

HANDBOOK OF NEW INSTITUTIONAL ECONOMICS

Edited by

CLAUDE MÉNARD

University of Paris (Pantheon-Sorbonne), France

and

MARY M. SHIRLEY

*The Ronald Coase Institute
Chevy Chase, MD, U.S.A.*

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