

Historical Contexts and Logics of American Expansionism

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(1) Introduction

The period of 1978-80 is regarded as a revolutionary turning point in the world's social and economic history (Harvey 2005: 1). A force called "globalization" has been felt around the world. Globalization debates have been prevalent in the social sciences from the 1990s onward, taking the place of debates on postmodernism. In retrospect, in the latter half of the 20th century, we were confronted with debates ranging from the "Miliband-Poulantzas debate" (1960s-70s), "state-deviation debates" in what was then West Germany, to the "bringing the state back in" movement in the American political science, and now globalization debates have gained prominence.

After the demise of the Soviet bloc, the US gained an ability to act unilaterally, paving the way for the Bush (Jr.) administration's declaration of a "preemptive military attack" and a "preventive use of force" in the aftermath of "September 11". The 2003 invasion of Iraq by the US and the "Coalition of the willing" was conducted without the support of the UN Security Council and was justified as a preemptive strategy because of the assumed presence of weapons of mass destruction. In order to understand the American policies exemplified by the invasion of Iraq, the NATO intervention in Kosovo, and the 1990 Persian Gulf War, one must examine the development of American hegemony and place the current state of affairs in historical context.

In 1885 John W. Burgess, one of the founders of American political science, expressed his vision of America from a historical perspective;

... the American commonwealth is already based upon ideal principles and has advanced many states in an ideal development; that it has only to be freed from some crudities and excrescences, and to pursue steadily the general course towards which its history points, in order to reach the perfection of its ideal; that, therefore, we need no revolution of our system, which would in fact drive us from the line which leads to the attainment of our ideal: and that we are compelled to regard those who should favor and advise such a revolution as the enemies in principle of the American republic and of the political civilization of the world (Burgess 1885: 424-25).

His speech was delivered against the background of "structural change" at home and abroad in American history. Facing a crisis, he considered the prime mission of the ideal American

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commonwealth to be the perfection of the Aryan genius for political civilization, and declared this to be "the transcendental mission of the American commonwealth" (*ibid.*, 407).

Almost one century later, President George W. Bush has declared a war on terror that pits freedom and democracy against totalitarianism and terrorism. The policies collectively known as the "Bush Doctrine" include strategies such as preemptive military attacks, the preventive use of force, and regime change for dealing with rogue states and international terrorism (*National Security Strategy of the United States of America* 2002; National Security Council 2006). There are two basic forces behind these policies: the Cheney-Rumsfeld-Wolfowitz axis and the neoconservative desire to preserve American hegemony in connection with American geopolitical and geoeconomic strategies.¹⁾ One similarity found in Burgess' writings and statements made by the Bush administration is the perception of the United States' ineluctable role and moral obligation to guide global society along what it deems to be the right path.

Globalization, often described as the compression of time and space, can also be characterized by the promotion of an open economy and the further liberation of capital. Expansionism has altered the relations between America and the world since Burgess' time, both challenging and enabling the spread of American hegemony, and distance can no longer be equated with security, as was evident in the 9/11 attacks. On the other hand, believing that American values of democracy, liberalism, and capitalism are universally applicable, the US has engaged in a military intervention by the "coalition of the willing," achieving regime change in Iraq although it was accomplished in an authoritarian manner.²⁾ The American values just mentioned converge in the "inevitable peace thesis," according to which peace and not war is pursued for the sake of friendly commercial exchange and trade. The expansion of liberal democracy, moreover, is viewed as a prerequisite for peace under the premise that democracies don't fight each other (known as the "democratic peace thesis"). It is in light of these assumptions that the Bush administration confronted what it called an "axis of evil," as if alluding to J. S. Mill's argument that the guardians of liberty possess the right to resort to physical force to forestall the spread of barbarism and tyranny (Mill 1973: 409). As a result of the administration's efforts to coercively promote democracy and American values, the United States has been labeled a "crusader state". It means an "informal empire" and its policies a "new form of imperialism."

"Hegemony" is an "intellectual and moral leadership" (Gramsci 1971: 57). It has an ideological function and intellectual and moral foundations for material (re)production in a

1) Rupert and Solomon 2006. The axis contains a rivalry between "democratic imperialists" and "assertive nationalists." Daalder and Lindsay 2003: 46-47.

2) Democratization relies on the efforts of each person. The "exportation of democracy" can often be traced to the paternalistic haughtiness of the exporter, and democratization under or by the military control of another country inspires repulsion and resistance unless there is some voluntary reception as in Japan under the occupation or central and eastern European states after the collapse of Soviet block.

society and world system constrained by the historical context of "path-dependency". When a country becomes a hegemon, its hegemony enables it to influence production systems, and can also create the intellectual foundation for new forms of socioeconomic organization at home and abroad. In these respects, (re)construction of the capitalistic production relations requires a norm of capitalistic commodification. Neo-liberalism is the main thrust of a hegemonic discourse for promoting and restructuring a capitalization of the world economies, and the Bush Doctrine also reflects the ways the administration strives to strengthen American hegemony.

Political society is able to use hegemony as a tool to facilitate the formation and cohesiveness of any given territorially-bounded-sovereign nation-states that enjoy various levels of relative autonomy in the international political arena, and although the capitalist nation-state presuppose the institutional separation between the state and society, the inherent contradictions and tensions in society demand political interventions or extra-economic functions. Reflecting these necessities, the capitalist state appears to be an "integral state" in which it shows itself to be a mutually compatible amalgamation of liberal political and liberal economic systems.

When it comes to international politics, a state is a sovereign endogenous container distinct from the exogenous international system. In such a framework, globalization is not a phenomenon that occurs outside of the international system, but a process that is caused by the intensification of interdependency and the interconnectedness of social relations. On one level, we may observe that nation and state power have declined under globalization. At the same time, there are, paradoxically, many reasons to believe that the role of the state is strengthened by the reconstruction of the socioeconomic system in response to globalization.

We can tentatively divide American history into three main periods: () from its founding to Reconstruction, () from the turn of the century to the end of the 2nd World War, () post-world war years. Here the paper will at first trace briefly the main currents of territorial expansion, and next focus on the emerging features of the dominant rhetoric and logic inherent in American supra-territorialism.

(2) Historical process of expansionism

() the first period: accumulation process by annexation

America is regarded as the place to realize "possessive individualism," and its political aims have been traditionally bound to keep and develop the market oriented social relations. The politico-economic system is, therefore, based on the principles of freedom to pursue each one's needs and demands. These possessivism incessantly gave an impetus to expand its territory towards the West and the South-West under the self-image as a liberator. In these context "frontier" was regarded as a territory to be integrated into the

“Free Empire” rather than as a given boundary. America ceaselessly extended its domination over the continent, and its territory almost quadrupled in comparison to the foundation. In this phase expansionism was closely connected to annexation of land and the rise of industrialization in the Northeast came into conflict with the slavocracy of the South.

() **the second period: socioeconomic reconstruction and the rise of liberalism**

After the Civil War and the Reconstruction, the social and economic structure radically changed into the urban-industrial one, and America came to be a leading state of the industrializing states. The turn of the century was a period of transformation in American history.

After the Spanish-American war, the American policy was inclined to a liberal trend at home and abroad. It is manifest in the open-door liberalism and interventionist liberalism. During the era of Progressivism America deployed the aggressive foreign policies toward the Central America and Asia as evident in the big-stick policy and the dollar diplomacy. And it reconstructed the socioeconomic system of itself according to the principle of liberal corporatism as evident in many city reforms and reorganizations of the federal government, in combination with repressions of descendents.

The First World War brought a turning point to America. It changed America from a debtor to a creditor and made America a center for international finance and trade system. In these conditions and under the Fordism America flourished in the 1920s. But the Great Depression attacked America, and the liberal reformism was established by the New Deal policies against the crisis. It was during the Second World War that America rose to the superpower of the world.

() **the third period: a world hegemon**

America emerged as a global hegemon in the post-war world and embarked on the reconstruction of the devastated world under its hegemony. America displayed its supremacy in the spread of its military and economic leadership through which America transplanted its dominant system around the capitalist countries. It means embedding the liberal-capitalistic system in them without territorial annexation. But its hegemony began to be unstable in a dollar crisis, stagflation and social unrests in the 1960s. These caused the collapse of New Deal liberalism and the Breton Woods system. Reaganomics and Thatcherism were a response to these crises, and “Washington Consensus” is a knot of measures to cope with the crisis. In these contexts the policies to recapitalize the politico-economic system of the world (deregulation, privatization, liberalization) have been also the basic policy trends in the major capitalist states. It is realistic and reasonable to situate the ongoing globalization in connection with this market-fundamentalistic neoliberalism.

America successfully remolded the postwar capitalist states according to its project. But it subsequently invites the relative decline of American hegemony in the world system.

(3) Rhetoric of expansionism

Two dominant paradigms are evident in the United States' postwar political economy. The first would be Fordist-Keynesian growth-oriented capitalism. "Market fundamentalism" or "global neo-liberalism," the second, gained prominence in the 1970s, cemented its position during the 1980s during the Reagan Revolution, and has been maintained by the current Bush administration. With the end of the Cold War, America gained its status as the sole superpower in international system. In considering these conditions one is able to understand how economic liberalization is evidence of hegemon's influence in global markets.

Every country goes through a unique period of state-formation and nation-building that endows it with its particular historical background. When this period has passed, however, a nation-state will dynamically or gradually change its configuration, be it due to internal or external factors (Linklater 1998). In examining the particularities of American nation-state and state-formation, one can get a sense of what is distinct about the American national identity.

We may, at first, grasp a particularity of its nation-state building. The origins of the United States sprang from the settlers from Europe and the principles of nation-state building are not based on an image of pre-given natural kinship, but a project to create new social and political relations. So the cohesiveness of its social connection relies on recognition of the state as an artificial device of civic association based on constitutionalism. The recognition of such a difference is underlying as a potential in association with the logic and psychology of comparison with others and identification of itself. This consciousness of specificity as a nation-state leads to a political fundamentalism and exemptionalism when it connects to recognition of oneself as an ahistorical entity or "norm folk".

Secondarily we can approach to its political inclinations by resort to a sort of sociology of religion. Tocqueville was not alone in noting that the separation of church and state was an important feature of American culture. It can be traced back to the communal habits and customs of churches and religious denominations during the colonial period. Of particular importance is the observation that the American colonies were founded by those escaping religious persecution in Europe. This background catalyzed policy-orientations that protected individuals' rights to worship as they pleased. This focus on individual rights, combined with the flight from old world Europe to "the new world," resulted in a vision of the colonies as an altogether different political entity, in which American colonies were regarded as a city-on-the-hill and a promised land. This self-consciousness as a

"chosen" people was shared among settlers and was implanted in society as an ethos and mores which involved contradictory gravitations toward exclusion and inclusion. In other words, on the one hand, there is a tendency to demand conversion or conformity, and on the other hand there is a compulsion to adhere to a particular belief in isolation when in adamant refusal to conform itself. Both of these positions were inspired by ecumenicism of each religious sect. These contradictory mindsets underlie American political thinking and transformed themselves into traditions of isolationism and internationalism in American foreign policy, owing to a stubborn defense of particular values and a missionary promulgation of them. American foreign policies have been said to "swing" between internationalism and isolationism like a pendulum because of the way in which the latter can give way to the former (*vice versa*) due to the pressures of domestic social forces and recognition of international relations. Both appearances are an expression of two sides of the same coin (Gill 2003: 40; Augelli and Murphy 1988: 39-41).

The third noteworthy feature of American society, related to the first, is its "vigilantism," which is due to its nature as a society that consists of an ethnically diverse society of immigrants. American identity has continually been challenged throughout history, resulting in a conformism as well as an almost paranoid attitude towards those who are not perceived as "American" (Hofstadter 1963). This, in turn, has brought about a dualistic worldview, in which incessant examinations of historical developments and guiding principles search to place people and beliefs into the categories of "orthodox" and "heterodox." This vigilantism has always lingered in the national consciousness, coming to the surface as an ideological compulsion to secure national unity during the time of transformation and crisis. In the international political arena, in which the United States interacts with "other" states, these tendencies also cause American foreign policy to swing like a pendulum in response to conditions at home and abroad.

The fourth distinct feature of American culture is discernible in its epistemology and practice: an experimental and empirical reformism based on an individualistic dichotomy of object and subject. The objectification of external factors and their reformation shapes the nation's intellectual climate and links it to a notion of destiny and obligation. Perhaps it can be traced back to a combination of Puritan logic of secularization and Calvinism's fatalistic views. At any rate, embedded in the national consciousness, the secularized version has resulted, for example, in a faith in science and a strong technological fetish, as M. Weber made clear in his *Die protestant Ethik und Geist des Kapitalismus*. This sense of destiny and obligation, in connection with a particular vision of democracy that will be mentioned next, came to the fore in the concept of the "Manifest Destiny." It consisted of a belief that it was inevitable and necessary that the nation's reach should expand to include the Pacific coast.

The fifth discernible feature is an attempt to connect American expansionism with democracy. One of the earliest of these attempts is found in F. J. Turner's "The

Significance of the Frontier in American History" (1893), which hypothesizes that American democracy was significantly influenced by its continuous confrontation with the Western frontier. Not only did the wilderness of the West provide a safety valve for relief from social conflicts, but it also imposed a collaborative community for the purpose of coping with exogenous conditions. The thesis of frontier democracy was a break away from the "germ theory" which had searched for the origins of American democracy in New England town meetings, and as far back as old governmental forms in German forests in remote ages.

The frontier was regarded as a social safety valve as well as a spring board for democracy, and the theory brought different elements (space and political order) together into one dimension because the frontier was deemed an object for democratization. In this context the expansionism was, on the one side, justified as an expansion of American democratic orders, and an apprehension of social homogenization could be, on the other side, supposedly avoided by free competition for acquisition which would be guaranteed by a successive enlargement of territory. The same political justification is discernible in Turner's contemporary priest, J. Strong who remarked that it was necessary for Western civilization to permeate the world by means of "steam and electricity." Thus this constant pushing against a savage frontier of natural barriers served to preserve the pluralism and individualism inherent in the republic, and territorial expansion and the development of political institutions became fused in the American mindset. It is because of this combination of intellectual and cultural conformity and homogeneous values that individualistic liberalism has been identified as the result of an American political genius, as Boorstin and Hartz said at the 1950s, the age of McCarthyism.

The last feature of American national consciousness that can be used to explain expansionist tendencies is America's civil society-oriented mentality, which can be traced back to those groups who fled European authorities to establish colonies in the new world. One should put America's early development into perspective by noting that nation-building preceded state-formation. State formation, in fact, was a lengthy process in which more and more areas were integrated into the commonwealth. Moreover, the federal structure from which the name "the United States" gets its name suggests that individual "states" have joined together under an overarching superstructure. If the "states" of New York and California are perceived to be roughly equivalent to Japan and Venezuela, the country name "the United States" on its own suggests an entity of interstate relations, and would invite speculation about possible expansion in projection into external relations around the world.

Tocqueville and Weber as visitors, Adorno as a refugee,³⁾ and Gramsci as an observer have a different views of America's future as compared to their own countries and Europe

3) Tocqueville stayed in the US for 9 months in 1831-32, Weber for 13 weeks in 1904 and Adorno for 11 years after his arrival in 1938 as a refugee.

in general.⁴⁾ But in the early 20th century, B. Adams argued that the entire world would soon look forward to the future of America, and the founder of *Life*, H. Luce declared the 20th century to be an American century (Rosenberg 1982: 22). Neo-liberals hold a similar belief that the 21st century should be American century (*Prospect for the new American Century* 1997, 1998). America has certainly transformed itself from a set of small colonies into a hegemonic power in world politics. We should inquire into the logic and dynamics of expansion in American growth.

(4) The logic of "Pluralistic Empire"

Capitalist states must be politically, economically, and socially integrated. Although the capitalist state is based on the organizing principle of the institutional separation of political and economic life, and civil society occupies a sphere distinct and separate from the political realm, these are in fact, nominally important characteristics. In reality, to keep economic and social life in order, political society is expected to play the most important role.

In the intellectual history of Western Europe, the concept of the "state" rose to the surface as a dimension of the emerging power, and acquired another notion from *res publica and civitas* as well as from the actual power holder, namely the monarch. The state was depicted as a territorially bound sovereign entity devoid of actual personality, and the source of basic human rights was assigned to the state as an abstract entity. Leviathan or general will (*volonté générale*), for example, shows these *persona fisca*, and the existent government was actually deemed to be an institutionalized agent of the state, as Dewey said that "government is to the state what language is to the thought."⁵⁾ In these contexts, the government is conceptually identified with the state and also pretends itself to be the state (double conceptualization of the state as an abstract entity and as the given government).

4) "America does not have 'great historical and cultural traditions'; but neither does it have this leaden burden to support. This is one of the main reasons----for its formidable accumulation of capital which has taken place in spite of the superior living standard enjoyed by the popular classes compared with Europe. The non-existence of viscous parasitic sedimentations left behind by past phases of history has allowed industry, and commerce in particular, to develop on a sound basis. It also allows a continual reduction of the economic function of transport and trade to the level of a genuinely subaltern activity of production. ----Since these preliminary conditions existed, already rendered rational by historical evolution, it was relatively easy to rationalize production and labour by a skilful combination of force (destruction of working-class trade unionism on a territorial basis) and persuasion (high wages, various social benefits, extremely subtle ideological and political propaganda) and thus succeed in making the whole life of the nation revolve around production. Hegemony here is born in the factory and requires for its exercise only a minute quantity of professional political and ideological intermediaries" (Gramsci 1971: 285).

5) John Dewey, "The Ethics of Democracy," (1888) in *The Early Work of John Dewey, 1882-1898*, vol. I, Southern Illinois University Press, 1969.

Such abstraction has not been prevalent in America owing to a strong provincialism and a negative conception of political power caused by a separation between state and society which was firmly agreed upon by the early settlers. Power remains in the community, rights belongs to the people, and the state is equated with the government. In addition, public authorities are equated with a political market in the capitalist society (Bell 1991: 62, n. 20).

The capitalist state is a complex ensemble of political, economical, socio-cultural elements. The presence of a dominant ideology or hegemony gives a certain uniformity and contributes to sort out the many contradictions inherent in the ensemble and give a systematic order to the "integral state". The capitalist state needs some hegemony to integrate a society in the institutional separation of political and economic domains. Hegemony plays a vital part in material (re)production and in recognition of the world regarding its implantation in society.⁶⁾ As these functions are conditioned by a given historical "path-dependency," historical contexts give a particular configurations to each capitalist state and ensure that nationalism assumes a variety of appearances in its history.

Although conflicts and contradictions have appeared intermittently throughout American history, America as a nation-state has basically held onto the ideas and framework of principles of the Constitution and has historically recast them in response to contingent necessities. Capitalistic democracy is a complex unity of contradictions: liberalism as a capitalistic principle, political liberalism as a democratic principle, and liberal democracy or democratic liberalism as a contradictory compound. So the problem of how to mitigate the tensions between two the principles and what contents to be assigned to liberalism in politics and economics has run through American history like a red thread. In these contexts, the concepts of liberalism have been obliged to adapt to a certain extent to the period at hand, given changes in social formation and the impact of socialist and the labour movement and so on.

T. Paine declared that the American Revolution was "common sense" and proclaimed the legitimacy of independence from the old world in terms of a natural separation in space and politics. The legacy of political revolution has been embedded in society as a national discourse over generations and became not only an intellectual foundation and common bond for Americans, but also transformed itself into a source of exceptionalism regarded as universal, not solely particular. Hegemony is the ideology put together by the elite, and common sense is the sedimentation of it among the people as an ethos or folklore. The self-description America laid down during its foundation began to take root in the society, and was gradually embedded in society as a national belief that future generations would

6) So long as political power is a political condenser of social relations through indulgence and deprivation of values, political subjectivization by each implies objectification by, and subjugation to power. But this interaction, implicitly or explicitly, involves a realization of one's relations with others (Penttinen 2000).

look to retrospectively for national ideals.

American common sense has a strong connection to a view of an atomized society characteristic of possessive-competitive individualism. This subconscious factor lingers in the tradition of anti-statism including economic-corporate unionism and anarcho-syndicalism as well as a prevalent paradigm in political science, because in mainstream American political science public goods are assumedly obtained through competition of pressure among interest groups to the state as a mediator.

Next we will examine the rhetoric involved in the trajectory of America's rise to hegemonic status. The Declaration of Independence and the Constitution reveal the spirit of an *advance guard*. Indeed, Hegel noted that America was a "country of the future". Paine's articulations came to ingrain itself in the national consciousness, and Tocqueville gained renown for his descriptions of the early United States. Tocqueville had expressed concern about the risks of building a democracy around individualistic competition-oriented citizens, pointing out the possibility of undesirable outcomes such as a mass society dependent on others, or a conformist society without tolerance for dissent. This is the "paradox of individualism": while individualism rejects the inequalities of an aristocratic system by making society consist of individuals viewed as "equal" just as a molecule is made up of atoms, it simultaneously runs the risk of homogenizing society and turning into a tyranny of the majority (Wolin 2001: 352). Therefore he emphasized the necessity of local self-government and associations serving as middlemen between individuals and the state as a way to prevent this from happening. The founding fathers also recognized the necessity of political and social diversity for dealing with the threat of majority rule.

The founding fathers apprehended the possibility of a tyranny of the majority, and against the threat they envisaged a political and social mechanism which was based on the vision of a complex division of government in function, space and time, including the presence of diversity and competition among many different social groups. Political and social pluralism was at the core of their model for staving off a tyranny of the majority and also a necessary condition for development because the introduction of diversity into a society was assumedly a driving force for the future. The following passage is from *The Federalist* (1787).

Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to act in unison with each other. Besides other impediments, it may be remarked that, where there is a consciousness of unjust or dishonorable purposes, communication is always checked by distrust in proportion to the number whose concurrence is necessary. (*The Federalist*, no. 10)

At the core of republicanism is the concept of self-government by citizens who embody civic virtue. But *The Federalist* did not rely upon the civic virtue of citizens,

mimicking Smith's vision of self-serving actors whose actions benefit society. The authors of *The Federalist* deemed the existence of fractions based on possessive interest to be an inevitable social phenomenon and tried to create a mechanism to prevent it (No. 10; 51). In this model, the tyranny of the majority could be prevented by representative republicanism, state powers divided through a complicated system of checks and balances, and the promotion of interest group diversity which allowed for groups with opposing interests to clash against each other and restrain any one group from becoming too strong. The social contrivance invented by the founding fathers is, in theory, an artificial introduction of political and social pluralism by which the negative effects of fractions can be transformed into positive ones through their mutual repulsion. They envisaged this mechanism to be a cornerstone of the protection of freedom and against tyranny of majority. This is the rhetoric of the formation of the states in place of a separate state.

Modern society deepened its functional diversity and complexity. In this respect, *The Federalist* designed an unsettled equilibrium in the shared arena by an incessant introduction of different interests. This vision is a closely connected with "Empire," because diversification demands an expansion in space as well as a differentiation in function. In this context freedom is equated with expansion and a national unity is ascribed to a social diversity by expansion in space. The prototypical image constructed by the founding fathers was proliferated, fetishized and embedded in society as an aspect of "common sense" and was continuously reaffirmed throughout American history. The US deepened its social plurality by its acquisition of new territory and immigration. The image of plurality is connected with individualistic liberalism and also transforms itself into interest groups liberalism in the 1920s and 1930s. These ideals also appear as a base for a strong repulsion of totalitarianism and authoritarianism. As previously mentioned, the logic of pluralistic "empire" is found in *The Federalist's* argument that American society should continually invite diversity through horizontal expansion. In Alexander Hamilton's words in *The Federalist*, "Let the thirteen States, bound together in a strict and indissoluble Union, concur in erecting one great American system, superior to the control of all transatlantic force or influence, and able to dictate the terms of the connection between the old and the new world !" (*The Federalist*, no. 11).

To put it simply, the founding fathers of the United States resorted to "pluralistic expansionism" as a means of erecting a protective barrier for freedom as well as a cause of building a federal state. Although democracy does not mean expansionism such a perception mentioned above, it, combined with a pursuit of national identity, led to the belief that pluralistic expansion or trans-territorialism was a "destiny" bestowed upon America. What was once the national civic religion has become a vision of a global civic religion; what was once a "promised land," if you will, is now a state with a destiny, with a mission. By the end of the 19th century, the United States had expanded to roughly four times its original size. This expansion was said to be an extension of freedom, liberation

from tyranny, and because it was seen as inevitable and desirable it was called "the Manifest Destiny."

Using World Systems theory, we can quickly summarize the United States' trajectory from state-building up to the Civil War. Separated from Europe by the Atlantic Ocean, the United States was able to expand its capitalist hegemony throughout the new continent. It absorbed the market industry of the Northeast, agriculture in the West, and finally subsumed the South into the capitalist hegemony. Protected from European interference by the natural barrier that is the Atlantic Ocean, reunification into a federation of states was achieved by internal violence in the Civil War. Rapid economic development followed, enabled by the mobilization of America's vast tracts of land, rich natural resources, and immigrant labor force under the ethos of capitalism. It is, however, noteworthy that the dominant feature of world politics at the time was a period of rival imperialism, and the dominant domestic feature was the depression of 1873, which shattered the myth of capitalism's continuous development. Subsequently, state intervention in the economy and the formation of monopolies became more and more frequent.

The development of industrial capitalism did not co-evolve with the process of democratization. Even though a free and equal society involves in principle "participation," it does not directly lead to democratic institutions, as the histories of England and Japan show. In this respect, the US followed the same historical process. For example, universal male suffrage was not established upon the nation's founding and women's suffrage was institutionalized by the 20th article amendment to the Constitution (1920). In addition, it was not until Wilson's speech on the entry of the First World War that democracy gained finally a positive meaning, because he declared that the US should be an arsenal of democracy of the world. The banner of democracy has been hence force waved as a slogan of non-territorial and anti-imperialist intervention.

American society at the turn of the century experienced a structural transformation. While the United States became the largest economy in the world, it had to cope with a variety of problems including frequent labor disputes and the rise of populism among farmers in the West. In addition to this, as the Pacific Coast was settled, the frontier line disappeared and with it the safety valve that territorial expansion had provided. Facing these conjunctures, leading forces in this period called the "victory of conservatism" (Kolko 1967) proceeded to reorganize both the societal and political machinery according to a progressive ideology. The core of the Republican Party platform consisted of clearly pro-industry policies implementing high tariffs on imports and prioritizing the maintenance of a sound currency. In brief, the country set itself on the path towards an intense restructuring of society in the midst of the search for a new American nationalism.

Regarding foreign policy, the United States annexed territory in the Pacific and defeated Spain in the Spanish-American War. Consequently its hegemonic reach was

extended and it gained a foothold in the Pacific for the engagement of Asia. In this historical context the United States began to develop a national consciousness that it was the "policeman of the world". The US also successfully promoted its free trade or commercial expansionist Open Door policies in combination with "gunboat diplomacy." Finally, US foreign policy tried to achieve an international consensus built around anti-imperialist policies. Therefore, the US first aspired to create a global system of capitalist production during the era of rival imperialism (Cox, R. 1987: 163). Its model, implicitly or explicitly, sprang from the ideals of the founding fathers, and expressed itself in continental territorial expansion, then became global internationalism. At the turn of the century production relations and international relations began to change drastically, as did authorities eventually bring about a restructuring of both society and the state.

As the communications and transportation revolutions intensified and expanded the contraction of space and time, the Atlantic Ocean began to seem more like the Atlantic Strait. American expansionism was no longer restricted by geographic barriers. Indeed, the United States' hegemony spread to other continents, and secured a foothold grounded in the infrastructure of the communication and transportation revolutions. Internally, nationalist progressives became engaged in a grassroots movement to transform the state, particularly by rearranging the socioeconomic system and the structure of government administration, and the US transformed itself from a relative non-interventionist regime to an intensely interventionist one at home and abroad (De Vroey 1984). Progressive movements were "national-popular" movements under the hegemony of elites who realized the urgent necessity of reconstructing the regime and the state under the banner of internal "reform".

(5) Conclusion

The 1970s and 1980s were a period of transition for the world economy. The much praised Bretton Woods system of embedded liberalism and "growth consensus" which emerged after World War II was shaken by oil shocks, the onset of stagflation, and the rise of Eurocommunism (Ruggie 1982). It is this setting that the Reagan and Thatcher governments, outspoken proponents of neo-liberal globalization, came into power. The 1990s witnessed acceleration in the pace of globalization, the end of the Cold War, and the collapse of the Soviet bloc. The WTO was established to implement a system of neo-liberal norms and regulation to govern the global economy.

At the same time as global governance has been strengthened, there has been resistance to American leadership and attempts to restrict it. At the Seattle Ministerial Meeting of the WTO in 1999, 70,000 people gathered in protest, and the meeting was cut short. Two years later, the first meeting of the World Social Forum was held in Porto Alegre, Brazil in opposition to the World Economic Forum meeting in Davos, Switzerland.

Additionally, much protests was made against the American refusal of the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, the Kyoto Protocol, the International Criminal Court, and the Ottawa Treaty banning the use of land mines. These actions were seen as symptomatic of American "exceptionalism" and "exemptionalism," and countries such as France and Germany, which share certain cultural similarities and capitalist economic structures with the US, criticized American actions as lacking a procedural rationality and legitimacy. It is needless to say that the Non-aligned members of the United Nations expressed the same opinions in the General Assembly. Furthermore, as neo-liberal globalization has widened regional disparities and as the war that George W. Bush began in Iraq without the support of the Security Council has become lodged in a quagmire, the 2006 midterm elections brought home a crushing defeat for Bush's Republican party and created a divided government.

Although it is hard to deny that the restructuring of capitalist socioeconomic relations throughout the world brings with it a certain Americanization, that is not to say that American attempts to push its own agenda and to escape restraints placed on its pursuit of its national interests could standardize the world according its design, nor that there will not be resistance to the use of force to achieve such aims. To the contrary, simply because of the hegemonic position it holds, US economic and foreign policies have been resisted by other countries because neo-liberal globalization awakens not only their own political cultural identity relating to their position in the international arena, but also demands for a democratic vision of the globalized world.

It is important not to gloss over the negative aspects of globalization, which include the diffusion of nuclear weapons and terrorism, regional economic disparities, and environmental and humanitarian problems. The ruthless exploitation of nature has especially caused serious problems for human existence.

As long as America, as a liberal democratic state, searches to substantiate the protection of individual human rights and collective self-determination, it will remain a "land of aspiration." *The Federalist's* reasoning on the subjects of "Pluralistic Empire" only hold true when we can have a recognition of "pluralistic world" based on the "universalization of human rights". And as long as we can reinterpret "empire" as "the world" searching for human rights beyond time and space, we can pursue a means of spreading peace and democracy in the era of globalizing world. In this respect, the right to live in peace expressed in the Japanese Constitution is very significant for the future.⁷⁾

Within the context of globalization, people all over the world have begun relativizing American democracy and striving toward social equality, environmental protection, and

7) "We, the Japanese people, desire peace for all time and are deeply conscious of the high ideals controlling human relationship, and we have determined to preserve our security and existence, trusting in the justice and faith of the peace-loving peoples of the world" (Preface of the Japanese Constitution).

respect for human rights. Our first challenge is to come to a conclusion as to what kind of global governance is needed. To come up with answers to the normative problems the world is now experiencing, we have to look for them at the present conjuncture as a historical context. The present as a history requires us to find answers.

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