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## Faculty Working Papers

INFORMATION CRITERIA FOR DISCRIMINATING AMONG ALTERNATIVE REGRESSION MODELS

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# Information Criteria for Discriminating Among <br> Alternative Regression Models 

## Takamitsu Sawa*

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## ABSTRACT

Some decision rules for discriminating among alternative regression models are proposed and mutually compared. They are essentially based on the Akaike Information Criterion as well as the Kullback-Leibler Information Criterion (KLIC): mamely, the distance between a postulated model and the true unknown structure is measured by the KLIC. The proposed criteria combine the parsimony of parameters with the goodness of fit. Their relationships with conventional criteria are discussed in terms of a new concept of unbiasedness.

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## 1. Introduction

In most statistical analyses it is taken for granted that the family of the probability distribution functions, say $F(y \mid \theta)$, may be correctly specified on a priori grounds. Uncertainty exists, therefore, only with reference to the values of parameters $\theta$ involved in the specified family of probability distribution functions (p.d.f.). In practice, however, we are seldom in such an ideal situation; that is, we are more or less uncertain about the family to which the true p.d.f. might belong. It may be very likely that the true distribution is in fact too complicated to be represented by a simple mathematical function such as is given in ordinary textbooks.

In practice we approximate the true distribution by one of the alternative p.d.f.'s listed in textbooks. Needless to say, we try to choose the most adequate p.d.f. with due thought to a priori considerations. A p.d.f. specified by a convenient mathematical function is usually termed a model. For further analysis a postulated model is identified at least tentatively with the true distribution. To put it differently, in the process of conventional statistical analysis a sharp distinction is seldom drawn between the postulated model and the true distribution.

To avoid the arbitrariness that inevitably occurs in the process of model building, nonparametric statistical methods have been extensively developed in the past two decades. It seems to me, however, that these methods have not been used very successfully in practical data analysis. In fact, most statistical inferences are based on some specific parametric models, very often on the model of normal distribution.

In recent years, however, more and more emphasis has been placed on the problem of model identifications ${ }^{1 / /}$ that is, how to identify the model when it cannot be completely speciffed from a priori knowledges. The main purpose of the present paper is to propose and analyze statistical criteria for model identification in regression analysis. Our basic attitude toward the problem is to recognize the fact that a certain amount of discrepancy inevitably exists between the true distribution and the model. The best we can do in trying to cope with this sort of situation is to identify the most adequate model relatively among a given set of alternatives. The adequacy of a model needs to be quantified by defining a suitable measure of the distance of the model from the unknown true distribution.

It is expected intuitively that the more complicated model will provide the better approximation to reality. But, on the contrary, in most practical situations the less complicated model is likely to be preferred if we wish to pursue the accuracy of estimation. To illustrate this point, let us consider the situaiton where two alternative density functions, $f_{1}(\cdot \mid \theta)$ and $f_{2}(\cdot \mid \zeta)$, are given as possible models of the density $g(\cdot)$ of the unknown true distribution, where $\theta$ and $\zeta$ are finite-dimensional vectors of unknown parameters. Even if $f_{l}(\cdot \mid \theta)$ is the better approximation to the true density $g(\cdot)$ in the sense that
$\inf _{\theta}\left\|f_{1}(\cdot \mid \theta)-g(\cdot)\right\|<\inf _{\zeta}\left\|f_{2}(\cdot \mid \zeta)-g(\cdot)\right\|$ where $\|\cdot\|$
is a suitably defined distance measuring the difference between two p.d.f.'s, it is quite likely that
$E_{\hat{\theta}}\left\|f_{1}(\cdot \mid \hat{\theta})-g(\cdot)\right\|>E_{\hat{\zeta}}\left\|f_{2}(\cdot \mid \hat{\zeta})-g(\cdot)\right\|$ if dim $\theta>\operatorname{dim} \zeta$ where $\hat{\theta}$ and $\hat{\zeta}$ are some reasonable estimates for $\theta$ and $\zeta$, respectively.

The above consideration leads us naturally to the so-called principle of parsimony. That is, more parsimonious use of parameters should be pursued so as to raise the accuracy of estimates for unknown parameters in a model. In general, closeness to the true distribution is incompatible with parsimony of parameters. These two criteria form a trade-off: if one pursues one of the criteria, the other must be necessarily sacrificed. The multiple correlation coefficient adjusted for the degrees of freedom may be the most comonly used statistic that incorporates the two incompatible criteria into a single statistic.

Akaike [I] has proposed a more general as well as more widely applicable statistic that ingeniously incorporates the above two criteria. As it is based on the Kullback-Leibler Information Criterion, Akaike's statistic is called the Akaike Information Criterion and is abbreviated as the AIC. Indeed, the procedure developed here is also based on the Kullback-Leibler Information Criterion, but the criterion for the choice of the most adequate regression model tmplied by our procedure is considerably different from that implied by the AIC. The disagreement stems from, among other things, a difference between Akaike's and our views on the true distribution.

Some readers may feel that it is useless to study the preliminary test any more because the resultant estimator has been proved to be inadmissible. To avoid this criticism in advance, we point out that mat we are proposing is not an estimation procedure but a procedure for model identification. More precisely, in the present context we aim to develop a procedure for identifying the most adequate model from a given set of alternatives rather than estimating unknown parameters involved in a given true model.
$\therefore:$
$\cdots$

In Section 2 we briefly review the Kullback-Leiblex Information Criterion and the Akaike Information Criterion. In Section 3 we develop a criterion for the choice of the most adequate regression model and compare it with a criterion implied by the Akaike Criterion. In Section 4 a different criterion is derived on the basis of the minimum attainable Bayes risk. The biases of those criteria are discussed in Section 5 .

## 2. Information Criterion

Suppose that we are concerned with the probabilistic structure of a vector random variable $Y^{\prime}=\left(Y_{1}, Y_{2}, \ldots, Y_{n}\right)$. Let $G(y)$ be the true joint distribution of $Y$. On the basis of a priori knowledge we postulate a model $F(y \mid \theta)$ to approximate the unknown true distribution $G(y)$, where $\theta$ is a finite-dimensional vector of unknown parameters.

The adequacy of a postulated model may be appropriately measured by the Kullback-Leibler Information Criterion (KLIC).

$$
\begin{equation*}
I(G: F(\cdot \mid \theta))=E_{G}\left[\log \frac{g(Y)}{f(Y \mid G)}\right]=\int \log \frac{g(y)}{E(y \mid \theta)} d G(y) \tag{2.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $g$ and $f$ are density (or probability) functions of, respectively, $G$ and $F ; E_{G}(\cdot)$ stands for expectation with respect to the true distribution $G$; the integration is over the entire range of $Y$. It can be easily shown that the KLIC is nonnegative.

$$
\begin{equation*}
I(G: F(\cdot \mid \theta)) \geq 0 \tag{2.2}
\end{equation*}
$$

with equality only when $F(y \mid \theta)=G(y)$ almost everywhere in the possible range of $Y$; namely, only when the model is essentially correct. (See, for instance, Rao [7] pp. 58-59.) Incidentally, the negative value of the KLIC is termed the entropy of a probability distribution $G(y)$ with
respect to $F(y \mid \theta)$. Noting the inequality (2.2) as well as an obvious equality

$$
\begin{equation*}
I(G: F(\cdot \mid \theta))=\int \log g(y) d G(y)-\int \log f(y \mid \theta) d G(y), \tag{2.3}
\end{equation*}
$$

we are led to propose the following rule for a comparison of alternative models or estimates. $2 /$

Rule 2.1: (i) A model $F_{1}(\cdot \mid \theta)$ is regarded as the better approximation to the true distribution $G(\cdot)$, i.e., the more adequate model than an alternative model $F_{2}(\cdot \mid \zeta)$ if and only if

$$
\begin{equation*}
\inf _{\theta} I\left(G: F_{1}(\cdot \mid \theta)\right)<\inf _{\zeta_{1}} I\left(G: F_{2}(\cdot \mid \zeta)\right), \tag{2.4}
\end{equation*}
$$

or equivalently

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sup _{\theta} E_{G}\left[\log f_{1}(Y \mid \theta)\right]>\sup _{\zeta} E_{G}\left[\log f_{2}(Y \mid \zeta)\right] . \tag{2.5}
\end{equation*}
$$

(ii) Given a model $F(\cdot \mid \theta)$, estinate $\hat{\theta}_{1}$ is regarded as a better estimate than $\hat{\theta}_{2}$, if and only if

$$
\begin{equation*}
E_{\hat{\theta}_{1}}\left\{E_{G}\left[\log f\left(X \mid \hat{\theta}_{1}\right) \mid \hat{\theta}_{1}\right]\right\}=E_{\hat{\theta}_{2}}\left\{E_{G}\left[\log f\left(Y \mid \hat{\theta}_{2}\right) \mid \hat{\theta}_{2}\right]\right\} \tag{2.6}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $E_{\hat{\theta}_{1}}$ and $E_{\hat{\theta}_{2}}$ stand for expectations with respect to the sampling distributions of $\hat{\theta}_{1}$ and $\hat{\theta}_{2}$, respectively. (Note that when we first take an expectation with respect to $G$ the estimate $\hat{\theta}_{1}$ or $\hat{\theta}_{2}$ should be treated as if it were a constant.)

In words, the adequacy of a postulated model is measured by the minjmum possibie KLIC distance between the model and the true distribution.

It was pointed out by Akaike [I] that if the $Y_{j}^{\prime \prime} s$ are independent and identically distributed the maximum likelihood estimate may be regarded as an estimate that minimizes the estimated KLIC, or equivalently maximizes the estimated entropy, because the log likelihood function divided by the sample size $n$

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{1}{n}: \sum_{j=1}^{n} \log f\left(y_{j} \mid \theta\right) \tag{2.7}
\end{equation*}
$$

may be regarded as a reasonable estimate for $E_{G}[\log £(Y \mid \theta)]$ whatever $G(y)$ is.

Apparently, the above rule for a comparison of models is not directly applicable in practice, because the criteria are totally dependent on the unknown true probability distribution. To establish a practical usable criterion for model identification on the basis of the kLIC, we need to replace unknown in (2.5) by their reasonable estimates. In fact, the Akalke Information Criterion (AIC) has been derived as an approximately unbiased estifate for the KIIC, neglecting its irrelevant constant terms and based implicitly on a fairly strong assumption that will be stated 1ater.

For the sake of convenience in developing our argument we give the following definition:

Definition: Given a model $F(\cdot \mid \theta)$, a parameter value $\theta_{0}$ such that

$$
\begin{equation*}
I\left(G: F\left(\cdot \mid \theta_{0}\right)\right) \leq I(G: F(\cdot \mid \theta)) \tag{2.8}
\end{equation*}
$$

for any possible $\theta$ in the admissible parameter space is called a pseudo true parameter value; $F\left(\cdot \mid \theta_{0}\right)$ is called a pseudo-true model.

If the true distribution $G(y)$ and a model $F(y \mid \theta)$ satisfy due regularity conditions, the pseudo-true parameter $\theta_{0}$ must satisfy

$$
\begin{equation*}
E_{G}\left[\frac{\partial}{\partial \theta} \log f(Y \mid \theta)\right]_{\theta=\theta_{0}}=0 \tag{2.9}
\end{equation*}
$$

The model $F\left(y \mid \theta_{0}\right)$ may be regarded as the most adequate relatively within the family of models $F(y \mid \theta)$ in the sense that the KlIC for $F(y \mid \theta)$ is minimized by $F\left(y \mid \theta_{0}\right)$. We note that Rule 2.1 is based on the comparison of the KLIC distances between the pseudo-true models and the true model.

Assuming that $I\left(G: F\left(\cdot \mid \theta_{0}\right)\right)=0\left(n^{-1}\right), i . e .$, the pseudo-true model is nearly true, Akaike [1] derives his criterion

$$
\begin{equation*}
\operatorname{AIC}(F(\cdot \mid \theta))=-2 \log f(y \mid \hat{\theta})+2 k \tag{2.10}
\end{equation*}
$$

as an almost unbiased estimate for $-2 E_{G}\left[\log f\left(Y \mid \theta_{0}\right)\right]$, where $\hat{\theta}$ is the maxinum likelihood estimate for $G$ based on observations $y$ and $k$ is the number of the unimonn parameters, i.e., the dimension of $\theta$. The procedure of choosing a model that minimizes the AIC is called the Minimum AIC (MAIC) procedure. The first term of the $A I C$ measures the goodness-of-fit of the model to a given set of data, because $f(y \mid \hat{\theta})$ is the maximized likelihood function. The second term is interpreted as representing a penalty that should be paid for incressing the number of parameters. In this sense the AIC may be regarded as an explicit formularion of the so-called principle of parsimony in model building.

Indeed, the assumption that

$$
\begin{equation*}
I\left(G: F\left(\cdot \mid \theta_{0}\right)\right)=0\left(n^{-I}\right) \tag{2.11}
\end{equation*}
$$

for every model $F$ simplifies the derivation substantialiy, but there is no denying that this simplifying assumption lessens the plausibility of
the AIC to some extent. To see this point in more detail let us consider the case where we have to choose one from the two altematives, say $\mathrm{F}_{1}$ and $F_{2}$. The AIC for $F_{1}$ is evaluated assuming that: $F_{1}$ with pseudo-true parameter value be true, while the AIC for $F_{2}$ is evaluated assuming that $F_{2}$ with pseudo-true parameter value be true. Thereafter, the two AIC's are numerically compared. In the next section, confining ourselves to Inear regression, we derive another criterion called the BIC on the basis of weaker assumptions than (2.11) and compare it with the AIC to see how much difference might arise depending on whether or not we assume (2.11).

## 3. Identification of a Regression Model

We are interested in investigating a joint distribution of a vector random variable $Y^{\prime}=\left(Y_{1}, Y_{2}, \ldots, Y_{n}\right)$. Each of $Y_{i}$ 's. may be an observation on a certain characteristic of a randomly chosen individual; or $Y_{i}$ 's may constitute a sequence of observed time series. The distribution function $G(y)$ is unknow, but each $Y_{i}$ is assumed to possess finite variance. We denote the mean vector and the variance-covarlance matrix, respectively, by $\mu$ and $\Omega$, where $\mu$ is a vector of $n$ components and $\Omega$ is a $n \quad x$ positive definite matrix. Unless we place more a priori restrictions on the elements of $\mu$ and $\Omega$, we can make no inference at all about the joint distribution of $Y$.

What we usually do is to assume that $\mu$ belongs to a linear subspace of lower dimension than $n$ and $Y_{i}$ 's are mutually uncorrelated. Then we have a familiar linear regression model

$$
\begin{equation*}
E(Y)=X \beta, V(Y)=\sigma^{2} I_{\dot{n}}, \tag{3.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $X$ is a $n \times k$ matrix of known constants, the $k$ columns of which constitute a basis of the subspace to which $\mu$ is assumed to belong; $\beta$ is a vector of $k$ unknown parameters; $\sigma^{2}$ is an unknown positive constant If is an fontity matrix of order $n$. In most practical situations the colums of $X$ are vectors of observations on certain characteristics considered to be associated with $Y$. Then the model implies that the i-th mean $\mu_{i}$ is represented as a linear function of $k$ explanatory variables, k
i.e., $\mu_{i}=\sum_{j=1} \beta_{j} X_{i j}$ Where $x_{i j}$ is the (i,j)-th element of $X$. By assuming a regression model we can reduce the number of unknown parameters from $n+n(n+1) / 2$ to $k+i$.

In addition to (3.1) we ofen assume the normal distribution for $Y$ and postulate a model

$$
\begin{equation*}
Y \sim N\left(X B, \sigma^{2} I_{n}\right), \tag{3.2}
\end{equation*}
$$

or

$$
Y=X \beta+u, \quad u \sim N\left(0, \sigma^{2} I_{n}\right),
$$

which is termed a Inear normal regression model.

Lemma 3.1: The pseudo-true values for parameters $\theta^{\prime}=\left(B^{\prime}, \sigma^{2}\right)$ are

$$
\begin{align*}
& \beta_{0}=\left(X^{\prime} X\right)^{-1} X^{\prime} \mu  \tag{3.3}\\
& \sigma_{0}^{2}=\frac{1}{n} \mu^{\prime}\left(I-X\left(X^{\prime} X\right)^{-1} X^{\prime}\right) \mu+\frac{1}{n} \operatorname{tr} \Omega . \tag{3.4}
\end{align*}
$$

The above results are easily obtained by solving the equations

$$
\begin{equation*}
E\left[\frac{\partial}{\partial \beta} \log f(Y \mid \hat{\theta})\right]=0 ; \tag{3.5}
\end{equation*}
$$

$$
\begin{equation*}
E\left[\frac{\partial}{\partial \sigma^{2}} \log f(Y \mid \theta)\right]=0 \tag{3.6}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where $f(y \mid \theta)$ is the density function of $N\left(X \beta, \sigma^{2} I\right)$ and the expectation is with respect to the true distribution. (All the lemas and theorems are proved in Appendix.) Geometrically speaking. $X \beta_{0}$ is a projection of the unknorn mean vector $\mu$ into the space spanned by the $k$ column of $X$, while $n 0_{0}^{2}$ is the sum of the variances of the $Y_{i}$ 's plus the squared length of the perpendicular fron $H$ to the space. Speaking heuristically, the error of approximating $\mu$ by $X \beta$ is observed into the error variance.

The maximum likelihood (MU) estimates
(3.7) $\quad \hat{B}=\left(X^{\prime} X\right)^{-1} X y, \quad \hat{\sigma}^{2}=\frac{1}{n} y^{\prime}\left[I-X\left(X^{\prime} X\right)^{-1} X^{\prime}\right] y$
for $\beta$ and $\sigma^{2}$ in the normal regression model (3.2) have the following property.

Lemma 3.2:

$$
\begin{equation*}
E(\hat{\beta})=\beta_{0}, \tag{3.8}
\end{equation*}
$$

$$
\begin{equation*}
\lim E\left(\hat{\sigma}^{2}-\sigma_{0}^{2}\right)=0 \text {, if } \Omega=\omega^{2} I_{n} \text { and } \lim \sigma_{0}^{2}<\infty \tag{3.9}
\end{equation*}
$$

This lema implies that with an incorrect nodel our objective is the estimation of the pseudo-true parameter values. To put it differently, what we ordinarily call the true parameter values are the pseudotrue parameter values that minimize the distance between the true unknown distribution and the postulated parametric model, where the distance is measured by the KLIC. Moreover, it should be noted that if $Y_{i}$ 's are uncorrelated, i.e., $\Omega=\omega^{2} I_{n}$, then $\hat{\beta}$ and $\hat{\sigma}^{2}$ are uncorrelated.

Along the lines of the previous section, one can measure the loss incurred by modeliing $G(y)$ by $F(y \mid \tilde{\theta})$ with some estimate $\theta$ in place of unknown $\theta_{0}$ by the quantity

$$
\begin{equation*}
W(F(\cdot \mid \tilde{\theta}))=-\frac{2}{n} E_{G}[\log f(Y \mid \tilde{\theta}) \mid \tilde{\theta}], \tag{3.10}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $f\left(y \mid \theta_{0}\right)$ is the density function of the pseudo-true model $N\left(X \beta_{0}, \sigma_{0}^{2}\right)$, i.e., the Iikelihood function of the model. It should be noted that the expectation on the right-hand side of (3.10) refers only to the argument $Y$ of the density function; i.e., $\tilde{\theta}$ is taken as a fixed constant.

Lema 3.3: The loss incurred by modelling the distribution of $Y$ by $F(y \mid \tilde{\theta})$ with an estimated value $\tilde{\theta}$ substituted for $\theta$ is evaluated as

$$
\begin{equation*}
W(F(\cdot \mid \tilde{\theta}))=\log (2 \pi)+\log \left(\tilde{\sigma}^{2}\right)+\left(\frac{\sigma_{0}^{2}}{\tilde{\sigma}^{2}}\right)+\frac{1}{n \tilde{\sigma}^{2}}\left\|X\left(\tilde{B}-\beta_{0}\right)\right\|^{2}, \tag{3.11}
\end{equation*}
$$

where \| . || is the Euclidean norm.
In this section we adhere to the sampling theory approach, and hence we base our decision about model selection on the risk function derived by integrating the loss function with respect to the samping distribution of the estimate $\tilde{\theta}$. Since the ML estimate $\hat{\theta}$ possesses the nice property in Lemua 3.2, even when a postulated model is incorrect, we define the risk of postulating a model $P(y \mid \theta)$ by an integral of the loss function of $F(y \mid \hat{\theta})$ with respect to the samping distribution of the ML estimate $\hat{\theta}$.

Theorem 3.1: Suppose that $\Omega=\omega^{2} I_{\hat{n}}$ and each $Y_{i}$ is symmetrically distributed with the same kurtosis as a normal distribution. 3/ Then
the risk of a model $F(\cdot \mid \theta)$, i.e., the expected value of $W(F(\cdot \mid \hat{\theta}))$, is evaluated to order $O\left(n^{-1}\right)$ as

$$
\begin{equation*}
R(F(\cdot \mid \theta))=\log (2 \pi)+\log \left(\sigma_{0}^{2}\right)+1+\frac{k+2}{n}\left(\frac{\omega^{2}}{\sigma_{0}^{2}}\right)-\frac{1}{n}\left(\frac{\omega^{2}}{\sigma_{0}^{2}}\right)+O\left(n^{-2}\right) \tag{3.12}
\end{equation*}
$$

The proof is given in the Appendix. It should be noted that $\sigma_{0}{ }^{2}$ decreases along with the successive addition of explanatory variables, i.e., the increase of $k$.

To develop a practical and useful criterion for model icentification, the risk function involving unknown parameters needs to be somehow estimated from a given set of observations.

Theorem 3.2: Suppose that we have an estimate, say $\hat{u}^{2}$, for $\omega^{2}$ such that $\hat{w}^{2}=\omega^{2}+0_{p}\left(n^{-1 / 2}\right)$, where $0_{p}\left(n^{-1 / 2}\right)$ stands for the terta of stochastic order of $n^{-1 / 2}$ and with finite second order moment. 4/

Then
(3.13)

$$
\operatorname{BIC}(F(\cdot \mid \theta))=-2 \log f(y \mid \hat{\theta})+2(k+2)\left(\frac{\hat{\omega}^{2}}{\hat{\sigma}^{2}}\right)-2\left(\frac{\hat{\omega}^{2}}{\hat{\sigma}^{2}}\right)^{2}
$$

is an asymptorically unbiased estimate of $n \mathbb{R}(F(-\mid \theta))$.
If we equate $\hat{\omega}^{2}$ to $\hat{\sigma}^{2}$, the BIC is identical with the AIC. 5/' As was pointed out in the preceding section, the AIC is based on the assumption that the true distribution defers from the pseudo-true model only in the order of $n^{-1}$; hence it is justifiable to equate $\sigma_{0}^{2}$ to $\omega^{2}$ in (3.12) or to equate $\hat{\sigma}^{2}$ to $\hat{\omega}^{2}$ inn (3.13).

The variance ratio $\hat{\omega}^{2} / \hat{\sigma}^{2}$ increases with successive addition of explanatory variables, and possibly if approaches one as long as the degrees of freedom are sufficiently large. Its reciprocal $\hat{\sigma}^{2} / \hat{\omega}^{2}(\geq 1)$
may be interpreted as a discounting factor for the penalty that has to be paid for increasing the number of parameters. Therefore, the favor to parsimonious models is more pronounced in the minimum BIC procedure. When we compare two regression models, one with less explanatory variables and poorer fit, the other with more explanatory variables and better fit, the BIC is rather more favorable to the former model than the AIC. The following numerical evaluations show that the difference between the two criteria is far from negligible.

Let us develop a decision rule to choose one from two nested alternative regression models

$$
F_{i}: Y \sim N\left(X_{1} \beta_{1}, \sigma_{1}^{2} I_{n}\right),
$$

$$
\begin{equation*}
F_{2}: \quad Y \sim N\left(X_{1} \beta_{1}+X_{2} \beta_{2}, \sigma_{2}^{2} I_{n}\right) \tag{3.14}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $X_{1}$ and $X_{2}$ are respectively $n x p$ and $n x q$ matrices of known constants, $\beta_{1}$ and $\beta_{2}$ are respectively $p \times 1$ and $q \times I$ vectors of unknown parameters, and $\sigma_{1}{ }^{2}$ and $\sigma_{2}^{2}$ are positive unknowns. The true distribution is assumed to be $N\left(\mu, \omega^{2} I_{n}\right)$. In practice, we cannot expect to obtain an estimate for $u^{2}$ from some independent source. Therefore, assuming that the more complicated model $\mathrm{F}_{2}$ is nearly true, i.e., $\omega^{2}-\sigma_{2}^{2}=o(1)$, we substitute the ML estimate $\hat{\sigma}_{2}^{2}$ of $\sigma_{2}^{2}$ for $\hat{\omega}^{2}$ in the BIC's for both models. Our decision rule is described as follows: we choose $F_{1}$ if $\operatorname{BIC}\left(F_{1}\right)<\operatorname{BIC}\left(F_{2}\right)$ and vice versa, where $\hat{\omega}^{2}$ is replaced by $\hat{\sigma}_{2}^{2} \underline{\sigma}$

It is straightforward to show that the decision rule based on the BIC is equivalent to a decision rule based on the magnitude of the F-statistic

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathrm{W}=\frac{(\mathrm{n}-\mathrm{p}-\mathrm{q})\left(\hat{\sigma}_{1}^{2}-\hat{\sigma}_{2}^{2}\right)}{\mathrm{q}_{2}^{2}} \tag{3.15}
\end{equation*}
$$

Which is customarily used to test the null-hypothesis $\beta_{2}=0$. That is, we decide to choose $F_{I}$ if an observed value of the F-statistic falls below a critical point determined by the inequality, BIC $\left(F_{1}\right)<B I C\left(F_{2}\right)$ which is equivalent to

$$
\begin{equation*}
n \log v-2(p+2) v+2 v^{2}+2(p+q+1)<0 \tag{3.16}
\end{equation*}
$$

where

$$
\begin{equation*}
v=\frac{\hat{\sigma}_{2}^{2}}{\hat{\sigma}_{1}^{2}}=\left[1+\frac{q}{n-p-q} W\right]^{-1} \tag{3.17}
\end{equation*}
$$

and choose $\mathrm{F}_{2}$ otherwise. ${ }^{7 /}$ The critical point varies depending on $n, p$, and $q$.

Confining ourselves to the case when $q=1$, we tabulate the critical points implied by the minimum BIC principle, say MBIC critical points, in Table 3.1. As the t-statistic appeals mare to our intuition rather than the F-statistic, these critical values are with reference to the t-statistic, the ML estimate of $\beta_{2}$ divided by its estimated standard error. We decide to choose $F_{1}$ if the observed value of the t-statistic falls below the critical point detemined by the inequality (3.16) and Vice versa.

It is straightforward to show that $\operatorname{AIC}\left(F_{1}\right) \leq \operatorname{AIC}\left(F_{2}\right)$ is equivalent to the inequality

$$
\begin{equation*}
W \leq\left[\exp \left(\frac{\pi}{2}\right)-1\right] \cdot \frac{n-p-q}{q} \tag{3.18}
\end{equation*}
$$

To examine how much the MBIC procedure differs from the MAIC procedure, the MAIC critical point, the right-hand side of (3.18), is also tabulated
in Table 3.2. $8 /$ Both of these approaches, albeit very slowly, $\sqrt{2}$ asymptotically. The MBIC procedure is always more parsimonious than the MAIC procedure for a finite sample. We note a remarkable difference in their asynptotic behavior, namely that the MAIC critical point approaches $\sqrt{2}$ from below whereas the MBIC approaches Erom above. Morevoer, as the number of variables already included increases, i.e., as $p$ becomes large, the MBIC procedure increasingly discriminates against the inclusion of additional variables, whereas the converse is true for the MAIC.

To see a connection between our procedure and the preliminary r-test, for some chosen cases, we tabulate the level of significance, i.e., the probability that the absolute value of the t-statistic exceeds the critical point when $F_{1}$ is true. Roughly speaking, for moderate values of $p$, the significance level for the MAIC procedure varies over the wide range from $30 \%$ to $16 \%$ as the number of degrees of freedom increases; on the other hand, for the MBIC procedure, it varies over a relatively narrow range from $10 \%$ to $16 \%$. Both procedures share a comon property in their more generous attitude toward incluston of additional variables than the tradicional preliminary test with the significance level $5 \%$ or $10 \%$. It should be noted, however, that these two asymptotically equivalent procedures will very often lead us to different decisions for mall samples. 9 / Based on the minimax regret principle with the squared error of prediction as a loss function, Sawa and Hiromatsu [8] calculated the optimal. signficance point for the preliminary t-test. Their mininax regret significance points are quite insensitive to the change in the number of degrees of freedom. That is, it remains constant at 1.37 to two decimal places, unless the number of degrees of freedom is extremely small, say

Table 3.1: The MBIC Critical Points and Significance Levels for the Preliminary t-Test

|  | 2 | 3 | 4 | $5^{-}$ | 10 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 10 | 1.646(.144) | 1.816(.119) | 2.036(.097) | $2.264(.086)$ | ---- |
| 12 | 1.591 (.146) | 1.715(.125) | 1.882(.102) | 2.092 (.081) | --- |
| 16 | 1.533(.149) | 1.610(.133) | 1.709 (.116) | 1.836(.096) | $2.758(.040)$ |
| 20 | 1.504 (.151) | 1.558(.139) | 1.625 (.125) | 1.707(.110) | $2.494(.034)$ |
| 30 | 1.469 (.153) | 1.500 (.146) | 1.536(.137) | 1.576(.128) | 1.912(.071) |
| 50 | 1.445 (.155) | 1.462 (.151) | $1.480(.146)$ | 1.449 (.154) | 1.625 (.112) |
| 100 | 1.429 (.156) | 1.437(.154) | 1.445 (.152) | 1.453(.150) | $1.499(.138)$ |
| 200 | 1.421 (.156) | 1.425 (.156) | 1.429 (.154) | 1.433(.154) | 1.453(.148) |
| 500 | $1.417(.158)$ | $1.419(.156)$ | 1.420(.156) | 1.421(.156) | 1.429(.154) |
| 1000 | 1.416(.158) | 1.416(.158) | 1.417(.156) | 1.418(.156) | 1.421(.156) |

$n$ is the sample shae and $p$ is the number of the explanatory variables already included in the model. The decision rule is described as follows: if the t-value for an optional varlable exceeds the MBIC critical point, we decide to augment the model by the optional variable, and vice versa. Note that the MBIC critical point approaches slowly to $\sqrt{2}$ as $n$ tends to infinity for every $p$.

Table 3.2: The MAIC Critical Points and Significance Lavels for the Preliminary $t-$ Test

|  | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 10 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 10 | 1.245 (.253) | 1.153(.293) | 2.052 (.341) | . 941 (.400) | --- |
| 12 | 1.278(.233) | 1.205 (.263) | 1.127(.297) | 1.043 (.337) | --- |
| 16 | 1.316 (.211) | 1.264(.230) | 1.210(.252) | 1.154 (.275) | . $816(.452)$ |
| 20 | 1.337 (.199) | 1.297(.213) | 1.256(.228) | 1.213(.245) | . $973(.356)$ |
| 30 | 1.364 (.184) | 1.339(.192) | 1.313(.201) | 1.286(.211) | 1.144(.267) |
| 50 | 1.385 (.173) | $1.370(.177)$ | 1.355(.182) | $1.340(.187)$ | 1.262(.214) |
| 100 | 1.400(.164) | 1.393(.166) | 1.385(.170) | 1.378(.172) | $1.341(.184)$ |
| 200 | 1.407(.160) | $1.404(.162)$ | 1.400(.164) | 1.396(.164) | 1.378(.170) |
| 500 | 1.411(.158) | 1.410(.160) | $1.409(.160)$ | $1.407(.160)$ | $1.400(.162)$ |
| 1000 | 1.413(.158) | 1.412(.158) | 1.411(.158) | 1.411(.158) | 1.407(.160) |

See the footnote to Table 3.1.
less than 10. Indeed it is difficult to see a clear-cut connection between the two basically different approaches, but it would be worth noting that if a loss function is specified in terms of the prediction error, the more prodigal model is likely to be preferred. $10 /$

We often encounter a situation where have to choose one of two unrested alternatives:

$$
Y \sim N\left(X_{1} \beta_{1}, \sigma_{1} I_{n}\right) \text { and } Y \sim N\left(X_{2} \beta_{2}, \sigma_{2}^{2} I_{n}\right),
$$

where the true distribution of $Y$ is $\mathrm{N}_{\mathrm{y}}\left(\mathrm{H}_{,} \mathrm{w}^{2} I_{\mathrm{n}}\right)$. In this kind of situation the unknown true variance $\omega^{2}$ may be reasonably estimated fron a regression of $y$ on all the explanatory varlables $X_{1} U X_{2}$. Another reasonable estimate of $w^{2}$ way be the smallest value of "unbiased" estimates, instead of the uaximum likelihood estimates, of variances for all possible regressions of $y$ an a subset of $X_{1} U X_{2}$.

The difficulty in estimating $\omega^{2}$ does admittedly place a serious limitation to the practical usefulness of the $\mathbb{M B I C}$ procedure. However, it should be noted that the same ditficulty is shared by Mallows' [5] procedure which is baseci on what he calls $C_{p}$ atatistic. Incidentally, Mallous' procedure gives a decision rule essentially similar to the AIC. 11/ It is worth noting that according to Ataike's procedure $\omega^{2}$ is estimated by $\hat{\sigma}_{1}{ }^{2}$ when we evaluate the AIC for the model $F_{1}$ and by $\hat{\sigma}_{2}{ }^{2}$ wher we evaluate the ATC for the model $F_{2^{*}}$. This means that, given a class of nested alternative models, the AIC for each model is evaluated assuming it is nearly true the the sense that the difference of the error variance in the model fron the true variance $\omega^{2}$ tends to zero as $n$ tends to infinfty. (See the equation (2.11).) On the other hand, the BIC for
each model is evaluated assuming that the most complex model within the class would be nearly true but the rest are not necessarily so.

## 4. A Decision Rule Based on Bayes Risk

In this section we look at the problem another way. Given a model $F(\cdot \mid 8)$ coupled with a prior distribution $P(\theta)$ we define the Bayes risk, say $B(\tilde{\theta} \mid \vec{s})$, for an estinate $\tilde{\theta}$ as the expectation of the loss function (3.10) or (3.11) with respect to the posterior distribution, that is,

$$
\begin{equation*}
B(\tilde{\theta} \mid F)=\int W(F(\cdot \mid \tilde{\theta})) d P(\theta \mid y) \tag{4.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

Where $P(\theta \mid y)$ is the posterior distributzon for $\theta$ given an observation y. If there exists an estimate $\tilde{\theta} *$ such that

$$
\begin{equation*}
B(\tilde{\theta} * \mid \vec{F})=\underset{\tilde{\theta}}{\min } B(\tilde{\theta} \mid F) \tag{4,2}
\end{equation*}
$$

then it is called the Bayes estimate of $\theta$ with respect to the loss function (3.10). Recalling that $W(F(\cdot \mid \hat{\theta})$ ) measured the discrepancy of a model $\mathrm{F}(\cdot \mid \theta)$ from the true distribution $G(\cdot)$, we take $B(\hat{\theta} * \mid F)$ as a measure of the adequacy of a postulated model $F(\cdot \mid \theta)$ associated with a prior distribution $P(\theta)$. That ths along the ines of previous sections, if we compare two alternative models, say, $F_{1}(\cdot \mid \theta)$ with $P_{1}(\theta)$ and $F_{2}(\cdot \mid \zeta)$ with $P_{2}(\zeta)$, then we decide to choose $F_{1}$ on $E_{2}$ according to whether or $\operatorname{not} B\left(\tilde{\theta} * \mid F_{1}\right)<B\left(\tilde{\zeta}^{*} \mid F_{2}\right)$.

In what follows let us be specific to a linear normal regression model for a vector random variable Y :

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathrm{F}: \quad \mathrm{Y} \sim N\left(X \beta, \sigma^{2} I_{n}\right) \tag{4.3}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $Y$ is $n \times 1, X$ is $n \times k, \&$ is $k \times 1$, and $u$ is $n \times 1$; the true distribution of Y is $\mathrm{N}\left(\mu, \omega^{2} I_{n}\right)$ with unknotns $\mu$ and $\omega^{2}$. If we assume a diffuse prior for $B$ and $\sigma^{2}$, the minimum attainable Bayes risk is evaluated as follows:

Lema 4.1. Given a model $F$ with a diffuse prior, the minimum attainable Bayes risk is

$$
\begin{equation*}
B\left(\tilde{\beta^{*}}, \tilde{\sigma}^{2 *} \mid F\right)=-\frac{2}{n} \log E\left(y \mid \hat{\beta}, \hat{\sigma}^{2}\right)+\log \left(\frac{n+k}{n-k-2}\right), \tag{4.4}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $\hat{\beta}$ and $\hat{\sigma}^{2}$ are the ML estimates for $\beta$ and $\sigma^{2}, \tilde{\beta} *$ and $\tilde{\sigma}^{2 *}$ are the Bayes estimates, and $f$ is the density function of $N\left(X B, \sigma^{2} I_{n}\right)$.

Let us make a comparison of two nested alternatives $F_{1}$ and $F_{2}$ given in (3.14). The Bayes decision rule, based on the magnitude of the minimum attainable Bayes risk, leads us to the following decision rule which is again described in terms of a famliar F-statistic. I2/

Theorem 4.1. A decision rule based on the minimum attainable Bayes risk is equivalent to: choose $F_{1}$ if

$$
\begin{equation*}
W \leq \frac{2(n-1)(n-p-q)}{(n+p)(n-p-q-2)} ; \tag{4.5}
\end{equation*}
$$

choose $\mathrm{F}_{2}$ otherwise, where $W$ defined by ( 3.15 ), is an $F$-statistic conventionally employed to test the hypothesis that $\beta_{2}=0$.

We call the right-hand side of (4.5) the Bayes critical point, which tends to 2 asymptotically, increases with $\%$, and decreases with $p$ if $n$ is moderately large. Limiting ourselves to the case of $q=1$, we tabulate the numerical values of the square root of the Bayes critical point in Table 4.1 which is comparable to Tables 3.1 and 3.2.

Table 4.1. Bayes Critical Points and Significance Levels for the Preliminary t-Test

| $n_{n}^{p}$ | 2 | 3 | 4 | 5 | 10 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 10 | 1.499(.178) | 1.441(.200) | 1.464 (.203) | 1.549 (.196) | --- |
| 12 | 1.421(.189) | 1.398(.200) | $1.387(.208)$ | 1.393(.213) | --- |
| 16 | 1.403(.184). | 1.376(.194) | $1.354(.203)$ | 1.336(.211) | $1.387(.224)$ |
| 20 | 1.399 (.180) | 1.374(.188) | 1.352(.196) | 1.332(.204) | 1.276 (.234) |
| 30 | 1.399 (.173)' | 1.380 (.179) | 1.362(.185) | 1.345(.191) | $1.270(.220)$ |
| 50 | 1.403(.167). | 1.390(.171) | 1.378(.175) | 1.366(.179) | 1.312(.197) |
| 100 | 1.408(.162) | 1.401(.164) | 1.395(.166) | 1.388(.168) | $1.357(.175)$ |
| 200 | 1.411(.160) | 1.407(.162) | 1.404(.162) | 1.401(.162) | $1.384(.166)$ |
| 1000 | 1.414 (.158) | 1.413(.158) | $1.412(.158)$ | 1.411(.158) | 1.408(.159) |

See the footnote to Table 3.1.

It is interesting to note that the Bayes critical point varies quite little according to the changes in the values of $n$ and $p$. Also, It is very close to the minimax regret critical point in Sawa and Hiromatsu [8].

## 5. Bias of Decision Rules

Now we return to Section 3 and reconsider the problem from the viewpoint of sampling theory. When we compare the two nested alternative models given in (3.14), our decision rule should be in principle based on the risk function given in Theorem 3.1. That is, we should choose $F_{1}$ if $R\left(F_{1}\left(\cdot \mid \theta_{1}\right)\right)<R\left(F_{2}\left(\cdot \mid \theta_{2}\right)\right)$ and vice versa.

Lempa 5.1. If $\delta=\sigma_{1}^{2}-\sigma_{2}^{2}=0\left(n^{-1}\right)$, then

$$
\begin{equation*}
R\left(F_{1}\left(\cdot \mid \theta_{1}\right)\right)-R\left(F_{2}\left(\cdot \mid \theta_{2}\right)\right)=\frac{\delta}{\sigma_{2}{ }^{2}}-\frac{q \omega^{2}}{n \sigma_{2}^{2}}+0\left(n^{-2}\right) \tag{5.1}
\end{equation*}
$$

The proof is given in the Appendix. It should be recalled that when we derived the BIC the terms of $O\left(\mathrm{n}^{-2}\right)$ were neglected. It is, therefore, consistent that we evaluate the difference of risk only to order $O\left(n^{-1}\right)$. The difference $\delta$ between the pseudo-variances is assumed to be $O\left(n^{-1}\right)$. This assumption may seem to be somewhat uncomfortable. However, it may be justified by the fact that the model discrimination procedure would be unnecessary unless the difference between the two alternatives is as small as the reciprocal of the sample size. Incidentally, starting from Mallows' type risk function, Sawa and Takeuchi [9] has arrived at the essentially same result as (5.1). This reflects the asymptotic equivalence of the two different approaches.

We can legitimately define a correct decision rule as follows: choose the model $F_{1}$ if $n \delta / \omega^{2} \leq q$ and choose $F_{2}$ if $n \delta / \omega^{2}>q$.

Based on the preceding consideration, we introduce the notion of unbiasedness of a decision rule: a decision rule is said to be unbiased if the probability of choosing $F_{I}$ is greater than $1 / 2$ when $n \delta / \omega^{2} \leq q$ and less than $1 / 2$ when $n \delta / \omega^{2}>q$. If the probability decreases continuously with the increase of $n \delta / \omega^{2}$, the condition of unbiasedness is simply described as follows: the probability of choosing $F_{1}$ (or $F_{2}$ ) is $1 / 2$ when $n \delta / \omega^{2}=q$. Note that when $n \delta / \omega^{2}=q$ the two alternative models are equally desirable. If the above probability exceeds $1 / 2$, then the decision rule is said to be biased toward a simpler model; if it falls below $1 / 2$, then the decision rule is biased toward a more com-. plex model.

All decision rules considered so far are based on whether or not an observed value of $W$, given by (3.15), exceeds a constant which changes
with $n, p$, and $q$. Under the assumption that $Y \sim N\left(\mu, \omega^{2} I_{n}\right), W$ is distributed as a doubly noncentral $F$ with ( $q, n-p-q$ ) degrees of freedom and the noncentrality parameters

$$
\begin{align*}
\delta_{1} & =\frac{n \delta}{\omega^{2}}=\frac{u^{\prime} X_{2}^{*}\left(X_{2}^{*} X_{2}^{*}\right)^{-1} X_{2}^{*^{\prime} \mu}}{}  \tag{5.2}\\
\delta_{2} & =\frac{\mu^{\prime}\left[I-X_{1}\left(X_{1}^{\prime} X_{1}\right)^{-1} X_{1}^{\prime}-X_{2}^{*}\left(X_{2}^{*^{\prime}} X_{2}^{*}\right)^{-1} X_{2}^{*^{\prime}}\right] \mu}{\omega^{2}}
\end{align*}
$$

where $X_{2}^{*}=X_{2}-X_{1}\left(X_{1}^{\prime} X_{1}\right)^{-1} X_{1}^{\prime} X_{2}$. It would be worth noting here that a decision is correct if we decide to choose $F_{1}$ when the noncentrality parameter of the numerator is less than its degrees of freedom and vice versa.

In Table 5.1 we tabulate the probability that $W$ exceeds the BIC critical point when $n \delta / \omega^{2}=q$, i.e., when $F_{1}$ and $F_{2}$ are indifferent. It can be observed from the Table that the BIC procedure is considerably biased toward a simpler model.

Table 5.1. Bias of the BIC Dectsion Rule

| noncentrality |  | $n=10$ | $n=20$ | $\mathrm{n}=30$ | $n=40$ | $\mathrm{n}=50$ |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $p=2$ | . 0 | . 696 | . 671 | . 664 | . 661 | . 659 |
|  | . 2 | . 742 | . 720 | . 714 | . 711 | . 709 |
|  | . 4 | . 781 | . 762 | . 756 | . 753 | . 752 |
|  | . 6 | . 814 | . 797 | . 791 | . 789 | . 788 |
|  | . 8 | . 842 | . 827 | . 822 | . 820 | . 818 |
|  | 1.0 | . 866 | . 852 | . 848 | . 846 | . 844 |
| $p=3$ | . 0 | . 738 | . 689 | . 675 | . 669 | . 666 |
|  | . 2 | . 781 | . 738 | . 725 | . 719 | . 715 |
|  | . 4 | . 817 | . 779 | . 767 | . 761 | . 758 |
|  | . 6 | . 848 | . 813 | . 802 | . 796 | . 793 |
|  | . 8 | . 873 | . 842 | . 832 | . 827 | . 824 |
|  | 1.0 | . 894 | . 866 | . 857 | . 852 | . 850 |

Each entry in the table is the probability that a doubly non-central $P$ variate, with noncentrality parameters $\left(\delta_{1}, \delta_{2}\right)$ and $(1, n-p-1)$ degrees of freedom, falls below the BIC critical point when $\delta_{1}=1$. The noncentrality is $\delta_{2} /(n-p-1)$, i.e., the normalized noncentrality parameter of the denominator in $F$, where $\delta_{2}$ is given by (5.3).

The unbiased decision rule has been considered in more detail by Sawa and Takeuchi [9].

## Appendix

Proof of Lemma 3.1

The log likelihood function is
(A.1) $\quad \log \cdot(y \mid \theta)=-\frac{n}{2} \log (2 \pi)-\frac{n}{2} \log \left(\sigma^{2}\right)$

$$
-\frac{1}{2 \sigma^{2}}\|y-x s\|^{2}
$$

Where $\theta^{\prime}=\left(\beta^{\prime}, \sigma^{2}\right)$ and $\|\cdot\|$ stands for an Euclidean norm. Differentiating it with respect to $\beta$ and $\sigma^{2}$, we have

$$
\text { (A.2) } \quad \frac{\partial \log f(y \mid \theta)}{\partial g}=\frac{1}{\sigma^{2}} X^{\prime}(y-X B)
$$

(A.3) $\frac{\partial \log E(y \mid \theta)}{\partial \sigma^{2}}=-\frac{n}{2 \sigma^{2}}+\frac{1}{2 \sigma^{4}}\|y-x \beta\|^{2}$.

Then
(A.4) $E\left[\frac{\partial \log f(Y \mid \theta)}{\partial \beta}\right]=\frac{1}{\sigma^{2}} K^{\prime}(1, x-x)$
(A.5) $E\left[\frac{\partial \log f(Y \mid \theta)}{\partial \sigma^{2}}\right]=-\frac{n}{20^{2}}+\frac{-1}{20^{4}} E\|Y-X B\|^{2}$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& =-\frac{n}{2 \sigma^{2}}+\frac{1}{2 \sigma^{4}}\left(X\|-\mu\|^{2}+\|u-X \beta\|^{2}\right) \\
& =-\frac{n}{2 \sigma^{2}}+\frac{1}{2 \sigma^{4}}\left(\mathrm{~L} \varepsilon \alpha+\|\mu-X \beta\|^{2}\right) .
\end{aligned}
$$

Equating (A.4) att (A.5) to zeroes and solving them yields the pseudo-true parameter values $B_{0}$ and $0_{0}^{2}$ given, respectively, by (3.3) and (3.4).

Proof of Lemma 3.2
(A.6) $\quad E(\hat{B})=\left(X^{\prime} X\right)^{-1} X^{\prime} \mu=\beta_{0}$
(A.7) $E\left(\hat{\sigma}^{2}\right)=\frac{1}{n} \operatorname{tr} \bar{P}_{X}\left(\mu \mu^{\prime}+\dot{\omega}^{2} I_{n}\right)$

$$
=\frac{n-k}{n} \omega^{2}+\frac{1}{n} \mu^{\prime} \bar{P}_{X^{\mu}}
$$

where $\overline{\mathrm{P}}_{\mathrm{X}}=I-X\left(X^{\prime} X\right)^{-1} X^{\prime}$. Then
(A.8) $\quad \lim \dot{E}\left(\hat{\sigma}^{2}\right)=11 m \sigma_{0}{ }^{2}$

Proof of Lemma 3.3

From ( $\mathrm{A}, 1$ ) we have
(A.9) $\quad-\frac{2}{n} \log f(Y \mid \hat{\theta})=\log (2 \pi)+\log \hat{\sigma}^{2}+\frac{1}{n \hat{\sigma}^{2}}\|Y-X \hat{B}\|^{2}$
where $Y$ is a vector random variable independent of $\hat{\theta}$. Taking expectation of (A.9) and substituting
(A.10) $\quad E\left[\|Y-\hat{X B}\|^{2} \mid \hat{B}\right]=E\left\|Y-X \beta_{0}\right\|^{2}-2 E\left[\left(Y-X \beta_{0}\right)^{\prime} X\left(\hat{B}-\beta_{0}\right)\right]$. $+\left\|X\left(\hat{B}-\beta_{0}\right)\right\|^{2}$
$=n \sigma_{0}^{2}-2 \mu^{\prime} \bar{P}_{X} X\left(\hat{\beta}-\beta_{0}\right)+\left\|X\left(\hat{\beta}-\beta_{0}\right)\right\|^{2}$
$=n \sigma_{0}^{2}+\left\|X\left(\hat{\beta}-\beta_{0}\right)\right\|^{2}$
therein, we obtain (3.11).

Proof of Theorem 3.1

The risk function is
(A.11)

$$
\begin{aligned}
R(F(\cdot \mid \theta))= & E[W(F(\cdot \mid \theta))] \\
= & \log (2 \pi)+ \\
& \log \left(\sigma^{2}\right)-E\left[\log \left(\frac{\sigma^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}\right)\right]+E\left(\frac{\sigma^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}\right) \\
& +\frac{1}{n \sigma^{2}} E\left(\frac{\sigma^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}\right) E\|X(\hat{\beta}-\beta)\|^{2}
\end{aligned}
$$

where use is made of the independence of $\hat{\sigma}^{2}$ and $\hat{B}$, and the suffix 0 of $\sigma_{0}^{2}$ and $B_{0}$ is dropped. We have the following power series expansions:
(A.12) $\quad \log \left(\frac{\hat{\sigma}^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}\right)=\log (1+\Delta)=\Delta-\frac{1}{2} \Delta^{2}+\cdots$
(A.13) $\quad \frac{\sigma^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}=\frac{1}{1+\Delta}=1-\Delta+\Delta^{2}+\cdots$
where
(A.14) $\quad \Delta=\frac{\hat{\sigma}^{2}-\sigma^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}$

Note that under the assumptions stated in the Theorem the expectatione of higher order terms in the expansions are of order $0\left(n^{-2}\right)$.
(A.15)

$$
\begin{aligned}
\Delta & =\frac{1}{n \sigma^{2}}\left[Y^{\prime} \bar{P}_{X^{\prime}} Y-n \omega^{2}-\mu^{\prime} \overline{\mathrm{P}}_{X}{ }^{\mu}\right] \\
& =\frac{1}{n \sigma^{2}}\left[V^{\prime} \bar{P}_{X} V+2 \mu^{\prime} \bar{P}_{X} V\right]-\frac{\omega^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}
\end{aligned}
$$

where $V=Y-\mu$. Inder the assumptions in the Theorem
(A.16) $\quad E\left(V^{\prime} \bar{P}_{X} V\right)=\omega^{2} \operatorname{tr} \bar{P}_{X}=(n-k) \omega^{2}$
(A.17) $\quad E\left(V^{\prime} \bar{P}_{X} V^{2}=\omega^{4}\left[\left(t r \bar{P}_{X}\right)^{2}+2 t r \bar{P}_{X}\right]\right.$

$$
=\left[(n-k)^{2}+2(n-k)\right] \omega^{4}
$$

(A.18)

$$
E\left(\mu^{\prime} \bar{P}_{X} V\right)=E\left[V^{\prime} \bar{P}_{X} V_{\mu} \bar{P}_{X} V\right]=0
$$

$$
x=-2
$$

$$
x^{3}+2-x-2=-2
$$

$$
\because
$$

$$
1
$$

(A.19) $E\left(\mu^{\prime} \overline{\mathrm{p}}_{X} V\right)^{2}=\omega^{2} \mu^{\prime} \bar{p}_{X} \mu=n \omega^{2}\left(\sigma^{2}-\omega^{2}\right)$

Hence, rearranging the terms, we obtain
(A. 20)
$E(\Delta)=-\frac{k}{n}\left(\frac{\omega^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}\right)$,
(A.21) $E\left(\Delta^{2}\right)=\frac{4}{\pi}\left(\frac{\omega^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}\right)-\frac{2}{n}\left(\frac{\omega^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}\right)^{2}+0\left(n^{-2}\right)$.

A1so, we have
(A.22)

$$
\begin{aligned}
E\|X(\hat{\beta}-\beta)\|^{2} & =E\left\|X\left(X^{\prime} X\right)^{-1} X^{\prime} V\right\|^{2}=\omega^{2} \operatorname{tr} X\left(X^{\prime} X\right)^{-1} X^{\prime} \\
& =k \omega^{2}
\end{aligned}
$$

Therefore,
(A.23) $\quad E\left[\log \left(\frac{\sigma^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}\right)\right]+E\left(\frac{\sigma^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}\right)=1+\frac{1}{2} E\left(\Delta^{2}\right)+0\left(n^{-2}\right)$

$$
=1+\frac{2}{n}\left(\frac{\omega^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}\right)-\frac{1}{n}\left(\frac{\omega^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}\right)^{2}+0\left(n^{-2}\right)
$$

(A. 24)
$E\left(\frac{\sigma^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}\right) E X(\hat{\beta}-B) \|^{2}=k \omega^{2}+0\left(n^{-1}\right)$
Substituting (A.23) and (A.24) into (A.11), we finally obtain (3.12).

## Proof of Theoren 3.2

From (A.12), (A.20) and (A.21)
(A.25)
$E\left(\log \hat{\sigma}^{2}\right)=\log \sigma^{2}+E(\Delta)-\frac{1}{2} E\left(\Delta^{2}\right)$

$$
=\log \sigma^{2}-\frac{k}{n}\left(\frac{\omega^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}\right)-\frac{2}{n}\left(\frac{\omega^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}\right)+\frac{1}{n}\left(\frac{\omega^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}\right)^{2}+0\left(n^{-2}\right) .
$$

Moreover, as $\hat{\omega}^{2}=\omega^{2}+0_{p}\left(n^{-1 / 2}\right)$ by assumption and $\hat{\sigma}^{2}=\sigma^{2}+o_{p}\left(n^{-1 / 2}\right)$, we have
(A.26)

$$
E\left(\frac{\hat{\omega}^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}\right)=\frac{\omega^{2}}{\sigma_{0}^{2}}\left[1+0\left(n^{-1}\right)\right]
$$


and
(A.27) $E\left(\frac{\hat{\omega}^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}\right)^{2}=\frac{\omega^{4}}{\sigma^{4}}\left[1+O\left(n^{-1}\right)\right.$

Noting that
(A.28) $\quad-2 \log f(y \mid \hat{\theta})=n \log (2 \pi)+n \log \hat{\sigma}^{2}+1$
and combining the above expectations, we obtain

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathrm{nE}[\operatorname{BIC}(F(\cdot \mid \theta))]=\operatorname{nR}(F(\cdot \mid \theta)) \div O\left(n^{-1}\right) \tag{A.29}
\end{equation*}
$$

## Proof of Lemma 4.1

If we assume a linear normal regression model $Y \sim \mathbb{N}\left(X B, \sigma^{2} I\right)$ with diffuse prior for $\beta$ and $\sigma^{2}$, the conditional posterior distribution of $\beta$, given $\sigma^{2}$, is $N\left(\hat{\beta}, \sigma^{2}\left(X^{\prime} X\right)^{-1}\right.$ ) where $\hat{\omega}=\left(X^{\prime} X\right)^{-1} X^{\prime} y$ is the maximum likelihood estimate, and also the marginal prior distribution for $\sigma^{2}$ is the inverse gamma distribution with the density function
(A.30) $\frac{2}{\Gamma(v / 2)}\left(\frac{\nu s^{2}}{2}\right) \frac{v / 2}{\sigma^{v+1}} \exp \left(-\frac{v s^{2}}{2 \sigma^{2}}\right)$
where $\nu=n-k$ and $s^{2}=n \hat{\sigma}^{2} /(n-k)$. The proof is given by Zellner [10]. The conditional expectation of $\|X(\tilde{\beta}-\beta)\|^{2}$ with respect to the posterior distribution is
(A.31) $E_{B \mid Y, \sigma}\|X(\tilde{B}-\beta)\|^{2}=E_{\beta \mid y, \sigma}\|X(\beta-\hat{\beta})\|^{2}+\|X(\hat{\beta}-\tilde{\beta})\|^{2}$

$$
\begin{aligned}
& \geq E_{\beta \mid y, 0}\|X(\beta-\hat{\beta})\|^{2} \\
& =k \sigma^{2}
\end{aligned}
$$

where the lower bound is attainable when $\tilde{\beta}=\hat{\beta} ; 1 . e .$, the Bayes estimate $\beta^{*}$ of $\beta$ is nothing but the ML estimate. A straightforward integration
ylelds
(A.32) $E_{\sigma^{2} \mid y}\left(\sigma^{2}\right)=\frac{v}{v-2} s^{2}=\frac{n-k}{n-k-2} s^{2}$
as long as $v>2$. Hence
(A.33)

$$
E_{\beta, \sigma^{2} \mid y}[W(F(\cdot \mid \theta))] \geq \log (2 \pi)+\log \sigma^{2}+\frac{n+k}{n-k-2}\left(1+\frac{k}{n}\right) \frac{s^{2}}{\sigma^{2}}
$$

The Bayes estimate of $\sigma^{2}$ is $\tilde{\sigma}^{2}$ that minimizes the right-hand side of the sbove inequality; 1.e.

$$
\text { (A.34) } \quad \tilde{\sigma}^{* 2}=\frac{n+k}{n-k-2} \hat{\sigma}^{2}
$$

where $\sigma^{2}$ is the ML estimate of $\sigma^{2}$. Substituting this into the right-hand side of (A.33), the minimum attainable Bayes risk is evaluated as follows:
(A.35)

$$
\begin{aligned}
B\left(\tilde{B}^{*}, \tilde{\sigma}^{* 2} \mid F\right) & =\log 2 \pi+\log \tilde{\sigma}^{* 2}+1 \\
& =\log 2 \pi+\log \hat{\sigma}^{2}+1+\log \left(\frac{n+k}{n-k-2}\right) \\
& =-\frac{2}{n} \log f(y \mid \hat{\theta})+\log \left(\frac{n+k}{n-k-2}\right) .
\end{aligned}
$$

## Proof of Theorem 4.1

Let $B_{1}$ and $B_{2}$ be the minimum attainable Bayes risks, respectively, for $F_{1}$ and $F_{2}$ with diffuse prior for parameters. The difference between $\mathrm{B}_{1}$ and $\mathrm{B}_{2}$ is
(A.36) $\quad B_{1}-B_{2}=\log \left(\frac{\hat{\sigma}_{1}{ }^{2}}{\hat{\sigma}_{2}^{2}}\right)+\log \left[\frac{(n+p)(n-p-q-2)}{(n+p+q)(n-p-2)}\right]$

If this is negative, we should choose $F_{1}$, and vice versa. By the monotonicity of the logaritha transformation, $\mathrm{B}_{1}-\mathrm{B}_{2}<0$ is equiveient to
(A.37)

$$
\frac{\hat{\sigma}_{1}^{2}}{\hat{\sigma}_{2}^{2}}<\frac{(n+p+q)(n-p-2)}{(n+q)(n-p-q-2)}
$$

which is again equivalent to (4.5).

## Proof of Lema 5.1

(A.38) $\quad R\left(F_{1}(\cdot \mid \theta)\right)-R\left(F_{2}(\cdot \mid \theta)\right)=\log \left(\frac{\sigma_{1}^{2}}{\sigma_{2}{ }^{2}}\right)+\frac{p+2}{n}\left(\frac{1}{\sigma_{2}{ }^{2}}-\frac{1}{\sigma_{1}{ }^{2}}\right) \omega^{2}$

$$
-\frac{q}{n} \frac{\omega^{2}}{\sigma_{2}^{2}}+\frac{1}{n}\left(\frac{1}{\sigma_{2}^{4}}-\frac{1}{\sigma_{1}^{4}}\right) \omega^{4}+0\left(n^{-2}\right)
$$

If we assume that
(A.39)

$$
\delta=\sigma_{1}^{2}-\sigma_{2}^{2}=0\left(n^{-1}\right)
$$

we have an expansion
(A.40) $\quad \log \left(\frac{\sigma_{1}{ }^{2}}{\sigma_{2}{ }^{2}}\right)=\log \left(1+\frac{\delta}{\sigma_{2}{ }^{2}}\right)=\frac{\delta}{\sigma_{2}{ }^{2}}+0\left(n^{-2}\right)$.

Aiso, it follows that the second and third terms on the right-hand side of (A. 38 ) are of order $0\left(n^{-2}\right)$. Hence, if we neglect the terms of order $0\left(n^{-2}\right)$, we can assert that $R\left(F_{1}(\cdot \mid \theta)\right)<R\left(F_{2}(\cdot \mid \theta)\right)$ if and only if (A.41) $\quad \frac{10}{\omega}<q$
and vice versa.

## GOOTNOTES

1. Kegardiag the importance of the model identification in econometrics, the readers should refer to excellent comprehensive survey papers by Gaver and Getsel [3] and Ramsey [6]. Particularly in Section 2 of Ramsey [6], a very illuminating as well as profound discussion is given about a concept of models.
2. In what follows, for simplicity of exposition $F(\cdot \mid \theta)$ will be simply called a model, instead of a family of models, except for cases when sharp distinction needs to be drawn between a family of models and its particular element.
3. It is fair to say that the assumption here is nearly equivalent to assumang the nomal distribution.
4. The precise meaning of $O_{p}\left(n^{-\alpha}\right)$ is as follows: Given $\varepsilon>0$, if there exists a positive number $\lambda_{\varepsilon}$ such that
$\operatorname{Pr}\left\{\left|x_{n}\right| \leq \lambda_{\varepsilon} n^{-\alpha}\right\} \geq 1-\varepsilon$,
then we say that $X_{n}=0_{p}\left(n^{-\alpha}\right)$. Note that
(i) $o_{p}\left(n^{-\alpha}\right) o_{p}\left(n^{-\gamma}\right)=O_{p}\left(n^{-\alpha-\gamma}\right)$
(ii) $o_{p}\left(n^{-\alpha}\right)+o_{p}\left(n^{-\alpha}\right)=o_{p}\left(n^{-\alpha}\right)$.

Also, if $E\left|X_{n}\right|^{k}<\infty$, then $\mathrm{E}^{\mathrm{E}}\left|\mathrm{X}_{\mathrm{n}}\right|^{\mathrm{k}}=0\left(\mathrm{n}^{-\mathrm{k} \alpha}\right)$.
5. Note that the aumber of unknown parameters is $k+1$, 1.e., $k$ regression coefficients and variance.
6. It should be here emphasized that the difference between the AIC and BIC decision rules steras from the following: the AIC for ${ }_{1}$ is evaluated assuming that $w^{2}-\sigma^{2}=o(1)$, whereas the BIC for $F_{1}$ is evaluated without assuming ${ }^{1}$ that $\omega^{2}-\sigma_{1}^{2}=0(1)$. See the last paragraph of Section 3.
7. It is impossible to explicitly write dow the BIC critical point as a function of $n, p$ and $q$. However, for each combination of $n$, $p$ and $q$, we can evaluate the $B I C$ critical point numerically. Note that the inequality $\operatorname{BIC}\left(F_{1}\right)<B I C\left(F_{2}\right)$ is equivalent to the inequality that the $F$ statistic is iess than a critical point determined by $n$, $p$ and $q$.
8. It should be here noted that the decision based on the adjusted multiple correlation coefficient is also equivalent to a decision based on the F-statistic with a constant critical point equalling one. Also, Mallows' $\mathrm{E}_{\mathrm{p}}$ statistic leads us to a declsion based on the F-statistic with $\mathrm{a}_{\mathrm{a}}^{\mathrm{P}}$ critical point equalling two, irrespective of $n, p$ and $q$.
9. The difference between the AIC and the BIC is more substantial for a larger value of $q$. In his personal correspondence $D r$. Akaike pointed out that the two cxiteria give almost identical critical points for cases when $\mathrm{p} / \mathrm{n}<0.1$. An implication may be that the simplifying assumption made by Akalke is virtually harmless if the sample size is large enough to satisfy the above condition.
10. A decision rule based on $\bar{R}$, the multiple correlation coefficient adjusted for the degrees of freedom, is equivalent to a decision based on F-statistic with critical point unity regardless of the degrees of freedom. (The proof is quite straightforward.) This decision rule is perhaps most often used in practical regression analysis. The implied significance level is a little bit greater than $30 \%$. Presumably, this is the most prodigal decision rule.
11. Mallows' $C_{p}$ statistic is $C_{p}=R S S+2 p \omega^{2}$, where RSS is the residual shom of squares, $p^{p}$ is the number of explanatory variables, and $\hat{\omega}^{2}$ is an estimate of the common varlance of $Y_{i}^{\prime} s$. It is straightforward to show that a decision based on ${ }^{1} C_{p}$ is equivalent to a decision based on the F-statistic with a constant critical point equalling two. Therefore, the AIC and BIC decision rules are asymptotically equivalent to Mallows' decision rule.
12. In his personal correspondence Dr. Akaike noticed the following: since $\quad \log \left(\frac{n+k}{n-k-2}\right) \simeq 2 \frac{(k+1)}{n}$
if $n \gg k$, a decision rule based on Bayes risk is almost equivalent to the MAIC decision rule. This may provide another justification for the MAIC procedure. It is fair to note that the decision rule derived in this section is considerably different from orthodox Bayesian approach.

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