RESEARCH ARTICLE

Immunizing mobile ad hoc networks against collaborative attacks using cooperative immune model

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ABSTRACT

In this paper, a security problem of cooperative immunization against collaborative attacks such as blackhole attacks and worm-hole attacks, in the mobile ad hoc networks such as the Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX) networks, was discussed. Because of the vulnerabilities of the protocol suites, collaborative attacks in the mobile ad hoc networks can cause more damages than individual attacks. In human immune system, nonselfs (i.e., viruses, bacteria and cancers etc.) can attack human body in a collaborative way and cause diseases in the human body. With the inspiration from the human immune system, a tri-tier cooperative immune model was built to detect and eliminate the collaborative attacks (i.e., nonselfs) in the mobile ad hoc networks. ARM-based Network Simulator (NS2) tests and probability analysis were utilized in the prototype for immune model to analyze and detect the attacks. Experimental results demonstrate the validation and effectiveness of the model proposed by minimizing the collaborative attacks and immunizing the mobile ad hoc networks. Copyright © 2012 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd.

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1. INTRODUCTION

Security is a key challenge in the networks of Worldwide Interoperability for Microwave Access (WiMAX), which provides a high-speed broadband access (up to 40 Mbps) with large coverage in the IEEE 802.16 standard and so is more flexible and usable in many scenarios than the other technologies such as digital subscriber line or WiFi. But, the shelf protocols of these networks make the vulnerabilities of those protocols available to attackers. For example, the availability of practical swarm intelligence and multiagent algorithms can help attackers to collaborate and realize more effective attacks against defending mechanisms [1,2]. The current WiMAX systems use some individualized security approaches such as antivirus software [3], intrusion detection tools [4], and mail-filtering applications [5]. However, the WiMAX network is not secure against collaborative attacks because the security approaches are suitable for only individual attacks. Collaborative attacks are launched by some malicious adversaries to accomplish disruption, deception, usurpation, or disclosure against the targeted networks [1].

For instance, if the SYN flood attack and the slammer worm are launched in a coordinated way, the resulting consequences will be devastating and very difficult to deal with [6,7]. What's more, many attackers can influence the decision making of some core machines with Sybil attacks in WiMAX [8].

To deal with the collaborative attacks, some cooperative approaches are designed and used for matching the features of multiple attacks in collaborative ways. Unfortunately, these approaches are often ineffective to unknown attacks [3]. In fact, human immune network is an advanced natural cooperative defending system against collaborative attacks from viruses, bacteria, and cancer [9]. Both RNA-containing and DNA-containing viruses, two obviously different classes of virus, can cause cancer [10], so bacteria with the viruses and cancer can cause the overload and damages of the immune system. Thus, the biological immune network inspires us to design more advanced defense system against the collaborative attacks. In general, the human immune network has a large number of immune cells (e.g., B cells and T cells) and immune molecules (e.g., antibodies). In many cooperative immune

responses, the immune cells and immune molecules make up the parallel immune tier, which realize immune responses in parallel cells and molecules [11]. At first, the immune network against the attacks determines whether the strange objects are selfs and detect the attacks [12]. If they are selfs, the objects are not relative with the attacks; otherwise, the objects are the nonselfs that cause the attacks. Detecting the selfs and the attacks is the first mission of the native immune tier, and recognizing and classifying the known attacks are the other responsibilities of the tier. To recognize the unknown attacks, immune learning and memory are required for the adaptive immune tier of immune network [13].

According to the bio-inspired ideas, an antiworm static artificial immune system (AIS) was proposed and evaluated on the basis of the tri-tier immune model [14]. The immune model was also used in software fault diagnosis of mobile robots [15]. In this paper, a novel cooperative immune model against the collaborative attacks such as blackhole attacks and wormhole attacks in the mobile ad hoc networks was proposed and evaluated to detect the attacks and minimize the attacks. In Section 2, the related work was analyzed on security, the collaborative attacks and AISs for this security application. In Section 3, the cooperative immune model was proposed against the collaborative attacks in the mobile ad hoc networks. In Section 4, the detection and learning capabilities of the immune model in a cooperative way were analyzed. In section 5, the experiments of the cooperative immune network against the collaborative attacks were realized in the NS2 networks with the ARM nodes. In Section 6, the conclusions of the paper were presented.

2. RELATED WORK

The vulnerabilities of the mobile ad hoc networks have been analyzed in the literature. In the following, the main characteristics of the vulnerabilities were reviewed briefly.

Bhargava et al. regarded the support to Data Encryption Standard as an important vulnerability in WiMAX standards because it can be broken by the collaborative attacks [1]. Second, attacks through the IEEE 802.16j standard include blackhole attacks [16], wormhole attacks [17], denial-of-message attacks [18], Sybil attacks [19], and so on. Besides, the implementation bugs and the incompatibilities are also the potential sources of vulnerabilities [1].

For instance, blackhole attack can transmit malicious broadcast information from a node that the node has the shortest path to the destination aiming to intercept messages [16]. Wormhole attack can record packets at one location in the network, tunnel them to other locations, and retransmit them there into the network [17,20]. The collaborative attacks of blackhole and wormhole almost have all the abilities of the two attacks [2].

To defend against the collaborative attacks, a few of cooperative approaches have been proposed recently. For example, Cheung et al. decomposed some cyber attacks into multiple subattacks and developed a method to model multistep attack scenarios on the basis of typical isolated alerts about attack steps [21]. Li et al. built a stochastic model of collaborative internal and external attacks [22]. Yang et al. designed a signature-based model to detect collaborative attacks [23]. With multicast, annotated topology information and blind detection techniques, Hussain et al. built a collaborative system to detect distributed denial-of-service attacks [24]. Ourston et al. used hidden Markov models to detect collaborative attacks [25]. Cuppens et al. made each Intrusion Detection System (IDS) in some collaborative IDSs send its triggered alerts to a central module to reduce the number of false positives [26]. The central module correlates the incoming alerts of all IDSs and generates a more elaborated and general alarm to the whole system. Lin et al. shared the information from the node that detected the intrusion to the other nodes so that they can save time and energy for doing pattern matching, which is a demanding task [27]. Yu-Sung et al. proposed a collaborative IDS for different sorts of IDSs to work cooperatively [28].

To overcome the disadvantages of the IDS approaches against the unknown attacks, the techniques of immune computation have been investigated for some security applications, especially in the mobile ad hoc networks. Sarafijanovic et al. used an AIS to detect node misbehavior in a mobile ad hoc network by using the dynamic source routing protocol [29]. Mohamed et al. presented the immune-inspired security architecture for simulating a number of human immune system processes for securing mobile ad hoc networks [30]. Atakan et al. introduced an immune system-inspired evolutionary opportunistic spectrum access protocol on the basis of the self–nonself detection and clonal selection principles [31].

As one of the security foundations, threat modeling is defined as a systematic exploration technique to expose any circumstance or event having the potential to cause harm to a system in the form of destruction, disclosure, modification of data, and/or denial of service, and results in a vulnerability assessment [32]. Thus, threat modeling or other exploratory techniques shall be applied to explore known and potential security vulnerabilities and their impacts. Bau et al. illustrated security analysis by using model checking, but analysts can use various methods and tools to evaluate system security, including manual and automated theorem-proving tools that provide assurance about the absence of attacks in a specified threat model [33]. Similar to the threat model, the immune danger theory was proposed by Matzinger [34], and in this danger theory, immune response distinguishes the danger signals that are generated by damaged cells. In the AIS, the threats are the damaged selfs and the foreign nonselfs, so the threats are the nonselfs in nature. The vulnerabilities of the AIS depend on its design in security.

3. COOPERATIVE IMMUNIZATION MODEL AGAINST COLLABORATIVE ATTACKS

The collaborative attacks here are defined as two or more types of attacks such as the blackhole attacks and the wormhole attacks, which can attack the mobile ad hoc network in a collaborative way.

Suppose a mobile ad hoc network such as the WiMAX network is represented as finite immune graph $G = (V, E)$, where V is the vertex or node set and E is the edge set with $E \neq \phi$. An element in the set V represents a client, server, or cloud in the mobile ad hoc network, and any element in the set E represents the relationship between one client/server and another one. It is assumed that the edges are undirected and the graph is connected. When the system initializes, the mobile ad hoc network without any attacks is normal, which is identified by the space–time representation of its normal model [9]. It is also assumed that a unique discrete time order is represented with $t = 0, 1, 2, \ldots$, although the time properties of some components may be turned back or changed forward with a big step in a local virtual space. Considering the attacks such as the blackhole attacks and the wormhole attacks in a sequential order, a node is secure, damaged, or removed at any point in time. Suppose the blackhole attacks are represented with $A^1 = \left\{ a_i^1 \mid i = 1, 2, \ldots, N^1 \right\}$ and N^1 represents the sum of the blackhole-attack nodes. Moreover, $A^2 = \left\{ a_j^2 \mid j = 1, 2, \ldots, N^2 \right\}$ denotes the wormhole attacks, and N^2 represents the sum of the blackhole-attack nodes. Thus, the problem on defending against the collaborative attacks such as the blackhole attacks and the wormhole attacks is how the two types of attacks can be detected and eliminated. For calculating the sum of the attacks, this problem on defending against the attacks is formulated in the following.

$$\text{Min} \sum_{k=1}^{2} N^k \qquad (1)$$

Because the attack detection is the first important step for minimizing the damages that are caused by the attacks, this problem has an important subproblem of maximizing the attack detection probability beneath.

$$\text{Max} \frac{1}{2} \sum_{k=1}^{2} p^k \qquad (2)$$

where p^1 denotes the success probability for detecting the blackhole attacks and p^1 denotes the success probability for detecting the wormhole attacks. Moreover, at the same time, the performances, such as the packet delivery ratio (PDR), throughput, overhead, and end-to-end delay, should be optimized by the network reconfiguration of immunization.

With the tri-tier immune model, which is of the native immune tier, the adaptive immune tier and the parallel immune tier, as shown in Figure 1, new tri-tier architecture for securing the mobile ad hoc networks such as WiMAX networks was proposed as shown in Figure 2 [35]. As the first tier, the native immune tier is used to detect attacks in a cooperative way, and the self is the most important factor in increasing the efficiency and effectiveness of the attack detection process. Besides, the native immune tier is also responsible for recognizing the known attacks. The second tier is adaptive immune tier that is used to learn and recognize unknown attacks cooperatively on the basis of the expendable multidimensional feature space of attacks. To minimize the collaborative attacks, the cooperative immunization works with the inputs of all objects in the mobile ad hoc networks in the following way.

First, the native immune tier detects the selfs, which are defined here as the normal components of the mobile ad hoc network. The self model is of the space–time properties for the normal states to increase the precision of self detection, as shown in Figure 1. When the mobile ad hoc network is normal, the space–time properties, which identify the self status, of the normal components are stored into the self database. The tri-tier immune model is based on the self model and the self detection because the results for detecting the selfs in the first step of immunization can be used to detect more attacks more quickly than the approach for detecting the attacks directly. For example, the wormhole attacks attempt to modify the routing protocol files and the routing table files of the attacked node so that the wormhole attacks can transmit their own attacking codes to other nodes from the compromised node by sending some attacking packets. Before the wormhole attacks occur, all the normal nodes of the mobile ad hoc network such as the WiMAX network store their space–time properties of each files in the nodes into a secure self database, and the space–time properties of the files can be the absolute pathnames and the last revision


**Figure 1.** Tri-tier cooperative immune model.

Figure 2. WiMAX immunization architecture. DHCP/DNS, Dynamic Host Configuration Protocol/Domain Name System; NTP, Network Time Protocol; AAA; Authentication, Authorization and Accounting.

time. Once any file of the core parts in any node is modified by the wormhole attacks to change the protocol and the routing table, the self detection through the self database will return an alert of detected nonself, that is, the wormhole attacks. Because the selfs of the normal components are well known for the system, it is easier to detect whether a node is a self than to detect whether the node is a compromised one by unknown attacks by recognizing the unknown features of the attacks. Moreover, when the self model is damaged unfortunately, the immune learning of the adaptive immune tier and the immune cloud of the parallel immune tier can be used to detect the attacks by matching the features of the nonselfs, as shown in Figure 1. Although the compromised node, whose self model may be damaged by the attacks, cannot detect the damages with its self model, the other nodes that are attacked by this node will detect the attacks with the normal model and the features of the damaged files in the compromised node.

For instance, when an attack is detected, the source node of the attack may be a normal one in the past and now damaged by the attack. This determination depends on whether the space property of the source node is already in the self database. If the search of this space property in the self database returns nothing, the source node of the attack is sure a new attacking node. The nonselfs are defined here as both the damaged components and the new attacking nodes, which are not acceptable for the immune mobile ad hoc network. The nonselfs are eliminated, and the damaged components are repaired finally.

In the third tier, the immune cloud is a new parallel computing system, which is built with the cloud-computing infrastructure. The cloud-based parallel immune tier is used to increase both the efficiency and robustness of immune computation. In Figure 1, the immune learning is made by searching the most similar known attacks in the feature space of attacks. In Figure 2, the subscriber client, the access

service network, and the connectivity service network in the WiMAX have different self models, and they can work cooperatively when any attack is detected. Because the subscriber client, the access service network, and the connectivity service network all have the normal model-based immune mechanisms that are similar to immune cells, they can detect the attacks and eliminate the attacks in a similar way that the biological immune cells defend against the viruses cooperatively. For example, when a subscriber client detects an attack with its immune mechanism and reports both the position and features of the attack to the immune interfaces of the access service network and the connectivity service network, the two service networks will activate their immune programs to detect the attack from the found position through the mobile ad hoc network. At the same time, the connectivity network may inform some external networks to detect the attack if the attack comes from any node of any external network or already goes out to any node of any external network.

After an attack is detected at any part of the network, the information about the attack will be sent to the relative clients and networks to activate the immune responses against the attack in the relative clients and networks. Afterwards, the attacks that have been detected will be recognized by matching their available features in the expendable feature space of all the known attacks with the real-time searching algorithms, and the pattern recognition will be made in a cooperative way via the servers and cloud-computing platform. The servers can be installed in both the access service network and the connectivity service network. If the search result is yes, then the attacks will be controlled and cleared in a relatively easy way, and both the features and the research result of the attacks will be delivered to the relative clients and networks to eliminate the attacks and defend the system. If the search result is no, then the attacks will be learned with some intelligent methods such as enhanced learning from examples and learning based on neural network, and so on, and the immune learning is partly built on the cloud computing and cooperation of the servers in both the access service network and the connectivity service network.

4. ANALYSIS OF IMMUNE MODEL

When a node in the mobile ad hoc network, defined in Section 3, is damaged by the attacks, it may be under control of attackers and thus may attack other nodes as a tool of the attackers. The attacks may remove crucial nodes, and the damaged nodes may be removed in its immune response to be repaired by its backup ones. So, it is assumed that the mobile ad hoc network such as WiMAX network has m clients, n servers (called AServer) in the Access Service Network, l servers (called as CServer) in the Connectivity Service Network, and d immune clouds. The immune clouds are built on cloud computing to increase the speed and efficiency of the AIS.

First of all, the set of nodes, which were damaged by the attacks at or before time t, is denoted by D_t. $N(t)$ is used to denote the number of nodes that were damaged at or before time t, and the number of nodes, which were removed or lost by time t, was denoted by $M(t)$. Therefore, $N(t)$–$M(t)$ is used to denote the number of nodes that were damaged but have not been removed by time t. For the event that the node was damaged, the degree of node v ($v \in V$) in G is denoted by $\deg(v)$, and the set of nodes neighboring with the node v is denoted by $\{v' | (v, v') \in E\}$. The time, at which the kth node changes state from secure to damaged (i.e., the kth incident occurs), is denoted by T_k, where $1 \le k \le |V|$, and the identity of the node, which was damaged by the attacks at time T_k, that is, the kth damaged node, is denoted by $\text{node}(T_k)$. Suppose for any sequence of damaged nodes $\text{node}(T_1)$, ..., $\text{node}(T_i)$, ..., $\text{node}(T_{|V|})$, the degree of $\text{node}(T_i)$ follows distribution D_i ($1 \le i \le |V|$), which is distributed identically and independently as the degree distribution D of $G = (V, E)$ [22].

For random variables R_1 and R_2, if $\Pr[R_1 > k] \ge \Pr[R_2 > k]$ for any k, then R_1 is called larger (or faster) stochastically than R_2, denoted by $R_1 \, \underline{\hbar}_{st} \, R_2$ [36]. Thus, for the sequence of the stochastic intervals between two incident (e.g., the ith incident and the succeeding incident) occurrences, which are denoted by $S_{1i} = T_{i+1} - T_i$ for $i = 0, 1, ..., |V|$-1, the sequence $S_0, S_1, ..., S_k$ is stochastically decreasing that is denoted by the following formula [22]:

$$S_i \, \underline{\hbar}_{st} \, S_{i+1}, \, i = 0, 1, \ldots, |V| - 1 \tag{3}$$

This proposition is used to prove that the coordinated attacks become more powerful as more internal nodes are damaged and produce new attacks. Here, the discretization makes T_k follow a discrete Poisson process of success probabilities r_{k-1} for $k = 1, ..., |V|$ [22], and the probabilities r_{k-1} are denoted by the following formula:

$$r_i = \frac{|V| + d_1 + d_2 + \ldots + d_i - i}{2|E| + |V|}$$
$$r_0 = \frac{|V|}{2|E| + |V|}, \, i = 1, 2, \ldots, |V| - 1 \tag{4}$$

Here, $d_j =^{\text{def}} \deg(\text{node}(T_j))$ for $j = 1, |V|$.

After the damaged node $\text{node}(T_i)$ is detected, the node should be isolated immediately by cutting off the damaged node's output. It is assumed that the success probability of detecting the damaged node is denoted by p_i, so the success probability of cutting off the output of the damaged node equals to p_i. Therefore, according to (4), the probability r_i with detection is improved by the following formula:

$$r_i = \frac{|V| + \sum_{j=1}^{i-1} d_j + d_i \cdot (1 - p_i) - i + 1 - p_i}{2|E| + |V|}$$

$$= \frac{|V| + \sum_{j=1}^{i} d_j - p_i \cdot (d_i + 1) - i + 1}{2|E| + |V|} \tag{5}$$

In general, there are three strategies to find the damaged node: (i) attack detection directly by getting and matching the features of the damaged node in the feature space F_B for the incomplete set B of attacks, with measuring errors; (ii) unknown attack learning from the feature space F_A for the complete set A of all known attacks, with uncertain results of detection and recognition; and (iii) self detection based on the space–time property set F_S of the selfs and the normal model for defining the selfs and then nonself detection based on the results of the self detection. For strategies 1 and 2, if the node is damaged by the known attacks, then the success probability $p_i^{(1)}$ for strategy 1 can be denoted by the following formula:

$$p_i^{(1)} = \frac{|F_B|}{|F_A|} \cdot p_e^{(1)}, i = 1, \ldots, |V| \tag{6}$$

Here, the probability of measuring errors for strategy 1 is denoted by $p_e^{(1)}$, and the success probability $p_i^{(2)}$ for strategy 2 is denoted by the following formula:

$$p_i^{(2)} = p_l \cdot p_e^{(2)}, i = 1, \ldots, |V| \tag{7}$$

Here, the probability of measuring errors for strategy 2 is denoted by $p_e^{(2)}$, and the success probability of learning unknown attacks is denoted by p_l. Thus, $p_e^{(2)} \approx p_e^{(1)}, p_l = 1$.

Thus, the following theorem is correct:

$$p_i^{(1)} \le p_i^{(2)} \tag{8}$$

$$r_i^{(1)} \ge r_i^{(2)} \tag{9}$$

Here, for $\gamma \in \{1, 2, 3\}$, the sequence of geometric success probabilities for detection strategy γ is denoted by $r_1^{(\gamma)}, \mathrm{K}, r_k^{(\gamma)}$.

If the node is damaged by unknown attacks, then the success probability $p_i^{(1)}$ for strategy 1 always equals to 0 because the features of the unknown attacks will not be matched in the feature space F_B; to our hope, the success probability $p_i^{(2)}$ depends on learning [37–41], and the following experience formula is mostly correct:

$$0 = \frac{|F_B|}{|F_A|} < p_l \le 0.8 \tag{10}$$

Thus, (8) and (9) are still correct.

When the space–time property set F_S is normal with the correct data for strategy 3, no matter whether the node is damaged by the known attacks or not, the success probability $p_i^{(3)}$ for strategy 3 can be denoted by the following formula:

$$p_i^{(3)} = p_s \cdot p_e^{(3)}, i = 1, \ldots, |V| \tag{11}$$

Here, the probability of measuring errors for strategy 3 is denoted by $p_e^{(3)}$, and the success probability of detecting the selfs is denoted by p_s. Moreover, $p_e^{(3)} \approx p_e^{(2)} \approx p_e^{(1)}$, $p_s = 1$.

Thus, when the node is damaged by known attacks,

$$p_i^{(3)} \approx p_i^{(2)} \ge p_i^{(1)} \tag{12}$$

$$r_i^{(3)} \approx r_i^{(2)} \le r_i^{(1)} \tag{13}$$

But, when the node is damaged by some unknown attacks, according to (10),

$$1 = p_S > 0.8 \ge p_l > \frac{|F_B|}{|F_A|} = 0 \tag{14}$$

$$\therefore p_S \cdot p_\varepsilon^{(3)} > p_l \cdot p_\varepsilon^{(2)} > \frac{|F_B|}{|F_A|} \cdot p_\varepsilon^{(1)} \tag{15}$$

$$\therefore p_i^{(3)} > p_i^{(2)} > p_i^{(1)}, \tag{16}$$

$$\therefore r_i^{(3)} < r_i^{(2)} < r_i^{(1)} \tag{17}$$

In summary, for any attack,

$$r_i^{(3)} \le r_i^{(2)} \le r_i^{(1)} \tag{18}$$

For $\gamma \in \{1, 2, 3\}$, the time at which the kth incident because of attacks occurs for detection strategy γ is denoted by $T_k^{(\gamma)}$ [22], and then for $k = 1, 2, \ldots, |V|$, the following theorem is correct:

$$T_k^{(3)} \ge T_k^{(2)} \ge T_k^{(1)} \tag{19}$$

This proposition is useful, for it inspires us, from the perspective for fighting against the attacks that detection strategy 3 outperforms detection strategy 2, which in turn outperforms detection strategy 1. In fact, because some of the collaborative attacks are known and the others are often unknown, if the space–time property set F_S is normal with correct data, strategy 3 is the best approach to test the attacks; otherwise, strategy 2 is often better than strategy 1, especially in dealing with the unknown attacks.

5. SIMULATION RESULTS AND ANALYSIS

Network Simulator 2.35 and the ARM-based nodes were utilized to build the experiment platform [42]. Some nodes were designed with the ARM systems, and each ARM node communicated with other nodes in the network by Zigbee modules. The normal states of the ARM systems were identified with the unique normal model for selfs, and the normal model stored the space–time properties of the normal components, such as the absolute pathname and the last revision time of the normal files. Both the blackhole attacks and the wormhole attacks are implemented as two new attacking ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing (AODV) based protocols with C++ in the NS2-based Linux environment. When any attack tried to change the ARM system to expand the damages, the immune algorithms would detect the attacks by checking the space–time properties of the selfs according to the normal model of the selfs. Because the normal model was unique and protected well, the self detection was quick and effective so that the results for detecting the selfs were used to increase the effectiveness and efficiency for detecting the attacks. Besides, the system repairing was also based on the normal model to keep high precision and efficiency, and the backup system of the normal ARM system was also used to repair the damaged components without affecting other normal components. The parameters for implementing and comparing the results of the experiments were shown in Table I. The purpose of this experiment is to show that the immune mechanism based on the normal model can be deployed in small-scale mobile ad hoc networks to detect and repair the collaborative attacks such as blackhole attacks in collaboration with wormhole attacks.

The topology for the proposed architecture was used into the simulation of collaborative attacks in the mobile ad hoc networks. This scenario consisted of 4 or 16 mobile nodes, 3 static nodes, and 1 base-station node. The basic AODV-routing protocol was used, and User Datagram Protocol packets were sent and received among the nodes. With the AODV-routing protocol, the blackhole attacks and the wormhole attacks were simulated with such protocols as blackholeAODV and wormholeAODV.

The velocity of the mobile nodes is changeable, and the increasing velocity can speed up the spread of the attacks and also activate the immune detection against the attacks more quickly. For example, when the first mobile node changed its velocity from 10.651114437597 m/s to 30.297753834616 m/s and moved towards the other nodes, the other compromised nodes could attack the first mobile node sooner. When the second mobile node changed its velocity from 38.667612113725 m/s to 0.290700863224 m/s and moved towards the other nodes, this node would be later into the attacking range of the other compromised nodes. So, the speedup of attacking activated earlier immune detection of the attacks, and the delay of the attacking time caused the immune detection delay of the attacks. However, once the attacking codes tried to change the core codes of the first mobile node or the second one, the immunization was always activated upon the detection of the attacking codes.

The immunization mechanism was used to cut off the connection between the attacked node and other normal nodes and make the attacked node repaired. All simulation runs lasted 90 s, and to avoid disturbances from the warm-up period, the first 8 s of the simulation results should be discarded.

Particularly, 2 normal network scenarios, 6 different attack scenarios, and 4 different antiattack scenarios were simulated. In the attack scenarios, the effect of single blackhole attack, the effect of single wormhole attack, and the combined effect of blackhole attack together with wormhole attack on the performance of ad hoc wireless networks were analyzed. The antiattack scenarios with different approaches were conducted and compared to evaluate the defending mechanism for keeping the network robust against collaborative attacks [2].

For these evaluations, the reaction time included the detection time and the response time. Different detection approaches spent different time, which might cause important difficulty to eliminate and defend the attacks. To improve the accuracy of the test, multiple repeated attacks were conducted to each experiment. In these experiments, four important metrics were evaluated, that is, PDR, throughput, overhead, and end-to-end delay. PDR is denoted with the ratio between the amount of packet delivered at the destination node and the whole amount of sent packets by the source node. Throughput and end-to-end delay are used to show the network performance degradation. Besides, overhead is represented with the fraction of all control packets sent during the simulation time out of the total amount of packets transmitted.

Figure 3 shows the PDR in four types of 8-node networks, and Figure 4 shows the PDR in four types of 20-node networks. Twenty nodes are fit to show the

Table I. Parameter setting of experiments with NS2 and ARM nodes.

Parameter name	Initial value
Simulation time	90 (s)
Sum of mobile nodes	4, 16
Sum of static nodes	3
Sum of base-station node	1
Sum of blackhole nodes	3
Sum of wormhole node	1
Topology	700×700 m
Normal routing protocol	AODV
Blackhole attack protocol	blackholeAODV
Wormhole attack protocol	wormholeAODV
Traffic	CBR
Normal packet size	512 bytes
Abnormal packet size	1024 bytes
Data rates	10 Kbits
Sum of ARM nodes	3
Sum of backup system	1

AODV, ad hoc on-demand distance vector routing; CBR, constant bit rate.

Figure 3. Packet delivery ratios of the 8-node networks under attacks including collaborative attacks.


Figure 4. Packet delivery ratios of the 20-node networks under the attacks.

Figure 5. Packet delivery ratios of the 8-node networks defending against collaborative attacks.


Figure 6. Packet delivery ratios of the 20-node networks defending against collaborative attacks.

characters of the mobile ad hoc network in the NS2 because too many nodes will cause overload in generating .nam files. The first network was a normal one; the second was damaged by the blackhole attacks on three nodes; the third was damaged by the wormhole attack on another node, and the last one was damaged by the collaborative attacks. The networks under the attacks had lower PDRs than the normal network, and the four curves in different positions and trends show that the collaborative attacks are more harmful than single attacks.

Both the 8-node network with cooperative immunization and the 20-node network with cooperative immunization performed better than the network with IDS in Figures 5 and 6, respectively. Once the network was immunized at 12 s in Figure 5, the PDR of the 8-node network being immunized was sure higher than those of the network with regular IDS and the network under the collaborative attacks. The regular IDS mechanism can detect the known attacks such as the blackhole attacks, but this approach cannot detect the unknown wormhole attacks with learning mechanism.

For comparing the performances of the two defense approaches, the throughputs of the connections in the different 8-node networks were measured and analyzed in

Figure 7. It is sure to affirm that regular IDS caused higher throughputs because of the harmful expansion of wormhole nodes, but the node under wormhole attacks was isolated, and the normal nodes were well protected by the immune network on the basis of the normal model.

The next metric evaluated was the network overhead, which shows how much of the control packets were generated within the 8-node network, as shown in Figure 8. Both the normal network and the immune network performed better than the network under collaborative attacks and the network with regular IDS against the attacks. The immune network first performed worst because of the attacks without beginning the immune responses. The higher the reaction time becomes, the better the overall performance of the proposed immunization scheme will be.

The last observed metric, the end-to-end delay of the 8-node network, is shown and compared in Figure 9. The results in this figure were calculated by taking the average of the end-to-end delay of the incoming packets

Figure 7. End-to-end throughput.

**Figure 8.** Overall overhead.

Figure 9. End-to-end delay.

at the receiver. As same as the previous, the end-to-end delay stresses the more chance of better performance for the wireless network by immunization.

Overall, the experimental results on the NS2 and the ARM nodes allow affirming that it is important and useful for the wireless WiMAX network to utilize the cooperative immunization for security. On the basis of analyzing the

experiment results, the immunization has three advantages than the regular IDS. First, the immunization is able to isolate the nodes under attacks by the network reconfiguration; second, the immunization can identify the nodes under attacks by detecting the nonselfs and the selfs on the basis of the normal model, which is useful and crucial for controlling and eliminating the fast expansion of the active attacks such as the wormhole attacks; finally, the immunization is of new powerful learning mechanism for defending the networks, called as immune learning.

6. CONCLUSIONS AND FUTURE WORKS

Some important properties and mechanisms of cooperative immunization were proposed to defend the ad hoc network under such collaborative attacks as the blackhole attacks and the wormhole attacks. New tri-tier cooperative immunization-based framework was designed to detect and recognize the collaborative attacks in mobile ad hoc networks such as WiMAX networks. The performance of the proposed framework was analyzed in terms of the PDRs, the throughput, the traffic overhead, and the responsiveness of the system. The experimental results confirm the effectiveness of the proposed cooperative immune model in detecting and mitigating these collaborative attacks from disrupting the protected mobile ad hoc networks such as WiMAX networks.

For future works, it is interesting to design the products of the proposed framework with the optimal parameters to keep the mobile ad hoc network secure. Another future research is to improve the protocols of immunization by increasing the accuracy and speed of the adaptive immunization in dealing with unknown attacks. Evaluations of the issues such as tests against other collaborative attacks, real-time identification of the selfs, complexity, optimization, and consumption are also left for future work.

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