Image acts and visual communities: everyday nationalism in contemporary Turkey

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Introduction
Looking At and Looking With Images

A Façade of Images

Figure 1: The façade of the Atatürk Culture Center (AKM) on Taksim Square, Istanbul, June 2013, decorated with the signs and banners of the Gezi protesters.

The photograph above depicts the façade of the Atatürk Cultural Center (AKM) in Taksim Square, Istanbul, during the Gezi protests of June 2013 (Figure 1).[1] The wave of protests was ignited by the occupation of Gezi Park in Taksim Square, in the heart of Istanbul, on the 27th of May and rapidly spread across the country, bringing several million people onto the streets. The initial aim of the park's occupation was to prevent the government's plan to demolish the area to build an Ottoman-style military barracks and a shopping mall as part of its urban development policy.[2] The police, after trying to evict the protesters from the park by

[1] http://everywheretaksim.net/tr/firatnews-taksimde-hayat-var/.

[2] The "Taksim Pedestrianization Project" envisaged the demolition of Gezi Park, as well as the replacement of the AKM building with an opera house or mosque. The urban transformation process (involving the construction sector) became one of the trademarks of the AKP government, resulting in the demolishing of living spaces, public and cultural centers, without the consent of the inhabitants of the city. This particular project on Taksim Square has been especially important for an AKP regime

burning their tents and using water cannons and tear gas, eventually had to withdraw from Taksim Square on the 1st of June. Consequently, the park and its periphery were occupied for fifteen days, surrounded by barricades, accommodating thousands of protesters who set up tents, medical centers, free food markets and a library, established various independent media channels, and organized numerous events and actions. Diverse groups had their own tents, slogans, songs, as well as banners and signs, some of which can be seen decorating the façade of the AKM, which is also in danger of being demolished. This iconic building of Istanbul, a symbol of the modern nation-state that reflects the Republican-era architecture of the 1960s, was turned into one of the most circulated symbols of the Gezi uprising.

The accumulation of restlessness leading up to the protests can be seen as a combination of reactions against the dispossessing effects of neoliberal policies concerning living and public spaces, and the increasingly authoritarian conservatism of the AKP (Justice and Development Party) regime, which manifested itself in attempts to regulate everyday life, sexuality, media, freedom of speech and the right to demonstrate through oppressive policies, discourses and police brutality. The issues behind the protests brought diverse groups together, which were not in contact or had collaborated with one another before, such as various leftist parties and organizations, Kemalists, nationalists, Kurdish people, anarchists, environmentalists, feminists, LGBTI activists, anti-capitalist Muslims, soccer clubs and fans, and people who were previously not politically engaged or organized.

It is crucial to mention that the struggle against the demolishing of the Emek movie theater to build a shopping mall, previous Mayday demonstrations, the Tekel workers resistance movement, smaller political networks around urban struggles, ecology, feminism, LGBTI, as well as the Taksim Solidarity network, which created visibility around the plans for Gezi Park for more than a year, among others, were all effective in paving the way to the protests. However, the extent and diversity of the protesters far exceeded the initiation of the organized political groups. The increasingly authoritarian and aggressive attitude of the government in general and of Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in particular, made the AKP and Erdoğan the main targets of the protests. In this sense, on the one hand, the reasons behind the uprising are specific to Turkey; however, on the other hand, they overlap with the last decade's global cycle of protests, positioning the Gezi uprising on the contemporary map

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seeking to reclaim it from both its Republican and leftist history and symbolism, which also explains the intensity of the reactions to the project. See: http://www.mimarist.org/odadan/3137-mimarlar-odasi-kamuoyuna-duyuru-akm-hukuken-yikilamaz.html.

of political mobilizations, ranging from Spain, Greece and the USA to Egypt and Brazil, around issues such as authoritarianism, urban dislocations, economic crises, precarization, and a general crisis of representational democracy.

One of the iconic images from the first days of the Gezi protests depicts two protestors holding hands, running away from the water cannon, one holding a Turkish flag with the image of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk on it, while the other carries the flag of the Kurdish BDP (Peace and Democracy Party). In addition, a man in their vicinity makes the "wolf sign" to the police, the sign of the ultra-nationalist MHP (Nationalist Movement Party). The iconicity of this photograph stemmed from its unusual depiction of the contact and momentary collaborations between previously conflicting groups and their visual symbols during the protests. The façade of the AKM building, in a strongly visual way, reflected this diversity and dynamism of the restless crowds by being transformed every day, like a giant urban canvas, a counter-monument or a diary that kept track of what was happening at the heart of the city reclaimed by the protestors.

On the building's façade, it is possible to identify the banners of football fan clubs, various leftist parties and organizations, unions, student collectives, anarchists, as well as the Turkish flag and the image of Atatürk.[3] These banners make various statements, such as "power to labor", "long live revolution and socialism", "do not surrender", "universities rising up", as well as calling for a general strike and advising the prime minister to "shut up and resign". Yet, the popularity of the AKM building as a political and visual symbol far exceeded the significance of any singular sign that was part of it.[4] Considering the size, location and historical and contemporary symbolic power of the building, as well as the unexpected diversity and radical content of the banners, it is not at all surprising that the first act of the police force, after evicting Gezi Park and Taksim Square on the 15th of June, was to remove all the signs from its façade.

[3] Among these different groups are Çarşı, the Beşiktaş fan club which has been one of the most active participants in the protests, the TKP (Communist Party of Turkey) and various leftist groups such as Mücadele Birliği (Union of Struggle), Partizan (Partisan), ESP (Socialist Party of the Oppressed), Halk Cephesi (People's Front), SYKP (Socialist Party of Refoundation), Devrimci İşçi Sendikası (Revolutionary Worker's Union), and Öğrenci Kolektifleri (Student Collectives).

[4] It became a common phenomenon to take group pictures and selfies with the AKM in the background, or, more popularly, on top of the building, which was in fact dangerous to climb, with a view of the reclaimed city center.

Figure 2: The façade of the Atatürk Culture Center (AKM) on Taksim Square, Istanbul, June 2013, after the police evicted Gezi Park and Taksim Square.

A Turkish flag and the image of Atatürk were hung in the place of the semantic patchwork or "scraps" as the Prime Minister disparagingly called the banners in his speeches, soon to be replaced with two larger Turkish flags and a larger Atatürk picture between them (Figure 2).[5] These prominent symbols of the nation, which had temporarily blended in with other images when the façade was still full, quickly reestablished their hegemony on the "cleaned" building that went back to its bleak outlook, amplified by the police forces in front of it. Whereas an empty façade could have overemphasized the act of cleansing, refurbishing the building with familiar national signs created the impression that "nothing ever happened" there. The fact that the AKM is usually decorated with flags and Atatürk during national holidays strengthened this act of normalization, which represents the perseverance of the employment of nationalist imagery to cover over political, cultural and economic differences, and to suppress any possible collaboration among them in an attempt to suggest and enforce a form of national unity and community.

[5] http://geziparkihaberleri.blogspot.nl/2013/06/akmden-ataturk-posteri-kaldrld.html.

This short account of the AKM as a changing visual sign captures the issues I want to raise and explore in this study. The "Atatürk" Cultural Center, a symbol of the modern Turkish nation-state and its Westernized culture, is first turned into the symbol of a complex political event, which carried revolutionary elements that challenged the tradition of the modern nation-state, although it also carried certain elements of it. The presence of the Turkish flag and the image of Atatürk among the banners, as well as the common slogan that a portion of the protesters kept repeating, "We are Mustafa Kemal's soldiers", were examples of the official nationalist symbolism's persistence among the protestors. Later on, the same building was turned into the symbol of the AKP regime, which represented its suppression of the opposition's political momentum by reinstating, exclusively, familiar nationalist imagery. The oscillation of the AKM building as a visual sign between different symbolisms, first of the nation-state, then of an uprising, and then of the current government – in other words, between the Kemalist state tradition, insurgent politics and the AKP government – shows that nationalist imagery is powerful and prevalent in accentuating and negotiating different political practices and situations, and mediating their relationships with each other in the realm of everyday life. Nationalist imagery is constantly claimed and reclaimed by diverse agents and moments.

However, this does not mean that the images of the nation are "empty signifiers", in constant flux and open to endless interpretations. Rather, they acquire strong meanings and histories, and are powerful forces in reifying those histories. At the same time, the Turkish flag hung from the AKM building for a regular Republic Day celebration is not the same as the one hanging among all the other banners on the building's façade during the Gezi protests or as the one hung by the AKP government after the cleansing. Perhaps it is more official, familiar, and even unnoticed in the first case, acquires an unusually "rebellious" character in the second, and is instrumentalized in the third. While the star and crescent on a red background stand for the defense of secularism in the first two examples, this image is far from having this connotation in the third. Yet, all three might join forces in a stance against the Kurdish political movement, reproducing the exclusive character of the flag.

These categorizations based on differences and similarities can be multiplied, yet what is clear is that in every use and form, the flag performs a distinct act that cannot be thought separately from the multiple histories behind it, which are at times strengthened and at other times challenged by it. In this research, I focus on precisely these complexities surrounding images of the nation and the different areas in which they are reproduced, tracking their travel through a variety of fields, on different surfaces and in various shapes.

Importantly, I focus less on the history of official nationalist imagery production by the state and the current government's reliance on the same imagery to establish its distinct political agenda, and more on the reproduction and performance of nationalist imagery in everyday life, by the people themselves, who do not only look *at*, but also look *with* these images. Images, as I will discuss, that provide an especially productive ground to analyze the contested and negotiated dynamics of national identity production and community formation in everyday life in contemporary Turkey.

More specifically, I will analyze five different types of images that I identify as significant for understanding the ways in which national identity formation and images intertwine: commodified images, bio-images, ghostly images, media images and disorienting images. Through a variety of objects of analysis, such as commodities, masks, tattoos, advertisements and films, shadowy apparitions, monuments and artworks, I explore the vitality of images both in drawing borders around communities and in providing the means to challenge these borders. This will contribute to understanding the contemporary performances of national identity, the popular, corporeal and affective survival mechanisms generated through nationalist images in Turkey, and, beyond this, to the theorization of the relationship between nationalism and imagery in general.

Historical and Contextual Framing

Starting this introduction with the Gezi protests, which took place as I was finishing this study, also allows me to comment upon the challenge of writing about a contemporary context while its dynamics are relentlessly contested. Mieke Bal, with regard to the object of cultural analysis, argues that the object does not remain the same as one keeps exploring it; rather, it becomes a "living creature, embedded in all the questions and considerations that the mud of your travel spattered onto it, and that surround it like a 'field'" (2002: 4). This description captures the compelling question of framing the object of analysis and the "field" of study, especially in a rapidly changing and at times "muddy" context like Turkey. More specifically, writing about the contemporary and everyday production of mainly Kemalist nationalism in the 2000s as that everyday is increasingly becoming configured and oppressed by the ruling AKP's authoritarian, conservative and neoliberal regime may appear to be not the most urgent theoretical and political task at hand. However, as I will argue, understanding the seemingly paradoxical process of the "rise and crisis" of official nationalism in the first decade of the 21st century is crucial to analyzing its history and lingering continuity, its

contemporary manifestations and survival mechanisms, as well as its possible future transformations.

Nationalism has been a crucial aspect of the official nation-state ideology and the state had a vital role in forming and disseminating it since the establishment of the Turkish Republic in 1923. Tanıl Bora, one of the most prominent theorists of Turkish nationalism, argues that nationalism has been one of the "six arrows" representing the official Kemalist ideology and that it has been diffused in every field of social life by the state apparatus (2002: 15). He argues that Kemalism always carried a tension between a territory- and citizenship-based nationalism and an ethnicist and aggressive nationalism, which in fact expanded its "margin of political and ideological maneuvering" (2003: 437). Consequently, Bora defines Turkish nationalism not as a "homogenous discourse, but as a series of discourses and a vast lexis", and distinguishes four main types:

> The first is the language of the official Kemalist nationalism (ADD, or Atatürk nationalism), focused on the mission to build and perpetuate the nation-state; in one respect, this is the root-language of Turkish nationalism. The second, which can be considered a dialect of this root-language, is "left-wing" Kemalist nationalism (ulusçuluk). The third, while being a liberal dialect of the Kemalist root-language, grows and develops under the spell of the promises held forth by the era of globalization; it is the language of a pro-Western nationalism advocating "civilizationism" and prosperity. The fourth, again a deviate dialect of the Kemalist root-language, is the language of the racist-ethnicist Turkish nationalism that derives from neo-pan-Turkism and from the reaction to the Kurdish nationalist movement. (2003: 436-437)

Bora adds that nationalism of an Islamic kind is entering this scheme, due to the currently expanding Islamic movement. During the 2000s, Islamic conservative nationalism not only gained momentum, but also challenged the historical continuity of the official Kemalist form of nationalism and incrementally established its own political and economic hegemony. Blending the capitalist-developmentalist, right-wing conservative nationalisms of the Democrat Party (DP), Motherland Party (ANAP) and National Vision (Milli Görüş) traditions with its own agenda, the AKP government surpassed the military-backed Kemalist hegemony. As a result, gestures of defending, protecting and performing Kemalist secular national identity multiplied in everyday life in this period in which the hegemonic presence

of Kemalism gradually decreased, especially after the election and re-elections of the AKP as the ruling party in 2002, 2007 and 2011.[6]

There are three main reasons that make the 2000s a relevant period to analyze the production of nationalism in everyday life through the realm of images, respectively with regard to the dual process of the rise and crisis of official nationalism, its new manifestations and its broader implications for other types of nationalisms. Firstly, it is a period in which it is possible to observe what I will call the dual process of the rise and crisis of official nationalism, which allows detecting both its strength and fragilities.[7] Bekmen et al. argue that the first decade of the 2000s was marked by the economic crisis of 2001 and the coming to power of Islamic cadres under the AKP, representing the reconsolidation of neoliberal hegemony. This resulted in a class conflict between the old Republican bourgeoisie and the rising neo-Islamic bourgeoisie, jeopardizing the economic, political and cultural privileges Turkish official nationalism had sustained since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. The seeming polarization of Turkish society into secularists and Islamists has, however, been challenged as a false separation, since both groups, which are far from homogenous, share a class position and a nationalist discourse (Erdoğan 59).

Nevertheless, the change in power relations has been reflected in everyday life as a result of the fear of political Islam and the decrease in the powerful role of the army as the guarantor of Kemalist ideology and secularism, culminating in the mid-2000s, especially among the middle-class secular Republican population. The manifestation of this conflict in the form of a clash between Islamic/conservative and liberal/secular lifestyles and everyday

[6] The popularity and longevity of the AKP regime, especially in the beginning of its twelve years of power (as of 2014), can be seen as a reaction to the exclusionary definition of citizenship and the political and cultural codes adopted and imposed by the Kemalist Republican modernization project. Yet, the AKP's claim to liberate alternative identities has quickly turned into an instrumentalization of the victim position in order to establish its own hegemony. Similarly, Bora argues that the AKP's "economist nationalism", which marked, in its first phase, a confident, "calm", and "liberal nationalism" against a more antagonistic and aggressive nationalism, has significantly changed over time. As the government's hegemony was challenged by social unrest and uprisings, it became more aggressive in its nationalism, perpetuating the sense of crisis through a rhetoric of "inner and outer threats" against Turkey as the "rising star". For the online article by Bora, see: http://www.baskahaber.org/2014/05/tanl-bora-gecmisle-yuzlesememek-turk.html.

[7] Evidently, there are various parallel, conflicting and intermingled "everyday lives" in a particular context and "any assumption that it is simply 'out there', as a palpable reality to be gathered up and described, should face an immediate question: whose everyday life?" (Highmore 1). I use the term "national everyday" to indicate that I am specifically looking at the everyday life coordinates determined by nationalist practices, in a combined effort by official and unofficial sources, in which historical and contemporary forms negotiate with each other. This study does not claim to cover the heterogeneous practices, different discourses and histories existing side by side, but dissects everyday life to analyze those national community formations strong enough to taint other elements in their vicinity.

habits increased the role of imagery and symbolism in everyday politics. In addition to this dynamic, the influence of the EU membership being on the agenda, the reactions following the murder of the Armenian journalist Hrant Dink, various smaller-scale political alternatives and mobilizations, and, more importantly, the ongoing Kurdish struggle both on the parliamentary and non-parliamentary levels, challenged the hegemonic national identity and increased the sense of crisis.[8]

Michael Skey argues that nations "are not, and never have been, stable, solid, coherent, fixed entities", but are subject to permanent crises "that are legitimated and managed (or not) through a process of ongoing struggle" (340). It is possible to say that the idea of constant threat from "inner and outer forces" is embedded in the formation of Turkish national identity, which is largely internalized through various means as a chronic survival anxiety. Bora argues that the sense of crisis is constantly reproduced in different ways, making more "real" and substantial threats that are not related to national issues, such as economic threats and precarization (2014, n. pag.).[9] He suggests that this is the result of the discontents of capitalism and modernism, and the need to belong to a community, which amplify the urge to embrace an "us" while cursing an "other". As the "we" becomes more fragile, people increasingly define themselves through the evilness of others. Thus, the chronic, almost banal quality of the sense of crisis justifies the rise of nationalism, which became ever more tangible in the 2000s in Turkey. While acknowledging the embeddedness of the sense of crisis in the national everyday, the moments that it becomes more tangible offer a particularly fruitful perspective on the ways in which national identity has been produced throughout the history of the Turkish Republic and the increasing role of images in sustaining it.

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[8] These challenges to the hegemonic national identity, especially those mounted by Kurdish movement(s) since the 1990s, are not less important than the one thought to be posed by the emergence of the AKP as a powerful political agent. I focus on the perceived threat of political Islam, since the imagery I look at and the people who employ it mostly position themselves in relation to this dynamic. In this sense, the everyday performances of national identity through images I look at carry characteristics of official Kemalist nationalism, "the root-language of Turkish nationalism", as well as of the variations of it Bora identifies: left-wing nationalism, which mostly positions itself against the AKP in this period, liberal nationalism, which adopts market fetishism as the ultimate sign of progress and integrates national signs in popular culture as much as possible, and the racist-ethnicist type of nationalism. However, this study shifts the focus from the categorization of hegemonic nationalist discourses to the realm of everyday life, in which national identity is performed in forms other than the ubiquitous national public monuments and images, which are mostly "cold, rigid, and stereotyped" representations (Bora, 2003: 438).

[9] Bora gives the example of places were Kurdish people are attacked as the lower and middle classes project their economic anxieties onto the "people from the East", in a similar vein to the anti-immigrant racist practices in European countries. See: http://www.baskahaber.org/2014/05/tanl-bora-gecmisle-yuzlesememek-turk.html.

The second reason for focusing on the 2000s is the opportunity this period offers not only to confront the strong nationalist tradition in Turkey and the role of images in perpetuating it, but also to explore the new survival methods that this tradition develops. According to Necmi Erdoğan, since the 1990s, the Kemalist bourgeoisie has manifested a nostalgic character, losing its symbolic power and independence (69). This nostalgia results from grief about not being able to sustain its class position and its Republican ideology. It could be argued that the emergence of not only the alternative national representations of Islamic conservatism, but also the increasing visibility of various alternative Kurdish and leftist imaginations accelerated the nostalgia in the 2000s and fueled the need for novel survival techniques. This in turn increased the role of the body and of popular consumption cultures in producing and performing national identity. Their increased role, rather than suggesting a compliance on the side of national symbolism, resulting in the weakening and alteration of old symbols into easily consumable, popular images, indicates a new collaboration between nationalism, popular culture and corporeal practices, resulting in the production of a new visual grammar in need of analysis.

Finally, the third reason behind my contextual and historical framing is related to the broader implications of this analysis. As I will explore in more detail in the conclusion, the power relations that gradually established their hegemony in the 2000s in fact generously borrowed from the Kemalist nationalist tradition, its rhetoric and imagery to shape its own specific nationalism(s). This can clearly be seen in the hasty gesture of hanging the Turkish flag and the image of Atatürk on the AKM building by the AKP government after the Gezi protests. Therefore, the analysis of everyday performances of national identity in the 2000s, which mainly position themselves against the AKP (although the position of "the other" also accommodates different groups, such as the Kurdish people, the Armenians, or leftists), also provides insights into the visual tactics employed by nationalism in general, which cuts across seeming polarizations and differences in political ideology. As Martin Stokes states: "whilst critique needs to deconstruct supposedly unitary categories of thought that had an alarmingly destructive impact on modern life ('nation', 'modernization' and so forth), it also needs to do exactly the opposite: to see commonalities where they have been suppressed" (335). Thus, the identification of the multiplicity of these everyday performances and of different types of images employed will not only reveal the specificities of the particular

context of 2000s Turkey, but will also offer a theoretical path and conceptual kit to analyze other intertwinements of nationalism and visual culture.[10]

National Identity and Its Visual Production

Benedict Anderson's theorization of the nation-state in his seminal work *Imagined Communities* provides one of the first and most influential perspectives not only on the emergence of the nation-state, but also on its dependence on the imagination and its rootedness in everyday life: "the newspaper reader, observing exact replicas of his own paper being consumed by his subway, barbershop, or residential neighbors, is continually reassured that the imagined world is visibly rooted in everyday life" (2006: 35). In this way, "fiction seeps quietly and continuously into reality, creating that remarkable confidence of community in anonymity which is the hallmark of modern nations" (2006: 36).

Etienne Balibar, in the influential book he co-wrote with Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, follows Anderson's emphasis on the fictive quality of the nation and adds that this should not "be allowed to prevent our perceiving the continuing power of myths of national origins" (Balibar 87). This is related to the "reality" he assigns to the notion of imagination:

> Every social community reproduced by the functioning of institutions is imaginary, that is to say, it is based on the projection of individual existence into the weft of a collective narrative, on the recognition of a common name and on traditions lived as the trace of an immemorial past (even when they have been fabricated and inculcated in the recent past). But this comes down to accepting that, under certain conditions, only imaginary communities are real. (93)

[10] Therefore, this study can be seen as a contribution to the need of analysis of the continuities between the "the root-language of Turkish nationalism" and AKP-type nationalism. Necmi Erdoğan, in what he calls a symptomatic reading, rightfully argues that it is important to look not so much at the differing sides of this conflict (between so-called Kemalists and Islamists) but at where they meet; not at what they speak about, but at what they are silent about (68). For Erdoğan, the silence mainly refers to the issue of class, since both the Islamic and the Kemalist bourgeoisie share a class position as a "meta code" and a "complicity" (69). An extensive analysis can reveal other complicities, such as the policies towards non-Muslim minorities and Shia Alevis, the prevalence of a militarist discourse, the progressive and developmentalist rhetoric, the reification of a shared past, the reliance on a cult leader figure and the sacred quality attributed to national symbols.

Through this imagination, individual existence is projected into a collective narrative and an immemorial past is fabricated and embraced. Thus, it is a common characteristic of nation-states "to represent the order they institute as eternal, though practice shows that more or less the opposite is the case" (Balibar 88). By supposedly being based on distinct cultural features, national identity is considered as if it were, in Balibar's words, "a precious genetic inheritance, to be transmitted uncontaminated and unweakened" (qtd. in Billig 71). The history of nations, then, "is always already presented to us in the form of a narrative which attributes to these entities the continuity of a subject" (Balibar 86).

Thus, nations do not naturally possess a given past or ethnic basis, nor do they mark the extinction of class conflicts: "the fundamental problem is therefore to produce the people. More exactly, it is to make the people produce itself continually as national community" (Balibar 93). The idea that the perpetuation of the national community, to a significant extent, occurs at the level of the people, who produce themselves as a national community, is one of the central premises of this study, which focuses on the interpretation, reproduction and performance of the claim to a national identity in the context of everyday life. The role of images in this process can be thought of as comparable to Anderson's theorization of the role of newspapers and clocks in generating a bond between people who do not necessarily know or see each other, but read the same newspaper and live by the same temporal order. Images enable imagination, and in a similar way to Marc Redfield's definition of the role of the tomb of the Unknown Soldier that Anderson discusses, "to some extent compensate for, the imagined community's dependence on the unimaginable" (88). Moreover, those images that are continuously reproduced seem to be the most effective devices to keep the imagination in shape, "for in order to imagine the nation, the imagination must be trained" (Redfield 77).

The question of the nation, then, is about knowing under what historical conditions it is possible to institute such a thing as "homo nationalis" through a network of apparatuses and daily practices and by virtue of "symbolic forms invested in elementary material practices" (Balibar 93-95). I argue that the formation of various visual communities is a crucial element in the "network of apparatuses" and elementary material practices through which symbolic forms are invested and reproduced. Visual communities are able to cut across the linguistic and racial communities of the nation, which are considered the main blocks of the fictive national community by Balibar. They facilitate the workings of linguistic and racial categories by providing shortcuts to existing notions of national language, race, as well as ethnicity and gender, and by covering up their "imaginative"

quality, turning the nation's fictive status into a tangible entity with material effects and consequences.

This understanding of the nation-state's claim to the continuity of its own existence and the subjectivity it attempts to construct can be thought in relation to Stuart Hall's general theorization of identity. Hall writes that "there is always 'too much' or 'too little' – an over-determination or a lack, but never a proper fit, a totality" (3). Bringing these ideas together, I will argue that the layers of the relationship a subject has with the nation unfold when we consider the rather slippery ground of (national) identity, which is assumed to be inherently stable and continuous, but never ceases to make one feel insecure and precarious. Images of the nation, produced and performed in different forms, provide the possibility to look at the tension between the excessive quality of the features attributed to the "inherited" and allegedly continuous national identity and the insecurity that underlies it.

A crucial motivation behind focusing on images is the understanding of nationalism as not an overarching strategy spreading from top to bottom and of nationalist strategies, pursued by the state and its institutions, as not necessarily fitting into everyone's imagination, but reinterpreted, reproduced and performed in everyday life. Yael Navaro-Yashin argues that "instead of looking for the state in tangible social institutions or stately persona, the sites of everyday life, where people attempt to produce meaning for themselves appropriating the political, ought to be studied as a central domain for the production and reproduction of the state" (2002: 135). The dynamic and incoherent nature of nationalist imagery allows an exploration of the variety of nationalism's everyday life performances. Focusing on images, then, does not mean understanding nationalism as no more than a collection of images, but rather as a "social relation between people that is mediated by images", to borrow Guy Debord's definition of the "spectacle" (7). I follow this perspective in focusing on what I will call "image acts", referring to the ways in which images act and people act with images through producing, consuming and displaying them, whose analysis not only provides insight into the production of the state in everyday life that Navaro-Yashin writes about, but goes beyond it to highlight the ways in which community, belonging and social encounters are negotiated.

This approach necessitates including the notion of affect in the exploration of image acts since national identity, belonging, and everyday life cannot be thought separately from the affective ways in which they are organized. I follow Spinoza's well-known formulation of affect as both to affect and to be affected – as "the modifications of the body, whereby the active power of the said body is increased or diminished, aided or constrained" (143). In the

context of nationalism, this helps conceptualize nationalism not only as an official, top-to-bottom process and a state practice, and national identity not only as a homogeneously imposed performance, but as practices reinterpreted, reproduced and continuously performed and materialized in everyday life. Since the construction and the performance of national identity takes place through a variety of emotions, such as fear, anxiety, hate, but also pride and joy, this aspect becomes crucial in detecting the dynamics of social encounters and their political implications in the national everyday.

The dual and simultaneous process of affecting and being affected also sheds light on image acts as referring to the relationship between images and people as capable of affecting and being affected by each other. Sara Ahmed's use of affect (not differentiating it strictly from emotion, which I also do not want to do) helps understanding the "cultural politics of emotions" especially in the context of national identity formation through images, which are "saturated with affect" through their circulation in and mediation of social relationships (2004a: 11). This perspective becomes even more urgent in the context of Turkey, where the nation intrudes in the lives of individuals at a corporeal and intimate level, and is performed through embodied practices. In this sense, focusing on affect helps to access the blurry area between official nationalism and the realm of the everyday, since "the slippery work of emotion cannot allow us to presume any opposition between extremist discourses and the 'ordinary' work of reproducing the nation" (Ahmed, 2004b: 121).

Mieke Bal's texts on contemporary art and Ernst van Alphen's conceptualizations of the role of affect in art, as an "intensity circulating in the domain of the sensible, between work and viewer, and without specific semantic content", will complement this perspective (Van Alphen, 2013: 67). This will allow me to elaborate on the political potential of image acts in contemporary art, especially in their attempt to affectively intervene in the construction of the national, the familiar and the ordinary. In this way, affective processes will not only be seen as operational in (national) community formations and performances, but also as disorienting them.

Image Acts

At this point, it is crucial for me to elaborate on my conceptualization of images and the ways in which they operate. W. J. T. Mitchell argues that understanding images "as projections of ideology, technologies of domination to be resisted by clear-sighted critique" is certainly fruitful, yet not adequate, since the "complex field of visual reciprocity is not merely a by-

product of social reality but actively constitutive of it" (1996: 82). The dual aspect of images as both projections of ideologies, made possible by specific contexts, and active constituents of these contexts is one of the guiding theoretical assumptions informing my analysis of images. Images of the nation are compelling sites to illustrate the ways in which nationalist ideologies operate in everyday life through images and how such images are not only reflective but also constitutive of these ideologies, perpetuating and at times possibly altering them. Thus, my aim is less to define what images are than to look at what they do and how they act by taking different forms and mediating social encounters in myriad ways.

In his discussion of the contemporary situation of visual studies, Mitchell argues that while the socially constructed and ideological nature of images has been a common assumption in the study of images, "a dialectical concept of visual culture cannot rest content with a definition of its object as the social construction of the visual field, but must insist on exploring the chiastic reversal of this proposition, *the visual construction of the social field*" (2002: 171, emphasis in text). I find it especially productive to extend this understanding to the realm of nationalism, in which images have a crucial role in reproducing, performing and perpetuating the idea of a nation, a national community and a national identity. If we are to understand belonging as "performatively produced, evoking the material contours of community as its effect", we can see images as acting to draw these contours, as well as carrying the power to re-shuffle and disorient these borders (Grabham 64).

Looking at the elements of visual culture as not only socially constructed, but as constructing the social by acting upon and shaping it, can productively be thought in relation to J. L. Austin's theory of speech acts, based on the idea that words are not only descriptive of a situation, but may be agents in its creation. For Austin, "the issuing of the utterance is the performing of an action" (6). In a comparable way, images can be seen as performing actions, as playing an active role in shaping what they claim to be depicting, rather than merely representing a preexistent reality. Like Austin's "speech acts", which are performative utterances that do what they say, "image acts" performatively shape what they portray and thus have direct effects and consequences. In this sense, the term "image act" captures the way I understand images to work and what they do, since it reveals the ways in which images act in all senses of the word, by taking action and doing things; taking action according to the context, but also in order to bring about that context; and performing a role, not only to express, but also to pretend, being deeds and pretenses at the same time.

Although speech act theory has been extended to the realm of visual studies, especially in the last decade, under different names, such as "bildakt" (picture act,

Bredekamp), "image act" (Bakewell) or "speech act of pictures" (Sarapik), these studies remain few and are situated mostly in the realm of art. Bátori argues that "a long forgotten philosophical advancement in visual communication has been recently revived, suggesting that the theory of speech acts can be successfully extended and developed for explaining the communicative nature and processes of pictures and other visual phenomena" (2014).[11] C. J. Reynolds also draws on speech act theory to explore image manipulations and their various social effects from an ethical perspective, exemplifying what is referred to as "image act theory" (2007). However, the way I use the term image act is different from image act theory, which specifically deals with image manipulations and their social effects. My employment of the term is more akin to the German art historian Horst Bredekamp's recent exploration of the "bildakt" (picture act), exploring the power of images in moving us to action, which Mitchell also refers to and remarks is in need of further elaboration (2006).[12] Exploring this term in the realm of images alluding to the nation, which claim to represent the pre-existing characteristics of a nation and the continuity of its subjects, contributes to the understanding of not only the active and consequential character of images, but also the ways in which nationalist practices persist.

This generates an understanding of national identity akin to Judith Butler's well-known conceptualization of the gendered self, partially based on Austin's theory of speech acts, as not existing prior to its enactments, but constituted by them performatively. Image acts, too, do not only constitute "the identity of the actor", but constitute it "as a compelling illusion, an object of *belief*" (Butler, 1990: 271). Butler's emphasis on the crucial role of repetition for a cultural code to become performatively naturalized sheds light on how the images of the nation, such as the flag and the image of the national leader(s), become so powerful in creating what they claim to represent. As I will explore, they circulate repeatedly and are reproduced in myriad forms, not only officially, but also in everyday life on objects, clothes, bodies and screens, and in public, private and art spaces.

The concept of image act implies that images acquire a certain life of their own and possess the agency to act in particular ways, as endowed, over time, with certain meanings and affects. They mobilize, as well as constrain and force people to do things; they have a life

[11] From conference paper abstract: Zsolt Bátori: *Photographic Illocutionary Acts*
5th European Communication Conference of The European Communication Research and Education Association (ECREA), Philosophy of Communication Section, Lisbon, Portugal, November 12-15, 2014.

[12] Unfortunately, Horst Bredekamp's book *Theorie des Bildakts. Frankfurter Adorno-Vorlesungen 2007* has not yet been translated into English.

of their own as "animated, vital objects", in Mitchell's terms, and they are things "that *want* things, that demand, desire, even require things –food, money, blood, respect" (2005: 194). In a similar way to Butler's discussion of speech acts, they do more than they are meant to: "we do things with language, produce effects with language, and we do things to language", but there is a limit to intentionality in the speech act, since "the speech act says more, or says differently, than it means to say" (8-10). However, the performativity of images cannot be thought separately from the agency of people who do things with images, who act upon, with and through them, who do not only look at or are not only looked at *by* images, but also look *with* them. The performative quality of images lies in how they are used and repeatedly invoked in order to remain effective. Thus, the concept refers to two simultaneous and inseparable processes that affect each other in dynamic and contextual ways: images which act and at times force people to do things, and individuals acting through, with and upon images, at times forcing them to do things. This dual process is especially important to explore in the context of nationalism, in which object and subject, image and body, tactics and strategies, are continuously negotiated, as I will argue throughout my chapters.

When conceptualizing image acts from the perspective of speech act theory, it is important to keep the limits of performativity in mind. Austin insists that the circumstances are vital for the success of the speech act: "either the speaker himself or other persons should also perform certain other actions, whether 'physical' or 'mental' actions or even acts of uttering further words" (8). Alongside the uttering of the performative words, "a good many other things have as a general rule to be right and to go right if we are to be said to have happily brought off our action" (Austin 14). This warns us not to overlook the context in which the image is able to act performatively. Consequently, I will contextualize the images that act and the people acting with images throughout this study by exploring the shifting dynamics of power relations, the sense of threat and crisis that dominates everyday life and the general precarity that underlies nationalism in everyday life in contemporary Turkey.

As I will explore throughout my chapters, image acts of nationalism work through different media and take different shapes, such as commodity objects, bodily accessories, masks, images made out of blood, tattoos, statues, ghostly apparitions, metaphoric images, movie characters and artworks. They all illuminate a different aspect of everyday nationalism and its visual production, such as how images act in the commodity market and reproduce the nation as marketable, exchangeable, portable and wearable, and how people employ these images as fetishes in their social encounters, as I will explore in the first chapter. In the second chapter, what I will call "bio-images" will provide the clearest examples of the

intimate relationship between people and images, their intertwined agencies, at times in harmony and at other times in tension. This discussion will resonate with Mitchell's warning "to scale down the rhetoric of the 'power of images'" by revealing that image acts do not only reveal the power of images but also their fragility, a fragility that also inhabits the national identity they claim to represent (1996: 74).

In the third chapter, I will look at monuments and apparitions of national symbols through the conceptual lens of ghostliness, which will reveal the ways in which images act across localities and generations in a haunting way. Monuments as image acts perform the nation as a reified entity, which can paradoxically travel beyond its solid ground, while ghostly apparitions as image acts perform it as a haunting entity, which is again paradoxically always there, across generations and periods. In the fourth chapter, the reframing of heroic representations of Atatürk in a bank advertisement and a biographical film will illuminate how image acts work through metaphors, myths and allegories. In the fifth and final chapter, the image acts I will look at come closer to the meaning of acts in "political action", since they make the existing and dominant image acts "unhappy" or "infelicitous", as Austin defines the moments in which speech acts lose their effect (15), by disorienting the ways in which they act normally and revealing other action potentials.[13]

In addition, the documentary that will accompany this study, entitled "Image Acts", constitutes an additional contribution to the exploration of image acts by focusing on some of the objects of analysis I explore in my chapters from a different angle.[14] It is a thirty-minute documentary consisting of footage I collected throughout my writing process. It includes materials from interviews I held with shop owners who sell products with national symbols on them, various tattoo makers with whom I spent long hours while people were being tattooed with the signature of Atatürk and his portrait, as well as with people who live around the giant Atatürk statue in Izmir. My main goal was to provide space for people to talk about how they relate to and are affected by the images of the nation, which inevitably evolved into broader discussions of their understanding of politics and more personal stories of relating to

[13] I will refer to Mustafa Kemal Atatürk as Atatürk throughout this study, not only to save space, but more importantly because I do not focus on who he "really" was, but on how his figure is embraced, employed and reanimated in contemporary times. I will refer to the disputes over his name whenever it is relevant for my analysis, such as in the analysis of the movie *Mustafa* (Can Dündar) in the third chapter.

[14] I have completed several documentaries since 2008, such as *Whose Lenin?* (2013), *Hair Dyeing: 45 Minutes* (2011), *Mask* (2011), *Ayşegül in Rebellion* (2010, Third Prize in If Istanbul Film Festival) and *Taboo* (2009, Third Prize in If Istanbul Film Festival). Some parts of the "Image Act" documentary that accompanies this study have taken from the documentaries I have made in this period.

the nation. The documentary also includes parts from a more interventionist documentary I made in the same period in which I asked people in the street if they would be willing to wear an Atatürk mask and act and talk like him. I recorded people who were willing to put the mask on and enact Atatürk talking about a variety of subjects. In the documentary, which can perhaps be considered as an image act itself, these examples of different performances of national identity, which at times conflict and at other times complement each other, depict a far from homogeneous picture of everyday nationalism in Turkey in the 2000s. Not only did the insights I gained from talking to people and relating to images through a camera inform my theoretical analysis, like a form of "field work", but my theoretical analysis in turn changed the way I looked at and framed the images I recorded. This can be seen as an experiment in translating my arguments into images and allowing them to speak for themselves, as well as carving out a space for the reader/viewer to make connections between words and images that will possibly exceed the ones I initiated and named here.

Travelling Images of the Nation

As I have argued, the theoretical framing the concept of image act offers informs and connects the different types of images I identify and analyze in my chapters. The first chapter will focus on the appearance of national images in the form of commodities since the 1990s, with a focus on the 2000s, when they gained more visibility. I will look at commodities such as flag-shaped necklace pendants, rings and lighters embroidered with Atatürk's image, and t-shirts depicting nationalist symbols and quotations. Through these items, I will explore the ways in which images of the nation become part of everyday life, appearing in smaller, more portable and more diverse forms than more familiar patriotic items, such as flags and statues in public spaces and institutions. Since this is a rather new phenomenon in the relatively short history of the Turkish nation-state, I will look closely at the political motivations for and the consequences of the conversion of official, collective national symbols into commodity objects that can be bought, sold, carried and worn by individuals. I will frame this process as a response from Kemalist nationalism to the crisis it faced in the 2000s, using the capitalist commodity market and popular culture by taking recourse to, in Özyürek's terms, "miniaturized" objects that allude to a certain lifestyle and that "do" things, such as evoking nostalgia and fear, and providing protection (376). The commodified image acts I will discuss, which both keep the aura that is characteristic of nationalist symbols intact and allow people to invent their own everyday rituals, reveal more than the seemingly routine

market and tourism-oriented strategies would suggest. More than indicating the desacralization and disenchantment of national imagery, they enable it to be diffused more broadly in everyday life in novel, more corporeal and more affective ways.

While Arjun Appadurai's *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective* will inform my exploration of how different types of objects and images intermingle in the form of the commodity, Sara Ahmed's theorization of "sticky objects" that are "saturated with affect, as sites of personal and social tension" will allow me to shed light on the affective quality these images acquire through their circulation (2004a: 11). The question of how these images act is complemented by a focus on how people act upon, with and through these images, how they configure commodified images in everyday life and the narratives they construct through this configuration. Rethinking Mieke Bal's conceptualization of collecting as a narrative in relation to consumption allows me to look at this aspect, as well as at the ways in which the narratives constructed through these commodified images function in people's encounters, perpetuating a sense of crisis that I argue has become "banalized". In addition, the notion of the fetish will enable me to further explore the encounter between people and commodified images, as well as other types of images I will explore later. Bringing together Sigmund Freud's well-known theorization of the fetish as a substitute and Louise Kaplan's focus on the strategic function of fetishism in the context of nationalism, I will look at the role of commodities in holding on to a sense of national identity in a perceived crisis by employing the materiality of things against the "immateriality" of national identity.

The second chapter will move closer to a seemingly more intimate realm, the body, by exploring what I will call bio-images, which are images that become part of the body or that are made out of body parts, such as masks, tattoos and flags made out of blood. Both commodified and bio-images reflect the embeddedness of nationalist images and practices in everyday life in Turkey and how they are being transformed in contemporary society in more daily and corporeal ways, in collaboration with commodity and popular culture. I argue that bio-images, too, are strong, tangible markers of a particular national identity caught up in a struggle to survive. Yet, the place of birth of bio-mages is not the market of mass produced items, but the body, which carries culture and identity "not merely as embodied representation but through performance", revealing the increasing role of the body in politics, in defense of national identity (Edensor 72).

The analysis of bio-images provides a strong case to see the body "as a performative articulation that – as Austin would say – 'does' the self", as well as others (Neef 231). In this

doing, politics is inscribed on and performed through the body, framing the individual as part of the body of the nation-state. Looking at how the political is engraved on the face as a mask, under the skin as a tattoo, and externalized through blood will allow seeing the ways in which the body is turned into the prosthesis of the modern nation-state in the face of loss and trauma. The coexistence of strength and fragility, vitality and mortality in relation to the body resonate significantly with the seemingly paradoxical rise and crisis of nationalism and the oscillating quality of national identity between lack and fulfillment.

The structure of the chapter will move closer to the body in each section, by first focusing on the Atatürk masks people put on in nationalist demonstrations, which cover the surface of the body, then the tattoos of national symbols, which actually become part of that surface itself, and finally the incident of a group of high school children making a Turkish flag out of their own blood, externalizing their body in the form of an image. The Bakthinian notion of carnival and the use of mask, Michel Foucault's conceptualization of the panopticon, as well as Michel De Certeau's notions of tactics and strategies respectively will inform my analysis by providing different entry points into the discussion of how images are not only looking or looked at, but also looked with in a corporeal way.

In the third chapter, I will move from the body to apparitions and monuments, to which I will look as other crucial image acts in the production of the nation through the haunting body of Atatürk that is in a constant loop of dying and being reanimated. The notion of ghostliness will contribute to my discussion of the liminality of images alluding to national identity between absence and presence. While Jacques Derrida's notion of spectrality sheds light on the liminal quality of Atatürk's image that haunts across generations, Esther Peeren and María del Pilar Blanco's conceptualization of ghosts as part of everyday life and popular culture will carry this discussion further.

The shift of focus to ghostly appearances and monuments through close readings of Atatürk's annual appearance on a mountain slope as a shadow, celebrated as a festival, and an Atatürk statue, erected in 2009 and that remained as the biggest Atatürk statue until 2012, will allow me to explore the haunting character of nationalist image acts, which "conjure up the nation by circumventing the history of its imaging" (Rafael 610). Looking at an ephemeral image like the Atatürk apparition as a monument and at a monument like the giant Atatürk bust as a ghostly entity will blur the association of the former with ephemerality and of the latter with solidity. This is important to reveal the fluidity of the forms and localities of nationalist image acts. Although this chapter resides in the middle of the study, the notion of ghost informs all the other chapters, retrospectively and prospectively, since I will look at

haunting images as constitutive of the national everyday and, ironically, crucial in turning the nation from an abstract entity into something tangible. In addition, I will focus on the rumors around the Atatürk monument about the youngsters of the neighborhood who enter into Atatürk's head and turn it into a hangout place, in order to discuss the ways in which the image act of the monument is challenged by acting upon that image. The issue of agency with regard to conscious attempts to challenge nationalist imagery will return in Chapter 5 that discusses the notion of disorientation.

From the ghostly images of Atatürk, I will move towards a "humanized" Atatürk figure, who walks, talks, bleeds and cries on the screen, seen in contemporary media representations that reframe this national figure and create same heroes with new manners. In this way, my third chapter will continue to explore the ways in which the image of the nation is reproduced through reanimating Atatürk, in an attempt to transcend the liminality of this figure between death and life by "humanizing" him and bringing him back to earth. I will focus on two recent media representations, the first television commercial in which Atatürk is portrayed by an actor (Isbank, 2007) and the first blockbuster movie on Atatürk's life (*Mustafa*, directed by Can Dündar, 2008). These objects provide a productive basis to reflect upon the motives, methods and consequences of this attempt of reframing national images in line with the necessities and facilities of media and popular culture, by exploring the metaphorical, allegorical and mythical burden put on the shoulders of this new "humanized" figure. Through the advertisement, I will question the infantilization of the nation in the image of a child and conceptualize metaphors as successful tools in perpetuating a sense of national "home", in parallel with a neoliberal subjectivity. Through the film, I will look at the continuity of previous national allegories and myths under new disguises, undermining the claim to novelty in this reframing of official national images.

Finally, in the fifth and last chapter, "Disorienting Images: A Bust with Multiple Faces", I will focus on a more "disorienting" reframing through Vahit Tuna's bust installation, from the exhibition "We were always spectators…" in the art space DEPO, Istanbul, 2011. Commodified images, bio-images, ghostly images and monuments, as well as media representations all attempt to create, in related but distinct ways, a unifying image of the nation. If one of the ways in which nationalism reproduces itself in everyday life is through a visual grammar by which one is supposed to make sense of the world and orient oneself towards the other, then it is crucial to look at the images that disorient this grammar and question the subjectivity it calls for. Thus, in the last part of this study, I focus on the images that turn these narratives into sites of struggle in order to explore the possibility of

"disorienting" national imaginations, both semantically and politically. In this sense, I will conceptualize the notion of disorientation as a shaking of an existing orientation, hence, a loss of destination, conveying a sense of an ongoing ambiguity, rather than the achievement of a new stasis.

I focus on three main tactics that I identify in Tuna's installation, which are, respectively, the reconfiguration of the space, the superimposition of different visual elements, in this case two distinct faces, and the affective channels the work opens up. The analysis of these tactics go beyond this specific installation and allows exploring the role of distance, the correlation between physical closeness and the ability to grasp an image, the genre of portraiture and its subversion, and the role of affect in challenging the representational fixities of national symbols. While up until the last chapter, I focus on the different forms in which the nationalist image acts work affectively, in the last chapter, I focus on another aspect of affect as an important element for the political power of critical images of art, in line with Ernst van Alphen and Mieke Bal's formulations of political art and affect, which I will elaborate on respectively. Through these tactics, which do not allow the image to be absorbed in one fell swoop, I will look at what disorientation does, both in the specific context of contemporary Turkey and with regard to a more general discussion of aesthetics and politics. This quest is closely connected to the confidence in the possibility of another world that would radically challenge the demarcations that an exclusive national identity brings about.

Although the example I focus on in the last chapter is from the realm of contemporary art, it connects smoothly with the example of the Gezi uprising that I started this introduction with and the possible moments of political and aesthetical subversion it made visible. One of the examples from the Gezi uprising that revealed the conflicting dynamics and negotiations with regard to nationalist imaginations has been the way in which the popular slogan "We are Mustafa Kemal's Soldiers" was counteracted. This slogan, chanted from the beginning of the protests by Kemalist protestors against the AKP, who made up a significant portion of the protestors, made a strong identity claim based on traditional nationalist codes. Other protestors reacted by turning it into "We are Mustafa Keser's soldiers", first appearing as a wall writing, then as a slogan, referring to a folk singer whose name is orthographically and phonetically similar to that of Mustafa Kemal (Atatürk). The sentence continued its metamorphosis as "We are Freddie Mercury's soldiers" and "We are Zeki Müren's soldiers", referring to the first popular transgender singer in Turkey from the 1960s, during the Gay Pride following the Gezi protests.

"We are Mustafa Keser's soldiers", building on the absurdity of being a folk singer's soldiers and replacing a leader figure with a singer who is known to be talented, funny and somewhat kitschy, disoriented the original one through a humorous and affirmative negation. It did not only stand out as a witty response to those protestors expressing themselves through nationalist symbolism, and perhaps as a creative method to make it possible to stand together with them, but also as a challenge to the authorities, which tried to reduce the protests to a Kemalist uprising or even a coup d'état initiated by clandestine Kemalist organizations with the help of foreign powers. The disorientation was confusing and ambiguous, especially since heard from a distance it could become indistinguishable from the original slogan. Thus, just like Tuna's bust had "multiple faces", it had "multiple sounds". Precisely by not "destroying" but "sounding" the original, it disoriented the original's claim to unification among the protestors based on sharing a masculinist, militarist and nostalgic notion of a nation, a past, and a leader.

Thus, the analysis of disorientation is crucial as the final step in my exploration of the visual reproduction of the nation because it gives insights into how orientation works in the first place and makes existing forms of orientation "unhappy" or "infelicitious", using Austin's term to describe the moments in which speech acts lose their effect (15). In this way, disorienting images contribute to the unmaking of larger exclusive constructs such as nationalist imaginations and remaking of others, not by providing an "outside position" or revealing the "truth" mystified by (nationalist) ideologies, but rather by generating unusual configurations of meaning, affect, thought, and action.

Chapter 1
Commodified Images: Buying (into) the Nation

It is perhaps not an unusual incidence in a world filled with national souvenirs - tiny Eiffel towers in France, wooden shoes hanging from "The House of Orange" ribbons in the Netherlands, or underwear brandished with US flags - that such "images of the nation" also appear on shop shelves in Turkey. This process, which already started in the 1980s, became even more visible in the 2000s, and flag-shaped silver and golden necklace pendants, collar buttons and rings with Atatürk's face, t-shirts depicting Atatürk and his most famous quotes, Swarovski accessories and kitchen equipment imprinted with national symbols flooded the market. More unusual and customized products, such as flag-shaped bread and Atatürk images made out of pastry or raw meat, also appeared in shop windows, especially when the political climate made people more restless due to the shifts in the hegemonic discourses and power relations I addressed in the introduction. For instance, in a 2010 email correspondence, the designer/spokesperson of "Modernist", one of the brands producing commodities decorated with national symbols, told me that until this time it had been a taboo to use Atatürk, "the architect of modern Turkey and the father of modernism", in clothing design. He added, in a way that captures one of the most crucial motivations stated by various people in my interviews: "I wanted to make it possible for such a leader, whom we always carry in our hearts, to be a part of everyday life, rather than him appearing only in official institutions and during official ceremonies."

Through the abovementioned products, national symbols indeed became part of everyday life, appearing in smaller, portable and more diverse forms than the more familiar patriotic items, such as flags, images and statues in public spaces and institutions. I argue that it is important to look closely at these everyday objects that claim to encapsulate different aspects of the nation and to explore what is behind the seemingly routine market and tourism-oriented strategies of their distribution, especially given the specificities of this rather new phenomenon in the relatively short history of the Turkish nation-state.

Thus, the first step of my exploration of the contemporary image politics of nationalism in Turkey consists of an analysis of the various appearances of national commodities on the market, with a focus on the 2000s, when they gained more visibility and different forms. I will examine the political reasons behind the conversion of official, collective national symbols, such as Atatürk images in schools and institutions, as well as

flags and busts displayed in public spaces, into commodity objects that can be bought, sold, carried and worn by individuals. My focus will be on the implications of this transformation for the ways in which nationalist images act with regard to the reconfiguration of power relations and the performative reiteration of national identity. This chapter, then, will shed light on the appearance of always-already-there images in novel forms and the ways in which this allows them to become more diffuse and visible in more corporeal and affective ways. My analysis of how the nation is "consumed" through commodity images and objects, the functions they fulfill and the desires they mobilize will illuminate the way the nation is imagined and national identity performed in contemporary Turkey through popular culture and commodity capitalism. Beyond the Turkish context, this analysis helps to better understand the dynamics of the relationship between national identity and commodification, as well as the role of images that circulate as goods, loaded with affects such as fear, anxiety and pleasure, in mediating people's relationship with the nation and each other.

Images of the nation in the form of merchandise become more widespread during the cultural and political transition period, which is described by the editors of *Turkey Reframed: Constituting Neoliberal Hegemony* as the shift of the dominant force in power relations from the old, Republican bourgeoisie to a new (neo-)Islamic bourgeoisie in the 2000s (Bekmen, Akça and Özden). On this basis, I will argue that these images represent a new form of visualization and performance of national identity, indicating both the rise and the crisis of Kemalist secular nationalism. The spread of these goods marks the way in which the Turkish political and economic crisis is mostly framed and experienced as a "clash of lifestyles" that manifests itself through images in everyday life. As I will argue below, Kemalist nationalism responds to this crisis, in collaboration with the capitalist commodity market and popular culture, by taking recourse to portable objects that allude to a certain lifestyle and are capable of evoking fear and providing protection at the same time.

I conceptualize commodified images as rich texts in which demand, desire and power interact. Their function as gateways to understanding the economic, cultural and affective construction of everyday life under the capitalist mode of production explains the prominent place they have occupied in critical theory dealing with modernization and capitalism, as well as nationalism.[15] As Tim Edensor defines them, nationalist commodities are "part of

[15] Among the seminal works that explore the commodity form in the 20th century are Walter Benjamin's detailed and poetic scrutiny of everyday life and commodities in a modernized urban setting (*The Arcades Project*, 1940), the Frankfurt School's ceaseless interest in masses and commodities within the context of the culture industry (*Dialectic of Enlightenment*, 1944), Guy Debord's exploration of the commodity form as the constituent unit of the "society of the spectacle"

everyday worlds, symbolic imaginaries and affective, sensual experiences which inhere in forms of national identity" (136). They have a crucial role in mediating people's encounters in everyday life, in more affective ways than, for instance, the more traditional official symbols. They can, consequently, be seen as "sticky objects" that are "saturated with affect, as sites of personal and social tension" (Ahmed 2004a: 11). It is crucial to explore the specific ways in which national commodities work when this social tension pertains to national identity. In addition, through their frequent proximity to the body and their capacity to respond to intense political processes, commodified "image acts" (as defined in the introduction) do not merely represent a person's identity, but are active in its creation in a performative way. In this sense, they are not mere encapsulations of a pre-established top-down nationalist ideology consumed by passive national subjects, but dynamic fields in which imaginations, affects, and personal relationships interact and are negotiated.

I will first briefly focus on the historical background and the political context that give rise to the emergence of these commodities by extending the analysis of Turkish political imagery from the 1990s to the 2000s, which is the context that also informs the upcoming chapters. In the 1990s, the decade in which official Kemalist nationalism was thought to be threatened by a rising political Islam, the dominant images of official nationalism started to be picked up by people to be used outside of the spaces determined by the state tradition. However, in the 2000s, with the increasing power of the neoliberal, authoritarian, Islamic ruling party AKP (Justice and Development Party), shifting power relations became more apparent and Kemalist nationalism found itself in a deeper political and cultural crisis. I focus on this historical moment, in which the employment of the national imagery in novel forms has become one of the most visible and significant ways to react to the sense of crisis.[16]

In the second part, I will explore what happens to national images when they become commodity goods. I will question whether they are either tamed and lose their political significance or spread the idea of the nation in different shapes than before and allow it to

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(*The Society of the Spectacle*, 1967), as well as various anthropologists' attempts to formulate the intricacies of the nature of commodities in different times and contexts (*The Gift* by Marcel Mauss, 1923, *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective*, edited by Arjun Appadurai, 1986).

[16] It is important to note how the visual symbols and tactics of Kemalist nationalism are being borrowed and re-employed within the new configuration of power relations, under the AKP regime since 2002, especially after 2010. While it goes beyond the scope of this research to discuss this in detail, this research does not only aim to reveal the specificities of Kemalist nationalism, but also to contribute to better understand the ongoing prevalence of nationalist imagery, which seems to cut across different periods and political movements. I will come back to this in the conclusion, where I focus on the AKP's 2014 election video.

diffuse further in everyday life. This questioning is crucial to explore the assumptions that the expansion of the commodity market decreases the influence of the nation-state by reinforcing consumption-based subjectivities and that commodification deprives national images of their political meaning and effectiveness. In *The Social Life of Things: Commodities in Cultural Perspective* (1986), Arjun Appadurai conceptualizes commodities as a phase in the life of objects and explores how different types of objects/images intermingle in the form of the commodity, which will help me to conceptualize how the national commodities I look at come into being. Sara Ahmed's emphasis on how objects stick to each other and, in this way, exceed their singular influence, as well as on the affective power they gain through circulation will contribute to framing commodified national images as strong actors in everyday life. However, the closer look at these items needs to be complemented by a focus on the agency of people in acting upon, with and through images – on how they configure the commodified images in everyday life in particular ways and construct narratives through this configuration. Rethinking Mieke Bal's conceptualization of collecting as a narrative in relation to consumption will allow me to look at this aspect and at the ways in which these narratives function in people's encounters with each other.

It is my argument that both the emergence and the widespread circulation of national commodities mark a sense of crisis in everyday life, which will be addressed in the third part of the chapter by looking at the notion of everyday life as the locus of performing national identity through images. More specifically, I will examine the curious relationship between "routine" and "crisis" in the production of the everyday in a national setting. Ben Highmore suggests that everyday life, precisely because of its non-transparency, is ideally suited for the study of the amorphous and problematic force that national culture is (84). Understanding the everyday as a less transparent and more complex site of struggle where seemingly oppositional processes such as routine and crisis overlap is crucial in looking at the performance of national identity through image acts. In this sense, Michael Billig's concept of "banal nationalism", seen through the lens of the Turkish context, which forces it to expand in different theoretical directions, will help to grasp the intricacies of the construction of the national everyday through commodified image acts.

In the last part of the chapter, the notion of the fetish enables me to explore further the active and interactive role people and commodified images play in holding on to a sense of national identity in crisis by shedding light on how the materiality of things is employed against the "immateriality" of national identity. Slavoj Žižek's conceptualization of the "national Thing" will contribute to exploring this immateriality, in other words, the lack

behind the claims to a totalizing national identity and its collectively shared assumptions. Sigmund Freud's well-know theorization of the fetish will illuminate an important aspect of the way the commodity works as a fetish, especially in the context of the nation, since it touches upon a vital conflict in the working of the fetish as both a substitute for the lack and reminiscent of it, oscillating between fulfillment and lack, between empowerment and fear. Louise Kaplan's focus on the strategic function of fetishism, as opposed to its unconscious quality foregrounded by Freud, will allow seeing it as a strategic "substitution of something tangible for something that is otherwise ephemeral and enigmatic" (5). I will argue that the strategic and the material and materializing quality of the fetish, its contractual function, its intimacy with the body, and its dual function in marking the lack while at the same time fulfilling it, make it a crucial conceptual tool in understanding the ways in which people relate to commodified images in the context of the nation.

The Spread of National Commodities

Figure 3

Figure 4

Figure 5

A flag-shaped necklace pendant that gives the impression of waving like a flag, a ring embroidered with the star and crescent on the sides and Atatürk on the front, a lighter decorated with an Atatürk image: these are among the many different types of commodities that appeared on the Turkish market in the 2000s (Figures 3, 4 and 5).[17] Like many other national commodities, they consist of images intended for other uses, such as the flag and the image of the founding leader as the hallmarks of nationalist imagery,

[17] http://www.e-aris.com/product.asp?CtgID=2166&ProdID=7645.
http://www.caddegumus.com/en/men-silver-rings/424-gye008-Atatürk-silhouette-men-silver-ring.html.
http://www.Atatürkimzalisaat.com/urunler/Atatürk-imzali-cakmak.

placed on objects initially produced for exchange, such as accessories, clothing, household material, postcards, toys and various other, functional or decorative daily objects. In the history of a nearly one-hundred-year-old nation-state, it is only in the last two decades that national images have acquired the commodity form that my analysis reflects on.

The limited literature on nationalist commodity items in Turkey agrees on the difficulty of pinpointing an exact moment for the appearance of products decorated with nationalist patterns, yet this emergence is generally traced back to the period in which Kemalist nationalists reacted to the rise of the Islamic Welfare Party (RP) in the 1990s.[18] Two major studies dealing with the commodification of the nationalist symbols, its implications for Turkish politics and the conceptualization of state symbolism are Esra Özyürek's work on the "miniaturization" and privatization of Atatürk imagery (2004) and Yael Navaro-Yashin's book, *Faces of the State* (2002), in which she explores how the Turkish state is being challenged by the rising Islamic movements and how Turkish nationalism is performed through various everyday rituals. Both Özyürek and Navaro-Yashin accept that the rise of Islam, as a political and economic force in the 1990s, is the main cause of the production of state ideology and imagery into the realm of everyday life through commodified and privatized rituals.

Özyürek adds to this formula the increasing neoliberal policies and the pressure coming from international organizations (EU, IMF, WB), as well as the critique of the Turkish national identity by Islamists, Kurdish people, and liberals. She claims that the symbols of secular state ideology are first carried onto the market, then into private homes, transforming state-led modernity into a market-based modernity (375). Similarly, Navaro-Yashin argues that the state, since the 1990s, has reproduced itself "not by enforcing narcissistic rituals, but by enabling certain groups outside the center of state practice, to produce in-and-of-themselves, in Foucault's sense of the term, rituals of thralldom for the state" (119).

The victory of the RP in the local elections in 1994 in Istanbul ignited a secular and nationalist anxiety, which was eventually amplified by the increasing visibility of Islamic symbols in public places, such as students with headscarves in the universities, places welcoming the Islamic bourgeoisie and newly built mosques (Özyürek 377). Kemalists

[18] Analogously, in my email correspondences with owners of different Turkish t-shirt brands in 2010, they mostly stated that the nationalist commodity trend started a few years ago, in parallel with the "rise of Islam". They saw the main goal of their brand as carrying modern designs of older nationalist themes into everyday life and disseminating them as widely as possible.

reacted to this visibility of Islam in everyday life using several methods, including increasing the number of busts and portraits of Atatürk in public spaces, both in the city and in the shantytowns that voted for the Islamic party. After the military warning in 1997, which caused the resignation of the Islamist prime minister and the coalition government, Atatürk's image became even more of a guiding symbol of a secular lifestyle, voluntarily picked up by people, rather than being imposed by the state in the form of public statues and sine qua non images on institution walls.

It is crucial, however, to extend this analysis to the period of the 2000s, in which the extensity and visibility of national commodities increase while the hegemonic presence of Kemalism gradually decreases, especially after the election and re-election of the ruling party AKP in 2002 and 2007. In the 2000s, the AKP regime challenges the historical continuity of official Kemalist nationalism and incrementally establishes its own political and economical hegemony. During this period, neoliberal policies are deepened, in British historian Perry Anderson's words, making "neoliberalism for the first time something like the common sense of the poor" (17). The AKP adopts "a neoliberal regime with the fervor of a convert," within which "fiscal discipline became the watchword, privatization the grail" (P. Anderson 17). Bekmen et al. also argue that the first decade of the 2000s is marked by the economic crisis of 2001 and the coming to power of Islamic cadres under the AKP, representing the reconsolidation of neoliberal hegemony. The class conflict between the old Republican bourgeoisie and the newly emerging neo-Islamic bourgeoisie manifested itself visibly in the realm of culture, especially in everyday life as a clash of lifestyles and war of images. The commodified images alluding to the nation can be seen as significant actors in this clash, making it possible for the type of national identity that has been dominant since the foundation of the Turkish Republic and that is thought to be under threat in contemporary Turkey to be preserved and spread in forms other than the ubiquitous national public monuments and images.

The seeming polarization of Turkish society into secularists and Islamists has been challenged as a false separation since both groups share a class position and a nationalist discourse, which in fact also bifurcate the groups themselves (Erdoğan 59). Thus, the visual communities created through commodified images bring lifestyle concerns to the foreground, creating a sense of unity that mystifies both the class conflict and possible collaborations between people against oppression based on ethnicity, class, race and gender. Despite this, the idea that secularism and Kemalism were being threatened by political Islam has been a widespread perspective, culminating in the mid-2000s, especially

among the middle-class secular Republican population, which has most eagerly and visibly used the type of nationalist commodities exemplified above. Özyürek argues that people who consumed nationalist products in the 1990s were mostly middle and upper-middle class Turkish "secular urbanites who had been living in a major city for two generations, who did not position themselves on either the right or the left end of the political spectrum, but who were adamantly opposed to the emergent Islamist movement" (375). It can be argued that the profile of the consumers in the 2000s remained similar in terms of living in the large urban areas. However, it is crucial to consider the conflict between the Turkish army and the Kurdish guerillas, as well as Kurdish people living in the urban areas, as additional key factors in the use and display of these products. In addition, the commodity items diversified in the 2000s, becoming relatively cheaper and more available, diffusing even more across everyday life in the form of varied objects whose circulation is also facilitated by the spread of images produced on the Internet and online shopping.

Although the majority of the items allude to Kemalist nationalism, carrying the historically dominant national symbols of the nation-state such as the flag and Atatürk, it is also important to note the proliferation of different products referring to a more Islamic, AKP-type nationalism through religious images and references reflecting what can be called a neo-Ottoman aesthetics. Such products may feature the portraits of Ottoman sultans, their signatures, and even the image of Prime Minister Erdoğan on car stickers or necklace pendants.[19] The rising competition between Kemalist nationalist and Islamic nationalist paraphernalia shows the role of the consumer market as an important ground on which cultural identity clashes are fought; it is also where the supposedly tense relationship between the secular and the religious throughout the history of Turkey can be observed as one of interaction rather than rivalry. As Navaro-Yashin puts it, since the 1990s, commodification has become a context and activity shared by Islamists and secularists alike, rather than a domain dividing them (79).

The two distinct but not homogenous political and visual cultures, whose different interpretations of modernity, religion and secularism also bifurcate within themselves, are able to express themselves through commodities in similar ways. This shows that both

[19] The examples in which the image of the Prime Minister Recep Tayyip Erdoğan circulated in similar ways to the ones I discuss here are remarkable, especially after 2010, in positive correlation with the intensification of AKP's neoliberal/conservative authoritarianism and the augmented role of Erdoğan in the political realm. My analysis of Kemalist nationalism sheds light precisely on this strong tradition of nationalist imagery, able to travel to and be employed by other political ideologies and movements.

Kemalist and Islamic nationalisms collaborate with capitalist/neoliberal economic structures and popular culture, and that the relationship between nationalism and popular/commodity culture cuts across different political histories and cultures. Thus, although the Kemalist nationalist commodities reveal the specificities of this culture, both the long history of nationalism behind it and the novel tactics it comes up with, it can also serve as a model to explore the commodification of Islamic nationalism as an increasingly visible phenomenon.

Keeping this background in mind, one of the questions that arise with regard to the commodities exemplified above is whether the commodification of nationalist images generates a democratizing process in which such images are no longer diffused top-down like the state or institution-led statues and images and thus marking a "less hierarchical relationship" with people, as Özyürek claims, or whether commodification in fact helps national images to penetrate everyday life even more thoroughly (376).[20] In other words, is there life for nationalist imagery after commodification, and if there is, what does this life look like? In relation to this, another crucial question that arises is whether the shift from official imagery to consumption-oriented imagery indicates the instrumentalization of commodities for nationalistic purposes, the instrumentalization of national values for consumption purposes, or both. To answer these questions, in the next section I will focus on what political imagery and the commodity form do to each other, how these items gain their significance, circulate and act, as well as the ways in which their users act with them by employing and placing them in everyday life.

Is There Life after Commodification?

Tanıl Bora argues that the most striking development in contemporary Turkey is the transfer of the universe of nationalism to the field of popular culture. He explores the effects of commodification by stating that:

> Many national symbols become a kind of "pop" coat of arms, and thus can be worn relatively independent of a specific political meaning. National symbols become trademarks, and their consumption is engendered. Thus, a dual process begins. On

[20] I do not base my argument on the assumption that the market is equally open to everyone, which would carry the risk of mystifying the differences in the conditions and capabilities of access of different classes or groups. However, besides the fact that the profile of the consumers of these products as mostly middle class decreases this risk, it is also important to mention that most of the products that I am talking about here are relatively inexpensive.

> the one hand, nationalistic "exhibitionism" dominates the everyday and public arenas, and on the other, by "becoming pop" it becomes tamed. (450)

Bora's stress on the domination of everyday life and public space by "nationalistic exhibitionism" in the 2000s in Turkey marks the most notable result of the flirtation between nationalist imagery and popular commodity culture I have described above. The national images on rings and necklaces that start to stand side by side with various other commodities engender a relationality that affects their meaning. In such a context, the meaning of, for example, Atatürk's image can no longer be thought independently from a Che Guevara or Madonna poster, a talking baby doll, or a soldier toy crawling on the floor. When his face stands directly beside them, the image's interaction with football logos, astrological signs, pop stars and even Islamic paraphernalia becomes inevitable. The main question here is whether this relationality demeans a national symbol by putting it next to popular culture items and tames its meaning by equating it to all other commodities, or whether it strengthens and spreads the effect of a nationalist image further by providing it with more popularity, and new forms and paths of distribution.

Robert Foster's argument represents one possible answer to this question, which is based on the idea that "political ritual" is replaced by "commercial ritual" in contemporary capitalism, as a result of which "nationality will live on as an idiom for some weak form of collective identity, one identity amongst others available in the global marketplace" (264-279). For the specific context of Turkey, Foster and Özkan argue that the construction of citizens has undergone a major transformation, resulting in the emergence of a "consumer citizenship" (n. pag.). Although they rightly emphasize the increasing role of the market, their perspective on the flattening power of consumption does not seem to reflect the complex ways consumption and nationalist practices interact. As Tim Edensor argues, as global cultural flows become extended, "they (may) facilitate the expansion of national identities and also provide cultural resources which can be domesticated, enfolded within popular and everyday national cultures" (29). Thus, identifying the different ways an Atatürk statue on a public square and a small Atatürk figurine in a shop window work is more productive when their interaction and collaboration are acknowledged, rather than placing the first in the realm of national culture and the latter in commodity culture.

Thus, the idea that the "popification" of national symbols deprives them of their political meaning does not adequately reflect the complexity of how a national commodity acts and mediates the relationship between people and commodities. National commodities

not only enrich consumption culture, but also create new channels for constructing and claiming a certain national identity. Commodification, instead of taming and demeaning nationalist images and stripping them of their political signification, carves out a space for the meaning of national images to be reinterpreted and acted out anew through small-scale everyday life rituals, such as putting on rings and necklaces with images alluding to a national identity or lighting a cigarette with a lighter decorated with Atatürk. The commodified images can travel through different fields of everyday life from one space to another and refer to an assumed national identity in the most daily scenes. In this sense, Özyürek's claim that this process signals the privatization of national imagery remains inadequate since their travel is in fact even more visible and substantial in public spaces. In addition, the "charm" and popularity they gain from popular cultural products they come into proximity with and the permeability they gain through becoming portable and functional make them more tangible and vigorous actors in everyday life. The examples of the ring, the necklace and the lighter all show how the images that are still the hallmarks of nationalist imaginations decorate public spaces, not only through public monuments and images, but in the form of portable items, which increases their radius of action and allows them to be not only integrated into but also constructive of everyday life, tainting its fabric with a nationalist outlook. They keep the notion of national identity on the agenda by reproducing it in seemingly routine, banal and insignificant everyday acts, establishing "visual communities" that draw borders between individuals.

Appadurai's conceptualization of commodities sheds further light on the empowering and vitalizing transformation both images of the nation and commodities go through by intermingling. Appadurai argues that commodities are "things that at a certain *phase* in their careers and in a particular *context*, meet the requirements of commodity candidacy" due to the "regime of value" that they are situated in, rather than their essential qualities (16). He distinguishes four types of commodities: commodities by destination (objects produced for exchange), commodities by metamorphosis (objects intended for other uses and placed into the commodity state), commodities by diversion (objects becoming commodities that were originally specifically protected from commodification), and ex-commodities (objects retrieved from the commodity state and placed in some other state). He argues that there are spatial and temporal overlaps between these types, so that an object can move from one category to another, or can carry features of more than one category at the same time. The accessories carrying national symbols, such as mugs, clothes, slippers, lighters, clocks, stickers, key holders and various household goods, stand

at the intersection of these different categories, productively revealing the transitions and overlaps between them, as well as how they gain power from previous statuses. These items mostly mark the meeting of objects produced for exchange and national symbols initially intended for other uses, positioning them in between commodities by destination and by metamorphosis. They also carry some features of the third type of commodities Appadurai identifies, commodities by diversion, in the sense that these "priceless" symbols were originally protected from becoming commodities. In fact, the Turkish Constitution still bans the use of the Turkish flag as clothing or uniform under the "Turkish Flag Law" (Law #2893). Thus, they change their status under the "regime of value" that they are situated in, determined by changing economic, political and cultural relations, such as the expansion of the commodity market, the shared sense of crisis that marks Turkish society, and the increasing imminence between popular culture and nationalism.

Appadurai argues that the diversion of commodities from specified paths is mostly "a sign of creativity or crisis, whether aesthetic or economic" and mostly results from novel and irregular desires and demands (26). The sense of crisis evoked by the perceived threats to national identity and the accompanying desire to protect it pave the way for the national images and commodity items to meet. As a result, the novel ways in which nationalist images enter the "commodity phase" carve them out a space outside the officially determined frames, making them part of everyday spaces and behaviors, cutting across private and public realms. This reminds us of the designer of the Modernist brand whom I quoted above stating his aim as carrying Atatürk outside of the official institutions and ceremonies into everyday life. In this context, not only souvenir shops, but also toy shops, a bakery that produces a bread shaped like a Turkish flag, or a butcher making the map of Turkey out of raw meat, can become places where images act to reproduce nationalism, while a lighter embellished with Atatürk can be carried in someone's pocket from the home to the street, meeting different eyes, becoming part of the most everyday gestures, having power over its user and the others.

A form of national identity and accompanying emotions, such as fear and pride, are (temporarily) attached to and are produced by these items that travel in different spaces and between bodies, which makes them "saturated with affect, as sites of personal and social tension" (Ahmed 2004a: 11). Ahmed states that feelings "appear in objects, or indeed *as* objects with a life of their own, only by the concealment of how they are shaped by histories, including histories of production (labor and labor time), as well as circulation or exchange" (2004b: 121). The circulation of these items as part of everyday life spreads national values

and the more they circulate, the more they become affective, since affect "does not reside positively in the sign or commodity, but is produced only as an effect of its circulation" (Ahmed 2004b: 120). Similarly, Appadurai claims that exchange is in fact the source of value, not its by-product (4). While the commodified images of the nation travel, they come together and gain power from each other, by alluding to a symbolic value that far exceeds their exchange value. Ahmed argues, for the context of the US, especially after 9/11, how "the flag is a sticky sign, whereby its stickiness allows it to stick to the other 'flag signs', which gives the impression of coherence (the nation as 'sticking together')" (2004a: 130). In the context of Turkey, too, these various items circulate, become more effective and affective by sticking to each other and acting together in shaping what they claim to signify, and taint the fabric of everyday life and people's encounters.

However, Ahmed's perspective, while highlighting the agency of objects and images, does not focus as strongly on the fact that these material items are in fact placed in everyday settings in particular configurations by people. Thus, the acknowledgment of the increase in the stickiness and agency of the objects should be complemented by the exploration of people's active role in employing these objects and creating narratives through them. Bal argues that the meaning of objects changes once they are included in a collection and therefore become part of a syntagm: "the objects as things remained the same, but the objects *as signs* became radically different, since they were inserted into a different syntagm" (1994: 112). She suggests that this insertion pushes a plot forward as it constitutes the development of a narrative. A similar process can be said to occur when objects bearing images referring to and shaping a national identity start to be consumed. The necklace remains a necklace and the lighter remains a lighter, but their meaning as *signs* changes significantly when they are inserted into another syntagm through the images on them that render them suitable to function in a narrative of national identity and by being "pushed forward" by people in everyday life.

According to Bal, narrative is "an account in any semiotic system in which a subjectively focalised sequence of events is presented and communicated" (1994: 100). People choose to buy certain items over others, and thus focalize the sequence of events to tell a particular story, becoming storytellers. To follow Bal, they become "the semiotic subjects producing or uttering that account" (1994: 101). The act of buying generates a narrative through such a placing of the items in a new syntagm by acting upon, through and with images. Fear and pride emerge as remarkable components of this narrative, as collectively constituted by a section of Turkish society, not by looking *at* but by looking

with images. The pride stemming from the assumption of being the real inhabitants and the original owners of everyday life, as well as the need for protection from a perceived crisis caused by others and their way of living seem to be vital motives both in the construction and dissemination of this narrative through commodified image acts.

Özyürek quotes a woman she interviewed who started to wear an Atatürk pin after Islamists gained power for the first time in the 1994 local elections in Istanbul:

> When I am walking on the street, I want to show that there are people who are dedicated to Atatürk's principles. Look, now there are veiled women walking around even in this neighborhood. Their numbers have increased. I push my chest forward to show them my pin as I pass by them. I have my Atatürk against their veils. (378)

The pin on the chest the woman pushes forward like a clove of garlic against a vampire is a response to the perceived threat coming to her neighborhood. The pin is put into a new syntagm alluding to a national identity, thought to be under threat, and is pushed forward as the plot is "pushed forward" in Bal's words. The narrative is focalized around the acute task that nationalists, at this particular historical moment, assign themselves of protecting their cultural codes through mapping and policing "proper" ways of dressing, acting, behaving and communicating. The conjuring of "threatening figures" who never cease to be constitutive factors of national identity and who are most of the time replaceable with each other shows that "the reading of the others as hateful aligns the imagined subject with rights and the imagined nation with ground" (Ahmed 2004b: 118). The statement above marks the co-existence of fear and pride in the task of ensuring that the social structure and lifestyle to which one is proud to belong to and is afraid of losing will survive.[21]

The woman wearing an Atatürk pin attempts to communicate with the "veiled woman" in a negative and exclusive form of communication, similar to what Saraçoğlu

[21] The perceived threat of Islam was accompanied by the threat of the large-scale migration from the East to the West of Turkey in the 1990s, which increased the population of Kurdish people in big cities. Cenk Saraçoğlu's book, *Kurds of Modern Turkey: Migration, Neoliberalism and Exclusion in Turkish Society*, provides a detailed analysis of the hostility towards Kurdish people that manifests itself through "lifestyle arguments" in contemporary Turkey. Saraçoğlu calls this form of hostility "exclusion through recognition" and argues that it is based on encounters between the urban middle classes and Kurdish people in urban settings within the context of immigration and neoliberal policies.

calls "exclusive recognition" (6).[22] The pin clearly acts to demarcate the boundaries between the two bodies in an attempt to prevent the possibility of other bodies getting closer, while the person acts with it on the basis of a fear that "works to restrict some bodies through the movement or expansion of others" (Ahmed 2004b: 127). Taking action within the syntagm of nationalism, the pin and the person collaborate to push a narrative forward that shapes mechanisms of exclusion and inclusion, belonging and non-belonging, through a combination of political, cultural and, at times, ethnic codes. In this sense, consumption unfolds as a performative act that draws the boundaries of the claimed national identity.[23]

In doing this, the image that acts and the body that acts with the image also transform each other. The commodity item that is mostly carried around, close to the body, "acts upon the body", rather than being merely a shell, "not only because it affects the experience and presentation of the self but also because it transforms that self physically and emotionally" (Gökarıksel 661). Thus, the image of Atatürk put above the veil and placed as an interface between bodies transforms the person who creates this narrative, perhaps more than the person who is supposed to receive the message. This resonates with Ahmed's point on the "passing" of objects between proximate bodies, "not merely as a process of 'sending' or 'transmitting', but also 'transforming'" (2010a: 38). The transformation seems to happen in this case through the sense of empowerment provided by the pride the pin evokes, as well as the fear perpetuated by it, which is a dual process that can be found in how fetishes work, as I will argue in the last section of this chapter. Yet, before going into the fetish, I want to explore the notion of crisis in more detail, as it is this sense that mobilizes people to reconfigure everyday life and endow commodity items with power and urgency. I will do this by regarding a governor's wife wearing a star-and-crescent necklace in order to "curse the terror" as symptomatic of a broader phenomenon the analysis of which will also inform the other types of image acts I will be looking at in the following chapters.

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[22] Saraçoğlu uses the term "exclusive recognition" to define the new perception of "Kurdishness" that urban middle class Turks develop through their actual physical encounters and experiences with the Kurdish people who immigrated to the cities, instead of through existing stories and myths.

[23] In this sense, commodities based on nationalist imagery can also be likened to what Peter Berta calls "ethnic pantheons" for "prestige items" in Gabor Roma communities in Romania, which are highly valuable and considered to be historical sites representing their ethnic identity (194). While giving an "ethnic warning", they also function like the "luxury goods" that Appadurai differentiates as goods whose principal use is rhetorical and social, as incarnated signs, while the necessity they respond to is fundamentally political (38).

The Banality of Crisis

Figure 6: Image from news depicting a governor's wife with the caption "She cursed the terror with her star and crescent necklace".

Figure 6 depicts a photograph used alongside a news report in a newspaper from Trabzon entitled, "The wife of the governor gave an impressive reply" published in December 2009.[24] The report states that while the whole country is mourning the seven Turkish soldiers, referred to by their generic name "Mehmetçik", who were "martyred in the cruel ambush", the Trabzon governor's wife attracted all the attention by sending a crucial message. This image of the woman who "curses the terror with her star-and-crescent-necklace", as the caption states, can be seen as symptomatic of a common nationalist reaction to the perceived threat of "terrorism" in the 2000s. The figure of the woman with the headscarf discussed in the previous section seems to be replaced with the figure of the Kurdish terrorist here, again highlighting the interchangeable nature of the figure of the threatening other. The vehemence of the reaction is representative of the fact that whenever the conflicts surrounding the Kurdish issue intensify, which has been a recurrent theme in Turkish politics in both the 1990s and the 2000s, nationalist items appear in novel forms to act upon and react to the situation, to demarcate groups and take sides.[25]

[24] http://www.medyatrabzon.com/news_detail.php?id=7531.

[25] What the news refers to as the "cruel ambush" was an attack on the Turkish army, reportedly undertaken by PKK (Kurdistan Worker's Party), on December 7, 2009 in Reşadiye, a district of Tokat province in Turkey, in which seven soldiers have died. PKK declared that it was a response to the Turkish army's current operations against the Kurdish guerillas and it occurred a day before the largest Kurdish party of the time (DTP) was considered to be outlawed by the court.

The governor's wife, who is described with reference to her husband's position throughout the report, is quoted as saying: "The message I give is that we should not forget our martyrs. Our martyrs found their places in the hearts of the entire Turkish nation. The traitors who planned this felonious ambush will naturally be punished by the law as they deserve."[26] The necklace is placed literally close to the heart and highlighted with bright jewels, to indicate the martyrs who "found their places in the hearts of the entire Turkish nation", a discourse justified not on the basis of hate but love. It is likely that the governor's wife did not meet the Turkish soldiers or the Kurdish guerillas she mentions in her speech, which symptomatically illustrates the production of highly normalized daily speeches on the basis of fantasies. The act of wearing the necklace works to "animate the ordinary subject, to bring that fantasy to life, precisely by constituting the ordinary as in crisis, and the ordinary person as the real victim" (Ahmed 2004b: 118).

Highmore notes how things become everyday by becoming invisible and unnoticed and suggests that Brechtian estrangement, which aims at stripping the familiar of its inconspicuousness and returning it to awareness, is a fruitful methodological contribution to everyday life studies (22). It can be argued that the spread and the increasing visibility of these everyday accessories in Turkey can be analyzed to provide such a Brechtian effect, albeit momentarily, revealing afresh what has been a routine part of everyday life, namely the embeddedness of national images in daily practices. This occurs due to the appearance of always-already-there images in novel forms, which allows them to become more diffused and tangible. Whereas a flag hung in a public space becomes a routine part of everyday life, no longer consciously perceived, a flag hanging from someone's neck implies, at least at first, an exceptional situation that is being addressed with this artifact. Thus, the epidemic of the star and crescent, which appears on almost every possible accessory, assigns an alarming quality to everyday life, implying the community is under threat and its values in peril. It is, moreover, implied that this threat can only be expressed and fixed with the help of these items.

Michael Billig's well-known formulization of "banal nationalism" is helpful to explore this relationship between nationalism, everyday life, and crisis, tainting and transforming each other. Billig, who connects the concepts of everyday life and invisibility in a similar manner to Highmore, argues that it is not crises that create nation-states as nation-states, but daily and mundane practices (8). A whole complex of beliefs,

[26] http://www.medyatrabzon.com/news_detail.php?id=7531.

assumptions, habits, representations and practices are continuously reproduced in a mundane way, "for the world of nations is the everyday world, the familiar terrain of contemporary times" (6).[27] Billig argues against the idea that the psychology of nationalism is that of an extraordinary mood striking at extraordinary times, as posited in some classical nationalism theories, such as that of Anthony Giddens, who states that nationalist sentiments rise up when "the sense of ontological security is put in jeopardy by the disruption of routines" (qtd. in Billig 44). Billig tries to catch what is obscured in conceptualizing nationalism as the exception rather than the rule, which is the banal reproduction of the nation. Although Billig does not address the crucial differences between the display of nationalism in everyday life in different contexts and in the form and prevalence of both institutional and commodified imagery, his theorization is crucial in the sense that it blurs the line between "the West and the periphery" and challenges the idea that the reflections of these two supposedly distinct forms of nationalism in everyday life are drastically different.[28]

It is productive to look at Billig's theory through the lens of the Turkish context for two reasons. Firstly, in line with Skey's critique, Billig's can be said to be a top-down approach that neglects the idea that national identities depend on the claims which people themselves make in different contexts and times. Although Billig's analysis shows the importance of everyday routines in perpetuating nationalism, its sole emphasis on the presence of official national symbols and discourses in everyday life neglects people's own claims and newly invented routines, such as pushing the pin against a veiled woman and "cursing the terror" with a necklace. In line with Balibar's emphasis on the necessity of looking at how people construct themselves as national subjects, rather than how they are constructed through top-to-bottom enforcements, the performative quality of images in

[27] Billig's notion of banal nationalism explains the ideological habits that enable the reproduction of the established nations of the West, which are very much present in everyday life, contrary to the conviction in especially Western Europe that nationalism and its everyday reflections are characteristic of the periphery and of times of crisis.

[28] It is possible to say that there have been significant transformations since Billig has written *Banal Nationalism* in 1995 towards a direction that makes it more difficult to overlook the nationalisms of "the West" which Billig sees as a crucial risk. In the 2000s, the "war on terror" conducted by the US in Afghanistan and Iraq, the rise of right-wing nationalist parties in European countries such as France, the Netherlands, Germany, Switzerland and Denmark, the "Judeo-Christian" rhetoric seeing "enlightened Western cultures" under the threat of Islamic forces, and the hostile policies towards immigrants in the West, among other examples, as well as the anti-nationalist struggles for equality of the last decade, can be said to have made it harder to overlook the issue of nationalism in the West compared to the year Billig has written *Banal Nationalism*.

shaping what the political and cultural realm and the rituals carried out by people through acting with these images in everyday life seem to gain more importance (93).

Secondly, Billig's conceptualization of banality as separate from crisis does not allow us to acknowledge the possibility that crisis and routine may coexist, as in the case of contemporary Kemalist nationalism in Turkey. The various commodity objects that appear in shops windows, on bodies and in such news items perform as the signals of an urgent situation by embodying the discourse of crisis precisely in their banal everyday existence. Their constant and common use simultaneously normalizes the state of crisis and the nationalist outlook in everyday life. Especially through the proliferation and diffusion of national symbols in more personal and corporeal ways, the exception becomes the rule and the rhetoric of inner and outer threats to the nation becomes mundane, in a similar way to the endless, pre-emptive "war on terror" in the US that marks the same decade of the 2000s. Thus, these material things that are mostly held close to the body and used to create either proximity or distance to other bodies not only signal a crisis, but normalize the sense of crisis and turn it into a routine. Therefore, two seemingly opposite notions of routine and crisis emerge as crucial factors, oddly complementing each other in the production of everyday life around the claim to a national identity made through material things. In that sense, the commodified images I am discussing here both do and do not fit into Billig's theory of banal nationalism, revealing the necessity to add another theoretical layer that acknowledges the curious tension in the symbiotic relationship of banality and crisis.

In this sense, commodified images of the nation are different from Billig's "unwaved flags", the unnoticed symbols of the nation that are constitutive of it in everyday life, the equivalent of which would be the Atatürk portraits hung on institution walls or Turkish flags placed in school courtyards. Those images are indeed so habitual that they are not consciously and constantly perceived anymore, although they still hold a crucial role in unfolding the fabric of everyday life around the notion of a national identity. In contrast, the necklaces, t-shirts, bags, shoes, and badges, pervasive not in state institutions but in private and public spaces, such as shops, cars, houses, streets and bodies, are in fact "waved flags". Their conspicuous existence underlines the belief that the nation is in crisis and has to be defended against the commonly perceived threat caused by the proximity of imagined others who come "not only to take something away from the subject (jobs, security, wealth), but to take the place of the subject", yet, on a daily basis (Ahmed 2004b: 117). Thus, these crisis-signaling objects rapidly become a mundane part of life as

commodity products, everyday decorations and identity markers, making the crisis routine and normalizing it. They become part of everyday life not by making people remember the nation by actually forgetting it, as with Billig's banal items, but by not allowing people to forget that there is a constant crisis. In this sense, the commodified image acts, seemingly acting upon and against the crisis, in fact act to create the crisis itself, which is in turn banalized, creating a loop of what can be called the banal crisis of nationalism.

Bora explains the perseverance of the sense of crisis in the case of Turkey as the result of its late modernization, which made the state of emergency a chronic political and psychic element that cuts across different political traditions and reveals itself through different matters, as the Kurdish issue in the present case.[29] Yet, when the perception of threat is amplified due to particular conditions, such as the rise of Islamic-neoliberal forces, the intensification of the Kurdish issue and the challenge of Kemalist national identity, the notion of crisis that is always at the basis of the national everyday comes to the surface more visibly and tangibly, taking the shape of material objects that are put on display such as the necklace around the neck or pin on the chest. These material objects, which reveal the intermingled quality of the banality of crisis in the nation-state, can be explored further through the conceptual lens of fetish, to further question the ways in they act at the juncture of the sense of pride and fear I discussed through the pin and of crisis and routine I discussed through the necklace.

[29] http://t24.com.tr/haber/Tanıl-bora-muhafazakarlar-kultur-sanat-alaninda-iktidar-olamamaktan-rahatsiz/250800.

The Nation Thing and the Fetish

Figure 7: Atatürk t-shirt: "The strength you need is already embedded in the noble blood in your veins".

The text on the t-shirt above reads: "The strength you need is already embedded in the noble blood in your veins", one of Atatürk's frequently quoted statements (Figure 7).[30] The image accompanying the text depicts Atatürk superimposed on the map of Turkey, printed in white, and a scene from the War of Independence, printed in red. The references in the sentence with regard to who needs strength and whose blood is noble would be evident for anyone familiar with the Turkish context and for those who have been exposed to this sentence numerous times at school, in ceremonies and in textbooks, among other contexts. The sentence, originally spoken during "Atatürk's Address to the Turkish Youth" in 1927, frequently travels, appearing in different times and places, including on this t-shirt, which was being sold in shops in 2011. The invisible addressee, who is said to need strength and

[30] http://www.matrakshop.com/Ataturk-ve-Turkiye,LA_533-2.html#labels=533-2.

whose blood is deemed noble, is the Turkish youth. Parla, in his analysis of Atatürk's speeches, interprets this sentence not as conveying a sense of nationalism based on race and physicality, but as rhetorical symbolism, designed to provide a sense of self-confidence and a strong identity for the nation (131). However, it does not seem easy to separate the two since it is evident that this rhetorical strategy gains strength precisely from a nationalist set of references based on race and ethnicity, crystallized in the image of noble blood. The commonality implied and constructed in the sentence is strongly based on difference. The subtext, which is not hard to decipher either, is that Turkish people are strong, as opposed to non-Turkish people who do not have noble blood coursing through their veins.

The focus might be on the blood, but, in fact, the community is defined in shorthand by various image acts on this t-shirt: not one but two figures of Atatürk, other heroic military men, the map of the country, and the war scene all act as a reminder of the moment of national genesis. In a way, one's membership of the community is confirmed by a portable item that refers to the supposed characteristics of that community, strongly based on difference. Placing these images together and bringing them closer to the body might be said to empower the wearer by quickly positioning him in a community that is textually and visually praised. These visual and textual signs act as proofs of a national identity, while at the same time, being results of and perpetuating the fear of losing it, despite the inscription of the seemingly stable nobility in the blood, again showing how pride and fear feed into and perpetuate each other.[31] This specific quality of such nationalist commodities, oscillating between fulfillment and lack, as well as their portability and proximity to the body, makes the fetish a productive conceptual tool to discuss their function.

The layers embedded in the relationship between a person and a national symbol as a fetish unfold when we first consider the rather slippery ground of (national) identity, which is assumed to be inherently stable, but never ceases to make one feel insecure. As I have argued above, the sense of crisis is already embedded in the national everyday, even without it being shaken by political instabilities. The supposedly distinct features and culture that national identity is based on are considered as if they were, as Balibar says, "a precious genetic inheritance, to be transmitted uncontaminated and unweakened", just like noble blood (qtd. in Billig 71). There seems to be a chronic tension between the excessive

[31] Blood as a metaphor perfectly fits into this duality since it is also strong and elusive, symbol of life and death at the same time, as I will analyze in detail in the next chapter.

quality of the features attributed to this inheritance and the lack that underlies them. Hall writes, with regard to identity, "there is always 'too much' or 'too little' – an over-determination or a lack, but never a proper fit, a totality" (3). This also holds true for national identity, mainly defined through "proofs" of this pseudo-genetic inheritance, which in fact do not amount to a totality.

What is presented as a cause and effect relation in fact remains a tautology: one is a strong Turkish person because one has noble blood and the reason one has noble blood is that one is a strong Turkish person. Yet, it is stated in an evidentiary and self-righteous tone, sounding like what Roland Barthes called the "voice of nature", referring to ideology's tendency to appear unchallengeable (47). Through this voice acted out by the t-shirt, the body is redefined in what B. Anderson calls "the eternal Goodness and Rightness of the Nation" (2010: 360). The t-shirt turns the body that wears it into a metonymic representation of the nation, standing for the body of the nation, through the metaphor of the noble blood. The wearer of the t-shirt, just like the carrier of the pin and the flag-shaped necklace, acts upon the identity constituted by the coupling of heterogeneous elements around an ostensible totality. Through the interaction of the image and the body, informed by a strong history of nationalism, various elements, such as personality traits, narratives, ways of appearing, acting and thinking, which are not necessarily consistent with each other, are brought together to claim a lifestyle, just like swearing an oath on a fetish object or driving a nail into a power figure to secure a bargain (Mitchell, 2005: 163).

Slavoj Žižek's conceptualization of national identity as "the Thing", in a similar vein, points out to the idea that national identity is not the sum of the parts that are claimed to constitute it and that there is a lack behind the claim to its totality. Žižek, arguing for the necessity of a psychoanalytical perspective in order to understand the relationship of national subjects with the nation, states that the bonds within a community cannot be reduced to a symbolic identification: the ties between the members of a community always imply a relationship to "the Thing", which is the lost, stolen Enjoyment in Lacanian terms:

> This relationship toward the Thing…is what is at stake when we speak of the menace to our "way of life" presented by the Other: it is what is threatened when, for example, a white Englishmen is panicked because of the growing presence of "aliens". What he wants to defend is not reducible to the so-called set of values that offer support to national identity. National identification is by definition sustained by a relationship toward the Nation qua Thing. (201)

The Thing cannot be defined outside of the tautological terms that it is "itself"; it is "the real Thing". It indicates our "way of life" that consists of "disconnected fragments of the way our community organizes its feasts, its rituals of mating, its initiation ceremonies, in short, all the details by which is made visible the unique way a community *organizes its enjoyment*" (Žižek 200). The Thing is, then, accessible only to the members of the community, something that others cannot grasp, but that is still perceived as constantly threatened by them. It is the belief that the community shares a lifestyle and that every member of the community believes in the Thing, which is in fact constructed by this belief itself. Thus, "the whole meaning of the Thing turns on the fact that 'it means something' to people" (Žižek 202).

This resonates with William Pietz's understanding of the fetish deriving its power from its status as "the fixation or inscription of a unique originating event that has brought together previously heterogeneous elements into a novel identity" (7). Pietz argues that the heterogeneous components that are appropriated into an identity by a fetish, despite the material quality of the fetish, are not only material elements. Desires, beliefs and narrative structures are also fixed by it, "whose power is precisely the power to repeat its originating act of forging an identity of articulating relations between certain otherwise heterogeneous things" (Pietz 7). This understanding helps seeing the national symbols, not as empty signifiers but as tainted by a lack of coherence, which they try to cover by an act of forging while conveying an identity and sense of belonging.

Then, it is possible to ask what happens when the Thing, which Žižek does not define as material, takes the form of commodity. The commodity, which is a "thing" itself, can be seen as alluding to the Thing, the symbolic value that exceeds the object's exchange value. On the one hand, as a material thing claiming to represent what unites the community, it guarantees, in a more tangible and visual way, that the national Thing is something that is agreed upon and believed in by the members of the community at stake. This can be seen from the fact that the t-shirt is not only worn to display it to the people in opposition to whom the consumer position himself, but also to those who are alike, supposedly feeling the same threat. In this way, it acquires a contractual function, allowing a particular section of the society to come to an agreement as to the nature of their community. It claims to provide a gateway to the national Thing.

Yet, through commodification, the Thing also becomes portable and exchangeable for something else, whereas as the Thing (non-commodity) it simply *is* (even though it *isn't*

anything). Therefore, the materialization of the Thing can also be said to destabilize it and to make it more fragile. It paradoxically makes the manifestation of the fear of losing something that is actually not there more tangible. What is at the core of the notion of the fetish is precisely this coexistence of the claim to an agreement and totality and the act of forging behind it, which can be pursued further by turning to Freud's initial formulization of fetish.

For Freud, the fetish is "a substitute for the woman's (mother's) phallus which the little boy once believed in and does not wish to forego" (199). Despite Freud's limited frame in his description of the fetish based on experiencing the mother's lack of phallus as a fear of castration in the childhood, his theory explains the way the commodity works as a fetish, especially in the context of the nation, since it touches upon a vital conflict. This is the conflict defined by Freud as "between the weight of the unwelcome perception and the force of his counter-wish" (200). The counter-wish makes him find a substitute for the lack, but the memory of castration is attached to this substitute. Thus, the substitute that is invented for protection both protects against castration and reminds of the horror of it. This ambivalent function of the fetish, oscillating between fulfillment and lack, helps explain the dual function of commodities in general, but nationalist commodities such as this t-shirt in particular, especially due to the additional reference they make to national identity. The knowledge of the lack going hand in hand with not wishing to believe it resonates with the national subject's confrontation with the lack of national identity, more so in times of crisis, co-existing with his wish to hold on to it, as a routine part of everyday life. On the one hand, the fetish protects from the fear of castration, which in this case translates into the fear evoked by the threat to the sense of national belonging, a feeling amplified in the context of the shifting power relations I have discussed. Thus, wearing the t-shirt, which substitutes for the lack, eases the troubling, disabling feelings of fear. On the other hand, the fetish constantly marks and reminds of the horror of castration, which, in the Turkish public sphere, causes people to push their chests forward or "curse" with their necklaces. Thus, the t-shirt as a substitute empowers and frightens at the same time, being "both a pseudo-presence and a token of absence", to borrow Susan Sontag's words about the "talismanic uses of photographs" (16).

In line with my discussion of the coexistence of the agency of images in acting and the active role of the people in constructing narratives through the act of buying, it is productive to think of fetishism as a strategy, as Louise Kaplan does in her book *Cultures of Fetishism* (2006), as opposed to the unconscious quality of the fetish that Freud foregrounds. Kaplan, critical of Freud's violent rhetoric towards women and his claim that only men can be fetishists, detaches the definition of the fetish from its Freudian genesis and defines it as

the "substitution of something tangible for something that is otherwise ephemeral and enigmatic" (5). Kaplan sees the reason for people not worshipping the gods or spirits directly but through tangible objects in the urge to possess and thereby manipulate the powers in question.

In a similar vein to Kaplan, Pietz notes that the idea of the idol indicates the worship of a false god or demonic spirit, whereas *feitiços* are practices aiming to achieve certain tangible effects in service of the user (16). For Pietz, the fetish is a material object that is thought to "naturally" embody socially significant values capable of affecting individuals in an intensely personal way. Examples he lists include "a flag, monument, or landmark; a talisman, medicine-bundle, or sacramental object; an earring, tattoo, or cockade; a city, village, or nation; a shoe, lock of hair, or phallus; a Giacometti sculpture or Duchamp's *Large Glass*" (Pietz 16). In addition, Tim Dant, combining the psychoanalytical and Marxist conceptions of the fetish, elaborates on these tangible effects and identifies the "capacities" that fetishes enhance in its user as function, ostentation, sexuality, knowledge, aesthetics and mediation (17). The fetish object, whatever ability it enhances, carries a certain excess, which exceeds its use-value for Marx and its neutral quality for Freud to acquire sexual connotations. In both cases, the fetish is thought capable of "delivering human qualities (love, power, authority, sexuality, security, status, intellect, exoticism)" (Dant 19).

National items acting as fetishes can be said to amplify these capacities by combining the fetish quality of commodities in general with that of national images in particular. Thinking of Dant's categories, it can be said that the Atatürk t-shirt, to varying degrees, is able to enhance a person's social abilities by empowering him (function), to underline his belonging to a social/national group (ostentation), to stress his libidinal relationship with the figure of power that substitutes the feeling of lack (sexuality), to provide a way of seeing the world (knowledge), to affect how he communicates with others (mediation), and to make him visually appealing to the ones who define themselves within the borders of the same national identity and perhaps repulsive to the ones excluded by those very borders (aesthetics). Seeing fetishism as such a strategy covering a wide range of fields, transforming the intangible into the tangible and enhancing these "capacities" allows us to better understand the role of image acts in shaping what they depict, in providing what is fictive with veracity, in turning the "threatening others" into concrete people in everyday life and in installing material boundaries between bodies. This makes apparent the power of image acts such as pushing the chest forward, cursing with a necklace and wearing the Atatürk t-shirt in shaping social encounters with direct effects and consequences.

The last point that is important to make about the explanatory value of the fetish as a conceptual tool is the intimate relationship fetishes establish with the body, which is also one of the defining features of the commodities exemplified here. The difference between the idol and the fetish for Pietz is that while the first is perceived as a freestanding statue, the latter is typically a fabricated object to be worn about the body (16). Similarly, Mitchell argues that while idols want human sacrifice and totems want to be your friend, fetishes "want to be beheld –to 'be held' close by, or even reattached to, the body of the fetishist" (2005: 194). Rings, necklaces and t-shirts are all held closer to the body than public monuments and images, which are more akin to idols of the nation-state. The proximity to the body is crucial for the national commodities to turn what is otherwise immaterial, such as the nation, or a type of national identity in particular, into something palpable and aim at transforming ambiguity into a sense of certainty. This would assuage the imaginary quality of the nation and render the immaterial quality of national identity tangible, and therefore, easier to deal with, represent and impose. More specifically, for the Turkish context, the traditionally dominant Kemalist national ideology, threatened by changing power relations, and more concretely, needs to be protected by being customized and corporealized. The tangible quality of the body seems to give an assuring quality to the images alluding to this identity that is always in danger, but more so, due to the crisis.

The proliferation of visual communities around these items indicates a collaboration of a national industry that manufactures fears and desires around a supposed national identity with the capitalist-commodity market manufacturing the objects that are supposed to fill the void around which this identity is organized.[32] Peter Schwenger argues that the fear and melancholy of losing is at the heart of our relationship with things (10). He argues that the sense of things has changed in the postmodern era from the epiphanic objects favored by modernism to "the melancholy object of consumption". This melancholy is induced by "manufactured desires, a void that objects claim to fill, and finally a melancholy that is itself reified and commodified by the depression industry" (16).

The commodified national items reveal the co-existence of the desire to be protected from fear through fetishized objects and the melancholy induced by the failure to do so, ending up bringing a certain comfort, which is always already tainted with a perpetuated sense of danger and fragility. What they do reflect is Bill Brown's remark on

[32] Significantly, the word "manufacturing" shares the same root as the word "fetish" (factitious): http://www.etymonline.com/index.php?search=manufacturing&searchmode=none.

the general function of objects as "always mediate[ing] identity and always fail[ing] to do so" (467). This is even more remarkable in the case of commodified images that mediate national identity, mainly because of the impossibility of achieving a sense of national identity that is not threatened by others and the slippery ground of the national Thing. In addition, when fragile or perishable consumption goods are used as fetishes to fill the lack, its lingering presence is, moreover, emphasized by the fact that the lighter will run out of gas, the pin will be lost, the necklace pendant will lose its shine, the t-shirt will lose its bright colors through washing, or they will all eventually go out of fashion.

In the next chapter, I will focus on the body in more detail, through the analysis of what I will call "bio-images", which are different from the commodity items discussed here in the sense that they are images that become part of the body, such as tattoos and masks, or body parts that make an image, such as a flag made out of blood, rather than external items that are held close to it. In fact, both commodified nationalist images and bio-images act to create narratives of national belonging through corporeal practices and bring about a transitive relationship between the body and the image, as well as between bodies. However, whereas in the case of commodified images the commodity market gains a crucial role as the source and means for the circulation of nationalist images in everyday life and the images remain external objects despite their proximity to the body, in the case of bio-images the medium for circulation becomes the body itself, which will allow me to focus on different aspects of the relationship between nationalism and visual culture and to highlight the corporeal aspect of image acts.

Chapter 2
"Bio-images" of the Nation: Masks, Tattoos and Blood

Introduction

During one of my interviews, in 2009, a man with a tattoo of the signature of Atatürk on his arm explains that t-shirts eventually lose their colors and get torn; pins and badges wither too. Yet, his tattoo will only disappear after he dies, after his skin rots. He adds that probably this tattoo already "got inscribed in his bones" and that therefore it will in fact never disappear. Another man with the same tattoo on his arm, sitting next to him, joins the conversation by claiming that his tattoo is inscribed even further than the bones, in his heart, in what seems like a gesture of claiming to be a more authentic Kemalist. He adds that he feels like "he is covered with a huge Atatürk signature". He feels Atatürk deeply and he knows that Atatürk feels him too, since "carrying Atatürk's signature is like carrying his blood", therefore, he is literally "part of him".[33]

The main goal of this chapter is to explore a specific type of image, which I will call the "bio-image", of which tattoos are one example. This allows me to focus on the relationship between the body and the image in order to continue to explore contemporary nationalist visual culture(s) in Turkey. The analysis of bio-images, which are images that become part of the body or that are made out of body parts, such as masks, tattoos and flags made out of blood, will build on the previous chapter on commodified images. Although they are different image acts, as stated in the account of the man with the tattoo that I will return to later, both commodified and bio-images are symptoms of a period in which Kemalist national identity is facing a crisis and its nationalist premises are being reinvented and performed with a sense of urgency through everyday life rituals by people themselves. Both types of images reflect the history of the embeddedness of nationalist images and practices in everyday life in Turkey, as well as the ways in which such images and practices are transformed and performed in contemporary society in more corporeal and affective ways, in collaboration with commodity and popular culture.

Both commodified and bio-images invite a different perspective than the analysis of national symbols as mainly surveilling images that operate top-down and invade public spaces, institutions, and, via these, various aspects of people's lives. They allow me to focus

[33] Most of the people with tattoos of national symbols I interviewed in 2009 can be heard in the documentary that accompanies this study.

less on the ways in which images that claim to represent a national identity are fabricated and imposed by the state, government and institutions, and more on how they are created, interpreted, and acted out by people, mainly through everyday practices and, particularly in this chapter, corporeal ones. While official monuments, publicly displayed national flags or textbook images perpetuate nationalist ideologies and discourses from an institutional level, the bio-images, like the commodified images discussed in the previous chapter, are employed by the people themselves through an intimate bodily affiliation with them.

The context in which bio-images emerged, similar to that of the commodified images, is marked by what I called the rise and crisis of Kemalist secular nationalism in the face of shifting power relations, from a Kemalist Republican bourgeoisie to a neoliberal authoritarian Islamic bourgeoisie as the dominant political and cultural force in the 2000s (Bekmen, Akça and Özden). Bio-images reflect the rise of Kemalist nationalist reactions in the 2000s due to this perceived crisis, which was based on historical, political and economic reasons, and yet mostly reflected in everyday life through the clash of different lifestyles and imagery, as I have elaborated on before. In this sense, bio-images can be seen as tangible signs of a lingering anxiety, strong markers of a particular national identity caught up in a struggle to survive.

The transformation of official national symbols into commodifed and bio-images with different implications and impacts shows that an image, as Mitchell argues in *What Pictures Want*, is in fact dynamic and flexible, and can acquire new functions in different periods depending on the social practices and narratives surrounding it. The image can shift between categories, not because their perceptual features change, but because their value, status, power, and vitality are altered (Mitchell 189). Bio-images have been one of the most effective manifestations of the way national images travel and shift categories in the 2000s in Turkey. They strongly resonate with the history of official nationalist imagery, yet they remain novel forms that operate through different means. The analysis of these means reveals the vital role of forming a visual community through renewed visual tactics when the need arises to reinforce the claim to a national identity in the face of a sense of threat or dread. They constitute an intensification of nationalism's visual regime, making it more tangible, as well as fragile, while simultaneously forcing it to expand in the different directions I will explore here.

The proactive anxiety and fear of losing certain privileges that I claim marked the 2000s in Turkey increased the involvement of the body in politics. The duality of this context as both a rise and a crisis in nationalism resonates with the two-fold nature of bio-images as

strong and alive on the one hand, and fragile and ephemeral on the other hand. The co-existing aspects of vitality and mortality of the body reflects the rise and crisis of the national identity, which resonates with the way tattooed skin is described by Sonja Neef as "marked by the difference between vulnerability and healing, between life and death, presence and absence" (228).

Specifically, bio-images can be defined as images that become part of a person's body or appearance, temporarily or permanently, as a result of which the body and the image influence, shape, and even animate each other. I will argue that through this corporeal bonding, bodies and images become involved in a mutually transformative relationship, vitalizing and affecting each other in various ways. Images are animated by the body to an extent that they start to have a life of their own, and at the same time, the body's materiality and vitality is marked by the images. The Greek word "bio-" means "life, course, or way of living".[34] The use of "bio" in the concept of bio-image serves both to imply that the image becomes a physical, biological part of one's self and that a certain way of living is attached to and made possible by the image.[35] The hyphen implies that the body and the image are not reducible to each other, but are constructed in their relationality, being shaped by each other. In this sense, bio-images exemplify the intertwined aspects of the agency of the image and the agency of the subject in an "image act", as well as being the types of images in which this relationship becomes the most complex and curious.

Foucault's notion of bio-power as "an explosion of numerous and diverse techniques for achieving the subjugations of bodies and the control of populations" informs my analysis since it is precisely the links between the body and politics that I am focusing on (1998: 140). In exploring how the nation is produced and performed through the body, the notion of bio-image focuses less on the various strategies through which the body is disciplined by nationalist discourses and more on people providing their bodies for the inscription of power relations by allowing certain images to become part of their bodies, which in turn shape them as political subjects. Through these images, politics is inscribed on and performed through the body, framing the individual as part of the body of the nation-state, revealing "how bodies

[34] See: http://www.oed.com/view/Entry/19188?rskey=k6ONzF&result=3&isAdvanced=false#eid.

[35] The way I conceptualize the bio-image is different from how this concept is used in the sciences as mainly referring to "cellular and molecular images" (http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Bioimage_informatics). My focus is on the process of a culturally and politically significant image establishing an intimate relationship with the body, becoming part of or being made possible by the body as a social and cultural entity, as opposed to referring merely to an image of a biological organism.

and corporeal techniques (…) are structured through, and themselves structure social and cultural norms" (Grabham 64).

Engraving the political on the face as a mask, under the skin as a tattoo or in blood, so that it becomes part of or partakes in bodily existence, visibly and affectively, can be seen as turning the body into the prosthesis of the modern nation-state in the face of loss and trauma. Bio-images, as literal examples of bodily modifications, provide a more material perspective on discussions of the embodied subject as culturally constructed and inscribed by power relations. From Foucault's perspective, the body is historically and discursively constructed and is "marked, stamped, invested, acted upon, inscribed, and cultivated by a historically contingent nexus of power/discourse" (Yeğenoğlu 113). The bio-images I discuss here not only highlight the fact that bodies are material surfaces on which power relations are inscribed, but also their active role in contributing to form the culture that manifests itself on their surface. The body, then, appears not as "a natural surface for cultural elaboration" that pre-exists the social, but as involved in its very production (Ahmed and Stacey 178). From this perspective, the body can be seen "as a performative articulation that – as Austin would say – 'does' the self", as well as others (Neef 231). Thus, it is not only the image that transforms the body into a cultural mark, but the bodily incorporation of an existing image that transforms that image into a more vivid entity with newly acquired intensities.

This means that the bio-image should be understood as a constitutive factor in laying the claim to a (national) identity, rather than as the result of an established and fixed position, marking an already completed identity. Again, this constitutive aspect of images is more apparent in the case of the bio-image due to its intimate relationship with the body, established through becoming part of it, either temporarily or permanently. Balibar states that "the naturalization of belonging and the sublimation of the ideal nation are two aspects of the same process" (96). Constructing a visual community through bio-images, and thus through the corporealization of national images, serves to sublimate the nation as an ideal and to "naturalize" one's belonging to it, a move that gains further strength from the assumed "naturalness" of the body. The emphasis on the corporeal and the "natural" aspect of national images becomes more urgent in a time that such images face the risk of dying out. Paradoxically, however, the bio-image simultaneously challenges the assumed proximity of the body to "nature" by showing that its surface is tinted by history and politics.

The masks that cover the face, the tattoos that cover the skin and the images made out of blood reveal a different form of imagination of the nation than official nationalist imagery by making the individually initiated modification of the body a significant locus of the

production of the collective and the political. As Grabham argues, "just as the nation is imagined and produced through everyday rhetoric and maps and flags, it is also constructed on the skin, and through bodies, by different types of corporeal 'flagging'" (64). These images of the nation that appear as part of bodies seem to be highly productive in exploring the acting out of the disciplining mechanisms in the Foucauldian sense by the people themselves, as will become clear in my discussion of the panopticon in the first section of this chapter. They also shed light on the moments of crises in which these mechanisms become more performative, tangible and fragile. In relation to this, bio-images also contribute to the theorization of the blurry area between tactics and strategies, in the sense that De Certeau uses these terms, as I will discuss below.

I will analyze three specific examples of bio-images: the phenomenon of people wearing Atatürk masks during contemporary nationalist demonstrations, the recent trend in branding bodies with nationalist tattoos, and the incident of a group of high school children making a Turkish flag out of their own blood. All three objects of analysis are contemporary visual forms that appeared in the 2000s in Turkey, and they all render accessible different aspects and functions of the bio-image. I argue that there are three main ways in which bio-images work in relation to the body. Firstly, they can allow an external image to temporarily become part of the self, to form an extension of the body, as in the case of putting on Atatürk masks in public spaces. Secondly, they can allow an external image to become an integral part of one's body, (semi)-permanently, as in the example of the nationalist tattoos. Thirdly, as opposed to the first two, the bio-image may consist of a body part that is externalized in the form of an image, as in making a flag out of blood.

The structure of the chapter will move closer to the body in each section, by first focusing on the mask, which covers the surface of the body, then the tattoo, which actually becomes part of that surface itself, and finally the image made out of blood, which can be seen as the excess created by the proximity and intermingling of the body and the image to the extent that it is externalized again in the form of an image. In all the examples of bio-images, in line with the general characteristics of image acts I outlined in my introduction, images appear as not only descriptive of a situation, but as agents in its creation. In the same way as Austin's speech acts, image acts performatively shape what they claim to represent – in this case, not only the nation, but the individual body as a metonymic part of the body of the nation.

Masks promise a temporary transformation on the basis of acquiring the face and the role of the nation's leader, which I will approach through the Bakthinian notion of carnival

and Foucault's conceptualization of the panopticon. The nationalist tattoos, which are physical embodiments of the image of the nation, will allow me to focus on "how 'skins' have been inhabited, lived and indeed (re)produced very differently in historically specific situations" (Ahmed and Stacey 9). I will conceptualize the skin as reflecting "the dynamic relationship between inside and outside, self and society" and as representing "the meeting place of structure and agency; a primary site for the inscription of ideology and a text upon which individuals write their own stories" (Patterson and Schroeder 254). I will explore this liminal position of the skin through De Certeau's notions of tactics and strategies, which will allow me to discuss the limitations of this theoretical distinction. I will also explore the medium of the tattoo as located in between proximity and distance, sexuality and abjection, as well as life and death, especially in the context of national images. Finally, the example of the flag made out of blood carries the claim to unification with the nation beyond body, by externalizing this coalescence in the form of an image that can survive even after the body dies. This example will allow me to theorize the role of blood and the ways in which the act of dying is performed metonymically. All three mediums of mask, skin and blood share an in-between position with regard to distinctions of self and other, individual and collective, structure and agency, as well as death and life, making them strong tools to look at the ways in which image acts work in the context of nationalism and to show how images are not only looked *at*, but also looked *with*.

Masks: Becoming Atatürk

Figure 8: Republic Protest, Izmir, 13 May 2007.

Figure 8 depicts, from above, a flood of people during the Republic Protests (*Cumhuriyet Mitingleri*), creating the impression of a red waterfall.[36] This series of protests started in 2007 and saw a second wave in 2009. They predominantly reflected a reaction against the increasing power of the ruling party AKP and were mainly organized in large Turkish cities by the non-governmental Atatürkist Thought Association (ADD).[37] The first rally was organized in April 2007, days before the presidential elections, to protest Abdullah Gül's presidential candidacy. In this and the other protests, among the most commonly stated sentiments were the need to protect both "secularism", mostly defined in a limited way in opposition to the AKP, and "Atatürk's principles" against "the threat of political Islam". The organizers and participants frequently stated that they were "aware of the danger".[38] Two of the most common slogans chanted during the protests were: "Turkey is secular and secular it will remain!" and "Neither USA, nor EU, Fully Independent Turkey!"[39]

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[36] http://www.Atatürktoday.com/refbib/izmirmiting13mayis2007.htm.

[37] The Atatürkist Thought Association (Atatürkçü Düşünce Derneği) was established in 1989, with the self-stated aim of "protecting Atatürk's principles and reforms against internal and external threats". For the official website, see: http://www.add.org.tr/.

[38] "Are you aware of the danger?" was the slogan that the Republican newspaper *Cumhuriyet* (Republic) used in 2007, both in its headlines and in advertisements on television. The slogan was written in a font that resembled the Arabic alphabet, reflecting the perceived threat of Islam. It became one of the mottos and visual imprints of the Republic Protests.

[39] http://www.milliyet.com.tr/2007/04/30/son/sondun10.asp.

The urge to express fear and anxiety was not easily separable from the task of perpetuating these feelings to keep people alert and mobilized. The bureaucratic-militarist elite and the established bourgeoisie in Turkey, which were both worried about the social, cultural, and economic rise of the AKP, worked to achieve such mobilization by using the extensive power of the mass media, in concordance with press conferences by the Chief of the Turkish General Staff (Yaşar Büyükanıt). These strategies were highly effective, especially for the urban middle classes, in creating the idea that a rapid Islamization of society was taking place. This strong sense of being in a state of emergency made the crowds go out on the streets and find various ways to express their reactions through novel methods they came up with, which positions the Republic Protests in between a series of demonstrations organized by the political campaigns of the bureaucratic-militarist elite and their media channels, and a grassroots mobilization in which people developed new forms of protest.

Figure 9: People with Atatürk Masks in a Republic Protest, Izmir, 13 May 2007.

Several components turned these demonstrations into colorful, powerful, and effective spectacles, which mostly consisted of more than a million people, carrying Turkish flags and images of Atatürk in different shapes and sizes. Protesters prepared rather unusual and creative banners, reflecting anger and defiance towards the AKP government. One of the most striking images that emerged out of these protests was that of people covering their faces with Atatürk masks made out of cardboard, printed in color with holes for the eyes (Figure 9).[40] The image, on the macro level, of an endless red ocean of Turkish flags filling

[40] *Radikal* newspaper, 14 May 2007.

the streets and, on the micro level, of multiple Atatürks wandering in the streets constituted a new political and visual phenomenon in Turkey. In fact, the history of using Atatürk's image in demonstrations goes back to 1994, during the protests against the increasing power of the Islamic RP (Welfare Party), which Navaro-Yashin marked as the beginning of the practice of defending lifestyles "semiotically" (229). However, putting on Atatürk masks rather than merely brandishing his image was a visual tactic that started with the Republic Protests and that was often used as its symbol in press coverage.

In order to explore what the image of Atatürk in the form of a mask worn in public space does, it is important to note the relation between the emergence of the Atatürk masks and another significant event in the same period, namely the murder of the Armenian journalist Hrant Dink by a young nationalist, backed up by broader power structures, in 2007. Dink's assassination provoked an intense social rupture marked by spontaneous demonstrations involving approximately 200,000 people. One of the most visible and most widely circulated items during Dink's funeral and the succeeding demonstrations was the slogan "we are all Hrant, we are all Armenian", chanted and written on banners, in which some people also wore Hrant Dink masks. The construction of this momentary paradigm of solidarity around a newly constructed, expansive "we", rejecting the ethnically and exclusively defined national Turkish identity by claiming to acquire that of one of the minority groups, created a hopeful feeling of collectivity and provided a common cause for leftist and liberal circles in Turkey, which do not frequently converge around similar objectives. It did not take long for a counter-reaction to emerge, consisting of nationalist demonstrations prominently featuring Turkish flags and slogans such as "we are all Turkish, we are all Mustafa Kemal" and "we are all Atatürk". Banners were unfolded at soccer matches and stickers appeared in Istanbul streets reading "we are all Ogün Samast", referring to Dink's murderer, who was caught shortly after the assassination, as the beginning of a lingering and unresolved case. These were all attempts to reinstate the hegemonic Turkish nationalist "we", the position and definition of which were perceived as under threat by the unexpected and unsanctioned inclusion of the "other", embodied in the figure of the Armenian.

Although the connection was never explicitly mentioned, the Atatürk masks that people started to wear during the 2007 Republican protests can be said to have their origin in this "we are all" paradigm and the associated discussions that grew out of Dink's murder. It is not a coincidence that when a "we" historically built and framed in nationalist terms was perceived as under threat, both by the rising power of the AKP and the embrace of a minority

identity, people felt the urge to "be" the symbol of that collective identity. A threat, experienced almost as a material force, gave rise to physical, bodily reactions that manifested themselves, first of all, in the form of going out in the street and, secondly, as bodily modifications achieved by incorporating images.[41] Bodies gain a significantly active role in protecting the past, the self and the body of the nation from the threat and the penetration of the other, which is not an entirely new theme in the national everyday life, but amplified and became tangible in this time of crisis. As Braunberger puts it, the citizen's body and subjectivity are "'already sutured to the public sphere,' but from the moment his uniform is accepted, his body must add an additional layer of public performance, becoming a site of national identity that abandons the seemingly covert practice of being a member of the nation" (8). Wearing the mask is precisely the moment people started their overt public performance as Kemalist nationalists, by transcending their identities "in order to epitomize their nation" (Braunberger 9).

The mask as an object has a long and multi-layered history, from ancient tribal rituals to contemporary anti-capitalist protests. Esther Peeren argues, in relation to the politics of carnival based on the theories of Bakhtin, that the mask is an essential part of the carnival tradition, in which it has a broader and more ambivalent function than mere disguise: "It blurs identities but also the boundaries of the body and the boundaries between bodies. It is associated with transformation, with becoming someone or something else, and it bears within it an element of transgression" (78). In addition, she suggests that "the mask is something that reveals as well as something that covers over and this dual function turns it into a potential political instrument" (79).

The Atatürk mask, as a significant emblem in the nationalist protests, at first might seem similar to the carnival mask in the sense that it blurs individual identities and the boundaries of and between bodies by allowing people to become someone else. However, although the Atatürk mask seems to work as a political instrument by allowing the protesters to cover their individual identities while revealing their particular political identities, the Atatürk identity assumed through the mask does not transform but reinforce the previous identities defined within nationalist coordinates. It shows that for people who wear the mask,

[41] The striking documentation of some of the Republican nationalist protests or (Atatürk) commemoration days from this period depicts crying and shouting people, mostly women. These images are reminiscent of funeral scenes and are loaded with intense affects, such as fear, anger and anxiety, indicating a strong physical reaction to political developments. For an example of people reacting to a commemoration that was to start without standing in silence as a respect to Atatürk, see: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=aO1RyeBhCug.

the most dominant aspect of their existence in public space and within collectivity is their identification with the national leader. What is emphasized is the nationalist body bringing people together in such a way that the boundary between bodies becomes blurred, not to enable an experience of difference, as in the carnival, but to create an experience of fusion and wholeness, reinforced by the mutual outlook provided by the mask.

Bakhtin's carnival mask "is connected with the joy of change and reincarnation, with gay relativity and with the merry negation of uniformity and similarity; it rejects conformity to oneself" (qtd. in Peeren 78-9). The element of joy can certainly be observed in the mass of people clapping, chanting and shouting, as well as in the ecstatic ways the participants describe their experiences.[42] However, what Bakhtin calls the "merry negation of uniformity" as an element of mask-wearing carnival does not hold true for the case of the Atatürk masks and the general tone of the Republican Protests, since people wear the same mask, transforming into the same person, which does not negate but strongly affirms uniformity and similarity. Each person claims to represent "the father Turk" (the literal meaning of Atatürk), who can observe others, assessing whether or not they are like him, through the eyeholes in the mask. While the carnivalesque mask carries a claim to being anonymous, the mask of a political leader is very particular in its symbolization, making it more akin to a uniform. Thus, while the carnival mask may imply unity while negating uniformity, the nationalist mask implies unity by affirming uniformity. The transformation the Bakhtinian carnival seeks in masquerade is replaced by a will and call for the stabilization of identities, by a nationalist ritual.

Hence, the Atatürk mask bends towards a unanimity anchored in a particular interpretation of national identity. Its signification is fixed in a strong national symbol as opposed to the anonymous masquerade, which involves a rejection of being visible within the compartmentalized categories of identity that power relations impose. The physical mask of the demonstrator reclaims the face of the state instead of defacing it, with the aim to become one with those perceived alike and to emphasize one's difference and distance from those who are not.[43] This distinction is made on the basis of nationalist criteria that depend on the recognition of categorical differences of ethnicity, race and gender.

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[42] For interviews with the Republican Protests participants reflecting the affective dimension of their experience, see Kaplan.

[43] For instance, the clown mask used by the alternative-globalization "Clandestine Insurgent Rebel Clown Army" or the Anonymous (Guy Fawkes) masks used in various contexts, including that of the "hacktivist" group Anonymous and Occupy and other similar protest movements, can be enumerated as examples of anonymizing masks that challenge authority, more akin to Bakthin's theorization.

Figure 10: Still image from Republic Protest, Izmir, 13 May 2007.

The implications of the mask as inscribing bodies in public space as "the father of Turks" are evidently gender specific. Remarkably, one of the most important visual elements that both the participants and the media underlined in their reporting of the Republic Protests was the presence of women at the forefront of these demonstrations (Figure 10).[44] The politicians, journalists and writers who supported these events emphasized the major presence of "modern and secular" women acting contentedly, wearing comfortable Western-style clothes – sometimes even the Turkish flag as a dress – and carrying Atatürk pins and masks. The strong stress on women being the organizers and the most visible part of these demonstrations reproduces the idea that women are the carriers of civilization and symbols of the nation, which has been a constitutive factor of nationalism since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. Yet, the fact that what covers women's faces is the image of a man, the father of Turks, implies that women may be the symbols of the nation, but the man remains its founder and most powerful representative.

Thus, the masks might blur the boundaries between certain bodies, but at the same time, they draw new boundaries to exclude others. By reclaiming and multiplying the face of the state tradition and Kemalist nationalism, the Atatürk mask creates an excess of it. The number of people becoming "the father of Turks" (literal meaning of Atatürk) increasing evidently has severe implications for those who are not considered "the children of this

[44] http://fakfukfon.blogspot.nl/2011/09/korkuyorum-anne.html.

country", which is a phrase commonly used in Turkish to express nationalist sentiments. Thus, although the Atatürk masks may give the impression of introducing elements of the Bakhtinian carnival in the political, they work quite differently since they stress the preservation and reanimation of the past and of previously fixed identities, resurrection rather than reincarnation, and unanimity over anonymity. In the next section, the aims and consequences of the unanimity the masks provide are unpacked further by invoking Foucault's well-known theorization of power relations through the architectural form of the panopticon.

The Panopticon Extended

Turning to Foucault is productive both to understand the working mechanisms of the official usages of Atatürk's image since the foundation of the Turkish nation-state and the implications of its new mask-form. While the Bakthinian mask reveals what the nationalist mask is not, the panoptic model of power helps to explore what it is and what it does, especially in perpetuating and extending surveilling mechanisms to novel forms. In *Discipline and Punish*, Foucault meticulously describes the specific characteristics of new political technologies appearing with the emergence of modern nation-states and capitalism in order to control large sections of the population. However, the utopia of perfect governance, of bringing an extensive power to bear on all individual bodies, cannot be fully realized, since the meticulous tactics of segregation and observation, as in the case of a plague-driven town, cannot succeed in modern societies.

Hence, Foucault differentiates between the disciplining of the plague-stricken town, in which this utopia can be realized, and the model of the panoptical prison, designed by the British philosopher and architect Jeremy Bentham in 1785. While the first one exemplifies the mobilization of power against an exceptional evil, the latter constitutes the generalizable form of the functioning of power in everyday life in modern societies. The panopticon, described by Foucault as "power reduced to its ideal form", gathers subjects around the organization of practices of surveilling and disciplining (1991: 205). It creates a closed and segmented space where every slightest movement is potentially under observation, manipulating the prisoners into monitoring their own behavior at all times, "caught up in a power situation of which they are themselves the bearers" (Foucault 1991: 201). This highlights the most important element of the panoptic model; it encourages self-surveillance through potential, but not necessarily actual observation.

The mode of operation of Atatürk's omnipresent image in Turkish society, as a cult political and founding figure, carries elements of the panoptic model in which one is never sure whether one is being watched, and thus becomes the "bearer" of the power situation. Atatürk's image's presence in institutions ranging from schools to hospitals, shops to public spaces, has been dictating Turkish citizens to act according to the pre-determined cultural and political norms of the nation-state, which may change over time, yet, in each form they take, are considered unassailable. Thus, Atatürk's image has been a crucial channel through which the surveilling structures in Turkish society are diffused by inducing in people "a state of conscious and permanent visibility that assures the automatic functioning of power" (Foucault 1991: 201). In this sense, Atatürk's image can be said to have functioned as a surveilling image keeping all of society under its gaze in a chronic attempt to enforce the proper way of existing in a society that can change its codes and content depending on the political structures of the period, making it "polyvalent in its applications" (Foucault 1991: 205).

The image's omnipresence and protected status, ensured both through legislation and the strong official history diffused through a range of fields, including education and media, strengthens its similarity to the operation of the panoptical watchtower, albeit in a spatially decentralized way. Atatürk's omnipresent image can be seen to create a shortcut to the structures of power by reducing "the number of people who exercise power, while increasing the number on whom it is exercised" (Foucault 1991: 206). Not only the task of exercising power is significantly performed by images in this context, but also the likelihood of being exposed to these images is increased through their diffusion in different fields, such as schools, institutions and public space.

What is striking in the case of the Atatürk masks worn in the Republican Protests is the way in which the panoptical structure is extended and to a certain extent transformed, making its mechanisms more visible. The power of the mask certainly stems from the panoptical role the Atatürk image has historically accumulated, but it extends its mode of operation, since the one who is watched can now watch as well, not only in the sense of self-surveillance as in the Foucauldian model, but also in the sense of surveilling others. The mask allows a panoptical image to become part of one's body, thus allowing this body to incorporate a previously external function. This is also what happens in the panopticon, in which the prisoner begins watching herself and thus incorporates the function of the watchtower. With the mask, however, the movement of incorporation is made more explicit and the mechanisms of surveillance become more embodied. In addition, the function of the

mask extends beyond the mere diffusion and intensification of the panoptic model, since the masked person comes to incarnate one of the strongest national symbols and, in this way, not only internalizes power mechanisms for self-discipline, but also obtains the position of being in the panoptic tower watching others.

Foucault claims that people being watched within the panopticon are objects of information, but never subjects in communication (1991: 200). Yet, people with Atatürk masks do not only become instruments of the panopticon, but also, seemingly paradoxically, claim a subject position that allows them to turn others into objects of information. The people wearing the masks, who now also hold the position of looking, watch the "others" of the current society, as well as the government that is thought to threaten the state tradition. In this sense, the Atatürk mask can be said to create an extended panopticon, allowing the surveilled to also become the surveilling subject. It, then, makes the original panoptic model more diffused and explicit by increasing the number of people who exercise power and multiplying the Benthamian towers, even if Atatürk remains the center of power since everyone watches through the eyeholes in his face.

In the case of the Republic Protests, the ones being watched are mainly the subjects of the perceived Islamic threat, whose main manifestation has been the figure of the woman with a headscarf, as well as the anti-nationalist of any kind, the member of a non-Muslim minority, or the Kurdish "terrorist". Equally importantly, the citizens are no longer the ones being watched by the state looking through the eyes of Atatürk anymore, but acquire the same face to watch the current government. This reaffirms Atatürk as the center of power, who is supposed to push the government to surveil its own compliance with the Kemalist nationalist tradition. The masks thus do not indicate a looking *at*, or even a looking *back at* Atatürk or the Kemalist state, but rather a looking *with*, spreading his look further and engraving it more deeply on everyday life.[45]

Moreover, the spread of Atatürk's gaze through the masks functions on a more individualized and affective level compared to his official statues and images. The various living people behind the Atatürk masks, talking, walking and looking, quite differently than a conventional Atatürk image hung on the wall, cause his image to obtain a more animated

[45] As part of the fieldwork for the documentary that accompanies this study, I asked people in the street if they would be willing to wear an Atatürk mask and act and talk like him for a few minutes. The performances and the speeches made by the people who were willing to put on the mask reveal that the understanding of Atatürk as a political symbol is far from monolithic at any given time. Although the will to bring Atatürk to life as a savior-leader recurred, other reenactments imagined communities on the basis of different values and assigned different "others" as objects of information and surveillance.

feeling. Thus, besides its function of surveilling and intimidating, the mask also reflects a will to animate Atatürk by giving up being oneself and becoming the one who can protect from the perceived danger and restore lost ideals and dreams. The blurring of the boundaries between the image and the body, reflecting a crucial feature of image acts, exposes the will to pass from one body into another, which is again opposed to the anonymous body of the Bakhtinian carnival, which subverts previously fixed positions but strives for uniformity.

This shows that wearing the mask is both an oppressive message to the others who are being watched and on whom a national identity is imposed, and an act of desperation that leads one to wish to change one's face. On the one hand, it is a sign of empowerment for the one who watches from this usurped panoptical position, yet, on the other hand, it signals anxiety and nostalgia. This is reflected by the fact that, during these protests, people's demands were certainly less clear than the anger they expressed towards the common enemy. In this sense, the mask also masks the lack of unification around a definable political stance or future goal, which shows that the strongest reference point of Kemalism in the contemporary Turkish context is not the present or the future, but the past. Therefore, the process of extending the surveilling mechanisms and making them more explicit, corporeal and affective, as necessitated by the perceived crisis of Kemalist nationalism, ultimately weakens the panopticon and highlights its perceived failure, since it makes clear that self-surveillance is not implicitly produced anymore.

The example of the nationalist tattoos in the next section will enable to explore further the emerging tactics in the face of a perceived crisis and loss, as well as the implications of the coalescence of the body and the image, which animates the image and turns the body, in one gesture, into the source and surface of a political statement. The tattoo is an image that actually comes to form part of the body's surface, as opposed to the mask, which only covers this surface. This allows me to move one step closer to the body and to further explore the implications of the increasing proximity between the body and the image, which clearly illustrates their intertwined and mutually transformative action potential in an image act.

Tattoos: Inscribing the Nation on the Skin

In the same period as the wearing of Atatürk masks in the demonstrations, another form of image became a remarkable component of contemporary Turkish visual culture, namely tattoos depicting national symbols. Having a tattoo done of Atatürk's portrait, his signature or the Turkish flag was a significant trend, first in 2007, then again in 2009. A tattooist in

Istanbul announced through Facebook in 2009 that he would be doing Atatürk tattoos for free all day long to commemorate Atatürk's death, an example that was immediately followed by other tattooists.[46] According to a tattoo shop in Izmir, which also started a free Atatürk signature tattoo campaign, nearly 4,000 Atatürk signature tattoos were done between December 2007 and September 2009.[47]

Tattoos, as mostly permanent modifications of the body, have been widely studied in anthropology, especially with a focus on ancient and aboriginal cultures. They are reported to be mostly ornamental, either ritual or identity oriented, generally received during rites of passage to manhood or marriage, or as marks of affiliation, age, and wisdom. Enid Schildkrout argues that in the 1970s Western body art became a practice and a fashion that crossed social boundaries of class and gender, "high" and "low" cultures, and was influenced by "tribal" practices of the past and present (322). Neef also argues that the practice of tattooing in the contemporary world still functions as an "import from an exotic, wild, natural, 'original' culture" in which the tattooed subject is inscribed into a system of classifications and norms formulated by a community marked by difference (227).

Tattoos cover a wide range of themes, showing "the divergence of different histories and cultures, from the mark of a primitive, to a sign of patriotism or rebellion" (DeMello 2000: 3), from religious marks to popular culture icons and from the logos of sport teams to more personal marks, such as the names of loved ones or even favorite foods. Making political statements through the skin is also common since the influence of cultural trends or political issues of the day finds its reflection on the body, as in the case of many Americans going under the needle to express their opinion about 9/11.[48] The history of tattoos of icons, symbols, names, and scenes related to the nation is a long one as well; these images are inscribed on the body in various different contexts and times, ranging from Nazi-related symbols and White Pride tattoos, to country maps and political figures' portraits across different geographies.

Neef argues that the tattoo, since its beginnings, has taken the living body as its

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[46] http://www.posta.com.tr/turkiye/HaberDetay/Moda_Atatürk_dovmesi.htm?ArticleID=7380. According to a column writer, the free tattoo trend started after someone was threatened to be fired from his work because of the Atatürk signature tattoo he had on his arm. The tattoo makers were furious to hear that the man wanted to remove his tattoo and declared that they would do it for free from then on. For the related newspaper article, see: http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/yazarlar/16259113_p.asp.

[47] http://www.koprualti.com.tr/ic/ata.htm.

[48] For one among many websites devoted to display a collection of 9/11 memorial tattoos, see: http://www.strikethebox.com/tattoo/wtc/.

medium, transforming it in a performing way, whose significance has always been the display of the present body (227). It is "ultimately based on physical materiality, and, as such, it functions as a somatic sign referring to the irreducible presence of the tattooed body" (Neef 224). The physicality of the tattoo, which brings the body forward while transforming it, reveals an interesting specificity of the nationalist tattoos in the Turkish context, in light of the ban on tattooing within the tradition of Sunni Islam, where it is considered an act of changing the creation of god. Some of the testimonies found on the tattoo forums reveal that people are aware of this ban on modifying the body and that they are making a statement against political Islam and its supporters in Turkey by having the image of Atatürk or the flag become a part of their body. Therefore, the form of the tattoo can be seen as equally important as its content in conveying a message, which makes the medium significant in the transference of specific political and cultural codes.

One of the most important features the medium of tattoo, considered as a bio-image, reveals is the mutually transformative bonding between the image and the body. The ink inscribed on the skin to become a virtually indissoluble part of the body shows how the image actually derives its life from the person carrying it and how it, in turn, gives life to the person as a political subject. This is even more striking in the context of the nationalist tattoos since in one gesture, the person embodies the national "body" through the tattoo and aims to acquire the features of the nation by exchanging his blood for ink. The visible surface of the body provides a passage from individuality to community, defined within the coordinates of the national identity. This reveals "the capacity of the skin not only to be marked by, but also to contribute to marking or 'flagging' difference" (Grabham 64).

It bears repeating that this act of flagging simultaneously marks fear and anxiety, in a similar way to the fetish, which strengthens and frightens at the same time, as I have discussed in the previous chapter. Braunberger captures this duality in a nutshell with regard to the function of seaman tattoos: "the tattoo fetishistically marked a desire to perform a phallic masculinity and the anxiety of what such a performance might mean" (2). It is possible to add that the anxiety the nationalist tattoo marks is amplified by the fact that the national image on the skin will die when the body dies (although some claim the opposite, such as the man cited in the opening paragraph of this chapter), as opposed to public statues or images, whose life span is not as predictable as that of living bodies. One of the underlying quests behind the act of being tattooed is for the mutual vitality and immortality that is thought to be provided between the two parts. However, tattoos do not make their carriers immortal, nor are their carriers capable of making these images immortal. On the contrary,

while animating these images, the skin also makes them more earthly, brings them closer to mortality, which again might increase the underlying anxiety by pointing to the precarity of nationalism's fantasies of eternity.



Figure 11: A Tattoo of Atatürk.

The tattoo in Figure 11 depicts the portrait of Atatürk looking at the viewer from a man's chest, placed right over the heart, possibly not in a coincidental manner.[49] The incarnadine background gives the impression that the tattoo was just finished and photographed, from an angle that makes Atatürk directly look into the eyes of the viewer. The extended panopticon effect that I have discussed above in relation to the Atatürk masks can be said to be at work here as well, since the tattoo inscribes a previously panoptical image onto the body, turning it into a bio-image and allowing the person under the gaze of Atatürk to acquire the gaze and watch others. The tattooed person acquires two more eyes on his skin, through which he can watch as well, strengthening the crucial element of identification in the ways in which he relates to this image. The same image that once positioned the person as being watched becomes the means of watching by being literally embedded in the skin, which again, makes the incorporation aspect of the panoptic model more tangible and the

[49] http://www.tattooartists.org/Gal67459_Big_lider_.ATATÜRK.asp.

surveillance mechanisms projected onto others in an attempt to discipline them more visible.

However, tattoos reveal different aspects of the corporeality of politics and image acts, since they reside on the skin, which is a different medium than masquerade, and cannot be put on and taken off as the masks can be. Braunberger writes: "Butler argues that masquerade is 'an appearing that makes itself convincing as a being.' If masquerade is about masking, what happens when the mask lives within the skin and can never be removed?" (25). In light of this question, we move one step closer to the body while traveling from an Atatürk mask to an Atatürk tattoo. Braunberger answers her own question by arguing that the masquerade on the skin is the fusion of "what is ostensibly real" and "what a symbol specifically refers to", as a result of which "one is no longer masquerading as a member of the tribe, one indeed is a member" (25). The confirmation of belonging to a community by a tattoo is indeed more permanent and even more "convincing as a being" since the tattoo is no longer attached to the body like the mask, but *is* the body.

Schilderkout argues that bodily modifications are "ways of writing one's autobiography on the surface of the body" (338). Tattoos are indeed like memoirs, to a certain extent personal and selective like all memoirs; yet, especially tattoos of collective symbols give a more explicit account of the social and political situatedness of the storyteller, with a crucial autobiographical note on how the person relates to the official history. The image of Atatürk, as a collective symbol, alludes to the official history of the nation-state more than to one's autobiographical specificities, showing the intermingling of personal and political histories on the skin. Ahmed and Stacey argue that the skin remembers, "skin surfaces record our personal biographies" and it becomes "the 'bearer or scene of meaning'" (2). Tattoos that allude to a particular cultural memory and history make explicit that the personal biographies that are surfaced on the skin are always mingled with cultural and political histories. They make visible in a particular way that the skin has multiple histories and "is inhabited by, as well as inhabiting, the space of the nation" (Ahmed and Stacey 2).

The corporeal and tangible acting out of national identity is made possible by the incorporation of an image, which works in a performative way, as described by Butler "not as a singular or deliberate 'act', but rather, as the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects it names" (1993: 2). The Atatürk image on the chest, by being displayed repeatedly by the same body and repeated on different bodies, thus produces the national identity that it claims to represent in a performative manner. As Neef argues, when framed within Butler's theory of performativity, tattooing can be considered as an event that is grounded in the repetition of "social and racial norms marking familiarity and difference"

(228). The depiction of Atatürk on the skin seems to allude to a predefined national identity, which it redefines and aims to stabilize through the very act of depiction. The function it acquires in constructing the self, mediating social relationships, and thus shaping culture in general, reveals "how skins, as well as other bodily surfaces and folds, expose bodies to other bodies, rather than simply containing 'the body' as such" (Ahmed and Stacey 4). Perhaps even the fact that there stands a national symbol between the tattooed and the tattooist in the first place can be seen as symptomatic of the ways in which the tattoo will mediate the tattooed person's social relationships in the future.

This understanding does not allow us to see the tattooed body as a mere site of political enforcement and manipulation, as was the case for the tattoos made by slave owners in ancient Greece and Rome, or the tattoos used in Nazi concentration camps, which are obvious examples of controlling and surveilling the body by marking it (Schildkrout 323). The Atatürk tattoo does not fit into the inclination of the literature on tattoos to see them as either inscriptions of power relations onto bodies like stigmas or as acts of resistance that resist these dominant power relations employed by "marginalized" people to separate themselves from the majority and the dominant identity (Pitts 2003). This ambivalence is also apparent in the seemingly paradoxical way that nationalist tattoos act to create a visual community through unification, rather than the tattoos that are made to be unique and authentic. Thus, the way the Atatürk tattoo and similar nationalist tattoos turn the body into the "surface of inscription of events" is neither through enforcement nor through subversion (Foucault 1991: 102). That is to say, they are neither merely the result of the bodily print of bio-power techniques since they are voluntary acts, nor directly rebellious corporeal acts, since the carried images of Atatürk and other national symbols have always been the visual imprints of a certain imagination of national identity.

The blurry area national tattoos as image acts inhabit between being strategically imposed and tactically opposed seems to challenge the distinction between tactics and strategies drawn by the French critic Michel de Certeau. For de Certeau, "a tactic is determined by the *absence of power* just as a strategy is organized by the postulation of power" (38). Whereas strategies are imposed from above by the government, the military, corporations, or urban planners, tactics appropriate and manipulate the imposed framework, attempting to subvert the master's plan. On the one hand, the tattoos can be seen as tactics since they are small-scale everyday life practices that people come up with to navigate within broader structures, such as nationalism, which are not totally mapped by strategies. For instance, they carry a "rebellious", anti-government character in the present case. They are at

times perceived as the voice of the oppressed against a government that is perceived as oppressive, which, as stated by one of the people I interviewed, "can cauterize people's arms with these tattoos in ten years time".

However, unlike tactics, they are not entirely in opposition to the "master's plan" or entirely defined by "the absence of power", since they in fact resonate with and diffuse nationalist imaginations and its exclusionary narratives. In this sense, they may be seen as strategies that perform and diffuse the codes of identitarian communities in everyday life through images. This is reflected by another person I interviewed, who said he feels like "a signed official document" with his tattoo. Still, they are certainly not imposed from a governmental or institutional level, despite the encouraging influence of certain media channels that praise these tattoos. In a way, they work as tactics that, in the end, reinforce strategies; in Braunberger's words, they constitute "transgression-that-maintains-interpellation", acts of the marginalized that end up guarding the social system's borders (17).

The theoretical difficulty in unraveling de Certeau's tactics and strategies as explanatory conceptual tools is made visible by the specific position nationalist tattoos in contemporary Turkey hold, with the official state tradition behind them and the novel, almost militant layer they acquire in the context of a perceived political crisis. In the ambivalent terrain in which officially built nationalist discourses and people's own tactics to deal with, transform, and act them up merge, nationalist tattoos emerge neither as a means of empowerment nor of social control. They challenge this distinction due to their position in between authenticity and unification, aligning people with a national identity, which itself stands in a liminal zone due to its threatened hegemonic position.

Going back to the tattoo on the chest in Figure 11, it is possible to focus in more detail what this type of image act does, especially with regard to its corporeal aspect. The tattooists announce on their websites and in their interviews the strict principle of not making Atatürk tattoos below the waist or on women's breasts.[50] This attempt to avoid the sexualization of Atatürk seems to be based on the assumption that the part of the body below the waist is more "sexual" than above and on the association of sexuality with disrespect. Moreover, "below the waist" body parts are also associated with excrement, and therefore abjection, as emphasized by Bakhtin in relation to the "grotesque bodies" of the carnival and the "lower stratum of the body" relating to "the acts of defecation and copulation" (21). DeMello argues that, in fact, "the combination of sexuality and excrement, and death and renewal" as

[50] This is similar to what people who sell products with national symbols on them say about not printing them on items that people step on.

"primary feature of what Bakhtin calls the grotesque concept of the body" applies to tattooed bodies, as well as pierced and surgically altered bodies (2007: 23). The principle the Turkish tattooists announce attempts to dissociate Atatürk tattoos from sexuality and abjection by segmenting the body into appropriate and inappropriate parts.

The evident gendered side of this particular segmentation of the body is manifested in the "only above-the-waist" principle of the tattooists, which seems to apply only to the male body since it excludes the chest when it comes to the female body. Bakhtin's "lower stratum of the body" needs to be extended to certain upper parts of the female body, which are also associated with sexuality or abjection and deemed not suitable for nationalist tattoos. In relation to this, it makes sense that the number of men with nationalist tattoos is seemingly much higher than that of women, as can be deduced from tattoo websites, catalogues, and tattooists' accounts. What is perhaps more interesting is that while women mostly have Atatürk's signature as a tattoo, there are barely any women who have his portrait. This might be related to the fact that portraits require more skin-space, but is more likely due to the "refined" aesthetics associated with the female body. Most people I interviewed stated that Atatürk's signature is more "refined" and "polite" compared to his portraits and therefore more suitable to the female body. This resonates with attempts to desexualize the female body, since the physical touch of a man's face to female skin might suggest the opposite.[51] In this sense, it is notable how women with nationalist tattoos are portrayed on the Internet as purified from any sexual connotations and celebrated as respectful and heroic members of the (national) community.

Alongside the attempt to desexualize the female body, the above-the-waist and not-on-a-woman's-chest principles can also be seen as an attempt to frame the figure of Atatürk as a paternal and even sacred figure, whose libidinal aspects are suppressed, although they slip out in the gendered aspect of the practice of tattooing. This in fact resonates with the ancient function of the tattoo described by anthropologist Alfred Gell in his influential work on tribal tattoos as negotiating "between the individual and society and between different social groups" and mediating "relations between persons and spirits, the human and the divine" (Schildkrout, 321). For Gell, tattooing is a "ritual performance that brought into being a protective spirit through the utterance of a 'legitimate' (stylistically coherent) graphic

[51] An interesting remark in this respect came from a person who had an Atatürk signature tattoo on his arm who said: "When I was a child, I would like to think of Atatürk as my father, but then that would be weird too, because it was not appropriate to think of my mother with another man than my father".

gesture" (1998: 191). The negotiation with divinity, which finds its reflection in the sanctified figure of Atatürk as a "protective spirit", animated to protect from loss, seems to necessitate the divorce of the body from its sexual facets. The body's political bonding and its belonging to the nation, and more so, its partial acquisition of the sanctified quality of Atatürk's image, is thought to be damaged by the sexual connotations of women's breasts and below-the waist body parts. B. Anderson, in relation to how the national body is perceived, writes:

> We are all aware of the tropes in which national citizenries understand their relationship with on another: they are Antigone's brothers and sisters, not husbands and wives, parents and children, boyfriends and girlfriends, let alone girlfriends and girlfriends. From citizen fraternity everything sexual is removed. We stand gazing, not at one another's bodies, or into one another's eyes, but Up Ahead. (2010: 367)

Through the ban on certain body parts, the tattooed body is redefined as the body of a citizen in a fraternity frame in which "everything sexual is removed". However, the attempt to asexualize a sanctified Atatürk figure does not seem to succeed entirely, as perhaps the asexual fraternity between citizens is never fully established either. In fact, nationalist tattoos can be said to sexualize the relationship between the body and the nation, as well as among different national bodies, even further. Braunberger argues that "not only are tattoos erotic and potentially fetishistic from an experiential level, they also visually mark a conflation of nationalism and sexuality" (40).[52] Atatürk's face is inscribed right over the heart like the face of a lover who is claimed to be loved forever.[53] He is now part of the naked body, since "a tattoo, after all, cannot be read but on a naked body" (Neef 226).

Susan Sontag talks about talismanic photographs, such as a lover's photograph in a wallet, a rock star poster on the wall, or the campaign button of a politician pinned on a coat. In all these cases, "the sense of the unattainable that can be evoked by photographs feeds directly into the erotic feelings of those for whom desirability is enhanced by distance" (16). The actual inscription of the image on/under the skin in the case of the tattoo can be said to shorten this distance. Yet, it also seems to grow it at the same time, in a tantalizing way, since it in fact depicts a dead person on living skin, who is in a way doomed to die again due to the

[52] It is interesting to note that we do not see images of erotic female bodies meshed with patriotic symbolism in the Turkish nationalist tattoo scene, as opposed to, for instance the American one.
[53] Poetic descriptions of Atatürk's beauty and the joy of carrying him on the skin can be found on various tattoo websites, as well as in the interviews I conducted with tattooed people.

current political crisis, as well as due to the mortality of the body. The proximity the tattoo provides, then, in fact shortens the insurmountable distance too. This ultimately amplifies the sense of unattainability Sontag talks about, which she claims feeds the erotic feelings attached to the image further.

Thus, the specific medium of the tattoo seems to capture the tension between the coexistence of and tension between the sanctified and parental figure of Atatürk and the eroticized Atatürk. It captures the psychoanalytical paradox of a divine-like protective parental figure and the libidinal energy that this relationship is charged with. The ban on certain body parts enforced by tattooists tries to fix his image as that of the respectful, parental and perhaps divine figure. Yet, the tattoo also uncovers the erotic characteristics that the cult figure of Atatürk has been endowed with since the foundation of the Turkish Republic, reflected in the school textbooks praising his blond hair, blue eyes and strong body, his muscles amplified in the public statues and the folkloric stories about his womanizer attitude and charm.[54] The unfamiliar texture of the skin he starts residing in with the tattoo brings to the surface these libidinal aspects that are already inscribed in his cult figure. In addition, beyond uncovering the already existing elements, the corporealization of Atatürk in the form of tattoo forces the signification of his image to move towards a more sexually implicated territory, despite the below-the-waist principles.

One of the people I interviewed who has an Atatürk tattoo captures this liminal space between parental and erotic, divine and mundane, and immortal and mortal in which the Atatürk tattoo resides. The young man said that he feels an "electrical current" between him and his Atatürk tattoo on his right arm, which he feels running every now and then, adding that he likes his right arm more than his left arm. He told that he wakes up some nights sweating after seeing Atatürk in his dream, with the wish of holding his hand, "just like a child holds his father's hand", but cannot really succeed. The co-existence of the libidinal implications of the excitement the electrical current evokes, which cannot be easily ignited by the cold bronze statues in the streets or the framed pictures on the walls, with the self-infantilizing wish to be protected by a parental figure, as well as the co-existence of

[54] In the documentary that accompanies the study, in the section on Atatürk masks, women can be heard talking about the beauty of Atatürk's blue eyes and the rumors on the difficulty of looking him in the eyes due to the power of his charisma. I should also note that my Jewish grandmother used to tell me that Atatürk made her sit on his lap during his visit to Izmir, when my grandmother was six years old, and that she could not look directly into his eyes since there was a strangely hypnotizing blue light spreading through them.

proximity with a sense of attainability in this man's account reflect the contradictory layers embedded in an Atatürk tattoo.

Figures 12 and 13: Tattoos of the Turkish flag and Atatürk's signature.

Before moving on to the externalization of body parts in the form of images in the next section, I want to look at two more examples of nationalist tattoos to comment on the particular visual features that some tattoos share, which provide further insight into how tattoos work as bio-image acts. Above, we see the tattoo of the Turkish flag appearing from under the seemingly torn skin of a shoulder (Figure 12) and Atatürk's signature on the inside part of an arm as if the skin surrounding it is cracking like a stone (Figure 13).[55] In both cases, the power of the image is dependent on and strengthened by the visual effects accompanying them. These effects, which can also be found in other examples, require special attention since they reveal the symbolic and performative character of bio-images, almost in too literal a form. The flag appears underneath as if it was already there, waiting for

[55] http://crazytattoostudio.com/Atatürk-dovmeleri/?print=1&nggpage=2.

the skin to be peeled off to become visible. In a similar manner, the signature appears to come from inside the body, making the skin crack as it rises to the surface.

Due to these effects, the images seem like they do not *become* an inseparable part of the body, but already *are* part of it. They come from a deeper level, below the skin, from the very flesh of the body. This takes Butler's question on what happens when the masquerade starts living on the skin one step further, since the visual effects imply that the images precede the skin, which itself seems to function as a mask. These tattoos emphasize, doubly, that images of the nation and what they signify were always-already constituents of the body, resonating with the essentialist claims of nationalism that conceptualize particular qualities, such as ethnicity, nationality, race, and gender, as natural and fixed. The skin here is no longer seen as reflecting the person, exposing him to others, but as a barrier that needs to be overcome to realize exposure of the essence inside.

The "naturalness" of the body is again used to convey the essentialist claims of nationalism, but the skin is interestingly left out this time as the outer and "less natural" part of the body. This highlights another liminal position the skin can take, not only in between self and other, but also in between the person's "outlook" and his "inner truth". From this perspective, the skin is perceived and depicted as a mask in need of being removed. The flag tattoo (Figure 12) clearly exposes the idea that the nation is not only inscribed on the skin, but shaped in flesh and bones, almost like a wound that refuses to be healed. The signature tattoo that cracks the skin (Figure 13) strengthens the implication of authenticity further by depicting Atatürk's signature, which is supposed to represent his (or now, the tattooed person's) authentic, individual uniqueness penetrated right to the bone, as the person in the opening paragraph of this chapter claimed.

Another way of reading the visual properties of these tattoos would be to see them as being inscribed on the body forcefully. In the first case, then, the skin has to be ripped to place the flag underneath and in the second, though not as obviously as the first, the skin cracks with the weight of the carved signature on/in the arm. They are not only imprints on the surface of the skin, but are placed below the surface, deeper and graver, at the expense of ripping and cracking the skin, making wounds on it. In both cases, they are so strongly engraved that they cannot easily be erased or taken off, based on a claim to surmount the skin, either by ripping it off to show what is underneath or to engrave something deeper down.

Gell writes that the tattoo is "simultaneously the exteriorization of the interior which is simultaneously the interiorization of the exterior" (1993: 38). The dual gesture Gell defines

is apparent in these two seemingly contradictory but in fact complementary readings of the visual effects as coming out or digging in, which resonate with the blurred area between tactics and strategies that I discussed. They seem to exteriorize national values that are thought to be internal, while in fact internalizing, as deeply and thus as "naturally" as possible, the external values of the nation-state. It can perhaps even be said that these tattoos are the result of an excessive internalization of nationalist ideology, which creates an excess that, in turn, is externalized on the surface of the body. The sense of crisis and the fear of loss can be seen as heavily tainting this embrace of national symbols, to the extent that they are not only inscribed on the skin, but are excessively internalized as "the real skin".

I would like to add that the signification of the nationalist tattoo is not fixed, since the context in which it gains meaning changes throughout the person's life for several reasons. The tattoo goes through various transformations as where the body resides shifts, the political and cultural dynamics evolve, the implications of the image change, personal and political histories are re-shuffled, and the skin acquires other histories. When I saw a person with an Atatürk tattoo on his arm participating in the Gezi uprising I realized both the elusiveness and the importance of the tattoo as an object of analysis. As noted in the introduction, the Gezi uprising, which started in June 2013 in Turkey, generated a drastically different political and cultural context than, for instance, the Republican Protests I analyze here. The Atatürk tattoo on the arm of the person who was struggling side by side with anti-militarists, anarchists, feminists and even anti-capitalist Muslims, at first seemed bizarre and misplaced in that context, which was supposed to be built on a critique of the existing boundaries between nationalities, different classes and gender roles. Thus, on the one hand, it revealed the elusiveness of analyzing tattoos, since the meaning that the analysis puts forward may be challenged by the future as the skins keep traveling in time and space. On the other hand, it also highlighted the importance of such an analysis, not only because the multiple histories the skin carries will always include the one that the analysis reveals, but also because it marks a particular historical moment with clarity, which is indispensible to make sense of the ever changing configurations of bodies and politics. As a visual mark, a tattoo physically makes the multiple histories that stain the present time apparent, as well as the compound possibilities of adding new layers. Thus, the Atatürk tattoo in the Gezi uprising appeared as proof that "the skin is both already inscribed, or marked, and is always yet to be inscribed" (Ahmed and Stacey 178). In the next section, the example of the flag made out of blood allows me to move even deeper into the body by involving bodily matter, while, on the other

hand, reversing the operation of the previously discussed bio-images by focusing on images constituted of the body but remaining external to it.

Blood: Making a Flag

Figure 14: Turkish flag made out of blood by Kırşehir Anatolian Teacher High School students, 2007.

The third and last object of analysis that I want to explore as an example of the bio-image is the Turkish flag shown in Figure 14, which, with its white star and crescent and red background, seems familiar and ordinary at first.[56] However, this image, which appeared in 2007 in Turkish newspapers and on TV, in fact is different from most other Turkish flags, since it is made out of blood. Not metaphorically, as in the genesis myth of the flag being stained with martyrs' blood taught in schools, but literally. On October 2007, the news stated that thirteen Turkish soldiers had been "killed by the PKK" (Kurdistan Worker's Party) in Dağlıca, a district in Hakkari in the East of Turkey. It was not long after that the news reported on a group of high school children making a Turkish flag out of the blood they dripped from their fingers in order to protest the death of the soldiers in the Dağlıca incident,

56 http://www.cnnturk.com/2008/turkiye/01/10/parmaklarindaki.kanla.bayrak.yaptilar/418601.0/index.html.

which in fact turned out to be highly controversial due to the complicit role of the Turkish army that was revealed later.

The flag made out of blood exemplifies the third type of bio-image that comes into being through the externalization of a bodily part in the form of an image. A physical part of the body, in this case blood, is detached from the body permanently and becomes an external image/object with a high symbolic value, which I will explore below. It shares the features of the other types of bio-images in the sense that the body becomes the source of political significance and vitality for these images' acts, while at the same time being animated and activated by the body itself. Together, these cases allow us to conceptualize bio-images as literally starting to have a life of their own as "animated, vital objects", in Mitchell's words, things "that *want* things, that demand, desire, even require things –food, money, blood, respect" (2005: 194). Here, I will ask what precisely changes when the image does not just "demand blood", but is actually made up of it and when it is not internalized by the body but made up by its externalization. Hence, this example will also highlight the vitality of the notions of shedding blood, sacrifice and death for the performative quality of bio-image acts that make a claim to a national identity, through a different mode of operation than the masks and tattoos.

Figure 15: Kırşehir Anatolian Teacher High School students with the flag made out of blood, 2007.

In Figure 15, we see the bodies that came together to make the flag, showing off the framed flag, most probably in their school.[57] They stand in front of another flag, which already gives a clue about the context that made such an act imaginable and possible. The fact that the tallest girl in the middle took the mission of holding the frame resonates with the traditional depiction of women in nationalist imaginations and imagery as the carriers of national values. The pattern that existed all the way from the images of "modern women", widely used from the first years of the nation-state formation, to the emphasis on the presence of women in the nationalist rallies that I discussed above, is followed here as well. The distribution of gender roles in such a way that girls represent the prime national values, even those exclusively assigned to boys, such as serving in the military, is symptomatic of Turkish nationalist and militarist discourses. In relation to this, it is remarkable that girls and boys are standing in separate rows in the picture, which again resonates with the assignment of different places to men and women that goes hand in hand with claims to modernity and secularism.[58]

The high school students declared that it was initially the idea of one of the students whose father is a policeman. This student explained the reasons behind making the blood-flag to one of the most widely circulated newspapers in the following way:

> I said let's remake the flag that was constituted of our ancestors' blood. My friends have accepted it. Every drop of our blood was absorbed by the fabric. Not a single drop of tear fell from our eyes; neither did we feel the slightest pain while doing this flag. We used to use needles to measure the blood type in our biology courses. That's where I got the idea.[59]

He states that he was affected by the "martyred soldiers" and that his idea was enthusiastically received by other students, who were also angry at the situation. These young people, who are between sixteen and seventeen years old, came together every day for two

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[57] http://simurg.info/2008/02/05/160-aydin-kaygilarini-dile-getirdi/.

[58] There is an extensive body of literature on the role of women since the beginning of the "modernization project" in Turkey in the 1920s as symbols of "civilization and Westernization". The resonance of the new roles defined for women with traditional gender roles ("the mothers of future generations"), the modern yet modest identity assigned to women, and the instrumentalization of the female body in the construction of nation-state values have been strongly criticized by feminist scholars from Turkey and beyond. For examples, see Sirman; Yuval-Davis.

[59] My translation.
http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2008/01/14/haber,D5EF5E4296304355A36E7F0AEDE242A5.html.

months and pricked their fingers with needles to color the fabric, whose size is fortunately small, keeping this action a secret from their teachers.[60]

Here, we take another step towards the body through the notion of blood, but in a different way than the masks and the tattoos. Whereas the mask modified the integrity of the body only temporarily and for the tattoo, blood is shed to make room for ink; in the case of the blood-flag, it is shed to make ink itself, which gives it a more active role. Different than the mask that covers the face and the ink that forms an image on the skin, the body (part) is now the sole constituent of the image. Blood that animates the body also brings the image of the Turkish flag to life.

Blood has been a crucial foundational element in nationalist imaginations as both a source of belonging to the nation, securing the ties between members of the nation, and the symbol of sacrifice for the nation, as in the repeatedly invoked genesis myth of the flag. The prominent idea in nationalist imaginations about sacrificing one's life to realize the ultimate coalescence between the body of the person and that of the nation finds its perfect reflection in making a flag out of blood. In addition, writing with blood has an immediate association with truthfulness and heroism, which is clear in the student's statement on not feeling pain and not shedding tears, behind which one can see the codes of masculinity enforced by a highly militarist culture.[61] Apart from its heroic implications, blood is often seen as securing the authenticity of the body. Fechner-Smarsly argues that blood serves "as a means of reinforcing authenticity by placing emphasis on the fingerprint as absolutely authentic: both the blood and the fingerprint belong to a particular person and, moreover, are part of his body or at least an immediate body effect" (197). Compared to ink, "blood seems much more auratic, even frightening, because blood is directly related to the body" (Fechner-Smarsly 200).[62]

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[60] Students from another high school (Galatasaray High School) reacted to the blood-flag by claiming that it was initially their idea. Apparently, the Galatasaray High School students made a blood-flag much earlier, in 1950, to send to Turkish soldiers fighting in Korea, on which they wrote in their blood: "We are with you". The flag was sent and stayed in Korea during the soldiers' service; after the soldiers came back, it was displayed in the Harbiye Military Museum. See http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2008/01/14/haber,FB3853F705E549AFAA2F6C6EAE05412A.html.

[61] It is also possible to remember other contexts of blood writing or drawing, such as the Chinese Buddhist tradition of writing Buddhist scriptures in blood, people writing letters in blood before committing suicide or as threats, or other military incidents, such as the "Blutfahne", the Nazi flag covered with the blood of Nazi members, which was considered sacred and was used to sanctify new flags in Nazi ceremonies. For a detailed description of the Chinese Buddhist tradition, see Kieschnick.

[62] Fechner-Smarsly gives the example of Iraqi citizens stamping voting ballots with their blood to show loyalty to Saddam Hussein during the presidential elections in 2002.

However, the step towards the body that we take with the "body effect" of the blood is followed by a seemingly paradoxical step back, not only because the body is in fact disembodied by forming an image that is external to it and that acquires a life of its own to circulate independently, but also because this is a collective act. It is the collectivity of different bodies coming together that form the image, which also makes it differ from the other examples of bio-images in this chapter. The collectivity in the formation of this image does not only make it difficult to detect a particular person's authentic contribution in its making, but it also makes it, to a certain extent, unimportant. The metonymic quality of blood, as a rehearsal of death and sacrifice, as well as of the students, as representing the young generations who are ready to die, makes the blood a sign of uniformity, more than of authenticity, in the context of nationalism.

Blood does not only connect the bodies, but also different temporalities. The children clearly state that they were inspired by the Turkish soldiers who died in the conflict. Their act replicates the death of the soldiers, echoing, deliberately or not, the genesis myth of the Turkish flag being stained with the blood of dead martyrs, which the high school students must have read in their textbooks. In addition, the students declare that they are not empathizing only with the present-day martyrs but also with historical ones: "When the proposition was made, I was angry at myself not to think about this before. I felt the same way as our grandmothers who were carrying cannon balls during the War of Independence". The parallels drawn between the grandmothers of the War of Independence and the recently died soldiers show the assumption of a continuity of the same heroic and suffering subject serving his country, which represents the general logic of the nationalist imagination in which the history of a nation is presented in the form of a narrative, ensuring the continuity of a subject. This is an example of what Grabham calls "a temporal 'trick'" that "rehearses the 'origins' of the nation so that the nation's fictional past secures its fictional future" (67). Blood appears as the main actor connecting past to the present, previous national heroes to the heroes of the future, providing a sense of continuity, as if national culture "were a precious genetic inheritance, to be transmitted uncontaminated and unweakened" (Balibar qtd. in Billig 71).

In this context, dripping blood seems to work in a metonymic way, performing an act that is associated with and in the place of another, namely dying for one's country. This "metonymic dying" serves to fulfill the students' perception of themselves as the successors of the soldiers and their wish to reiterate their actions, which is clearly stated in the letter they wrote with the flag: "It is time for our hands holding the pens now to hold weapons. We are

also longing to be martyred!".[63] There is a disconcerting resemblance between this act and the last words of the oath that, up to 2013, children had to repeat every school morning during primary education: "I give my existence as a gift to Turkish existence!" The blood-flag is, then, a partial realization of this discursive promise, a ritual of death performed collectively through the bio-image act.[64]

What Braunberger writes to describe a tattoo is even more pertinent in the case of these children, who are not pricked by a needle to get ink under their skin, but who prick themselves with a needle to make ink out of themselves: "The needle arrives like a koan, with some inexplicable riddle that asks for acknowledgment of one's own mortality" (30). In a way, while the image gains life, the body dies; it dies to give life to the image, acknowledging its own mortality. Yet, the body gains vitality as soon as it dies, since it is a metonymic dying, in fact just marking the "dyability" of the body for the nation. This possibility is externalized and fixed by the image, which then becomes the source of life for the body again. The metonymic quality of making a flag out of blood, associating it with other and bigger acts, such as entering military service and being martyred for the nation, makes it at least as heroic as the bigger acts themselves, since it is in fact precisely this metonymic quality that stabilizes the bigger acts' possibility and continuity.

The embraced heroism of the act is apparent in the ways in which this image circulated, which also underlines how the bio-image is externalized, acquires a life of its own, without ceasing to be a source of vitality for its creators, as well as for other possibly ideal members of the nation. The travel of the image also shows that the blood-flag, which might seem marginal and extreme at first glance, in fact reveals the broader institutional structures that this bio-image is embedded in, perhaps more explicitly so than the examples of the masks and tattoos. The most influential figures of the country and several institutions, not to mention an infinite number of newspaper articles and TV programs, backed up the incident and increased its visibility.[65] The telephone lines of the school were jammed because of the

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[63] http://arsiv.sabah.com.tr/2008/01/14/haber,D5EF5E4296304355A36E7F0AEDE242A5.html.

[64] The metonymic mode of operation, although less visibly, can be said to be at work in the act of being tattooed as well, since while getting tattooed blood is exchanged for ink. The tattoo can also be seen as an act of sacrifice that echoes a bigger sacrifice, such as dying for the nation. However, while the nationalist tattoo emphasizes the incorporation of the image by making it come alive on the skin, the blood-flag brings the shedding blood aspect to the forefront as a metonymic act, a rehearsal of sacrifice.

[65] Critical voices were silenced by the usual methods; a newspaper (*Tercüman*) targeted two female columnists (Perihan Mağden and Ece Temelkuran) who criticized the militarist and violent atmosphere that caused the children to make the blood-flag. *Tercüman* stated that two "ugly women went astray" and committed a crime by saying "ugly words that are far from the Turkish identity". It

large amount of people who wanted to call to celebrate the students. An organization founded by the families of martyrs, the "Federation of People Sacrificing Their Lives for the Country", visited the students in January 2008 to celebrate and promise them scholarship opportunities when they go to university. In their speech, the visitors stated that every Turk who is ready to give his blood to protect the sacred flag should complete this mission by serving in the military and added: "You have shown by making this flag, even before going to the military that you are ready to sacrifice your lives".[66] "Every Turk" evidently meant "every male Turk", since only men can enter military service, which is a typical example of the gendered quality of "military-inflected national identities" (Roei 67). However, the implication of this sentence can also be seen as an inclusive rather than exclusive one, since it also allows women to be praised through the militarist masculinity codes.

Figure 16: The Chief of Staff, Yaşar Büyükanıt, shows the blood flag to the press, 2007.

The school children sent the flag as a gift to the Chief of Staff, Yaşar Büyükanıt, who was a strongly influential figure in determining Turkey's social and political agenda at the time, right before AKP's policies pushed the leaders of the Turkish Military Forces, one of the most historically dominant political forces, to the background. During the "Support

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is not a secret what type of risks people encounter after being targeted as "unpatriotic" by the media in Turkey; however, this time, the newspaper had to pay compensation after the two writers filed a defamation lawsuit. See http://bianet.org/bianet/ifade-ozgurlugu/104304-tercuman-magden-ve-temelkurani-hedef-gosterdi.

[66] The organization also gave the students a flag and a ceramic plate as a gift, which read: "This country and this flag have existed and will exist with you". See http://www.nethaber.com/Toplum/52432/Kaniyla-bayrak-yapan-ogrenciye-burs-sozu.

Campaign for Heroes Fighting against Terror" ceremony, which delivered the donations collected for martyrs and veterans to their families, Büyükanıt showed off the blood-flag and made an emotional speech with teary eyes in the presence of media (Figure 16).[67] He congratulated the students by saying "This is a great picture showing what kind of a nation we are!" and uttered part of a frequently repeated nationalist stanza, "what makes a flag a flag is the blood on it; what makes the land a country is the people dying in it", confirming Billig's argument that "all societies that maintain armies maintain the belief that some things are more valuable than life itself" (1). All these scenes set up around the image, full of celebration and flattery, show how the blood-flag as a bio-image fits and feeds into the image of an ideal youth in the national imagination by in fact redefining and reproducing it in its acting. Braunberger's words describing the heroic tattooed seamen hold true for these high school children too: "While the nation looked on admiringly, these men were unwittingly marched into the realm of the symbolic" (9). In this case, the "symbolic" consisted of the metonymic relationship their blood had with the idea of sacrifice and their bodies with the image of the ideal young generation of the nation.

Billig writes that a political crisis leading to war can be created easily, but the willingness to sacrifice cannot; thus, "there must be prior rehearsals and reminders so that, when the fateful occasion arises, men, and women, know how they are expected to behave" (124). The blood flag is precisely the kind of performative rehearsal Billig is talking about, in which the blood of the youth enacts the leading role in a militarist and nationalist play. As I have shown, this image act was also framed, both by the media and the visitors, as setting a good example for future generations. This performative rehearsal that combines the martyrs of the past, children of today and future generations, through metonymic acts, constitutes another attempt to fix the slippery notion of a nation in a time of (perceived) crisis. B. Anderson describes the function of this type of performances for nationalism quite accurately: "the national dead and the national unborn, in their uncountable billions, mirror each other, and provide the best sureties of the ineradicable Goodness of the nation" (364).

Although B. Anderson focuses on the elements that fix the Goodness of the nation without mentioning the elements that represent the Badness, the latter seems to be a prerequisite for the continuity of the first. In this case, it is the figure of the "Kurdish terrorist" that lurks, in a ghostly manner, behind the decision to make the flag and its

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67 http://www.cnnturk.com/2008/turkiye/01/10/parmaklarindaki.kanla.bayrak.yaptilar/418601.0/index.html.

celebrations. Mitchell discusses the notion of terrorism as one of the most effective fetishes of contemporary times, as both a spectacle and a word that demands "the 'ultimate sacrifice' both from the terrorists and from those who mobilize the world to stamp it out" (2005: 190). What we see in the Dağlıca incident, which is highly controversial due to the revealed complicity of the state and the army apparatus in the event, precisely represents this fetish character of terrorism, which successfully obscures the actual course of events as soon as it enters the scene. The discourses and affects mobilized around the word "terror" help to legitimize the role of the army and the ongoing conflicts between the Turkish army and the Kurdish guerillas. According to this logic, the Turkish soldiers are always killed, but they never "kill", since "National Dead are never killers" (Anderson 2010: 363). Similarly, Kurdish people do not die, but are "eliminated" by the army.

In this context, the blood-flag waved by school children appears as a powerful tool to mystify the asymmetrical "war on terror" that the Turkish state and the army have been perpetuating since the 1990s. This incident also shows that spectacles through which people construct themselves as a national community, in this case by creating a bio-image act, is a *sine qua non* for the legitimization of the premises of the nation-state, serving to put its obscure and violent policies out of sight. When the children's act of embracing and rejoicing in death is normalized, it is not a surprise that the same people who are content to see under-age Kurdish children who throw stones at the Turkish police sentenced to life-time imprisonment celebrate the blood flag made by the children. Through this celebration, Judith Butler's questions about when "life is grievable" and especially "whose lives are more grievable" are answered in a cold-blooded and performative way (2009: 22).

Thus, the blood flag as a bio-image act, on the one hand, creates a "body effect" through blood, which bends towards not authenticity but uniformity, and generates a "metonymic dying" performance that functions as a rehearsal to secure the nation's Goodness and mystify its violent policies. On the other hand, it is an externalized and "disembodied" image that can circulate independently, though without really ceasing to be a source of life for the bodies who created it, as well as other bodies who embrace it, which is a factor that strengthens its metonymic efficiency. The blood-flag, crucially, is not one particular object with a fixed place, but travels around from the hands of the students to the army members, in the form of an image, words in the news and discussions, in the form of replicas distributed by the newspapers, as well as in its ability to "inspire" other people to generate other acts of bio-images.

Alongside the masks, tattoos and a flag made out of blood as bio-image acts that I discussed here, other examples of bio-images from the contemporary context of Turkey can be enumerated. They range from YouTube clips depicting people drawing Atatürk's image with blood to crescent and moon tongue piercings, and huge Atatürk faces and signatures made out of hundreds of bodies on national holidays. In addition, the national flag made out of raw meat by several butchers in different places can also be considered as another form of bio-image, animating a national symbol not through human but through organic material. Conversely, there are examples of national symbols made out of pastry by patisseries, or of bread by bakers, which can actually be consumed.[68]

With regard to these latter products, it is not far-fetched to say that a significant part of their charm comes from the fact that the symbolically charged national images can be eaten and digested, making them an organic and indistinguishable part of one's body. However, it should be noted that people hesitate to eat such products, as has been reported by their sellers. Although not stated explicitly, this ambivalence can be explored further as related to the implications of digesting these images, which would mean turning them into excrement and expelling them from the body, rendering them no longer visible or intact.

The three different ways that bio-images work, as I observed in the examples of the masks, tattoos and the blood-flag, bring together different aspects of the corporeal production of nationalist image acts. These are, respectively, the generation of a unified outlook in everyday life that extends the surveilling nature of omnipresent images through an act of incorporation that gives birth to surveilling subjects; the political role of the skin as a liminal space where political structures and agency meet and through which social encounters are mediated; and the externalization of body parts in order to vitalize images in a way that perpetuate the premises of nationalism around the notions of death and sacrifice in a metonymic way. People, as active agents in the production of power relations, endow these images with life, which is particularly crucial at times when they seem to be under threat of dying out: they provide a moving body and living eyes for Atatürk's face, a breathing canvas for tattoos, and blood for the flag to come to life. In turn, these images give life to people as political subjects and conveyers of socio-political signifiers. They provide an affective structure through which the body is modified or, as Spinoza put it, "whereby the active power

[68] For a YouTube clip depicting Atatürk being drawn with blood, see: http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lM-cppqgBPA.
For the crescent and moon tongue piercing, see: https://twitter.com/OnurCengiz/status/439837074284240897/photo/1.
For the star and crescent made out of bread, see: http://www.haberler.com/ay-yildiz-simit-haberi/.

of the said body is increased or diminished, aided or constrained" (143). This parallel process highlights the coalescence of the agency of the image and the agency of the subject in constituting an image act endowed with a performative power in shaping what it depicts.

In all three types of bio-images, we can say that the body gains a metonymic role, since its association with a broader signification chain becomes more urgent and tangible through the images that it incorporates by internalizing or externalizing them. The body starts working as a part that refers to a whole, as ultimately epitomizing the body of the nation by representing Atatürk with a masked face, the image of the nation with the tattooed skin, and the bodies of past national heroes and martyrs through making the flag out of blood. These aspects frame the concept of the bio-image by overlapping and complementing each other. They all show in different ways the reviving relationship between imagery and national subjectivity through which the possible interactions of and the blurry area between the body and the image, the personal and the political, tactics and strategies (resonating with what are sometimes called "low" and "high" nationalisms) are explored. The next chapter will move on to a different set of images, which render the nation imaginable and tangible, in the form of apparitions and monuments. I will explore the afterlives of Atatürk as a continuously reanimated national leader whose constantly reproduced image haunts generations and imaginations by oscillating in between absence and presence, life and death, in a ghostly manner.

Chapter 3

"A Specter is Haunting Turkey": Ghostly Images in the National Everyday

The national, as I have also discussed in the previous chapters, is at first an abstract and intangible notion, hard to locate and apprehend. When something is not immediately and entirely discernible and visible, it needs to be imagined, as has been stated innumerous times following Anderson's *Imagined Communities*, in various forms some of which I have explored in the previous chapters. Such scenes of imagination, or "image acts" as I have called them, are vital for the continued existence and performance of the nation. As Marc Redfield argues, one of the goals of nationalism, "particularly of what Anderson calls 'official nationalism,' is to monumentalize such scenes and fence them off. They record, and thus to some extent compensate for, the imagined community's dependence on the unimaginable" (88). In this chapter, I focus on certain images that precisely "monumentalize" and "fence off" the nation to render it imaginable and tangible; taking the form of apparitions and monuments, in an attempt to become the nation's fixed signifiers. The afterlives of Atatürk as a continuously reanimated national leader in contemporary everyday life provides a productive ground to do this, since his constantly reproduced image is designed to "drastically abbreviate the work of memory and imagination" and "conjure up the nation by circumventing the history of its imaging" (Rafael, 610).[69]

The dead constitute one of the most significant sites of contestation and negotiation in politics, as some people never really die in the political realm. Within the context of Turkey, Atatürk is one of these immortal dead; provided with innumerous afterlives in the form of statues, images and even ghostly apparitions, who continues to exist in a liminal space between life and death. Looking at his reanimations provides crucial insights into how a national community is continuously rebuilt in everyday life through a form of "remembering" that consists in "fencing off" the past and the dead. The employment of figures that are no longer alive, but not entirely dead, as vital for the imagination of the nation, can be thought of as analogous to Anderson's theorization, in *Imagined Communities*, of the role of newspapers and clocks in generating a bond between people who do not necessarily know or see each other, but read the same newspaper and live by the same temporal order. As Taussig puts it, "the circulation of spirits of the dead through live human bodies is a movement parallel to the circulation of the ghostly magic of the Nation-State through the body of the society" (139).

[69] Rafael's words refer to the ways in which the image of one of the national heroes of the Philippines, José Rizal, is reproduced to support Philippine nationalism.

Drawing on Weber's writings and concentrating on the United States, Anderson, in "The Goodness of Nations", argues that the "national dead" and the "national unborn" mirror each other and "provide the best sureties of the ineradicable Goodness of the nation". He adds: "It is exactly their combined ghostliness that makes them past-perfect, future-perfect American" (2010: 182). In this chapter, I focus on how the task of the "national dead" and the "national unborn" that secure the "goodness of the nation" in contemporary Turkey is mediated through the image of Atatürk and its specific appearances between presence and absence.

It is important to mention that, in Turkey, there are various national/visual communities that gather around different "national dead" that belong to diverse historical periods and political realms. These posthumous lives sometimes serve similar political purposes; at other times, they clash with each other.[70] The politicians and military heroes of especially the early years of the Turkish Republic (Fevzi Çakmakçı, İsmet İnönü, etc.) accompany Atatürk's animations, mostly in the form of statues. The generic soldier figure, referred to as "Mehmetçik", is another example of an anonymous yet encompassing body that keeps being resurrected to represent the innumerous other soldiers who are not yet dead and the celebrated possibility of their dying.[71] Especially as the imagery and discourses of nationalism bifurcate, and political and cultural conditions shift, the revived dead tend to multiply. This can be seen in the proliferation of images of Ottoman sultans in the last decade with the rise of new forms of nationalism with more Islamic overtones and a new framing of a national past. I should clarify that the body of Atatürk that I focus on here is primarily associated with official Kemalist nationalism and state tradition, but also cuts across other types of contemporary nationalisms. Given Atatürk's long reign as the heroized national leader and founder of the Turkish nation-state, his affiliation with diverse political realms and the various ways in which his image is employed, there is no doubt that his has been the most

[70] On another level, there are the living dead bodies of "others," such as artists who died in exile and who were, later on, turned into more or less accepted, but still ambiguous figures, such as the socialist Kurdish director Yılmaz Güney and the Kurdish singer Ahmet Kaya (both buried in Paris), and the poet Nazım Hikmet (buried in Moscow). In addition, there are countless heroized dead who are not officially recognized and fall outside national imaginations, but who are nevertheless kept alive by smaller communities, such as these belonging to the Kurdish resistant movement or leftist organizations.

[71] The "çik" suffix added at the end of "Mehmet" is a diminutive (literally Little Mehmet), most likely alluding to their infantilized perception in the society as the generic young sons of the country (Mehmet is one of the most generic names in Turkish), to facilitate for people having parental, affectionate and embracing feelings for them.

animated corpse in the history of the Turkish Republic, gaining power not from the fact that everyone agrees upon its meaning, but precisely from the fact that they do not.

Among other images of the nation, Atatürk's image, at the juncture of death and life, has haunted my previous chapters as well, embedded on commodity objects traveling through public and private spaces, evoking strong affects and mediating social relations, as well as animated by living bodies in the form of bio-images such as tattoos and masks. Here, I shift the focus to ghostly appearances and monuments through close readings of Atatürk's annual appearance on a mountain slope as a shadow and a recently erected Atatürk statue. These objects of analysis will allow me to explore other types of image acts crucial in the production of the nation as a spectral structure and, in addition, to look at the notions of ghostliness and monumentality as curiously interconnected.

Firstly, I will give a brief account of the practices, both historical and contemporary, that keep Atatürk oscillating between absence and presence. My first object of analysis will be the yearly "Atatürk apparition", a shadow cast on a mountain slope in the northeast of Turkey in the shape of Atatürk's face, which appears every year at a certain date and is interpreted and celebrated as a visit from Atatürk himself. The affinity of this apparition as a secular ritual with spiritual practices and their affective dimension will allow me to follow Yael Navaro-Yashin's argument, in her book *The Faces of the State*, that the terms "belief", "magic", and "mysticism" have strong explanatory value in studying secularist cultures in Turkey (190). In addition, the Atatürk apparition provides an almost too literal, but nevertheless symptomatic example of the spectral quality national image acts might take on in everyday life. This is best exemplified by the way Atatürk's image exists in between past, present and future, as well as between absence and presence, as a "non-present present" or "being-there of an absent" (Derrida 5). Jacques Derrida's notion of spectrality will shed light on the liminal quality of Atatürk's image, however, as opposed to Derrida's invitation to learn how to live *with* ghosts, Esther Peeren and María del Pilar Blanco's concern to explore "how we live with [them] already" will help me to expose the longstanding haunted character of the Turkish nation-state (15). In addition, Avery Gordon's emphasis on the demanding presence of the ghost will contribute to my framing of the Atatürk apparition as assertive.

The notion of spectrality will also inform the analysis of my second object, which is a recently erected 42-meter-high Atatürk monument, carved into a mountain in Izmir in 2009, reminiscent of the statue on Rushmore Mountain in the US. This monument enjoyed the status of being the biggest one in Turkey until an even bigger one was erected in 2012 in Artvin. Looking at an ephemeral image like the Atatürk apparition as a monument and at a

monument like the giant Atatürk bust as a ghostly entity blurs the association of the first with ephemerality and of the latter with durability. This unexpected but productive transitivity between ghostliness and monumentality reveals the ways in which haunting images are constitutive of the everyday and, ironically, crucial in turning the nation from an abstract entity into something tangible. In addition, it exposes the changing forms of haunting in contemporary times, which engender more popular, affective and "naturalized" ghosts.

The statue also exemplifies how Atatürk's continuous presence is naturalized through monuments that are becoming bigger and bigger, alongside the smaller and portable objects that I looked at in the previous chapters. As such, it evokes a novel visual strategy that I identify in contemporary Turkey: the "magnification" of nationalist images, contrasting with and complementing Özyürek's analysis of the "miniaturization" of nationalist imagery (2004), which I discussed in the first chapter. I will also examine how magnification paradoxically renders the statue more fragile in this case by focusing on the tactics people come up with in its employment. These tactics are not mapped out by monumental strategies, but carve out unexpected spaces in the city, revealing the possibility of poking holes in the scopic and spatial regime of nationalism. Andreas Huyssen's theorization of monuments, Meltem Ahıska's analysis of the role of monuments in Turkey, and Pheng Cheah's notions of spectral nationality will inform my analysis and provide different entry points into these images as spectral phenomena that always partially fail in their attempts to incarnate the dead and materialize the nation.

Reanimating the Dead

Katherine Verdery's *Political Lives of Dead Bodies* (1999), an insightful book on the life of monuments, focuses on the ex-Soviet Bloc countries and investigates the reasons for the appeal of using corpses in politics, especially in moments of major transformation. She contends that corpses lend themselves particularly well to politics in times of major upheavals, in her case the post-socialist period. The reason for this is that they do not talk while still indicating a capacity to talk that makes it possible to put words in their mouths. Thus, it is "easier to rewrite history with dead people than with other kinds of symbols that are speechless" (29). Verdery adds that the loaded history of these symbols further enhances their potential as resources for creating meaning and their legitimacy in moments of political contention. However, it seems that the employment of "bronze beings" in politics, but also marble, stone, and play of light (as in the case of the Atatürk shadow), is neither specific to

the post-socialist period, nor to times of major upheaval. The diverse practices and rituals around the Atatürk figure reveal that re-animation has been in fact a constitutive element of the national everyday in Turkey, although its form has changed through different periods.

It is worth mentioning that Atatürk initiated the making of his own statues while he was still alive, but hardly ever attended the revelation ceremonies of these statues (Tekiner, 2010). Tekiner, in her work on Atatürk sculptures, states that Atatürk's decision to not attend the ceremonies might be related to his wish to make people believe that these were independent attempts at erecting statues, rather than his own initiations. However, he might also have been aware of the way the power of the dead exceeds that of the living and therefore may have chosen to give more room for his animation by withdrawing his real body from the scene. Although Atatürk uttered the sentence, "to expect help from the dead is a disgrace for a civilized society" in his speeches, referring to the veneration of sheiks and dervishes, his eagerness to replicate himself nevertheless shows that he actively attempted to take the place of the powerful dead of the past.[72] Perhaps for this reason he allowed his two- and three-dimensional representations to overshadow his own person as a strategy to amplify the "reality effect" of the image and the stone. This, in a way, would turn his absence into an element that strengthened his presence, resonating with Navaro-Yashin's words with regard to Atatürk statues, "with the aura that is ascribed to them in the political culture, they have the capacity to move people's innermost senses of personal identification" (198).

The process the anthropologist Taussig describes, in a different context, as the continuous passing away of the body of the Liberator (Bolivar of Venezuela), through everyday rituals, into the body of the Venezuelan people, is similar to the one of the ways in which Atatürk's image functions in the Turkish case. Taussig, exploring the link between rituals of spirit possession and the workings of the modern nation-state, argues that the passing away of one foundational body into that of the people depends on "a capacity not merely to continuously resurrect his image, but to be possessed by his spirit by virtue of that image" (102). The prevalence of the image of the leader constitutes the most striking example of "the genius of this popular culture to have seized on this image to drive home the power of a specific presence within dissolution" (102). The "specific presence within dissolution" does not only illuminate the liminal quality of Atatürk's image between presence and absence, but also its contemporary vulnerability in the changing political

[72] The sentence can be found in *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri* (Atatürk's Speeches and Declarations), 2006.

context, which the various rituals pushing his image forward as a way to "be possessed by his spirit" seek to circumvent.

Following James Elroy's point about dead people belonging to "the live people who claim them most obsessively", the graveyard seems to be just the beginning of a new life and a space of ritual (qtd in Verdery, 23). Atatürk's monumental mausoleum in Ankara, where his corpse lies, is a great example of this, since it is one of the most officially sacred sites in Turkey.[73] The mausoleum is visited regularly by both officials and civilians, especially on every 10th of November (the anniversary of Atatürk's death), to perform multiple rituals.[74] People put flowers and stand silent for one minute in the morning at the hour of his death. Alongside these common acts of commemoration, what is striking is the existence of practices that show how Atatürk is still treated as alive rather than as a dead body. Some people make a secular pilgrimage by visiting his mausoleum, write him personal notes in the official diary and complain to him about the current state of affairs by making speeches directly addressing him.

These animating acts do not only take place close to Atatürk's preserved body in the mausoleum. Stone can be as vivid as a preserved body, as can be observed in rituals such as Atatürk's bust being put on a ship and being symbolically landed during the commemoration of the day he stepped ashore in Samsun, which is considered to mark the beginning of the Turkish War of Independence (1919). In addition, during the celebrations of the liberation days of certain cities, an Atatürk bust has been placed on a military truck, which then enters the city for people to greet it/him. These instances show how blurred the boundary is between the actual body of the dead leader and its reproductions in other materials; to use Verdery's words, the thin line "separating bronze from bone" (12). One of the mottos of Turkish nationalism, found as a text hung on walls, in school textbooks, or in children's songs repeated in schools, provides a good summary of these animation practices: "Atatürk is not dead, he lives in our hearts". Yet, while this expression refers to his aliveness, another one,

[73] Navaro-Yashin describes the architectural and ritualistic significance of Atatürk's mausoleum as follows: "A massive neoclassical structure, somewhat resembling the Acropolis in Athens, it was erected on the topmost hill of Ankara. Visits to the mausoleum took on a ritualistic protocol; people would have to descend from their vehicles and walk toward the monument in silence and respect. Anıtkabir had been built in a site that was visible from all points in Ankara, a city founded by Atatürk to set Turkey's course in a direction that countered that of the Ottoman place in Istanbul" (191-192).

[74] Navaro Yashin argues that although the practice of visiting Atatürk's mausoleum had been institutionalized since 1953, it was reinvigorated in public life during the 1990s (191). It is possible to see its rising prominence in the anti-AKP campaigns of the 2000s, to the extent that the visit was officially made obligatory by certain institutions for their employees, and at times, non-officially enforced.

"my Atatürk, you stand up (from your grave), I shall replace you", contrastingly refers to his dead state and implies the possibility of his resurrection.

I argue that Atatürk's continuous dying is as important as his continued aliveness. After all, he needs to die over and over again to be reanimated. The rituals performed on his death's anniversary every year all over the country underscore the vitality of his death and of its experience by the public as if it is happening "right now". These rituals consist of dramatic visual elements, ranging from spectacular and institutional ceremonies to media images of the narrowest and widest streets coming to a standstill during the one minute silence and of people getting out of their cars on Atatürk Bridge to stand in silent homage. The details, such as the well-known image of his deathbed and the precision in marking the exact time he died with a siren sound heard from everywhere, all amplify the work of mourning and situate the death in the present. The sadness and loneliness that dominate Turkish society that day, with half-mast flags everywhere, is reminiscent of Robert Pogue Harrison's remark in his book *The Dominion of the Dead* on the importance of the dead for the survival of the living: "left to ourselves, we are all bastards" (5). There is no better way to show that Atatürk continuously dies than the various incidents in which his statues, which had to be removed for different reasons, had to be buried, since it was decided that demolishing them would be disrespectful (Tekiner, 2010). Another striking example of the way the act of mourning is triggered every year anew is the contemporary practice of uploading videos on YouTube showing children crying after learning that Atatürk is not alive.[75] One can watch uncomfortably how some of these children are provoked by their parents, who tell them over and over again, in stunningly dramatic ways, that Atatürk is dead.[76]

This continuous loop of life and death, dying and being reanimated, is embedded in nationalism's general logic and its attempt to engender a national bonding. These diverse practices and rituals show that this loop has been a constitutive element of the national everyday in Turkey, although its form changes in different periods. I have already mentioned B. Anderson's emphasis on the "ghostly" combination of the national dead and the national unborn, of past and future generations, in stabilizing "the goodness of the nation" (2010:

[75] I witnessed two instances of elementary school students (between the ages of 7 and 12) realizing that Atatürk did not die on the day of commemoration but was already dead. One of them was genuinely struck and the other could hardly stop crying.
For one of the most popular YouTube videos of crying children on the anniversary of Atatürk's death, see: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=J5556FD9njA.

[76] This is also a striking example to show the ways in which the performance of mourning changes by acquiring different characteristics with the use of different media such as the social media on the Internet in this case.

182). In a similar vein, Cheah states that nationalism is one of the phenomena we associate with death most closely, an association that is inseparable from nationalism's desire for life. In Cheah's words, the nation is "regarded as the enduring medium or substrate through which individuals are guaranteed a certain life beyond finite or merely biological life, and, hence, also beyond mortality and death" (225). However, the premise of maximizing life can be said to serve to mystify the death of certain people and justify the death of others, perpetuating the power relations nationalism is founded on. Ahıska expresses this as the state enacting "the capacity (and delegate[ing] the capacity) to destroy particular forms of life through social processes either before or beyond the law, thus transforming death into a mystical and mysterious source of life for the continuity of power" (35). The interplay between death and life in the construction of the nation, which, in the Turkish context, is perfectly embodied by the image of Atatürk, makes the notion of the ghost, which is more ambivalent than simply a figure associated with fear and shock, a productive tool to examine the "haunting" quality of the different appearances of this image across periods and generations.

A "Natural Miracle": The Atatürk Apparition



Figure 17: Atatürk apparition in Ardahan

The appearance of the image of Atatürk, as one of the most recurrent signs that serves to "monumentalize" and "fence off" the nation, ranges from the banal forms of nationalism to rather rare and idiosyncratic rituals. The materials that are given life in the practice of reanimating Atatürk are quite diverse, including commodity objects made out of plastic, glass, ceramics or gold, the skins that carry Atatürk tattoos and the stones that his monuments are made of. Yet, at times, less substantial materials, such as the sunlight, are also thought to reproduce this image, as in the case of the Atatürk apparition on a mountain slope in Ardahan (Figure 17).[77] Although the functions of these different image acts overlap substantially, their divergent forms deserve to be analyzed in their specificity. After giving an account of the Ardahan apparition's emergence and reception, I will explore what it does as an image act and its specific theoretical and political implications with regard to the contemporary image politics of Turkish nationalism.

Every year in July in Turkey, an unusual event is celebrated in Damal, a town of the city of Ardahan, in the northeast of Turkey, close to the border with Georgia. The reason for the celebration is none other than the Atatürk silhouette that ostensibly appears, in the form of a shadow, on a mountain slope. As the story goes, Atatürk's silhouette was first recognized in 1954 by a shepherd and then photographed in 1975 by a journalist who sent the picture to the General Staff.[78] However, the solstice started to be celebrated under the name of the "Damal Festival in Atatürk's Path and Shadow" only in 1995. Ever since, the annual appearance of Atatürk's shadow has overshadowed other features that the city was known for, such as its old cheese, highest plateau, hand-made dolls, and extreme cold and snow, instead highlighting the city's strong Republican and Atatürkist stance.[79]

[77] http://www.ardahan.gov.tr/default_B1.aspx?content=1062.

[78] This is the widely accepted account of the history of the apparition: http://www.ftnnews.com/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=2232.

[79] The Kemalist nationalist CHP (Republican People's Party) received 80% of the votes in the 2011 general parliamentary elections in Ardahan. However, in the 2014 local elections, AKP won 34% of the votes.

Figure 18: Still from "Damal Festival in Atatürk's Path and Shadow".

Atatürk "appears" every year in mid-June and can be seen for almost a month, within which timeframe the Damal festival is also organized.[80] Atatürk's silhouette is visible after six o'clock in the evening for about twenty minutes on the Karadağ Mountain crest. A large yearly budget is saved for the festival and plans have been made to build tourist facilities in order to help develop the city's tourism. The rituals around the shadow are highly reminiscent of the celebrations of national holidays: various military officers and government representatives visit the region to celebrate the coming of Atatürk; people gather on the plateau and applaud enthusiastically when the silhouette appears; they read the national anthem and raise the Turkish flag (Figure 18).[81] The activities continue throughout the days: visitors read poems, make speeches, put on folk costumes, have picnics and take pictures and make videos in front of the shadow. The animals and shepherds of the region stroll around, adding an idyllic element to the event. People upload videos on YouTube shot with amateur cameras, reporting the activities during the festival. The following report from a newspaper reflects the spirit of the festival and the language used in its descriptions:

[80] Some sources claim that the festival lasts for a week, others for a full month.
[81] http://www.timesturkiye.com/gundem/haber/4779/ataturk-silueti-ortaya-cikti.html

> The Atatürk silhouette once again showed itself on the outskirts of Damal. Visitors who came to see this magnificent silhouette could not hide their awe in the face of this natural event. The locals have celebrated it by playing drums and zurna [a Turkish flute]. Visitors have danced "halay", and children have chanted, "Turkey is secular, and it will remain secular".[82]

The apparition is often referred to, in the videos and in news items such as the one above, as a "natural event" or, in a few cases, a "natural miracle". This is a notable semantic coupling that gives a natural touch to the "miracle" and a miraculous touch to nature.[83] It simultaneously "miraculizes" and "naturalizes" the image, which shows the importance of the specific spatiality of the apparition, as it literally inscribes Atatürk on the Turkish land, making his rule and legacy seem natural. In addition, its description as a miracle frames the gaze of the national leader over society as a miracle that happens by itself, rather than as a historical and cultural phenomenon.[84]

It is worth citing some of the events and stories surrounding the apparition in order to show the ways in which Atatürk's image is again treated as alive, yet still different from any living being, assigning it a more liminal and ambivalent status. In 2003, during the appearance, a herd of sheep passed over the hill, causing a series of indignant reactions. A furious CHP (Republican People's Party) representative announced that "it is impudence to graze on this hill and it is treachery to let this happen". He also said that the miracle might disappear at any time if necessary measures were not taken. He gave the right of initiative for legislation for the region, which is in fact under protection against possible flood and erosion, to become a national park.[85] Alongside the angry official announcements accusing the shepherd of being a "traitor, collaborator, supporter of Soros and Fethullah, a backward woman", people also expressed their fear of the miracle disappearing due to a change of angle in the earth's turning axis.[86]

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[82] Mustafa Akyol, *Hürriyet Daily News*, 26 June 2008.

[83] http://video.milliyet.com.tr/video-izle/Karadag-sirtinda-Atatürk-silueti-3i2NuletaefR.html.

[84] This process is similar to the one I will discuss in the next chapter in relation to the movie Mustafa, in which the images of Atatürk are juxtaposed with spectacular images of nature, creating a parallelism that gives a miraculous quality to Atatürk's life while simultaneously naturalizing it.

[85] http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=13&ArsivAnaID=14577.
http://www.savaskarsitlari.org/arsiv.asp?ArsivTipID=13&ArsivAnaID=14577.

[86] George Soros is a Hungarian-American businessman, chairman of Soros Fund Management, which funds NGOs and mostly liberal and progressive causes. In Turkey, he is associated with liberal-leftist circles by nationalist discourses and his name is used to claim someone has "imperialistic" connections. Another name invoked in the accusation, Fethullah Gülen, is the founder of the Gülen

In 2010, during the 15th Damal Festival, the apparition was late by two weeks. People who had gathered to wait for Atatürk with concerts and other festivities were disappointed due to the rain and fog, which prevented the "natural miracle" from happening. Many people interpreted this as a result of Atatürk being angry at the current situation in Turkey. The Turkish soldiers "killed by the Kurds" and the threats of Islam, alongside other political issues on the agenda, were put forward as reasons for the shadow's non-appearance.[87] In 2011, the shadow was late again, which was then attributed to the conflict between the parties in the Turkish parliament, more specifically CHP and BDP refusing to recognize the 2011 elections results since some of the elected parliamentarians had been imprisoned. The invocation of these issues as reasons for the non-apparition can be related to Verdery's remark on the advantages of using dead bodies, into whose mouths words can be put, in politics. However, in the Turkish context, this form of instrumentalization does not seem to exclude the perception of Atatürk as still able to follow and comment on the current situation, in the present time, just like a living being, though a fragile one in need of protection, since he can disappear at any time due to physical or political reasons. Thus, Verdery's focus on the pragmatic instrumentalization of dead bodies should be complemented by acknowledging the spiritual dynamics of the rituals involved.

It is in fact hard to miss the Atatürk apparition's affinity with the realm of religion and the lineage of ghostly appearances of religious and spiritual figures in the unexpected places and moments of everyday life, beyond the complete control of the living, but still in need of their protection. In South America, the Virgin Mary is frequently thought to appear on objects as various as grilled sandwiches, trees, shop windows, and utensils. Jesus Christ, in some parts of the world, is considered another fairly regular visitor to the mundane world. His image has been said to have appeared on clouds, shadows, stones, cooking equipment and tortillas, to name just a few. These apparitions rapidly make their way into the media and, especially in contemporary times, become Internet phenomena and are at times sold on

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movement, which attempts to "modernize" Islam by spreading it in close connection with Turkish and American business elites. Gülen's collaboration with the AKP government ended due to major differences in their economic and political interests in 2013. Similar to the criticisms the movie *Mustafa* received, as I will analyze in the next chapter, this sentence is yet another example of the mixture of "others" used in nationalist discourses, tied to each other and presented in a package: "the leftist" (traitor, collaborator), "the liberal" (Soros), "the religious" (Fethullah Gülen), and "the woman" (backward woman).

The original in Turkish can be found here: http://www.anatolianrock.com/topic-ardahan 8217_in_damal_ilcesinde__nbsp_ata_turizmi__-40-96808-1.htm.

[87] An example of this discourse can be found in the news article entitled "How could he appear?": http://www.mevzuvatan.com/haber/4174-nasil-gorunsun-ki.html.

auction sites. Alternatively, they become popular sites of visit, as in the case of the "monkey tree phenomenon" in Singapore in 2007.[88]

The word "Allah" in Arabic is also a frequently sighted apparition; reported to be seen in the middle of a watermelon, a tomato or chocolate cake, on fishes, fruits, plants and animal furs, and heard in animal shouts.[89] In Turkey, there are other incidents in which Atatürk supposedly appeared in different cities such as Çanakkale, Antalya and Izmir. The image of a cloud that looked like Atatürk is among the most famous and is now exhibited at the Atatürk museum in Istanbul. The apparition of Atatürk on the mountainside in Damal can be related to this lineage of appearances, which are geographically diverse, but affectively and aesthetically comparable. They appear on manmade or natural things and are all resemblances that alert the living by coming from somewhere else unexpectedly and creating awe, shock, fear or admiration as a result of a collective interpretation and meaning-giving process, determined by a particular cultural (or religious) history in a particular context.

The Atatürk apparition can also be affiliated with ancient European divination practices, which are based on interpreting shadows cast by objects, or its modern transformation, fortune telling. It may be seen as an instance of a collective hallucination, a *pareidolia*, the act of seeing a random image or hearing a random sound as significant (the term originates from Greek, *para-*, meaning "beside" or "false" and *eidolon*, meaning "image"). The appearance, as well as the non-appearance in 2010 and 2011, is seen as a visual sign that carries additional meanings to be divined by the people. In this sense, the mountain is like a huge coffee cup used for fortune telling, or a gigantic Rorschach test card, interpreted collectively.[90] Through the Atatürk shadow, the current political situation is read and future visions are declared, as can be seen in the shouted slogan "Turkey will remain secular!" This shows the paradox of building a national identity with a secular overtone on

[88] Crowds visited the tree callus, which looked like a monkey (some saw two), believing that the images were a manifestation of either a deity from Chinese mythology or the monkey deity in the Hindu pantheon. They brought gifts such as bananas and peanuts, and prayed in the hope that the apparition would bring them luck.

[89] For a recent example from Turkey of the word Allah seen in a chocolate cake, see: http://www.ilgazetesi.com.tr/2010/12/29/kek'in-icinden-allah-yazisi-cikti/064860/.

[90] Navaro-Yashin recounts another striking practice in which a coffee cup is literally used to communicate with Atatürk: "Spirit calling is very popular; especially in urban places, and is undertaken by saying Kuranic prayers over a reversed Turkish coffee cup placed in the middle of a circle of Turkish-alphabet letters written in Latin script. Those who call upon spirits, sometimes with the help of a medium, recount the coded responses of the spirits through the movement of the coffee cup among the letters of the alphabet. It is interesting that, as common as it is to call upon spirits in urban Turkey, so is it not unusual to supplicate the spirit of Atatürk. And, invariably it is reported that Atatürk responds with only one sentence, spelling the letters of 'Don't disturb me' *(Beni rahatsiz etmeyin)* with the coffee cup" (194).

the basis of an incident perceived as miraculous, supporting Murat Belge's argument that the ideology that has formed alongside the Republic was in fact not a secular alternative and never has been (15).

The affinity between the Atatürk apparition and predominantly religious and spiritual incidents reveals that the strategies used to reproduce "secular nationalism" are not far from those used by what it opposes, which is clearly manifested in the realm of image acts. This confirms Navaro-Yashin's research on the prevalence of magic and mysticism in the formation of contemporary secularist cultures in Turkey (2002). Departing from the anthropological notions such as "secular ritual", "civic religion," or "secular theodicy" to refer to the religiosity of the state practices, Navaro-Yashin challenges the opposition between mysticism and nationality that is taken for granted in the literature on secularism (188-189).[91] She argues that in the historical context of Turkey, "secularism has been manifest not only in the rational and ordered terms of an analytically reified modernity, but also in the medium of excessive expression, mystical, ritualesque, and religious" (203). Similarly, Ahıska points to the seemingly paradoxical continuity between religious traditions and modern nation states by stating that "the forbidden idol in religious tradition as the *fabricated god* can gain a legitimate ground, with modern states opting for the position of the fabricated god" (12). Although they are significantly different structures, the comparison allows us to say that the fabricated quality of the depiction, which is precisely the problem in Islam since god's image may not be reproduced by earthlings, is justified within the fabricated (imaginary) context of the modern nation-state.

As Taussig also suggests, in modernity, god "has neither ceased to exist, nor continues to exist as God, but instead exists as Dead God equipped therefore with powers far surpassing Live God" (149). Ahıska's "fabricated god" and Taussig's "Dead God" are compatible in the sense that they both belong to the nation-state and signal a specific form of justification of the power relations in the nation-state, "especially by means of the theatrics of the stately everyday" (Taussig 149). The word "theatrics" is not accidental here but suggests that the fabrication aspect is justified in the imagined national community by means of performative daily rituals such as the Atatürk apparition. When Taussig talks about the vitality of magic rituals for the presence of the nation-state, in his own poetic style, he could be talking about

[91] Navaro-Yashin formulates one of her general aims of her book as answering the ethnographic call "for a deconstruction of the categories 'secularity' and 'religion,' so pitted against one another in both public political discourses and social scientific analyses" (190).

the Atatürk apparition: "a crucial quality of being is granted the state of the whole by virtue of death, casting an aura of magic over the mountain at its center" (4).

Sociologist Esra Özyürek, one of the few people who have written about the Atatürk apparition, draws our attention to another aspect of the event by emphasizing that the silhouette appears in an Alevi town; consequently, she interprets the festival as an Alevi dedication to Atatürk in the hope of bringing cash to town (2004).[92] This aspect cannot be ignored, since embracing the unusual, with or without belief, might bring commercial opportunities, politicians and tourists to town, as well as cultural and political recognition. Therefore, seeing this phenomenon merely as a divination practice, a *pareidolia*, or a collective hallucination would put it in a rather narrow framework, neglecting the potential presence of cynicism, pretension or opportunism, related to economic concerns, political interests, or societal peer pressure. Thus, it is not possible, neither necessary to detect people's intentions and "real" beliefs about whether they think it is really Atatürk's spirit who comes or whether they simply see the shadow as yielding potential economic or political benefits. What is more important is to acknowledge the possibility that these two positions, cynicism and belief, in fact, might not exclude each other, and that a ritual like the apparition allows the blurring of the boundaries between them.

The inclusivity of these positions can be better understood if the apparition is thought of as a ghost, defined by Derrida as "something that one does not know, precisely, and one does not know if precisely it is, if it exists, if it responds to a name and corresponds to an essence" (Exordium 17). Hence, in order to continue analyzing how the shadow keeps blurring these distinctions and what it does instead of what it really is for people, I will bring in the notion of ghost in the next section. This will expose the function of the set of traditions, discourses, and cultural performances that are symptomatic of everyday life in the Turkish nation-state and make the shadow into Atatürk, as well as being reproduced and performed by it. The cultural baggage that is evoked and perhaps becomes heavier with Atatürk's every visit can be better identified by focusing on him as a ghost, a regular visitor in everyday life, existing between presence and absence, as well as between past, present and future.

[92] The Alevis are a religious group, deviating from the Sunni tradition of Islam, with specific religious tenets and cultural habits of the Shia tradition of Islam.

Ghostly Images

The definition of "ghost" in the Oxford English Dictionary is "an apparition of a dead person which is believed to appear or become manifest to the living, typically as a nebulous image".[93] Derrida's understanding of the ghost in *Specters of Marx* points at the ambivalences and broader implications of the concept. For Derrida, the ghost is "neither substance, nor essence, nor existence, *is never present as such*" (Exordium 17). Although Derrida's context of dealing with spectrality with regard to the future of Marxism is significantly different, his conceptualization of ghost helps identifying certain characteristics pertaining the ghostly nature of a national leader, who is, as I argued, in a chronic loop of dying and being reanimated. The ghostlinesss of the image of Atatürk can be thought precisely in relation to the liminal position Derrida attributes to the ghost as a "non-object" "non-present present", "being-there of an absent" (5). Atatürk comes from the past and appears in the present, dying and being reanimated according to the needs of the specific historical period and political climate as I explored in the first section. In addition, he is perceived as able to affect the future. In that sense, Derrida's emphasis on the ghost's being in-between presence and absence, travelling in various temporalities, and having no fixed essence makes the ghost a helpful conceptual tool to understand how the image of Atatürk functions in general, including and beyond the specific Damal apparition.

Obviously, the Damal appearance is specific, no other figure but Atatürk will appear each time, and it is determined by the time of the year, by the angle of the sunlight on the surface of the mountain. In this sense, the waiting for the Atatürk image is perhaps more akin to messianism, from which Derrida specifically distinguishes his theory, since this is a type of waiting while knowing what will appear. As opposed to Derrida's emphasis on waiting for and opening up to the unexpected, in this case, people attend the festival and expect the apparition to appear as scheduled. Although the apparition, like Derrida's specter, sometimes does not accommodate this expectation, as the two years in row in which it did not appear, it mostly comes as expected. However, the determinedness of its character and its locality does not prevent it from being a haunting ghost in-between presence and absence, bringing together different temporalities. As Derrida argues the spectral look may operate beyond a single generation, as with family ghosts whose hauntings persist over centuries. Therefore, "being-with specters would also be, not only but also, a politics of memory, of inheritance,

[93] http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/ghost?q=ghost.

and of generations" (Derrida 18). This is crucial for the Atatürk ghost, which goes beyond a specific time and space, inhabiting memories and perceptions over generations. Atatürk's ghost guarantees a form of immortality for the nation and eternity for its values since ghosts never die, but only sometimes "abandon" as in the case of the Damal non-apparitions.

Thus, the determinedness of the locality of this apparition does not restrain it from having a haunting quality, not only because it travels around in various media visually and orally, but also because it in fact gains its meaning from all the other Atatürk "apparitions" that pop up in the Turkish national context. It seems that Atatürk is haunting through his different images in different localities, which all appear in more or less expected places. One expects to see Atatürk when entering a schoolyard, a state office, an institution, souvenir shops, or in their encounters with other citizens who carry him on their clothes, accessories and bodies. The fact that he appears in diverse localities, in a repetitive manner, makes the image pervasive, which gives it its haunting quality, looking at people, whether he is seen to do so or not. Thus, the implication of the shadow is not that he is only there during the festival, but that he is always there, albeit not always visibly so. Thus, Atatürk's body may reside in his mausoleum, yet his status as a leader has no singular body anymore. In Derrida's words, "the body is with the King, but the King is without a body" (8). In other words, Atatürk's real body might be residing in his mausoleum, yet his "kingness", which can be translated into the Turkish context as his status as a national foundational myth and leader, does not require a single body, since he appears in different places and in different forms, haunting the country continuously.[94]

Although while Derrida's understanding of ghost sheds light on Atatürk's liminality between absence and presence, travelling in different temporalities across generations, as opposed to Derrida's call "to learn to live with ghosts, in the upkeep, the conversation, the company, or the companionship", this example requires acknowledging how we live with certain ghosts already and the possibilities that might be opened up once the shadow the

[94] Yet, Atatürk does not haunt Turkish society in every period in the same way. As I have argued in my previous chapters, in the 1990s and even more so in the 2000s, Atatürk's image started to be employed in different realms, closer to popular culture and on a more daily, ritualistic base. It is no coincidence that the Damal festival only became a celebrated phenomenon in the post-1995 period. In Derrida's words: "every period has its ghosts (and we have ours), its own experience, its own medium, and its proper hauntological media" (241). Thus, on the one hand, the apparition in Damal exemplifies some of the new mechanisms in the contemporary image politics of nationalism, namely the integration of these images into everyday life by people in more ritualized, naturalized, and affective ways. On the other hand, it is an instance of a wider history of Atatürk haunting Turkish society, an explicit and tangible example of Atatürk's continuous gaze over the people since the foundation of the nation-state.

ghosts cast is dispersed (18). Hence, understanding Atatürk as a ghost in the national everyday, less as an interruption whose potentiality we should be open to, but more as a restrictive haunting, diverts from the Derridean model of the ghost and entails an approach more akin to Avery Gordon's perspective in *Ghostly Matters*. Gordon suggests that the ghost is less about invisibility and "the unknown or the constitutively unknowable" than about *presence* (2). It "has a real presence and demands its due, demands your attention" (2). Atatürk as a ghost, as well, does not indicate a rupture, as does Derrida's ghost, but has a continuous and demanding presence in everyday life. Thus, theorizing Atatürk as a ghost reveals how it is already *present* in the everyday life of the nation-state and how it constantly asks for attention, makes demands and in a way "ghostifies" others who are not included in the exclusively defined ethnic and cultural codes of national identity, a notion to which I will come back later. It shows the intermingling of the national and the spectral with its mystifying, "ghostifying", and limiting effects.

Gordon states that "haunting is one way in which abusive systems of power make themselves known and their impacts felt in everyday life, especially when they are supposedly over and done with (…) or when their oppressive nature is continuously denied" (2). The survival strategies that nationalist practices come up with during what I called the dual process of the crisis and rise of Kemalist nationalism in the 2000s of Turkey fit perfectly in this formulation. The appearance of the images that were already there is highlighted in particular and more ritualistic ways in the period of crisis, such as the shadow on the mountain, due to the perceived threats that nationalism and its iconic images are faced with, representing both their continuous power and fragility. However, the apparition shows that what is at stake is not merely a top-to-bottom process of systems of power imposing their ghosts on people, but also of people coming up with rituals to perpetuate these systems due to the sense of belonging they offer and the insecurity stemming from the fear of losing them.

María del Pilar Blanco and Esther Peeren's work on spectrality also provides a valuable insight into the existence of different forms of ghostliness in everyday life. Their conceptualization of the ghost helps to see how Atatürk's ghost functions not necessarily as an interruption in the everyday, but rather as an aspect of it that is always already there, as a constitutive element. The everyday is "no longer strictly opposed to the supernatural realm of the ghost or simply disturbed by it on specific occasions, but fundamentally intertwined with the ghostly" (Blanco and Peeren 14). By placing ghosts in the everyday and the everyday in the ghostly, not as a disruption but as an intermingling, Peeren's contribution to *Popular Ghosts* suggests that the aim of everyday life studies should not only be to theorize "how to

make normally unnoticed and trivialized aspects of existence visible, but also how aspects that from one perspective appear extra-ordinary or even excluded from reality altogether may from a different perspective be all there is to the everyday" (112). This attempt becomes even more urgent in the context of the national everyday, which is not only determined by the "ordinariness of the state", but more so by its "mysterious spell" (Ahıska 10). The ghostly Atatürk apparition sheds light precisely on the ways in which this mysterious spell is cast through the acts of images and reproduced by the people who form a community around it by acting upon images.

Yet, the national ghost of Atatürk is not as new as the popular ghosts explored by Blanco and Peeren. As I have argued, his intertwinement with everyday life is almost a prerequisite for the existence of the nation-state, its modern metaphysics, which necessitates the constant imagination of the nation under the shadow cast by its haunting images. However, the forms that I explore here resonate with Blanco and Peeren's point about ghosts becoming more "popular", more integrated in the realms of popular culture and everyday life, operating in more naturalized and affective ways. The embeddedness of the Atatürk ghost in nature, its dependence on the mountain, the sun and the weather conditions, strengthens the impression that it is part of the natural flow of things. In a way, it tries to be normal, in line with what Blanco and Peeren note with regard to contemporary ghosts: "Whereas it used to be common to find ghosts trying to drag the living out of the everyday into a world of horrors on 'the other side,' what contemporary ghosts want more than anything, it seems, is to be normal" (14).

One of the ways in which Atatürk's ghost becomes normal, as well as more popular, is through its capacity to be part of rituals that address a mixture of affects. Seeing the one who haunts might surprise, fascinate, scare, entertain or evoke pride all at the same time. Although awaited, the apparition is nevertheless surprising, as can be seen in the sentence from the news item that I cited before: "Visitors who came to see this magnificent silhouette could not hide their awe in the face of this natural event". It is fascinating due to being perceived as a miracle. It might carry an element of fear, since it is a shadow watching over people, even "without being seen", creating what Derrida calls a "visor effect" (6). In addition, it is certainly entertaining, as can be seen from the proudly presented activities in the festival. Yet, it might also evoke anger on the part of those who feel threatened by the haunting gaze of Atatürk, perhaps including people in the neighboring Kurdish villages. Thus, what unfolds between Atatürk's ghost and those who apprehend it is a social interaction generating a variety of affects.

Here, it bears repeating Sara Ahmed's conceptualization of emotions as not circulating by themselves, but sticking to objects of emotion, which circulate instead and shape "the materialization of collective bodies, for example the 'body of the nation'" (2004b: 121). Emotions move through the circulation of these objects, which "become sticky, or saturated with affect, as sites of personal and social tension" (2004a: 11). In this sense, the apparition is a sticky image that is loaded with a mixture of affects; the more it circulates, in the form of the media images, videos and the narratives it generates in popular culture, the more affective it becomes. Its explicitly ghostly quality not only allows seeing the haunting nature of other Atatürk images in circulation, but also endows them with more ghostly, miraculous and affective qualities. Different images gain power from each other in performing and shaping a supposed national identity, showing how "the living body of the nation" is formed to a large extent through haunting images. This can be connected to the need for the nation as an "enduring medium or substrate through which individuals are guaranteed a certain life beyond finite or merely biological life, and, hence, also beyond mortality and death" (Cheah 225). In this sense, the apparition, as symptomatic of this role of spectrality in nationalism, reveals the spectral quality of other images too, including the giant Atatürk monument that I will look at in the next section, which is interestingly called "Atatürk mountain" at times and which at first seems far too tangible to be ghostly. As opposed to the apparition on the mountainside, the Atatürk monument is solid and stable, yet it in fact does possess ghostly and "ghostifying" characteristics, allowing me to carry the discussion of the relationship between ghostliness, monuments and the national everyday further.

The "Magnified" Atatürk Monument



Figure 19: Atatürk statue in Izmir, Buca.

The Atatürk monument in Izmir (Figure 19) was completed in 2009 by the sculptor Harun Atalayman, who carved Atatürk's face on a mountain slope in a rather similar style to the statue on Rushmore Mountain in the US.[95] The reason I find this example productive is threefold. First of all, it sheds light on the history of monumentality in Turkey by being a continuation of this strong tradition, while at the same time allowing me to identify a novel visual strategy that I will call "magnification". Secondly, it provides a suitable ground for exploring the notion of ghostliness in relation to monuments. Thirdly, the particular tactics developed by the people living around this monument show the ways in which people may intervene in the space of the monument and, so to speak, come to haunt the haunting. These tactics expose the cracks that can be found in the most pervasive strategies, which perhaps

[95] http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/bucada_ataturk_dagi-954100
The construction of the monument was initiated in 2006 by the mayor of the time (Cemil Şeboy from the AKP) and was supposed to be unveiled on 29 October 2008. However, this was postponed due to the local elections. The elections were won by a CHP mayor (Ercan Tati) who initiated the completion of the statue, which was opened to the public on 10 September 2009, one day after Izmir's Day of Liberation. This shows the similar approach of different parties towards Atatürk monuments, proving that Atatürk's image cuts across political ideologies. The initiation of the monument by AKP can also be seen as a strategic move on their side to adapt to the strong Kemalist identity the city of Izmir is affiliated with.

become even more likely to be exploited as the object through which the strategies are imposed is enlarged.

To begin with, the Atatürk monument can be placed in the lineage of national monuments in public space in Turkey, which have been crucial elements of the official image politics of nationalism since the foundation of the Turkish Republic. National monuments, erected during the foundational years and multiplied, mass-produced and spread afterwards, have been significant sites of memory and boundary makers in public space, considerably influencing the ways in which people experience public space. As Navaro-Yashin states, erecting Atatürk statues has been "an ordinary practice of statecraft in Turkey, undertaken by each new government to illustrate authority over different districts of the country and to reproduce an overpowering image of a unified Turkish statehood" (197). The omnipresent Atatürk monuments all around Turkey still represent the most familiar form in which Atatürk continues to be part of everyday life. Thus, Atatürk has not been haunting Turkish society as an ephemeral apparition only, but has also been animated in stone to watch over the schools, the squares and the inhabitants of the cities and towns. These monuments have an enormous influence on defining public spaces and performing a national identity through their configuration, "as if the entire country has been converted into a mausoleum" as Taussig defines the omnipresence of the imagery of the national leader Bolivar in Venezuela.[96]

The chain of monuments established over the course of the history of the Turkish nation-state is in line with Andreas Huyssen's discussion of the role of the monumental in 19th- and 20th-century modernity, always in search and desire of origins and replying to the demands of the bourgeoisie and the nation-state. He explains comprehensively why this tradition, which continues today, has been critiqued:

> The monumental is aesthetically suspect because it is tied to nineteenth-century bad taste, to kitsch, and to mass culture. It is politically suspect because it is seen as representative of nineteenth-century nationalisms and twentieth-century totalitarianisms. It is socially suspect because it is the privileged mode of expression of mass movements and mass politics. It is ethically suspect because in its preference for bigness it indulges in the larger-than-human, in the attempt to overwhelm the

[96] For a historical analysis of the relationship between the construction of national identity and public space in the early years of the Turkish Republic, see Sibel Bozdoğan's *Modernism and Nation Building: Turkish Architectural Culture in the Early Republic*. For an extensive examination of Atatürk statues from the early years of the Republic until today, see Aylin Tekiner's *Atatürk Heykelleri: Kült, Estetik, Siyaset* [Atatürk Sculptures: Cult, Aesthetics, Politics].

> individual spectator. It is psychoanalytically suspect because it is tied to narcissistic illusions of grandeur and to imaginary wholeness. (189-90)

The Atatürk bust certainly partakes of this aesthetic, political, social, ethical and psychoanalytical "suspectness," as do other monuments that have marked Turkish public space as a national space filled with leaders to look up to.

The ways in which Atatürk is brought to life have changed several times since the early years of the Turkish Republic. For instance, Tekiner argues that while in the 1950s the Atatürk image was embraced by the right-wing, Islamic party DP (Democrat Party) bestowing him a cult status above political parties, the rising leftist and civil movements of the 1960s and 1970s challenged the cult Atatürk image by putting forward a more earthly figure deprived of his religious connotations (162-166). In this period, in which the dominance of official ideology was relatively diminished, he was mostly depicted in a civil outfit. However, after the coup of 1980, the previous serious Atatürk image as a cult figure returned. Tekiner argues that 1981 heralded a new epoch with regard to the reproduction and cultification of Atatürk's image that sped up the statue-mania around his persona (194). That year, the "Committee for Celebrating the 100th Year of Atatürk's Birth" was founded and the trend of giving Atatürk's name to large physical spaces, such as bridges and airports, started. In parallel, his image, face, body, signature, and quotes began to be inscribed on mountain slopes in large sizes.[97] The sizable Atatürk shadow that I explored earlier in this chapter also became a celebrated ritual within the same period, although, as noted, it was "discovered" decades earlier. In general, the interest in size, or what Huyssen calls "bigness", has increased, as manifested in attempts to make the biggest Turkish flags to be put on what are called "flag hills", or the biggest Atatürk statue, which would compete with the biggest monuments in the world.

[97] Tekiner also argues that, in the same period, the number of "site-specific" Atatürk sculptures or quotes which directly talk to their environment increased. Examples include a sentence uttered by Atatürk, "big fires start from little sparks", being written on the façade of a firehouse, a sculpture of Atatürk riding a tractor being put in front of the Agricultural Faculty, or a statue of Atatürk with a walking stick appearing in front of the Six Dots Blind Foundation (Tekiner 192).

Figure 20: Atatürk statue in Izmir, Buca, at night.

Until the completion of the Atatürk monument in Artvin in 2012, the monument in Izmir enjoyed the status of being the largest Atatürk monument in Turkey.[98] It was compared to the Jesus statue in Brazil, the Statue of Liberty in the US and the Eiffel Tower in France, and it engendered great pride as a statue that would make Turkey more known in the world.[99] The monument was completed in three years and more than 450 tons of steel were used to attach the separate parts to the mountain, costing 4.2 million Turkish Lira in total. There are four flag poles next to the bust and an Atatürk quote relief which reads: "Peace at Home, Peace in the World". There is also a spectacular lighting system that works at night and amplifies the grandness of the bust (Figure 20).[100] At 42 meters high, it was not only the largest sculpture in Turkey at the time it was erected, but was also among the highest ten sculptures in the world, being higher than the Christ the Redeemer Statue in Brazil and the third biggest bust in the world (Tekiner 259).[101] Although the statue was accused of being a

[98] Other examples of giant statues are the Atatürk statue in Istanbul (35 m. Tamer Başoglu, 1999), the Naval Force Atatürk Relief in Ankara (20.5 m. Tankut Öktem, 2008) and the Kuva-yi Millliye Atatürk Statue in Manisa (65m. Tankut Öktem, 2006).

[99] For comments of the ex-minister of Buca, Cemil Seboy, see: http://www.malatyailke.com/inx/haber-1309-En_buyuk_Atatürk_heykeli_.html.

[100] http://www.geolocation.ws/v/P/29939870/peace-in-the-countrypeace-in-the-world/en

[101] There is confusion about which statue is the highest one in the world, as well as in Turkey. The 60-meter-high Turkish Revolutionaries and Atatürk Monument in Manisa, Turkey, is considered to be the third biggest statue in the world. However, the recent 22-meter-high Atatürk in Artvin was presented as the biggest Atatürk statue as well. Using different criteria to measure the statues (mask, bust, the whole body, etc.) changes which one will be listed as "the biggest".

luxurious expenditure at a time when the city needed more schools and better healthcare, and there were complaints that the money was in fact not all spent on its making since white spots appeared on the statue with the first rains of the season, the statue gained popularity as the largest one in Turkey.[102] People also declared that, with the erection of the monument, the region had been cleared of shantytowns, which is an issue I will come back to. On the basis of its status as the biggest Atatürk statue in the world, it was even submitted to the Guinness Book of Records, which has always been an object of fascination and a matter of pride for popular and national culture in Turkey. It is remarkable that the monument, which is also called the "Atatürk mountain" in the news, occupies more or less the same amount of space as the Atatürk apparition on the mountain slope in Damal. It is also similar to the apparition in that it looks as if it is part of nature, an extension of the mountain, engendering a comparable mechanism of "naturalizing" a national symbol.[103]

Thus, this particular monument is not only the continuation of Turkey's long-standing statue-mania, but it also represents a visual strategy that emerged as part of the survival strategies of contemporary nationalism, namely the magnification of existing nationalist imagery. Although "bigness" is embedded as a strategy in the tradition of modernist monumentalism and is listed by Huyssen as one of the ethically suspicious traits of the monumental as it attempts to "overwhelm the individual spectator", the further magnification of this bigness is significant (190). Contrary to Huyssen's speculation that the fate of monumentality in "our postmodern times" is to migrate "from the real to the image, from the material into the immaterial", materiality, emphasized by being enlarged, seems still to be a vital component of the survival strategies of Kemalist nationalism (199). Thinking this materiality together with the haunting quality of Atatürk's image, as described above, challenges the opposition Huyssen installs between the real and the image, as well as the material and the immaterial.

In my first chapter on nationalist commodities, I argued that commodification allowed national imagery and objects to decrease in size, to "miniaturize" in Özyürek's words, and consequently to circulate through public and private spheres in more fluent and rapid ways (375). However, the Atatürk monument in Izmir shows that this process should be thought in relation to a parallel process of magnification with a larger emphasis on size and materiality.

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[102] As an example, there is a Facebook group called "Izmirians" that uses the image of the statue as its avatar picture and proudly announces that the biggest Atatürk statue in the world is in Izmir.

[103] There is a video circulating on Facebook called "Atatürk on the Mountains and Clouds", depicting different historical Atatürk apparitions, including the monument, showing that the monument is thought of as part of a lineage of "natural" apparitions.

The framework through which I understand the parallel processes of miniaturization-magnification is the increasing ritualization of a historically loaded, dominant but endangered ideology such as Kemalist-nationalist secularism, which tries to increase its radius of action by simultaneously scaling down and scaling up its image acts. It might be the case that the bigger the monuments, the more invisible the threats to Kemalist nationalist tradition are thought to become. However, in a similar way to Huyssen's argument that the Holocaust monuments that intend to invoke the past lose this ability as they multiply and become bigger, the attempt to dwarf the threats to secularist nationalism by multiplying and magnifying Atatürk's image also partially fails. This is mainly because there does not seem to be an end to the process of magnification, a bigger statue can always be built, and because the more magnified the image becomes, the more difficult it is to protect them from penetration, as I will discuss in the next section.

Nevertheless, within Turkey's historical and political framework, attempts to make the visible more visible, more voluminous and more natural by making it part of the landscape are designed to circumvent or counter the perceived crisis of official visual regimes. They can be seen as efforts to magnify "banal nationalism" with the purpose of underlining the "always-already there" components of everyday life.[104] Atatürk monuments run the risk of becoming invisible due to their omnipresence and familiarity, in line with the Austrian novelist Robert Musil's remark that "there is nothing as invisible in the world as a monument" (qtd in Huyssen 32). Turning the volume of the same images up further and increasing the space they take up in the city might function as an antidote to this risk of invisibility, as a measure taken against the possibility of Atatürk becoming invisible in his very visibility, in his very banality.[105]

Thus, it is not a coincidence that the Atatürk bust tears through the city like a shout, slashes it and creates a rupture, not only in the existing visual monumental pattern in terms of

[104] See my exploration of Billig's concept of "banal nationalism" in Chapter One.

[105] The practice of magnification, as an attempt to make the visible more visible, is reminiscent of another visual tactic that emerged in the 2000s with regard to Atatürk's image. A particular type of picture emerged, which can be seen in shops, institutions or houses, in the form of a poster or postcard. Its distinctiveness lies in the way it depicts *more than one* Atatürk in the same frame. Sometimes one of his poses is duplicated from different angles and sometimes five different Atatürk images are put side by side, increasing the symbolic value of each image. The slightly superimposed images mostly portray Atatürk in different phases of his life, emphasizing his role as a soldier, general, civilian, and so on. These pictures also mark the war waged in recent years over different images of Atatürk, resulting in his military pictures being foregrounded by anti-AKP, pro-military people, whereas his more down-to-earth pictures are preferred by Kemalist liberals and NGOs. In relation to the practice of magnification, these pictures can be seen as a form of "magnifying by multiplying".

its size, but also, and precisely because of this, in the urban fabric itself. As a "loud statue", it overshadows its surroundings and manages to be the most easily perceivable entity in the landscape, both from close range and long distance, just like a loud voice is able to suppress other voices. Being close to the monument and looking at its imposing face from below produces a certain vertiginous feeling, just like being at a distance and looking at the massive place it occupies in the cityscape. The words of a Rouen resident quoted by de Certeau are applicable to this effect: "the city keeps us under its gaze, which one cannot bear without feeling dizzy" (104). In Huyssen's terms, there is a definite sense of the monument trying to "overwhelm the individual spectator" (190).

The monument as an image act seems to become the city's (and perhaps the nation's) gaze, by being placed right in the middle of its eclectic structure, superseding and stamping it with its presence. In giving the landscape eyes, it creates a surveillance-based space and enjoys a scopic dominance. This is a perspective over that part of the city and its people that no inhabitant can have, except, ironically, the people who live in the two shanty houses situated above the statue. The monument constitutes the same type of "celestial eye" that de Certeau associates with the one who looks down from a skyscraper and watches the ordinary practitioners of the city who live "down below" (93). Yet, this is not just any eye, but a personified eye: the eye of Atatürk. In contrast to the Atatürk apparition, which derives its haunting character mainly from its ephemerality, the monument's main mode of haunting is through this personified celestial eye. In a similar way to my discussion of the ghost's capacity to haunt across generations, the monument's gaze does not only belong to the present time, but carries within it the history of the nation-state. Derrida writes in *Specters of Marx*: "To feel ourselves seen by a look which it will always be impossible to cross, that is the *visor effect* on the basis of which we inherit the law" (7). The monument's gaze, which is hard to avoid and which oscillates between the past, present and future, reproduces and transfers the laws of the nation-state and its form of nationalism by exposing the inhabitants of the city to its "visor effect".

Yet, the inheritance of the law that this spectral monument seeks to enforce does not work in the same way for all the inhabitants of the city and, by implication, the nation. Despite the fact that a monument, as a spatial mark, claims to address everyone in the public space regardless of race, gender or class, its gaze is in fact received differently depending on the spatial, cultural and political location of the addressees. A striking example of this is the Kurdish neighborhood on the other side of the road that the Atatürk monument directly faces. It is not surprising in the context of Turkey that the ones who are most directly watched by

Atatürk's celestial eye are Kurdish people, who are also the most forcefully exposed to the imperative to "inherit the laws" of the nation-state and the ones who have most consistently challenged these laws in the history of the Republic. Thus, Atatürk's gaze, directed at that specific neighborhood, resonates with the historically loaded struggle between official Turkish nationalism, embodied by Atatürk, and the Kurdish struggle.[106]

Ironically, the Kurdish neighborhood on which Atatürk's eyes focus was evicted in 2011 and an empty valley remained instead, showing that while the monument stands still the city it faces is constantly transforming. In this case, what emptied the neighborhood were the neoliberal transformations that are taking place in many big cities, which mostly hit the urban poor and minorities, who are evicted from their living spaces in the city center with the purpose of building more profitable and segmented cityscapes.[107] The inhabitants of the Kurdish neighborhood are also the ones who are the most directly influenced by the neoliberal reconfiguration of Izmir, mostly conducted in terms of a nationalist discourse veiled by one of urban transformation. Within this context, the metaphor of the ghost does not only emerge as an adjective that defines the spectral quality of the monument (its mobilization of the visor effect), but also functions as a verb defining what it does.

In this sense, the monument "ghostifies" what it looks at, especially when the one being looked at refuses to inherit the laws of the nation-state. The monument's eyes turn those who do not fit into the frame of the strictly defined Turkish national identity into ghosts by making them invisible and, consequently, expendable. Hence, the evacuation of the Kurdish neighborhood and the absence that replaces the presence of the Kurdish people in front of the monument's eyes can be seen as a visualized instance of the "ghostifying" quality of monuments, with the visualization all the more powerful as a result of the monument's scale. However, besides pointing to the vanishing and excluding power the monument wields through its magnification of Atatürk's image, it is also crucial to explore the blind spots in the scopic regime it installs and the possibility of creating further ruptures in it. To show how the monument's gaze does not function as a perfect Foucauldian panopticon or uncrossable Derridean spectral gaze, I will conclude this chapter by exploring some instances where the haunting effected by the Atatürk monument comes to be haunted in turn.

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[106] It is also a common practice to inscribe the sentence "How happy who says I am a Turk" on the mountains in the East of Turkey, where most of the population is Kurdish.

[107] Cenk Saraçoglu's book *Kurds of Modern Turkey: Migration, Neoliberalism and Exclusion in Turkish Society* provides an analysis of the ways in which contemporary neoliberal economic policies and Kurdish migration transform cities. Yıldırım and Haspolat's collection of essays *Değişen İzmir'i Anlamak* [Understanding the Changing Izmir] explores the transformations that Izmir is going through, including the eviction of the Kurdish neighborhood across the Atatürk monument.

Getting inside Atatürk's Head

The scopic dominance of the monument and its ghostly and ghostifying performances can be complicated by focusing on the alternative narratives and practices that have emerged in the monument's surroundings. This allows us to see how inhabitants of Izmir, although all living under the gaze of the celestial eyes of the monument to some degree, come to use the monument to create and narrate their own stories and establish their own spatial configurations. One evident instance of reacting against the massive presence of the monument is the reported attack on it in October 2010. The mayor of Buca stated that bullet traces were detected on Atatürk's face, proving that the statue was shot at several times, allegedly from the Kurdish neighborhood across the street.[108] This was apparently not the first incident of vandalism after its erection. People tried to roll rocks onto it, attempted to cut the iron pipes used to ventilate its inside and stole some historical objects, such as war equipment and medals, which were exhibited in the first weeks after the statue's opening.[109] After these incidents, the mayor declared he was ready to keep guard in front of the statue himself. In fact, following the suspected armed assault on the monument, a proposal to provide eight armed security guards to protect it around the clock was unanimously approved by the city council, though never implemented.[110]

During my visits to the monument and talks with people in its proximity, several people told me with condemnation that the youngsters of the neighborhood had managed to find a way to enter the monument, since it was not well protected. As the stories went, young people found refuge in Atatürk's head, where they were "using drugs" and involved in "immoral behavior with the opposite sex", as the monument's neighbors expressed it. In their

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[108] http://www.cnnturk.com/2010/turkiye/10/01/izmirdeki.Atatürk.maski.kursunlandi/591638.0/.

[109] I gathered these stories from people I interviewed around the statue. Some of them were also reported in the news.

[110] This is in fact not the first time that people were charged with protecting attacked monuments in Turkish history. The first reported attacks on Atatürk sculptures were recorded in the 1990s and followed by the institution of a law that criminalizes the vandalizing of Atatürk monuments. This legal intervention increased the status of Atatürk monuments as objects of fear. As an example of the fear that surrounds Atatürk statues, the "First Step Statue" in Samsun, which depicts Atatürk and his friends, as well as the figures of an athletic girl and boy, was removed to a storage room for eighteen years due to qualms about the appropriateness of the young figures' nudity. In 2000, they were placed in their original location again, protected by security forces. In another incident, which again shows how Atatürk monuments are often treated as alive, an unemployed young man took an Atatürk sculpture in the city center of Bingöl hostage and held a gun to its head while shouting at the police; "if you get closer, I will shoot him!" After he was released, he put flowers in front of the sculpture and apologized to Atatürk. Similarly, in Denizli, a young boy was arrested for throwing stones at an Atatürk monument and breaking parts of it. He defended himself by saying that he and his friends wanted to learn whether the Atatürk monument was alive or not (Ahıska 15).

complaints, people mainly put forward moral and safety reasons, stating that it was immoral since the monument provided a space for the youth of the neighborhood to be far from adults' eyes and that it was unsafe because they were throwing and breaking bottles. There was even an incident in which the youths started a fire, which caused the curtilage of one of the houses nearby to burn. It is evidently not possible, and perhaps not necessary, to ascertain the accuracy of these stories and the extent to which they have been embellished by the storytellers. However, it seems to be a fact that youngsters of the neighborhood found a way to avoid the adults' gaze by creating a new space for themselves behind the celestial eyes of the monument.

Although it constitutes a remarkable transformation of the monument-space, this incident does not immediately mean that using a monument's head to throw parties is a necessarily subversive practice or fully effective in altering the scopic and spatial regime the monument engenders. A casual gathering of young people in Atatürk's head neither fully displaces the monument's surveilling and excluding effects, nor causes a significant transformation in the broader spatial and visual regime of haunting images that pervades the Turkish public and private spheres. However, the act of turning the monument's head into a hangout and the stories circulating about it do carve out an unexpected space within the space of the monument, challenging its monolithic presence and exploiting the invisible space behind its celestial eyes (something made possible only by its very magnitude). Thus, it suggests that the spatial configurations monuments contribute to and their political implications are not fixed and that they may fail in shaping a homogenous and totalizing public space and community, especially when their size becomes excessive. People come up with different uses and attribute different characteristics to the visual and spatial configurations that inscribe them as proper – or non-proper – citizens, as in the case of the youngsters gathering in Atatürk's head or the bullets aimed at him from the Kurdish side of the road. In this sense, the holes opened by the bullets on the monument's surface or by the gatherings in the monument's head can be seen as ruptures in the monument's continuous act of haunting or, in other words, as the possibility of the haunting to become temporarily haunted, possessed by foreign bodies that do manage to look back at (or to look at the back of) its spectral gaze.

The holes created in the monument can be considered as tactics that transgress strategies, following de Certeau's understanding of the practices of everyday life, which go beyond the intended uses of the objects and surroundings, even within strictly knit coordinates. Entering Atatürk's head is a tactic in the sense that it subverts the aesthetically,

politically, socially, ethically and psychoanalytically "suspect" strategies of monumentalism that Huyssen identifies and carves out an unexpected space for the other by using the holes in the law. In this case, these are literal holes in the monument that, by mobilizing the visor effect, imposes a certain law. It is important to emphasize that the sheer size of the specific object, in this case the "magnified" head of Atatürk, is what makes the tactic possible, since the regular-sized statues present all around Turkey do not offer this kind of headroom. Thus, the magnified size, designed to make the monument more imposing, paradoxically makes it possible to carve out spaces for alternative uses, shows that new strategies (such as that of magnification) are always open to being disturbed by new, unexpected tactics. Thus, the unexpected use of the monument can be seen as a form of spatial "détournement", defined as "the reuse of preexisting artistic elements in a new ensemble" (Knabb 15).[111] This turns the hauntological coordinates of the monument upside down by developing tactics that haunt strategies, again showing the possible transitions between these notions, as I also discussed in the previous chapter.

In more general terms, this intervention in the monument-scape, and other similar ones, to some extent fracture or jam a highly spatial image act that shapes and imposes an identity and totality, by bending spatial coordinates towards other necessities, practicalities, or preferences, while still being located within those coordinates, namely in the head. Interventions of this kind are acts of reconfiguring the urban space and its coding according to top-to-bottom regulations. In the case of the Atatürk monument, this is achieved by détourning the national space it shapes in everyday life. On the one hand, the stone beings, as Verdery argues, "stabilize the landscape and temporally freeze particular values in it", while, on the other hand, various tactics are employed in order to defrost this stabilized visuality and the values crystallized in it (12). It is noteworthy that people who use their "right to the city", in the sense that Henri Lefebvre uses the term, are also the ones who are the most exposed to its hegemonic coordinates, in this case the people who live around the monument or who are looked at by it.[112] The co-existence of haunting strategies and the tactics that seek to disjoint

[111] *Détournement*, which can be translated as deflection, rerouting, distortion, misuse, or misappropriation, is defined by the French art, theory and politics collective Situationist International as an artistic and political tool based on a reconfiguration of the existing elements, "the reuse of preexisting artistic elements in a new ensemble" (Knabb 15).

[112] The "right to the city" is defined by Lefebvre as a demand of transforming urban life, by reclaiming the needs for creative activity, information, symbolism, the imaginary and play, which "are not satisfied by those commercial and cultural infrastructures which are somewhat parsimoniously taken into account by planners" (147).

them in turn allows us to see public space and everyday life not only as media through which boundaries are drawn and nationalist and identitarian notions are constituted, but also as mobile sites of struggle.

As the analyses of both the Atatürk apparition and the monument suggest, spectrality in the national everyday does not only carry the past into the present in an attempt to keep the nation together in the future, but also endows nationalist image acts with vitality beyond life and death, as well as with a surveilling quality that at times can be undermined by various everyday practices. Conceptualizing an immaterial shadow-image and a massive material statue as similar to each other in terms of their function is possible through their shared haunting quality and the different forms haunting can take. The similarity is at first disorienting because it destabilizes the immediate association of monuments with palpability and stability, and of ghostliness with ephemerality and volatility. Reading the two objects together, however, has allowed the shadow to become apparent as a monument and the monument to become apparent as a haunting shadow cast over society, showing that spectrality is operationalized in different, sometimes conflicting forms of haunting. Monuments as image acts perform the nation as a reified entity that can, paradoxically, travel beyond its solid ground, while ghostly apparitions as image acts perform it as a haunting entity that is, paradoxically, always there, across generations and periods. This implies that ghosts can be persistent and tangible, while monuments can be ghostly and intangible. Consequently, it shows that image acts perpetuate the nation by blurring the boundaries between presence and absence, solidity and ephemerality, and the material and the immaterial.

Thus, the notion of the ghost, challenges nationalism's presupposition of a "vitalist ontology", as defined by Cheah, "that opposes life to death, spirit to matter/mechanism, and, ultimately, living concrete actuality to abstract ghostly form" (227). Analyzing haunting images allows seeing the intermingled quality of these categories, revealing the rituals perpetuating the loop of dying and reanimation and the transitional quality of the matter and the abstract, as exemplified by the apparition and the monument. The images of the nation, especially the one of Atatürk, have a vital role in the construction of the everyday of the nation-state as haunted and in turning it from an abstract entity into a tangible one, by seemingly paradoxically relying on something as impalpable as a ghost. By looking at the shadow cast by these haunting images, the metaphysics of the nation-state can be better understood and perhaps also better disoriented, a notion I will come back to in the last chapter. Facing the ghosts of the nation, of which Atatürk provides a good case, theoretically

and practically, appears to be a way to disperse the shadow they cast and see what this dispersal might actually open up, which necessitates the imagination of the ways of being together that are not determined by nationalisms, its inevitably haunting images, figures, and borders.

In the next chapter, I will continue to explore the ways in which image acts performatively produce the nation through reanimating Atatürk, this time on the screen by actors in an attempt to reframe his traditional image as a more earthly figure, which marks a significant point for the image politics of everyday nationalism. As opposed to the positioning of Atatürk as a celestial and untouchable person, a specter, as I have explored in this chapter, these contemporary media representations seek to transcend the liminality of this figure between death and life by "humanizing" him and bringing him back to earth. I will focus on two recent media representations, in the form of an advertisement and a movie, which try to situate the figure of the national hero in everyday life by reframing him as an "ordinary" person who can walk, talk and even bleed, again showing the increased role of the body in contemporary everyday nationalism as I have explored in the second chapter on bio-images. I will reflect upon the motives, methods and consequences of this attempt of reframing national images in line with the necessities and facilities of media and popular culture, by exploring the metaphorical, allegorical and mythical burden put on the shoulders of this new "humanized" figure.

Chapter 4
Same Heroes, New Manners: The Nation on the Screen

Introduction

In the previous chapters, I have examined the ways in which images act and people form visual communities around them by focusing on the commodity market, the body, monuments and ghostly apparitions. In this chapter, I will concentrate on the act of reframing the image of the national leader on the television and cinema screen, which constitutes an important aspect of contemporary image politics of Kemalist nationalism. My focus will be on the first television commercial in which Atatürk is portrayed by an actor (Isbank, 2007) and on the first blockbuster movie on Atatürk's life (*Mustafa*, dir. Can Dündar, 2008). These cultural objects will allow me to explore the representation of the figure of Atatürk on the screen, which, seemingly paradoxically, continues the strong tradition of nationalism in Turkey as well as constituting a break in its image politics. My analysis will explore how the image of Atatürk as a "national hero" is reframed in contemporary times through an attempt to "humanize" him, in ways that both challenge and affirm its history.

Through the analysis of Atatürk's appearance in a bank advertisement and a docudrama about his life, I explore the ways in which traditional representations of Atatürk as a leader and the symbol of the state, considered at risk of losing their effectiveness in the changing political and cultural context, are translated into the field of popular culture through novel visual means. This process unfolds against the background of the shifting power relations in Turkish politics that I have focused on previously, reflecting the process in which Kemalist ideology and aesthetics are put on the defense, resulting in the need to develop new ways of collaborating with popular media. The images in question, as images of national identity in crisis, can thus be seen as "icons [that] have only recently lost the protection of their national iconicity" (Berlant 2). This does not mean that these images stop being national symbols altogether, but that they lose the special protection that comes with the stable position of national iconicity. Therefore, old images are, to a certain extent, forced into being updated in line with new popular and affective codes, generating old heroes with new manners. In the Turkish context, it is not only a novelty for the image of a national leader to appear in a television commercial and a blockbuster film, but it is also remarkable that both of these media representations overtly claim to be producing a shift in the way the national hero is imaged by going beyond the familiar, official traditions. The commercial and the film

claim to make long-existing symbols more accessible and to bring them down to earth by means of the new tools that contemporary media offer. One of the main questions I explore is whether this can be considered a structural representational shift with regard to national identity and what remains intact, and is perhaps even strengthened, in the course of this change.

More specifically, the analysis of the Isbank advertisement, which depicts the nation as a rose garden to be taken care of, will allow me to explore the role of metaphors in creating a sense of home and spreading this sense through popular, easily accessible image acts. I will focus on the implications of imagining the nation as a rose garden by drawing on George Lakoff and Mark Johnson's understanding of the "metaphors we live by" and Mieke Bal's conceptualization of metaphor as having "cognitive, aesthetic and affective" qualities to theorize metaphors as significant units to transfer ideological premises (2006: 157). Through such metaphors, the notion of the nation as home(land) is defined and performed, its borders are delineated and exclusive and inclusive positions assigned.

In the analysis of the movie *Mustafa* and the representational shift it suggests, I will focus on the textual and visual devices, such as the allegorical quality of the narrative structure, the employment of heroic myths and the treatment of Atatürk's personal vulnerabilities. Invoking Berlant's understanding of allegories of the nation and the coexistence of the ordinary and the sublime, as well as David Adams Leeming's categorization of the eight stages that characterize stories of mythic heroes, I will ask whether the implied representational shift from strict, serious, and mostly state-employed imagery to mediatized and popular depictions suggests a structural change in the perception of the national leader and the codes of national community formation.

Both the commercial and the movie can be seen as what Hayden White calls "para-historical representations," which deal with historical phenomena or figures and "appear to 'fictionalize' to a greater or lesser degree the historical events and characters which serve as their referent in history" (1996: 18). I will explore how history and fiction, old and new imaginations of the nation, heroic and human aspects, and, in Berlant's words, the "ordinary" and the "sublime" coexist in these objects (395). This will enable me to acknowledge the claims and reasons behind the emergence of apparently novel "image acts", while also deconstructing the opposition of old and new by exploring the continuities between them.

The Nation as a Rose Garden

The history of the image of Atatürk being used in commercials is rather short and Atatürk being played by an actor in a commercial is unprecedented. The first case was an advertisement for the swimwear company Zeki Triko, which appeared right after the Islamic Welfare Party (RP) was victorious in the 1994 local elections and proceeded to ban swimwear advertisements that involve nudity from city billboards. The advertisement used a picture of Atatürk in his bathing suit, with a caption reading: "We miss the sun". The word "sun" here seemed to refer both to the awaited summer and to Atatürk himself as the face of secularism, thought to have become hidden behind Islamic clouds. Another example is a promotional video from 1998, funded by the Turkish government for the 75th anniversary of the Turkish Republic to broadcast on CNN both in the United States and in Turkey, with the title "The Unending Dance". The clip depicts an actor playing Atatürk who is dancing with one of his adopted daughters at her wedding with other dancing couples around them. These images are juxtaposed with images of the industrial and technological developments that took place after the foundation of the country in 1923. At the end of the video, the evident metaphor is explained once again by the voice-over: "The Turkish Republic is rooted and strong as one thousand years old, and is young and dynamic as one year old. This dance will never end."

Almost a decade later, a television commercial joined these examples, appearing on Turkish TV channels on the 10th of November 2007, the day of the 69th commemoration of Atatürk's death. It was an advertisement for Isbank, the first and among the largest of Turkish banks, founded by Atatürk in 1924 and still partially owned by the political party he founded.[113] This is reported to be the first popular commercial in which Atatürk is played by an actor (Haluk Bilginer) and, in that sense, it differs from both the bathing suit company, which used his actual image, and the never-ending dance clip, which is in fact not exactly a commercial but a promotional video, and which was not as popular as the Isbank advertisement. Although Isbank's institutional identity is based on it having been the "only truly national bank" since its foundation, it is remarkable that it was only in the 2000s that Atatürk was brought to life to perform this identity. In a period in which Kemalism faces a crisis due to the increasingly hegemonic economic, cultural and political position of the AKP and the appearance of alternative cultural products and heroes, as well as the increasing

[113] The original name of the bank is Türkiye İş Bankası [Turkey Work Bank]. The English corporate name is Isbank, which literally means Workbank.

visibility of the Kurdish struggle and alternative political mobilizations, the anniversary of Atatürk's death proved to be a good time to resurrect him.[114]

Looking in detail at what happens in this two-minute video, which, except for the last scene, is in black and white, allows me to explore how its moving images resonate with the history of nationalist narratives, yet simultaneously transform them in specific ways, to the extent of creating controversy. The advertisement starts with a long shot of a rose garden.[115] A man and a boy are seen from behind while they are gardening. As the camera moves in closer, it shows the man pruning the roses while the young child watches him with eyes full of admiration. When the camera finally focuses on the man's face, we understand that he is Atatürk. Atatürk and the boy (Hakan Büyüktopçu) look at each other and smile. At that point, a rose thorn is shown pricking Atatürk's finger. The conversation between them proceeds as follows:

[114] In 2010, Isbank made another television commercial in which Atatürk was again played by an actor (Mustafa Presava), fictionalizing its foundation by accessing the past through a contemporary computer screen. Also in 2010, the Anadolu Insurance Company, of which Isbank is part, had the same actor play Atatürk in another television commercial depicting the dramatic story of the establishment of the insurance company after Atatürk met an old man in a village who lost everything in an earthquake.

[115] To watch the advertisement, which was directed by Gürkan Kurtkaya, see http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6K9vMIFVC3U.

Figure 21: Selection of scenes from the Isbank advertisement.

Child: (after seeing Atatürk's finger being pricked) Oh!

Atatürk: What happened, child?

Child: (surprised) Can a thorn prick *your* finger?

Atatürk: (slightly laughing) Ha, why wouldn't it?

Child: Can *your* hand bleed?

Atatürk: (wiping his hand with a tissue) Of course it can.

Child: But, are *you not* Atatürk?

Atatürk: Yes, I am, child.

Child: (still surprised and a little disappointed) But…

Atatürk: (starting to walk, putting his arm around the child's shoulder) Now, leave aside who I am. If you want to grow roses, you will get hurt, your hand will bleed, the sun will make you sweat…There will be people claiming no rose can grow in this garden. They will

tell you roses are not supposed to be grown this way. (Raising his finger in an instructive manner) You have to ask yourself this, "Do I want to make this place a rose garden?"

They sit down on the bench in the garden. The child listens carefully with admiration. Atatürk seems thoughtful and wise, with his finger still raised.

Atatürk: Do I want to grow the most beautiful roses in the world here? If you really want it, neither the thorn that pricks your finger, nor what people say, will be of concern to you. Whoever you may be, the only thing you will want… (he takes a deep breath, the child imitates him involuntarily and in his eyes tears well up) …is to smell this scent. Do you understand?
Child: (smiling with an air of revelation) I understand.
Atatürk: (touching the child's cheek affectionately) That's my boy! Now, come on, let's keep going…[116]

Then, the child gets up from the bench and starts watering the roses. Their image becomes blurry; the camera retreats and focuses on the only red rose in the black and white garden, while Atatürk and the child are in the background. The voice-over says "We respectfully commemorate Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, the founder of our country and bank" as the name of the bank appears on the screen. The red rose becomes part of the name of the bank, turning "Turkey Work Bank" into "Turkey (rose) Bank" (Figure 21).

This commercial frequently appeared in the news and the details of its production became widely known, emphasizing its eventful quality. The makeup team prepared the kit in Italy in one week by taking a mold of the actor's face to produce the necessary Atatürk eyebrow and hair effect, which took forty hours to put on. Five hundred roses were used. Old pictures of Atatürk in which he is gardening with his stepdaughter were used to create a more realistic scene, which in fact does not explain why they decided to replace the girl with a boy. The actor Haluk Bilginer was chosen over previously considered candidates for Atatürk roles, such as Kevin Costner and Antonio Banderas, and was honored by the opportunity to play Atatürk for the first time in a commercial. All these facts were presented as signs of the scrupulous way in which the commercial was made. There were also magazine articles focusing on issues such as how successful the child actor was at his school, whether the

[116] My translation.

sweater Atatürk wore would become a fashion item, as well as the grammatical mistake Atatürk makes in his speech.

The portrayal of Atatürk and the context he is placed in, which reproduces his image outside the official imagery and for different, namely commercial, purposes, made this clip not only popular, but also controversial. The reactions on television, Internet forums and in newspaper columns reveal the reverberations of this cultural product, mostly among those who share the Kemalist nationalist premises it propounds. Affirmative reactions underline the clip's touching story, its timeliness in a time of crisis for Kemalism and the joy of seeing Atatürk in the flesh, "among us", in an earthly, contemporary setting like a bank commercial, which brings him up to date.[117] The negative reactions center on the idea that Atatürk's image is being exploited for commercial reasons, which "turns a national hero into a salesman".[118]

One of the best-selling humor magazines, *Uykusuz*, put Atatürk on its cover, depicting him as reprimanding the child in the commercial for making a fortune out of him.[119] The cover reflects the controversy the commercial created and shows that it caused the image of Atatürk, in novel forms, to be reproduced in different fields. This suggests that once the channels connecting national symbols and popular culture are opened, their intertwinement is reinforced in an accelerated way, including by attempts to criticize this development, as in the case of the humor magazine. The variety of the reactions from those with nationalist motives also indicates that the image of Atatürk is far from being monolithic. This makes the dissolution of the Kemalist hegemony and the different perceptions and imaginations circulating around Atatürk's image more tangible. In addition, it confirms its status as an icon

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[117] For newspaper articles and forums about the commercial that reflect these reactions, see: http://www.lafmacun.org/bak/Atatürk+lu+turkiye+is+bankasi+reklami. http://cadde.milliyet.com.tr/2010/03/23/YazarDetay/1222973/Atatürk-reklam-ve-tabu. http://www.sabah.com.tr/Yazarlar/ardic/2010/04/01/Atatürku_reklamlarda_kullanmaya_utanmiyor_musunuz. Among many others, two websites built around user contributions ("eksi sozluk", "itu sozluk") are especially useful to follow a range of reactions to current issues in Turkey. An example of the joy of seeing Atatürk "among us" can be found on "itu sozluk": http://www.itusozluk.com/goster.php/mustafa+kemal+atat%FCrkl%FC+i%FE+bankas%FD+reklam%FD.

[118] The other television commercials in which an actor played Atatürk received similar reactions to the Isbank advertisement, ranging from appraisal for their touching nature to anger at Atatürk being turned into a "commercial object". For a range of comments on the commercial (in Turkish), see: https://eksisozluk.com/anadolu-sigorta-85-yil-reklami--2367499.

[119] The cover shows Atatürk saying: "When I was your age, I was chasing crows, but you, you are chasing advertisement business!" This refers to Atatürk's well-known childhood activity of chasing crows. The surprised and anxious child, surrounded by a couple of roses referring to the bank commercial, says: "Oh shit! The real Atatürk!" Atatürk continues to complain: "You guys are making a fortune out of me!" The caption above the image reads: "Some people, from journalists to singers, from bankers to international companies, see the founder of our Republic, Atatürk, as a source of profit" (my translation).

that has "only recently lost the protection of [its] national iconicity" as Berlant describes the white, male citizens as the previous iconic figures in the context of the US who now feel anxious and nostalgic about their loss (Berlant 2).

The Isbank commercial is a significant cultural product in that it attempts to reconstruct a former iconicity and reveals the possibility of reframing the image of the national hero in different ways than the limited official framework allows. It performs the act of reconstruction through reframing by having a "humanized" version of Atatürk play out a plot he was never actually part of. The way it animates Atatürk in the realm of commercial and popular culture shows both the crisis of Kemalist national identity in the face of changing cultural coordinates and the transformations it goes through as it adapts to the new context. The commercial's reproduction and reframing of national narratives is conveyed through quite explicit but notably symptomatic metaphors. In the next section, I will look at the ways in which such metaphors define the notion of "home", delineate its borders, assign exclusive and inclusive positions, and perpetuate a feeling of threat.

Metaphors We Live in

Metaphor, in its dictionary definition, is a "figure of speech in which a word or phrase is applied to an object or action to which it is not literally applicable" or "a thing regarded as representative or symbolic of something else".[120] According to Lakoff and Johnson's well-known theorization of "metaphors we live by", metaphor entails understanding and experiencing one kind of thing in terms of another and is not solely a "device of the poetic imagination and the rhetorical flourish", but instead a matter of ordinary language (4). Bal similarly states that metaphors "are not vague, poetic oddities or decorations but fundamental forms of language use with an indispensable cognitive function, in addition to the more generally recognized affective and aesthetic functions" (2006: 157). Metaphors, then, are pervasive in everyday life and our conceptual system; they not only structure language, but our thoughts, attitudes and actions.

Lakoff and Johnson argue that although there are also idiosyncratic and unsystematic metaphors, the systematic ones are the "metaphors we live by" (56). These systematic metaphors have a significant role in determining what is deemed real; they function as self-fulfilling prophecies whose utterances make what is uttered come true (Lakoff and Johnson

[120] http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/metaphor?q=metaphor.

154-57). Despite their emphasis on the decisiveness of "human nature" and the underdeveloped theorization of culture and ideology, Lakoff and Johnson's stress on the effect of metaphors on our conceptual system and on their systematicity is crucial for understanding their role in the formation of cultural narratives, including national ones. Although Lakoff and Johnson never use this term, they conceptualize metaphors as performative, as shaping reality by defining it and delineating its boundaries. Following Butler's definition of the performative, the metaphor can be seen "not as a singular or deliberate 'act', but rather, as the reiterative and citational practice by which discourse produces the effects it names" (1993: 2). Thus, the metaphors that construct the narrative of the Isbank advertisement, which are symptomatic of how the idea of a national community is fabricated, gain their intelligibility from their resonance with the notions about national community embedded in the history of Turkish culture, while at the same time producing and realizing them.

Bal claims that, instead of proliferating meanings, the metaphor can also do the opposite and obscure. She argues that metaphorization might cause the active character of the referent and the subjectivities of the agents involved to get lost, since metaphor does not just replace another term but an entire narrative. In this way, "the entire narrative remains an implication, skipped as it were" (2006: 156-157). The displaced and obscured item "is a story with several agents, a variability of interpretation and a difference of experience" (2006: 157). Only when it is considered as a metaphor, and analyzed as such, does it proliferate meanings again. Herein lies the importance of detecting metaphors that narrate the nation by replacing complicated cultural and historical situations and contexts with multiple actors, agents and points of view, and of unpacking the shortcuts they create to maintain and transfer ideology.

Returning to the Isbank commercial to unpack the shortcuts it creates, firstly, its viewer knows quite well that Atatürk was not a gardener but a national leader, who should be taken as talking about the nation rather than about how to grow roses. The rose garden, then, as an image act based on metaphors, evidently stands in for the country or community, and needs to be taken care of by Atatürk, who knows how to do it well, and eventually by the child, who is supposed to learn from him. The garden is isolated, surrendered by fences, and consists of almost identical roses, whose beauty, fragility and need for protection are underlined. Thus, through the rose garden metaphor as a shortcut, Turkish society is presented as demarcated, beautiful, vulnerable and homogeneous. The established cultural significance of the rose allows the population for which it stands to be invested with other

qualities, such as love, sensuousness and devotion.[121] The rose metaphor is also gendered in that it associates the country with femininity (motherland).[122] In this sense, it is perhaps not a coincidence that a boy was chosen to act in the commercial rather than a girl, which would have been more historically accurate given that the commercial was inspired by photographs of Atatürk gardening with his stepdaughter. While the rose garden, and thus the motherland, is identified as feminine, the one who will take care of it is a boy, who will become a man under the supervision of the patriarchal leader.

Additionally, an evident binary opposition between "us" who constitute and protect the rose garden and "them" who form a threat to it is created through the rose garden metaphor. While the "us" consists of the national leader and his followers (embodied by the child), the "they" are the people claiming that "no rose can grow in this garden", or that "it is not the right way to grow roses". The rose garden is protected from an outside world the viewer never sees by fences that resonate with the ideologically sustained partition in nationalist imaginations. In this sense, the rose garden metaphor acts like a "fantasmatic screen", defined by Noury as "the interpretative matrix through which a 'we' is both constructed and constructs, symbolizes and narrativizes its reality" (366). The concept of the fantasmatic screen makes clear the role of imagination and fantasies in sustaining the separation between an "us" and a "them", an "inside" and an "outside" that is indispensable for the formation of a national community.

Žižek, rejecting the common-sense notion of fantasizing "as indulging in the hallucinatory realization of desires prohibited by the Law", claims that "the fantasmatic narrative does not stage the suspension-transgression of the Law, but it is rather the very act of its installation" (1996: 81). The fantasized, fictionalized and visualized rose garden installs such a Law of nationalism and upholds, through its metaphorical power, "the very border within which a national imaginary operates" (Noury 366). This is not a physical border but one "constructed and maintained by an ideological fantasy" (Noury 366). Metaphors help to justify and fix these borders by constructing narratives that provide shortcuts to ideological fantasies, while at the same time obfuscating the complex histories behind them, as well as the failures of these fantasies.

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[121] The cultural and symbolic meaning of rose is relatively stable across periods and cultures. For instance, in Greek mythology, Aphrodite, the Goddess of love, is often depicted with roses in her hair, and in Christianity, rosary is the symbol of devotion to God. In the contemporary globalized world, it is one of the most common symbols of passionate and enduring love.

[122] It should be noted that the words "rose" and "flower", as well as other flower names, are female in Turkish.

Beyond these borders, on the blurry side, are people who might steal the roses or tell the people that roses are not supposed to be grown in this way. This turns the nation into "the object of love precisely by associating the proximity with others with loss, injury and theft" (Ahmed, 2004b: 12). Significantly, however, the thorny rose that pricks Atatürk's finger suggests that the danger is not only outside, but also inside. The thorns might hurt the people who take care of the rose garden, but Atatürk insists that "one who loves roses should endure the thorns".[123] These metaphors reproduce the rhetoric of the "inner and outer threats", used to justify situating different groups in the position of the other in different periods, and the political, cultural, and literal war raged against them, as well as the sacralization of the notion of sacrifice for the love of the country (enduring thorns for the love of roses) that I have also explored in Chapter 2. The threat that is felt, which might not have a material basis, is performed and materialized through metaphors and perceived as real, in a seemingly paradoxical way since the metaphoric is typically not associated with the real and literal. Its reality stems from the fact that it is perceived as real, again indicating that the sense of threat is performative or "affectively self-causing" (Massumi, 2010: 54). As this example suggests, metaphors, especially those alluding to the notion of home and its safety, mobilize emotions, mainly through activating certain values embedded in culture and evoking strong, dramatized images. These emotions, in Ahmed's words, provide a script through which "you become the 'you' if you accept the invitation to align yourself with the nation, and against those others who threaten to take the nation away" (2004b: 12). The commercial sends out a call for such alignment, generating an identitarian sense of love whose borders are delineated by metaphors of home.

The "cognitive, aesthetic and affective" functions of the metaphor that Bal identifies are employed in the commercial by creating an understanding of the nation as a garden that sustains the idea of a restricted, beautiful but demanding community facing inside and outside threats, by forging aesthetic associations between signs and senses such as a fenced garden and a national community, and by mobilizing affects such as love and fear. The metaphors used, by referring to existing cultural knowledge, define and fix some aspects of the community, while hiding and obscuring others. Hence, the metaphors "we live by" end up defining the borders of the home "we live in". They provide shortcuts to its "truth" in the form of eligible, totalizing, and easily transferable accounts of "home" that seem commonsensical and self-evident, and thus difficult to question and deconstruct. In addition

[123] This is a commonly used Turkish proverb; meaning one is willing to endure the difficulties and problems if one really loves the person or thing in question.

to relying on existing cultural associations and ideological units, the narration of the nation through the metaphor of the rose garden taken care of by Atatürk, who in turn teaches the child how to do it, also reframes and builds upon these associations in ways that change the coordinates of "feeling at home". Therefore, in the next section, I will explore how the nation is infantilized by adding the notion of metonymy to the discussion, while also examining the characteristics the national father and child are endowed with, and how the notion of growing up is employed, especially in the context of a bank advertisement that successfully combines national and neoliberal subjectivities in one narrative.

The Nation Infantilized

Figure 22: Scene from the Isbank advertisement.

The Isbank commercial and its metaphorical intensity also provides a productive ground to look at the common strategy of infantilization of the society, treating it as a child under its patriarchal leader's supervision. In B. Anderson's eloquent formulization, "the generic child of the nation (…) shows up in every national imaginary, each with its own slight local inflection", as a "sort of vanguard of the imminent Unborn" (2010: 365). The child in the Isbank commercial seems to embody not only the unborn generations of Turkey, but also, metonymically, the generic national subject in the image of the child. Lakoff and Johnson stress that there are many parts that can stand for the whole and "which part we pick out determines which aspect of the whole we are focusing on" (37). They argue that "metonymy serves some of the same purposes that metaphor does, and in somewhat the same way, but it

allows us to focus more specifically on certain aspects of what is being referred to" (38). In this sense, the choice of the child in the commercial is evidently not random and highlights the commonality and vitality of depicting society as infantile, as in need of protection and education, as well as in the process of growing. The absurdity of imagining the child replaced by an adult being lectured by Atatürk reveals the extent to which this depiction is normalized, showing that metonyms, like metaphors, are systematic and embedded in culture through performative repetition.

Berlant sheds light on the central role of infantilization in the construction of national subjectivity by referring to Alexis de Tocqueville, who wrote about how citizens are encouraged to love their nation as they love their families, as well as how democracies can produce "a special form of tyranny that makes citizens like children, infantilized, passive, and overdependent on the 'immense and tutelary power' of the state" (21). Berlant's focus on the affective context, "in which the citizen is not only disempowered but also situated within the subjectivity of the child, with childlike emotional responses and childlike naiveté", is also illuminating (Sturken 360). In this narrative, the citizen is innocent and by extension, the nation is also innocent. In Sturken's words, "in a strange way, this affirms the nation's power through sentiment. Thus, the paradoxical effect of the nation under threat is that modes of sentiment that might have been perceived as weakening its stature become the terrain through which it is recuperated" (357). The simultaneously weakening and empowering effect of being "under threat" resonates with what I have been calling the dual process of rise and crisis of contemporary nationalism, which reveals its strengths and fragilities in the most tangible way.

Infantilization, carrying this dual aspect, not only weakens the nation, but also helps recuperate it from the crisis through the image of the child (the nation must have a bright future), while serving to fix the position of the leader by stressing the vitality of identifying with him (the nation must have a stable past). This call to identify with the father figure, which also puts the child in the process of growing up, is produced in the commercial through various image acts. The viewer sees Atatürk from below, which amplifies his size, and the child from above, which makes him look even smaller. The child walks when Atatürk walks, breathes when he breathes and waters the roses at the end of the commercial as Atatürk did in the beginning. The latter repetition suggests that the narrative has progressed in a way that furthers the fantasized identification process. The child takes the necessary steps of mimicry to "become" Atatürk, something that is perhaps never fully possible but whose impossibility does not evade the necessity to pursue it. This pursuit becomes easier because, in the

commercial, Atatürk appears not as an unapproachable, invulnerable hero, but as an ordinary human being with whom one can have a conversation and who is susceptible to injury. Crucially, the images invite the viewer to identify with the child rather than with Atatürk, since the child represents the effort of identification with the national leader, an effort that can only succeed under the supervision of the parental figure himself, who therefore remains separate and superior despite his humanization.

On the basis of his analysis of Atatürk's speeches, Parla claims that Atatürk sets a typical example of "charismatic leader psychosis" by acting as a paternalistic leader who bases his authority on being the only person who recognizes the "great capacity for growing" – in the sense of maturing – in the nation (35). Parla claims that one of the negative consequences of charismatic parental leadership is that the ego-ideal remains dependent on a model figure and society remains an infant as the leader preserves his solemnity (166). Parla's emphasis on the "capacity" for growing is important since it indicates the impossibility of becoming adult and "child in the process of growing up" becoming a chronic state. The child should never become independent because the parent needs to be needed, which fixes the society in a pre-mature identity. As a consequence, people compete to be a "better son", as exemplified in the stressed mimicry of the child in the commercial, which is in fact suggested as a way of doing politics, in this case, following Kemalist ideology.

However, it is important to note that while the Isbank commercial continues the tradition of infantilizing the nation, it also implies that the old-school narratives about Atatürk that place him in a superior-heroic position are in fact "childish". This is another reason why the commercial is striking as an object of analysis that grasps a crucial characteristic of Kemalist nationalism in the 2000s. This is best underlined by Atatürk's slight contempt of the child's surprise at the possibility that his finger can be pricked by a thorn. The child seems to be torn between his idealized image of Atatürk and the real flesh and blood person in front of his eyes. Atatürk tells him to leave aside who he is, suggesting a move away from "childish" hero worship to a more "realistic" focus on the practicalities of the task at hand.

This brings us to the significant fact that the "rose garden" does not complete its metaphorical duty by referring to the demarcated, beautiful, eternal, and threatened Turkish community and the need for Kemalism to persist. It also sends out an invitation to the viewers to belong to the community of the customers of the bank, which should be thought of as a factor behind the necessity of leaving childish hero-worshipping behind for a more grown-up citizenship. One of the roses that used to stand for the community comes to stand for the bank in the final shot in which "Turkey Work Bank" transforms into the "Turkey

(Rose) Bank". The image of the rose, the only colorful item vitalizing the black and white scene, literally stands in for the word "work" (Is). This symbolism resonates with the common employment of the rose symbol in social democrat and labor parties' logos (British, French, Spanish, Danish, Swedish, Brazilian, Dutch, etc., socialist or social democratic parties).

Apart from the rose's universal symbolism of love, looking at diverse political parties' explanations of their use of rose symbolism, the themes that come to the fore are the red color of socialism (historically, to differentiate it from more radical communism), community (represented by the petals), fragility (the need to protect the weak), the growth potential and the element of struggle represented by the thorns. As opposed to the threatening red flag of communism, the rose symbolizes patriotism, community values and social democracy. Thus, in the commercial, not only the members of the community and the bank are brought together and national and consumer subjectivities are connected and negotiated, but they are also linked via the rose as referring to the worker of the social democracy. While the black and white images underline the rather nostalgic, past quality of the encounter between the child and Atatürk, the red color appears when the child "gets back to business" in the present.[124]

Within this context, growing roses can be seen as a metaphor for "doing business" and the rose thorn as the risk that the consumer/entrepreneur should take in the context of the market economy. Then, Atatürk's words, apart from their most explicit and immediate meaning I explored above about the survival of the country in line with Kemalist ideology, should also be interpreted as telling the child, and thus also the viewer, not to be afraid, to take risks, to keep investing and, in this way, brighten the future of this country (and Isbank). The subject the commercial interpellates, who needs to invest not only in Kemalism but in the capitalist/neoliberal system, is not a passive consumer, but an active worker (who actually does the manual labour of gardening) and entrepreneur (who keeps investing as gardening

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[124] Lakoff and Johnson argue that sometimes metaphors are not consistent but they still "'fit together' by virtue of being subcategories of a major category and therefore sharing a major common entailment" (45). The connections between metaphors are more likely to involve coherence than consistency. When the rose does not only stand for the community, but also for "work", as well as the worker of the social democracy, a new act of sticking occurs, which connects the neoliberal working subject, the national subject, labour and democracy by forming pairs that are not necessarily consistent, but coherent in the wholeness of the narrative.
One of the most blatant examples of the intermingling of the capitalist/neoliberal and nationalist rhetoric is the book that is published in 2010, *If Mustafa Kemal Would Run a Company: Lessons from Atatürk on Organization and Human Management* (Mustafa Kemal Şirket Yönetseydi: Atatürk'ten Organizasyon ve İnsan Yönetimi Dersleri, Koray Tulgar, Alfa Press), which includes sections such as, "What would Mustafa Kemal do to increase the profit of the company?", "How would he behave in the company?", and "How would he motivate his workers?".

suggests on the metaphorical level), namely the ideal, ambitious subject of the neoliberal market economy who is concerned with growth. In this sense it is not a coincidence that the commercial appears after almost half of the shares of Isbank had been privatized as part of the ongoing implementation of neoliberal policies in Turkey.[125]

Berlant argues, in the US context, that "to live fully both the ordinariness and the sublimity of national identity, one must be capable not just of imagining but of managing being [American]" (395). This is precisely what the commercial does by not only imagining the nation as a rose garden, but managing the roses and ensuring that they will be managed in the future. The notion of "managing" is particularly apt here since Atatürk functions as a manager building a corporate identity, inviting the members of the nation to connect through Isbank. Atatürk, who now walks, talks and bleeds, is given new, common manners that diminish his importance as a national hero ("leave aside who I am"). His new, common manners facilitate the reframing of national subjectivity as "daily business" in both senses of the word. The combination of the unusual appearance of Atatürk on the television screen with his new, down-to-earth manners exemplify the successful intermingling and coexistence of "the ordinariness and the sublimity" of national identity, in other words, the "domains of utopian national identification and cynical practical citizenship" (Berlant 406).

More generally, the reframing of the national identity with a neoliberal tone can be seen as suggesting a move from a "childish" and naïve nationalism towards a more mundane, functional, and productive nationalism. The "generic child" needs to grow up and turn towards work and progress, defining his home not only as the national space but also as the capitalist space the bank belongs to. Seeing Atatürk with pure admiration and belief in his almightiness is being challenged with the image of a growing child who is now learning more important matters, under the supervision of Atatürk, who is a human being just like himself. Although growing up is encouraged, the child who is held from the neck by Atatürk is still innocent, whose innocence perhaps lies not only in his lingering belief in his ideal, but also in his willingness to accept the new image offered to him (Figure 22).

Thus, the commercial represents a reframing of national Kemalist identity, presented as in crisis, threatened by inner and outer threats, which can be interpreted, considering the context of the commercial, as the "thorns" of political Islam, the Kurdish struggle and the

[125] As of December 2006, 41.5% of Isbank shares are held by Isbank's own private Pension Fund, 28.1% are Atatürk's shares that are represented by Republican People's Party and 30.4% are free float.
Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/T%C3%BCrkiye_%C4%B0%C5%9F_Bankas%C4%B1.

imperialism of the West, which form a compound "other" from the Kemalist perspective. It builds upon this idea of crisis, not only by instrumentalizing it for commercial purposes, but also by taking sides, making a political point and offering solutions. It does this by reproducing secular/ nationalist values and heroes with new manners, and by reframing national identity in line with the logic of development and progress, indicating the alliance between neoliberalism and nationalism that feeds both of them in various ways. This reframing of the manners of the metonymic child of the nation and Atatürk does not render the commercial subversive of traditional ways of building national identity through image acts; instead, the new manners attributed to them constitute an attempt to offer a way out of the identitarian and economic crisis. This attribution justifies the change without any betrayal to the previous frame, which it normalizes as a perhaps childish but necessary step in the development of the national subject and the country within nationalist and capitalist coordinates. In the context of this transformation, Atatürk is turned from god into demigod, which is perhaps an even more powerful position, since he is now endowed with the qualities of both this and the other world, being ordinary and sublime, humane and divine at the same time. Through the analysis of the movie *Mustafa* in the next section, I will further explore the implications of a "humanized" and down to earth leader figure and the role of allegory, myth, and particular image acts in the contemporary reframing of national identity on the screen.

Mustafa: Giving Kemalism the Kiss of Life

The idea is old. Since 1951, there have been attempts to make a film about Atatürk. Significantly, these initiatives were developed in Hollywood rather than in Turkey, presumably because the Turkish state had a monopoly on the reproduction of national heroes. Prominent actors such as Douglas Fairbanks, Laurence Olivier, Antonio Banderas and Kevin Costner were considered potential candidates for the role of Atatürk at different times. The newspaper article "The 56-Year Story of the Unmade Atatürk Film" notes the adventure started when Douglas Fairbanks declared he was ready to play Atatürk and was greeted with a state ceremony upon his arrival in Turkey in 1951.[126] However, when Fairbanks returned to the US, problems arose with the script and the project became the first Atatürk film never to be made. Cecil B. DeMille also wanted to make a movie about Atatürk but he could not convince Turkish institutions to help him. After his death, his co-producer signed Yul

[126] Şermin Terzi, *Hürriyet Daily News*, October 31, 2007.

Brynner for the title role, but the project was cancelled due to negative reactions in Turkey: "Atatürk is too grand to fit in history, how can he fit in a movie?"[127] In other incidents, Tarquin Olivier contracted Antonio Banderas to play Atatürk in 1997, but the project was blocked by political turmoil in Turkey and by questions about how a dark-skinned and dark-eyed actor could play the blue-eyed and blonde Atatürk.[128]

The power of cinematic representation in keeping heroic figures alive, which was almost neglected for most of the twentieth century in Turkey, was finally acknowledged after the 1980 coup d'état.[129] With the encouragement of Kenan Evren, the general leading the coup, Metamorfoz was made (Feyzi Tuna, 1992), and later on Cumhuriyet (Ziya Öztan, 1998), as well as several television series broadcast on the government TV channel TRT.[130] These productions started a representational tradition that positioned the army, with Atatürk as its leader, as the founder and the savior of the country, contributing to the Kemalist restructuring of society after the coup.[131] None of them, however, provided a popular biographical account. Only in 2008, Mustafa, a movie directed by Can Dündar, was released, claiming to provide a new perspective and to challenge the conventional ways of representing Atatürk. This movie, which is contemporary with the Isbank advertisement, resonates strongly with it in terms of its attempt to bring Atatürk down to earth and to protect his image in the face of the crisis of Kemalism through popular cultural means.

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[127] Although it is not clear who said this, the statement is frequently quoted in different accounts of the story. See, for instance, *Turkish Daily News*, October 28, 2007.

[128] The political turmoil concerned the 1997 military memorandum, also called the "February 28 process", by which the Turkish Military Forces ousted Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan (Welfare Party) and his coalıtıon government. This event is also referred to as Turkey's "postmodern coup". With regard to Banderas, there are also rumors that threats from the Armenian lobby in the US made him decide not to play the role.

[129] It should still be noted that Atatürk considered cinema important and initiated the making of several films while he was alive. On Atatürk's support for cinema and the films made during his lifetime, see Erman Şener's 1970 book *Kurtuluş Savaşı ve Sinemamız* [The War of Independence and Our Cinema] and Enis Dinç's "Images of Atatürk: The Commemoration of the Turkish Past in Audiovisual Media" (PhD thesis, University of Amsterdam, in progress).

[130] The fact that the actor portraying Atatürk in *Metamorfoz* (Feyzi Tuna, 1992) was not Turkish but Belgian reflects the still prevalent idea that it would be impossible to cast a local actor in the lead role, because nobody in Turkey is thought capable of playing this role. The nationalist reflex that more willingly accepts a Turkish hero being played by a non-Turkish person might seem paradoxical, but could also function as a way to maintain the hero's uniqueness within the national geography.

[131] Zeynep Özen's "Atatürk Representations in Turkish Cinema" (2010) states that, after the coup, cinema was in crisis and television gained importance since it could more easily reach a wider audience. The television series depicting Atatürk reproduced a theatrical documentary style and placed a strong emphasis on the honorable role of the army. Özen also mentions that these series were important in reinforcing the Kemalist hegemony, which became more effective, oppressive and doctrinaire after the coup (102). The series in question include Ziya Oztan's productions for the government channel TRT, such as *İttihat ve Terakki* (1980), *Ateşten Günler* (1987) and *Kurtuluş* (1996).

In my reading of the movie, I will first focus on the motives behind its production as well as the mixed reactions it provoked. Then, I will analyze the narrative devices used in the film to shed light on whether the seeming representational shift in contemporary image acts of nationalism from strict, serious, uniform, and mostly state-employed imagery to mediatized, popular, and multi-dimensional representations has the potential to transform the codes of national community formation and the function of the national hero within these codes. This will build upon my exploration of the reframing of national identity through attributing new manners to the national hero in the context of the Isbank commercial. My reading of the movie will concentrate on its treatment of Atatürk's personal flaws, the allegorical nature of the narratives he is placed in and the employment of heroic myths.

Mustafa covers Atatürk's life from childhood to death (or, rather, from death to childhood, since the movie starts with Atatürk's deathbed), combining historical footage with reenactments in accordance with the genre of docudrama.[132] It was released on the 29th of October, Republic Day in Turkey, which is a familiar patriotic gesture also performed by the Isbank advertisement.[133] The movie's official website states that more than half a million people watched *Mustafa* in less than a month, and more than one million in total. One of the ways in which *Mustafa* seems to break with the Turkish representational tradition is the fact that Atatürk is played by six different actors, none of whose faces we see in its entirety. In this way, it escapes the old discussion of who is and is not able to play such an important role. More importantly, it claimed novelty in its attempt to show the "human side" of Atatürk, to recount his life by including pictures and information from notebooks, letters, and diaries that had not been made public before. The director's statements are remarkable, not because his intentions determine how the movie works, but because his public persona, as well as the various reactions he received, can be considered part of the movie as a circulating cultural product. Dündar stated he wanted to go beyond the existing perception in society that "reduces Atatürk to badges" and focus on Atatürk's entire life, representing his military, political and personal sides together, without repeating the existing stereotypes.[134] He

[132] *Mustafa* had a budget of 11 million dollars, which is remarkably high for the standards of the Turkish cinema industry.

[133] National holidays seem to be suitable grounds for new cultural products to emerge and flourish, since they can share some of the positive affective accumulation of the special national moment and become more visible through them.

[134] Dündar's statement against "reducing Atatürk to badges" show that the diverse image acts I look at throughout the chapters do not constitute a consistent, let alone homogenous, picture of the nation, national identity and it symbolism. Instead of revealing Kemalism as a coherent nationalist ideology, they highlight different aspects and means through which national identity is performed in everyday

claimed he wanted to revive Atatürk as Mustafa, which is a significant move I will come back to, by giving him "a kiss of life".[135]

Dündar also stated that the new generation is bored of the standard information and the old black-and-white pictures they see in their textbooks, and that, consequently, he wanted to use "an intimate language and modern animation techniques in the movie". His aim was to deliver an "affectionate account of [Atatürk's] life" by bringing together the houses he lived in, the words he said and the music he loved.[136] In the movie, Mustafa suffers, makes mistakes, smiles, and even cries. He cannot sleep in the dark. He smokes cigarettes, drinks raki and impresses various women. He dreams, not only about founding a new country, but also about the women he is in love with. In this sense, *Mustafa* can be said to be the most popular and controversial depiction of Atatürk in the lineage of the few examples attempting to portray him within a more personal frame since the end of the 1990s.[137]

After the movie was shown in cinemas, the chief public prosecutor's office opened an investigation into the director, due to complaints made by the Anti-Tobacco Organization and the Istanbul Body of Lawyers that showing Atatürk as a smoker and heavy drinker would encourage children to smoke and drink. They added that the movie damaged Atatürk's image by treating him "like an ordinary person", by having a Greek boy play him as a child, by

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life. For instance, while Dündar claims that his movie fights against people who "reduce Atatürk to badges", people who are fond of their Atatürk badges disapprove of the Atatürk tattoos as "showing off" and those who are content with the movie *Mustafa* may criticize the Isbank advertisement for turning Atatürk into a commodity object. Similarly, some people who celebrate Atatürk's ghostly apparition in Damal think that the huge Atatürk bust in Izmir is a waste of money, while people who are proud of the bust may believe that the apparition is a childish entertainment. While Atatürk's military character is emphasized in some representations, his civil qualities are underlined in others. These seeming contradictions also point to the fact that the cracks and disagreements within Kemalist nationalism have deepened and become more tangible due to the changing power relations.

[135] This is the expression used by historian Ayhan Aktar, quoted on Can Dündar's website: "The aim of the 1980 coup was to use Atatürk as a club to beat Turks with. Dündar's documentary has given Kemalism the kiss of life". Source: http://www.canDündar.com.tr/_v3/index.php#!#Did=9285.

[136] www.mustafa.com.tr.

[137] Some examples of this lineage are a theater play about Atatürk's personal life (He is Human, 1998), a book on Atatürk's relationship with his wife (One Thousand Days with Atatürk, Nezihe Araz, 1993), and the documentary about the life of his wife (Latife Hanım, Ali Akyüz, 2006). Paintings and sculptures also reflect this representational shift. Özyürek mentions a painting showing Atatürk playing backgammon by Bedri Baykam, an internationally known Turkish artist with a strong Kemalist stance, as the first example to receive public attention. In Özyürek's interview with Baykam, the latter states that he wanted "to show the leader as a bon vivant, who loves good conversation, pretty women, alcohol, and playing backgammon. You know, he was a real human being" (384). In addition, Aylin Tekiner, in Atatürk Sculptures: Cult, Aesthetic, Politics (2010), notes that in the 2000s more casual sculptures of Atatürk started to be erected, showing him in everyday clothes and "ordinary" settings (242).

having Warner Bros distribute the movie, and by allowing an Armenian composer to create the soundtrack.[138] The investigation was eventually closed, but non-official accusations continued and were limitless in their creativity: in televised debates and on social media Dündar was accused of being a CIA agent, "Soros's child", Jewish, gay, or a secret AKP supporter.[139] A nationalist newspaper wrote that the film constituted the biggest attack on Atatürk, disguised as Kemalism, while one of its columnists stated he was surprised that the Conservation of Atatürk Law had not been employed in this case and suggested that people should boycott the movie.[140] Nicholas Birch from *The Independent* reported that some radical secularists went further by seeing the film as part of a Western-backed plot to weaken Turkey's Kemalist army in favor of "enlightened Islam".[141] Turgut Özakman, the writer of the nationalist bestseller *These Crazy Turks* (2005), who later made another movie on Atatürk as a response to *Mustafa*, claimed Atatürk fought against more important things than crows, darkness, and solitude.[142] The accusations went as far as claiming that the movie used brainwashing methods, "unconscious seeding techniques" one columnist named them, developed by secret services to indoctrinate young people.[143]

These reactions mainly given by Kemalists themselves, as in the case of the Isbank commercial, stem from the movie's attempt to reframe the dominant image of Atatürk. As stated in one of the few analyses of *Mustafa,* the struggle over the popular representation of Atatürk inspired by the movie constituted an important moment in Turkish history in terms of juxtaposing different semiotical codes and interests (Işık 42). Similarly, in another analysis,

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[138] *Yeni Şafak* newspaper, 20 December, 2008.
Goran Bregović, who made the soundtrack of the movie, is not Armenian but Serbian. The fact that he is referred to as Armenian is a typical example of the common way of denigrating someone by declaring that he or she has Armenian blood, as a pejorative label with an extensive realm of use in nationalist discourses.

[139] "Soros's child" was commonly used at the time by nationalists to refer to someone who (supposedly) received funding from George Soros or foreign ("imperialist") capital in general. The common practice of using labels taken to allude to different political ideologies and positions, such as Soros's child, Armenian, Jewish and gay, to position someone as a threat is at work here as well. The subject of hate is not fixed but travels among different ethnicities, geographies, and political orientations fluidly, in a way reminiscent of Ahmed's point that hate does not reside in a given subject or object but is, rather, economic, circulating "between signifiers in relationships of difference and displacement" (Ahmed 2004b: 119).

[140] İsrafil Kumbasar, *Yeni Cağ* newspaper, 15 December 2008.

[141] http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/mustafa-the-movie-divides-turkey-with-a-portrait-of-the-real-Atatürk-998232.html.

[142] In fact, reactions to *Mustafa* did not only take the form of columns, books, and television programs. Two movies were made in response to it: *Dersimiz Atatürk* (Our Class on Atatürk, Hamdi Alkan, 2009, written by Turgut Özakman) and *Veda* (Farewell, Zülfü Livaneli, 2010).
http://www.kemalistgencler.com/turgut-ozakmandan-mustafa-filmi-elestirisi.

[143] Yiğit Bulut, *Vatan* newspaper, 8 November 2008.

Altıntaş explains the Kemalist reactions to the movie as a result of its deconstruction of the founding myth of the Turkish nation and its claim that this myth "can be fixed" (239).[144] These reactions reveal that conflicting constructions of the past can turn media texts into political controversies and that challenging the dominant cultural memory and visual regime even slightly, through overused biopic techniques that I will look at in detail below, can have significant cultural as well as legal consequences in Turkey. However, looking at the movie in detail challenges its claim to representational novelty and reveals the continuity of previous national allegories, myths and the image acts perpetuating them.

From Atatürk to Mustafa

Figure 23: Still from *Mustafa*

The title of the movie discloses what is perceived by its critics as disturbing. Mustafa is the name Atatürk was given at birth and was used in his childhood, until the name Kemal was given to him by his mathematics teacher at school due to his successes (the name Kemal means perfection), and the surname Atatürk was granted to him by the Surname Law in 1934 (meaning "the father of Turks"). As frequently mentioned in the movie's advertisements and the director's interviews, the viewer finally has the opportunity to get to know "Zübeyde

[144] Altıntaş mentions that *Mustafa* bypasses one of the hallmarks of the foundational myths of the official national history, which is the date of May 19, 1919, the day Atatürk landed at Samsun, considered to be the beginning of the Turkish War of Independence. Instead, *Mustafa* shows Atatürk talking to and negotiating with the last Ottoman sultan. This move challenges the official history's attempt to detach the Turkish Republic from the Ottoman past. Altıntaş rightly claims that the reattachment of the national myth to Ottoman roots is an attempt to negotiate between the two polarized ideologies in contemporary Turkey, namely Kemalism and Islamism.

Hanım's (his mother) son" and call the national leader by his childhood name.[145] Thus, naming the movie *Mustafa* is a statement inviting viewers to come to know Atatürk when he was not yet a soldier, a leader, or the father of Turks. On the one hand, this move is disturbing from the perspective of official history since it suggests that Atatürk was simply one of us. While no one but Atatürk can carry that name, there are innumerous people in Turkey named Mustafa. In addition, the name switch changes the position of the national leader from the one who infantilizes the nation to the one who is himself infantilized. On the other hand, the movie's title also largely explains its success and popularity, which was due precisely to the creation of a more down-to-earth figure who addresses the emotions and with whom it is therefore easier to identify in the present time.

The movie starts in 1938, the year Atatürk died, suggesting that the viewer can only access Mustafa's childhood through Atatürk's deathbed. Thus, the gesture of naming the movie *Mustafa* is already partially undermined as Atatürk still takes precedence. In the first scene, the camera zooms in from outside of Dolmabahçe Palace towards a dimly lit room in which Atatürk is lying in bed. We only see the edge of his bed, his feet covered with a blanket. The narrator tells us that Atatürk's condition is severe and that, when he wakes up for a moment, he sees the *Four Seasons* painting on the wall, which reminds him of the Rumelia lands where he grew up. Atatürk is seen to look at the painting with longing and tells his adopted daughter he wants to go there as soon as he feels better. The viewers' suggested identification with Atatürk is facilitated by not showing him directly, but instead making them see the painting through his eyes. As the camera zooms into the painting until it loses sight of its frame, the viewer is invited into Atatürk's dream, which is also his journey of remembrance.

In the painting, we see Mustafa as a child, walking on a path (Figure 23).[146] The disappearance of the painting's frame suggests the erasure of the boundaries between the film and the world outside it, between past and present, and between the viewer and the protagonist; it is a call to the viewer to enter the movie to travel through time and space

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[145] An example to this argument is Kemal Uloğlu's column "Mustafa'yı Tanımak" [Getting to Know Mustafa] in *Bursa Meydan* newspaper, 24 October 2008.

[146] http://www.canDündar.com.tr/_v3/#!/MUSTAFA/#Did=7280.
A discussion erupted about this scene even before the movie was released. In an interview, the director reveals that when they were in Greece shooting it, they saw a child in the park and asked him to act for them, to walk, run, and chase the crows. The child did so without knowing that it would be perceived as outrageous for a Greek child to play the young Atatürk. (Can Dündar's interview with Emre Ünsallı, in *Yeni Aktüel* newspaper, 23 October, 2008).

with/as the protagonist. By doing this, the viewer joins the movie in giving "a kiss of life" to Atatürk on his deathbed, allowing him to be born again as a child, as Mustafa. The metaphor of the kiss of life should be taken not only as defining this first scene, but, more generally and symptomatically, as describing one of the survival strategies of a hegemonic ideology in the face of cultural and political changes: the new image acts as a response to the old ones losing their iconicity and efficacy.

After Atatürk is reborn as Mustafa, the narrator tells us that he did not have a dream-like childhood; he lost his father, had to quit elementary school, and moved to Thessaloniki with his mother due to economical problems. The movie's resurrection of this lonely child, having been reached through the memory of a man about to die, attempts to evoke compassion and affection. Showing Atatürk first as a sick man, then as a sad child, opens a gateway to less familiar aspects of his life and mobilizes affects in a very different way than the traditional portrayal of a strong, strict and inaccessible leader. However, this transformation, rather than challenging the assumed necessity of identifying with a dead national leader, reduces the distance to him and, thus, facilitates identification.

The specific techniques of the genre of docudrama are crucial for achieving such identification, since this genre, as Ebbrecht argues, combines re-enactment, fictional stories and computer animation techniques to deal with historical subjects in a way that will attract people's attention (50). It aims at producing "power, curiosity, sympathy, tension and concern", and seeks to "adopt history sensually", as it is clearly seen in the first scene of the movie depicting a dying national leader and a lonely child wandering in nature (Knopp qtd. in Ebbhert 38). It is important that docudramas, which were long seen as belonging to television, have a "cinematic value" as well, in order to allow the emotionalizing of history for a mass audience and the finding of a way into historic incidents that will facilitate spectators' identification (Ebbrecht 50). These techniques can be found in *Mustafa*, reflecting the general quality of docudrama in "its exploitation of the dual role of cinema as a representation of the real and a source of fantasy and identification" (Işık 14). As a result, a certain reality effect stemming from the documentary footage intermingles with the fictional characteristics of the narrative, such as the dramatization of the events, a sensational storyline, condensation of the course of events, and a certain amount of fabrication to make the story more fluent. In order to see the effect of this intermingling for the reframing of the heroic images of the nation, I want to explore, in the next section, the use of allegory and the employment of heroic myths, which stand out as keeping the film's narrative together, blending history and fiction, and redrawing the contemporary coordinates of a national hero.

Allegories and Mythical Journeys

Figure 24: Still from *Mustafa*.

After the viewer moves into the painting to witness Mustafa's childhood, she sees him chasing crows, a childhood pastime most viewers know all too well from school textbooks as perhaps the most personal detail in the official account of his life, "an image ingrained in the national imagining of everyone disciplined into subjecthood under the Turkish state" (Navaro-Yashin 198). Then, Mustafa builds a shed for himself, "a sanctuary of his own which can protect him and serve as a home in a period when he lost everything". The voice-over continues by telling how Mustafa was missing a soil of his own since he lost his father, his school, and his house.[147] This scene, which is repeated at the end of the movie, is also the image used on the movie poster (Figure 24).[148] It depicts Mustafa's childhood as full of epicedial and almost accursed incidents by using epic cinematic techniques, such as high contrast lighting and wide-angle images, as well as spectacular visual items such as gigantic trees and looming clouds. These dramatic techniques create the impression that the childhood of an extraordinary future hero cannot have been ordinary, but must portend greatness. Although we are ostensibly witnessing everyday moments in the life of a sad but otherwise

[147] It is frequently emphasized that Mustafa lost his father at an early age and; unlike about his mother, not much is known about him. It is interesting to consider this in relation to the infantilization mechanism discussed above; perhaps a father figure without a father is a more effective formula for nationalism in the sense that it reinforces the sense of uniqueness and primacy of the leader.

[148] http://www.canDündar.com.tr/_v3/#!/MUSTAFA/#Did=7280.

normal child, the way they are framed intimates that they sow the seeds for the extraordinary feats that will happen in the future.

Allegory, in its dictionary definition, is "a story, poem, or picture which can be interpreted to reveal a hidden meaning, typically a moral or political one".[149] Frederic Jameson defines allegory as "an elaborate set of figures and personifications to be read against some one-to-one table of equivalence" and adds to this traditional definition that in fact this table of equivalence is not fixed but in constant change (73). Allegory, as a more elaborate and extended form of metaphor, appears as a key element for understanding how the Turkish nation is narrated by *Mustafa*. It is the most significant figurative device in constructing a symbolic representation based on the following "table of equivalence": Mustafa = Atatürk = the Turkish nation. However, this table of equivalence does not seem to be "in constant change and transformation at each perpetual present of the text", as Jameson claims (73). Rather, the film uses allegory to keep Atatürk's image and his role in national imaginations stable even as it pretends to transform them.

This becomes evident when the first scene is repeated towards the end of the movie, when Atatürk proclaims the Republic. The voice-over says: "35 years ago, the orphan child who built a sanctuary for himself after losing his father, now built a country for his people to take shelter". Then we hear Atatürk's real (recorded) voice: "A demolished country on the verge of a cliff, bloody combats with various enemies, a war that lasts for years…followed by the foundation of a new country, a new society, a new government which is respected both inside and outside. Here is the general Turkish revolution!" During the speech, the image of the child transforms into that of Atatürk on a podium that, not coincidentally, has a rather similar shed on it. This linking of past and present is typical of the way Mustafa's childhood is treated as already carrying within it his future as a unique hero whose destiny is that of the nation. The child heralds a leader and the leader is the harbinger of a new nation; all connected and stabilized in an allegorical manner.

As opposed to Jameson's famous, and rather reductive, correlation between third world texts and national allegories, Berlant sees allegory functioning in all forms of nationalism, including that of the US.[150] She describes its role in relation to national and media culture in a way that grasps what the movie does:

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[149] http://www.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/allegory?q=allegory.

[150] For a rigorous critique of Jameson's conceptualization of allegory in the context of Third World literature, see Aijaz Ahmad's "Jameson's Rhetoric of Otherness and the 'National Allegory'" (1987).

> The performance of mass media-dominated national political culture reveals a system of national meaning in which *allegory is the aesthetic of political realism* at every moment of successful national discourse, one in which the narrative of that discourse itself, at a certain point of metarepresentation, becomes a conceit that erases aggregate memory as it produces knowledge of the nation as a thing in itself. The competent citizen knows this and learns how conveniently and flexibly to read between the lines, thus preserving both domains of utopian national identification and cynical practical citizenship. (Berlant 406)

Berlant's emphasis on the vital role of the mass media and on allegory as being "the aesthetic of political realism" within all nationalisms is evident in the narration of Atatürk's childhood as a metarepresentation of his future-to-come and that of the Turkish nation. Everything gains meaning in relation to a larger set of references, which are easily detectable but effective through repetition: Mustafa's childhood, which we enter through the painting, itself an allegory, is an allegory of the yet-to-be established nation. Mustafa loses everything as a child while the Ottoman Empire is losing its territory and power; Mustafa builds a shed when the whole nation is under threat of becoming homeless; Mustafa carries Atatürk within him and Atatürk, in turn, incarnates the destiny of the whole Turkish nation. Even Latife, whom Mustafa will meet much later and marry, is not just a woman but the symbol of the new modern Turkish woman, which, the film suggests, is the reason Mustafa wants to marry her in the first place. This proleptic form of narrative not only mystifies the historical dynamics and power relations at work in the coming into being of a nation, but also frames the nation's existence as destiny or, in Berlant's words, "a thing in itself" that elides memory (406).

As Bal similarly notes, allegory "takes the represented event out of its own history to put it into a different one" (2006: 61). This is precisely how the movie makes sense: individual stories and events are selected and taken out of their context to be placed into the broader context of the national history, before this national history has even commenced. Establishing a table of equivalence between individual psychological development and political history is not only a common tactic in the genre of docudrama, but is also perfectly in line with the narrative structure of the controversial book *Immortal Atatürk* by Vamık Volkan and Norman Itzkowitz, which Dündar cites as a source of inspiration for *Mustafa*. This book can be seen as the prototype of the attempt to "humanize" Atatürk while keeping his prophetic aura intact by treating his childhood experiences as a precursor of the destiny of the nation. Both the book and the movie follow the conventional structure of nationalist hero-

making; they explain politics on the basis of the individual psychology of the protagonist and, at the same time, restrict the meaning of the personal stories to what they allegorically represent about the nation.[151]

Various visual techniques contribute to the movie's construction of allegory, including the use of images of nature, which often acquire a dramatic quality, as in the frequent appearance of the sky with a large moon, intense clouds, and sunsets, evoking the sense that something is taking place that exceeds the individual and the ordinary. When Mustafa is sad, the clouds gather; when he is thoughtful, the moon is fuller. As such, Mustafa is made part of fantastic nature, whose characteristics are depicted beyond realistic representation, suggesting that he gets his power from nature or is empowered by it. The implication is that they reflect and reinforce each other, and in this manner, nature is personified and Mustafa's characteristics are naturalized, strengthening the allegorical and mythical quality of his life journey.

Other cinematic techniques, such as the use of maps to trace his military moves, the epic music used during war scenes and at emotional moments, the use of camera angles that make Mustafa seem big and the world around him small, and the employment of a partially didactic and partially affective voice-over, all contribute to the sense that there is an additional layer of meaning to everything that is shown. In addition, the voice-over has a more distinct quality than the standard deep male voice. Therefore, it successfully brings together the effective and affective aspects of a voice-over by combining the authority grounded in the enigmatic and all-knowing voice-over with the more affective voice of the director himself, gaining familiarity and popularity from his public persona.

Despite the movie's attempt to bring Atatürk down to earth, the mythical and allegorical quality of the film's narrative and visuals indicates that *Mustafa* in fact follows all the steps of a "monomyth", defined by Joseph Campbell as a venture "from the world of common day into a region of supernatural wonder" (23). The monomyth culminates in the hero winning a victory and "com[ing] back from this mysterious adventure with the power to

[151] *Immortal Atatürk* was published in 1984 in the US and ten years later in Turkey, to be censored immediately. The censoring of the book was based on similar criticisms to those made by nationalist Kemalists against *Mustafa*. The book narrativizes the foundation of the Turkish nation-state by tracking the traces Atatürk's dead brother and lost father left on his psyche, which, after his mother's death, are seen to put him on a nationalist path: "M. Kemal directed his love for his mother to his country" (290). In the movie, it is similarly stated that, after her death, "there was no one to call him Mustafa anymore. He buried his pain in his heart and stated that what matters now is to save the *motherland*".

bestow boons on his fellow man" (23). Leeming unpacks Campbell's monomyth further and identifies eight stages that feature in mythic hero stories that travel across times and cultures, acquiring contextual inflections. The first stage Leeming classifies is the birth of the hero, which is generally followed by miraculous or unusual events: "for the hero who will burst through the limitations of the local and historical, this first event, like all the events in his life, must be special" (7). The birth myth "involves initiation, the search for origins, the hope of a fresh beginning, the acceptance of what we call evil as a permanent reality, and the adoption of the heroic principle by the human psyche" (40). Atatürk's deathbed, as portrayed in *Mustafa*, can be seen as an indirect take on the birth myth, since he is in search for origins and hopes for a fresh beginning, which is provided by the journey into the painting to his childhood. Reading the scene allegorically, the notion of "evil as a permanent reality" can be seen as the threat to Kemalism in contemporary Turkey, which threatens to "kill" Atatürk again and thus necessitates a rebirth.

The second stage of the hero myth sees the child-hero becoming aware of forces larger than himself, which he cannot fully comprehend. Mostly, this phase is represented as a struggle with wild animals or giants. The child needs outside assistance to move through this stage (Leeming 65). The scenes following the deathbed scene have a perfect resonance with this phase. We see Mustafa, with his mother, standing in front of the grave of his brother, unwilling to accept his fate.[152] The presence of wild animals (jackals) underlines the power of nature, which Mustafa observes with his mother, perhaps seeking support from her. The camera moves and passes behind a tree, creating a moment of darkness. Mustafa appears from the darkness, alone, having overcome the second stage of mythical heroism. He has completed the early process of self-realization in which the child-hero needs to confront and control demons or evil powers in order to pass from childhood to manhood, "to determine his own fate" as the movie's narrator puts it. On the allegorical level, the forces of the Ottoman past are left behind in order to start building the new nation-state.[153]

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[152] In this scene, the voice-over tells us: "It is the end of the 19th century. On the Thessaloniki coast, there is a fresh grave and a little baby in it. His name is Ahmet". Ahmet is Atatürk's three-year-old brother, the third child that the family lost. Over the image, we hear wolves howling and waves washing ashore. The voice-over tells how first the waves took little Ahmet out of his grave and then jackals crowded around the corpse. From a distance, we see a flock of jackals circling the rather kitschy horror movie-like graveyard, illuminated by the moon and the gloomy clouds. We hear: "The parents lived with this pain for years. Then there was a new baby in the house. A new hope." A lightning bolt hits and disperses the jackals as the word "hope" is uttered.

[153] Altıntaş interprets the jackals in this scene as the occupying powers descending upon the dead body of the Ottoman Empire, which again suggests an attachment to the Ottoman past countering its total erasure in official nationalist history.

The third stage of the hero's journey, which is a prevalent myth in animistic religions, those of the Far East (especially Buddhism and Hinduism) and Christianity, sees the hero tempted by the "illusory values of the world", represented by a devil figure "who attempts to disrupt the lonely vigil" (Leeming 7). However, in the end, "his inner strength prevails" and the hero withdraws for meditation and preparation in search of personal destiny (Leeming 76). The scene in which Mustafa builds a shade and sits under it, which chronologically follows the scenes described above, but is shown before them in the movie, can be read as the third stage of the hero's journey. Like Endymion's, Penelope's, or Muhammad's caves, in which they withdraw in order to come out stronger, Mustafa regains the energy absorbed by the difficulties of his early life under the shelter he builds, where he contemplates his personal destiny. Leeming also notes another common elements of this stage, which is the use of the tree as a center or "symbolic world heart" (98). The impressive tree that rises next to Mustafa's shade, which is also the movie's poster, is not far from transmitting the feeling that this is a significant and symbolic place in which Mustafa's (and the whole nation's) destiny is being determined.

The period in which Mustafa travels around the world and proves himself as a successful military man can be read as the fourth stage of the heroic journey, which comprises the agony and rewards of adult life. The period of adolescent crises and query is followed by a wave of exaltation, reflected in Mustafa's painful first year at school followed by his gallant military acts. In this stage of quest, the hero "make[s] his name" (Leeming 101). Having dealt with internal problems in the previous stage, he now has to deal with external ones. In the fifth stage, the hero must confront physical death, which has to be miraculous, like his birth. Often, he is dismembered in this phase of his journey. He becomes a scapegoat for other people's fear and guilt, and there is usually a woman who laments him. The equivalent in Mustafa's life is his confrontation with physical death during the Battle for Gallipoli (1915-16). As the voice-over reads the exciting story of the First World War from Mustafa's diary in a thrilled voice, we hear that a bullet hit his heart during the conflict. What saved his life was nothing other than the watch he carried in his pocket. The bullet is broken into pieces by hitting the watch, leaving only a deep trace of blood. In this stage, "it is important that his death be memorable—especially when we consider what follows" (Lemming 8).

The voyage of the mythical hero who miraculously escapes death continues in the sixth and seventh stages, in which he maintains his role as a scapegoat and quester. He travels to the underworld, for various possible reasons, such as to rescue a loved one, to attain

knowledge of a personal or racial destiny, or simply to complete a great task (Lemming 213). Mustafa's pilgrimage is one that takes place mainly in the military, where he constantly confronts pain and death. His great task is to ward off the enemy and his underworld is the battlefield. The use of militarist language in the film climaxes during this stage. It is proudly told that Mustafa joined the First World War as a commander and became a colonel by coming into prominence as a brave and reckless soldier. During the Battle for Gallipoli, the voice-over notes, the Turkish army "fought off the occupant forces, saved Istanbul and changed the flow of history". At sunrise, "the slope was as red as blood". A commander visiting the front asks Mustafa where his forces are. Mustafa, standing alone in the red field, shows him the field of corpses lying in front of them and says: "Here are our forces! These dead bodies are my forces". This image suggests that Mustafa has completed his task in the underworld of the battlefield, namely to build Turkey on the ruins of the Ottoman Empire.[154]

Finally, after a succession of successes, the feeling of loneliness and a series of inner monologues take over. These become quite intense towards the end of the movie and Mustafa's life. Despite his success, he feels lonely and forgotten, as if "he is trapped in a cage". One night, while drinking raki at the dinner table, he starts to cry. When his stepdaughter asks why, he explains that he loves the country and its people so much that he cannot stand the thought of having to leave it at some point. This marks the last phase, what Leeming calls the "apotheosis", in which the hero reflects a "later desire, to be given special treatment by being taken out of the cycle and placed in a permanent state in relation to the cosmos and to the creator-father god" (8). Mustafa, trapped in the melancholy of loneliness and in the fear of death and being forgotten, searches for ways to become memorable, for instance by ordering the building of statues of himself. His attentiveness to the cultivation of his image into the future is a sign of a striving for immortality. In the eight and the last stage of the hero myth, the hero dies as a modern man, to be reborn as an eternal, universal, and perfected figure. The act of being reborn brings us back to the beginning of the movie, in

[154] Although there is one sentence in the movie which makes a statement regarding the discussions on the role of the army in contemporary politics in Turkey, implying that Atatürk was not in favor of the army interfering in the political realm, the rest of the narrative conflicts with this statement. Atatürk is not presented as reluctant in exerting his power from above. At some point, he becomes furious upon hearing the ambassador's wife claim that it is very hard to establish the Western way of living in Turkey and he writes in his diary: "If I have the necessary power, I can bring the social changes at once, with a coup. For, I do not believe, like many others, that you can do this slowly by convincing people one by one. My soul rebels against this idea! After so many years of education, examining the civilized life and society, spending my years to gain my freedom, why would I go down to the level of ignorant people? I would make them come up to my level. It is not me who should be like them, but it is them who should be like me".

which Mustafa is on his deathbed being resurrected as a child. This establishes a circle of immortality, of apotheosis, performed by the movie itself, which gives a kiss of life to the heroic figure of the nation-state, once more threatened and at risk of being forgotten at the time the movie was made.

The eight stages of the mythic hero's journey, namely birth, childhood, withdrawal, death, underworld, rebirth, quest and apotheosis, are followed by the movie in an almost too literal and didactical manner, giving shape to Mustafa's life and guiding how the viewer interprets this life and relates to it. With regard to the common pattern of heroism in mythology, Leeming argues that "we must go with the hero through his rites of passage. We must lose ourselves to find ourselves in the overall pattern of the cosmos. We must discover the image of man within the self" (7). This illuminates the task assigned to the viewer by the movie, which is to find the image of the leader "within the self" by following the stages in the hero's journey and identifying with him in this "cosmos" of the Turkish nation-state, since nobody can be Atatürk, but everyone can be Mustafa.

Although Leeming's categorization is helpful in detecting this structure, the Jungian framework that he follows, calling a return to the myths and be in harmony with these "primordial images of the subconscious", does not fit the way I conceptualize the employment of myths in the movie as narrative structures reproducing ideological patterns. I rather see them in terms of George Schöpflin's understanding of the myth as "intellectual and cognitive monopolies" that "nations establish and determine the foundations of their own being, their own systems of morality and values" (19). They are "a set of beliefs, usually put forward as a narrative (…) about the ways in which communities regard certain propositions as normal and natural and others as perverse and alien", which are crucial for the continuity of the community (Schöpflin 19). Thus, as opposed to Leeming's Jungian emphasis on the individual necessity of self-realization through reaching mythical unconscious, in *Mustafa* the invitation to follow this mythic journey is a way to reproduce the "intellectual and cognitive monopoly" on myths, vital for sustaining the national community, in this case through the popular representation of Atatürk's heroism on the cinematic screen (Schöpflin 19).

Mustafa's mythic journey provides the building blocks for the allegorical narrative of the movie, which connects individual stories to national ones, the past to the present, and the viewer to the movie in a relation of identification, keeping Atatürk's heroic characteristics intact while claiming to humanize him. Therefore, this act of reframing, which tries to bring an authoritative figure down to earth, cannot be thought separately from the allegorical and mythic burden that is put on the shoulders of this new "human". In the final section of this

chapter, I will explore further the tension between the portrayal of Mustafa's rational and weak features and his heroic and mythic picture, since this tension is central to this act of reframing and the ways in which it is dealt with is key to understanding the novel phenomenon of old heroes with new manners.

Human with a Capital H

The reason behind both the praise and criticism heaped on *Mustafa* was its depiction of Atatürk as a human being, as opposed to his traditional portrayal as a firm, inaccessible, invulnerable figure. Similar to the Atatürk of the Isbank advertisement, whose finger bleeds like any other human's, Mustafa is an ordinary person too. Thus, throughout his journey there is a seeming tension between the hero journey he follows and the flesh and blood Mustafa, who is afraid of the dark, who could only give a short speech after the declaration of Republic since he had just had his teeth pulled, whose marriages ended in divorce, and who, towards the end of his life, smoked three packs of cigarettes and drank fifteen cups of coffee and a big bottle of raki a day.

Özgür Taburoğlu, in his book *Urban Legends: Superstitions and Obsessions of Our Times* (2011), writes about the continuous need for superstition and the ongoing existence of obsessions in contemporary societies, as well as about the disenchantment processes that accompany the fairy tales and legends of today. In the Turkish context, he gives the recent ways in which Atatürk is depicted in photographs and movies as an example of this disenchantment process, pointing out that Atatürk is no longer portrayed as inaccessible (17). Taburoğlu claims that this renewal of the figure of Atatürk, perhaps unintentionally, undoes the legends that surrounded him and turns him into someone ordinary, who could eat and drink, who lived, got sick and died (17). However, this conclusion about the disenchantment of the Atatürk legend is too quickly reached, not only in view of the national allegories and mythical journey *Mustafa* reproduces, as I have shown above, but also because of the insidious way in which the seemingly disenchanting aspects of the movie work to strengthen the structures of national heroism. It is possible to claim that the significance of these structures is enhanced in this way, making the sacral "become part of everyday life, instead of being confined to a special place of worship" (Billig 51).[155]

[155] Here, Billig talks about national ceremonies turning into routines rather than intense experiences, which does not diminish their significance, but enhance it by integrating them more in everyday life.

The personality traits that can be seen as infelicitous, weak or infirm create a contrast, which, in the movie, is made to highlight the strength of Mustafa's personality, *despite* his weaknesses. The narration of his mistakes and flaws is mostly followed either by information about how quickly he detected and solved them or by pointing out how great he performed in another respect. For instance, Mustafa, who, upon his arrival in Istanbul, is fascinated by the city and starts drinking, dancing, and being impressed by women, pulls himself together in his second year at school. It is noted that he strays "only in one year" and, after it, immediately gets back to work; his behavior is further mitigated by the remark that "he was only 18 years old". Every act of weakness is treated as an excuse for showing the power he possesses to deal with it, as proof of his being a special person dealing with extraordinary tasks, and as an extra source of admiration since the tasks are accomplished "despite" the weaknesses. In a way, each and every limitation and obstacle that comes in Mustafa's way, from his dead siblings to his father's death, from his drinking habit and melancholia to the bullet that hits his heart, contribute to the enchantment of the heroic figure, just like the dragons Leeming's mythic heroes slay on their way to triumph. In this way, Mustafa becomes a demigod, carrying the characteristics of both this world and the other one, as opposed to a god who is limited to the latter.[156]

[156] Being a demigod brings the figure of Atatürk closer to the superheroes of popular culture who are mostly "super-heroes despite their human weaknesses". There is mostly an uneasy relationship between their heroic powers and their human qualities, which are crucial elements for the viewer to identify and have stronger ties with them. In a way, the weaknesses of the super-hero can be seen as leading to the empowerment of the viewer.

Figure 25: Stills from *Mustafa*.

The reframing of Atatürk's image as a demigod who is neither fully here nor there, between absence and presence, is apparent in one of the crucial visual methods employed in the movie, namely its use of the shadow in relation to Atatürk's image in a way that resonates with my discussion of ghostliness in the previous chapter. As I noted before, the movie was able to stave off the discussion of who is or is not capable of playing Atatürk by using different actors and not showing their faces fully. Yet, the lack of these faces and the insistent presence of Atatürk as a shadow also serve a broader function, working to preserve the cult figure's mystical and venerable air, despite the human attributes attached to him. Apart from Atatürk's actual photographs, the shadowy face dominates the film's visual regime, accompanied by other body parts: feet taking confident steps towards a definite goal, contours of a thoughtful face in the dark, long fingers holding a pen to write political texts or love letters, or a silhouette looking out of the window in contemplation (Figure 25). The viewer is not allowed to see Atatürk in total; she is given only some parts and has to bring them together herself.

This specific way Atatürk's image is treated appears in a crystallized way during the scene in which Mustafa goes to a costume ball in Sofia with the aim of making useful contacts with the Bulgarian elite. He chooses a costume that will make Bulgarians remember the times they were under the yoke of the Ottoman Empire and writes Istanbul to ask for a

janissary costume, with which he wins the costume competition. A Spanish photographer wants to take a picture of him. When his picture is being taken, the viewer sees Mustafa from the back and the photographer from the front. The scene conveys how the viewer, throughout the movie, lacks the position of the photographer, who can see the protagonist in full. This inability to see resonates, perhaps more habitually than deliberately, with the signifying modality of the ban on representing the prophet in Islam. During the taking of the photograph, the voice-over says: "this photo was the precursor of a leader who was about to step on the stage of history". The scene conjures an incomplete photo, yet to be developed, of a janissary yet to become a heroic soldier and national leader, exemplifying how the extent to which the human aspects of Atatürk are "brought to light" is circumscribed by what remains in the dark (including his very face), which is crucial in preserving and consolidating his heroic side.

Thus, rather than seeing the new narrative as a sign of a disenchantment process, as Taburoğlu claims, the hero's humanization and the sense of everydayness that is introduced can be seen as strengthening his position as what can be called Human with a capital H. Atatürk's reframed portrayal does not lead to the disenchantment of the hero-myth that surrounds him, but rather marks the enchantment of the human and the everyday as new ingredients of the myth that reinforce it. Hence, the seeming contradictions between Mustafa's coming into the world with the inevitable destiny of a messiah and his personality defined as non-fatalist and self-deterministic – in other words, his mythic and earthly characteristics – do not imply a paradox, but a successful combination of, in Berlant's words, "the sublime" and "the ordinary". The coexistence of the ordinariness and the sublimity of national identity is one of the key elements in the film, which focuses on the ordinary aspects of Mustafa's life while at the same time treating them as allegories standing for the sublime history of the nation as an inevitable thing in itself. In this sense, *Mustafa* reproduces the sublime in line with contemporary needs, combining the "domains of utopian national identification and cynical practical citizenship" (Berlant 406).

In addition, the attempt to show Atatürk's human side also stakes a claim to a more affective figure, capable of mobilizing the population in a more intimate manner than the portrayal of a sullen, strict figure about whose private life not much is known. While the figure remains equally heroic, Mustafa sets the affects in motion by additionally fulfilling his (and the viewers') "human needs". Thus, the moments at which Atatürk is depicted as weak are also the moments at which the viewer can worry about him, adding a new dimension to the relationship established with the figure on the screen. As Massumi states, "with

intensified affect comes a stronger sense of embeddedness in a larger field of life — a heightened sense of belonging, with other people and to other places" (2003: 214). In this case, the productive potential of affects can be seen to work to solidify Kemalist nationalism through an amplified sense of loyalty to the leader and the nation, which undermines the claim to novelty made by the film by in fact making national myths more accessible through mobilizing affects, metaphors, allegories and myths.

Ultimately, *Mustafa*, despite the statements made by its director and viewers, does not succeed in transcending the existing visual regime, but in fact stays firmly within it, with modifications that make it possible for the old heroes to survive with new manners, something that is needed in a context where icons are in danger of losing their iconicity. These new manners can be observed even in the movies about Atatürk, made after *Mustafa* and as a response to it. Thus, similar to the Isbank advertisement, *Mustafa* contributes to the survival strategy of contemporary image politics of nationalism by forming alliances between old hegemonic ideologies and new tools of popular culture/media, which create more contemporary, accessible and affective images. In this way, the heroic narratives and representations become more insidious, purporting to divert from the founding myths while giving them a "kiss of life".

There have been various different narratives that emerged during the decade under AKP rule attempting at constructing national identity based on other myths, heroes and narratives than the ones belonging to the official history of the Turkish Republic. The spreading of Ottoman sultans' stories in movies and TV series is the most evident example of this process. Through these products, alternative national pasts and myths are being constructed and different heroes created. Some examples of these figures are the Ottoman Sultan Süleyman Kanuni (The Magnificent in Western historiography) in the TV series *Muhteşem Yüzyıl* (Taylan Brothers, 2011), Mehmet II in *Fetih 1453* (Faruk Aksoy, 2011) or the Kurdish-Islamic thinker Said-i Nursi in *Hür Adam* (Mehmet Tanrısever, 2010). Although it is beyond the scope of this chapter, the analysis of the ways in which the appearance of these alternative figures challenge the Kemalism's monopoly on heroism and of the ways in which different heroes interact with each other on the screen would provide crucial insights into the changing national imaginations of Turkey.

In the next chapter, I will focus on another act of reframing a traditional image (that of Atatürk) in the context of contemporary art by analyzing Vahit Tuna's bust installation from the exhibition "We were always spectators…" in the art space DEPO, Istanbul, 2011. I have discussed the related but distinct ways in which commodified images, bio-images, ghostly

images and monuments, as well as the screen representations I discussed in this chapter, all attempt to act out and perform a unifying image of the nation. If one of the ways in which nationalism reproduces itself in everyday life is through these image acts by which people orient towards or away from each other, then it is crucial to look at the images that disorient these processes and make these image acts "unhappy". Thus, in the last part of this study, I will focus on the image acts that turn these narratives into sites of struggle in order to explore the possibility of "disorienting" national imaginations, both semantically and politically.

Chapter 5
Disorienting Images: A Bust with Multiple Faces

Making and Unmaking the Nation through Images

I have been exploring image acts which describe images that perform an action, playing an active role in shaping what they depict in the context of the nation, and people who act upon, through and with these images, constructing visual-national communities around them. I have looked at the different types of images through which these acts are performed, such as miniaturized commodity items, bodily accessories, masks, tattoos, flags made out of blood, ghostly apparitions, magnified monuments and media representations. I would like to start this chapter on what I will call "disorienting images" by describing a deviation from the image acts I have explored so far in the realm of contemporary art.

I will try to narrow the inevitable gap between the object itself and the text about the object by describing it in a way that comes as close to my experience of seeing it as possible. Therefore, I want to go back to January 2011 and enter the courtyard of one of the prominent contemporary art spaces in Istanbul, DEPO, formerly a tobacco warehouse. The weather is cold and the sky is dim. The courtyard seems a little depressing. After a moment, I realize that the depressing feeling is not totally independent from the bust I can see in a far corner of the courtyard, next to the second, smaller exhibition building. The bust, which looks exactly like the familiar Atatürk busts due to its material, style, and size, makes me feel like I am in a school building, or any other official institution for that matter. The architecture of the exhibition space amplifies this feeling since it is a former warehouse with concrete walls and small, barred windows. The dried leaves underneath the bust are also just like those in the schoolyards in the fall. As I walk towards the bust, with a disoriented feeling and a sense of curiosity stemming from not being able to place this object in this particular space, I realize that there is also something wrong with Atatürk. He is not quite as he should be; his face has slightly different proportions than usual. It is certainly an uncanny feeling; a familiar image becoming unfamiliar as I approach it. Then comes the final twist: the name written on the pedestal is Anthony Hopkins. I can formulate, retrospectively, that one of the first ideas that crossed my mind in this unexpected encounter with an "Atatürk bust" in an art space was that the images and objects of my research haunt me in a disturbing way wherever I go, which is probably the reason why they are my objects of analysis in the first place. When I had figured

out that the bust in fact portrayed Anthony Hopkins, I knew that it would end up in this chapter (Figure 26).[157]

Figure 26: Vahit Tuna's bust installation, from the exhibition "We were always spectators…" in DEPO, Istanbul, 2011.

The Atatürk-Hopkins bust, as I will refer to it since it does not have a title of its own, is a work by the well-known contemporary Turkish artist Vahit Tuna, and was placed in the courtyard within the context of his solo exhibition "We were always spectators…" in DEPO in 2011.[158] This bust works on various levels, as I will explore here, and provides a fruitful

[157] http://www.depoistanbul.net/en/activites_detail.asp?ac=44

[158] The bust was made by the sculptor Hatice Gür. See www.depoistanbul.net. The complete title of Vahit Tuna's exhibition as it appears in the exhibition catalogue is: "We were always

ground to discuss what I call disorienting images in the context of nationalism and the intricate relationship between art and politics. In the previous chapters, I have explored the unifying effect of images and their active role in constructing visual communities around which people gather and perpetuate various inclusion and exclusion mechanisms in everyday life. I have argued that national communities reproduce themselves in everyday life on the basis of a visual grammar through which people understand the world, express themselves and relate to others. I have looked at various image acts in different media that attempt to create a sense of bonding and a cohesive communitarian outlook, while at the same time drawing borders that separate people. Here, as a complementary move to that analysis, I turn to the realm of contemporary art and focus on disorienting image acts, which carry the potential to disrupt the way these visual communities work, both semantically and politically.

Mitchell is among the theorists who have explored the dual function of images in constructing and disrupting meaning by arguing that images are ways of "worldmaking", as well as ways of "unmaking" the various worlds they circulate in. They are "not simply manifestations of coherent world pictures or cosmologies whose myths and sacred geographies might be securely mapped and narrated, but sites of struggle over stories and territories" (2005: 196). The commodified images, the bio-images, the apparitions, the monuments and the media representations I discussed in the previous chapters, in related but distinct ways, actively shape such a coherent picture of the nation and "securely map and narrate" its myths and values, despite some of them also claiming to attempt to reframe them. Here, I will take a closer look at the images that turn these narratives into sites of struggle and challenge the nation's sacred geography, in a more deliberate manner than the young people of the neighborhood who enter the Atatürk monument's head and repurpose it. Analyzing the ways in which nationalist image acts are made "unhappy", as Austin defines the moments in which speech acts lose their effect, will contribute to the unmaking of the borders they draw, the ways of orienting they impose and the subjectivity they shape.

Nicholas Mirzoeff, rather simplistically, historicizes the dual aspect of visuality through the opposition between the heroes of the empire and the ones seeking emancipation by creating an "inverse visuality", which is "any moment of visual experience in which the subjectivity of the viewer is called into question by the density and opacity of what he or she sees" (70). Although the density and opacity Mirzoeff talks about is also crucial for the example I will look at, contrary to Mirzoeff, I will argue that there is no neat distinction

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spectators, we always scrambled for the tickets to become spectators, now there are more 'things' to see and tickets are never sold out…" The bust does not have a title of its own.

between the two realms of visuality and that the call to question subjectivity does not solely come from the image, but emerges out of the dynamics between the image and the viewer. Similarly, I will suggest that the density and opacity do not reside in the image (as representation) to be transferred to the viewer, but emerge in the relationship that the image and the viewer establish in a particular space and time.

There are two reasons why I find such an analysis crucial as the final step in my exploration of nationalist imagery. First of all, looking at the critical ways in which the order such images attempt to establish is disrupted provides further insights into the ways in which the dominant images work in the first place. The familiar, the ordinary, the oriented, and even the "oriental" need to be more or less established and stabilized so that they can be destabilized.[159] Images alluding to a nation, first of all, try to achieve such stabilization. What is disrupted uncovers the elements that were formerly stabilized in and by the image; in other words, moments of disorientation shed light on the orientation that is "dissed". As Ahmed puts it: "It is by understanding how we become orientated in moments of disorientation that we might learn what it means to be orientated in the first place" (2006: 6). Yet, images that disorient and contribute to the unmaking of larger exclusive constructs, such as nationalist imaginations, do not achieve a new stasis, but suggest a shaking of an ongoing orientation, hence, a loss of destination, conveying a sense of an ongoing ambiguity.

Second, the analysis of images that disorient allows me to discuss the relationship between aesthetics and politics through the ways in which images shape sites of struggle and act critically, getting closer to "political action". This reveals one of the crucial ways to make the normalized patterns of nationalism and identity politics more visible and the building up of alternatives more possible. Exploring this potential contributes to thinking of and relating to the social and the political outside of the national terms they are described in, both in the specific context of contemporary Turkey and with regard to a more general discussion of art and politics. I argue that this potential does not lie in constituting an "outside position" or in revealing the "truth" mystified by (nationalist) ideologies. Rather, it lies in the disorientation of stabilized signs in order to construct unusual configurations of meaning, affect, thought, and action. This quest is closely connected to the possibility of another world that would challenge the demarcations that an exclusive national identity brings about. To put it in Jill

[159] Although the notions of orientalism and the "oriental" are not within the theoretical framework of this analysis, Inge Boer's employment of the term disorientation, in her book *Disorienting Vision: Rereading Stereotypes in French Orientalist Texts and Images* (2004), is a productive source to explore the term's connection with orientalism.

Bennett's terms, it is about "how art and aesthetics encounter 'problems', how these practices reimagine social relationships in the face of such problems, and how they generate new spaces and terms of operation beyond the social identities already in place" (2012: 5).[160]

Artistic production is one of the more productive realms to explore the potential for disorienting the usual ways of seeing and transforming how culture and politics are defined and acted upon. There has been a proliferation of artworks dealing with controversial political issues in Turkey starting from the 1990s, especially after the oppressive 1980 coup d'état regime and the (auto)-censorship system it engendered became looser. The art critic and theoretician Erden Kosova distinguishes the rise of nationalism, civil war, the war between the army and the Kurdish guerrillas, and the violence in everyday life as the reinforcing factors in art dealing with political issues since in this period (2009, n. pag.). It is striking that, as the realm of the political is constricted due to the influence of nationalism, neoliberalism and conservatism in the 1990s and 2000s, the amount of "political works" in the contemporary art scene has increased.[161] In this period, works and collective exhibitions focusing on the issues of nationalism, discrimination, military coups, sexism, and human rights became significantly more visible. Thus, Tuna's work, which I analyze here, should be situated in the same historical period in which the other objects I have looked at (commodity items, bio-images, monuments, films, and so on) emerged as well, which is also a period in which nationalist practices were on the rise and were simultaneously challenged in various ways.[162]

However, the existence of these "political" artworks by itself neither constitutes conclusive proof of a critical atmosphere, nor implies a direct relationship between the

[160] The turn to deal with the world's political events by means of art in this period is not specific to Turkey. Jacques Rancière identifies, quite critically, the "return to politics" in art since the turn of the century, especially after the events of 9/11, in *Dissensus: On Politics and Aesthetics*. Bennett points to the same "return" as the direct and indirect consequence of 9/11 in her article "The Dynamic of Resonance: Art, Politics and the Political Event".

[161] It would, however, not be fair to say that the artworks of the 1990s were the first ones to deal with social and political issues. In Turkey, there have been artists and artworks resisting the dominant currents in art and politics since the 1970s, feminist women artists being the most significant. However, works dealing with issues of nationalism and national identity, especially by Kurdish artists, did become significantly more visible towards the end of the 1990s.

[162] Looking at the potential of art to create political spaces that challenge nationalism does not dismiss its significant role in the reproduction of the existing nationalist structures. Examples of this are as plentiful in government-sponsored, official, institutional, or even independent art circles in Turkey as elsewhere. For my purposes here, I focus on examples that attempt to undermine these structures. For an extensive analysis of the intimate relationship between art and nationalism, see Boynik and Hendriksson. Their book examines contemporary art as yet another effective structure through which "the Nation" is perpetuated, alongside structures such as army, police, church, schools, family, academia, and mass media.

political content of the works and their transformative impact. I argue that the presence of a rather explicit political content is not what necessarily constitutes the disorienting effect of images and that a detailed analysis of the particular tactics that generate the sense of disorientation is necessary. Kosova, with regard to certain images produced by artists in this period, argues that these gestures "that relied on a single visual effect and prompted astonishment/anger/smile seemed to be too fragile to resist instant consumption" (5). Rancière formulates a similar critique when he asks whether contemporary artistic images "can reshape political spaces or whether they must be content with parodying them" (2009: 60).

In this chapter, I focus on three essential tactics that I identify in Tuna's installation to explore what makes an image more resilient towards instant consumption and less willing to settle for parody. The attempts made in the context of contemporary art to deconstruct the scopic regime of Turkish nationalism arguably remain peripheral and limited in scope, yet they deserve close scrutiny as they enable us to better understand critical image acts and the possibilities of transformation that such tactics can open up. These tactics, which will be discussed in the following sections, are, respectively, the reconfiguration of the space in which the artwork resides, the superimposition of different visual elements, and the affective channels the work opens up. Firstly, the analysis of spatial reconfiguration will enable us to look at the role of distance and the lack of a fixed point to look at an art object, which turns the process of orientation into a series of disruptions and disorientations. I will analyze how the Atatürk/Hopkins bust challenges the positive correlation between physical closeness and the ability to better grasp an object, semantically and cognitively. Secondly, the analysis of the superimposition of images will provide a basis for looking at the role of the genre of portraiture and its subversion, as well as the association among faces, acting, and political representation. And thirdly, I look at the affective channels opened between the viewer and the work, which possibly challenge the representational fixities of national symbols, disorient what is familiar, mobilize the senses, and generate ambiguity. The analysis of these tactics, which do not allow the image to be absorbed in one fell swoop, will frame my conceptualization of disorientation and what it does in the context of the relationship between aesthetics and politics. This relationship will be explored in the fourth and final section by invoking Mieke Bal's, Ernst van Alphen's and Jacques Rancière's ideas on the political potential of art and situating my contribution to this potential with the concept of disorientation.

Space Reconfigured

As I described earlier, Tuna's bust was installed in the DEPO gallery's courtyard in a far corner away from the entrance door with its profile turned to the viewer. As one steps into the courtyard, there is no immediately recognizable work of art there, since the bust is not directly seen and is not registered as a work of art. After being perceived, unless the viewer already knew about the work, it is most likely to be taken as a common Atatürk bust, since it is a bronze statue on a black pedestal, the size of the usual Atatürk busts found in schoolyards and streets, which renders it unrecognizable as a work of art. Thus, the first relationship the viewer has with the "artwork" is not based on recognizing it as art. However, this phase is the first concrete step in the viewer's encounter with the work, before any engagement with its aesthetic appeal or enticing content.

Bal, in the opening sentences of her book *Of What One Cannot Speak: Doris Salcedo's Political Art* (2010) describes her first encounter with Salcedo's work "Shibboleth", the long crack the artist opened up in the Tate Modern museum's Turbine Hall floor in 2007:

> Sometimes you go to see an artwork, and when you enter the space, you look around in bewilderment. Where is the artwork? Then, retrospectively, you realize that first turn of your head was already a response – something the work had made you do. And so the game called "art" begins. (1)

This statement is relevant for understanding how Tuna's installation "begins" to work. The bust has a comparable effect, not so much in causing visitors to wonder where the artwork is at first, but more in provoking confusion about what an ostensibly non-artistic object is doing in an art space: what can Atatürk possibly be doing in a gallery courtyard? Has the building been turned into something else, or has he started watching over artists and artworks as well now?[163] Is it perhaps a remainder from the previous owners of the space, which cannot be easily removed, since it is usually a hassle to displace Atatürk statues?[164] Or am I just

[163] This is not a far-fetched idea, since at the entrance of Mimar Sinan Fine Art University in Istanbul a huge Atatürk quote about the difficulty of being an artist welcomes people.

[164] In her book on Atatürk statues, Tekiner explains that some Atatürk statues, which need to be removed for one or another reason, have to be buried since demolishing them is considered disrespectful (2010). Following the afterlife of this statue would be interesting, as is unlikely to share the destiny of "real" Atatürk busts.

imagining that it is him? These questions, unanswered for the moment, are not "mistakes" that have to or will eventually be left behind, but are in fact strongly included in how the work is experienced. Thus, a sense of confusion about the space that one is in, and about the placement of the objects within it, turns out to be an important part of the work itself, proving that as soon as one enters the courtyard, in fact, "the game called art" begins.

The viewer approaches the bust, both because it is in the direction of the building's entrance and because she is mobilized by the inevitable and semi-conscious recognition that the courtyard belongs to the art space and that, therefore, the bust must mean something else. Approaching it, most probably retaining the impression that it is Atatürk, the viewer realizes that there is something eerie about it. It does look like Atatürk, but not quite, which is confirmed after a few steps when the name Anthony Hopkins appears on the pedestal. The shifting thoughts and moods experienced in the process of approaching the bust and the confusion that accompanies it are described in a similar way to my own experience by the writer Pınar Öğünç:

> The little building next to DEPO looks like a small elementary school building. The golden yellow color of the bust, dry leaves on the floor, drizzling rain…Tricked by my unconscious, I could smell chrysanthemum. At the elementary school, it was mandatory to bring a bouquet of flowers for the ceremonies on the 10th of December [the anniversary of Atatürk's death] and put them next to the Atatürk bust. Now is also the season for chrysanthemum. This smell still reminds me of the December 10 ceremonies and the sound of children who read out touching poems.[165]

Following her description of the nostalgia evoked by the scene, Öğünç explains that she was content about not hearing of this work before, so that she had the luxury of being confused and falling into the trap the work had set for her. Confusion perhaps gives way to nostalgia as in Öğünç's case, which is then succeeded by other possible feelings, such as discomfort stemming from not being able to identify an image, awkwardness created by the gap between what one expects and receives, and joy due to the playful scene one finds oneself part of. The thoughts and feelings in relation to the object keep shifting and evolving as the viewer's position in space, as well as time, changes.

[165] My translation. For the original, see http://www.radikal.com.tr/Radikal.aspx?aType=RadikalYazar&ArticleID=1036750.

The distance between the subject and the object appears as a key factor in the signification process that the work triggers from the first instant. The moment at which one thinks "art did not begin yet" turns out to be the very moment that art begins; what was considered a non-artistic object turns out to be the art object itself; and what was thought to be an Atatürk statue turns out to be an Anthony Hopkins statue. What is striking is that these different phases do not necessarily exclude each other, but are constantly intermingling and shifting, depending on the viewer's expectations and distance. It is as though the apparently static and inanimate object sets invisible traps in the space around it, which in turn transforms the experience of the subject who orients herself towards it, turning the process of orientation into a series of disruptions and disorientations.

These different positions, which are not unidirectional but transitional, are made possible by reconfiguring the space in such a way that it provides various possible entry points into the work. The framing of the work does not allow a static point of view but turns the space into a heterogeneous one, full of traps, whose different locations offer different experiences. A crucial result of the fluctuations in the space around the object is that the viewer is deprived of her certainty about the sameness of the object, in a way that exceeds the effect of more familiar perspectival changes. A well-known national figure turns out to be a well-known international actor, disrupting the expected continuity between the signifier (the bronze, medium-sized, official-looking statue) and the signified (Atatürk). On yet another level, the disruption consists of the transformation of a work of art into a public statue, and then back to a work of art again, in various loops for different viewers. It may also remain a work of art for viewers who already know the trick, or it may remain a public bust for viewers who do not come close enough to experience the transformation.

It might seem as though, once the viewer's eyes are close enough to read the name of the famous actor on the pedestal and to realize that there is in fact no Atatürk statue in the exhibition space, the perception changes once and for all, and the continuity between the signifier and the signified is restored. It is not Atatürk, but Hopkins; it is not an official statue, but part of a contemporary art exhibition. Yet, this is not the case. It is true that one cannot go back to the entrance, walk towards the work again and feel the exact same confusion and surprise. However, although there are various possible ways of relating to the work, once one is standing by the bust, the discomfort is likely not to cease, despite the knowledge that it is a work of art that playfully superimposes the two images-identities. At this moment, the bust is indeed not seen as Atatürk anymore, but there is also a striking resistance in the eyes against

seeing it merely as Hopkins. The eyes almost do not register what the brain knows and keep seeing it as Atatürk to a certain extent, in a peculiar way.[166]

Through this cognitive dissonance, the work challenges the positive correlation between physical closeness and the ability to grasp an object semantically and cognitively. Although getting close to the bust somehow means to be exposed to its meaning, it in fact does not ease but amplify confusion. Hence, proximity ceases to be the guarantee of a better grasp and getting close to the object does not make it easier to "see" and know it. A gap opens between physical and cognitive contiguity, between senses and thoughts. This process has a strong temporal dimension as well since the spatial reconfiguration does not allow a linear temporality to be at work in the relationship between the viewer and the work. The viewer strays further from the familiar Atatürk image and the feelings that this image evokes as she gets closer to it in space and time. Yet, she does not exactly get close enough to Hopkins either, since the "Atatürk feeling" keeps pulling her back. The dried leaves around the work seem to contribute to this in a subtle way by reminding that they cannot be under Hopkins's pedestal, but only Atatürk's, just like in the schoolyards. While distance is relatively more secure, closeness becomes the source of an uncanny feeling, first operating within, and then shaking off the sense of familiarity. In this sense, the dried leaves, which seem to prevent the viewer from getting too close to the work, can also be seen as operating as a metaphor for the inevitable distance between the work and the viewer, and thus, between the national symbol and the person.

Indeed, what loses its familiarity is not a random image, but the image of Atatürk, one of the most familiar national symbols in the Turkish context, which is reproduced in myriad forms as I have explored throughout the previous chapters. It is this national symbol that slips away by being transformed into something else as one gets closer. Yet, at the same time, it does not cease to haunt the viewer as it slips away, in between absence and presence, across spatialities and temporalities, in a similar way to my discussion of ghostliness in the previous chapter. In this sense, the bust's relation to space, developed through the interplay between closeness and distance, can be seen as a metaphor resonating with the ways nationalist image acts work in general by asserting their totalizing premises while failing to fully realize them.

[166] The instability of perception experienced here, going back and forth between different interpretations, is similar to the "multistability" quality of perception defined by the school of Gestalt psychology. Gestalt psychology focuses on visual patterns that are too ambiguous or difficult for human perception to grasp, without attempting to explain the reasons behind this. The example at hand here allows me to explore the role of cultural and political memory in these perceptional shifts and the political implications of this sensory phenomenon.
On the multistability phenomenon in Gestalt psychology, see Kruse and Stadler.

Additionally, the striking resistance in the viewer's perception to seeing the bust as Hopkins, even after the "mystery" is solved, forces us to think of the tenacity of the culturally and politically shaped quality of our perception, and the difficulty of reshaping this habitual ground that our perception is fed from.

The reconfiguration of space achieved by the work cannot be thought without considering the specific location of the gallery and how the work makes use of it. DEPO is in the Tophane district, a neighborhood in which several new art spaces opened in the last few years and which is marked by the conflict between the old, lower-class inhabitants, mostly with Islamic/conservative backgrounds, and the new middle-class tenants (hence the art spaces) brought to the neighborhood through the ongoing gentrification processes.[167] Firstly, the transportation of a national sign common in public space such as an Atatürk bust into the space of the gallery can be seen as pointing at the gap between these different spaces, populations, and thus, political orientations and socio-economic classes. This gap, marked and enacted upon by the bust, might refer to the schism between the supposedly Islamic background of most of the population in the area and the secular outlook of the newcomers, as well as the class conflict and the cultural differences brought to the surface by the gentrification processes. This gap the bust might be referring to can also be interpreted, on a more general level, as the discrepancy between the common signs of public space, which are "banal" from art's perspective, and the signs of art within the gallery space, which might appear inaccessible and perhaps senseless from the perspective of the people outside and not interested in it. In each case, the bust makes the role of the threshold of the gallery more visible, which has symbolic value in separating different economic, cultural and political groups. It can, thus, be seen as underlining the class dimension of art with a self-reflexive and ironic tone, implying that an image transforms and changes its meaning depending on whether the viewer stands outside (Atatürk) or inside (Hopkins) the gallery space. In doing this, the work might be seen as deepening this gap between the two spaces by turning a familiar image into an opaque one, which is probably not accessible to the general public anymore since it is not easy to recognize Hopkins's face unless the name on the pedestal is read.

[167] For a detailed analysis of the gentrification process in the Tophane district and the role of the art galleries in it, as well as the recent conflicts between the inhabitants and the galleries, see Meltem Ahıska's article, "Monsters That Remember: Tracing the Story of the Workers Monument in Tophane" and Begüm Özden Fırat's "Bir Fotoğraf Bin Söze Bedel" (One Photograph is Worth a Thousand Words).

However, the act of bringing an object, which at first sight looks as if it is supposed to be out in the street, into the space of the gallery can also be seen in the opposite manner, as a bridge between inside and outside. Precisely by making the passerby or the inhabitant of the neighborhood affiliate with a sign in a space that they usually are not affiliated with, and by alienating the art viewer from the space she is affiliated with, the bust not only underlines the gap between the two spaces, but also confuses their borders by disorienting the viewers. In addition, the fact that the work is in the courtyard rather than inside the gallery proper makes it viewable also when the gallery is closed, making it a part of public space and its gaze more than is usually the case for artworks inside art spaces. In that sense, it creates the impression that the statue has escaped from the gallery space and the other works exhibited inside towards the streets, or, conversely, that a national sign has escaped public space to take refuge in the gallery space. Both possibilities disorient notions of inside and outside by blurring the boundaries between. In this sense, the bust can be seen as helping to make "living together a little bit easier" by having "fear and togetherness -join forces in a particularly *spatial* sensibility" (Bal, 2013: 67).[168]

Another work by Tuna in the same exhibition consists of roller blinds with Turkish flag motives that cover the windows of the exhibition space. The automatic flag blinds make a direct reference to the habit of hanging flags from windows, which became even more common within the period in which the exhibition took place, due to the nationalistic campaigns of the time. Putting the image of the flag on such a stable household object as a blind suggests that flags became part of the regular inventory of the house. The blind is also a special furnishing: hanging where private and public spaces meet, obscuring as well as revealing outside and inside to each other. The act of hanging a flag from a window is evidently performed to show it to others outside, yet closing the blinds is an act designed to hide the inside from the outside. Tuna's roller blind flags, which can be easily seen both from inside and outside the gallery, in a similar vein to the bust, creating a disorientation between the two, again showing the ambivalent spatial and semantic configurations that Tuna's works are based on.[169] This ambivalence invites viewers to think of the similar ambivalences

[168] Interestingly, during my personal conversations with the people working in and visiting the gallery, I was told that the people living in Tophane, who have a conflicting relationship with the new galleries, were content to have an "Atatürk bust" in their neighborhood, to the extent that some of them complimented the artist during the opening.

[169] Another similar example would be a photography work by Tuna that depicts the artist sitting inside a house, in front of the window, holding his hands up and seeming to grasp the Turkish flag hung from the window of a house in the opposite building between his fingers. We get the impression that he has a tiny flag between his two fingers until we realize that it is a full-sized flag hung at a distance.

between the private and the public, the official and the non-official, tactics and strategies, as well as power and agency in the context of the everyday production of nationalism.

There is no clear answer to the question above of whether the bust points at and deepens the cultural, political and economic gap between the inhabitants of the neighborhood and the people who visit the gallery, or whether it creates an unusual bonding between the different groups in its vicinity. Yet, as I have already argued, these two seemingly oppositional interpretations do not necessarily exclude each other, as the main characteristic of the work lies in being two things at the same time, which is also where its potential for disorientation lies. Similar to what Bal says about Salcedo's work, the relation of "irresolvable ambiguity" the work has towards representation is the key to its political effectiveness (2013: 73). Through the disorientation it creates, the bust invites viewers to think about spatial and cultural demarcations, while avoiding any definite answer. In this way, it questions the protocol that more or less determines when, how and by whom an artwork should be seen and experienced, and through which mechanisms it becomes eligible as an artwork. Thus, the negotiation of the space conducted by this particular object can be seen as also a negotiation of the place of art and the place of the viewer in her relationship with it.

Bal's theorization of the significance of the artwork's "field" sheds light on this particular way spatiality functions in Tuna's work. In Bryson's words:

> The meaning of a work of art does not, for Bal, lie in the work by itself but rather in the specific performances that take place in the work's "field": rather than a property the work has, meaning is an event; it is an action carried out by an *I* in relation to what the work takes as *you*. (2001: 5)

The distance-specific appearances that the bust takes on and the demarcations it invites viewers to think about can be seen as such a specific performance that shapes what Bal calls the work's "field". The bust is a productive example to make explicit how this field is a heterogeneous, shifting ground, generating different meanings depending on the point that the viewer occupies in space. Thus, meaning becomes an "event" molded by interaction, rather than being the "property of the work" as Bal argues. It is produced precisely at the moments

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For images of the roller blind flags, see http://www.radikal.com.tr/yazarlar/aysegul_sonmez/vahit_tunanin_sergisine_neden_gitmeliyiz-1037651.

in which the positions of the viewer and the artwork are negotiated and their encounter takes unexpected turns, since there is no determined beginning or end point in this interaction. Thus, what shapes the experience is not a possible destination, but a sense of disorientation, which makes the work more likely to resist immediate consumption by requiring more time and effort from the viewer to make sense of it, a sense that is perhaps never fully stabilized.

Thus, the effect of disorientation stems from the lack of a coherent and linear narrative, which is, as I have argued, achieved through the configuration of the work's field as heterogeneous and dynamic. Bal claims that visual images are almost always narrative in different ways and argues for certain cultural objects that challenge the notion of narrativity; images that do this do not always tell stories, but "they perform one, between image and viewer" (2003: 37). On these occasions, they challenge the notion of narrative, explore its limits, and extend its meaning by undermining the "referential fallacy attached to narrativity" (2003: 38). It is productive to think of the challenge to narrativity in relation to space by considering how the bust rejects the notion of a starting point and a destination in its field, and underlines, or rather undermines, the implications of distance and the assumed spatial limits of the work. It opens up a space of performance "between image and viewer" by not telling an explicitly decipherable story and not allowing a fixed position for the viewer, but rather encouraging multiple interpretations and providing various entry points. As such, this performance carries the potential to create what Rancière calls "folds and gaps in the fabric of common experience" by disorienting the usual ground on which someone's encounter with an artwork, as well as with a national symbol, takes place (2008: 11). I argue that the proliferation of interpretations and the resistance to the fixity of the meaning/content of the work is one of the key elements in constituting the disorienting effect of the work. While the reconfiguration of the spatial codes is one of the means through which this is achieved, the superimposition of images that I will analyze in the next section is another tactic that allows exploring the sources of disorientation further.

Images Superimposed

Figure 27: Vahit Tuna's bust installation, from the exhibition "We were always spectators…" in DEPO, Istanbul, 2011.

The particular ways in which the face of the bust is formed comes forward as another crucial locus for the disorienting effect of the work, which is strongly related to the spatial reconfiguration, yet deserves special attention. It is not only a significant factor for the initial assumptions made about the work, but is yet another source of shifting perceptions and senses. Since what is at stake is a face combining two faces, firstly, it is fruitful to look at the genre of portraiture to understand the role of the face and how the "two faces" relate to each other.[170] In *Portraiture: Facing the Subject* (1997), Joanna Woodall defines one of the goals of the genre of naturalistic portraiture as rendering "a subject distant in time, space, spirit, eternally present" (8). Therefore, "a 'good' likeness will perpetually unite the identities to which it refers" (17). For Woodall, this is the reason why, in traditional Western art discourse, portraiture was based on exact resemblance and ideal likeness, which is thought to refer to the inner subjectivity of the portrayed. Similarly, Richard Brilliant, in *Portraiture* (1991), defines the distinctiveness of the genre as "the necessity of expressing this intended

[170] Although an analysis could be made of the distinct ways in which a two-dimensional portrait and a three-dimensional bust work, the dynamics of conventional portraiture outlined here are at work in both.

relationship between the portrait image and the human original" (7). The portrait is supposed to function as proof of the existence of the portrayed and his authentic personality. In this sense, we can say that the portrait works metonymically, standing for the depicted person's wholeness. As Lakoff and Johnson also argue, the tradition of portraits, then, is based on the metonymic assumption that it stands for the person, as opposed to the body for instance (38).[171]

In *Art in Mind: How Contemporary Images Shape Thought* (2005), Ernst van Alphen elaborates critically on this relationship between the proof of existence assumed by the portrait and the authority that is attributed to it. He argues that there is a dual process determining the relationship between authority and portrait: it is not only likely that the person was portrayed in the first place because he had some kind of authority, but authority is constantly attributed to him because he has been portrayed (22). Atatürk's portraits, which, as I explored in previous chapters, appearing in a range of fields, mostly showing the intimidatingly serious and thoughtful expression of an important person dealing with important matters, clearly show this dual process.

Van Alphen extends his argument on authenticity by focusing on the notion of representation and argues that "the qualifications authenticity, uniqueness, or originality do not belong to the portrayed subject or to the portrait or portrayer but to the mode of representation that makes us believe that signifier and signified form a unity" (2005: 24). On this basis, he concludes that the bourgeois self depends on this specific mode of representation in order to appear authentic. This argument has explanatory value for the portrayal of cult figures of the nation-state like Atatürk, who can also be included in the conception of the bourgeois self, as authentic and heroic figures of modernity and nation-state. What is more important in Van Alphen's discussion for the case of Tuna's bust is his emphasis on the illusion of the uniqueness of the portrayed subject that stems from the assumption of a unity between the signifier and the signified and its possible undermining: "As soon as this semiotic unity is challenged the homogeneity and the authenticity of the portrayed subject fall apart" (25).

The claim made, in classical portraiture, to a stable identity, an inner subjectivity and authenticity in a form of representation that strictly unites the signifier and the signified, is

[171] Lakoff and Johnson give the following example: "If you ask me to show you a picture of my son and I show you a picture of his face, you will be satisfied. You will consider yourself to have seen a picture of him. But if I show you a picture of his body without his face, you will consider it strange and will not be satisfied. You might even ask, 'But what does he look like?'" (38).

pertinent to the classical monumentalization of Atatürk that I discussed in Chapter 3.[172] Tuna's work can be said to use the form of the monument and the genre of portraiture against themselves, challenging both the promises of portraiture and the codes of monumentalizaton, such as authenticity, representational directness, immediate access to the person depicted, and a cohesive identity, which are crucial characteristics for nationalist myths to be perpetuated. Through his discussion of artists like Cindy Sherman and Christian Boltanski who contest the mimetic conceptions of representation by using portraiture in unusual ways, Van Alphen shows "how a genre can be liberated from its history by means of exposing that history so that it can become an arena for new significations" (47).[173] As a result, portraiture can become "the form of new conceptions of subjectivity and new notions of representation – a genre that does not take its assigned place in history but embattles what history had naturalized" (47).

By undermining the viewer's preconceptions about the portrait genre, which are inevitably shaped by the visual histories of the society she forms part of, and by making her oscillate between different meanings, Tuna's bust challenges the promise of the portrait to transfer a singular meaning through the unity of what is in front of the eyes and what it is thought to refer to. The face, by being Atatürk only briefly, does not provide the cohesive identity and the stable reference points promised by his usual portraits. Thus, it disorients the fixed subject position of the viewer, creating confusion, turning the face from a source of fixity into a cause of disorientation. In Bal's terms, it turns the face from "the classical 'window of the soul' into an 'inter-face'" (2009: 122). In this way, the face refuses to open onto a particular person's soul and instead becomes an "interface" through which the work is experienced and conventional ways of seeing are negotiated.

[172] In the third chapter on ghostliness and monumentalism, I also explored a range of practices, from the strict rules and behavioral codes with regard to monuments to their use in rituals of commemoration and the criminalization of their vandalization. These practices show that monuments can operate in a way that goes beyond mere symbolism; they are thought to "be" the real, authentic figures in a way that closes the gap between the monument as sign and that which it signifies.
[173] For a discussion of the ways in which other twentieth-century artists have challenged authentic portraiture, see Van Alphen's chapter on "The Portrait's Dispersal" in *Art in Mind: How Contemporary Images Shape Thought*.

Figure 28: Hakan Akçura, "Defaced Atatürk", *Fear of God* Exhibition in Hafriyat Gallery, Istanbul, 2007.

Understanding the specific ways in which Atatürk's face is turned into an "interface" and in which familiar ways of seeing are reshuffled requires looking at what the superimposition of these two specific faces does in more detail. It is striking that the superimposed face is not that of a controversial and oppositional figure or a political leader, which might have triggered a stronger reaction in the viewer. It is neither a sheer "defacement" of Atatürk, as in the case of Hakan Akçura's artwork entitled "Defaced Atatürk", which was displayed in the exhibition *Fear of God* in the Hafriyat gallery in Istanbul in 2007 (Figure 28).[174] Akçura's work, which consists of a black-and-white poster depicting a well-known Atatürk image with the face rendered blank, employs the same theme as Tuna's bust, which is not dealt with often in art history in Turkey. The defaced Atatürk is at first sight reminiscent of Tuna's bust in that it, too, creates an eerie feeling of encountering something else where you expect to see a familiar face, that of the national leader. Yet, the defaced image, as a mere act of negation, does not allow the viewer to explore the

[174] http://hakanakcura.com/2009/06/.

ambiguities in the same active way as the more ambivalent act of superimposing two faces does.[175]

While the defacement in Akçura's work is based on and feeds off the momentary shock it creates, the superimposition of two faces invites a reading that actually involves a multiplicity of roles and faces. It is important that the relationship between the two faces is neither exactly one of juxtaposition nor one of replacement. Thus, whereas defacement turns presence into absence, the disorienting effect of superimposition stems from the lingering in between. Oscillation, then, seems to be a more suitable way of describing the bust that is in constant flux from one person to another. This is also the source of disorientation due to the lack of a fixed destination of meaning and for representation. Hence, the challenge to conventional portraiture made by the bust is based on simultaneity rather than serialization and on the co-existence of different elements rather than on one coming after another to replace it.

The other face that co-exists with Atatürk's is not a random one but that of an internationally acclaimed and successful actor, who has enacted a variety of characters from the American president Nixon to the famous scary and evil characters of Hannibal and Dracula. In addition to this, as I discussed in the chapter on Atatürk's media representations, Hopkins was also one of the candidates to play Atatürk in the Hollywood movie that was supposed to be made in 1997. Although the movie was never realized, the fact that Hopkins was one of the actors whose name was uttered frequently in relation to the main part makes it possible to see the bust as a belated completion of Hopkins "playing" Atatürk, a reference that can be read in multiple ways. Despite the hesitations about the appropriateness of making a movie about Atatürk, it was possible to detect some pride among people from the cinema sector and authorities in the plan to have a world-famous Western artist bring Atatürk to life

[175] Before the *Fear of God* exhibition opened on 10 November 2007, the Islamic conservative newspaper *Vakit* targeted it and asked people to "react to it" (http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/gundem/7639192.asp?m=1). The artists were worried about people's possible reactions during the opening, so they decided to provide security. During the opening, there were approximately three hundred people, six undercover policemen, and three security guards inside. The policemen, who were there to protect the artists, were instead focused on three specific posters in the exhibition and recorded them with photo and video cameras. After about forty minutes, a chief officer and several other policemen with official suits arrived, including members of the "Prevention of Terrorist Acts" team. They started to examine the three posters and interrogated the artists about them. Apparently not satisfied with the answers, they told the artists that the posters would be investigated further and that they would inform the office of the public prosecutor. It is ironic that although it was the Islamic newspaper that targeted the exhibition, the posters that were subject to police inquiry were not the ones about God and Islam, but the ones about Atatürk, including Akçura's "Defaced Atatürk".

on the screen. In addition, Hopkins's accepted talent and fame, the "Sir" in front of his name, and his ties with royalty cause him to be perceived as a powerful figure, much like Atatürk. The long and ambiguous relationship of the Turkish Republic with "the West", as well as the ongoing discussions at the time about joining the European Union, add other possible layers of meaning to the superimposition of Atatürk's face with that of a Western actor. In fact, considering the pride evoked by a national figure becoming even more internationally known through a famous and respected Hollywood actor makes it possible to see the inclusion of his persona as adding to the power of the bust, rather than a simple act of erasure or subversion. Although it is obvious that invoking two authoritative faces at the same time does not necessarily make a bust more powerful, and although in this case it evidently remains an ironic gesture, these two figures feed into each other in intricate ways, instead of creating a simple antagonism.[176]

Consequently, it is difficult to answer the question of whether Hopkins only detracts from Atatürk's "authentic power" or also adds to it. On the one hand, the extra face undermines the one that was first seen; on the other hand, it builds upon it. Hopkins's face enters into a certain dialogue with Atatürk's and the viewer witnesses their interaction as the face resists settling into one character and the senses resist seeing it as one person. In this way, Atatürk's face, as a sign, is made part of a more complicated reference system, instead of merely being erased and replaced with another. This ambivalence that the choice of Hopkins allows the bust to sustain is, I want to argue, another crucial element in constituting the disorienting effect of the work. The questions about the two faces that are left unanswered do not allow the viewer to hold a stable position and keep her contact with the work in constant movement and ambiguity. This maneuver enables what Bal, in her understanding of political art, identifies as "debate with 'antagonists' rather than the "rejection and exclusion of 'enemies'" (2010: 24). The prevalent, dictating image of Atatürk, which is the main subject of Tuna's work, enters into a debate on various levels, is made to speak, rather than being silenced and rejected altogether, opening up more space for the viewer in choosing how to relate to it, actively.

In addition, the various roles and personalities played by or assigned to the cult figure of Atatürk, depending on the historical period, the political orientation and the interests of the

[176] The distortion of Atatürk's features has an additional personal relevance for the artist. In 1995, Vahit Tuna applied to the "Today's Artists" group with his hand-painted Atatürk portraits and was not accepted due to the inadequate quality of the drawings. The deliberately malformed bust can thus be seen as a personal revenge. It can also be read as a reference to the expectation that artists in Turkey should be able to draw Atatürk "well".

person who employs it (even if the claim to authenticity remains intact in each case), are emphasized by turning him into an "actor". Due to the multipurpose employment of Atatürk's public persona, as well as the general effect of cultification and iconization, it is impossible to discern a real person behind this face. The replacement of his iconic face with the face of an actor whose main task is to play other people underlines the performative character of Atatürk's image in the political history of Turkey. The possession of Atatürk's face by an actor, then, can be seen as a reference to the theatrical and performative quality of politics and the figure of the politician.

Maaike Bleeker's argument about the relationship between aesthetic/semiotic representation and political representation allows us to see that this association is not necessarily a direct reference to falseness or insincerity. Bleeker cites Mitchell's definitions of aesthetic representation as things standing for other things and political representation as persons acting for other persons (250). Mitchell states that, despite the differences, these two forms of representation are structurally similar, which can be best made visible with a reference to theater and role-playing. Bleeker, however, argues that what is at work in the function of representation in politics is not a structural similarity with theater, but a "structural confusion" (249). She argues against the association of theater with "falseness, artificiality, and exaggeration" as opposed to "something more true, more authentic, and more sincere", which boils down to the "old anti-theatrical prejudice" (251). Instead, she contends that the theatrical quality or insincerity are not what is problematic in politics, as in fact they are the foundation of representative government, with politicians not elected to be sincerely themselves in the first place. Tuna's statue, oscillating between a politician and an actor, reinforces this point by invoking the foundational theatricality and performativity, as well as "confusion" that is at the core of representational politics and the position of leadership. From this perspective, the oscillating face, which is in fact not two but many faces and none of them at the same time, point to the impossibility and needlessness of the search for authenticity and sincerity in representational politics and, I would add, in the manifestations of national identity.

Additionally, the bust and its invocation of a famous actor can be interpreted as making a statement about the cult political figure of Atatürk being part of the "society of the spectacle", which is explicitly referenced in the title of the exhibition: "we were always spectators…". The notion of the spectacle, in the sense that Debord used it not as "a collection of images", but as a "social relation between people that is mediated by images", emphasizes not the images per se, but the alienating relationships between people and the

illusionary sense of community created through them (25). The increasingly visible process of Atatürk's image becoming part of popular culture in the form of movies and commodity items in the same period in which the artwork was made makes this reference stronger and, like the exhibition title, accentuates the position of the spectator. In this way, the viewer's act of watching is also stressed over Atatürk's usual surveilling character, making the viewer more active, even in the spectacle.

Thus, I would argue that the power of the bust does not stem from its critique and "détournement" of the spectacle, but from its embracement and amplification of it, as well as from commenting on the complicit role of the viewer in its production.[177] Rather than providing the necessary knowledge and formulas of action to get rid of the nationalist spectacle and its theatricality, as embodied by the image of Atatürk, it emphasizes and magnifies the various layers in the spectacle and the spectator's gaze by superimposing the faces of a national leader and a famous actor in the form of an official bust. In this sense, Rancière's intervention in the Debordian critique of the spectacle helps carry the understanding of what the bust does with the notion of spectacle and spectator further. Rancière argues that the passive spectator was challenged by Brecht's epic theater and Artaud's theater of cruelty in favor of a spectator who must, on the one hand, become more distant, and on the other, lose his distance and end up with a more "active way of looking" (2009b: 6). Rancière argues that the oppositions between looking/acting and passivity/activity assume a gap, an inequality between different groups of people. He invites us to dismiss these oppositions in order to conceptualize looking as a form of acting and the spectator as already active.

This understanding resonates with my emphasis on not looking *at* but looking *with* images in my attempt to highlight the performative power of image acts. The spectator interprets what she looks at, which is already a form of transforming it for Rancière, as opposed to the alienated subject position immersed in the spectacle in Debord's understanding. In the case I am discussing here, the title of the exhibition, "we were always spectators…", and the bust itself, can be seen under the light of Rancière's logic that the spectator might not be as passive as she is assumed to be, suggesting that nationalism does not simply create spectacles to be consumed by spectators passively, but that the spectator is

[177] The tactic of "détournement" is defined by Situationist International, the French political and artistic collective active in the 1950s and 1960s, as "the mutual interference of two worlds of feeling, or the bringing together of two independent expressions" in a way that would supersede "the original elements and produce[s] a synthetic organization of greater efficacy" (Debord qtd. in Knabb 55).

complicit in its construction, as well as its deconstruction. This increased agency of the spectator in Tuna's work is also strongly connected to the fact that the work does not give directions to follow, but bases itself on ambiguity and disorientation. As such, it mobilizes the senses in a curious way, which is the last disorienting aspect of the work that I want to explore.

Affective Engagement

In the previous chapters, I focused on the affective ways in which the nation is performed and the borders of national communities are drawn through images and looked at the significant role affects have in perpetuating these borders in different fields of everyday life. Here, I argue that, alongside the role of affects in maintaining and justifying existing exclusionary social structures, their potential for transforming them should be analyzed in order to expand the conceptualization of the notion of affect and its role in the construction and challenging of national identity. Tuna's work allows me to focus on this latter aspect, since its ambiguous relationship with representation opens up an affective channel through which the viewer relates to the work.

The bust is neither a familiar national symbol, nor an easily recognizable counter-symbol, but oscillates in-between, thus challenges any solid representational basis on which the viewer makes sense of it. It works through an intervention on the level of the senses and the habitual experience offered by what I have been calling the national/visual communities. Thus, the impact of the bust lies not in its representation of "the other" who is left outside the borders of national identity, but in its opening up of an affective realm in the "field" of the work. Kate MacNeill makes a distinction between, on the one hand, what she calls the "identity art" of the 1980s, which was based on representing an identifiable other and, on the other, artworks that disrupt the binary of self and other, and are based on a non-unitary understanding of subjectivity, which open up more space for political intervention (118). Tuna's bust can be situated in the latter category, since in such artworks the identity invoked is not that of an other, but of the viewer, which "provokes the affective response wherein lies the possibility of a politically strategic moment" (118).

Similarly, Van Alphen, in "Affective Operations of Art and Literature", argues that we need to focus on the affect dimension to explore contemporary artworks, since the way they work is through the transformation of affects, which is also the source of their political impact. He pinpoints the popularization of affect as a scholarly term and argues that its

abundant usage mostly remains rather vague. Though affect is frequently used as a synonym for notions of the personal or subjective, Van Alphen emphasizes that it is in fact just the opposite, namely social. Therefore, what is usually described as personal voice is articulated as affective by Van Alphen and positioned against "sloganeering art" or "assertive or didactic modes of communication" (21). In a similar vein, Bal defines affect as "intensity circulating in the domain of the sensible, between work and viewer, and without specific semantic content", considering them the "primary material for politically effective art" (2013: 67).

However, positioning of affect against "explicit political content" and "slogans" might be said to carry certain risks, such as ignoring the possible transitions between these two realms. This formula, which may not find its reflection in practice in such sharp and binary terms, positions artists such as Barbara Krueger and Roni Horn on opposite sides, and carries the risk of preventing us from seeing the shifts in between different artistic grammars. Van Alphen rightly argues that the political cannot be reduced to a slogan; yet, one could add that a slogan, or explicit political content, can also not be reduced to a didactic instruction devoid of affect. I argue that a focus on the affective dimension of the artwork should overcome the assumption that direct and explicit political content is necessarily less affective and thus less politically effective. In fact, it is hard to categorize an artistic element as either strictly "sloganeering" or strictly "affective", since a work can include both of these aspects at the same time, just as a slogan can work affectively and an affect might function in a sloganeering way. Tuna's bust provides an example of a work that has a rather explicit political content and a strong affective dimension at the same time. I find it important to maintain this critique while acknowledging the importance of affect for the political impact of this work and of art in general.

In the case of Tuna's bust, it is perhaps less the lack of a specific semantic content and more the lack of a fixed semantic content that makes it work affectively. Its semantic content is not undetectable, yet the senses trying to detect it are not allowed to settle in one particular interpretation. In this way, it is similar to the "visual tricks" Shlomith Rimmon-Kenan writes about that "constantly tease the eye and never let our interpretative faculty come to rest" (9). She points out that two mutually exclusive images which are perceived alternately (duck or rabbit) create an "impossible" situation for us, the viewers, in which we cannot hold them both and cannot find clues for choosing one rather than the other: "all we can do is oscillate between the two conflicting readings as long as we join in the game" (10).

Rimmon-Kenan employs the notion of ambiguity to define these "mutually exclusive" objects, which makes it impossible and undesirable to choose: "when the two hypotheses are

mutually exclusive, and yet each is equally coherent, equally consistent, equally plenary and convincing, so that we cannot choose between them, we are confronted with narrative ambiguity" (10). This formulization explains clearly what happens on the level of the senses relating to space and visuality, since every different spatial position brings another experience and Atatürk's and Hopkins's faces cannot be seen at the same time. These spatial and visual narratives are equally convincing narratives. Hence, the work does not reject representation as a tactic and a technique, but unfixes the anchor of representation, and thus, starts working more affectively. Ambiguity, then, can be identified as an important way in which the effect of disorientation can be made to work affectively.

However, Rimmon-Kenan's account does not adequately explain the source of the affective and semantic power of Tuna's work, since it is only through the togetherness of the incoherent facts, which are more than just two in this case, does the effect of the work emerge in this case. In that sense, the conflicting readings are not mutually exclusive as Rimmon-Kenan argues, but complementary, gaining meaning from each other's presence, since neither Atatürk nor Hopkins alone would be enough to make suggestions about the intricate relationship between people and prevalent national symbols frozen in the form of busts, the claimed authenticity of portraiture, and the mystified theatricality of representation. Hence, the presence of the alternative loci in the work that gain meaning from each other is different than Umberto Eco's "open work" and Roland Barthes's "infinite plurality", as well as Rimmon-Kenan's "ambiguous work", which she differentiates from the first two due to the existence of two strictly opposing and mutually exclusive systems. The bust is neither infinitely open, calling for multiple readings "without any necessary relation, any necessary 'propositional operation' to link them", nor does it consist of two oppositional and exclusive systems as in Rimmon-Kenan's "ambiguous work", since the two main loci of the work and the ambiguity they create is precisely the source of the effect of the bust (13). Thus, in this case, the incompatibility between the two images is not the source of exclusivity, but a curious basis for a jointly built meaning. Rimmon-Kenan's definition of ambiguity as simultaneously calling for choice and making it impossible to choose between disjuncts that both "refer to the totality" is similar to what the bust does (15). Yet, the bust differs from Rimmon-Kenan's account through the disorientation of the senses, which is the source of the political impact of the work, since the impossibility of the two claims to totality is precisely the source of meaning both for each disjunct and for the work as a whole.

In addition, it is productive to think of how the bust works affectively in relation to Rancière's definition of the aesthetic experience, the political effect of which is affiliated

with a certain loss of destination that "disturbs the way in which bodies fit their functions and destinations" (2008: 11). This political effect does not try to convince the viewer about what has to be done and does not frame a new collective body, but is rather

> a multiplication of connections and disconnections that reframe the relation between bodies, the world where they live and the way in which they are "equipped" for fitting it. It is a multiplicity of folds and gaps in the fabric of common experience that change the cartography of the perceptible, the thinkable and the feasible. (2008: 11)

This intervention into to the fabric of common experience and the reshuffling of the habitual paths of perception and action are best achieved by what Rancière calls the "metamorphic image", which attempts to displace the representational quality of imagery "by changing their medium, by locating them in a different mechanism of vision, by punctuating or recounting them differently" (2007: 27).

Rancière classifies the images exhibited in contemporary art spaces into three categories: naked, ostensive and metamorphic. According to this categorization, the naked image does not constitute art because "what it shows us excludes the prestige of dissemblance and the rhetoric of exegeses" (2007: 22). Photographs of the Nazi camps constitute an example of this category; although signed by famous artists, what they do is witness a reality that can scarcely be represented in any other way without interpreting it. The ostensive image also "asserts its power as sheer presence, without signification", but this time in the name of art. It includes, in its presence, its relationship with media, discourses around it, institutions and its historicization (23). The metamorphic image is a more modest type of image that questions the radicalism of its powers and plays with the products of imagery, rather than mystifying them. In this way, it is distinguished form those forms claiming to represent reality without interpretation (naked image) or confining themselves to self-reflexivity within the rather safe frame of art and settling for different forms of representation rather than challenging the notion of representation itself (ostensive image). Rancière is careful not to formulate these three categories as able to function only within their own limits, since each category is forced to borrow something from the others, making them transitive in their functioning to a certain extent.

A metamorphic image plays on "the ambiguity of resemblances and the instability of dissemblances, bringing about a local reorganization, a singular rearrangement of circulating images" (Rancière, 2007: 24). As such, this type of image transforms "the distribution of the

sensible", which is the structure that determines "who can have a share in what is common to the community based on what they do on the time and space in which this activity is performed" (Rancière, 2004: 13). Rancière associates this transformation with the clash of different senses and the suspension of the sensible that is at work in the community. In this way, the stable codes of the representative regime with regard to the distinction between appearance and reality can be questioned. The affective aspect of an image can be thought of, independently from the specific or fixed semantic content of the work, precisely in this ability to intervene in the "distribution of the sensible" that is at work in a community. In this positioning, the affective dimension of the work helps us to see the ways in which an image becomes eligible to the senses and how it may intervene in the usual path of this eligibility.

The affective reactions that the Atatürk-Hopkins bust triggers, as explored through the reconfiguration of space and the superimposition of images, can be thought of in this framework. The work puts the viewer in a quarrel with her senses and visual habits, since her perception does not stay in one sensory phase for long, but instead goes back and forth among them, like ascending and descending M. C. Escher's stairs.[178] This process of a constant questioning of the relationship between appearance and reality is experienced not so much as a systematic and detectable stream of thoughts as in an affective manner. Thus, the bust does not change the viewer's perception through a revelation, nor by a formulation of a political critique. The encounter with the bust does not liberate the viewer by providing a particular knowledge or inviting her to be detached from or take part in a particular community. Nor does it claim to be "the privileged medium that conveys the knowledge or energy that makes people active" (Rancière, 2009b: 15). Rather, it provides a different sensory experience in relation to what is "common to the community", in this case to the realm of national symbols. It deliberately misreads and misrepresents the usual codes and signs of the visual culture, makes its "image acts" unhappy and builds an affective play on them.

Thus, the affective dimension is crucial for the disorienting effect of the image since it conveys a sense of ongoing ambiguity, rather than the achievement of a new stasis. In this sense, disorientation, by allowing an interaction that does not yield to a destination but rather anchors in oscillation, differs from the notion of redistribution, which seems to assume a new settling. Although the disorienting images act by challenging the existing distribution of the sensible and thus the familiar ways of seeing, acting and thinking, they do not so much

[178] The Dutch artist M. C. Escher's lithograph prints *Relativity* (1953) and *Ascending and Descending* (1960) are examples of works known for creating constant shifts of perception.

redistribute them as make the viewer oscillate between different possibilities. As Ahmed argues, "'getting lost' still takes us somewhere; and being lost is a way of inhabiting space by registering what is not familiar" (2006: 7). Disorientation, as a way of inhabiting space by itself, created by the alteration of the senses and the re-shuffling of affects, meanings and appearances, as well as the codes concerning artistic forms, monuments and national symbols, constitutes the political power of the work, which I want to explore in a broader context in the last section of this chapter.

"Spectral Dust": Art as Agent

The disorienting effect of art, in the case of Tuna's bust, mainly works through the three channels I have explored, namely the reconfiguration of space, the superimposition of images, and the affective engagement the work encourages the viewer to have with it. In all three tactics, a certain ambiguity dominates: there is no "right" point and distance from which to look at the work, no appropriate way to decipher the meaning of the elements brought together, and no stable affective orientation to define how the work "feels". However, these very ambiguities provide the viewer with a certain agency in deciding her own entry point to, interpretation, and experience of the work. Thus, looking at the notions of agency and intervention in relation to these three tactics allows us to see the political impact of art from a broader perspective, especially in relation to its potential for challenging fixated national imaginations.

Firstly, I argued that the way Tuna's bust employs space and dwells on distance is a crucial factor in the relationship between the viewer and the object. It challenges the positive correlation between physical closeness and achieving a better grasp of the work, the demarcations between art and non-art, as well as between art and public space. Moreover, the parallel shifts in space and experience do not allow the viewer to hold a static point of view and provide different perspectives as the distance changes. As a result, the positive correlation between the non-fixity of meaning and its disorienting effect gives the viewer more agency in her relationship with the work, and thus with the national symbol the work alludes to, as she is able to shift between different points of views and relate to the work and the national symbol from different entry points. In one gesture, the viewer intervenes in the field of the artwork, while the artwork also intervenes in the orientation the viewer has in public space, art spaces, and in her perception of conventional national signs.

Secondly, the particular use of the face against the way it appears in the classical genre of portraiture and monumentalism undermines both the expectations associated with portraiture and with the ubiquitous portraits, images and statues of the national leader. The bringing together of two different images, in a way that the senses cannot dissociate them anymore, destabilizes the authenticity and the fixed identity of the portrayed, which are indispensible features of Atatürk representations. In this way, it is not only the artwork that is denied a stable reference point and a fixed meaning, but also a dominant national symbol and identity. The bust triggers this process, not by replacing one face with another, one representation with another, but by intermingling them, thus questioning the nature of representation itself. The work preserves a certain ambiguity by doing this, leaving open the question whether the face of Atatürk is actually empowered or deprived of its power and again giving more agency to the viewer in the ability to choose from various ways of bonding with the work. Although the work is critical of the ways in which national symbols work and construct communities around them, it does not offer a clear formula of criticism or a recipe for changing it, which also makes it hold a modest position in relation to the political role of art.

Thirdly and finally, the affective channels that the work opens up, through the gap opened up between, on the one hand, physical and cognitive contiguity and, on the other, the unsettled senses relating the act of seeing, turns the encounter between the viewers and the work into an intense and heterogeneous experience without a fixed beginning and endpoint. The affective intervention disorients the feeling of familiarity and comfort, which is another crucial factor for the political effect of the work, especially considering the role of familiarity in the way national symbols work and communities form. The relationship of the viewer and this image, then, is not one between a completed work that evokes certain thoughts and emotions and a subject who already carries certain attributes that would determine how she would be affected by the work. Even the affective aspect avoids such an understanding and instead allows us to focus on their encounter, which carries the potential to shape both the work and the viewer in their relationality, just like all the other images acts I have discussed so far. In that sense, affect as a conceptual tool, as Bal suggests, transforms "the centrality of representation", which anchors the effect of the artwork in the figurative quality of a given artwork and facilitates the "analysis of the *agency of art*" (2013: 68). The affective aspect, in contrast, "compels agency without prescribing what the agent must do" (Bal, 2013: 75).

These three tactics I have distinguished are strongly connected with each other, working in separate realms yet feeding into each other and forming different ways of

providing multiple entry points to the work and revealing the mutually transformative relationship between the image and the person. The superimposition of images allows a questioning of the specific coordinates of the space, while the reconfiguration of the space allows interpretation not to rely solely on the effect of combined visual elements, but also on how they act in the space they are in. This enriching connection between space and images amplifies the effect of disorientation, which shakes habitual ways of seeing and approaching an object, turning the act of looking at into the act of looking with. These aspects cannot be separated from the affective dimension of the artwork, since both the way the viewer relates to the space and the images evoke a clash between what one knows, sees and feels, which is another key factor for the political effect of the artwork.

These maneuvers, which allow a general questioning of national identity, are reminiscent of one of the identifying features of Mirzoeff's "inverse visuality", namely a visual experience in which "the subjectivity of the viewer is called into question by the density and opacity of what he or she sees" (70). These moments, for Mirzoeff, are "spectral dust in the eyes of visuality that cause it to blink and become momentarily unsighted" (70). What becomes unsighted in the face of this type of visuality is in fact the person who is looking, whose subjectivity "is called into question" by what she sees, due to the clash of senses that disorients the relationship between the signifier and the signified. In this case, what is called into question is the usual function an Atatürk bust has as a founding and perpetuating myth of national identity. This troubling position of becoming momentarily unsighted carries a crucial potential as a basis for agency for political action, since "perhaps only by risking the *incoherence* of identity is connection possible" (Butler, 1997: 149).

For such an intervention to be successful, "art needs to possess as well as bestow agency" (Bal, 2013: 73). Bal clearly argues for the agency of the art objects that she looks at in shaping the realm of "the political" by suggesting that it is not "as if there is art, some of which happens to be political. Political art is art because it is political; it is art by virtue of its political 'nature'. Neither art nor political are defined by subject matter" (2010: 2). Thus, according to Bal, these two terms are inseparable, but they also cannot be reduced to each other. She states that the "intertwinement – not the identification - of art and politics is essential rather than incidental" (16). Bal's exploration of "where art's political efficacy can be located; how it performs; how it exerts agency; and what the point is of art's political agency for the larger domain of culture" points at its power of interfering (2).

In a similar vein, Van Alpen argues that artworks are not only historical products, but also performative interventions in the realm of culture (2005). He thinks of art as situated in

the cultural environment as "a form of thought": "If art 'thinks,' and if the viewer is compelled, or at least invited to think with it, then art is not only the object of framing – which, obviously, is also true and important – but it also functions, in turn, as a frame for cultural thought" (16). Following this thought, images of art reveal in the best way the performative power of image acts, getting close to action in its political sense, having power in transforming and creating what they show or what they refuse to show, as in the case of Tuna's bust. Considering the strict coordinates of the nationalist image acts that shape cultural space in Turkey, disorienting image acts trigger a process of reframing and reshaping.

Rancière, too, states that art is not political due to its content, but because it reconfigures the realm of aesthetics by intervening in the distribution of the sensible. The double function that he assigns to the "metamorphic image" – "the image as cipher of history and the image as interruption" – also serving to focus on the transformative quality of the art object (2007: 25). I have stated in the beginning of this chapter that Rancière identifies as one of the main questions of our contemporary times whether images "can reshape political spaces or whether they must be content with parodying them" (2009a: 60). The distinction Rancière makes here between parodying, which functions within the realm it parodies, and an act of reshaping, which transforms the shape of the realm that it deals with, is crucial. When Rancière's words are thought in the context of national identity, one of the questions that arises is whether images that tackle national identity reject the ways in which a particular national identity is represented by parodying it or, alternatively, whether they disorient the notion of identity and representation itself. In the first case, another form of representation or identity can be a remedy to the critique, whereas in the latter case, the notion of representation is undermined in a way that what is criticized cannot be simply replaced by another identity, community and collective body.

This is the point at which we can see the broader implications of the analyzed tactics with regard to the relationship between artistic production and the existing national imaginations, as well as for the political potential of images in other places and times. The visual tactics I analyzed here point to the ability of certain images to go beyond parodying or replacing one identity with another by disorienting ways of seeing and thus reshaping cultural and political spaces. They evoke a sense of disorientation rather than destination, work through implication instead of direct representation, and involve mobile affects rather than fixed meanings. The spatial, semantic, and affective disorientation challenges the existing distribution of the sensible and the sense of the familiar, of what and who is in the "family".

Hence, disorientation is not simply the first step towards redistribution, but a process at play on the spatial, visual and affective level that avoids moving towards a fixed destination.

Bal elaborates on an ambiguous Greek notion that Alain Badiou uses, "*anabasein*", which means both embarking and departing, and argues that one can be lost in the world, in social relationships, as well as in an art experience: "with the loss of clarity, a plurality of possibilities become visible, some of which we can connect to the lives of others in unmoored situations" (2013: 78). Tuna's bust causes a loss of clarity and denaturalizes the act of seeing, but does not offer a formula for its reestablishment. Such a formula would be especially risky in the context of nationalism, since artistic production can only be part of a larger process of socio-political transformation whose destinations must be defined and achieved along the way, collectively and flexibly, on various economic, social and political levels and fields.

It is important to keep in mind Butler's warning that "there are many reasons to be suspicious of idealized moments, but there are also reasons to be wary of any analysis that is fully guarded against idealization" (2012, n. pag.). Thus, on the one hand, it is crucial not to sound an overly celebratory tone about the power of art, which might mystify its dilemmas and limitations. On the other hand, it is vital to see the power of images like the one discussed here as "small-scale resistances against the status quo" or "little resistances", as Bal and Hernández -Navarro define them, which carry the potential to disorient the legitimate and accepted patterns of representation (2011: 10). These disorienting image acts contribute to the transformation of the hegemonic codes of everyday life and offer new conceptual, visual and discursive toolkits to imagine alternatives to nation-based visual communities. The possibility of a way of seeing, thinking, and being together in an alternative way to the established nationalist imaginaries and identitarian notions cannot be theorized, then, without considering the intervention that images are capable of in "unmaking" existing worlds, and cannot be realized without being disoriented by them.

Conclusion

> One name for another, a part for the whole: the historic violence of Apartheid can always be treated as a metonymy. In its past as well as in its present. By diverse paths (condensation, displacement, expression, or representation), one can always decipher through its singularity so many other kinds of violence going on in the world. At once part, cause, effect, example, what is happening there translates what takes place here, always here, wherever one is and wherever one looks, closest to home. Infinite responsibility, therefore, no rest allowed for any form of good conscience.
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> Derrida, *Specters of Marx*, 14

Figure 29: Still from Justice and Development Party (AKP) election video launched before the local elections on March 30, 2014.

The screen lightens to reveal a large Turkish flag flying above a cityscape. A dramatic soundtrack fades in as a man in a black suit, wearing black sunglasses, menacingly approaches the flagpole. He breaks a bar on the pole, his hands clad in black leather gloves and stops the metal reels inside unwinding the rope. The flag descends in slow motion, and a male voice begins to read the Turkish national anthem (The Independence March) “My

friend! Leave not my homeland to the hands of villainous men!" As the flag descends it casts a shadow on streets, shops, classrooms and fields. People look up in concern and wonder, as the voice continues: "Render your chest as armor and your body as bulwark! Stop this disgraceful rush!" As the anthem calls for unification at this time of national emergency, people abandon their tasks; a barber, a veiled woman, a Kurdish man with a keffiyeh, a businessman amongst the skyscrapers, students in their classroom and workers in the fields all begin to run. Others join them from parks, fishing boats, villages and farms. Some jump into the water and swim across the Bosphorus. Others cross the bridge by foot. From above we see the people approaching the flagpole from all directions. They slowly build a human pyramid around the pole (Figure 29).[179] A young man steps on the others' shoulders and struggles to grab the rope. He briefly looks to the sky with pride, then jumps, clasping the rope so that the flag is raised again. The last scene is the same as the first; the flagpole rises amid the cityscape and the flag flutters in the breeze as people continue to run towards it.

This commercial was broadcast by the ruling party AKP in the run up to the local elections of March 2014, in which the AKP received 42% of the votes.[180] The voiceover is that of Prime Minister Erdoğan, who appears on the screen, next to AKP's slogan, in a jump cut from the last scene,: "The nation does not succumb. Turkey cannot be defeated", followed by the party logo. This three-minute commercial, which was broadcast after I completed the chapters of this study, brings together, multiplies and extends in different directions the main issues relating to nationalism and imagery that I have explored. It allows me to observe the different forms of images I have explored embodied in one example, and to highlight how entwined they are. In addition, the commercial shows the resilience of nationalist "image acts", as I defined them, that cut across supposed political and cultural polarizations, ideological diversities and historical periods, offering insight into the possible directions further research might take.

The commercial employs two longstanding national symbols: the national anthem and the flag. The former evokes notions such as motherland, fear, blood, belief, divinity, martyrdom, and death, while the latter, placed on top of a phallic flagpole, alludes to protection and sacrifice.[181] The use of these symbols is not surprising considering their

[179] http://gundem.bugun.com.tr/yayini-durduruldu-haberi/1023462

[180] The results of the local elections in 2014 were as follows: AKP (Justice and Development Party) 42%, CHP (Republican People's Party) 26%, MHP (nationalist Movement Party) 17%, BDP (Peace and Democracy Party) 4%.

[181] It is remarkable that the national anthem is not read in order or in full. Three stanzas out of ten are left out and the other seven are ordered so that the semantic suits the semiotic.

performative power, gained through repetition, in establishing hegemony and sustaining it in times of crisis. Their use is also consistent with the AKP's success in embodying right-wing conservative traditions and bringing various elements of conservatism, neoliberalism, nationalism and populism together. Yet, it is important that the party employs these tools in the context of a television commercial, which exemplifies the intertwined relationship between the construction of national identity and commodity culture, which I explored in Chapter 1. These images, appearing among other commercials for consumer products, and quite frequently in diverse channels, promote a product with a name and a logo, which can be bought by supporting and voting for the political party concerned. The qualities of the product are defined throughout the clip, starting from the very first scene in which the green spaces, which the AKP ironically, if not tragicomically, claims to protect, coexist with the large road, which symbolizes the AKP's penchant for road building, as their trademark and the biggest source of pride and electoral success.

The way parliamentary politics takes recourse to high-budget, narrativized and commercial images of political and national identity disseminated through the medium of TV shows not only the increasingly corporate nature of party politics, but also nationalism's vital alliance and dependence on commodity and popular culture, as explored in Chapter 1 and Chapter 4. Significantly, the clip appropriates images from different realms, such as the Gezi uprising (through the images of masses, especially protestors who crossed the bridge on foot, which is surpassed here by the swimming people) and, less visibly, Hollywood movies and promotional tourism videos.[182]

The disturbing image of the city shown from above, resembling a nest of ants, and the humming bodies on the pole, clambering on top of each other, is evocative to say the least.[183] The human pyramid formed around the flagpole constitutes a vivid example of the embodiment of national symbols and of the metonymic quality the individual body acquires when representing the body of the nation. In this sense, it exemplifies, rather succinctly, what, in Chapter 2, I called bio-images, images that become part of the body or are made from the body. In the commercial, the bodies, as prostheses of an alarmed nation, come

[182] The commercial, especially the image of the human pyramid, was compared to and accused of borrowing heavily from the Hollywood apocalyptic blockbuster movie, *World War Z* by Marc Foster, starring Brad Pitt. It was also likened to the Sony Play Station 2 commercial for the same reason.
[183] During the shooting of the advertisement in Ayazaga, Istanbul, it was reported that the platform on which the extras were standing was overloaded and collapsed, leaving dozens of people hospitalized. One of them explained to the newspapers later that they were paid fifty Turkish liras (around seventeen euros) to play in "a commercial".
http://www.radikal.com.tr/turkiye/ayazaga_ata_studyolarinda_cokme_meydana_geldi-1178471.

together to save the symbol of that nation. The miniaturized and almost dehumanized bodies in the human pyramid go through two phases of metonymy, first standing for their own groups, then for the nation as a whole. For example, the Kurdish-looking man, whose prayer is synchronized with the religiously connoted stanza of the national anthem, firstly represents the Kurdish people, but then joins the allegedly multicultural panorama standing for the entire Turkish nation. It is significant that he seems to be welcome in this panorama only on the basis of the shared religion of Islam. People gain access to the metonymy on the condition that their singularized bodies relate to the nation in an identical and sacrificial manner.

The notion of sacrifice is the crux of the narrative, as indicated in its first sentence: "Render your chest as armor and your body as bulwark! Stop this disgraceful rush!" The young man who clutches the rope and jumps down to raise the flag, to the delight of the crowd, combined with the crescendo of the grotesque lyrics of the national anthem, once more establishes sacrifice as the most sacred national virtue on both the political and the affective level. What makes sacrifice possible and necessary is the sense of crisis I explored as "banalized" in the national everyday throughout my chapters. This rhetoric of threat, prevalent in nationalism, and widely and effectively used by the AKP regime in the last decade, strongly resonates with the Kemalist nationalists' campaigns against the AKP in the 2000s that I explored in this study. Strikingly, the apocalyptic atmosphere of the commercial and the man in black who hauls the flag down do not only resonate with various incidents from the history of Turkish Republic, but also with the future. The paranoid fantasy of the advertisement became true a few months later, in June 2014, during what is called the "flag crisis" in which a Turkish flag was reportedly hauled down in the Kurdish town of Lice, supposedly by a young Kurdish activist with his face obscured by a keffiyeh.[184]

The last aspect of the commercial that resonates meaningfully with the analyses conducted in this study is its reliance on a leadership cult, which I have explored throughout, but especially in Chapter 3, in the shape of a ghostly apparition. The balance the AKP government tries to achieve between rejecting the old Kemalist hegemony while at the same

[184] The incident took place during the protests in Lice against the construction of high security checkpoints. It was reported that a young protester jumped over the fence of an air force base, climbed onto the flagpole and hauled down the flag. After the incident, while the leader of the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP) supported "shooting in the forehead anybody who lowers the flag", the Prime Minister, alongside his aggressive words, called on the public to show their "sensitivity" around the issue, which is a not-so-discreet call for lynch-like street conflicts. This incident, like the "flag crisis" in Mersin in 2005, in which Kurdish children were accused of burning a Turkish flag, or the attacks on Kurdish people and party buildings in the 2000s, showed the incendiary combination of a nationalist aggression ready to erupt at any time in everyday life and the authorities building on, if not mobilizing, these affective facilities by using national symbols.

time borrowing, reclaiming and appropriating its strategies and image acts is remarkable. Although this complex issue needs more elaboration, it is possible to say that, especially in the 2010s, the familiar War of Independence rhetoric has been confidently hijacked by the AKP.[185] In this sense, the absence of Atatürk from this commercial is highly conspicuous. Atatürk seems to be reincarnated in the body of Erdoğan, whose voice is heard reading the national anthem. His image is not seen until the end, giving him an air of mystery and immortality that suggests his "being" transcends his physical existence, which are characteristics I explored in relation to Atatürk in Chapter 3. This impression is amplified by the epic instrumental music interspersed with Erdoğan's voice. While the Turkish flag haunts the city like a shadow, in the same way as Atatürk's ghostly apparition on the mountain slope, Erdoğan has come to embody Atatürk in his political and public persona.[186] Erdoğan seems to be engaged in a dual process of contributing to the continuous task of resurrecting Atatürk and attempting to replace him. What is intriguing here is the persistence of nationalist image acts, which performatively establish a people, a nation and notions such as unity, sacrifice and leadership, despite the complexity of political processes and the differences in the configuration of power relations over time. Thus, looking at what images do and what people do with them, as I have done throughout this study, does not only reveal the specificities of one form of national identity, but also those elements that cut across its different forms.

In addition, focusing on image acts provides a perspective on the tensions and conflicts between the different ways in which the nation is produced and performed. In the case of the AKP commercial, this manifested itself in The Supreme Election Committee's (YSK) ban on its broadcast. Following complaints filed by the main opposition Republican People's Party (CHP) and the Nationalist Movement Party (MHP), the commercial was

[185] In July 2014, as I wrote the last words of this study, Erdoğan announced that he would run for the Turkish presidency. Leaving aside the complicated political implications of this decision, one detail was of particular significance for the framework of this discussion. Erdoğan started his pre-election visits from the city of Samsun and continued with Erzurum. This was the same route Mustafa Kemal Atatürk took in 1919, at the start of the Turkish War of Independence. In his speech in Samsun on "Republic Square", Erdoğan significantly said: "this is a new historical journey . . . as big as Mustafa Kemal's first step in Samsun to start the War of Independence".

[186] The coexistence of ghostly and earthly or human characteristics in the figure of the leader that I discussed in Chapter 3 and 4 can be observed in Erdoğan's figure as well. He is portrayed as simultaneously an intimidatingly haunting sovereign figure and as "one of us". The latter aspect is among the most repeated themes in his political discourse, best seen in his emphasis on choosing the "nation" over the "state". Through the attempt to separate and reify these two intertwined and highly negotiated entities, he reproduces his populist discourse of being "one of us", as opposed to the Kemalist elites.

withdrawn on the grounds that the use of the Turkish flag as "propaganda material" contravened the Election Law. The AKP was eventually made to change the end of the clip by replacing the star and crescent on the Turkish flag with their campaign slogan: "The nation will not succumb. Turkey will not be defeated". This ban is crucial in showing that the reclaiming of old Republican political, visual and discursive tools by new powers is a complex process and that the strong tradition of the nation-state can and will use various means to resist the AKP's maneuvers to dissociate the "nation" from the "state". This attempt, based on associating the nation with the people who are potential AKP supporters and the state with the old Republican elite and traditions, also shows that the similarities I briefly focus on here should be complemented by the acknowledgement of these differences for a thorough analysis.

The image forms I identified in this study have also kept appearing in the realm of everyday life in different forms. In the late 2000s Erdoğan's signature began to appear on car stickers, just like Atatürk's signatures had previously. His image also started to decorate necklace pendants, while T-shirts appeared with the caption "Adam İzindeyiz" [Man, we follow your path], clearly referring to the famous sentence "Atam İzindeyiz" [My Atatürk, we follow your path]. The types of Islamic paraphernalia that had already existed in the marketplace for several decades multiplied and became even more visible, in shapes including electronic rosaries, praying mugs, mosque-shaped alarm clocks, neo-Ottoman style ornaments and figurines and posters of the Ottoman sultans. In addition, striking bio-images appeared in positive correlation with the intensification of the AKP's neoliberal/conservative authoritarianism and the augmented role of Erdoğan in the political realm. Erdoğan's signature was composed by the bodies of one hundred university students, in a similar vein to the compiling of Atatürk's face and signature.[187] An AKP supporter had Erdoğan's signature with the caption "great master" put on his back as a large tattoo, which he showed to Erdoğan at an AKP meeting and took souvenir pictures of.[188]

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[187] The signature was drawn with the bodies of one hundred students from Usak University on May 3, 2014. After the performance, students made the Rabia sign and finished the performance by declaiming the national anthem. See: http://www.cnnturk.com/fotogaleri/turkiye/bedenleriyle-Erdoğanin-imzasini-olusturdular.

[188] Two years later, in July 2014, Erdoğan seems to have changed his attitude towards tattoos (perhaps especially when they do not depict him); he has publicly criticized the tattoos of a football player in a ceremony he attended, saying that he could get cancer because of them. See: http://www.timeturk.com/tr/2012/07/18/Erdoğan-in-imzasini-sirtina-dovme-yaptirdi.html#.U424wPmSzTo; http://www.radikal.com.tr/politika/basbakandan_dovmeli_futbolcuya_uyari-1200236.

Hairstyles and biscuits in the shape of the Rabia sign have also appeared. Erdoğan's image haunted people from highway billboards and city walls, earnestly gazing down on them in his dark suit beneath the caption "iron will".[189] Various representations in popular culture emerged, such as videos made on the Internet, referring to Erdoğan as the "Grand Master" or the "Tall Man". The enlarging cultural space of an Islamic national identity, based on a Turkish-Muslim-Sunni majority, could also be observed in popular culture with the emergence of TV series and movies promoting the Ottoman sultans as new leaders and constructing alternative national histories. Erdoğan even surpassed Atatürk's shadowy apparition on the mountain slope when he appeared as a hologram at an AKP meeting.

There were also many instances in which these nationalist image acts were made "unhappy, were disoriented, best exemplified by the prolific image production during the Gezi uprising that I explored in the Introduction, which addressed Erdoğan himself, the government, the media and the police, with an angry but humorous tone. These images that appeared in the form of wall writings, social media images, posters, banners, performing bodies and even barricades give insights into the possible directions towards which my conceptualization of disorientation in the last chapter in the context of contemporary art might be extended.

The resemblance of the tactics and strategies of this different form of nationalism to Kemalist forms of nationalism, especially after 2010, suggests that image acts and the visual communities that form around them remain one of the most crucial means by which national identities are claimed, reproduced and performed. Derrida says, in the passage quoted at the opening, "one name for another, a part for the whole", referring to the possibility of treating one kind of historic violence as a metonymy whose singularity allows the detection of other kinds of violence in the world. This is possible, or rather necessary, since "what is happening there translates what takes place here, always here, wherever one is and wherever one looks, closest to home" (Derrida, 14). Accordingly, this study can be seen to function metonymically in the sense that the analysis of nationalism in one context and period, using particular conceptual tools, provides insights into its ongoing production in other contexts

[189] The Rabia sign is a hand gesture (raising four fingers of any hand and folding the thumb) that first appeared in Egypt in August 2013 during the coup d'état led by General Abdel Fattah el-Sisi. It was subsequently popularized by Erdoğan in Turkey and started to be used widely by AKP supporters. The Erdoğan billboards appeared a few days after the 17 December corruption scandals in 2013, following the conflict between the AKP government and the Gülen community. These billboards were jammed by defacing Erdoğan and modifying the slogan into "iron fascist" or "iron corruption".

and times. In this way, my study contributes to disorienting the boundaries drawn between seemingly polarized groups, national identities and violent acts of the past, present and future.

However, the fact that the image acts I explored in the context of everyday nationalism, with a focus on the period of the rise and crisis of Kemalist nationalism in the 2000s, keep traveling and acquiring new forms does not indicate a full equation between different image acts. Neither does the emergence of different forms of disorienting image acts propose disorientation works in the same way in different contexts. It rather suggests the "image act" as a concept that offers a way to analyze conflicting forms of nationalisms and the ways in which they are challenged. Thinking in terms of image acts highlights the active and consequential role of images in shaping the cultural field as well as the various ways in which images act and people act upon, through and with them.

Mitchell argues that the hammer in Nietzsche's metaphor of "philosophizing the eternal idols with a hammer" is not used as an instrument for destruction, but for "sounding the idols" in order to "break only the silence that is so characteristic of idols" (2006: n. pag.). Similarly, my analysis of image acts aspires to contribute to a methodology by which the image is not destroyed or abolished, but made to "sound" in a way that casts a different light on its existence and actions, as well as enabling its role in the making and unmaking of larger exclusive constructs such as nationalism to be better understood.

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Summary

In this study, I investigate the image politics of nationalist practices in everyday life by focusing on contemporary Turkey and tracking the way images of the nation travel through a variety of fields, taking various shapes. I depart from the idea that images provide an especially productive ground to analyze the contested and negotiated dynamics of national identity (re)production and community (de)formation in everyday life. Thus, I focus less on the history of official nationalist imagery production by the state, and more on the reproduction and performance of nationalist imagery in everyday life, by the people themselves. These people not only look *at*, but also look *with* images. In this way, my aim is to contribute to the understanding of contemporary performances of national identity and the popular, corporeal and affective mechanisms generated through nationalist images in Turkey, as well as to the theorization of the relationship between nationalism and imagery in general.

I identify five different types of images as significant for analyzing the ways in which national identity formation and image politics intertwine: commodified images, bio-images, ghostly images, media images and disorienting images. Through a variety of objects, such as commodities, masks, tattoos, advertisements, films, shadowy apparitions, monuments and artworks, I explore how images act both to draw borders around communities and to provide the means to challenge these borders, as well as examining the cultural and political implications of the "visual communities" people form around these images. I look at the ways in which visual communities provide shortcuts to existing notions of national language, race, as well as ethnicity and gender, and how they work to cover up the "imaginative" quality of the nation, turning its fictive status into a tangible entity with material effects and consequences. The identification of these image acts and visual communities does not only reveal the specificities of the particular context of 2000s Turkey, but also offers a theoretical path and conceptual kit to analyze the intertwinements of nationalism and visual culture in other parts of the world.

The 2000s proves to be a relevant period to analyze the production of (Kemalist) nationalism in Turkish everyday life through the realm of images as this period features a dual process of the rise and crisis of official nationalism. During the 2000s, Islamic conservative nationalism not only gained momentum, but also challenged the historical continuity of the official Kemalist form of nationalism, incrementally establishing its own political and economic hegemony. As a result, gestures of defending, protecting and performing Kemalist secular national identity multiplied in everyday life as the hegemonic

presence of Kemalism gradually decreased. The increasing visibility and power of alternative national representations of AKP (Justice and Development Party)-type Islamic neoliberal conservatism, as well as of various alternative Kurdish and leftist imaginations accelerated Kemalist nostalgia and fueled the need for novel survival techniques. This in turn increased the role of the body and of popular consumption cultures in producing and performing national identity, which indicates a new collaboration between nationalism, popular culture and corporeal practices, resulting in the production of a new visual grammar in need of analysis.

The dual aspect of images as both projections of ideologies, made possible by specific contexts, and active constituents of these contexts is one of the guiding theoretical assumptions informing my analysis of this visual grammar. Thus, my aim is less to define what images are than to look at what they do and how they act by taking different forms and mediating social encounters in myriad ways. W. J. T. Mitchell argues that while the socially constructed and ideological nature of images has been a common assumption in the study of images, "a dialectical concept of visual culture cannot rest content with a definition of its object as the social construction of the visual field, but must insist on exploring the chiastic reversal of this proposition, *the visual construction of the social field*" (2002: 171, emphasis in text). I find it especially productive to extend this understanding to the realm of nationalism, in which images have a crucial role in reproducing, performing and perpetuating the idea of a nation, a national community and a national identity.

Hence, I conceptualize images as performing actions, as playing an active role in shaping what they claim to be depicting, rather than as merely representing a preexisting reality. Like J. L. Austin's "speech acts", which are performative utterances that do what they say, "image acts" performatively shape what they portray and thus have direct effects and consequences. In this sense, the term "image act" refers to two simultaneous and inseparable processes that affect each other in dynamic and contextual ways: images which act and at times force people to do things, and individuals acting through, with and upon images, at times forcing them to do things. This dual process is especially important to explore in the context of nationalism, in which object and subject, image and body, tactics and strategies, are continuously negotiated, as I argue throughout my chapters.

In the first chapter, I focus on the appearance of national images in the form of commodities since the 1990s, with a focus on the 2000s, when they gained more visibility. I look at commodities such as flag-shaped necklace pendants, rings and lighters embroidered with Atatürk's image, as well as at t-shirts depicting nationalist symbols and quotations.

Through these items, I explore the ways in which images of the nation become part of everyday life, appearing in smaller, more portable and more diverse forms than more familiar patriotic items, such as flags and statues in public spaces and institutions. Since this is a rather new phenomenon in the relatively short history of the Turkish nation-state, I look closely at the political motivations for and the consequences of the conversion of official, collective national symbols into commodity objects that can be bought, sold, carried and worn by individuals.

I frame this process as a response by Kemalist nationalism to the crisis it faced in the 2000s and argue that commodified image acts, which both keep the aura that is characteristic of nationalist symbols intact and allow people to invent their own everyday rituals, reveal more than the seemingly routine market- and tourism-oriented strategies would suggest. Rather than indicating the desacralization and disenchantment of national imagery, they enable it to be diffused more broadly in everyday life in novel, more corporeal and more affective ways.

The question of how these images act is complemented by a focus on how people act upon, with and through these images, how they configure commodified images in everyday life and the narratives they construct through this configuration. Rethinking Mieke Bal's conceptualization of collecting as a narrative in relation to consumption allows me to look at this aspect, as well as at the ways in which the narratives constructed through these commodified images function in people's encounters, perpetuating a sense of crisis that I argue has become "banalized". In addition, the notion of the fetish enables me to further explore the encounter between people and commodified images. Bringing together Sigmund Freud's well-known theorization of the fetish as a substitute and Louise Kaplan's focus on the strategic function of fetishism in the context of nationalism, I look at the role of commodities in holding on to a sense of national identity in a context of perceived crisis by employing the materiality of things against the "immateriality" of national identity.

The second chapter moves to a seemingly more intimate realm, that of the body, by exploring what I call "bio-images", which are images that become part of the body or that are made out of body parts, such as masks, tattoos and flags made out of blood. Bio-images are strong, tangible markers of a particular national identity caught up in a struggle to survive, revealing the increasing role of the body in politics. Looking at how the political is engraved on the face as a mask, under the skin as a tattoo, or externalized through blood opens up a perspective on the ways in which the body is turned into a prosthesis of the modern Turkish nation-state in the face of loss and trauma. The coexistence of strength and fragility, vitality

and mortality, in relation to the body resonates significantly with the seemingly paradoxical rise and crisis of nationalism and the oscillating quality of national identity between lack and fulfillment.

Structurally, the chapter moves closer to the body in each section, by first focusing on the Atatürk masks people put on in nationalist demonstrations, which cover the surface of the body, then on tattoos of national symbols, which actually become part of that surface itself, and finally on the case of a group of high school children making a Turkish flag out of their own blood, externalizing their body in the form of an image. The Bakhtinian notion of carnival, Michel Foucault's conceptualization of the panopticon and Michel de Certeau's notion of tactics and strategies inform my analysis by providing different entry points into the discussion of how images are not only looking or looked at, but also looked *with*, corporeally.

In the third chapter, I move from the body to apparitions and monuments that, as image acts, produce the nation through the haunting body of Atatürk, which I argue to be in a constant loop of dying and being reanimated. The notion of ghostliness contributes to my discussion of the liminality of these images, alluding to national identity's status as oscillating between absence and presence. Close readings of Atatürk's annual appearance as a shadow on a mountain slope, celebrated as a festival, and of an enormous Atatürk statue erected in 2009 allow me to explore the haunting character of nationalist image acts, which "conjure up the nation by circumventing the history of its imaging" (Rafael 610). Looking at an ephemeral image like the Atatürk apparition as a monument and at a monument like the giant Atatürk bust as a ghostly entity blurs the association of the former with ephemerality and of the latter with solidity. As such, the fluidity of the forms and localities of nationalist image acts is revealed.

In Chapter 4, I move from ghostly images to more "humanized" images of Atatürk. I focus on two recent media representations: the first television commercial in which Atatürk is portrayed by an actor (Isbank, 2007) and the first blockbuster movie on Atatürk's life (*Mustafa*, directed by Can Dündar, 2008). I argue that the national figure who walks, talks, bleeds and cries on the screen, as seen in contemporary media representations, reframes the notion of national hero in a way that creates "same heroes with new manners". By exploring the metaphorical, allegorical and mythical burden put on the shoulders of this newly "humanized" figure in the two objects of analysis, I reflect upon the motives, methods and consequences of their attempt to reframe national images in line with the capacities and needs of media and popular culture.

Commodified images, bio-images, ghostly images and monuments, as well as media representations all attempt to create, in related but distinct ways, a unifying image of the nation. If one of the ways in which nationalism reproduces itself in everyday life is through a visual grammar by which one is supposed to make sense of the world and orient oneself towards the other, then it is crucial to also look at the images that disorient this grammar and question the subjectivity it calls for. Thus, in the last part of this study, I focus on images that turn these narratives into sites of struggle in order to explore the possibility of "disorienting" national imaginations, semantically and politically. I conceptualize the notion of disorientation as a shaking of an existing orientation, as a loss of destination, conveying a sense of ongoing ambiguity rather than the achievement of a new stasis.

Thus, in Chapter 5, I focus on three main tactics of disorientation that I identify in Vahit Tuna's bust installation from the exhibition "We were always spectators…" in the art space DEPO, Istanbul, 2011: the reconfiguration of space, the superimposition of different visual elements, and the opening up of affective channels. The analysis of these tactics go beyond this specific installation and allows me to explore the role of distance, the correlation between physical closeness and the ability to grasp an image, the genre of portraiture and its subversion, and the role of affect in challenging the representational fixities of national symbols. In this way, I look at what disorientation can do, both in the specific context of contemporary Turkey and with regard to a more general discussion of aesthetics and politics, which is closely connected to the confidence in the possibility of another world that would radically challenge the demarcations that an exclusive national identity brings about.

Samenvatting

In dit proefschrift onderzoek ik de verbeeldingspolitiek van alledaags nationalisme in hedendaags Turkije, en analyseer ik hoe beelden van de natie circuleren in verschillende hoedanigheden. Mijn uitgangspunt is dat een kritische bestudering van beelden een zeer productief beginpunt kan zijn voor een beter begrip van de vaak tegenstrijdige onderhandelingen die een nationale identiteit en gemeenschap (re)produceren en (de)formeren. Ik focus daarom niet zozeer op een officiële staatsgeschiedenis van nationalistische verbeelding, maar juist op de productie van nationalistische verbeelding door gewone mensen in het alledaagse leven. Deze mensen kijken niet alleen *naar* beelden, maar nadrukkelijk ook *met* beelden. Het is mijn doel om bij te dragen aan het begrip van hedendaagse uitoefeningen van nationale identiteit, evenals de populistische, belichaamde en affectieve mechanismes van de nationalistische verbeelding in Turkije, en tot slot aan de algemene theorievorming rondom de wisselwerking tussen nationalisme en beelden.

In dit onderzoek heb ik vijf verschillende typen beelden geïdentificeerd die ieder op eigen wijze de werking van nationale identiteitsformaties en beeldenpolitiek inzichtelijk maken: gecommodificeerde beelden, bio-beelden, spookachtige beelden, mediabeelden, en desoriënterende beelden. Met koopwaar, maskers, tatoeages, reclames, films, schaduwverschijningen, monumenten en kunstwerken als mijn analyseobjecten, onderzoek ik hoe beelden zowel kunnen begrenzen als doorbreken, en wat de culturele en politieke implicaties zijn van de 'visuele gemeenschappen' die rondom beelden worden gevormd. Zo onderzoek ik hoe visuele gemeenschappen reeds bestaande begrippen van nationale taal, ras, etniciteit en gender weerspiegelen, maar ook hoe ze de 'imaginaire' dimensies van de natie verhullen en zo haar fictieve status transformeren in een tastbare realiteit, met alle materiële gevolgen van dien. Mijn studie over 'image-acts' en visuele gemeenschappen beschouwt niet alleen de specifieke context van Turkije sinds 2000, maar biedt ook bruikbare theorieën en concepten om de vervlechtingen tussen nationalisme en visuele cultuur elders ter wereld te kunnen bestuderen.

Het afgelopen decennium zag zowel een opkomst als een crisis van officieel nationalisme in Turkije. Gedurende deze periode groeide een nieuw Islamitisch conservatief nationalisme dat de historische validiteit van het officiële Kemalistische nationalisme in twijfel trok. Hierdoor won het gestaag aan politieke en economische hegemonie. Als gevolg van deze hegemoniale machtsverschuiving verspreidde de aanhang en uitoefening van een Kemalistische seculiere nationale identiteit zich op een meer diffuse en diverse wijze in het

alledaagse leven. De toenemende zichtbaarheid van alternatieve nationalistische representaties, zoals het neoliberaal Islamitisch conservatisme van de AKP (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi* / Partij voor Rechtvaardigheid en Ontwikkeling) of de verschillende Koerdische en linkse verbeeldingen, versterkten ook de nostalgie naar het traditionele Kemalisme en zodoende de ingebeelde noodzaak van nieuwe overlevingstechnieken. De rol van het lichaam en populaire cultuur werden steeds belangrijker in het produceren en beoefenen van nationale identiteit. Dit suggereert een nieuw samenwerkingsverband tussen nationalisme, populaire cultuur, en lichamelijke praktijken, en daarmee een nieuwe visuele grammatica, die om een rigoureuze analyse vraagt.

De onderbouwende stelling van mijn benadering is dat beelden zowel projecties zijn van reeds bestaande ideologieën als actieve elementen in de totstandkoming van nieuwe ideologische contexten. Het is daarom niet zozeer mijn doel om te definiëren wat beelden zijn, maar juist om te begrijpen wat ze *doen*: hoe ze handelen, welke vormen ze aannemen, en op welke manieren ze bemiddelen in sociale relaties. W.J.T. Mitchell stelt dat in veel visueel onderzoek het een algemene aanname is dat beelden sociale constructies zijn en ideologisch geladen, maar dat "een dialectisch concept van visuele cultuur geen genoegen mag nemen met definities die hun object slechts als een sociale constructie van het visuele veld zien, ze zouden juist de omdraaiing van zulke stellingen moeten benadrukken: *de visuele constructie van het sociale veld*" (2002: 171, cursief in origineel).[190] Deze stelling kan doorgetrokken worden naar het domein van nationalisme, aangezien beelden een cruciale rol spelen in de verankering van begrippen van natie, gemeenschap en identiteit.

Ik beschouw beelden dus als performatief: ze spelen een actieve rol in de totstandkoming van hetgeen ze verbeelden, in plaats van dat ze slechts een reeds bestaande realiteit weerspiegelen. Net als J.L. Austins idee van 'speech-acts' - taaluitingen die doen wat ze uitspreken - moeten 'image-acts' begrepen worden als handelaars die directe effecten en consequenties produceren. Mijn begrip 'image-act' verwijst naar twee simultane en onafscheidbare processen: beelden die handelingen van mensen kunnen afdwingen enerzijds, en mensen die kunnen handelen door middel van beelden anderzijds. Dit tweezijdige proces is met name van belang in het verkennen van nationalisme, aangezien hier de verhoudingen tussen object en subject, beeld en lichaam, en tactiek en strategie voortdurend opnieuw onderhandeld worden.

[190] Translation by Thijs Witty.

In het eerste hoofdstuk benader ik de opkomst in Turkije van nationalistische beelden als koopwaar. Dit proces begon in de jaren negentig en werd steeds zichtbaarder in het daaropvolgende decennium. Ik analyseer kettingen, ringen en aanstekers met vlagsymbolen of plaatjes van Atatürk, alsmede t-shirts met daarop verschillende nationalistische symbolen en citaten. Zo verken ik de manier waarop beelden van de natie onderdeel worden van het alledaagse leven en in steeds handzamere formaten beschikbaar zijn. Dit verschilt aanzienlijk van de manier waarop meer vertrouwde patriottische voorwerpen zoals vlaggen en beelden in de publieke ruimte functioneren. Aangezien dit een vrij recente ontwikkeling betreft in de geschiedenis van de Turkse natie-staat, onderzoek ik zowel de politieke motivaties voor als de consequenties van deze transformatie van officiële, collectieve symbolen in makkelijk verkrijgbare koopwaar.

Ik beargumenteer dat dit proces begrepen moet worden als een reactie op de crisis die het Kemalistische nationalisme onderging in de jaren na de millenniumwisseling. Deze gecommodificeerde 'image-acts' onthullen dan ook meer dan routineuze markt- en toerismestrategieën: ze houden namelijk niet alleen de aura intact die zo karakteristiek is voor nationalistische symboliek, maar staan mensen eveneens toe hun eigen alledaagse rituelen te ontwikkelen rondom de nationalistische verbeelding. Met andere woorden: deze ogenschijnlijk vulgaire koopwaar maakt het mogelijk dat de nationalistische verbeelding op meer diffuse wijze verspreid wordt in het alledaagse leven, zowel lichamelijk als affectief.

Naast de specifieke handelingen van zulke verbeeldingen, gaat dit hoofdstuk ook over het gebruik van beelden door mensen: in het algemeen over hoe men deze gecommodificeerde beelden in het alledaagse leven introduceert, in het bijzonder over de verhalen die hiermee gecreëerd worden. Mieke Bals conceptualisering van de collectieverzameling als een vertelling in relatie tot consumptie helpt mij dit aspect uit te diepen en inzicht te krijgen in de wijze waarop deze vertellingen betekenis krijgen in concrete ontmoetingen tussen mensen. Dit laatste benadrukt hoezeer de crisis van het nationalisme als iets banaals en alledaags ervaren wordt. Het idee van de fetisj biedt een middel om de samenkomst tussen mensen en gecommodificeerde beelden beter te duiden. Ik maak hierbij gebruik van Sigmund Freuds theorie over de fetisj als substituut en Louise Kaplans focus op de strategische functies van fetisjisme in relatie tot nationalisme. Ook onderzoek ik welke rol koopwaar speelt bij het creëren van een nationalistisch sentiment in de context van een waargenomen crisis. Met deze invalshoek zet ik de materialiteit van koopwaar af tegen de zogenaamde 'immaterialiteit' van nationale identiteit.

In het tweede hoofdstuk verschuif ik mijn focus naar het lichaam en introduceer ik het begrip 'bio-beelden': beelden die onderdeel worden van het lichaam of uit lichaamsdelen bestaan, zoals maskers, tatoeages, of vlaggen beschilderd met bloed. Bio-beelden zijn een tastbaar bewijs van een nationale identiteit die strijdt voor haar voortbestaan, maar ze onthullen ook hoe het lichaam tot een prothese van de hedendaagse Turkse natie-staat – gekenmerkt door verlies en trauma – gemaakt kan worden. In dit lichaam komen kracht en kwetsbaarheid, vitaliteit en kwetsbaarheid samen, een paradoxaal gegeven dat resoneert met de eerder beschreven gelijktijdige opkomst en crisis van het hedendaagse Turkse nationalisme.

Elk afzonderlijk onderdeel van dit hoofdstuk gaat in op een specifiek deel van het lichaam: als eerste de Atatürk-maskers die tijdens nationalistische demonstraties opgezet worden, dan tatoeages van nationalistische symbolen, en als laatste een voorval waarbij een groep middelbare scholieren een Turkse vlag maakte met hun eigen bloed en zodoende hun lichamen omzetten in een extern beeld. De begrippen van het carnavaleske (Bakhtin), de panopticon (Foucault), en tactiek en strategie (de Certeau) helpen mij in de formulering van verschillende uitgangspunten voor de discussie over een type beeld dat niet uitsluitend kijkt of bekeken wordt, maar waar nadrukkelijk ook *mee* gekeken wordt.

In het derde hoofdstuk staan spectrale verschijningen en monumenten centraal die, als 'image-acts', de natie produceren middels het spookachtige lichaam van Atatürk: een schim die een constante beweging lijkt te maken tussen dood en wederopstanding. Het begrip van het spookachtige benadrukt het grensgebied waaraan deze beelden raken en verwijst in algemenere zin ook naar de status van een nationale identiteit die constant heen en weer beweegt tussen af- en aanwezigheid. De analyse bestaat uit c*lose readings* van een jaarlijkse gefêteerde 'verschijning' van Atatürk in de vorm van een schaduw langs een bergwand, en een reusachtig Atatürk-reliëf dat voor het eerst werd onthuld in 2009. Deze twee figuren tonen het spookachtige karakter van nationalistische 'image-acts' die "de natie in het leven roepen door de geschiedenis van haar verbeelding te omzeilen" (Rafael 610).[191] De schaduw van Atatürk wordt een monument, terwijl het reusachtige beeld (beschouwd als een spookachtig fenomeen) het onderscheid tussen vergankelijkheid en soliditeit doet vervagen. Met deze vergelijkend analyse benadruk ik dus de vloeibaarheid van de verschillende verschijningsvormen en locaties van nationalistische 'image-acts'.

[191] Translation by Thijs Witty.

In hoofdstuk vier staan twee meer gehumaniseerde beelden van Atatürk in visuele media centraal: een televisiereclame waarin Atatürk door een acteur gespeeld wordt (Isbank, 2007) en de eerste blockbusterfilm over zijn leven (*Mustafa*, regie: Can Dündar, 2008). De wijze waarop Atat, 2 beweegt, spreekt, en lijdt op het grote of kleine scherm herziet de notie van de nationale held door een 'oude held met nieuwe manieren' te crend m. Ik bestudeer de metaforische, allegorische en mythische elementen van deze nieuwe gehumaniseerde figuur, en reflecteer op de verschillende motieven en methodes waarmee Atatürk een beeld aangemeten wordt dat past bij de verwachtingen van de populaire mediacultuur.

Gecommodificeerde beelden, bio-beelden, spookachtige beelden, monumenten en mediarepresentaties proberen elk een geünificeerd beeld van de natie in het leven te roepen. Deze visuele grammatica is echter niet de enige manier waarop nationalisme gereproduceerd wordt in het alledaagse leven, noch het enige middel waarmee men de sociale wereld begrijpt of zich tot anderen verhoudt. Het is daarom noodzakelijk om ook naar beelden te kijken die deze grammatica juist problematiseren. Daarom besteed ik in het laatste deel van mijn onderzoek aandacht aan beelden die de nationalistische verbeelding ontwrichten en tot discussiepunt maken, en zoek ik naar de semantische en politieke potentie die 'desoriënterende' beelden kunnen hebben. Ik conceptualiseer desoriëntatie als een opschudding van een bestaande oriëntatie, als het verlies van een bestaande richting en als iets wat een gevoel van ambiguïteit losmaakt in plaats van een herwonnen stabiele orde tot stand te brengen.

In hoofdstuk vijf benader ik drie verschillende tactieken van desoriëntatie, die ik identificeer in relatie tot een buste van kunstenaar Vahit Tuna die in 2011 tijdens de tentoonstelling 'We were always spectators…' in de galerie DEPO te Istanbul onthuld werd. De drie tactieken van desorikenende zijn: ruimtelijke reconfiguratie, de samenkomst van verschillende visuele elementen, en de opening naar affectieve reacties. De analyse van deze tactieken gaat voorbij de installatie in kwestie en laat de functie van afstand zien: de correlatie tussen fysieke nabijheid en de mogelijkheid om een beeld te kunnen vatten. Ook verken ik de mogelijkheden voor subversie die het genre van portrettering biedt en beschouw ik de rol van affect in het betwisten van de vastigheid van nationalistische symbolen. Ik kijk in mijn concluderende hoofdstuk dus naar de mogelijke effecten van desoriëntatie, zowel in de context van Turkije als in relatie tot algemene discussies over politiek en esthetiek. Deze laatste discussies zijn nauw verbonden met het besef dat er een andere wereld mogelijk is, waar de beperkende kaders van een uitsluitend nationale identiteit radicaal kunnen worden doorbroken.