

October 2006

Instrumental and Socio-Emotional Paths to Intergroup Reconciliation and the
Need-Based Model of Socio-Emotional Reconciliation

Arie Nadler and Nurit Shnabel

Tel Aviv University

Israel

To appear in: A. Nadler, T. Malloy & J.D. Fisher (eds.) Social Psychology of
Intergroup Reconciliation. New York: Oxford University Press.

The development of Social Psychology during the 20th century occurred against the backdrop of intergroup conflicts between and within nations. Throughout this time the field's research agendas were shaped by international (e.g., the Second World War, the Cold War) and intra-societal (e.g., the civil rights movement in America) conflicts (Farr, 1996). It is no surprise therefore that intergroup conflict and its resolution has been a central concern of social psychology since its inception. This ongoing interest has been driven by the wish to gain basic knowledge on the social psychological dynamics of intergroup conflict, and a desire to facilitate more harmonious intergroup relations between and within societies. As we move away from the 20th century which has seen two world wars, numerous regional conflicts and a number of genocidal campaigns (e.g., the Jewish Holocaust, the genocidal campaign of the Pol Pot regime in Cambodia, the massacres in Rwanda) there is no need to belabor the importance of studying intergroup conflicts and ways to end them. The present chapter is within this research tradition. It centers on processes of intergroup reconciliation and has three related goals. We begin with a definition of reconciliation, then consider the distinction between socio-emotional and instrumental reconciliation (Nadler, 2002), and finally we present the Need-Based Model of socio-emotional reconciliation. We conclude by discussing the theoretical and applied implications of this model.

A “Realist” and “Psychological needs” perspectives on conflict:

Scholars of conflict have viewed the antecedents of conflict and ways to end them through two perspectives: The “realist” and the “psychological needs” perspectives. The realist approach suggests that conflict is attributable to the parties' competition over scarce and *real* resources. In international conflicts these are often natural resources (e.g., land), in intra-societal conflict these are often scarce budgets,

and in conflict between two groups of children these may be pocket knives (Sherif, Harvey, White, Hood & Sherif, 1961). This approach holds that because competition over tangible and scarce resources causes conflict, an agreement on how to divide them will bring an end to conflict. Such an agreement is said to be the result of a negotiation between two *rational* actors who put their differences on the table in and seek an agreement on how to divide the contested resources. Much of the social-psychological literature on ending conflict has focused on processes that lead to the achievement of such an agreement and its characteristics (Pruitt & Carnevale, 1993). Thus for example, Cross and Rosenthal (1999) argue that a focus on adversarial *positions* results in *distributive bargaining* that centers on ways to split the disputed “pie”, while a focus on the parties’ underlying *interests* results in *integrative bargaining* that seeks to expand the “pie” for both parties before dividing it. The realist approach to conflict has been influential in generating new understandings on ending conflicts in applied settings (e.g., Fisher & Ury, 1981; Ury, 1991).

The psychological needs perspective goes beyond a realist view of conflict of interests to causes that are rooted in the threat to parties’ basic *psychological needs* (Burton, 1969). During conflict parties inflict humiliation and pain on each other and this results in threats to basic psychological needs such as needs for positive esteem and worthy identity, need for autonomy, or needs for security and justice. These threats result in emotions that contribute to the maintenance conflict and act as barriers to ending it. Thus for example, the feeling of humiliation by one’s adversary often precipitates a motivation for revenge which can instigate a new cycle of violence (Frijda, 1994). Similarly, feelings of distrust in the adversary may cause a discounting of the adversary’s positive gestures as manipulative ploys thereby making the end of conflict more difficult (Lewicki & Wiethoff, 2000). This perspective on

conflict suggests that the end of conflict is predicated on the removal of these threats to basic *psychological needs* and resultant *emotions* and motivations (Burton, 1969). Our chapter lies at the center of the psychological needs perspective on conflict. We define the process of intergroup reconciliation as: ***the process of removing conflict-related emotional barriers that block the way to ending intergroup conflict.***

In the past, the study of intergroup conflict was dominated by the real conflict approach. Parties were traditionally viewed as rational actors who try to maximize self-gain. The willingness to compromise and reach an agreement was attributable to parties' perception that the costs of continuing conflict outweigh the alternative costs of ending it. Concepts at the center of the human needs perspective (e.g., humiliation, honor, and revenge) were relatively ignored in early discussions of ways to end intergroup conflicts (Scheff, 1994). This relative under-representation of emotional and identity related processes is captured by Scheff (1994) who writes that "One would hardly know that they [emotions] existed from reading social science analysis of conflict... emotions are sometimes invoked under the rubric of "non rational motives" but with little attempt to specify what this category might contain" (p. 66).

In recent years this one-sided emphasis is changing both outside and within social psychology. Outside of our field this shift is evident in the increasing number of episodes where political and cultural leaders try to promote the end of conflict by apologizing for the wrongdoings that their group had committed (Barkan, 2001). For example, in 1998 UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan apologized for the UN's failure to prevent the Rwandan genocide, and in the year 2000 Pope John Paul II apologized to victims of two millennia of persecution by the Catholic Church. This greater awareness of the need to promote the end of intergroup conflict through the removal of conflict-related emotions of guilt and victimhood is also reflected in the more than

twenty truth commissions that were established worldwide to facilitate reconciliation between former adversaries (e.g., Guatemala, Phillipines, etc.) (Hayner, 2001). The most outstanding of these was the Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa. Its name epitomizes the working assumption that underlies all truth committees: Uncovering the painful truth by the perpetrator will allow the victim to grant forgiveness and facilitate reconciliation. Another illustrative example is the change in emphasis in applied analyses of the negotiation process. In 1981 Roger Fisher and William Ury published the first such influential analysis under the title: “Getting to Yes: Negotiating agreement without giving in”. This book sold over 2 million copies, was translated to more than 20 languages, and introduced concepts such as “win/win” solutions to the daily discourse of conflict. Recently, in 2005, Roger Fisher and Daniel Shapiro authored a book titled: “Beyond Reason: Using emotions as you negotiate”. This epitomizes the change in the direction of greater awareness by scholars and practitioners to the role of adversaries’ psychological needs and associated emotions in ending conflicts. .

Within social psychology recent research on interpersonal conflicts has become similarly concerned with emotional processes that are associated with the analysis of the end of conflict. This research has focused on the effects of apologies on the reduction of interpersonal conflict (e.g., McCullough, Worthington & Rachal, 1997), variables that explain perpetrators’ willingness to apologize (e.g., Hodgins & Liebeskind, 2003) and the victim’s readiness to forgive (e.g., Darby & Schlenker, 1982). In the context of intergroup relations, social psychological theory and research indicates that group members can experience feelings of collective guilt (e.g., Brancsombe & Miron, 2004; Leach, Snider & Iyer, 2004) or collective victimization (e.g., Roccas, Klar & Liviatan, 2004) that result from wrongdoings that ingroup had

perpetrated or was the victim of. These feelings of collective guilt or victimhood color group members' perceptions and behavior towards the outgroups (Brancscombe & Miron, 2004; Roccas, Klar & Liviatan, 2004). Finally, recent experimental research highlights the fact that under conditions of a relatively high feeling of trust in the adversary apologies for past wrongdoings can lead to a greater willingness to reconcile with the enemy group (Nadler & Liviatan, 2004).

Two Paths to Reconciliation: Socio-Emotional and Instrumental

Reconciliation

Building on the distinction between the realist and psychological needs perspectives Kelman has recently proposed a distinction between three processes of peace-making: Conflict settlement, Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation (Kelman, 2004). *Conflict settlement* operates at the *level of interests*. Similar to the emphasis in the 'realist' perspective on conflict the settlement of conflict consists of finding an agreed upon formula for the division of contested resources. Processes of conflict resolution and reconciliation are two aspects of psychological needs perspective. *Conflict resolution* operates at the level of the *relationships between the adversarial parties*. It aims to restore a feeling of trust between the adversaries and build a pragmatic partnership in which each side is convinced that cooperation is in its own best interests. Kelman views *Reconciliation* as a process which reflects *identity changes* that each of the adversaries undergoes. It consists of removal of the negation of the other as an element in one's own identity and of being able to acknowledge the other's narrative without having to fully agree with it. In a process of reconciliation each party is said to strengthen the core elements in its own identity while accommodating the other.

Consistent with Kelman's position which distinguishes between affecting an end to conflict through changes in adversarial relations or through changes in the adversaries' identities we have also distinguished between two categories of emotional barriers that need to be removed in order to facilitate an end to conflict: (a) a feeling of distrust in the other, and (b) feelings which emanate from threat to the sense of one's worthy identity (Nadler, 2002). Since trust between the adversaries is said to result from repeated acts of cooperation between the adversaries to achieve common *instrumental* goals (e.g., cleaner environment, better health) we have labeled this route to ending intergroup conflict as ***Instrumental Reconciliation***. Because we focus on the restoration of a sense of worthy identity by overcoming the *emotional* barriers of victimhood and guilt through an *interaction* that involves an admission of past wrongdoings and subsequent forgiveness we have labeled this route to ending conflict as ***Socio-Emotional Reconciliation***. These processes of Instrumental and Socio-Emotional Reconciliation are similar to Kelman's distinction between processes of Conflict Resolution and Reconciliation, respectively. Yet, our analysis is different from Kelman's analysis in several respects. First, we seek to compare these two routes to end conflict on a common set of criteria (e.g., the end-state that each of these categories aims for; the temporal focus of each category). Second, our view of socio-emotional reconciliation centers on the apology-forgiveness cycle and the Need-Based Model of Reconciliation which elucidates the psychological processes that underlie it.

Further, due to the multi-disciplinary nature of the study of conflict and the relatively recent attention to reconciliation there is lack of clarity regarding the definition of "reconciliation". While Kelman terms the process of building of trustworthy relations *conflict resolution* and distinguishes it from that of

reconciliation, other scholars view building trustworthy relations as the essence of the process of reconciliation. Thus for example, Worthington & Drinkard (2000) define reconciliation as "the restoration of trust in an interpersonal relationship through mutual trustworthy behaviors" (p. 93). These different views on the same concept create conceptual ambiguity. Our definition of reconciliation as consisting of the removal of emotional barriers to the end of conflict and instrumental and socio-emotional reconciliation as dealing with two different classes of such emotional barriers (i.e., lack of trust and threat to worthy identity, respectively) allows a clearer view of the unique nature of the concept of reconciliation as distinct from the realist approaches to ending conflict.

Before we move on to discuss the differences between instrumental and socio-emotional reconciliation, it should be noted that we do not view these two processes as mutually exclusive but rather as interdependent. We shall return to discuss their links in a later section, but first, for the sake of conceptual clarity, we will specify the unique nature of each of them.

The processes of socio-emotional and instrumental reconciliation are markedly different. Socio-emotional reconciliation seeks to remove the emotional and identity-related barriers to the end of conflict through the successful completion of an apology-forgiveness cycle (Tavuchis, 1991). We view this cycle as consisting of a social exchange between perpetrator and victim in which each provides to the other the psychological commodities that are needed to ameliorate the threats to their respective identities. Victims face a threat to their identity as able and worthy actors. When perpetrators apologize and accept responsibility for past wrongdoings they create a 'debt' that only their victims can remove by granting forgiveness. This restores the victims' sense of power and equality which had been robbed from them

during the victimization episode(s). In her analysis of psychological consequences of the TRC process Gobodo-Madikizela made a similar argument: "...the decision to forgive can paradoxically elevate a victim to a position of strength as the one who has the key to the perpetrator's wish... the victim becomes the gatekeeper to what the outcast desires..." (Gobodo-Madikizela, 2003, p. 117). Perpetrators, on the other hand, are faced with threats to their identity as moral actors. Being identified as the guilty perpetrator may result in expulsion from the "moral community" to which one, or one's group, belongs (Tavuchis, 1991). The granting of forgiveness for past wrongdoings by the victim ameliorates this threat (Exline & Baumeister, 2000). The apology-forgiveness cycle, which we view as lying at the center of socio-emotional reconciliation, is expected to increase the parties' willingness to end the conflict. The working assumption behind the TRC process in South-Africa was that the prospects of reconciliation between Blacks and Whites will be facilitated through the processes of truth telling by perpetrators and the conditional granting of forgiveness by victims (Tutu, 1999).

The road to instrumental reconciliation is different than the apology-forgiveness cycle that lies at the heart of socio-emotional reconciliation. It is not concerned with the past of the conflict. It implicitly suggests to "let bygones be bygones" and centers on the gradual learning which occurs when the former adversaries cooperate repeatedly to achieve instrumental goals that are important for both parties. During these repetitive cooperative projects the parties gradually learn to trust and accept each other. Programs in educational and community settings that are based on the ideas of the contact hypothesis (Pettigrew & Tropp, 2005) and the Sherif et al's proposal that intergroup conflict can be reduced by cooperative efforts to obtain superordinate goals (1961) represent this approach. A similar emphasis exists in

Osgood's GRIT proposal which suggests that international tensions such as those that existed between the USA and the USSR during the height of the cold war could be reduced by reciprocal cooperative gestures (Osgood, 1962). Also, in discussions of peace-building efforts that follow the signature of agreements to end a conflict. Peace building requires participation in multiple cooperative programs that aim to achieve instrumental goals that are important for the former adversaries (e.g., environmental, agricultural and health projects, Lederach, 1997). The "people to people" programs between Israelis and Palestinians after the signing of the Oslo agreements are a recent real world example of this approach. These, and similar programs in other conflict areas, share the idea that repeated instances of cooperative contact between the adversaries will help to gradually transform adversarial relations that are marked by suspicion and distrust to more trustworthy relations (Kriesberg, 2000).

Instrumental and Socio-Emotional reconciliation are different on 4 dimensions: (a) the *target*, (b) the *nature*, (c) the *temporal focus*, and (d) the *goal* that the change of reconciliation represents. The *target of change* in instrumental reconciliation is *external* while that of socio-emotional reconciliation is *internal*. Instrumental reconciliation seeks to change the relations with and perceptions of the adversary, while socio-emotional reconciliation seeks to affect a change in each of the parties' own identity and image. The *nature of change* in instrumental reconciliation is *evolutionary* whereas the change in socio-emotional reconciliation is *revolutionary*. Processes of instrumental reconciliation consist of gradual changes that reflect learning over time to trust and accept the other, whereas the change that occurs as a result of socio-emotional reconciliation is relatively instantaneous. Change is assumed to follow immediately after the successful completion of the apology-forgiveness cycle. Commenting on the nature of such change Tavuchis (1991) writes: "... when

this secular act of expiation is punctiliously performed ... our world is transformed in a way that can only be described as miraculous” (p. 8). Regarding the *temporal focus of the process of change*, socio-emotional reconciliation is focused on the *past of the conflict* and asserts that the key to a reconciled future lies in a constructive confrontation with the painful past. Efforts of instrumental reconciliation are focused *on the present* and are based on the premise that ongoing cooperation between the adversaries in the present will result in a reconciled future.

The *goal of reconciliation* can be the creation of a conflict free environment in which two separate parties co-exist or the formation of one *integrated* social unit of which the former adversaries are two parts that share a “we” feeling (i.e., *separation* and *integration* respectively). If the goal of reconciliation is separate co-existence between the former enemies instrumental reconciliation is enough. It restores trust to the relations between the two former adversaries who wish separate co-existence in a conflict free environment. Socio-emotional reconciliation is consistent with the goal of integration. It seeks to restore each of the parties’ worthy identities through the apology-forgiveness cycle thereby freeing them from the threats that each presents to the identity of the other. It therefore allows the former adversaries to share a larger and more inclusive identity. This may be one explanation why most truth committees that institutionalize processes of socio-emotional reconciliation have been established at the end of *intra-societal* conflicts where the goal of reconciliation is social integration (Hayner, 2001). On the other hand, peace building efforts which seek to allow the former enemies to co-exist as separate nations in a conflict-free environment are more common after the conclusion of *international conflicts*.

TABLE 1

The distinction between instrumental and socio-emotional reconciliation is echoed in other analyses of the reconciliation process. In political science, Long and Brecke (2003) have analyzed the differences between intergroup reconciliation in international and intra-national contexts. They distinguish between a *signaling model* and a *forgiveness model* of intergroup reconciliation. The forgiveness model consists of admission of past wrongdoings unto one's former enemy and seeking their forgiveness. It aims to establish a different kind of relationships between the two former adversaries. The signaling model seeks to signal to one's former adversary that one's intentions are benign and that social interaction with them is safe. Consistent with our analysis, Long and Brecke suggest that the forgiveness model is more appropriate for intra-national contexts where the goal of reconciliation is integration and the signaling model is more appropriate for international contexts where the goal of reconciliation is separate co-existence. The parallels between the signaling and forgiveness model, on the one hand, and instrumental and socio-emotional reconciliation, on the other, are immediately clear. Finally, studies of primate behavior suggest that apes' conciliatory gestures at the end of conflict (e.g., hugging, patting) may signal that one can be trusted, or they may serve the function of setting a base for future relationships of interdependence in a single social unit (i.e., "*signaling function*" or "*relationship-repair function*", de Waal & Aureli, 1996). With all the necessary caution when discussing similarities across species, there exists a general similarity between the goals of "*signaling function*" and "*relationship-repair function*" and the goals of instrumental and socio-emotional reconciliation, respectively.

Before we move to a more detailed account of socio-emotional reconciliation we should note that the discussion of socio-emotional and instrumental reconciliation as two separate paths is done for sake of conceptual clarity. In reality these two

processes are related to each other. When the goal of reconciliation is separate co-existence, the creation of trustworthy relations between the former adversaries through instrumental reconciliation may suffice. However, when the goal is integration, the success of socio-emotional reconciliation processes depends on the existence of trust between the two adversaries. Recent research indicates that in the presence of a low level of intergroup trust, apology by the perpetrator is viewed as a manipulative ploy and leads to an increase in tensions (Nadler & Liviatan, 2006). This suggests that the process of socio-emotional reconciliation needs to be viewed as a two stage process. Only after efforts of instrumental reconciliation secure a basic level of trust can processes of socio-emotional reconciliation be implemented to remove identity related barriers to the end of conflict (Nadler, 2002; Nadler & Liviatan, 2004; Lindskold, 1978).

Dealing with the Threats of Victimhood and Guilt: Unilateral Actions and the Need-Based Model of Socio-Emotional Reconciliation

Victims suffer a threat to their identity as powerful actors and perpetrators suffer a threat to their identity as moral actors. The differential threats to *powerful* and *moral identity* evoke feelings of powerlessness and moral inferiority, respectively. To avoid these negative feelings and ameliorate threatened identities victims are motivated to regain the identity of powerful actors and perpetrators are motivated to regain the identity of moral actors. They can do so unilaterally or interactively. Taking revenge and distancing oneself from the victim both socially and emotionally are two unilateral ways in which victims and perpetrators can ameliorate threats to feelings of powerlessness and guilt, respectively. Yet, such unilateral removal of threats is likely to intensify rather than quell conflict while an interactive amelioration of these threats through the apology forgiveness-cycle is expected to promote

reconciliation. We first discuss the two major unilateral ways of ameliorating feelings of powerlessness and moral inferiority (i.e., revenge and social distancing) and then move to discuss the interactive alternative of the apology-forgiveness cycle and suggest a model that accounts for the psychological dynamics of this process: The Need-Based Model of Reconciliation.

The Unilateral Alternative: Revenge and Social Distancing The commonly used phrase that victims are “at the hands” of their tormentors epitomizes the lack of control and loss of power that is the sine qua non of victimhood. Empirical research which indicates that victims feel a threat to their self-esteem (i.e., Scobie & Scobie, 1999), perceived control (Baumeister, Stilwell & Heatherton, 1994), and power (Foster & Rosbult, 1999) corroborate this observation. Scholars who have analyzed the role of emotions in international conflicts have made a similar argument by noting that a major reason for the protracted nature of some of these conflicts are victim’s feelings of humiliation (Scheff, 1994; Lindner, 2006). To cope with these threats victims need to restore feelings of self-worth, self-control and social equality. Perpetrators who hold power over the victim during the conflict episode do not experience a similar threat to their perceptions of power and control. They, on the other hand, worry about their image as moral social actors. This threat results in feelings of guilt (Baumeister, Stilwell & Heatherton, 1994), shame (Exline & Baumeister, 2000) and moral inferiority (Zechmeister & Romero, 2002). This myriad of emotions is associated with perpetrators' fear that they will be rejected from the moral community to which they belong (Tavuchis, 1991) and raises the possibility that they will be excluded by psychologically relevant others (Baumeister, Stilwell & Heatherton, 1994). To cope with these threats perpetrators need to restore the feeling that they are accepted by others and are viewed by them as moral social actors.

Victims can restore their identity as powerful actors by taking revenge on their perpetrator. Revenge changes the power asymmetry which had existed between victim and perpetrator and makes relations more equal (Frijda, 1994). Akhtar (2002) has summarized this psychologically positive aspect of revenge by noting that "...some revenge is actually good for the victim...it puts the victim's hitherto passive ego in an active position ...[and] imparts a sense of mastery and self-esteem" (Akhtar, 2002). Echoing a similar sentiment Freud, quoting Heine, wrote "one must, it is true, forgive one's enemies - but not before they have been hanged" (quoted by Akhtar, 2002, p. 179). Although revenge is psychologically healthy for the victim it is unlikely to contribute to the ending of conflict because of its unilateral nature. The perpetrator is the passive recipient of the victim's revenge. While revenge may restore the victim's feelings of power and control, it does not respond to the perpetrator's need for acceptance. Thus, although the victim may feel more ready to end the conflict after taking revenge than before having done so, revenge will not promote the prospects of reconciliation. Further, since what one party sees as justified revenge, the other commonly views as unjustified aggression that needs to be avenged. Therefore, acts of revenge are likely to lead to an intensified cycle of violence (Newberg, dAquila, Newberg & deMarici, 2000).

Perpetrators can ameliorate the threat to their identity as moral actors by denying the painful consequences of their actions and/or their responsibility for having caused them (Schonbach, 1990). They can distance themselves from the pain and suffering of the adversary by belittling them or by feeling no empathy with the victim's sufferings. Since increasing the social distance between oneself and the victim lowers empathy (Fry, 2006), the ultimate tactic of social distancing is the dehumanization of the victim. This common practice of parties in intractable conflicts

(Bar-Tal, 1990) allows one to feel no empathy with the victim. Alternatively, perpetrators may deny responsibility for having caused pain and suffering. They may do so by asserting that the victim “brought it on him- or herself”, or by attributing their harmful actions to external constraints. The use of either of these psychological mechanisms (i.e., denying the victim's consequences or one’s responsibility for them) reduces the perpetrator’s guilt and threat to moral identity. Yet, as is the case with revenge, these are unilateral mechanisms to remove the identity-related threats and emotional barriers on the road to end conflict. The victim is the passive recipient of the perpetrator’s construal of their actions as harmless or themselves as blameless and because of this social distancing is unlikely to facilitate reconciliation. The interactive alternative of the apology-forgiveness cycle removes the emotional and need-related barriers to reconciliation for both victims and perpetrators simultaneously. It is therefore likely to encourage readiness for reconciliation. This act of social exchange allows victims and perpetrators to reconcile by moving beyond victimhood and moral inferiority, respectively.

The Interactive Alternative: The Need-Based Model of the Apology-Forgiveness Cycle. The Need-Based Model of Reconciliation is a systematic account of the apology-forgiveness cycle which is at the heart of the process of socio-emotional reconciliation. The basic idea of the model is that as a consequence of conflict victims and perpetrators suffer threats to different dimensions of their identity, and that the amelioration of these differential threats, through the apology-forgiveness cycle, promotes socio-emotional reconciliation. Until this has occurred, these threats to identity act as barriers to reconciliation. The apology-forgiveness cycle represents an interactive removal of threats to the parties’ identities. From this perspective, the apology-forgiveness cycle is viewed as an act of social exchange in

which each party provides to its adversary the psychological resources that ameliorate the specific threat to its identity. In the following sections we provide a more detailed account of this process, which is summarized in Figure 1, describe studies which support it and discuss its theoretical and applied implications.

INSERT FIGURE 1

The Needs Based Model of Reconciliation consists of three consecutive levels of predictions: (1) Victims experience a threat to their identity as powerful social actors and perpetrators experience a threat to their identity as moral social actors; therefore (2) perpetrators seek information that others accept them and view them as moral whereas victims seek power and acknowledgement of the injustice done to them. The frustration of these needs leads to feelings of moral inferiority or powerlessness which constitute barriers to reconciliation. Finally, (3) messages of social acceptance and empowerment will satisfy the perpetrators' and victims' emotional needs, respectively, and will therefore be linked to greater willingness to reconcile with one's adversary. The apology-forgiveness cycle represents a social interaction which satisfies the psychological needs of victims and perpetrators. When the perpetrator apologizes by admitting responsibility for past wrongdoings this gives the victim the power to grant or withhold forgiveness. This restores to the victim the power and self-control which had been taken from them during the victimization episode. The indication that the victim understands the circumstances which had drove the perpetrator to commit wrongdoings and that they forgive them for these wrongdoings implies to perpetrators that they are no longer viewed as immoral and bad and should not be concerned about being socially excluded by the victim or the community. Thus, the successful completion of the apology-forgiveness allows the

victim and perpetrator to move beyond the emotional barriers of powerlessness and moral inferiority and this raises their willingness to reconcile.

We have recently set out to validate the 3 consecutive layers of hypotheses of the Need-Based Model in the context of interpersonal relations (Shnabel & Nadler, 2006). To test the hypotheses that a victimization episode threatens different psychological dimensions for victims and perpetrators, and that this threat results in different needs, we devised an experimental situation in which half of the participants were randomly assigned to the role of victims and the other half to the role of perpetrators. Following this induction, we measured participants' sense of power and moral image (i.e., their perceptions of others' view of them as moral or not). We compared the reactions of participants in the victim-perpetrator dyad to those of participants in a relevant control dyad in which participants experienced unequal power relations in terms of control and success, but there was no direct victimization episode.

The findings supported the hypothesis that following victimization episodes victims suffer a decrease in their sense of power and perpetrators suffer a decrease in their ratings of moral image. Consistent with the model's predictions, the decrease in perpetrators' ratings of moral image was associated with a parallel increase in need for social acceptance which found expression in a greater wish that the victims would understand their perspective and indicate their view of them as decent people. In line with predictions, following a victimization episode victims express a greater need for power and justice (i.e., that perpetrators would acknowledge that victims had been unduly wronged). It should be noted that this support for the model's predictions was obtained in an experiment in which the roles of victim and perpetrator were experimentally induced in the same context. This is the first experiment, known to us,

which has accomplished this. Past experimental research explored victims' reactions to victimization and could not therefore provide experimental answers to hypotheses regarding the dynamics of victim-perpetrator interactions.

To increase the external validity of these findings we sought to replicate them in real life settings. To this end we had participants to recall a personal episode in which they had either hurt a significant other or had been hurt by them. Thus, we induced people to enter the perpetrator or the victim role in a real life interpersonal context. Subsequently, we asked them to rate their sense of power and their moral image in the conflict episode, as well as their need for power, justice and social acceptance with the antagonist. The findings replicate the results of the experiment described earlier. Participants who had thought about themselves as victims had lower ratings of power and expressed greater need for justice and power than those who had thought about themselves as perpetrators. On the other hand, those who had been induced to think about themselves as perpetrators had lower ratings of moral image (i.e., their ratings of others' view of them as more or less moral) and expressed greater need for acceptance than those who had been induced to think about themselves as victims. The empirical consistency of the patterns across the two studies provides external validity to the model's predictions that a victimization episode threatens different dimensions in the perpetrator's and victim's identities and that these threats result in different psychological needs.

In the next phase of our research program we moved to examine the model's claim that victims' readiness to reconcile with the adversary is enhanced by the satisfaction of their need for power, and that perpetrators' readiness to reconcile is enhanced by the satisfaction of their need for acceptance. In the first test of this hypothesis we again used an experiment in which participants had been randomly

assigned to the role of victim or perpetrator. Participants then received a message from their counterpart which included either an element of empowerment (i.e., that they were viewed as competent) or social acceptance (i.e., that they are viewed as sociable). Our model predicts that because a message of empowerment responds to the victims' need for power it will increase their willingness to reconcile while a message of acceptance, which responds to the perpetrators' need for acceptance, will increase their willingness to reconcile. The findings supported these predictions. A message of empowerment restored victims' sense of power and thus increased their willingness to reconcile more than a message of acceptance, which did not affect participants' sense of power, whereas a message of acceptance restored perpetrators' moral image and thus increased their willingness to reconcile more than a message of empowerment, which did not affect participants' moral image. In a subsequent study we replicated these findings with reactions to a vignette which described a victimization episode in which a waitron's request not to work on a certain shift is declined by his superior.

In a final study in this research program we sought to examine the full range of the model's predictions by measuring individuals' sense of power, moral image and willingness to reconcile *before* and *after* they had received a message of empowerment or acceptance from an adversary. Participants were asked to read a vignette which described an event in which the protagonist discovered that their position in an organization, which was an attractive one, had been taken over by a fellow worker. Half of the participants were asked to assume the role of the perpetrator (i.e., the person who had taken the job) and the other half were asked to assume the role of the victim (i.e., the worker who had lost it). Immediately following this participants were asked to fill out the first set of dependent measures. Consistent

with the previous findings we found that perpetrators felt greater threat to their moral image and had a greater need for social acceptance than did victims, who experienced a greater threat to their sense of power and expressed greater need for power and justice. Following this, participants received the second part of the vignette, in which they learned that the antagonist in the story made a verbal statement which consisted of expressions of empowerment or acceptance for the protagonist. Following this, the second set of dependent measures was administered again. Importantly, and in line with the model's predictions, the increase in victims' sense of power between the first and second administration was higher in the empowerment than acceptance condition; accordingly, their willingness to reconcile was higher in the empowerment than in the acceptance condition. For perpetrators, on the other hand, the increase in their moral image and willingness to reconcile was higher in the acceptance than in the empowerment condition.

Although there is no direct examination of the model's assertions in the context of intergroup conflict, the recent findings of Nadler and Liviatan (2006) on the effects of intergroup apologies suggest indirect support for the model in such contexts. In that study Israeli participants read statements by a Palestinian leader which included an expression of empathy with Israel's conflict-related sufferings, an acceptance of responsibility for having caused them, both, or neither. The findings indicate that, in the presence of trust in the adversary, expressions of empathy, but not acceptance of responsibility, led to greater willingness by Israeli participants to reconcile with Palestinians. When viewed within the Need- Based Model these findings may reflect the different power positions of Israelis and Palestinians. Since Israelis are viewed as the more powerful party they are also likely to be viewed as the perpetrators of wrongdoings, and the Palestinians, who are the weaker party, are

likely to be viewed as the victims. The finding that Israeli participants' willingness for reconciliation was affected by expressions of empathy is consistent with the model's assertion that perpetrators' willingness to reconcile is facilitated by messages of social acceptance. When the victim expresses empathy with the perpetrator's pains they also implicitly convey a message that they accept them as similar human beings who also suffer from conflict-related pains. Such expressions of empathy by the victims re-humanize the perpetrators and render them as individuals who have committed bad acts, rather than bad and immoral people. The Need-Based Model of reconciliation suggests that the weaker party in the conflict, which is also likely to experience itself as the victim, will be more ready to reconcile after receiving a message which contains an acceptance of responsibility for past wrongdoings than after a message which expresses empathy to their suffering. Placed within the context of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, this suggests that Palestinians will be more ready to reconcile after Israelis have accepted their responsibility for wrongdoings committed against Palestinians. This hypothesis needs to be empirically validated.

>From a broader perspective, the above indicates the importance of considering differential power positions of the two adversarial groups when analyzing processes of socio-emotional reconciliation. In fact, the route for socio-emotional reconciliation is different for the stronger and weaker parties. The weaker party, which is likely to view itself as the victim, has a higher need for power and justice and the stronger party, which is likely to view itself as the perpetrator, has a higher need for acceptance and empathy. Although this possibility has not been put to the direct scrutiny of social psychological investigation, some anecdotal evidence seems to support its validity. During the Camp David 2000 peace discussions the Palestinian delegation was very adamant that the Israeli government accept responsibility for the

suffering of the Palestinians from 1948 onward. The Israelis were equally adamant in their refusal to do so (Ross, 2004). Viewed within the context of the present discussion this discourse can be seen as representing the weaker side (i.e., the Palestinians) demand that the stronger side (i.e., Israelis) admits a "moral debt" which would make the weaker side more equal. The Israeli refusal to do so can be explained as reflecting their fear that admission of responsibility for past wrongdoings would not be reciprocated by empathy with their own predicament and subsequent forgiveness and acceptance. They, so it seems, were concerned that their apology would not be the first step towards the conclusion of a successful apology-forgiveness cycle, but rather a springboard for further demands and accusations.

Before we close we should note that our discussion of processes of socio-emotional reconciliation and the Need-Based Model are based on an assumption of a clear distinction between perpetrators and victims. Yet, such a clear-cut distinction was intended for conceptual clarity and does not reflect the reality of conflicts. In the real world some conflicts end with a clear consensus on who is the victim and who is the perpetrator but many do not. Two examples for the first category are the Second World War which ended with a consensus that the Nazi regime had been the perpetrator and the conflict between Whites and Blacks in South-Africa which ended with a consensus that the system of apartheid regime and its officers were the perpetrators. The Israeli-Palestinian conflict may be a representative example of the second category. A number of scholars writing on this conflict have suggested that in this conflict both parties claim the role of "victim" (Maoz & Bar-On, 2002). Under these conditions of "double victimhood" processes of socio-emotional reconciliation are more difficult. Since both parties view themselves as the victims they regard the other as the perpetrator who is responsible for initiating the apology-forgiveness cycle

by admitting responsibility for past wrongdoings. This is likely to lead to an impasse and an inability to move forward on the path of socio-emotional reconciliation. One way in which this trap of “double victimhood” may be broken is for both parties to recognize what social psychology has taught us for decades: Viewing oneself as a victim or perpetrator is a psychological construal that may change across time and situational contexts. Such a realization will allow both parties to view themselves as victim and perpetrator and encourage the initiation of a simultaneous and reciprocal apology-forgiveness cycles in which each party admits wrongdoings and grants forgiveness to its former adversary.

We do not propose that the adoption of the principles of the Need-Based Model of Reconciliation will dramatically alter the reality of intergroup conflicts. We realize the multi-causal and complex nature of protracted intergroup conflicts such as the one that exists between Israelis and Palestinians. Yet, our model highlights the need to attend to the different psychological needs of the adversaries. Such a differential attention is likely to increase our sensitivity to what each of the adversaries desires and results in better understanding of processes of intergroup reconciliation.

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	Socio-Emotional Reconciliation	Instrumental Reconciliation
Target of Change	A secure, equal and worthy <u>identity</u> of each party	A trustworthy <u>relationships</u> between the parties
Nature of Change	<u>Revolutionary</u> change which occurs relatively instantaneously after the successful completion of the apology-forgiveness cycle	<u>Evolutionary</u> change which consists of gradual learning over multiple projects of cooperation to trust one's adversary
Temporal Focus of Change	The key to a reconciled future lies in addressing the infliction of pain of humiliation during the <u>past of conflict</u>	Repetitive events of cooperation in the <u>present</u> are the key to a reconciled future.
The Goal of Reconciliation	<u>Integration</u> of the adversarial parties into a single social unit with a "we feeling". More characteristic of intra-societal conflicts	<u>Separation</u> between the adversarial parties so that they can co-exist in a conflict-free environment.

Table 1: Differential Emphases in Socio-emotional and Instrumental Reconciliation

Figure 1

The Needs-Based Model of Reconciliation