

arson, drink, wandering away and sexual acts, are described seriatim at some length. These types are regarded not as monomanias, but as symptoms or syndromes of a variety of psycho-pathic conditions — degeneration, epilepsy, hysteria, etc. — in each of which they take on a modified form. Among the points of interest in the discussion of the medical aspects of the phenomena, the view taken of the treatment by suggestion may be referred to as indicating the present trend of opinion on this subject. The authors believe that this form of treatment is only applicable in cases of impulsive obsessions and even then only when there is a hysteropathic disposition for hypnotic suggestion to work on; but even in these cases they find the results frequently disappointing in spite of the large promise of the beginning. But the pure degenerate and the victim of constitutional neurasthenia — and these form a large part of the cases — cannot, they declare, be hypnotized at all.

The work concludes with the detailed report of a number of criminal cases in which the authors have given expert testimony in favor of medical treatment in place of the ordinary legal penalties.

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Human Nature and the Social Order. CHARLES HORTON COOLEY.

New York, Charles Scribner's Sons. 1902. Pp. viii + 413.

It is the author's aim 'to set forth from various points of view, what the individual is, considered as a member of a social whole.' Believing that "'society' and 'individuals' do not denote separable phenomena, but are simply collective and distributive aspects of the same thing," he holds that in current thought, the social and the individual are often opposed in a fallacious fashion, as though two separable entities or forces were under consideration.

Our modern world is particularly liable to emphasize the individual aspect as in some sense more real, or as psychologically primary though ethically inferior. Such abstract views may be classed as: (a) *mere individualism*, in which the collective phases are looked upon as quite secondary and incidental; (b) *double causation*, in which society and the individual are thought of as separate causes, and socialism is opposed to individualism as a theory of life; (c) *primitive individualism*, in which man is conceived to have been originally a mere individual, but to have been undergoing a process of socialization, and thereby of moralization, since the individual in this view is liable to be identified with the bad, the social with the good; (d) the

social faculty view, in which the social is regarded as including only a part of the individual, *i. e.*, certain faculties or emotions. As contrasted with these four views the author holds that individuality and sociality have always existed as complementary aspects, and that 'the line of progress is from a lower to a higher type of both, not from the one to the other'; that 'man's psychical outfit is not divisible into the social and the non-social, but that he is all social in a large sense, is all a part of the common human life, and that his social or moral progress consists less in the aggrandizement of particular faculties or instincts and the suppression of others than in the discipline of all with reference to a progressive organization of life, which we know in thought as conscience.'

It is evident from the above that the author's program includes both social psychology and ethics. The platform just quoted is of course not peculiar to the author. It has been gradually emerging in the work of criticism and construction in which many have engaged. The interesting and valuable feature of Professor Cooley's contribution is the happy manner in which he has developed and illustrated his thesis. He has had the fortune to have two children so different in their types of reactions as to prevent the hasty generalizations from 'one' to 'all' sometimes met with in genetic psychology, and has added important observations and reflections to this field. He has drawn upon a wide acquaintance with literature for illustrations of the social sentiments, and has indicated ways in which the experimental method might well be applied to this great field of emotional expression. He has an observant eye for significant aspects of human conduct, and sanity of judgment for their interpretation. He has expressed himself with simplicity and directness. The various points of view from which he considers his subject, as suggested by the titles of his chapters, are suggestion and choice, sociability and personal ideas, sympathy, the social self, hostility, emulation, leadership, the social aspect of conscience, personal degeneracy, and freedom.

Under 'Suggestion and Choice' the phenomena of imitation are discussed. The point is well taken that we must distinguish carefully between the result and the process. The result of a child's efforts may be the production of an act which is like the act of the parent, but the process may not be at all that of mechanical suggestion. Children 'cannot imitate an act except by learning how to do it, any more than grown-up people can, and for a child to learn a word may be as complicated a process as for an older person to learn a difficult piece on the piano.' The two children observed by Professor Cooley

showed a marked difference as to imitation. One showed scarcely any tendency of imitation until after the age of two years and a half ; the other began to show vocal imitation when a little over two months and continued in the ordinary path. The former reached his results largely by his own experimentation and refused to imitate directly.

The chapter on ' Sociability and Personal Ideas ' makes a vigorous statement of the fact that society is fundamentally a subjective reality. " In order to have society it is evidently necessary that persons should get together somewhere ; and they get together only as personal ideas in the mind." " Persons and society must, then, be studied primarily in the imagination." " The imaginations which people have of each other are the *solid facts* of society." It seems to the reviewer that the emphasis upon the function of imagination, both in this and the following chapter, is one of the best features of the book. The chapters on the social self may be regarded as in part a supplement of Professor James' chapter on the self.

The author has a special criticism in several passages upon the popular antithesis between egoism and altruism. It may be readily granted that the phrases as ordinarily employed are liable to criticism in so far as they seem to imply mutually exclusive alternatives. But common life knows perfectly well what it means by selfishness, and no amount of psychological criticism on the terminology will alter the fact that one man has a ' self ' which does not recognize the equal or superior claims of others, while another man has a self which does recognize the claims of others to be treated always ' as an end, never as merely a means.' Now, from the individual standpoint one of these selves may be as ' harmonious,' as ' stable ' as the other. But they have very different ethical values. I query whether, in his desire to correct a current misuse of terms, the author has done justice to the real ethical difference implied in the terms. Other queries as to details will naturally suggest themselves to the reader, but the book is a decidedly welcome contribution to social psychology.

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NATURE OF CONSCIOUSNESS.

The Psychology of Mental Arrangement. I. MADISON BENTLEY.
Am. Journ. Psychol., Vol. XIII., No. 2.

" We may say, in general, that any structure made up of heterogeneous elements — if it be anything more than a mere collection or heap — implies arrangement, plan, pattern, and not simply addition of