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Title

Honor and Political Violence: Micro-level findings from a Survey in Thailand

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Bios

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Abstract

Who participates in political violence? In this study, we investigate the issue at the micro-level, comparing individuals who have used violence in political uprising with those who have not. We develop our argument from the observation that men are strongly overrepresented in political violence, although most men do not participate. Literature on masculinities emphasizes the role of honor and its links to different forms of violence, such as domestic abuse, criminal violence, and violent attitudes. Building on this literature, we discern two separate but related aspects of honor: honor as male societal privilege and control over female sexuality, i.e., *patriarchal values*, and honor as *ideals of masculine toughness*, i.e., the perceived necessity for men to be fierce and respond to affronts with violence or threats of violence in order to preserve status. We argue that patriarchal values combined with ideals of masculine toughness together constitute *honor ideology*, which contributes in turn to the explanation of who participates in political violence. We present new and unique individual-level survey data on these issues, collected in Thailand. We find that honor ideology strongly and robustly predicts a higher likelihood of participating in political violence among male political activists. A number of previous studies find a macro-level relationship between gender equality and peacefulness in a society. This study provides evidence for one micro-level mechanism linking gender equality and political violence at the

macro-level. Based on these results, we conclude that honor ideology endorsement is a driver of violence in political conflicts.

Honor and Political Violence:

Micro-level findings from a Survey in Thailand

Although collective violence during a political struggle can be extremely destructive and have far-reaching consequences, the number of people using violence for political purposes is often surprisingly small. For example, in the conflict over Northern Ireland between 1975 and 1991, the number of troops of the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRI) was at no time higher than 500. Compared to the population of Ukraine of 45 million, the armed Self-Defence Group of the Maidan protest movement is reported to consist of only 12 000 members (UCDP Conflict Encyclopedia). In the case we focus on in this article, Thailand, the political struggles between the so-called "red-shirts" and "yellow-shirts" were predominantly non-violent, but a small number of individuals took to arms, causing destruction and violence that contributed to an escalation of the conflict and, eventually, a military coup.

Who decides to use violence in a political struggle? This important question has been the subject of surprisingly little systematic research. Most studies on the causes of collective violence within a state have used aggregate units of analysis, such as country-years or opposition movements. As a result, the explanations provided by these studies tend to be structural in character, for example pointing to poverty, semi-democratic political institutions, or economic dependency on natural-resource extraction (Blattman and Miguel

2010, Wimmer 2014). While such aggregate structural explanations help to identify societies at risk, they have little or no leverage when it comes to characterizing who uses violence. We thus know very little about what distinguishes the small minority that engages in political violence from the large majority that does not.

A small stream of research has recently begun investigating the causes of violent participation by comparing individuals who have used violence with those who have not. Summarizing the existing evidence on individual-level attributes that predict participation in various forms of collective violence, McDoom notes that there is robust support for sociodemographic characteristics, in particular age and gender, and "more contingent support for socio-economic attributes" (2013, 455). In other words, we know that the relatively small numbers who participate in collective violence are predominantly male young adults. Literature debating why people participate in violence has mostly emphasized different aspects of grievance, selective incentives, and social networks, but there is little consensus on what factors matter. Humphreys and Weinstein argue that several different causes for why people engage in armed violence "coexist within a single civil war" (2008, 437). McDoom states that "[b]eyond age, gender and debatably socio-economic status, a scholarly consensus is crystallizing that violent perpetrators do not possess distinguishing individual characteristics" (2013, 455). What sets participants in political violence apart from non-participants remains a puzzle, something that we address in this article.

We test a novel argument that relates honor ideology to participation in political violence. Our study concerns people who make a decision to participate in violence for political purposes—not people who have been forcefully abducted or conscripted. We develop our argument from the observation that men are strongly overrepresented in political violence, although most men do not participate. Literature on men and masculinities has long emphasized the role of honor and its links to different forms of violence, such as domestic abuse, criminal violence, and violent attitudes (such as approval of torture and racism). Building on this literature, we discern two separate but related strands of research around honor: one that conceives of honor as male societal privilege and control over female sexuality, i.e., *patriarchal values*, and the other that focuses on *ideals of masculine toughness*, i.e., the perceived necessity for men to be fierce and respond to affronts with violence or threats of violence in order to preserve their status. We argue that patriarchal values combined with ideals of masculine toughness together constitute *honor ideology*, which contributes in turn to the explanation of who fights in political conflicts. We propose that patriarchal values lead to othering, and that masculine toughness drives violent aggression, so that honor ideology predisposes men to participate in political violence. Previous studies have explained why variables such as right wing authoritarianism or machismo predispose people for extremism or sexual violence; we similarly investigate the role of honor ideology in political violence.

Political Violence in Thailand

Thailand's modern history is filled with political conflict, mass demonstrations, and military takeovers (see e.g. Bjarnegård 2013). The two most recent military coups took place in 2006 and 2014. In this article, we focus on the volatile period between these two coups. During this time, two groups were taking turns demonstrating in the streets. The groups were often referred to simply as the "yellow-shirts" and the "red-shirts", but the official names of the main actors were the People's Alliance for Democracy (PAD) and the National United Front of Democracy Against Dictatorship (UDD) respectively. The conflict mainly played out in the streets of the capital Bangkok, but its origins lay in a division between city and countryside. The privileged, urban yellow-shirts mobilized against the increasing influence of the red-shirts who were of predominantly rural origin, so called 'urbanized villagers' (Naruemon and McCargo 2011). The red-shirts were initially mobilized to oppose the coup in 2006 that had ousted then Prime Minister Thaksin Shinawatra (e.g. Dalpino 2011). Increasingly, however, the movement went beyond being about supporting Thaksin, to centering on questions of access to development, wealth, political inclusion and influence more generally (Sopranzetti 2012). The vast majority of the tens of thousands of demonstrators were peaceful, orderly, and with moderate demands (Pasuk and Baker 2012, Stent 2012).

Officially, the red-shirts and yellow-shirts depicted themselves as demonstrating citizens and they advocated non-violent but increasingly disruptive methods, such as occupying government buildings, international airports, and large parts of the capital Bangkok (Chaisukkosol 2010, Montesano 2012). However, the two groups were growing social movements rather than coherent organizations. As such, they were loosely made up of people with similar ideological convictions, but with internal differences and fractured leaderships that resulted in different sub-elements advocating different strategies and methods – including the question of whether or not to use violence (Chambers 2010, Naruemon and McCargo 2011). For instance, even though the red-shirt UDD leaders publically distanced themselves from the alleged chief trainer of a hardcore armed group known as the "men in black", "Seh Daeng[1]", a personality cult developed around him and many ordinary UDD members were inspired by him "as a symbol of masculinity, daring, and resistance to authority" (Naruemon and McCargo 2011, 998).

From time to time, violence did erupt during demonstrations, but it remains unclear which individuals used violence, and under whose orders. Death tolls and injuries rose when the police stepped in against the yellow-shirts occupying the government complex in 2008, and in particular when the military was called in to disperse the red-shirts that were occupying entire blocks of central Bangkok in 2010 (e.g. Askew 2010, Montesano 2012,

[1] His real name was Khattiya Sawasdipol. He died from a sniper attack in May 2010.

Prasirtsuk 2012). In 2010, despite the fact that most demonstrators were non-violent, buildings and property worth billions of baht were destroyed and around one hundred people were killed, most by the military. When the military launched their 2014 coup, they argued that they had to restore peace and order to the country.

Over time, there were more radical and armed elements aligning with both movements, and these armed elements were involved in attacks that included the use of assault weapons and arson (e.g. Naruemon and McCargo 2011). However, the red-shirts and yellow-shirts in Thailand cannot be described as armed rebel groups with a primary purpose of fighting state forces or other groups using violence. The vast majority of protesters did not use violence and were not armed. Guns and weapons were not openly encouraged or centrally distributed through any official channels. In addition, there is no indication that the underground militias used forced recruitment. Although violent methods may have been encouraged by certain leaders, and although some leaders may have inspired protesters to use violence, ultimately participation in political violence was voluntary. Some protesters were prepared to use violence, although not necessarily planning to do so. Hence, it seems to have been an individual decision to bring a gun or other type of weapon to a demonstration. Some may have armed themselves to be prepared to defend themselves if attacked. For instance, much of the 2010 violence and destruction of infrastructure took place as the military intervened against protesters.

This study zooms in on the small minority of protestors who decided to use violence in the red-yellow conflict in Thailand, despite being part of predominantly non-violent social movements.

Previous Explanations for Participation in Political Violence

As mentioned, a small number of studies have in recent years begun to systematically examine what sets voluntary participants in collective violence apart from the great majority that never joins. The most recurrent results are that young men are highly overrepresented. The fact that all forms of collective violence are extremely gendered is often not problematized in the studies reviewed here, but is rather taken as a given, so that male sex is viewed merely as a control variable or selection criterion.[2] Yet, the estimation that less than one percent of all warriors in history have been women (Goldstein 2001, 10) needs to be taken into account when searching for explanations of who takes to arms.

Beyond sex and age, different socioeconomic attributes have been found to predict violent participation, although the results differ between studies. Humphreys and Weinstein (2008) find that political alienation, poverty, and low education were significant predictors for voluntarily taking up arms in the civil war in Sierra Leone. The authors also report that fighters

[2] Important exceptions include Carpenter (2006), who discusses male over-representation in war mortality rates as gender-based violence, and Thomas and Bond (2015), who discuss the openness of violent political organisations to recruit women as key for explaining female participation in violent armed conflict.

were offered money to join, and that they said they felt safer as part of an armed group.

Analyzing the economic profile of perpetrators of the Rwandan genocide, Verwimp (2005) finds that both those who were economically and socially vulnerable, and therefore potentially had much to gain from participation, and the local elite who had something to defend, were overrepresented among the killers (Verwimp 2005). A study of participation in deadly riots in Nigeria shows that the number of individuals with strong grievances was much higher than the actual number of participants (Scacco 2008). Scacco argues that grievance measures therefore are poor predictors of violent participation. Instead, she finds that the interaction of subjectively experienced grievances with membership in local social networks explains who participates and who does not: People who felt poor in comparison to their neighbors and who attended local community meetings before the outbreak of riots were more likely to participate. Lower education also predicted participation (Scacco 2008).

McDoom (2013) finds that individuals were more prone to participate in the Rwandan genocide if they lived in the same neighborhood as other participants, and if other family members participated; and that these results cannot be accounted for by age, gender, or socioeconomic status. McDoom thus concludes that it matters where an individual lives, and that mechanisms of social influence, such as peer pressure, help to distinguish who becomes a killer.

Other studies focus more on in-depth understanding of the participants of political violence than on comparison with non-participants. For example, a study of recruitment to the Viet Cong guerillas in the context of the Vietnam war in the early 1960s lists a number of reasons for joining, including discontent and safety concerns, and specifically highlights that for many young recruits "the desire to win glory, or perhaps just the respect of their community" was the main reason for joining (Donnell 1967, xii). In a similar vein, Wood (2001) argues that individuals who joined the FMLN insurgents in El Salvador in the 1970s reaped emotional benefits, because participation expressed their moral outrage at the injustices they had experienced, often in the form of government violence against them or their families. Fighting represented the reassertion of their personal dignity, and led to a sense of pride. These guerillas were not expecting any material benefits; for them, fighting had a value in itself despite the obvious risks and costs, because of these emotional benefits.

Considerable progress has been made in research about individual-level determinants of participation in political violence, but we still know little about what differentiates participants from non-participants.[3] Explanatory factors like poverty, political alienation, and local networks would seem to pertain to more individuals than the very small number who actually join out of choice. Explanations that involve seeking glory and respect in the local

[3] With 'participants' we mean those who use violence in political struggle. We operationalize 'participation' for the purposes of our study in the Methods section below.

community, and expressing outrage over injustices, are intriguing but also raise new questions. Why is it that only some individuals seek glory and respect through violence? As researchers repeatedly point out, there is also a risk that people misrepresent their true motivations in self-serving ways when asked about why they fought (e.g., Collier 2007). In what follows, we argue that men who more strongly endorse honor ideology are more prone to political violence. We then proceed to test this hypothesis in survey data collected among both participants and non-participants in political violence in Thailand.

Approaching Honor

In the most general sense, honor has been defined as "the right to be treated as having a certain worth" and "a right to respect" (Stewart 1994, 21). Also in a general sense, most societies and cultures have a concept of honor that means something along the lines of honesty, integrity, and virtuous conduct. Honor also has a more sinister meaning, however. The traits and behaviors that give a person honor in this latter sense concern strength and domination, and the respect that is earned entails the right to privilege and precedence (Nisbett and Cohen 1996, 4). Two conceptions of honor that involve domination and precedence can be discerned in the literature: patriarchal values and ideals of masculine toughness. We suggest that both must be examined in order to

understand how honor can be the driving force behind an individual's decision to participate in violence

Patriarchal Values and Othering. The first strand of research on honor emphasizes the role of patriarchal values in honor. Patriarchal values entail a fundamental dichotomization between "us" and "them," namely between men and women, and a hierarchical power relationship privileging men. The othering of women means that they are devalued, deprived of privileges, and controlled, relative to men. The two pillars of this "othering logic" correspond to the so-called "gender system." Hirdman (1988) claims that the gender system shows a regularity based on two different rules or principles: "The first is the rule of distinctive separation, which can be seen in the division of virtually all areas and levels of life into male and female categories. The second rule is that of the male norm, i.e. the way that higher value is almost automatically accorded to things masculine" (Hirdman 1988, 63).
Hudson and co-authors (Hudson and den Boer 2012, Hudson et al. 2009, Hudson et al. 2012) review the study of othering related to patriarchal values, and link such othering to proneness to violence. Psychological studies show that human beings notice three basic differences almost from infancy: age, gender, and race. Furthermore, the first adults that most children observe regularly interacting are their parents. The way in which men and women relate to each other therefore becomes the fundamental template for differentiating between groups of people, and to the extent that the father

dominates and controls the mother, this model teaches the child that domination by one group over another is appropriate and normal.

Psychological research also shows that children who grow up in violent homes have a greater tendency to become violent themselves (Alexander, Morre, and Alexander 1991, Ehrensaft et al. 2003, see also Velitchkova 2015). Hudson et al. hold that "the first 'other' is always woman, and if one can make peace with the first other without resorting to coercion, one will have a template in place to know how to do so with other 'others'" (Hudson and den Boer 2012, 317). In other words, when patriarchal dominance by men over women is reduced, the type of othering that breeds intolerance and violence is weakened, and more companionate marriages instead serve as templates for respectful and equal interaction with others (Hudson and den Boer 2012, Hudson et al. 2009, Hudson et al. 2012).

The process of othering and dehumanizing has been referred to as a sociopsychological process that is a prerequisite for being able to consider killing another human being (Potts and Hayden 2008, 50). In the context of war, such othering has been argued to lead to the perception that the perpetration of violence—including killing—is the right thing to do (Staub 1989). This psychological process implies a strong differentiation between oneself and the enemy, to the extent that enemies are devalued and excluded from the moral realm (Staub 2006). In line with the literature reviewed above we argue that the othering and devaluation of group differences inherent in

patriarchal values provide a template for justifying violence against collectives such as political opponents.

A host of studies have found that patriarchal values are related to violent outcomes, both at the societal level and at the individual level. Cohrs et al. (2007) argue that egalitarian values in society are linked to more positive orientations toward human rights; conversely, Feather and McKee (2012) demonstrate a link between the value systems underlying right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation on the one hand, and prejudice against women on the other. In a meta-analytic review, Murnen, Wright, and Kaluzny (2002) found that the strongest predictor for sexual violence against women was a combination of adhering to a masculine ideology that included the acceptance of aggression against women and holding negative, hostile beliefs regarding women. Santana and colleagues (2006) found that men who reported more "traditional masculine gender role ideologies" had engaged in sexual risk behaviors and Intimate Partner Violence (IPV) perpetration to a significantly higher degree than others. In a recent study on male perpetration of IPV conducted in the Asia-Pacific region involving over 10,000 men in six countries, Jewkes et al. (2013) found that the most important explanatory factors for IPV were norms and practices relating to gender and relationships. Using data from Africa, Velitchkova (2015) shows that individuals who support patriarchal norms have a stronger tendency to participate in political violence. These studies follow a long line of scholarship pointing to the significance of sex role stereotyping (Burt 1980),

norms of hypermasculinity (Mosher and Sirkin 1984), and hostile masculinity (Malamuth et al. 1991) for explaining men's violence against women.

Ideals of Masculine Toughness. The second strand of research looks at honor from the point of view of ideals of masculine toughness. According to this perspective, honor depends on violence or threats of violence as a means to protect a man's reputation and maintain his societal status. Indeed, Nisbett and Cohen claim that the distinguishing feature of cultures where honor is strong is that men "are prepared to fight or even to kill to defend their reputations as honorable men" (1996, 4). Another key aspect is the importance placed on insults and displays of disrespect. If a man's social standing and power is built on his preparedness for violence, not reacting to an insult can be interpreted as a lack of strength and an incapacity to protect himself and what belongs to him—including the female members of his family (Nisbett and Cohen 1996). The extent to which insults or affronts to a man's female family members are considered threats to the man's own honor is, in turn, related to patriarchal values. In other words, trying to live up to the ideals of masculine toughness requires men, in particular, to use violence.

In many societies, "honor" has been used as justification for inter-personal violence. Ethnographer David Mandelbaum, studying honor in North India, describes this concept as "a word often heard in men's talk, particularly when the talk is about conflict, rivalry and struggle. It crops up as a kind of final explanation for motivation, whether for acts of aggression or

beneficence" (Mandelbaum 1988, 20). Several other studies also find that attitudes that are linked to this understanding of honor are important factors in the study of violence. Barnes, Brown, and Osterman found that ideals of masculine toughness among men in the USA were linked to more militant attitudes toward terrorism, such as supporting the use of torture during interrogation (Barnes, Brown, and Osterman 2012).

Similarly, the link between honor and violence is key in the literature on the "code of the street" (Anderson 1999). Anderson found that in low-status groups in disadvantaged communities, self-respect and honor depended on cultivating a "tough reputation" whereby any insult must be avenged with violence. Brezina et al. (2004) conducted a longitudinal study with 900 adolescent men and found that youths who held street-code beliefs, i.e., beliefs that violence is an appropriate and legitimate response to disrespect and insults to honor, were involved in more violence than others one year later, including deadly violence.

Honor Ideology as Patriarchal Values and Ideals of Masculine Toughness

We conceive of honor ideology as the combination of patriarchal values and ideals of masculine toughness. Honor ideology is present in some way or another in all contemporary countries and cultures; although individuals vary in the degree to which they endorse it. We argue that the othering associated

with patriarchal values predisposes men to violence, and that it becomes particularly dangerous when it is combined with the proneness to violence that is associated with idealizing masculine toughness. We also think that these two components tend to covary to some extent, although most previous research has focused on either one or the other. We will therefore test whether honor ideology in this sense, i.e., the combination of patriarchal values and ideals of masculine toughness, predicts participation in political violence in Thailand.

We are inspired by Mahalingam, who states that the reputation and standing of men in cultures of honor hinge to a large extent on two things: men demonstrating aggressiveness in the face of insult; and the chastity and loyalty of their female family members (Mahalingam 2007). There is also a feminist literature investigating the role of honor in nationalism that has, at least implicitly, linked patriarchal values and ideals of masculine toughness to the concept of honor. In nationalist discourses, the nation is often likened to a family; as such, men and women are assigned different roles. As wives and mothers, women are bearers of honor, and women's sexuality is to be controlled and defended by men (McGregor 2003, Nagel 2005).

Ideals of masculine toughness endow individuals steeped in patriarchal values with an additional impetus to violence. Thus, we propose that patriarchal values leads to othering, and that masculine toughness drives violent aggression, so that the combination of patriarchal values and masculine toughness, which we refer to as honor ideology, predisposes men to participate

in political violence. We will investigate this proposition with the help of survey data on attitudes regarding gender and actual participation in political violence in Thailand. As described above, Thailand has seen several episodes of political violence in recent years. While both the red-shirt movement and the yellow-shirt movement described themselves as peaceful, some radical elements used violence. Thailand thus represents a case where there have been ample opportunities for participating in political violence, and where provocations and calls to stand up for a particular cause have been fairly common. Structural and organizational characteristics inherent in the political conflict provided a context in which violence was more of an option, but individual activists have nevertheless had a choice. Thailand is also a country in which gender roles have shifted quite remarkably in some areas but not in others. Women are highly visible in the public sphere and are participating in the workforce to a large extent, but they have not reached high levels of representation in the political sphere (Bjarnegård 2015). Thailand thus provides an interesting case for our analysis as we can expect to find variation both in participation in political violence and in attitudes concerning honor ideology. Focusing on Thailand also addresses the identified lack of studies on honor and violence in East Asia (Vandello and Cohen 2008).

Design and Methods[4]

This study builds on the *Survey on Gender, Politics and Violence in Thailand* (more information on the survey design can be found at [insert webaddress]), that was conducted in collaboration with King Prajadhipok's Institute (KPI) in Bangkok, Thailand. Data was collected between November 2012 and February 2013, in total 1,200 questionnaires were completed. We assumed that participation in political violence (our dependent variable) will generally be very rare in Thailand, as in most societies. We therefore collected two sets of data: first, a cluster survey of 200 respondents who are politically active as either red-shirts or yellow-shirts; and second, a nationally representative sample of 1,000 respondents. The reason for drawing special samples with politically active and possibly radical red-shirt and yellow-shirt members was to try to obtain larger variation in the rare phenomenon of participation in political violence. The activist sample is the main sample of interest for this study. We will however use the nationally representative sample to construct our measures of honor in Thailand.

The two hundred political activist interviewees—100 red-shirts and 100 yellow-shirts—were chosen by purposive sampling, with 20 interviewees per district in 10 districts that were considered to be either red or yellow strongholds. The representative survey of the national population was

[4] In the following, a short description of the main characteristics of the design and methods will be provided. A more detailed description of the design and methods of the survey study can be found in Appendix A.

conducted by selecting one thousand interviewees using multistage random sampling: (1) regional sampling, (2) district sampling, (3) sub-district sampling, and (4) household sampling. Thirty-seven out of the 76 provinces in Thailand were surveyed. More details about both the purposive sampling of red-shirt and yellow-shirt activists, as well as about the nationally representative survey of the Thai population can be found in Appendix A.

Most of the survey questionnaire was conducted in face-to-face interviews, however, one section containing sensitive questions on personal experiences of violence and the personal use of violence was self-administered on paper. This has been recommended in earlier studies that have demonstrated that self-administration of sensitive questions tends to reduce interviewer effects such as social desirability bias and thereby increase the probability of getting honest answers even to sensitive questions (see Jewkes et al 2013 and more information in the Appendix A). According to our argument, honor ideology predisposes men, but not women, to participate in political violence. Consequently, we only use the male part of the sample in the analyses. There are 113 men among the 200 activists, and 572 men in the nationally representative sample.[5]

[5] Both our theory and our analysis focus on explaining male violence. Although the overwhelming majority of warriors in the history of warfare have indeed been male, we do acknowledge that women become warriors too. Out of the 200 activists, 8 women and 25 men engaged in PPV. The ideologies and motives of women participating in political violence, and possible links to honor ideology, are in our view an important topic for future research.

Dependent Variable: Participation in Political Violence (PPV). The dependent variable is "participation in political violence," and it is measured by the following three questions:

(1) "Have you ever carried a weapon (e.g., a gun, bomb, knife, or club) during a protest for political purposes?"

(2) "Have you ever used a weapon during a protest for political purposes?"

(3) "Have you ever caused damage (to a building, car, or infrastructure, or assaulted others) during a protest for political purposes?"

Responding "yes" to any of these three questions yields a code 1 on the dichotomous dependent variable PPV because it denotes that an activist has either carried out acts of violence or at least considered violence as an option before going to a demonstration.

In an alternative test we used a more restrictive dependent variable. This alternative dependent variable does not include causing material damage as part of PPV; in this test, only bringing a weapon to or using a weapon in a political protest count as PPV. In yet another alternative test we used an even more restrictive dependent variable. This alternative dependent variable takes the value 1 if the respondent admits to actually having used a weapon during a protest for political purposes, and zero otherwise.

Explanatory Variables. In the theory section, we argued that honor ideology should be associated with PPV, and that honor ideology consists of the

combination of an attitude that embraces ideals of patriarchal values and masculine toughness . The implication of our theoretical argument is that the appropriate way of testing for the effect of honor ideology is to test for the effects on PPV of the interaction of patriarchal values and ideals of masculine toughness.

Based on previous research, we developed survey questions to capture our proposed construct of honor ideology. In doing so, we take on Vandello and Cohen's call for developing better "individual-level measures of the endorsement of honor beliefs and values" (2008, p 662).[6]

To capture the first element of honor ideology, we constructed the measure of *Patriarchal Values* as an index, composed of a combination of nine different questions. The questions are developed from previous theory and surveys (Vandello and Cohen 2003, Figueredo et al 2001, Neff 2001) and the index has been constructed using factor analysis. In line with theory, we argue that patriarchal values consist of the belief in male privilege and dominance in society at large as well as in the family, and that they extend to control over female sexuality. We thus expect that a set of questionnaire items tapping into these attitudes can be combined to measure patriarchal values with more precision than any item used by itself. We submitted nine items that we – based on theory – believe tap into patriarchal values to an exploratory

[6] Our study also addresses two additional lacunae articulated by these authors: the need to bring the research on honor and violence to East Asia, as well as to groups outside the traditional college student sample (Vandello and Cohen, 2008).

factor analysis using principal axis factoring as the extraction method (Table 1). These nine items measure the view of appropriate roles of men and women in different spheres of life, including in the family, education, the working-life and in politics. One dominant factor emerged, accounting for 82% of the total variance, with an eigenvalue of 2.34. No other factor had an eigenvalue greater than 1, which indicates that a single dimension captured the bulk of the variation in these items. All items load positively and strongly or moderately strongly on the first factor, and the alpha internal reliability value for the resulting index is an acceptable 0.67. We therefore use these items combined as our index of patriarchal values. The last column of Table 1 gives the regression coefficients used to estimate the individual scores. Despite referring to different spheres in life, this analysis demonstrates that these items taken together represent a single dimension that has to do with the view of the appropriate roles of men and women in a society. We will hereafter refer to this index as *Patriarchal Values*.

[Table 1]

Ideals of Masculine Toughness (henceforth shortened to *Masculine Toughness*) is captured by two statements derived from previous theory (Nisbett and Cohen 1996, Brezina et al 2004, Barnes et al 2012) and by adding the answers to these two survey items. The first item is a dichotomous indicator that reflects whether or not the respondent agrees with the statement "A man shouldn't show emotions and weakness." The second item is likewise

a dichotomous indicator that reflects whether or not the respondent agrees with the statement "It is fair for a man to assault anyone who has spread a rumor that he is a coward." Taken together, these two statements capture the main components of masculine toughness as described in the literature: that a man's reputation and social status is upheld by emotional detachment and by displaying signs of strength (for example through using threats of violence), not least in response to insults and signs of disrespect (Nisbett and Cohen 1996). The resulting variable *Masculine Toughness* thus ranges from 0 to 2 depending on whether the respondent agreed with none of the two items, with one item, or endorsed both statements.

Based on our reading of the relevant literatures, we argue that *Patriarchal Values* and *Masculine Toughness* are separate but related elements of honor ideology. The correlation between *Patriarchal Values* and *Masculine Toughness* is positive as expected, but not very strong (0.23). Moreover, if the variable measuring *Masculine Toughness* is added to the factor analysis of the items that constitute *Patriarchal Values*, it loads only weakly on the first factor (0.27). Thus, we consider it to be warranted to treat *Patriarchal Values* and *Masculine Toughness* as separate but related elements of honor ideology. Next, we will test whether these two elements indeed interact as we expect in explaining PPV.

We construct the interaction term *Patriarchal Values* × *Masculine Toughness* by multiplying the index *Patriarchal Values* with the indicator for *Masculine Toughness*. When testing for the effect of honor ideology, we will

thus include both the component variables *Patriarchal Values* and *Masculine Toughness* as well as the interaction term *Patriarchal Values* × *Masculine Toughness* in our baseline regression models, as is standard practice.

In addition, we used a number of control variables: age, education, income, importance of politics, importance of religion, marital status, identification as a Muslim, identification as a red sympathizer, identification as a yellow sympathizer, identification as a military veteran, identification as Malayu ethnicity and employment status.

Results

The purpose of our analysis is to determine if honor ideology played a part in the individual decisions to participate in or prepare for political violence among red-shirt and yellow-shirt activists in Thailand. Table 2 (below) presents multivariate logit regressions testing whether honor ideology is associated with a higher likelihood of PPV among male activists.

[Table 2]

In Model 1 we examine the effect of honor ideology by including the two component variables *Patriarchal Values* and *Masculine Toughness* together with the interaction term *Patriarchal Values* × *Masculine Toughness*. Model 2 tests for an unconditional effect of patriarchal values, but no significant effect is found for the unconditional effect. Model 3 uses the first

alternative, more restrictive dependent variable (which does not include causing material damage). Model 4 uses the most restrictive dependent variable (which only includes admitting to actual use of a weapon during political protests).

Interpreting the coefficients for the components that together capture an interaction is not straightforward when dealing with regressions with a binary dependent variable. The sign, magnitude, and significance of the individual coefficients that together capture the interaction effect (*Patriarchal Values*, *Masculine Toughness*, and *Patriarchal Values* × *Masculine Toughness*) tell us nothing in and of themselves about the existence and statistical significance of substantially meaningful interaction effects in terms of the relevant probabilities (i.e., the likelihood of PPV). As pointed out by Ai and Norton, the interaction effect can be non-zero even if the coefficient of the interaction term (Patriarchal Values × Masculine Toughness) is 0; the statistical significance of the interaction cannot be tested with a simple *t*-test on the interaction term; and the sign of the interaction term is not necessarily the same as the sign of the interaction effect (Ai and Norton 2003). Using the software *Clarify* (Tomz, Wittenberg, and King 2003; King, Tomz, and Wittenberg 2000), we calculated the change in the predicted risk of PPV for different combinations of variable values in Model 1.

[Table 3]

Table 3 reports the change in the predicted likelihood of PPV for three different scenarios, all three of which show the effect of a change in *Masculine Toughness* from 0 to 1 (41% of the male activists had *Masculine Toughness* = 0 whereas 47% scored 1 on this variable and 12% had the highest value 2). The three scenarios differ in the value of the conditioning variable *Patriarchal Values*, and scenario [1] looks at low patriarchal values. Note that the effects in scenario [1] are not statistically significant, and that this finding agrees with our expectations. In other words, *Masculine Toughness* has no statistically significant effect when *Patriarchal Values* are low. It is the combination of the two components of honor that creates the predisposition to participate in political violence. The effect of the one unit increase from 0 to 1 in *Masculine Toughness* is significant from levels of *Patriarchal Values* equal to or greater than –.57, which among the activists is the 59th percentile of this variable. Scenario [2] shows the effect of a change in Masculine Toughness from 0 to 1 when patriarchal values are somewhat higher. The statistically significant effect at the 59th percentile is strong in that the predicted probability of PPV is more than twice as high (26% compared to 11%) for a male activist with *Masculine Toughness* 1 compared to an activist with *Masculine Toughness* 0. Strikingly, scenario [3] shows a very strong effect when Patriarchal Values are high, at the 90th percentile: a change in *Masculine Toughness* from 0 to 1 now corresponds to a more than four-fold increase in the risk of PPV, from 6% to 27%.

These numbers show that *Patriarchal Values* has a strong conditioning effect on the relationship between *Masculine Toughness* and PPV. Moreover, the effect of *Masculine Toughness* is very strong in substantial terms when combined with higher levels of *Patriarchal Values*. On the other hand, there is no statistically significant relationship between *Masculine Toughness* and PPV among the men with low *Patriarchal Values.* These results are in line with our arguments about the function of honor ideology with regard to participation in political violence. In other words, red-shirt and yellow-shirt male activists with strongly patriarchal values in combination with strong ideals of masculine toughness were far more likely to participate in political violence than were activists who did not agree with these values and ideals. These gender ideologies influence the propensity to use violence more than the political ideologies they fight over. Neither being a yellow-short nor being a red-shirt has any statistically significant effect on participation in political violence in any of the models (as shown in Appendix B, tables B3, B6, B10).

As pointed out above, we analyze the data on activists; given how rare participation in political violence is among ordinary people it follows that it would have been very difficult to obtain statistically significant results had we instead used the nationally representative sample. Indeed, only eight men (out of 533) in the nationally representative sample reported having participated in political violence, and hence running multiple logistic regression using this sample is not meaningful because of the very small cell counts. Seven out of the eight agreed with one of the two items used to capture *Masculine*

Toughness, whereas the eighth participating non-activist did not answer the question about men showing emotions and weakness. Furthermore, the average value of *Patriarchal Values* among those who had participated in political violence was more than three times the average value of those who had not (0.55 versus 0.16) in the national sample. These numbers together suggest that honor ideology may operate in a similar way among non-activists, although this cannot be tested with these data. The unsurprising fact that participation in political violence is much rarer among ordinary Thais than among the activists also suggests that other violent triggers exist among activists. Potentially encouragement to use violence from within the movement, or inspiration from idealized radical front-figures may trigger violence among those that subscribe to honor ideology and who already see violence as a justifiable way of solving political conflicts. The importance of such triggers for honor ideology to translate into violent political actions is an important avenue for future research

A number of control variables were added, one by one, to each of Models 1-3[7]. The controls failed to achieve significance, whereas the results for honor ideology remained similar throughout. We must also ask: Is it possible that embracing honor ideology is a consequence of being exposed to violence or threats of violence, so that the direction of causality is from participation in violence to honor ideology? A coherent argument can be made

[7] See tables B1 to B11 in Appendix B.

that people become more warlike in their attitudes when their environment and experiences suggest that there is a need for manly warriors. We explored this possibility in several different ways, and conclude that there is no indication that our results are due to reverse causality.

First, we tested whether honor ideology is systematically related to having served in the armed forces. All armed forces socialize recruits into a warrior role and try to convince them of the necessity and virtue of military service. One would thus expect that men who have served in the armed forces would espouse honor ideology more strongly than other men, if the causal direction is the opposite from what we hypothesize. In Thailand, conscription among men is enforced through lottery. As a result, a large proportion of the men in Thailand have served in the armed forces (18% in our survey). However, in numerous tests, we find no indication that honor ideology is stronger among men who have served in the military compared to other men[8].

Furthermore, our survey includes questions on whether the respondent has been a victim of violence or threats of violence, personally or directed against one's family. If the causal direction goes from violence to honor ideology, we would expect to see that people who have experienced violence or threats of violence have higher honor ideology; however, numerous tests failed to show any such relationship[9].

[8] See Appendix B, tables B15 to B17,
[9] Se Appendix B, tables B15 to B17.

Conclusion

In this study, we set out to investigate to what extent honor ideology predicts participation in political violence. Previous research has established that the level of gender equality within a country correlates to the peacefulness of the state (Caprioli 2005, Melander 2005, Hudson et al. 2009, Gleditsch et al. 2011, Reiter 2014). This study provides unique micro-level evidence that links misogynist attitudes with self-reported participation in political violence among political activists. Do gender-unequal norms increase the likelihood of participating in political conflict? Our findings suggest that yes, they do. In particular, male activists who more strongly endorse honor ideology are more likely to have participated in political violence than other male activists. We argue that honor ideology consists of patriarchal values (i.e., male societal privilege and control over female sexuality) combined with ideals of masculine toughness (i.e., the perceived necessity for men to display fierceness in order to preserve their status) .

Thailand is a country that has seen recent political violence in predominantly non-violent red- and yellow-shirt demonstrations. More than a hundred fatalities were incurred and enormous material damage inflicted in this political conflict. We collected and analyzed survey data in order to examine the effect of honor ideology on participation in political violence in Thailand. We found that honor ideology strongly and robustly predicted a higher likelihood of participation among male political activists in Thailand.

Based on these results, we conclude that honor ideology endorsement is a driver of violence in political conflicts.

We should mention a few caveats. The first is that while participation in political violence is rare, it is also likely to be underreported. As in all survey work, receiving honest, truthful answers to questions—particularly sensitive questions—is a challenge. Biases such as acquiescence ("yah-saying") and social-desirability rating (the tendency to answer in a way that gives others a favorable view of oneself) are always part of survey responses. In order to minimize such effects, sensitive questions were asked in a self-administered part of this survey. This should also minimize any potential incentive of honor endorsers to exaggerate their participation in violence to appear more manly, since not even the enumerator will know the respondent's answers.[10]

It should also be noted that the statistically significant and robust effects that we found pertain to male political activists. By design, our sample of political activists differs from the complementary nationally representative sample. Whereas participation in political violence is extremely rare among ordinary Thais (1.5% of the men reported that they had participated), a substantial share, namely 23%, of the male political activists had participated in political violence. Previous research has shown that misogynist ideals increases violence in families, here we demonstrate that this is also true for

[10] More details on the self-administration procedure can be found in Appendix A.

political activists: future research should investigate to what extent this is also the case for political violence among ordinary people. Relatedly, the question of how and why a person becomes a political activist in the first place also deserves more study.

Furthermore, we argue in this paper that honor ideology pivots around two elements: patriarchal values and ideals of masculine toughness. While these factors seem to be fundamental and universal elements of honor ideology, they are found to a different extent and take different forms around the world. Therefore, the measures developed in this paper are likely to be culture-specific, and if applied to other contexts, will require care in adapting wording and meaning.

We also acknowledge that we do not know the scope conditions for the explanation that participation in political violence in part is driven by honor ideology. Does this explanation only apply to the kind of violent protesting and street clashes that characterize the recent turmoil in Thailand, or is the explanation applicable also to other forms of political violence such as guerilla warfare and massacres? This is an important issue for further study. We argue that it is likely that honor ideology will turn out to be a driver also of other forms of political violence as all forms of deadly political violence exhibit the particular pattern that an overwhelming majority of those who fight are men while at the same time most men never take up arms even under conditions of political conflict.

Future research should also explore the multifaceted concept of honor ideology further. We need to conceptually and empirically refine this concept in order to determine exactly what it entails. We also need to complement studies of one country, such as this one, with comparisons of other contexts. Much remains to be done, but the micro-level findings presented in this article provide important and unique insights into what causes male political activists to use violence for political purposes.

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Table 1. Results of Exploratory Factor Analysis of *Patriarchal Values*

Item	Range	Factor Loading	Scoring Coefficients
Overall, men are better political leaders than women.	Strongly Disagree/Disagree/Agree/Strongly Agree	0.56	0.18
Overall, men are able to administrate a business better than women.	Strongly Disagree/Disagree/Agree/Strongly Agree	0.64	0.27
University education is more important to men than to women.	Strongly Disagree/Disagree/Agree/Strongly Agree	0.54	0.17
The husband should make the final decision on all matters.	Strongly Disagree/Disagree/Agree/Strongly Agree	0.50	0.15
A woman should bear violence to keep her family together.	Ten-step scale: 1 (Disagree) – 10 (Agree)	0.40	0.11
It is appropriate to beat a child for his/her good upbringing.	Ten-step scale: 1 (Disagree) – 10 (Agree)	0.44	0.12
A good wife should obey her husband despite disagreeing with him.	Ten-step scale: 1 (Disagree) – 10 (Agree)	0.59	0.21
A woman should remain a virgin until her marriage.	Ten-step scale: 1 (Disagree) – 10 (Agree)	0.46	0.16
It is a man's duty to protect his family's dignity by watching over his woman's chastity and ethics.	Ten-step scale: 1 (Disagree) – 10 (Agree)	0.39	0.13

Table 2. The Effect of Honor Ideology on Participation in Political Violence

	Model 1	Model 2	Model 3	Model 4
Dependent Variable	Standard	Standard	Alternative DV1	Alternative DV2
Patriarchal Values	-0.74	0.35	-0.68	-1.03
	(0.45)	(0.28)	(0.47)	(0.63)
Masculine Toughness	1.53		1.56	1.55
	(0.56)**		(0.59)**	(0.783)*
Patriarchal Values ×	0.78		0.87	0.99
Masculine Toughness	(0.42)		(0.45)	(0.48)*
Constant	-2.59	-0.94	-2.73	-4.02
	(0.70)**	(0.29)	(0.73)**	(1.11)**
N	83	87	83	83

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Table 3. Changes in Predicted Probability of Participation in Political Violence when *Masculine Toughness changes from 0 to 1.*

Scenario [1]	Scenario [2]	Scenario [3]
Low Patriarchal Values = –1.97 (10th percentile)	*Medium Patriarchal Values = –.57 (41st percentile)*	*High Patriarchal Values = 1.1 (90th percentile)*
Not significant	11% to 26%	6% to 27%

Appendix A: Detailed description of survey design and methods

The survey study was conducted in close collaboration with King Prajadhipok's Institute (KPI) in Bangkok.[11] The survey questionnaire was carefully elaborated on, translated, and pilot-tested.[12] Data was collected between November 2012 and February 2013. Data collection was coordinated by a local coordinator in each survey location. The survey coordinators were respected academics (in political science/social science) from local universities in each surveyed area. Each survey coordinator worked with an interviewer team consisting of a small group of university students (around 10 per team) with previous experience of survey interviewing for KPI. Data collection in each location began with a training session.[13] In total, 1,200 questionnaires were completed.

Sampling. A key aim of this project is to contribute to the understanding of who participates in political violence. Thus, we want to examine what characteristics set activists who are prone to political violence apart from other people in Thailand. In order to enable the best possible test of our theoretically derived expectations, we therefore needed a sample with variation in the

[11] KPI is an independent research organization under the Thai National Assembly with long experience of working with national surveys in Thailand. Among others, they have carried out surveys for the Asia Barometer and World Values Survey.

[12] The questionnaire is available from the authors upon request.

[13] The training session consisted of the following modules: presentation of the project, interview techniques in general, interview techniques in relation to sensitive questions, research ethics and anonymity, reading and understanding the questionnaire, explanation of the codes to be used in the questionnaire, KPI requirements for reporting and fieldwork conduct, and finally a session for questions and answers.

dependent variable as well as potential variation in the explanatory variables. We assumed that high values on our dependent variable, "participation in political violence," will generally be rare in Thailand, as in most societies. We chose not to use probability sampling only, as we were concerned that this method would not capture enough people with extreme behavior in this regard. As we emphasized earlier, however, the fact that such people may be uncommon should not be confused with the claim that they are unimportant. On the contrary, a very small group of violent-minded individuals can constitute the driving force behind a conflict turning violent. Thus, although such people are (likely to be) rare, they are also (likely to be) influential. We therefore decided to collect two sets of data: first, a cluster survey of 200 respondents who are politically active as either red-shirts or yellow-shirts; and second, a nationally representative sample of 1,000 respondents with a slight oversampling in the Deep South (Yala, Narathiwat, Pattani, and Songkhla districts). The reason for drawing special samples with politically active and possibly radical red-shirt and yellow-shirt members is to try to obtain larger variation in the rare political violence that we aim to investigate. We use the nationally representative sample to investigate whether findings from the activist samples also hold true in the nation-wide sample, where experiences of political violence are much rarer.

The representative survey of the national population was conducted by selecting one thousand interviewees using multistage random sampling. This sampling consisted of the following stages: (1) regional sampling, (2) district

sampling, (3) sub-district sampling, and (4) household sampling. In total, 37 out of the 76 provinces in Thailand were surveyed. People on the household lists were contacted via their house addresses and names. The interviewer teams went to the selected village/neighborhood and knocked on the interviewee's door, sometimes with the assistance of the village headman, who would introduce the interviewer to the potential interviewee. With the exception of one section of the survey, the interviews were conducted face-to-face in the interviewee's home, without the presence of onlookers. KPI's teams have worked in this way with national surveys for about a decade.

To protect the integrity of the interviewee and to minimize social desirability bias (i.e. the tendency of survey respondents to answer in a socially favorable manner) sensitive questions on personal experiences of violence and the personal use of violence were asked in a self-administered section of the survey. For these sensitive questions, the interviewee filled out the questionnaire him- or herself, after which this numbered and removable part of the survey was placed into an envelope, which was sealed and placed in a closed box. It is important to point out that social desirability responding usually refers to the tendency for people to underreport socially undesirable attitudes or behaviors. However, considering the theory of honor ideology as proposed in this study, we may also suspect that men with high levels of honor ideology may *over-report* the use of violence in order to present themselves as more 'manly'. To mitigate effects such as these, we posed sensitive questions

through self-administration. The possible incentive for endorsers of honor ideology to brag about using violence should be greatly reduced thanks to the self-administration of this part of the survey since not even the enumerator will know the respondent's answers.

Part of the reason for using a self-administered part of the survey was also to reduce the potential problem of missing data due to item nonresponse. We reasoned that respondents should be less uncomfortable about admitting to having participated in political violence if the enumerator would not know the answer to these questions. This strategy seems to have been successful in that 95% or more of the respondents answered the questions about their use of violence.

The two hundred political activist interviewees—100 red-shirts and 100 yellow-shirts—were chosen by purposive sampling, with 20 interviewees per district in 10 districts that were considered to be either red or yellow strongholds. By having a few (20) interviewees in several (10) districts we hoped to obtain a quite general and broad picture of political activists, albeit the small number. In each province, the KPI local survey coordinator contacted active red- or yellow-shirts in the province and snowball sampling was used to contact interviewees. From the first interviewee, and in all subsequent interviews, the following question was asked in order to contact the next interviewee: "Can you introduce me to someone who is an active red/yellow?" In order to assess a potential interviewee's degree of red-shirt or yellow-shirt activity, they were asked whether they had participated in

red/yellow riots, particularly at Ratchaprasong (in April/May 2010) and at the Don Muang and Suvanaphum airports (in 2008). Each subsequent interviewee was contacted via an introduction by the previous interviewee, in a way that was deemed appropriate by this previous interviewee. We thus used ten different starting points in a chain of referral for the yellow-shirt activists, and ten for the red-shirt activists, thereby reducing the risk that any particular referral in the chains of referrals becomes decisive for the resultant sample.

Appendix B: Additional robustness tests

We also repeated Model 1 using rare events logit to correct possible inaccuracies in the standard errors because of the rarity of the dependent variable (King and Zeng 2001); again, the results held up.

Another series of robustness tests used regressions that allowed for random effects, so that both the intercept and the slope for Patriarchal Values varied by geographic subdivision. Likelihood-ratio tests show that the models with random effects are not superior.

In our data, 54 male respondents reported their ethnicity as Malayu and have non-missing values for Patriarchal Values, Masculine Toughness, and PPV; none of them participated in political violence. All of the Malayu respondents come from the South, where there is an active Malayu separatist insurgency against the state of Thailand. Malayu respondents are overwhelmingly Muslim, and tend to have higher levels of Patriarchal Values and to be more likely to agree with Masculine Toughness. It may be that Malayu respondents are more prone to underreport PPV because of this very

violent ethnic conflict in the Deep South; therefore, we repeated Models 1, 3, 5 and 6 with all Malayu respondents excluded. The results, however, remained very similar.

Table B1. Adding control variables to Model 1

PPV	Patriarchal Values	-0.685	-0.665	-0.687
		(0.453)	(0.455)	(0.486)
	Masculine Toughness	1.448	1.448	1.471
		(0.562)**	(0.561)**	(0.576)*
	Honor	0.677	0.682	0.651
		(0.431)	(0.428)	(0.429)
	Age	-0.014	0.041	
		(0.021)	(0.139)	
	Age squared		-0.001	
			(0.001)	
	Education			-0.198
				(0.185)
	Constant	-1.813	-3.036	-1.396
		(1.283)	(3.313)	(1.264)
N		82	82	81

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Table B2. Adding control variables to Model 1

PPV	Patriarchal Values	-0.616	-0.616	-0.740	-0.796
		(0.499)	(0.499)	(0.454)	(0.472)
	Masculine Toughness	1.501	1.501	1.494	1.510
		(0.590)*	(0.590)*	(0.574)**	(0.562)**
	Honor	0.636	0.636	0.757	0.805
		(0.485)	(0.485)	(0.431)	(0.424)
	income1	1.271	1.271		
		(1.407)	(1.407)		
	income2	0.696	0.696		
		(1.002)	(1.002)		
	income3	0.201	0.201		
		(0.907)	(0.907)		
	income4	0.499	0.499		
		(0.882)	(0.882)		
	income5	0.303	0.303		
		(0.840)	(0.840)		
	Income Missing	0.000			
		(0.000)			
	Importance Politics			-0.049	
				(0.179)	
	Importance Religion				0.083
					(0.192)
	Constant	-2.838	-2.838	-2.143	-3.343
		(0.806)**	(0.806)**	(1.759)	(1.883)
N		83	83	83	83

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Table B3. Adding control variables to Model 1

PPV	Patriarchal Values	-1.177	-0.772	-0.784	-0.791
		(0.545)*	(0.463)	(0.460)	(0.461)
	Masculine Toughness	1.806	1.575	1.590	1.598
		(0.613)**	(0.572)**	(0.569)**	(0.573)**
	Honor	1.102	0.742	0.741	0.751
		(0.488)*	(0.429)	(0.429)	(0.425)
	Married	-0.826			
		(0.636)			
	Yellow		0.840	0.636	
			(1.162)	(0.570)	
	Red		0.241		-0.483
			(1.185)		(0.581)
	Constant	-2.427	-3.155	-2.968	-2.463
		(0.782)**	(1.227)*	(0.796)**	(0.711)**
N		82	83	83	83

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Table B4. Adding control variables to Model 2

Alt DV1	Patriarchal Values	-0.629	-0.585	-0.633
		(0.471)	(0.476)	(0.518)
	Masculine Toughness	1.486	1.517	1.509
		(0.587)*	(0.593)*	(0.608)*
	Honor	0.760	0.799	0.717
		(0.458)	(0.454)	(0.463)
	Age	-0.016	0.183	
		(0.022)	(0.158)	
	Age squared		-0.002	
			(0.002)	
	Education			-0.249
				(0.195)
	Constant	-1.821	-6.249	-1.259
		(1.327)	(3.813)	(1.304)
N		82	82	81

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Table B5. Adding control variables to Model 2

Alt DV 1	Patriarchal Values	-0.453	-0.453	-0.685	-0.741
		(0.521)	(0.521)	(0.473)	(0.492)
	Masculine Toughness	1.452	1.452	1.529	1.542
		(0.611)*	(0.611)*	(0.602)*	(0.589)**
	Honor	0.624	0.624	0.853	0.896
		(0.512)	(0.512)	(0.457)	(0.453)*
	income1	1.745	1.745		
		(1.460)	(1.460)		
	income2	1.035	1.035		
		(1.051)	(1.051)		
	income3	0.586	0.586		
		(0.952)	(0.952)		
	income4	0.417	0.417		
		(1.015)	(1.015)		
	income5	0.734	0.734		
		(0.893)	(0.893)		
	Income Missing	0.000			
		(0.000)			
	Importance Politics			-0.042	
				(0.187)	
	Importance Religion				0.082
					(0.204)
	Constant	-3.082	-3.082	-2.342	-3.466
		(0.859)**	(0.859)**	(1.843)	(2.001)
N		83	83	83	83

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Table B6. Adding control variables to Model 2

Alt DV 1	Patriarchal Values	-1.073	-0.720	-0.726	-0.738
		(0.565)	(0.484)	(0.480)	(0.481)
	Masculine Toughness	1.803	1.613	1.620	1.633
		(0.638)**	(0.601)**	(0.596)**	(0.602)**
	Honor	1.156	0.833	0.833	0.842
		(0.513)*	(0.457)	(0.457)	(0.453)
	Married	-0.685			
		(0.667)			
	Yellow		0.683	0.597	
			(1.170)	(0.598)	
	Red		0.103		-0.482
			(1.198)		(0.612)
	Constant	-2.604	-3.158	-3.080	-2.602
		(0.815)**	(1.237)*	(0.831)**	(0.743)**
N		82	83	83	83

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Table B7. Adding control variables to Model 2

Alt DV 1	Patriarchal Values	-0.554	-0.573	-0.628	-0.685
		(0.495)	(0.496)	(0.471)	(0.181)**
	Masculine Toughness	1.302	1.491	1.506	1.559
		(0.612)*	(0.590)*	(0.586)*	(0.284)**
	Honor	0.794	0.792	0.794	0.872
		(0.465)	(0.463)	(0.462)	(0.391)*
	Served Armed Forces	0.929			
		(0.608)			
	Regular income		0.568		
			(0.739)		
	North			-1.009	
				(1.055)	
	Northeast			0.059	
				(0.929)	
	Constant	-2.871	-3.039	-2.421	-2.725
		(0.752)**	(0.850)**	(1.095)*	(0.073)**
N		83	83	83	83

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Table B8. Adding control variables to Model 3

Used Weapon	Patriarchal Values	-1.036	-1.071	-1.002
		(0.623)	(0.638)	(0.742)
	Masculine Toughness	1.680	1.720	1.598
		(0.786)*	(0.812)*	(0.856)
	Honor	1.001	0.995	0.808
		(0.516)	(0.521)	(0.522)
	Age	-0.016	-0.075	
		(0.030)	(0.181)	
	Age squared		0.001	
			(0.002)	
	Education			-0.379
				(0.277)
	Constant	-3.284	-2.032	-2.029
		(1.895)	(4.155)	(1.799)
N		82	82	81

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Table B9. Adding control variables to Model 3

Used Weapon	Patriarchal Values	-0.765	-0.765	-1.106	-1.075
		(0.711)	(0.711)	(0.678)	(0.659)
	Masculine Toughness	1.690	1.690	1.355	1.534
		(0.863)	(0.863)	(0.827)	(0.786)
	Honor	0.612	0.612	0.849	1.009
		(0.635)	(0.635)	(0.513)	(0.488)*
	income1	2.842	2.842		
		(1.747)	(1.747)		
	income2	-0.124	-0.124		
		(1.737)	(1.737)		
	income3	1.236	1.236		
		(1.337)	(1.337)		
	income4	0.709	0.709		
		(1.479)	(1.479)		
	income5	0.080	0.080		
		(1.501)	(1.501)		
	Income missing	0.000			
		(0.000)			
	Importance Politics			-0.410	
				(0.223)	
	Importance Religion				0.063
					(0.281)
	Constant	-4.627	-4.627	-0.551	-4.588
		(1.409)**	(1.409)**	(2.125)	(2.806)
N		83	83	83	83

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Table B10. Adding control variables to Model 3

Used Weapon	Patriarchal Values	-1.399	-1.064	-1.114	-1.101	-0.963
		(0.794)	(0.657)	(0.655)	(0.649)	(0.659)
	Masculine Toughness	1.737	1.544	1.628	1.632	1.336
		(0.874)*	(0.795)	(0.806)*	(0.811)*	(0.818)
	Honor	1.194	0.915	0.915	0.949	0.934
		(0.529)*	(0.489)	(0.487)	(0.485)	(0.494)
	Married	0.023				
		(0.988)				
	Yellow		15.678	0.883		
			(2,870.629)	(0.831)		
	Red		14.955		-0.544	
			(2,870.629)		(0.842)	
	Served Armed Forces					0.748
						(0.838)
	Constant	-4.393	-19.294	-4.599	-3.901	-4.174
		(1.370)**	(2,870.629)	(1.313)**	(1.139)**	(1.172)**
N		82	83	83	83	83

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Table B11. Adding control variables to Model 3

Used Weapon	Patriarchal Values	-0.932	-0.946	-1.030
		(0.659)	(0.616)	(0.490)*
	Masculine Toughness	1.460	1.446	1.546
		(0.792)	(0.765)	(0.267)**
	Honor	0.912	0.927	0.993
		(0.502)	(0.501)	(0.234)**
	Regular income	0.585		
		(1.160)		
	North		-1.330	
			(1.520)	
	Northeast		-0.138	
			(1.231)	
	Constant	-4.351	-3.490	-4.016
		(1.343)**	(1.520)*	(0.349)**
N		83	83	83

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Table B12. Multilevel model allowing random intercept and random slope, Models 1

eq1	Patriarchal Values	-0.739
		(0.453)
	Masculine Toughness	1.527
		(0.561)**
	Honor	0.783
		(0.420)
	Constant	-2.589
		(0.698)**
lns1_1_1	Constant	-23.593
		(4057672225.802)
lns1_1_2	Constant	-26.112
		(105841343039.072)
N		83

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Table B13. Multilevel model allowing random intercept and random slope, Models 2

eq1	Patriarchal Values	-0.685
		(0.472)
	Masculine Toughness	1.559
		(0.587)**
	Honor	0.872
		(0.447)
	Constant	-2.725
		(0.728)**
lns1_1_1	Constant	-29.460
		(1.544e+12)
lns1_1_2	Constant	-25.529
		(88705253372.112)
N		83

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Table B14. Multilevel model allowing random intercept and random slope, Models 3

eq1	Patriarchal Values	-1.030
		(0.628)
	Masculine Toughness	1.546
		(0.783)*
	Honor	0.993
		(0.482)*
	Constant	-4.016
		(1.113)**
lns1_1_1	Constant	-20.071
		(223,524,396.611)
lns1_1_2	Constant	-24.493
		(21758777197.738)
N		83

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Table B15. Honor Ideology as Dependent Variable

	Honor	Honor	Honor	Honor
Served Armed Forces	-0.045			
	(0.099)			
Witnessed Violence		-0.129		
		(0.077)		
Family Assaulted			-0.077	
			(0.152)	
Intimidated w Violence				-0.303
				(0.136)*
Constant	0.128	0.191	0.144	0.165
	(0.042)**	(0.050)**	(0.040)**	(0.040)**
R^2	0.00	0.01	0.00	0.01
N	432	443	442	442

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Table B16. Honor Ideology as Dependent Variable

	Honor	Honor	Honor	Honor
Served Armed Forces	0.025			
	(0.102)			
Activist	-0.282	-0.273	-0.300	-0.254
	(0.099)**	(0.104)**	(0.099)**	(0.104)*
Witnessed Violence		-0.050		
		(0.083)		
Family Assaulted			0.013	
			(0.154)	
Intimidated w Violence				-0.180
				(0.144)
Constant	0.169	0.209	0.195	0.202
	(0.044)**	(0.050)**	(0.043)**	(0.042)**
R^2	0.02	0.02	0.02	0.02
N	432	443	442	442

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$

Table B17. Honor Ideology as Dependent Variable

	Honor	Honor
Served Armed Forces	0.045	0.074
	(0.104)	(0.106)
Witnessed Violence	-0.005	-0.014
	(0.085)	(0.085)
Family Assaulted	0.034	0.068
	(0.153)	(0.153)
Intimidated w Violence	-0.177	-0.132
	(0.146)	(0.145)
Activist	-0.244	-0.104
	(0.110)*	(0.123)
Education		-0.045
		(0.023)*
Muslim		0.259
		(0.118)*
Importance Religion		0.048
		(0.021)*
Constant	0.173	-0.141
	(0.052)**	(0.208)
R^2	0.02	0.06
N	425	416

* $p<0.05$; ** $p<0.01$