS2 prevents the rewrite of an entire sector to erase a single byte and ensures that different areas of memory are used in rotation to manage wear.

Because a limited number of forensic tools exist for acquisition of ROM and RAM contents from a PDA, the choice is often simple. One main consideration is to maintain compatibility with the toolkit eventually used in examination and analysis, since interoperability among different PDA tools, especially commercial case file formats, is not guaranteed.




Figure 7: Alternative ROM/RAM Assignments

In order to preserve the integrity of the data, examiners should handle the original evidence as little as possible. Generally, it is recommended to create a “master” forensic copy of the device first, which is kept completely pristine. The master copy is then used to create additional mirror images needed for analysis and examination of evidence [Gas03]. A strong one-way cryptographic hash (e.g., SHA1) should be performed to ensure that the additional images created from the master copy are identical.

6.2 Obstructed Devices

Obstructed devices typically refer to devices that are shut off (i.e., in the quiescent state) and require successful authentication using a password or some other means to gain access. Password protected devices normally require the expertise of a specially trained forensic specialist to gain access to the device contents, while maintaining integrity of the information and avoiding damage to the device. A number of ways exist to extract data from obstructed devices. They fall into three classes: investigative, software-based and hardware-based methods.

Software and hardware-based methods are often developed specifically for a particular device or narrow class of device. In developing a method, the following actions should be considered for determining possible approaches:

- Contacting the device manufacturer for information on known backdoors and vulnerabilities that might be exploited.
- Reviewing manufacturer specifications and other documentation when formulating plausible exploits.
- Contacting commercial evidence recovery professionals that specialize in handheld devices.
- Searching Internet sites for developer, hacker, and security information.

- Contacting device maintenance and repair companies, as well as commercial organizations that provide architecture information on handheld device products.²⁹

6.2.1 Investigative Methods

Investigative methods are procedures the investigative team can apply, which require no forensic software or hardware tools. The most obvious methods are the following:

- **Ask the suspect** – If a device is protected with password, PIN, token, or other authentication mechanism involving knowledge-based authentication, the suspect can be queried for this information during the initial interview.
- **Review seized material** – Passwords are frequently written down on a slip of paper and kept with or near the device, at a desktop computer used to synchronize with the device, or on the suspect's person, such as within a wallet, and may be recovered through visual inspection.
- **Manually supply commonly used input** – Users may weaken a mechanism by the way in which it is used. For example, if a device requires a 4-digit PIN, an examiner may wish to try the combination 1-2-3-4, as one of the three guesses allowed before the device is completely locked down [Kni02].

6.2.2 Software-based Methods

Software-based methods involve software techniques used to break or bypass authentication mechanisms. While some general-purpose software techniques and tools may apply to a class of PDA devices, most of the techniques are specialized for a specific model within a class. When a specialized technique is developed, it is normally programmed and tested on an identical test device. Software-based methods include the following:

- **Exploit known weaknesses in authentication** – If an authentication mechanism is weak, exploiting the weaknesses to defeat it may be possible. For example, early password protection schemes on Palm OS PDAs obfuscated the password using a reversible algorithm [Kin01], allowing it to be recovered easily from devices running version 4.0 or earlier, using a utility. Similarly, early versions of the Pocket PC Active Sync protocol allow unlimited authentication attempts to be made without penalty, allowing a dictionary attack of commonly used passwords to be attempted. In addition, some systems may have a reserve password or master password built into the authentication mechanism, which allows unfettered access when entered [Kni02].
- **Gain access through a backdoor** – Manufacturers often build in test facilities or other backdoors that an examiner can exploit to obtain information. For example, the bootloaders on some PDA devices support functions that among other things allow device memory to be read and copied or transmitted. For instance, the iPAQ 3900 and other models in that product series support the parrot bootloader, an unadvertised utility so named because of the bird that appears on the display [Log01]. When triggered by a specific combination key chord and provided appropriate commands

²⁹ For handheld device architecture information see <http://www.portelligent.com/prodserv.asp>

via the serial port, the bootloader returns the contents of memory or copies it to a memory card. Similarly, the penguin bootloader for Linux handheld devices allows memory to be copied to a memory card.

- **Exploit known system vulnerabilities** – Mobile systems may possess system vulnerabilities within a standard interface protocol that an examiner can exploit to bypass authentication and gain access to information. For example, access to the device may be possible via a misconfigured network service [Cha02], a flaw in a standard networking protocol supported by the device, or an error in the protocol's implementation making it susceptible to an attack method such as buffer overflow. Possible communications interfaces for exploitation include the serial, USB, IrDA, Bluetooth, WiFi, and GSM/GPRS facilities.

6.2.3 Hardware-based Methods

Hardware-based methods involve a combination of software and hardware to break or bypass authentication mechanisms. Few general-purpose hardware-based methods apply to a general class of PDA devices. Most of the techniques are specialized for a specific model within a class. As with software-based methods, when a specialized technique is developed, it is normally developed using a test device identical to the one under examination. The device manufacturer may also provide useful information and tools for extracting data. Hardware-based methods include the following:

- **Gain access through a hardware backdoor** – Hardware backdoors, such as interfaces for debugging, production testing, or maintenance, may be used to gain access to memory. For example, some devices have active hardware test points on the circuit board that can be used to probe the device. Many manufacturers now support the JTAG (Joint Test Action Group) standard, which defines a common test interface for processor, memory, and other semiconductor chips, on their devices [Int96]. Forensic examiners can communicate with a JTAG-compliant component by utilizing software and an add-in hardware controller in a personal computer card slot or a special purpose stand-alone programmer device to probe defined test points. The JTAG testing unit can send commands and data to the JTAG-compliant component and return the results to the unit for storage and rendition [Xjt03]. JTAG gives specialists another avenue for imaging devices that are locked or devices that may have minor damage and cannot be properly interfaced otherwise.
- **Examine memory independently of the device** – An experienced examiner may be able to examine memory chips directly on the device and extract information from them. For example, the Netherlands Forensic Institute has developed a general-purpose tool for examining a wide range of memory chips. Once physically connected via a memory clip, the tool is able not only to read and store memory contents, but also to overwrite them [Kni02].
- **Reverse engineer the device to find and exploit a vulnerability** – Reverse engineering involves retrieving the operating system code from the ROM of a PDA identical to the one under examination and analyzing the code to understand its use of the device hardware. With the understanding gained, any plausible vulnerabilities noted can be systematically tested to determine a useful exploit technique. For example, for a password authentication mechanism, it may be possible using memory

injection to overwrite the password with a known value or replace the authentication program with a version that always authenticates successfully [Kni02]. Similarly, flipping two bits in a data structure, which determine whether the start-up password is active and configured, may turn off the mechanism completely, as reported for the XDA PDA/phone hybrid device [Its].

- **Infer information by monitoring physical device characteristics** – Techniques that monitor power consumption or other device characteristics have been effective in systematically determining the password or PIN. For example, forensic specialists report that the passwords of some electronic organizers have been uncovered by determining the address area of the password and, as characters are entered, systematically monitoring the data and address bus of those memory locations to reveal the value one character at a time [Kni02]. Differential power analysis, which has been shown to be effective in gaining information from smart cards, is another technique that could be applied [Aig].
- **Use automated brute force** – If a password mechanism has no restrictions on the number of manual attempts made and the examiner had time to spare, a brute force dictionary attack could be attempted. Normally, this approach would be out of the question. However, with automated keystroke entry, it is plausible. For example, the Netherlands Forensic Institute developed, an automated password entry system for devices with a keyboard and screen. Equipped with a robot arm and video camera the unit can systematically enter passwords until the correct entry is detected or, in the worst case, the keys become damaged [Kni02].

6.3 Tangential Equipment

Tangential equipment includes devices that contain memory and are associated with a PDA. The two main categories are memory cards and host computers to which a PDA has synchronized its contents. Surprisingly, USB memory drives, which are a common peripheral for host computers, are generally not a factor for PDAs because of interface issues.

PDAs, especially higher end models, typically support Compact Flash (CF), Secure Digital (SD), Multi-Media Cards (MMC), and other types of removable media designed specifically for handheld devices, which can contain a significant amount of data. Like RAM and ROM, memory cards are typically semiconductor memory. They are normally used as auxiliary user file storage, backup of important PDA content, or a means to convey files to and from the device. The physical sizes of memory cards supported by handheld devices are noteworthy insofar as they are quite small, about the size of a coin, and easy to overlook. Therefore, investigators should take their time and thoroughly search the premises, when seizing material. Data can be acquired from removable media with the use of a media reader and a forensic application used to image hard drives.

The data contained on a PDA is often present on a personal computer, due to the capability of a PDA to synchronize or otherwise share information among one or more host computers. Such personal computers or workstations are referred to as synched devices. Because of synchronization, a significant amount of valuable evidence on a PDA, if not all, may also be present on the suspect's laptop or personal computer, and recovered using a conventional computer forensic tool for hard drive acquisition and examination.

USB drives, sometimes referred to as thumb drives, are chewing-gum-pack size hardware components with a USB connector at one end, and built as a printed circuit board within a plastic housing that encases a processor and memory. USB memory drives can be treated similarly to a removable disk drive, and imaged and analyzed using conventional forensic tools.

6.3.1 Synched Devices

Synchronization refers to the process of resolving differences in certain classes of information, such as e-mail, residing on two devices (i.e., a PDA and PC), such that both retain most current versions, which reflect any actions taken by the user (e.g., deletions) on one device or the other. Depending on how the suspect's device is configured, a significant amount of informative data may reside locally on the personal computer. When a connection is established between the device and the PC, the user may communicate through the following types of account:

- **Guest Account** – No data is automatically synchronized between the device and the PC, unless explicitly initiated by the user.
- **User Account** – Upon connection, data is synchronized automatically between the device and PC. The user predefines what data is synched and which device takes precedence. Most handheld devices are configured to synchronize new data, such as messages, address book entries, and agenda information.

Synchronization of information may occur at either the record level or the file level. When done at the file level, any discrepancies from the last synchronization date and time result in the latest version automatically replacing the older version. Occasionally manual intervention may be needed if both versions were modified independently since the last synchronization occurred. Record level synchronization is done similarly, but with more granularity whereby only out-of-date parts of a file are resolved and replaced.

With Palm OS devices, record level synchronization is the norm. The core PIM databases that can be synchronized include the following: Address Book, Date Book, Memo Pad, Note Pad, and To Do List. With Pocket PC devices, file level synchronization is the norm. The core PIM application files that can be synchronized include the following: Calendar, Contacts, Inbox, Pocket Access, Tasks, and Favorites. Synchronization software other than that built into the operating system also exists and may provide a more extensive or different set of capabilities. Because the synchronized contents of a PDA and personal computer tend to diverge quickly over time, additional information may be found in one device or the other.

Digital devices are typically populated with data from the PC during the synchronization process. Data from the PDA can also be synchronized to the PC, through user-defined preferences in the synchronization software. The synchronization software and the device type determine where PDA files may be stored on the PC. Each synchronization protocol has a default installation directory, but the locale can be user specified. Palm's HotSync manager keeps a log of data transfers containing: dates, location of the data, and what information was synched.

6.3.2 Memory Cards

A wide array of memory cards exists on the market today, ranging from the size of a stamp to that of a matchbook. Removable media storage capacity ranges from 8MB to beyond 2GB. As technological advances are made, such media becomes smaller and offers larger storage densities. Removable media extends the storage capacity of PDAs, allowing individuals to store additional files beyond the device's built-in capacity. Memory cards provide another avenue for sharing data between multiple users that have compatible hardware.

Unlike RAM within a device, removable media is non-volatile storage and requires no battery to retain data. Fortunately, such media can be treated similarly to a removable disk drive, and imaged and analyzed using conventional forensic tools with the use of an external media reader. Memory card adapters exist that support an Integrated Development Environment (IDE) interface. Such adapters allow removable media to be treated as a hard disk and used with write blocker software, which ensures that the removable media remains unaltered [Wie02]. Data contained on the media can be imaged and searched, and deleted files recovered. Below is a brief overview of several common storage media in use today that may contain significant information related to an investigation.

- **Compact Flash Cards (CF)** - Compact Flash memory is a solid-state disk card with a 50-pin connector, consisting of two parallel rows of 25 pins on one edge of the card. Compact Flash cards are designed for PCMCIA-ATA functionality and compatibility, have a 16-bit data bus, and are used more as a hard drive than as RAM. They use flash memory technology, a non-volatile storage solution that retains its information once power is removed from the card. Compact Flash cards are about the size of a matchbook (length-36.4 mm, width-42.8 mm, thickness-3.3 mm for Type I and 5mm for Type II) and consume a minimal amount of power.
- **Microdrives** - The Hitachi Microdrive digital media is a high-capacity, rotating mass storage device that is in a Compact Flash Type II package with a 16-bit data bus. A tiny glass disk serves as the storage media, which is more fragile than solid-state memory and requires energy to spin. Similar in function to the solid-state Flash memory cards, the 4GB Microdrive storage card is preformatted with a FAT32 file system. FAT32 is required to allow for storage over 2GB. By moving to FAT32, more storage space can be accessed, but cameras and other devices must support the newer file system. Many digital cameras and most PDAs support FAT32.
- **Multi-Media Cards (MMC)** - A Multi-Media Card (MMC) is a solid-state disk card with a 7-pin connector. MMC cards have a 1-bit data bus. As with CF cards, they are designed with flash technology, a non-volatile storage solution that retains information once power is removed from the card. The cards contain no moving parts and provide greater protection of data than conventional magnetic disk drives. Multi-Media Cards are about the size of a postage stamp (length-32 mm, width-24 mm, and thickness-1.4 mm). Reduced Size Multi-Media cards (RS-MMC) also exist. They are approximately one-half the size of the standard MMC card (length-18mm, width-24mm, and thickness-1.4mm). Though they were designed specifically for mobile phones, they can potentially be used with PDAs. An RS-MMC can be used in a full size MMC slot with a mechanical adapter. A regular MMC card can be also used in RS-MMC card slot, though part of it will stick out from the slot. MMCplus and

MMCmobile are higher performance variants of MMC and RS-MMC cards respectively that have a 13-pin connector and an 8-bit data bus.

- **Secure Digital (SD) Cards** - Secure Digital (SD) memory cards (length-32 mm, width-24 mm, and thickness-2.1mm) are comparable to the size and solid-state design of MMC cards. In fact, SD card slots can often accommodate MMC cards as well. However, SD cards have a 9-pin connector and a 4-bit data bus, which afford a higher transfer rate. SD memory cards feature an erasure-prevention switch. Keeping the switch in the locked position protects data from accidental deletion. They also offer security controls for content protection (i.e., Content Protection Rights Management). MiniSD cards are an electrically compatible extension of the existing SD card standard in a more compact format (length-21.5 mm, width-20 mm, and thickness-1.4 mm). They run on the same hardware bus and use the same interface as an SD card, and also include content protection security features, but have a smaller maximum capacity potential due to size limitations. For backward compatibility, an adapter allows a MiniSD Card to work with existing SD card slots.
- **Memory Sticks** - Memory sticks provide solid-state memory in a size similar to, but smaller than, a stick of gum (length-50mm, width-21.45mm, thickness-2.8mm). They have a 10-pin connector and a 1-bit data bus. As with SD cards, Memory Sticks also have a built-in erasure-prevention switch, to protect the contents of the card. Memory Stick PRO cards offer higher capacity and transfer rates than standard Memory Sticks, using a 10-pin connector, but with a 4-bit data bus. Memory Stick Duo and Memory Stick PRO Duo, smaller versions of the Memory Stick and Memory Stick PRO, are about two-thirds the size of the standard memory stick (length-31mm, width-20mm, thickness-1.6mm). An adapter is required for a Memory Stick Duo or Memory Stick PRO Duo to work with standard Memory Stick slots.
- **Extended Memory Cards** - Memory cards may support extensions for additional functionality. For example, the X-Mobile Card from Renesas is a MultiMedia card that contains both a smart card and a memory chip and able to function in either mode.

6.3.3 USB Memory Drives

Many manufacturers produce USB memory drives of various capacities. Currently, however, very few PDA devices support host USB ports, which are needed to interface with these peripherals. Moreover, few if any USB drive manufacturers provide the necessary drivers for PDA operating systems. This situation is understandable given that host USB specifications intend for an interface to be capable of supporting multiple devices sharing the port, which if permitted would place a significant power drain on the battery of the device. Other factors include the restrictions in mobility imposed by a USB drive sticking out of the side of a PDA compared to the benefits of providing one or more memory card slots that completely contain a card when inserted.

As with memory card extensions, USB drives may offer additional capabilities such as a wireless interface. Access to memory contents may also be protected through a built-in fingerprint reader or some other mechanism such as a smart card, which complicates the acquisition process. However, for the reasons mentioned above these peripherals are not normally associated with PDA devices.

7. Examination and Analysis

The examination process gives light to probative data. The results, gained through applying established scientifically based methods, should describe the content and state of the data completely. Such documentation allows all parties to discover what is contained, including information that may have been hidden or obscured. Once all the information is exposed, data reduction can begin, thereby separating relevant from irrelevant information. The analysis process differs from examination in that it looks at the product of the examination for its significance and probative value to the case [ACPO]. Examination is a technical process that is the province of the forensic specialist. However, analysis may be done by roles other than the forensic analyst, such as the investigator or the forensic examiner. One individual may perform all the roles involved.

The examination process begins after a forensic workstation has been set up with the appropriate tools and a copy of the evidence acquired from the device. If available, the examiner should have studied the case and become familiar with the parameters of the offence, the parties involved, and potential evidence that might be found. Conducting the examination in a partnership with the forensic analyst or the investigator guiding the case construction is advisable for the examiner. The investigator or analyst provides insight into the types of things sought, while the forensic examiner provides the means to find relevant information that might be on the system [Wol03].

If the forensic examiner performs the analysis independently, without conferring with the forensic analyst or investigator, the knowledge gained by studying the case should provide ideas about the specific keywords or phrases to use when searching the image acquired from the device. Fortunately, compared with classical examination of individual workstations or network servers, the amount of acquired data, in terms of raw image size, is many times smaller (i.e., Mbytes vs. Gbytes).

Depending on the type of case, the strategy varies. A case about child pornography may begin with browsing all of the graphic images on the system, while a case about an Internet-related offence might begin with browsing the Internet history files [Wol03]. Examination often reveals not only potentially incriminating data but also useful information such as passwords, network logon names, and Internet activity. In addition to evidence directly related to an incident, information can be uncovered about the lifestyle of a suspect, their associates, and the types of activities in which they are involved.

7.1 Locating Evidence

Standard PDAs typically offer similar information handling features and capabilities, including Personal Information Management (PIM) applications, support for e-mail, and Web browsing. Hybrid devices that incorporate both PDA and cell phone functionality also exist. Potential evidence on these devices includes [DOJ01]:

- Address book
- Appointment calendars/information
- Documents
- E-mail
- Handwriting

- Password
- Phone book
- Text messages
- Voice messages

Generally, two types of computer forensic investigations take place. The first is where some incident has occurred, but the identity of the offender is unknown (e.g., malicious code attack, hacking incident, etc.). The second is where the offender and the incident are both known (e.g., a child-porn investigation). Armed with the knowledge of the circumstances of the incident, the forensic examiner and analyst can proceed toward accomplishing the following objectives:

- Gather information about the individual(s) involved {who}.
- Determine the exact nature of the events that occurred {what}.
- Construct a timeline of events {when}.
- Discover what tools or exploits were used {how}.
- Uncover information that explains the motivation for the offense {why}.

Table 5 below provides a cross reference of generic evidence sources found on PDAs and their likely contribution toward satisfying the above objectives. Most of the source information comes from PIM data, and Internet related information. Other support applications that run on the device potentially provide other evidence sources. User files placed on the device for rendition, viewing, or editing are also another important evidence source. Besides graphic files, other relevant file content includes spreadsheets, presentation slides, and similar items. For hybrid devices, such as PDA phones or GPS PDAs, additional evidence sources exist, for example, the last dialed number or coordinates to some destination.

Table 5: Cross Reference of Sources and Objectives

	Who	What	Where	When	Why	How
Owner Info	X					
Contacts	X				X	X
Calendar	X	X	X	X	X	X
To Do List	X	X	X	X		X
E-mail Contact	X	X	X	X	X	X
Web URLs/Content		X	X	X		X
Graphic Files	X	X				
Other File Content		X	X	X	X	X

Knowledge and experience with multiple tools for acquiring and examining the contents of PDAs is extremely valuable. For instance, one tool may perform better than another in

specific areas such as file identification or search facilities; tools may report, acquire, and examine the contents of acquired data differently; and some tools may be platform specific. Therefore, using a toolkit that offers the best set of features for recovering and analyzing evidence from a specific device is advantageous.

7.2 Applying Tools

Once the acquired image has been copied, the next step is to begin searching the data, creating bookmarks, and developing the contents of a final report. Forensic examination tools are a crucial component in this process as they translate data from raw bit images to a format and structure that is understandable by the examiner and can be effectively used to identify and recover evidence. It is important to note that tools have the possibility to contain some degree of error. For example, the implementation of the tool may have a programming error; the specification of a file structure used by the tool to translate bits into data comprehensible by the examiner may be inaccurate or out of date; or the file structure generated by another program as input may be incorrect, causing the tool to function improperly [Car02]. Therefore, having a high degree of trust and understanding of the tool's ability to perform its function properly is essential. In addition, a knowledgeable suspect may tamper with device information, such as purposefully misnaming a file extension to foil the workings of a tool or apply a wiping tool to remove or eliminate data. Over time, experience with a tool provides an understanding of its limitations, allowing an examiner to compensate for them and avoid error.

Forensic Examination of Digital Evidence – A Guide for Law Enforcement, produced by the U.S. Department of Justice [DOJ04], offers the following suggestions for the analysis of extracted data:

- **Timeframe analysis** – Determine when events occurred on the system to associate usage with an individual by reviewing any logs present and the date/time stamps in the filesystem, such as the last modified time.
- **Data hiding analysis** – Detect and recover hidden data that may indicate knowledge, ownership, or intent by correlating file headers to file extensions to show intentional obfuscation; gaining access to password-protected, encrypted, and compressed files; gaining access to steganographic information detected in images; and gaining access to reserved areas of data storage outside the normal filesystem.
- **Application and file analysis** – Identify information relevant to the investigation by examining file content, correlating files to installed applications, identifying relationships between files (e.g., e-mail files to e-mail attachments), determining the significance of unknown file types, examining system configuration settings, and examining file metadata (e.g., documents containing authorship identification).
- **Ownership and possession** – Identify the individuals who created, modified, or accessed a file, and the ownership and possession of questioned data by placing the subject with the device at a particular time and date, locating files of interest in non-default locations, recovering passwords that indicate possession or ownership, and identifying contents of files that are specific to a user.

The capabilities of the tools, the richness of features, and the operating system (e.g., Windows CE, Palm OS, Linux) and type of device under examination determines what information can

be found, recovered, and reported, and the amount of effort needed. Areas of variability include the search and recovery of deleted information, information on reset devices, or information within compressed file archives or files with misnamed extensions [Aye04]. For example, some tools used to search for evidence may identify files by file extension where others use a file signature database. The latter feature is preferable since it eliminates the possibility of masking data based upon an inconsistent file extension. This is especially true for graphics files of various types, since by their very nature they generally are shrouded from textual searches.

The search engine plays a significant role in the discovery of information used for the creation of bookmarks and final reporting. Searching data for positive results on incriminating evidence takes patience and can be time consuming. Some tools have a simple search engine that matches an input text string exactly, allowing only for elementary searches to be performed. Other tools house more intelligent and feature rich search engines, allowing for grep (generalized regular expression patterns) type searches, including wildcard matches; filtering of files by extension, directory, etc.; and batch scripts that search for specific types of content (i.e., e-mail addresses, URLs, etc.). Similarly, the ability to find and gather images automatically into a common graphics library facility can differ among tools. The greater the tool's capabilities, the more the experience with and knowledge of the tool become valuable for the forensic examiner.

To uncover evidence, specialists must first gain a background of the suspect and offense and determine a set of terms for the examination. Search expressions should be developed in a systematic fashion, such as using contact names that may be relevant. By doing this, the specialist creates a profile for potential leads that may unveil valuable findings. To eliminate all possibility of omitting valuable evidence, the data should be thoroughly looked through from beginning to end in a memory window provided by either the tool or a hex editor. Additionally, specialists should have a database of file signatures to locate the headers and footers of specific files that may lead to further evidence such as: graphics files, avi files, etc.

Once the data has been thoroughly searched and relevant items bookmarked, it is time to create a report. Many forensic applications come with a built-in reporting facility that imports bookmarked data, allowing the specialist to organize the report, choose its style, and customize other aspects of the report. Reports may include the following: Specialists Name, Case Number, Date, Title, Suspect Name, Categories for evidence, and relevant evidence found. The software-generated report is only a small part of the overall final report. The final report contains the software-generated report alongside the documentation accumulated throughout the entire cycle, which summarizes the actions of the forensic examination and presents the results of the analysis, including any evidence uncovered.

The following criteria have been suggested as a fundamental set of requirements for forensic tools [Car02], and should be considered when a choice of tools is available:

- **Usability** – the ability to present data in a form that is useful to an investigator.
- **Comprehensive** – the ability to present all data to an investigator so that both inculpatory and exculpatory evidence can be identified.
- **Accuracy** – the quality that the output of the tool has been verified and a margin of error ascertained.

- **Deterministic** – the ability for the tool to produce the same output when given the same set of instructions and input data.
- **Verifiable** – the ability to ensure accuracy of the output by having access to intermediate translation and presentation results.

Other factors in choosing among software tools include the Daubert considerations mentioned earlier in section 4.2 (particularly Acceptance) and the following items:

- **Quality** – technical support, reliability, and upgrade version path
- **Capability** – supported feature set, performance, and richness of features with regard to flexibility and customization
- **Affordability** – cost versus benefits in productivity

8. Reporting

Reporting is the process of preparing a detailed summary of all the steps taken and conclusions reached in the investigation of a case. Reporting depends on all participants carefully maintaining a record of their actions and observations, reporting the results of tests, and explaining the inferences drawn from the evidence. The basis of a good report is solid documentation, notes, sketches, photographs, and tool-generated reports.

Reporting of the results of a forensic examination tend to follow predefined templates, customized as required by the specific circumstances of each investigation. Reports of forensic examination results should include all the information necessary to identify the case and its source, outline the test results and findings, and bear the signature of the individual responsible for its contents. In general, the report may include the following information [DOJ04]:

- Identity of the reporting agency
- Case identifier or submission number
- Case investigator
- Identity of the submitter
- Date of receipt
- Date of report
- Descriptive list of items submitted for examination, including serial number, make, and model
- Identity and signature of the examiner
- The equipment and set up used in the examination
- Brief description of steps taken during examination, such as string searches, graphics image searches, and recovering erased files.
- Supporting materials such as printouts of particular items of evidence, digital copies of evidence, and chain of custody documentation
- Details of findings:
 - Specific files related to the request
 - Other files, including deleted files, that support the findings
 - String searches, keyword searches, and text string searches
 - Internet-related evidence, such as Web site traffic analysis, chat logs, cache files, e-mail, and news group activity

- Graphic image analysis
 - Indicators of ownership, which could include program registration data
 - Data analysis
 - Description of relevant programs on the examined items
 - Techniques used to hide or mask data, such as encryption, steganography, hidden attributes, hidden partitions, and file name anomalies
-
- Report Conclusions

Many forensic software applications have reporting facilities built-in. Examiners should include only relevant findings in the report to minimize size and confusion among those reviewing it. Automated reports typically contain the following key components: Case Number, Date, Examiner Name, Suspect Name, and Files Acquired (showing hash, ASCII data, graphical representation of data, etc.).

Digital evidence, as well as the tools, techniques and methodologies used in an examination, is subject to being challenged in a court of law or other formal proceedings. Proper documentation is essential in providing individuals the ability to re-create the process from beginning to end. As part of the reporting process, making a copy of the software used and including it with the output produced is advisable. This is especially pertinent for custom tools, since confusion about the version of the software used to create the output is eliminated, should it become necessary to reproduce forensic processing results at a later time. The same practice applies to commercial software tools, which could be upgraded after an examination is completed [NTI].

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Appendix A. Acronyms

- API** – Application Programming Interface
- ASCII** – American Standard Code for Information Interchange
- CF** – Compact Flash
- Codec** – Coder-Decoder
- CIR** – Consumer Infrared
- CRC** – Cyclical Redundancy Check
- dd** – duplicate disk/data dump
- DLL** – Dynamically Linked Library
- GDI** – Graphics Device Interface
- GPS** – Global Positioning System
- GPRS** – General Packet Radio Service
- GSM** – Global System for Mobile Communications
- GWES** – Graphics, Windowing, and Events Subsystem
- IDE** – Integrated Drive Electronics
- IPsec** – Internet Protocol Security
- IrDA** - Infra Red Data Association
- JFFS2** – Journaling Flash File System, Version 2
- JTAG** – Joint Test Action Group
- LCD** – Liquid Crystal Display
- LED** – Light Emitting Diode
- MMC** – Multi-Media Card
- OAL** – Original Equipment Manufacture Adaptation Layer
- OEM** – Original Equipment Manufacture
- OS** – Operating System

PC – Personal Computer

PDA – Personal Digital Assistant

pdd – Palm data dump/duplicate disk

PFF – Palm File Format

PIM – Personal Information Management

PIN – Personal Identification Number

POSE – Palm Operating System Emulator

PPC – Pocket PC

PPTP – Point-to-Point Tunneling Protocol

RAM – Random Access Memory

RAPI – Remote Application Programming Interface

ROM – Read Only Memory

SD – Secure Digital

SHA1 – Secure Hash Algorithm, version 1

SSH – Secure Shell

TCP/IP – Transmission Control Protocol/Internet Protocol

TFT – Thin Film Transistor

UART – Universal Asynchronous Receiver/Transmitter

URL – Uniform Resource Locator

USB – Universal Serial Bus

WiFi – Wireless Fidelity

WinCE – Windows CE

XIP – eXecute In Place

Appendix B. Glossary

Acquisition – A process by which digital evidence is duplicated, copied, or imaged.

Analysis – The examination of acquired data for its significance and probative value to the case.

Authentication Mechanism – Hardware or software-based mechanisms that force users to prove their identity before accessing data on a device.

Bluetooth – A wireless protocol that allows two Bluetooth enabled devices to communicate with each other within a short distance (e.g., 30 ft.).

Brute Force Password Attack – A method of accessing an obstructed device through attempting multiple combinations of numeric/alphanumeric passwords.

Buffer Overflow Attack – A method of overloading a predefined amount of space in a buffer, which can potentially overwrite and corrupt memory in data.

Chain of Custody – A process that tracks the movement of evidence through its collection, safeguarding, and analysis lifecycle by documenting each person who handled the evidence, the date/time it was collected or transferred, and the purpose for the transfer.

Compressed File – A file reduced in size through the application of a compression algorithm, commonly performed to save disk space. The act of compressing a file will make it unreadable to most programs until the file is uncompressed. Most common compression utilities are PKZIP and WinZip with an extension of .zip.

Cradle – A docking station, which creates an interface between a user's PC and PDA, and enables communication and battery recharging.

Cyclical Redundancy Check – A method to ensure data has not been altered after being sent through a communication channel.

Deleted File – A file that has been logically, but not necessarily physically, erased from the operating system, perhaps to eliminate potentially incriminating evidence. Deleting files does not always necessarily eliminate the possibility of recovering all or part of the original data.

Digital Evidence – Electronic information stored or transmitted in binary form.

Duplicate Digital Evidence – A duplicate is an accurate digital reproduction of all data objects contained on the original physical item and associated media (e.g., flash memory, RAM, ROM).

Electromagnetic Interference – An electromagnetic disturbance that interrupts, obstructs, or otherwise degrades or limits the effective performance of electronics/electrical equipment.

Electronic Evidence – Information and data of investigative value that is stored on or transmitted by an electronic device.

Encryption – Any procedure used in cryptography to convert plain text into cipher text to prevent anyone but the intended recipient from reading that data.

Examination – A technical review that makes the evidence visible and suitable for analysis; tests performed on the evidence to determine the presence or absence of specific data.

Exculpatory Evidence – Evidence that tends to decrease the likelihood of fault or guilt.

eXecute in Place – A facility that allows code to be executed directly from flash memory without loading the code into RAM.

File Name Anomaly – A mismatch between the internal file header and its external extension; a file name inconsistent with the content of the file (e.g., renaming a graphics file with a non-graphics extension).

File Slack – Space between the logical end of the file and the end of the last allocation unit for that file.

Filesystem – A software mechanism that defines the way that files are named, stored, organized, and accessed on logical volumes of partitioned memory.

Flash ROM – non-volatile memory that is writable.

Forensic Copy – An accurate bit-for-bit reproduction of the information contained on an electronic device or associated media, whose validity and integrity has been verified using an accepted algorithm.

Forensic Specialist – Locates, identifies, collects, analyzes and examines data while preserving the integrity and maintaining a strict chain of custody of information discovered.

Global Positioning System – A system for determining position by comparing radio signals from several satellites.

Hardware Driver – Applications responsible for establishing communication between hardware and software programs.

Hashing – The process of using a mathematical algorithm against data to produce a numeric value that is representative of that data.

Heap – A software data structure used for dynamic allocation of memory.

Image – An exact bit-stream copy of all electronic data on a device, performed in a manner that ensures the information is not altered.

Inculpatory Evidence – Evidence that tends to increase the likelihood of fault or guilt.

Loop-Back Mode – An operating system facility that allows a device to be mounted via a loopback address and viewed logically on the PC.

Misnamed Files – A technique used to disguise a file's content by changing the file's name to something innocuous or altering its extension to a different type of file, forcing the examiner to identify the files by file signature versus file extension.

Password Protected – The ability to protect a file using a password access control, protecting the data contents from being viewed with the appropriate viewer unless the proper password is entered.

Personal Digital Assistant (PDA) – A handheld computer that serves as a tool for reading and conveying documents, electronic mail, and other electronic media over a communications link, and for organizing personal information, such as a name-and-address database, a to-do list, and an appointment calendar.

Personal Information Management (PIM) Applications – A core set of applications that provide the electronic equivalents of an agenda, address book, notepad, and business card holder.

Probative Data – Information that reveals the truth of an allegation.

Steganography – The art and science of communicating in a way that hides the existence of the communication. For example, a child pornography image can be hidden inside another graphic image file, audio file, or other file format.

Synchronization Protocols – Protocols that allow users to view, modify, and transfer/update PDA data from the PC or vice-versa. The two most common synchronization protocols are: Microsoft's ActiveSync and Palm's HotSync.

Thread – A defined group of instructions executing apart from other similarly defined groups, but sharing memory and resources of the process to which they belong.

Universal Serial Bus (USB) – A hardware interface for low-speed peripherals such as the keyboard, mouse, joystick, scanner, printer, and telephony devices.

Volatile Memory – Memory that loses its content when power is turned off or lost.

Write-Blocker – A device that allows investigators to examine media while preventing data writes from occurring on the subject media.

Write Protection – Hardware or software methods of preventing data from being written to a disk or other medium.