

1 **Influences on policy-formulation, decision-making, organisation and management for maternal,**
2 **newborn and child health in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Malawi and Uganda: the roles and legitimacy**
3 **of a multi-country network**

4
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24

25 **Abstract**

26 The Network for Improving Quality of Care for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (QCN) is intended to
27 facilitate learning, action, leadership and accountability for improving quality of care in member countries.

28 This requires legitimacy—a network’s right to exert power within national contexts. This is reflected, for
29 example, in a government’s buy-in and perceived ownership of the work of the network.

30 During 2019– 2022 we conducted iterative rounds of stakeholder interviews, observations of meetings,
31 document review, and hospital observations in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Malawi, Uganda and at the global level.

32 We developed a framework drawing on three frameworks: Tallberg and Zurn which conceptualizes legitimacy
33 of international organisations dependent on their features, the legitimation process and beliefs of audiences;

34 Nasiritousi and Faber, which looks at legitimacy in terms of problem, purpose, procedure, and performance
35 of institutions; Sanderink and Nasiritousi, to characterize networks in terms of political, normative and

36 cognitive interactions. We used thematic analysis to characterize, compare and contrast institutional
37 interactions in a cross-case synthesis to determine salient features.

38 Political and normative interactions were favourable within and between countries and at global level since
39 collective decisions, collaborative efforts, and commitment to QCN goals were observed at all levels. Sharing

40 resources and common principles were not common between network countries, indicating limits of the
41 network. Cognitive interactions—those related to information sharing and transfer of ideas— were more

42 challenging, with the bi-directional transfer, synthesis and harmonization of concepts and methods, being
43 largely absent among and within countries. These may be required for increasing government ownership of

44 QCN work, the embeddedness of the network, and its legitimacy.

45 While we find evidence supporting the legitimacy of QCN from the perspective of country governments,
46 further work and time are required for governments to own and embed the work of QCN in routine care.

47

48 **Keywords:** legitimacy, ownership, embeddedness, power, institutional interaction, quality of care network
49 (QCN).

50

51 **Introduction**

52 The Network for Improving Quality of Care for Maternal, Newborn and Child Health (QCN) [1] was created to
53 reduce maternal, newborn and child health morbidity and mortality by improving quality of care. QCN was
54 intended to facilitate learning, action, leadership and accountability for improving quality of care in member
55 countries [2].

56

57 For the network to work as intended the government of each member country must buy into the idea and
58 spend time and resources on network activities and coordination [2]. Each member country therefore must
59 recognise the legitimacy of the network and take sufficient ownership of the required policy and
60 management activities. In this paper, legitimacy is understood as ‘the right to exert power’[3]. This right can
61 be understood both in a normative and empirical sense. The former, from the perspective of democratic
62 theory questions if an actor has a right to exert power, i.e., is it representative of constituent interests and/or
63 historically effective in meeting those interests? The latter examines an actor’s perceived right to exert power
64 from the perspective of a particular actor. Previous work on international organisations, primarily from the
65 perspective of the public, indicates that social trust, democratic organisation, and how these are influenced
66 by prior communication and beliefs compatible with the mission and values of the initiative are likely to foster
67 legitimacy, and the absence of these make an initiative or actors less likely to be seen as legitimate [4-7].
68 Work on the legitimacy of organisations from the perspective of expert stakeholders found an organisations
69 performance, their purpose and procedure to all drive legitimacy [8]. These factors, and especially

70 performance, explained perceptions of effectiveness and confidence in organisations as well [8], aligning with
71 the findings on the role of trust, democracy, and communication and belief in increasing legitimacy.

72

73 In this paper, we examine QCN's legitimacy in advancing policy and improving services—from the perspective
74 of QCN country teams and in particular the national governments departments that led them— across four
75 of the involved countries: Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Malawi, and Uganda. Specifically, we investigate QCN's
76 legitimacy by analysing the nature of the interactions across global, national, and local network actors
77 engaged in QCN. Consequent to QCN's legitimacy we also investigate the ownership and direction of
78 strategies adopted in each country, and how embedded the work of the network is in the health system
79 (routine care) of each country [9]. We consider the context of each country in our investigations.

80 This paper on network legitimacy and ownership is part of a series of papers evaluating the QCN and
81 complements our papers on network emergence [10] and network effectiveness [11] [additional file: 2-page
82 summary explaining collection of QCN papers]. Following the emergence of the network at global and
83 national levels [10] this paper looks at interactions between the institutions involved in each country, and
84 the global level, which is key to understanding network effectiveness, as well as specific aspects of the work
85 of the network such as innovation, sharing and learning [12] and our stakeholder network analysis [13],
86 looking at interactions between QCN actors from a quantitative perspective. Understanding the factors
87 shaping legitimacy of QCN is important both for understanding the emergence and effectiveness of QCN, and
88 for the success of future multilateral international efforts that bring governments and multiple stakeholders
89 together to improve health systems and quality of care, and for work on other initiatives more broadly.

90

91 **Methods**

92 QCN emerged during 2017-2019, involving 11 countries, and was disrupted by the COVID-19 pandemic [10].

93 Our study was carried out at national and local levels in Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Malawi and Uganda as well as

94 at the global level of QCN. We chose these four countries as case studies as they represent a range of
95 maternal, newborn and child health contexts and prior histories with quality improvement efforts. Our study
96 is qualitative research, and involved, over three years (2019-2022) an iterative series of interviews of key
97 stakeholders, observations of meetings at local and national levels, document review and hospital
98 observations. The iterative nature of our work, which included follow-up interviews of many respondents
99 over several years during the evolution of QCN, with accordingly iteratively revised interview topic guides,
100 enabled us to investigate how institutional interactions and consequent legitimacy and embeddedness of the
101 network changed over time, up until 2022. The COVID-19 pandemic also disrupted our research, though like
102 QCN itself, some work, such as interviews, moved online [14]. Please see supplementary material [common
103 methods document] for details of all data collection methods and how this study is linked to the wider
104 evaluation of the QCN we undertook. Here we focus on the framework and theories we use and our analytical
105 methods for this paper.

106

107 ***Legitimacy frameworks***

108 To guide our analysis, we developed a framework (Figure 1) drawing on three relevant frameworks. First that
109 by Tallberg and Zurn [4] which conceptualizes legitimacy of international organisations as being dependent
110 on their features (authority, procedure, performance), the legitimation process (intensity, tone, narrative),
111 and legitimacy beliefs of audiences (constituents and observers). Second, by Nasiritousi and Faber [8], which
112 looks at legitimacy in terms of the focus of institutions on a problem, looking at purpose, procedure, and
113 performance of institutions. We use this to consider how the history of work on quality improvement in each
114 country by the institutions involved in QCN relates to observed legitimacy, ownership and embeddedness of
115 QCN in the country. Third, a framework developed by Sanderink and Nasiritousi [15] to characterize networks
116 in terms of perceived institutional interactions. This divides institutional interactions into political, normative,
117 cognitive, behavioural and ‘impact level’ interactions. We focused on three of these interactions, political,


118 normative and cognitive (Figure 1) to investigate the legitimacy and ownership of the work of the network in
119 each case study country, looking at the extent to which different organisations involved in the network work
120 together across these three dimensions. Political interactions are those related to joint decision making and
121 collaboration; normative interactions are those related to shared principles, norms and commitments; and
122 cognitive interactions are those related to information sharing and transfer of ideas [15]. We do not focus on
123 behavioural or impact level interactions as behavioural change and impact are difficult to measure and are
124 concerned with network effectiveness, the subject of another of our papers [11].

125
126 Institutional interactions may also be shaped by power relations between institutions, which may be
127 dependent on the capacity of each institution [16, 17], e.g., institutions with greater capacity have more
128 power to form policies and influence decisions and ways of working of other organisations. In our
129 examination of interactions between institutions we also consider the nature of institutional agency and
130 power in relation to structure, by considering distribution of financial and economic resources, organisational
131 culture and ways of working, alignment of goals between actors, leverage via other agreements and
132 influences and political stability (Figure 1).

133
134 We consider the history of quality improvement efforts in each country in relation to the formation of the
135 network and wider context of maternal, newborn and child health programmes in detail in supplementary
136 material common to all papers in our QCN evaluation series [common country context document]. In this
137 paper we extract the most relevant aspects of this background information explaining the role of institutions
138 involved in QCN at the beginning of our results section and follow with the results of our analysis of
139 institutional interactions, legitimacy and ownership of the work of the network described above.

140

141 **Fig 1. Framework describing drivers of legitimacy and ownership of the work of Quality of Care Network**
142 **(QCN) from the perspective of national governments leading the work of QCN**




Arrows represent Institutional Interactions, including: [Sanderink & Nasiritousi \[5\]](#)
 Political Interactions
 Normative Interactions
 Cognitive Interactions

Extent of influence of each body and actor (width of arrow) will depend on:

- Capacity [see Wu et al, ref [XX](#), Paper 6, ref [XX](#)] e.g. Human resources available in country to draft policy and programmes, organise activities, analyse and evaluate processes and outcomes
- Alignment of goals between actors (**beliefs**, organisational **purpose**)
- Leverage (**authority**) via other agreements and influences, and **procedures**
- Organisational culture and wider cultures
- Political stability
- **Performance** of organisations

[Nasiritousi & Faber \[6\]](#)

[Tallberg & Zurn \[Ref X\]](#)



144 *Analysis*

145 We used thematic analysis [18] of interview transcripts and process tracing [19] using interview data, review
146 of key documents and observations of meetings to characterise political, normative and cognitive
147 interactions between institutions involved in QCN in each country. We compared and contrasted these
148 interactions in a cross-case synthesis to determine salient features of these institutional interactions in order
149 to evaluate the legitimacy of the network and ownership and embeddedness of the work of the network in
150 each country, and which contextual factors they depend on, to answer our research question.

151

152 *Ethics*

153 Ethical approval was received from University College London Research Ethics Committee (ref: 3433/003);
154 BADAS Ethical Review Committee (ref: BADAS-ERC/EC/19/00274), Ethiopian Public Health Institute
155 Institutional Review Board (ref: EPHI-IRB-240-2020), National Health Sciences Research Committee in Malawi
156 (ref: 19/03/2264) and Makerere University Institutional Review Board (ref: Protocol 869). The conduct of the
157 evaluation was based on clear ethical standards which assured confidentiality, privacy, anonymity and
158 informed consent. All respondents provided verbal or written informed consent. All respondents were
159 informed of: (i) the purpose of the evaluation; (ii) their right to refuse to participate; and (iii) that their
160 possible decision not to participate would not be held against them or affect their status in the network.

161

162 **Results**

163 In examining QCN's legitimacy, we first summarize key contextual information concerning the roles of each
164 network partner institution in each of the country cases; further details on QCN's emergence in each of the
165 countries, as well as their histories concerning quality improvement and MNCH initiatives are provided in

166 Shawar *et al* [10] and the supplementary material [common country context document]. We then discuss the
167 political, normative and cognitive interactions between involved actors.

168

169 ***Bangladesh***

170 Bangladesh's work on and government commitment to quality improvement long pre-dates the
171 establishment of QCN. In terms of government commitment, the Quality Improvement Secretariat (QIS),
172 established by the Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoH&FW) in January 2015, supports quality
173 improvement (QI) initiatives across the country and strengthens and coordinates QI activities in the public
174 and private health sector. QCN was integrated into QIS. In addition to QIS, there were several development
175 partners that have long worked on quality improvement in the country, including WHO, UNICEF, USAID and
176 Save the Children. UNICEF worked in partnership with the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation and the Ministry
177 of Health (MoH) since 2015 to demonstrate a model of quality of care to scale up at national level via its Every
178 Mother, Every Newborn (EMEN) pilot project in Kurigram (one of the northern districts in Bangladesh) [20].
179 Save the Children is a key implementer of USAID's Mamoni Maternal, newborn and child health strengthening
180 project (MNCSP), a flagship activity to support the Bangladeshi Maternal and Newborn Health program,
181 started in 2018 [21]. These actors collectively engaged in the establishment and implementation of QCN
182 activities. Other actors, that did not appear to interact directly with QCN but contributed to QI
183 implementation processes included UNFPA, the National Institute for Preventative and Social Medicine
184 (NIPSOM) and district-level Civil Surgeons. NIPSOM is a government academic institution invited by UNICEF
185 to play the role of national learning hub. NIPSOM was also working as implementing partner with UNICEF's
186 support, and participated to train and coach facility health workers. URC from the global level also worked to
187 train and coach health workers, especially during the initial stages of QCN, and sometimes via online sessions.
188 The Civil Surgeon is the district head in health and implementing partners run the projects informing him of
189 every detail. UNFPA works on Maternal and Perinatal Death Surveillance and Response (MPDSR) at the

190 national level along with other partners, but not part of QCN activities. Relevant departments of the
191 Directorate General of Health Service (DGHS) and Directorate General of Family Planning (DGFP), also get
192 involved by two partner organizations.

193

194 ***Ethiopia***

195 Ethiopia also had a history of MNCH and quality improvement initiatives prior to the introduction of QCN
196 [2]. For example, in 2015, the government introduced the Health Sector Transformation Plan (HTSP), which
197 sought to improve maternal and child health services. In 2016, the National Healthcare Quality Strategy
198 (NHQS) was launched, followed by the establishment of quality units at federal, regional, district and facility
199 levels. The country also had experience with similar network initiatives, including the Ethiopian Hospitals
200 Alliance for Quality (EHAQ), initiated by MoH in 2012 [22]. In 2016, QCN was placed in the MoH, which
201 played a leadership role in coordinating and providing technical support, coaching and mentoring for
202 quality improvement activities. It established a technical working group (TWG) consisting of representatives
203 of different partners and prepared a national roadmap called LALI (Leadership, Accountability, Learning,
204 Implementation, alternatively used to LALA) [23] and identified learning facilities. QCN eventually became a
205 country-led program, mainly coordinated by the MoH, with institutions, including international donors, and
206 NGOs either funding or providing technical support at national level (for example WHO, UNICEF, USAID and
207 UNFPA) or implementing the program at the facility level (these include IHI, Transform Primary Health Care
208 Unit (Transform PHCU), Transform Health in Developing Regions (Transform HDR), CHAI, and WHO). WHO
209 played a vital role in initiating, directing and coordinating the implementation together with MoH. WHO
210 also provided technical and financial support for some of the local facilities, up until 2021 when WHO
211 ceased their QCN activities in Ethiopia. It also served as a link to the WHO headquarters and the QCN at the
212 global level. UNICEF and UNFPA play the role of financial partners.

213

214 ***Malawi***

215 In Malawi, QCN built on previous government and partner efforts to reduce maternal and newborn mortality
216 as part of the MDGs/SDGs, as well as efforts towards achieving universal health coverage (UHC) and work
217 done on HIV to trying to reduce mother-to-child transmission [24]. In November 2016, the government
218 established the Quality Management Directorate (QMD) within the Ministry of Health, where QCN was
219 placed. QMD aimed to contribute to improve health and client satisfaction via provision of quality health
220 services and to drive the national agenda to improve quality and equity in the health sector in Malawi. After
221 introducing the QCN to the MoH, the WHO assisted the Ministry in gathering key stakeholders, which formed
222 a coordinating body (TWG) in charge of planning the implementation of QCN in the country. Other key
223 stakeholders at the national level include the Reproductive Health Directorate (RHD) of the MoH, UNICEF,
224 UNFPA and GIZ. RHD was a technical partner and worked with QMD in supporting and coordinating network
225 efforts though they were less visible in QCN efforts over time. GIZ and UNICEF were playing the roles of
226 implementation, technical and funding partners and also supported other community-based organizations
227 (e.g. Society of Medical Doctors (SMD) and MaiKhanda) directly to implement QoC activities. UNFPA was
228 providing technical assistance to develop policies and strategies, providing funding to RHD and QMD, and
229 playing the role of an implementing partner. Other stakeholders who also played substantial roles at the
230 national level include PACHA, NEST 360, ONSE, and Cowater where PACHA was playing both the role of
231 technical and implementing partner and other organizations were working in implementation. JHPIEGO,
232 CHAI, Save the Children and EGPAF assisted to review the roadmap.

233

234 ***Uganda***

235 QCN in Uganda built upon a long history of QI initiatives that remain ongoing, particularly those focused on
236 HIV, reproductive health, and malaria. Previous QI initiatives in Uganda were Yellow Star and using the 5S's
237 (sort, set, shine, standardize, and sustain) approach in HIV, TB and malaria, which established QI teams at
238 each level of the health system as well as specific standards, indicators and databases. Uganda's commitment
239 to improving MNCH was exhibited in its 2013 RMNCAH Sharpened Plan for Uganda, a national RMNCAH
240 policy which set out to address existing bottlenecks to reduce MNC morbidity and mortality [25]; the updated
241 plan in 2021, sought to especially focus on quality of care.

242
243 QCN was originally co-led by the government's Quality Assurance Department and MCH department. QCN
244 only began to flourish in 2019 after the renaming of the Quality Assurance Department to the Standards
245 Compliance Accreditation Patient Protection (SCAPP) department under the Directorate of Governance and
246 Regulation, and assigning it sole oversight and appointing a focal person for QCN, who brought more partners
247 and funding on board. In this new arrangement, SCAPP would still work with the other departments but took
248 responsibility for Network activities. In line with the country's decentralised health system regional quality
249 improvement teams (QIT) were established, which aimed to lead and support district and health facility
250 QITs. Several implementing partners played crucial roles in QCN in Uganda. The WHO introduced the QCN
251 to the MoH and helped gather key stakeholders to form a TWG. Other key stakeholders in the country at the
252 national level, included USAID, UNICEF, UNFPA. USAID worked through their partner organisations in Uganda:
253 URC (previously) through Applying Science to Strengthen and Improve Systems (ASSIST) RHITES (North for
254 Acholi region and East central for Busoga region), RHITES-Southwest/EGPAF, Save the Children and FHI
255 (specifically under the MNCH/N activity). UNICEF and UNFPA also supported other organisations (CBOs) to
256 directly implement QoC activities, e.g., AVSI and IntraHealth. Over the course of 2021, UNFPA increased its
257 involvement with QCN and decided to formally enter the network rather than mirror its work independently.
258 Other stakeholders who also played substantial roles at the national level were the Makerere University

259 School of Public Health as the designated learning partner on the Network, CHAI, JHPIEGO, and Ugandan
260 professional associations including the Ugandan Paediatric Association and the Uganda Private Midwives
261 Association. Another stakeholder playing a large role in the QCN in Uganda indirectly, was the World Bank
262 through its GFF, which funded MOH's URMCHIP project, though it was not a direct QCN partner. Most
263 involved partners requested to join the network themselves and were already Ministry partners on
264 SRMNCAH issues.

265

266 ***QCN Legitimacy Within and Across Countries***

267 QCN's legitimacy is understood to be comprised of several types of interactions: political, normative, and
268 cognitive. We first present our findings on political interactions, then normative interactions, and finally
269 cognitive interactions, bearing in mind how the extent of the institutional interactions will depend on the
270 capacity, beliefs, performance, purpose, procedures and authority of each organisation, its wider
271 organisational culture, and wider culture and political stability of the country (Figure 1). The presence (X) or
272 absence (blank) of these types of interactions between the major institutions mentioned above, is
273 summarized in Table 1, both for institutions within each country, and from the country to other countries in
274 the network or the global level. All of these interactions drive (Figure 1) and reflect legitimacy of the QCN in
275 each country, whilst for government ownership and embeddedness of the QCN in each country we are
276 specifically interested in sharing of resources and transfer of concepts from the national level to other
277 network countries or the global level of the network.

278

279 **Table 1: Types of institutional interactions observed in case study countries**

Interaction type	Bangladesh		Ethiopia		Malawi		Uganda	
	Within country	Bangladesh to [^] other network countries or Global level	Within country	Ethiopia to [^] other network countries or Global level	Within country	Malawi to [^] other network countries or Global level	Within country	Uganda to [^] other network countries or Global level
Political interactions								
- Collective decisions	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
- Collaborative efforts	X	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
- Resource Sharing [^]	X		X		X		X	
Normative interactions								
- Shared commitments	X	X		X		X	X	
- Shared norms	X	X					X	
- Common principles	X	X		X		X	X	X
Cognitive interactions								
- Exchange of information	X	X	X		X	X	X	
- Transfer of concepts and methods [^]								

280 [^]For our analysis of government ownership and embeddedness of the QCN in each country we are specifically interested
 281 in sharing of resources and transfer of concepts from the national level to other network countries or the global level of
 282 the network

283

284 **Political Interaction**

285 The political institutional interactions we examined included those related to collective decisions,
286 collaborative efforts, and resource sharing among key network partners across local, national and global
287 levels. Political interactions between QCN institutions appeared strong in all four case study countries.

288

289 Collective Decisions

290 Collective decisions, evidenced by a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) or joint statement for example,
291 should be artifacts of any multi-stakeholder network [15] and both bolster and reflect legitimacy of the
292 network. Collective decisions were observed at the global level as the network emerged, where all partners
293 had an agreement with the WHO-based QCN secretariat regarding the formation of the network. This
294 suggests QCN legitimacy is linked to legitimacy of the WHO.

295

296 At the national level, partners of all case countries working for QCN implementation, including those in the
297 private sector, have contracts or longstanding bilateral arrangements with the MoH and with each other. The
298 prior performance of partner organisations in each country –their history of contributing to quality
299 improvement efforts– influenced their contribution to collective decisions.

300

301 Implementing partners in each country usually co-produced knowledge, guidance and gave statements on
302 key issues with the MoH but were keen for the MoH to be seen as taking the lead and were in support roles
303 of the ministry's strategic and operational direction.

304 *“In new districts, at first we have one to one interaction with leadership where we give some overview.*

305 *After that, we organized an inception meeting, all of the leaders attended that meeting, and through*
306 *that process, we make them oriented as well as engaged with our activities.”* (Technical and

307 Implementing Partner – National level – Bangladesh Round 3)

308

309 In Bangladesh, QIS and other partner organizations attended the follow-up meeting with WHO QCN
310 secretariat together and sent a narrative report and working plan to the WHO QCN secretariat, which was a
311 good example of joint work. Another example of a collective decision was observed in Ethiopia in identifying
312 partners and selecting learning sites by MoH and WHO in country, at the initial stage of QCN.

313 Autonomous decision-making persists along with coordination and collective decisions. For instance, in
314 Uganda, partners took the autonomous decision during the selection of sites for scaling up. Bangladesh also
315 experienced independent decision-making (e.g. selecting scaling up areas) and influence on MoH (e.g. joining
316 the network, running capacity building activities by NIPSOM) in decision-making by the partners. The partners
317 in Malawi also seem to have a lot of autonomy concerning decisions of which activities they will support and
318 where. Similarly, Ethiopia also has the experience of autonomous decision-making on site selection since the
319 selection of facilities was made based on partners existing support or pre-existing support by another project.

320

321 Collaborative efforts

322 Collaborative efforts include co-organizing events, co-coordinating activities, or co-authoring publications.
323 Partners across global, national and local levels, and especially key national level partners in all four case
324 study countries displayed strong collaborations. Cohesive participation in developing the forthcoming
325 National Health Quality Strategy (NHQS) by all key partners at the national level in Bangladesh was observed
326 for instance, though USAID was steering the strategy and communicating with different directorates as well
327 as the WHO global network.

328

329 Developing QCN roadmaps in Ethiopia, Malawi and Uganda were the result of collaboration between QCN
330 partners and in Uganda, this collaboration at the national level increased after MoH's leadership transition

331 which also made clear roles and responsibilities of the different units. Many respondents expressed their
332 realization of the importance and benefit of QCN setting-up opportunities for collaboration.

333

334 Co-organizing different events, workshops and training were common across all study countries though the
335 events were led by different partners depending on the topics. For example, in Bangladesh, national events
336 were mostly led by government; they led in agenda setting and decision-making, and development partners
337 supported technically and/or financially, so they could push the government to organize such types of
338 collaborative events. Such financial and technical support to proceedings provided development partners
339 authority to strategically influence QCN, though, as in Bangladesh, government often set the agenda and
340 made the decisions on what was implemented and by which organizations. This was not always the case
341 though. Two perspectives were observed regarding funding and decision-making in Malawi - influence of
342 development partners in implementation and conditional funding, which is experienced through UNICEF, and
343 reliance on partners for direction.

344 *".....we are hoping that partners like UNICEF, GIZ would come and say; 'okay, what will be our*
345 *direction?'* This is because other than WHO, we need to engage other partners" (Government -
346 National level - Malawi Round 3)

347

348 Sharing resources

349 At the global level, BMGF and USAID were the primary funding partners. BMGF primarily supported through
350 funding the WHO-based QCN secretariat and UNICEF for national implementation. Later, BMGF did not fund
351 network activities beyond the global secretariat which shrunk the implementation activities in UNICEF funded
352 countries and spaces though they overcame this quickly through alternative funds. For instance, in
353 Bangladesh, BMGF was the primary funder for the Kurigram project, while they also worked in 5-6 other
354 districts with funding from Global Affairs Canada and the UN Emergency Fund for the Rohingya in Cox's

355 Bazaar. USAID funded QI efforts in-country via the MoMENTUM award, a global initiative covering 30
356 countries including Bangladesh and Malawi (but not Ethiopia as MoMENTUM award was not running there
357 and Uganda because of their own system) that will continue some of the QCN activities after QCN funding
358 stops in 2022-2023 [26], with funding going directly to implementing partners rather than MoHs. Involvement
359 of most funding partners in all four case countries was either via the continuation of previous QI efforts or
360 MNCH activities, or via alignment with QCN activities (e.g., Mamoni project in Bangladesh). QI was also
361 incorporated into pre-existing work, for example, World Bank/GFF supported funding for QI activities in
362 Uganda, but they didn't really align themselves with QCN activities.

363
364 Funding or sharing resources at the national and local levels is catalytic. In addition to receiving direct budget
365 support from donors, it was common for partners in all four case study countries to mobilise their own
366 resources, though the amount of resources varied across countries. Since there was no specific budget for
367 QCN in Ethiopia, partners were using their own budgets earmarked for other similar QI activities to prepare
368 learning sessions and support facilities. Big partners like USAID, UNICEF, WHO, Save the Children also
369 provided human resources support through providing direct funding to the government or through
370 implementing partners or by themselves at the national and/or facility level in all countries.

371 *"We provided funding to the government directly to hire additional human resources like officers*
372 *for/located at the regional hospitals". (Technical and Implementing partner – National level -*
373 *Uganda Round 1)*

374
375 Except human resources support, partners also provided logistics and financial support and additionally, in
376 some cases, support in the reconstruction and renovation of different facilities for MNH services across our
377 four case countries. Pooling resources depended on necessity and on the ministry's request and/or facility
378 manager's request. For example, in Ethiopia, rather than focusing solely on quality, all activities were

379 considered such as project design, implementation planning, and so on and when a need developed, such as
380 when the government requests assistance or when gaps exist, donors such as UNICEF helped to fill those
381 gaps, either in kind or cash. In Bangladesh and Malawi, partners also directly provided resources (e.g.,
382 equipment) to learning sites. In Uganda, partners pool their resources at the national level for QCN activities
383 but previous funding experiences and prevailing implementing partner working arrangements with MOH,
384 including tight timelines and targets, led funders to prefer directly funding their own QI initiatives whilst
385 ensuring alignment and reporting to MOH priorities.

386
387 Domestic resources have been used for QCN activities in Ethiopia and Bangladesh in MoH or development
388 partner's initiatives. In Ethiopia, MoH eventually shared some budget with the regions. However, having
389 financial autonomy, some of the regions used the money for other purposes. On the other hand, one partner
390 in Bangladesh succeeded to convince the National Institute of Local Government (NILG) to properly utilize
391 their budget for MNH. Our meeting observation and interview showed that Save the Children succeeded to
392 do it by engaging NLGI's in different events, like, advocacy meetings, establishing functional linkage between
393 health and family planning departments and NLGIs, engaging them in data-driven decentralized planning and
394 regular communication and follow-up. This helped to develop ownership by local government and
395 contributed to sustainability. Such type of devolved funding was not observed in Malawi or Uganda. This
396 suggests that the organizational and political culture of the MoH –their willingness to allow devolution or
397 flexibility of funding– influences allocation of resources for QCN activities and reflects the extent to which
398 the local level of QCN implementation was seen as legitimate by governments in each country.

399
400 However, our interviews and observations indicate that resource allocation was not sufficient in most
401 facilities to run QCN activities smoothly. In Uganda, there was a common theme that the global level of QCN
402 did not consider the physical constraints or level of rapid resourcing needed from the government to be able

403 to achieve the goals and meet the standards, particularly around experience of care. A similar claim regarding
404 organizational and structural capacity, came from respondents in Bangladesh.

405

406 **Normative Interaction**

407 The commitment, norms and principles of all QCN actors of all countries overlapped with national goals and
408 were consistent with previous works that have been discussed in the background section. However, all
409 agreed that network activities gave them more impetus to act and be accountable at global level. All the
410 actors sought synergy though they didn't always experience synergy in terms of joint working on
411 implementation and achievement of goals.

412

413 The governments of participating countries were leading the QCN through their commitment for improving
414 quality of care and adaptation of the Network's strategic objectives to their country contexts through growing
415 the partnership with the different organizations. All case study countries also adopted and adapted the QoC
416 standards considering their own country context, led by MoH or the responsible department of MoH [11].
417 Each country had exposure to QI activities through partners and mostly previous partners were working on
418 network implementation. This was supposed to be beneficial, but this was not always the case. For instance,
419 in Uganda, new coordination of actors was required as initial lack of clear coordination led to many
420 participants reporting a lack of awareness or sense of cohesion. While participants at the national level were
421 aware of and unified behind the QCN's goals, there was often a sense that each actor was continuing to
422 operate in its predetermined silo at sub-national level. Another challenge in design for Uganda's in-country
423 approach was that facility-level stakeholders, especially frontline workers were not fully oriented to the QCN
424 separately; but rather some network activities were mainstreamed into other existing standard operating
425 procedures, practice guidance or QI initiatives implemented by other implementing partners. A lack of a
426 standardized implementation plan, including a clear set of timed targets, made it difficult to ensure alignment

427 and cohesion around QI at all levels of the network in Uganda. One MoH participant reflected that having
428 clear, time-bound and measurable commitments would have increased motivation and momentum by
429 encouraging accountability. However, this situation was not static: our last round of data indicated better
430 coordination and leadership from the centre.

431
432 Ethiopia experienced similar challenges throughout the entire implementation period. At the start of QCN,
433 most of the actors in Ethiopia perceived network activities as WHO's work until the MoH announced it was
434 their flagship initiative. In Ethiopia there was some disconnect between the federal and regional levels. The
435 federal level and regional level blamed each other. The regional level complained that the central (federal)
436 level didn't share anything or give clear direction, nor assign them with responsibilities properly, and that
437 made them see the work as the federal level's project. On the contrary, the federal government was
438 complaining about the regional level's lack of commitment whilst the regional level associated this with lack
439 of capacity. In addition, regional level informants also mentioned they had a minimal sense of ownership.

440 *".....the MoH announced the QCN program in their own; they simply ask us to send them one or two*
441 *participants in a meeting."* (Government-Regional level-Ethiopia Round 1)

442
443 In the initial phases of QCN emergence, lack of coordination was also observed between the quality
444 improvement and MCH departments of MOH. However, this was to improve later after a clear allocation of
445 roles and responsibilities was undertaken. Lack of clear direction to the sub-national level was observed as a
446 reason for slow inception of activities at local level in Malawi. Less concentration and poor political
447 commitment of central level gradually made the RHD less active. Besides this, involvement of numerous
448 partners, and persistence of discrepancies between the partners' and local objectives, created difficulties to
449 coordinate and consolidate various efforts.

450

451 Evidence showed that implementation activities in Bangladesh were mostly ‘DP [Development Partner]
452 centric’ despite the government chairing the QCN. Like the other three case study countries, awareness was
453 mostly at central level, and the network was not known to most of the sub-national level actors who
454 perceived the activities as partner’s work. This perception was, however, transformed progressively though
455 not entirely, through meetings, workshops, and training organized by implementing partners, and when
456 health workers at facilities started to comprehend the benefits.

457
458 The above findings indicate that the beliefs of network actors about the purpose of QCN influence its
459 legitimacy. This is exemplified at the local level, where the network was less well known by many health
460 workers, and consequently had less authority.

461

462 **Cognitive Interaction**

463 It was expected in the network that all pathfinder countries will be willing to transparently share data within
464 the network, have a desire to learn and develop, and that the international actors and countries will join to
465 learn from one another. Good synergy was expected, but rarely materialized beyond sharing information
466 through implementing-partner-led efforts. This may be due to lack of government capacity to assemble,
467 manage, analyse and share information and adapt programming quickly in response, organizational cultures
468 unused to such dynamic network-dependent decision-making, or both. Overall, the lack of transfer of ideas
469 and concepts between institutions and countries involved in QCN illustrated limits to the network, and the
470 embedding of QCN work in government health systems.

471

472 Exchange of information


473 Learning and sharing occurred between and within countries and at various levels: global, regional, national,
474 sub-national, district, sub-district and facility level. Here, sub-national, district, and sub-district levels are

475 identified as local level (Figure 2). To continue the learning within country, district level learning networks
476 were established in Bangladesh (in 2020) and Ethiopia (in 2019) [2]. A national level learning hub was also
477 established in Bangladesh. QCN had a learning platform at global level and other methods of learning and
478 sharing included: i) regular calls between partner countries and the QCN Technical Working Group (TWG)
479 where countries share implementation progress and challenges, ii) a topical webinar series co-organized with
480 partners, with a focus on sharing national level experience and know-how, and iii) in-person global level
481 meetings where all global partners and network countries send delegations of eight to ten people [12].

482

483

484 **Figure 2 QCN learning and sharing methods at global, regional, national and local levels**



485

486

487

Exchange of information between countries was executed by all case study countries through regular calls and international meetings. From Bangladesh, TWG representatives attend the meetings. The QCN secretariat usually communicated with the focal person of development partners, and they coordinated and joined meetings along with the MoH. The MoH and development partners then shared updates on implementation activities in country with the QCN secretariat. In Uganda, the Ministry of Health and the WHO country office had weekly calls with the QCN global leadership and participate in network meetings, and their interaction increased and improved over our study period.

494

495

Of our four case study countries, Bangladesh and Malawi participated and shared experiences in different webinars initiated by the WHO QCN secretariat. MoH of Ethiopia and Uganda were initially reluctant to share at the global level though they agreed subsequently. In Bangladesh, development partners mostly coordinated it and included participants from local level also identified by them, with the consensus of the

498

499 MoH. However, the webinars were mostly “DP centric” as government stakeholders hardly attended. A
500 national respondent in Bangladesh noted:

501 *“Yeah! It’s good but the government people don’t have the time to attend/participate in*
502 *this meeting. They don’t want to talk, understand on this issue. So I think these are DP centric.”*

503 (Technical and Donor partner-National level-Bangladesh Round 4)

504
505 Though the learning platform is appreciated by most stakeholders, global participants mostly benefited and
506 few stakeholders at national or local level attended.

507
508 All the partners including MoH, attended the global meetings, held during 2017–2019 before the COVID-19
509 pandemic, and shared experiences [12]. Key development partners of Bangladesh also attended other global
510 or regional meetings and webinars to share their methods, experiences and learning. Uganda also shared
511 with neighbouring countries at the initial stage of QCN in their country.

512 Information exchange within countries was experienced by all countries in diverse ways and at both national
513 and local levels. However, these meetings are mostly initiated and financed by implementing or technical
514 partners, and dependent on their support. For example, facility level meetings in Malawi were initiated and
515 financed by implementing partners, so stopped functioning for lack of resources when partners stopped
516 supporting them. Shortage of budget and mistrust between the ministry and the regions affected regional
517 level meetings in Ethiopia. In all four countries, the MoH also conducted national level sharing and learning
518 meetings including large collaborative learning sessions, and implementing partners undertook district
519 collaborative learning sessions and facility-based learning visits to learning facilities within and between
520 districts.

521

522 QCN was structured in Bangladesh and Malawi using already established national, subnational and facility
523 level committees. Many of these were inactive though and started to be functional (mostly at the facility
524 level) due to support and continuous focus by implementing partners.

525
526 Transfer of concepts and methods
527 Some respondents talked about adapting lessons from Bangladesh by other countries, though there was no
528 evidence of transfer of concepts or methods by the study sites, i.e., neither the case study countries adopted
529 learning from other countries nor other countries adopted learning from these countries.

530 Within countries, no one discussed implementation or adaptation of learning from other partner's quality
531 improvement methods; rather all the partners' implemented QCN activities following their own approaches,
532 and often in separate geographical silos. In Uganda, different partners operated in different regions and used
533 different specific tools dictated by their different funding mechanisms. In Malawi, partners continued to
534 support the kind of activities they had been doing before the launch of the QCN, working in similar areas. In
535 Ethiopia, all partners used their own approaches, for example, one partner provided coaching every month,
536 and another provided district-based coaching every quarter. Another one went to the districts from the
537 center.

538 *"Partners have their own interests; they all have different approaches that they follow. For*
539 *example, we say learning collaborative should be prepared in three months. Some do it within six*
540 *months. Some conduct coaching every month, the others do it quarterly. Therefore, it lacks*
541 *uniformity."* (Government - National level - Ethiopia Round 1)

542
543 The two key partners in Bangladesh were following two different approaches. However, at the initial stage
544 of the study, one stakeholder of one development partner (UNICEF), mentioned about a cross learning
545 process, where they have learned 5s-CQI-TQM from the other partner (Save the Children)'s previous planned

546 piloting area which was originally implemented by JICA Bangladesh. Similarly, the USAID team visited
547 Kurigram as Kurigram was already established as a model district. A national respondent from Bangladesh
548 noted:

549 *"Many [stakeholders] from different districts came to Kurigram including the whole USAID*
550 *team.....they visited Kurigram before they started the Project. They observed the measurement*
551 *system including other good system"* (Technical, Implementing and Donor partner - National level -
552 Bangladesh Round 1)

553
554 However, as our study progressed, no stakeholder talked about this type of visiting or learning. This may be
555 due to a lack of embedding of such cross-learning in organizational cultures of institutions involved in QCN
556 including the units of government ministries of health leading QCN in each country. Political instability, e.g.,
557 in Ethiopia, and the COVID-19 pandemic –in all countries– may also have contributed to QCN being unable
558 to achieve significant cross-learning.

559

560 Discussion

561 We found political interactions to be good in all four case study countries supporting the legitimacy of QCN.
562 In particular, collective actions and collaborative efforts were present both within countries and between
563 countries, and between countries and the global level (Table 1). Resource sharing between QCN stakeholder
564 institutions was also found within all four case study countries, though not between countries. Nonetheless,
565 the dependency on development partners and donors for resources limits the reach and depth of the
566 network when their support is withdrawn and may also impinge on government authority to lead QCN-
567 related work. In Bangladesh, the situation may be different as the next operational plan for quality should
568 come with a separate government budget. Normative interactions including shared commitments and

569 norms, and common principles were also observed in each of the case study countries, apart from shared
570 commitments in Ethiopia, where there was some tension between the central (federal) and regional levels.
571 Normative interactions extended between network countries and between network countries and the global
572 level as shared commitment to achieving the goals of QCN and commitment to the WHO quality of care
573 standards used by QCN. This built on shared commitments to global goals on maternal, newborn and child
574 health over the last two decades and the legitimacy of WHO as a co-ordinating, technical and normative body
575 driving, underpinning, and representing the global maternal, newborn and child health agenda.

576
577 In terms of cognitive interactions there was exchange of information within countries and between them,
578 though bi-directional transfer of concepts and methods was more challenging and was generally absent
579 within countries and between countries. Implementing partners typically implemented activities separately
580 – using different concepts and methods, and in different geographical areas. This indicated the limits of
581 government ownership of the QCN work and embeddedness of the network in that governments were not
582 able to direct the work of the network to be cohesive. Specific activities were often determined by partners,
583 differently in different areas dependent on which partner was operating where. Methods and concepts were
584 not harmonised or synthesised and programmes of work often remained disparate and unconnected, despite
585 the collaborative nature of the network and shared commitments indicated by the positive political and
586 normative interactions. This lack of harmonisation and bi-directional transfer of concepts and methods may
587 reflect lack of institutional capacity for this, or organisational culture not adapting to such new, networked,
588 ways of operating. In many cases previous quality improvement efforts in the country, or district, and the
589 partners that implemented them, shaped the specific work on quality for QCN.

590
591 Leadership at multiple levels to motivate individuals and to drive systems and policy and coordinate partner
592 actions was identified by respondents as one of the core themes to drive the network [16]. QCN was

593 frequently said to align well with government policy and to promote partner alignment across all network
594 countries [16]. The leadership of QCN purposively identified and engaged NGOs that work on quality of care
595 in each country, and globally. Having access to adequate physical resources, financing health care, and
596 managing disruptive events all emerged as key drivers to network functionality [16].

597
598 Though the network aimed to link actors at facility level together and to those at district, regional and
599 national level, the periphery of the network was found to be weaker, have less power, and be less networked
600 [13] and coordinated than the central level. Our stakeholder network analysis found QCN to be a multi-hub
601 network with less connections between actors at the periphery, and most connections between the centre
602 and the periphery [13]. We also found the online learning platform to be predominantly used by global
603 stakeholders rather than those at the periphery of QCN [12] though those at district and facility levels were
604 occasionally involved in collaborative learning sessions and learning visits. Actors at the periphery have
605 limited power to change or improve local systems that are dependent on the central level (e.g., provision of
606 human resources, procurement). The network did facilitate sharing of resources between partners and
607 providers at local level though in some cases. However, state (MoH) actors at local and national levels lacked
608 power to coordinate or pool such inputs. Together, these finding suggest that whilst the network was strong
609 at global and national levels and useful for advocacy and sustaining the policy-profile of QCN objectives it did
610 not often extend to influence day to day changes in practice at facility level. Organisational culture, and
611 beliefs of network actors about the purpose of QCN may also have influenced its legitimacy, and consequent
612 reach, at the local level.

613
614 We found the presence or absence of political, normative and cognitive interactions and resultant relatively
615 high legitimacy of QCN and relatively low ownership and embeddedness of the work by governments to be
616 similar across Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Malawi and Uganda. There were a few notable differences though

617 including history of quality improvement in maternal, newborn and child health [10], different roles of
618 different partners, and learning and sharing at the sub-national level. For example, the MoH in Ethiopia
619 played an apparently leading role to run QCN activities and took the full leadership role since 2021 when
620 WHO in country shrunk their activities in Ethiopia. Learning and sharing at sub-national level was experienced
621 in Bangladesh more frequently than the other three countries.

622
623 Prior work has looked at legitimacy of agenda setting and prioritising specific issues in global health, for
624 example, non-communicable diseases [27]. Prior work has also looked at legitimacy of specific organisations
625 working in global health, for example the World Health Organisation [28, 29], or Bill and Melinda Gates
626 Foundation [30], and has looked at the power relations involved [3]. In this study we examine the legitimacy
627 of an implementation-focused network (QCN). Drawing on prior work described in our methods section [4,
628 8, 15, 17], we developed a framework to look at network legitimacy in terms of political, normative, and
629 cognitive interactions between institutions involved in the network and determinants of the presence and
630 strength of such interactions. We hope this framework may be useful in characterising the legitimacy of other
631 implementation focused networks and the institutional interactions involved. The related concept of
632 alignment may also be useful to consider going forwards as it has much in common with the concept of
633 legitimacy. As described in a scoping review by Lundmark and colleagues [31], alignment has both structural
634 (aligned plans and organisational structures) and social (cognitive, emotional and behaviour alignment of
635 actors) dimensions and can be thought of as the process of creating a fit between inner and outer contexts
636 of a system. Strategies to improve alignment include those pertaining to design and preparation,
637 contextualisation, communication, motivation and evaluation of implementation efforts [31]. QCN has had
638 some success so far in most of these areas [11, 26].

639

640 Recent work to develop a common understanding of networks of care reflects our findings by highlighting
641 the importance of agreement, purposeful arrangements, buy-in and trusting relationships as enabling factors
642 [32]. When assessing the results of applying their framework to consider the effectiveness of multi-
643 stakeholder partnerships for renewable energy, Sanderink and Nasiritousi found that sharing of procedural
644 information and coordination mechanisms were most fruitful, though care was needed to ensure such
645 interactions didn't harm the autonomy or efficiency of multi-stakeholder partnerships [15]. Our separate
646 investigation of the effectiveness of QCN [11], and investigation of the legitimacy and embeddedness of QCN
647 in this paper, reflects this: we found leadership and coordination aspects of QCN to be particularly strong and
648 effective [11], whilst in this paper we find government autonomy is needed to embed and sustain the work
649 of QCN to improve quality of care.

650
651 Key strengths of our study are the longitudinal iterative nature of the data collection over three years, the
652 inclusion of four diverse case study countries and the global level of QCN, triangulation and synthesis of
653 information between multiple methods including interviews, observations and document review, and use of
654 recently developed frameworks that specifically consider drivers of legitimacy and different types of
655 institutional interactions necessary for legitimacy and ownership of the work of QCN by country
656 governments. Our study is therefore robust, though key limitations remain. Not all instances of absence of a
657 particular type of interaction, e.g., absence of sharing resources between countries, was stated or
658 corroborated by a wide range of respondents. Therefore, our findings, whilst likely to be broadly true, may
659 lack some precision. We did not find large differences in perceived legitimacy and government ownership of
660 QCN work between our four case study countries despite large divergence in both the extent to which QCN
661 emerged in each of them [10] and in how effective QCN was in each of them [11]. It may be that the relatively
662 high legitimacy and low ownership of the work of QCN that we found across Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Malawi

663 and Uganda is common to the other seven countries in QCN, or it may be that other countries had lower or
664 higher legitimacy or ownership from the perspectives of their governments.

665
666 The findings from this paper are useful as context for our assessments of the effectiveness of the network in
667 delivering interventions and changing processes of care [11] and in understanding how it operates [33].
668 Further research looking at legitimacy and ownership of the work of QCN, and networks of care more broadly
669 [32], at district, health facility and community levels within countries will be useful to deepen understanding
670 of what drives networks and how best to embed their work into routine systems and sustain them.

671

672 **Conclusion**

673 We found QCN legitimacy to be supported by shared commitments, norms and principles, developed from a
674 long history of commitments to maternal, newborn and child health held in common, collective decision
675 making, and collaborative activities. Encouraging pooling of resources and empowering peripheral levels may
676 increase perceived legitimacy, and reach, of the network. Further work is required to develop government
677 ownership of the work of QCN and embed it into routine systems. Enabling governments to synthesise and
678 harmonise often diverse methods and approaches to quality improvement brought by different partner
679 organisations, often working in different geographical areas, may be the key to this. Via such work
680 governments may be able to embed processes to ensure higher quality of care for mothers, newborns and
681 children across national, district and local health systems.

682

683

684

685 **Acknowledgement**

686 We thank all respondents and stakeholders for their time and contributions toward making this work
687 possible. The QCN Evaluation Group is: Nehla Djellouli, Kasonde Mwaba, Callie Daniels-Howell, Tim Colbourn
688 (UCL Institute for Global Health, UK), Kohenour Akter, Fatama Khatun, Mithun Sarker, Abdul Kuddus, Kishwar
689 Azad (BADAS-PCP Bangladesh), Kondwani Mwandira, Albert Dube, Gladson Monjeza, Rachel Magaletta,
690 Zabvuta Moffolo, Charles Makwenda (Parent and Child Health Initiative, Malawi), Mary Kinney, Fidele
691 Mukinda (independent researchers, South Africa), Mike English (Oxford University), Yusra Shawar, Will
692 Payne, Jeremy Shiffman (Johns Hopkins University, USA), Kathy Lubowa, Agnes Kyamulabi, Hilda Namakula,
693 Gloria Seruwagi (Makerere University, Uganda), Anene Tesfa, Asebe Amenu, Theodros Getachew, Geremew
694 Gonfa (Ethiopia Public Health Institute, Ethiopia), Seble Abreham, Tanya Marchant (LSHTM, UK)

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802 **Figure captions**

803 **Fig 1. Framework describing drivers of legitimacy and ownership of the work of Quality of Care Network**

804 **(QCN) from the perspective of national governments leading the work of QCN**

805 **Fig 2. QCN learning and sharing methods at global, regional, national and local levels**


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807 **Supporting Information**

808 **S1_Text. PLOS GLOBAL HEALTH QCN Evaluation Collection 2-page summary.**

809 **S2_Text. QCN papers common methods section.**

810 **S3_Text. QCN papers common country context**



Arrows represent Institutional Interactions, including: [Sanderink & Nasiritousi \[5\]](#)


- Political Interactions
- Normative Interactions
- Cognitive Interactions

Extent of influence of each body and actor (width of arrow) will depend on:

- Capacity [see Wu et al, ref [XX](#), Paper 6, ref [XX](#)] e.g. Human resources available in country to draft policy and programmes, organise activities, analyse and evaluate processes and outcomes
- Alignment of goals between actors ([beliefs](#), organisational [purpose](#))
- Leverage ([authority](#)) via other agreements and influences, and [procedures](#)
- Organisational culture and wider cultures
- Political stability
- [Performance](#) of organisations

[Nasiritousi & Faber \[6\]](#)

[Tallberg & Zurn \[Ref X\]](#)



Paper 2

