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# Inter-bureau power relations; a sociological analysis of an ideal type organizational model

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Title:   Inter-Bureau Power Relations:  A Sociological Analysis of an

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APPROVED BY MEMBERS OF THE THESIS COMMITTEE:

Joseph F. Jones, Chairman

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The research problem of this thesis is an examination of inter-
bureau power relations.  A modification of Max Weber's classical ideal
type bureaucracy is the conceptual model to which sociological analysis
is made.  An empirical examination of the variance between the con-
ceptual model and data collected in the field is analyzed in order to
illustrate inter-bureau power relations.  The analysis of the conceptual
model is based upon three assertions.  They are:  (1) inter-bureau
power relations are based upon coercion and not cooperation; (2) norm-
ative standards that are established by the administrators of the
bureaucracy are differentially enforced; and (3) goals that are established

by the administrators of the bureaucracy are subject to distortion.

Participant-observation and casual interviewing techniques were the methods employed to collect data pertaining to the nature of inter-bureau power relations over a nine month period. The research problem lent itself to a qualitative approach in that the data were largely subjective and required recording over a period of time. The data collected were primarily a result of participant-observation conducted while an employee of the bureaucracy studied. Additional information was collected and analyzed from documents related to the functioning of the bureaucracy. Permission was sought and received, from the bureaucracy and related organizations studied, to use the data collected.

This study found that the Weberian styled conceptual model, representing the authority hierarchy of the bureaucracy studied, was theoretically based upon cooperation, rationality, logic and equalitarian principles. Maintaining the Weberian styled authority hierarchy had become ideology to the administrators of the bureaucracy. The existence and operation of this particular hierarchy was made a matter of public record, thus satisfying the political aspects of public accountability. However, it was found that there were other organizational hierarchies that the administrators of the bureaucracy utilized in performing the operational functions of the bureaucracy. For the purposes of this thesis the "other" authority hierarchies were known as working models. The authority hierarchies of the working models seems to be operationally based upon the concepts of coercion, differential enforcement of normative standards, and distortion of administrators'

goals. A unique characteristic of the working models was that they were quasi-secret, and virtually no public records were kept of their existence of operation.

INTER-BUREAU POWER RELATIONS: A SOCIOLOGICAL

ANALYSIS OF AN IDEAL TYPE

ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL

by

GERALD WAYNE POTTERF

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
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August 12, 1971

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CHAPTER I

A THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVE

Introduction

The purpose of this thesis is to critically examine inter-bureau

power relations of a specific bureaucracy.[1] (Inter-bureau power rela-

tions refers to the relationship maintained between bureaus[1] that form

a single bureaucracy on the basis of super and subordination). A refine-

ment of Max Weber's classical presentation of the ideal type is created

in order to establish a conceptual frame of reference for this study.

This frame of reference is designated the "Weberian ideal type model"

(see Faris, 1966:980 on the use of conceptual models in sociological

analysis). This model provides the conceptual structure for analysis

of organizational inter-bureau power relations. Initially, four asser-

tions are discussed in a critical analysis of the modified Weberian

ideal type model (a discussion of this model is contained in Chapter II).

This discussion is followed by an empirical examination of an actual

bureau in an attempt to illustrate the variance between the Weberian

model and the empirical example. The findings of this examination are

presented in a subsequent chapter.

Methodology

For the purposes of this study the term bureaucracy, or complex

_____

1. Terms are defined below.

organization, refers to an administrative structure composed of separate agencies or bureaus which are managed by sets of officials on a super and subordination basis. Within a bureaucracy the term bureau denotes a component agency that has a fixed position on a hierarchical scale that is managed by its own set of officials; a subdivision of a bureaucracy.

With the title of "Assistant Director for Citizen Participation"[1] for the McCannville Development Commission (MDC)[1], I was afforded a "ring side seat" in the observation and participation of the exercise of formal and informal power in the citizen participation realm of urban renewal. As an employee of the MDC, my duties included the receiving and understanding of the formal public goals of the Commission and the proposed formal method of achieving goals. I found that while formally claiming an organizational structure that I have designated the Weberian ideal type model, the organization was forced to informally modify its formal authority hierarchy to achieve its formal goals (Becker, 1970:14).

I found that the participant-observation and casual interviewing techniques have several drawbacks. Primarily, data were collected in a nonstandardized way, thus making statistical type treatment and analysis of information very difficult (Doby, 1954). Consequently, I had to depend on a more impressionistic interpretation of some of the data in order to make generalizations, thus potentially allowing bias to change the impression of emerging data (Doby, 1959). In reference

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1. Fictitious name.

to the participant-observation method, Eugene Webb, et al., (1966:113) in his, Unobtrusive Measures, suggested that, " . . . no matter how well integrated an observer becomes we feel he is still an element of potential bias." Thus, Webb's position was that an "observer may select-ively expose himself to data, or selectively perceive it . . ." As a researcher utilizing the participant-observer technique, I felt Webb's point was well taken. The greatest area for bias in this study is what M. W. Riley (Faris, 1966:1001) referred to as "the limitation to a specific role." As the "Assistant Director for Citizen Participation" for the MDC I was confined to a specific role, and it was from that role that most of the data for this thesis were collected. In an attempt to "counter-act" bias, informants were used to supply additional inform-ation and to confirm previously held notions, thereby acting as a check on potential distortions (Dean, 1954). Informants were used throughout this study, via the casual interview technique. Also, documents, minutes of meetings, memorandums, letters, etc., were collected on the basis of their pertinence to the study. Thus, a check system was devel-oped to curb the effects of bias in interpretation of data. The parti-cipant-observation portion of this study was conducted over a nine month period, February,1970, through September,1970.

The theoretical perspectives for the interpretation of the data were primarily a result of a library search. The books and periodicals listed in the selected bibliography were chosen because of their seeming pertinence to the problem.

Permission was sought and received from the bureaus and organizations involved in this study to use data collected from them.

## The Problem

The administrators of some formal organizations appear to have adopted a form of administrative hierarchy that can be conceptualized as a modification of Weber's ideal type bureaucracy. The formal organization of some of these bureaucracies seem to follow Weber's description of an authority hierarchy, based upon super and subordinate relationships. I assert that the reality of inter-bureau power relations is somewhat different.

My first assertion is that coercion, not Weber's concept of cooperation, serves to integrate bureaucratic elements that form the functional processes of a bureaucracy (Etzioni, 1961b). This is demonstrated by an authority hierarchy based upon super and subordinate relationships of one bureau (in a chain of bureaus or within a bureaucracy) to another. Rules, "files", laws and regulations, etc., are not established to insure efficiency of goal attainment _per_ _se_, but are established as rigid boundaries and strong coercive measures to prevent the exercise of power and decision making at certain bureaucratic levels. Thus, rules, laws and regulations provide a sanctioning base for those individuals not performing to predetermined expectations. Further, employee ratings and recommendations for promotions are not in reality based upon job knowledge or particular skill, but based upon the employee's ability and willingness to "play-the-game," and as a method to coerce those not overtly "cooperating" to so do. The role of these mechanisms is not indicative of voluntary or cooperative integration of bureaucratic elements, but a demonstration of the expectation that employees may not cooperate and thereby require rigid control.

My second assertion is that the normative standards established

by the administration of a bureaucracy are differentially enforced
within bureaus of a given bureaucracy. By way of illustration, the
administration of bureau D (the lowest level bureau in a four level
bureaucracy) may be expected to perform certain established duties
regularly by the administration of bureau A (the highest administrative
bureau in the bureaucracy), while the directors of bureau A might require
another of its subordinate bureaus to take only cursory notice of the
same required duties. Thus, the existence of uniform normative standards
throughout the bureaucracy allows bureau A, via arbitrary use of sanc-
tioning power, to control its subordinate bureaus. The administrators
of subordinate bureaus may violate certain standards with the knowledge
of the director of bureau A, but the leaders of bureau A retain the
optional ability to apply sanctions to their subordinate bureaus for
those violations. Thus, the directors of bureau A by arbitrary use of
authority over their subordinate bureaus greatly disrupt  the authority
hierarchy of A to B to C to D. This practice is continued on the
bureau level as well by the supervisors of individual bureaus.

My third assertion is that goals established by the directors
of bureau A are subject to distortion and manipulation while being
"passed down" through the various administrations of subordinate
bureaus, while the communication relating to the achievement of the
goals tends to support the original goals intent, as the report of
accomplishment passes back up the chain of bureaus to the directors
of bureau A. Thus the administrators of bureau A tend to believe that
much of the original goal has been achieved; the "boss gets what he
wants to hear."

CHAPTER II

REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE

## Weber's Classic Bureaucratic Model

Weber's theoretical analysis of the ideal type bureaucratic struc-
ture has been criticized by some contemporary sociologists (Dahrendorf,
1959; Thompson, 1961; Udy, 1959) for only examining its formal char-
acteristics and ignoring the modifications that occur in actual practice.
My purpose here is not to add still more criticism of the Weberian
bureaucratic model, but to illustrate Weber's ideal model as it pertains
to inter-bureaucratic power relations and specifically that part of the
Weberian model which relates to the authority hierarchy. The relation-
ship of Weber's ideal structure to actual working models will be dis-
cussed in the following sections of this paper.

Victor Thompson (1961:12) suggests that Weber equates the devel-
opment of modern bureaucracy to the evolution of society; that is,
modern organizations have evolved from earlier forms by incorporating
advancing specialization:

> In an earlier period organizations could depend much more on
> the "line of command." The superior could tell others what to
> do because he could master the knowledge and techniques neces-
> sary to do so intelligently. As science and technology devel-
> oped, the supervisor lost to experts the ability to command in
> one field after another, but retained the right as part of the
> role.

Technology, combined with the ever increasing complexity of admin-
istration, has greatly modified the supervisor's role. He has maintained

his power and authority through his "office," but has been forced to
rely on specialized staffs or experts for technical knowledge and pro-
blem solving strategy. (The term "office," in this case, may be defined
as a designated position within a bureau or bureaucracy that is highly
defined in terms of duties and responsibilities, and is located on a
vertical scale of super and subordination.) Defined areas of authority
are well marked in modern bureaucracies, dividing the right to make a
decision from the ability to do so. Thus the authority hierarchy is
maintained and relationships of super and subordination are perpetuated.
Crucial to Weber's position is that authority, representing the right
to issue orders and expect them to be obeyed, is inherent in the office
(Peabody, 1964). The office, by its strategic placement and desig-
nation within a bureau or bureaucracy, represents power and authority
that is inherent in the structure of the organization, thus in Weberian
terms, it is definable as formal, rational and impersonal.

Peter Blau (1955:226) offers a useful differentiation between
power and authority:

> The distinctive feature of authority is that normative con-
> straints affect compliance with directives. The fact that a
> person compels others to do his bidding by employing coercion
> or sanctions or threats is prima facia evidence that he does
> not have authority over them in respect to the conduct he
> seeks to bring about.

Individuals occupy the office and consequently wield the power of that
office. The amount of power and authority then is regulated by the
position that the office occupies within the bureaucratic hierarchy.
The officeholder is appointed by a superior within the organization to
hold a specific office. This appointment is theoretically based upon
tenure, ability and merit. Thus, qualities of charisma and leadership

tend to play a secondary role in the selection of a new officeholder.
Weber (1968:956) states that:

> Although managerial ideology still strongly contains the char-
> ismatic image, bureaucratic organizations seek to avoid dependence
> upon individuals by reducing relevant information to classes, and
> organizational activity to routines which are activated when the
> appropriate class of information is perceived.

Consequently, with the advance of specialization a greater stress

on departmentalization and routinization of work activity has been

created. The structure of a bureaucracy is manifested as a department-

alization of offices within a hierarchy in which each office has a

place in a table or organization, a vertical hierarchical position in

which the office is subordinate to another office(s). This placement

of individuals within offices of the formally categorized structure

becomes what Weber (1968) calls "the principle of official jurisdictional

areas," which is generally ordered by rules, laws and administrative

regulations. The bureau, within a bureaucracy, is highly departmental-

ized, with each individual occupying a specific designated position

within a department or unit. For each position there are official duties

assigned, designated authority lines, and methodical provision established

for carrying out rules and regulations (Weber, 1968). The formality of

this system is manifested by a means of a more or less complicated social

ritual which by its nature symbolizes and supports the "pecking order" of

various offices (Etzioni, 1961:47).

> Such formality, which is integrated with the distribution of
> authority within the system, serves to minimize friction by
> largely restricting (official) contact to modes which are pre-
> viously defined by the rules of the organization.

Thus the Weberian principle of office hierarchy and the channel-

ization of communication within it, clearly establishes a system of

super and subordination. The methodology of inter-bureau communication is a highly controlled and regularized phenomenon. With established rules, laws and regulations routinizing and categorizing communication the hierarchical structure is reinforced, as options and decisions of individuals become sanctionable for noncompliance with established procedures. This sanctioning process is based in part upon written documents (the "files") which are preserved in their original form and provide a managerial base. These documents provide a focal point for the exercise of authority by supervisors within a bureau. That is, "the files" provide regularized guidelines for office procedure, and a nonpersonalized base for sanctioning deviancy from the established routines. A supervisor has the option of saying, "it's nothing personal, but you know the rules." The supervisor is only supporting the established system of laws and regulations and is somewhat protected by the formal appearance of objectivity in this decision making process, an appearance formulated by this "screening" function of bureaucratic rules (Gouldner, 1954:163).

Weber's ideal bureaucracy is elaborated in Figure I. The solid arrows represent lines of authority on a superordinate basis—while broken arrows represent the channels of communication.

Bureaucracy XY is represented by four separate bureaus in a relationship of super and subordination. That is, bureau A is superordinate to bureaus B, C, and D; while B is subordinate to A, it is superordinate to C and D, and so on, leaving bureau D subordinate to all and superordinate to none. Formal communication between the bureaus follows the authority hierarchy, thus performing both hierarchy reinforcing

FIGURE I

WEBER'S IDEAL TYPE BUREAUCRACY

Bureaucracy XY

and boundary maintenance functions.

Maintenance of the hierarchy is accomplished through the establishment of laws, rules and regulations. Bureau A, the head agency, maintains the superior position in the realm of inter-bureaucratic power relations in which it has overriding authority over subordinate bureaus. However, bureau B, while subordinate to A's dictums, also may require bureaus C and D to comply with its standards and rules, and C likewise in relation to D. D remains subordinate to bureaus A, B and C and consequently is obliged to comply with their requirements. Thus, while subordinate bureaus may not disregard or veto regulations established by superordinate bureaus, they may add additional requirements or regulations for subordinate bureaus and expect compliance.

Once it is fully established, a bureaucracy is among the social institutions which are the hardest to change. Bureaucracy has developed as an effective instrument for institutionalizing power relationships. Consequently, a system of rationally organized reasons stands behind every act of a bureaucratic administration. The more the bureaucracy is "dehumanized" (or the more "rational"), the more it succeeds in eliminating from official business, love, hatred, and all purely personal, irrational, and emotional elements which escape calculation. In Weberian terms, this is the specific nature of bureaucracy, and its special virtue.

## A Critical Analysis

The Role of Coercion in Inter-Bureau Power Relations. Crucial to the description of the Weberian authoritarian hierarchy is the assumption that compliance is based upon cultural values, societal norms, and associational roles (Nisbet, 1970). Therefore, the system of super and

subordination is viewed as legitimate in the minds of the organization's

actors in light of the societal socialization process. Consequently,

in theory, the actors within a bureaucracy spontaneously and willingly

"obey those authorities in which they can sense, however dimly, even

subconsciously, their legitimacy" (Nisbit, 1970:140). Here the argu-

ment becomes somewhat circular in that authority is made legitimate

"by the mores, by all the customs and folkways with which authority is

commonly surrounded" (Nisbit, 1970:140). In short, Weber posits that

bureaucratic systems are systems that assume cooperation and integration

of their composite elements, rather than the coercion of them.

Upon examination of inter-bureau power relations, both theoretically

and analytically, I found that the formal or public presentation of a

bureaucracy generally followed the Weberian model. Organizational and

manpower charts nominally supported the Weberian theory to near per-

fection, while designs of communication systems formally support and

illustrate the super and subordinate channels of authority. Laws,

rules, regulation and the "files" are additional written evidence of

the applicability of the Weberian model.

My review of the mechanisms through which bureaucratic authority

is exercised however; demonstrates an informal system of coercion and

blatant authoritarianism that is far more influential in inter-bureau-

cratic power relationships than in Weber's formal model.

The nature of bureaucracy itself is based upon the concept not

of cooperation, but of coercion, in that a hierarchy of authority is

established in order to have maximum control over subordinates. Con-

sequently, "bureaucratic authority is based not on devotion to the

supervisor or respect for him as a person, but on an adaptation neces-
sitated by his power (Blau, 1955:226)."

With these concepts in mind, one becomes aware of the conservative
nature of bureaucracies. The authority hierarchy is not necessarily
designed to achieve goals, but instead serves the function of pun-
ishing those individuals failing to comply with established procedures.
Thus, it would seem that bureaucracy is not generally designed for
achievement or goal attainment, but for the prevention of failure of
the bureaucratic system.

> The advancement chance of officials and even their chances
> to keep their civil service jobs depend on the rating they
> periodically receive from their supervisor. Such an imper-
> sonal dependency creates anxieties and frustrations for most
> adults, and thus the need for adaptation (Blau, 1955:219).

Thus, what would overtly appear to be voluntary obedience to the
supervisor, is in reality instigated through coercion (job security).
The subordinates' concern with his supervisor's opinion provides the
supervisor with informal sanctions, since supervisory praise or blame
becomes significant for every member of the group. Additionally, the
supervisory practice of rewards and punishments for subordinates demon-
strates that the supervisor does not expect unconditional obedience of
his directives. A system of rewards and punishments within such a
highly organized institution is clearly an example of the coercive
nature of the supervisory aspect of bureaucracy, because one generally
can only be "rewarded" for compliance with organizational directives
established by the bureaucratic officials. Reward is achieved through
maximum compliance--while punishment tends to be illustrative of failure
to comply with organizational directives.

A further illustration of the negative and coercive nature of

bureaucracy was reported by Thompson (1961:15):

> Hierarchical relations overemphasize the veto and under-
> emphasize approval of innovation. Since there is no appeal
> from the supervisor's decision, a veto usually ends the matter.
> However, an approval will often go to the next higher level
> where it is again subject to veto.

The consequence of this particular authoritarian mentality is
the suppression of innovation and deviancy and the promotion of "status
quoism."

The following list of tactics available to supervisors as control
devices is adapted from Downs (1966:144):

1. The creation, development and implementation of rules and
   regulation. This has the ffect of reducing discretionary
   decision making by subordinates.

2. "Development of distortion proof message codes for instruc-
   tion." This reduces the subordinate option of saying, "I
   didn't understand what I was supposed to do."

3. "Development of objective measures of performance."

4. "Checking out proposed directives in advance with subordin-
   ates to insure that no extraordinary resistance will occur."

The first three of these measures are designed to reduce subordin-
ates discretionary powers, hence instilling rigidity into the organi-
zation.

A further method of control is the requirement of keeping written
reports of transactions and performances, which provide supervisors with
a means of exerting control over their subordinates. These reports have
three major purposes:

1. They inform high-level officials about what is happening
   in the lower levels of the bureaucracy.

2. The necessity of preparing periodic reports serves to re-
   mind each subordinate that he must meet certain standards
   of performance.

3. The _fear_ of punishment for failure to meet those standards

> encourages him to carry out desired performances or at
> least report having done so (Downs, 1966:144).

The third point is perhaps the most critical one for the purposes of this paper--"the fear of punishment for failure to meet those standards" is clearly indicative of the coercive nature of the bureaucratic hierarchy. The subordinate is not willingly complying to a supervisor's directive; he may be coerced into doing so by the threat of sanctions. As Blau (1955) suggests, the ultimate source of bureaucratic authority is the official power of sanction, externally bestowed.

One of the most widespread and complex devices employed by a bureaucracy to control subordinate agencies is separate monitoring organizations.

The purpose of the external monitoring service is to determine the extent to which compliance to established procedures is being maintained. Thus, the monitoring service is another mechanism for the maintenance of the status quo nature of the bureaucracy by the discovering and reporting areas of noncompliance, thereby providing still another basis for issuing sanctions.

Bureaucratic rules are particularly illustrative of the coercive nature of bureaucratic hierarchies. Rules comprise a functional equivalent for direct, personally given orders. Like direct orders, rules specify the obligation of the worker; hence, rules serve to narrow the subordinates area of discretion. Subordinate's have fewer options concerning what they may or may not do, and the area of "privilege" is crowded out by the growing area of "obligation" (Gouldner, 1954:163). The public nature of rules enables deviancy to be detected by any supervisor, thus enlarging the informational channels open to the heads of

bureaus and in turn enabling them to keep their own subordinates in line (Gouldner, 1954:163). Official sanctions normally occur within the framework of these pre-existing rules of the organization. Rules, then form both a potential sanctioning base for supervisors and also represent boundaries of obligatory behavior.

What has been discussed to this point is the reality of bureaucratic power relations. Of some sociological significance is the degree of divergence between the formal public presentation of the bureaucratic power structure compared to the informal or real nature of the organization. In the public presentation of its organizational structure, the bureaucracy appears to be rational, equalitarian, and just, with its authority hierarchy established as being both legitimate and humane. Efforts are instigated by "top-level" management to promote this image both internally and externally. Continual propagandizement of the ideal model to the actors within the bureaucracy and to the society at large performs the function of making any deviancy from the ideal model seem to be only a local or isolated problem, and therefore, not ubiquitous to the system itself. However, an examination of the mechanisms by which a bureaucracy operates has revealed a rigidly authoritarian and coercive structure. Its nature relies on power relations rather than cooperation for its functioning; consequently a bureaucracy is oriented towards "status quoism" rather than achievement and innovation.

Differential Enforcement of Rules and Regulations. Differential enforcement of rules and regulations will be discussed on both the inter-bureaucratic and bureaucratic levels.

Normative standards, as manifested through organizational rules
and regulations, may receive differential enforcement between the
bureaus of a single bureaucracy. That is, action agency D, at the
bottom of the model (see Figure I, p. 13), might be expected to perform
certain universally required duties by A, the "head" bureau, while A
might require subordinate bureau B only to take cursory notice. The
existence of normative standards allows A to control, via sanctioning
power, its subordinate bureaus. Bureaus B, C and D may violate certain
standards with the knowledge of A, but A retains the optional ability
to sanction its subordinate bureaus for those violations (Blau, 1955).
The result of this overriding authority is a significant compromise
of the ideal model. In that A may sanction B, C, or D without using
designated channels of A to B to C to D, likewise, B may exercise the
same option in regard to C and D, as illustrated in Figure II.

Bureau B, represented by the black bar, may or may not maintain
the same relationship to bureaus C and D, depending upon the discretion
of A.

Bureaus C and D in this model have the same informal and formal
authority and communication channel because of their placement within
the hierarchy.

The solid bar and arrows on the left of the figure represent
the actual or informal authority and communication channels that
bureau A has the option to exercise in an attempt to assure inter-
bureaucratic compliance with normative standards. This model illustrates
a violation of its counter-part, the ideal model, in that the powers of
subordinate bureaus are usurped by bureau A by by-passing them in an
attempt to deal directly with all levels of the bureaucracy.

FIGURE II.

A WORKING MODEL

Bureaucracy XY

It should be noted that this is an example of how one working
model may operate within Bureaucracy XY, and is not meant to be the
exclusive working model of the bureaucracy. As circumstances and events
evolve within the bureaucracy, the working model also tends to adjust
to the changing situations.

Differential enforcement of normative standards (rules and regu-
lations) is perhaps most obvious within a single bureau because the super-
visor is responsible for all operations within his department and is
consequently reliant to some degree on the cooperation of his subordin-
ates. The fact that he may occasionally yield to some of their collect-
ive demands indicates that the group can exert some influence over
his decisions. These concessions however, tend to furnish him with
discretionary sanctions and create social obligations which extend his
power and establish his authority over every individual subordinate.
As a result, his authority is validated through social interaction
which enables him to control his subordinates much more effectively
than they control him (Blau, 1955).

According to Blau (1955:214),when a new supervisor takes over a
department there is an initial period of leniency which allows the
supervisor to:

1. Use subordinates' first names in order to foster cordial
   relations.

2. Never issue commands.

3. Always make polite requests.

4. Explain reasons for directions.

5. Show willingness to rescind directives if subordinates
   desire it.

6. Demonstrate willingness to help subordinates "get ahead."

7. Permit subordinates to break minor rules.

The rationale of the above techniques is to create social obligations of subordinates to the supervisor. Thus, toleration and leniency toward exceptional or even illicit practices will actually enhance the power of a supervisor, i.e. a rule that is regularly broken extends the discretionary power of the supervisor, because it furnishes him with a base through which he can issue legitimate sanctions when he sees fit.

> By voluntarily relinquishing some of his prerogatives, the supervisor created social obligations. His requests for cooperation when he could issue orders, his promises for future help, his toleration of prohibited practices and special favors for agents, his references to his identification with them and his considerate manner--all these serve to obligate his subordinates to him (Blau, 1955:215).

Ideally then, the supervisors appear to be somewhat altruistic in their approaches to management, supporting their subordinates whenever possible, but in reality this support is manifested in the control the supervisor gains over his subordinates by creating social and personal obligations to himself.

Inter-Bureaucratic Distortion of Goals. The formal public function of all the activities within a bureaucratic hierarchy is the achievement of goals. Ideally, the organization is structured for the "effective" accomplishment of the purpose. Simply speaking, bureau A is primarily interested in controlling the bureaucracy in order to achieve its goals to the greatest possible extent.

The head of bureau A (theoretically the most powerful individual in the bureaucracy) oversees many policies; consequently he must formulate each one in broad general terms, and does not have time to work out the details. The details, then are left to subordinates to

be worked out. Therefore, the orders of top-level management are al-
most always general in nature (Downs, 1966).

> Top-level officials cannot review everything done by sub-
> ordinates in response to their orders. It might seem, there-
> fore, that they might review the most important responses, or
> those likely to be executed badly. However, if their selection
> for review can be easily forecast, subordinates will have great
> discretion regarding those orders that will not be reviewed.
> This will drastically reduce official control over the organi-
> zation (Tullock, 1965:186).

The meaning of the last passage is significant in that it sug-
gests the need to use coercive methods in order to gain compliance from
subordinates who would not otherwise comply with the orders given them.
The Weberian model posits that bureaucratic activity is both rational
and predictable because the source of authority is located in the
office as opposed to being located within the individuals who occupy
the office (Peabody, 1964). This approach tends to ignore the moti-
vations and attitudes of the human beings working within the organization.

Anthony Downs (1966:135) in his work, Inside Bureaucracy, states
that:

> There are very few orders so precise and unequivocal that
> they cannot be distorted by a factor of 10%; consequently,
> B's orders to his C level subordinates embody only 90% of what
> A originally desired. C level will distort because its goals
> will be different, if only slightly, from A's and B's. If
> similar distortion occurs by the time A's orders get to D
> level they will contain only 53% of A's original goals.

Downs terms this process "authority leakage" and suggests that
it is a common phenomenon when orders are passed down through levels
of a hierarchy, and that this leakage tends to become cumulative when
many levels are involved. What, in reality happens, then, is that
administrators of bureau B believe that a slight distortion of the order
can help him personally, or he may consciously or subconsciously distort

orders so that his bureau will be best benefited. This concept would

logically apply to bureaus C and D as well. A bureaucracy must contend

with not the smooth functioning of the ideal model, but the varying

personalities, abilities, attitudes, memories, images of goals, etc.,

of the individuals who occupy offices within the structure. The

following is an adaptation of a mechanism Downs labels the "basic con-

trol cycle."

1. An official issues a set of orders.

2. He allows his subordinates time to put each order into
   effect.

3. He selects certain orders to evaluate his subordinates
   performances.

4. He seeks to discover what has actually been done at lower
   levels as a result of the orders.

5. He compares the effects of his orders with his original
   intentions.

6. Evaluates results of the order and selects appropriate action.

7. If he elects to issue further orders as a result of his evalu-
   ation, the cycle starts again (Downs, 1966:144).

If the hierarchy functioned as the public formal model suggested,

actual control of the activities of the bureaucracy would be in the

hands of the top-level management. However, those officials must al-

ways delegate some of their power to subordinates; hence the "rub," and

the need for anti-distortion devices to obtain compliance. Individuals

within the organizational structure are subject to the attributes and

failings of humans, and consequently require monitoring, direction, coaching

and must be generally coerced into the proper performance.

Weber suggests that organizations, as problem solving mechanisms,

depend upon factoring of the general goal into subgoals and these sub-
goals into sub-subgoals and so on, until concrete routines are reached
(Thompson, 1961). These subgoals are allocated to the organizational
units or departments and become their goals. This pattern is indicative
of the "order giving" process. That is, in passing orders downward,
subordinate bureaus must translate commands received into more specific
and expanded form. As we have previously discussed, this ideal bureau-
cratic function does not take into account the human element and as a
consequence a system of formal and informal sanctions and rewards has
been created to account for and motivate the human actors.

Bureaucracy in Perspective. Bureaucrats, though publicly and
formally defending and supporting the Weberian model, have had to com-
pensate for that model's inability to cope with daily operational func-
tions by creating an informal "working" model. This informal model may
vary from organization to organization, but one may say, with some
assurance, that it inevitably exists.

Of considerable importance is the latter model, in that it enforces
conformity, and threatens innovation at lower levels as deviancy, thereby
assuring a spirit of benign "status quoism." As Downs (1966:50) posited:

> While the tendency of administration may appear to be benign
> and peaceful, as opposed to turbulence of conflict, it is actually
> violent. It demands compliance; nothing less than compliance
> will do; and it must obtain compliance, by persuasion or manage-
> ment if possible, by repression if necessary.

In essence, the nature of the mechanisms of the actual operation of
a bureaucracy are strongly coercive in demanding compliance to established
procedures, and in Downs' terms this "imposed order [compliance] is
violent."

This concept is further amplified when one considers that the

administration of a bureaucracy rejects the concept of conflict as a

desirable element of society. The administration wants extremes ad-

justed; it wants differences settled; and primarily, it wants to find

a set of procedures that it can use exclusively within the organization.

Whatever or whoever refuses to be adjusted is considered by supervisors

as a deviant, a departure from the norm that must be treated and cured.

Consequently:

> Discipline and control may inhibit initiative and creativ-
> ity on the part of subordinates. They may hesitate to assume
> or go out of their way to avoid responsibility. A worker
> may tell his boss what he thinks his boss wants to hear.
> Despite these potential inhibiting and disruptive consequences,
> authority remains an inevitable aspect of complex organiza-
> tions (Peabody, 1964:10).

In sum, the system that is largely responsible for the adminis-

tration of this country is treating procedure and knowledge as absolute,

and establishing mechanisms of control and operation to insure accpetance

by the actors within the organization. With the advent and rapid adop-

tion of technology and technological change in our society, it would

seem more appropriate to view knowledge and procedure as relative, as

opposed to absolute.

AN EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE

## Introduction

The intent of Chapter III is to present a description of an event

in the urban renewal process on the action agency level. The event,

the selection of a park site, is treated in terms of "what" happened

in this section; while the analysis of the selection process will be

discussed in Chapter IV. Chapter III, then, illustrates an empirical

example of inter-bureau power relations as they are manifested in the

urban renewal process on the bureau level. The relationship to the

Weberian model in a technical sense will be discussed in the subsequent

chapter.

## Park Site Selection: An Empirical Example

The McCannville Development Commission (MDC) will be the bureau

discussed, and the selection of a park site in the Hayes District will

be the empirical example through which the above concepts will be

examined.

The selection of the park site in the Hayes District was chosen

for analysis because: (1) it affords an empirical example of the con-

cepts of citizen participation; (2) it provides a link between inter-

bureau and bureau relations; and (3) it further illustrates the working

and ideal type bureaucratic models. (The term working model refers to

an empirical administrative structure composed of separate bureaus, or

departments within bureaus, that may or may not conform to the estab-
lished organizational structure.)

According to Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD)
regulations, the residents of the Hayes District would, through their
community association, assist the MDC in the planning, selection and
execution of a park site in their neighborhood. But the extent of
citizen involvement in the actual selection of a park site was the
endorsement of a Commission developed and sponsored plan. This is in
essence the thrust of this chapter.

## The Neighborhood

A broad view of the District which is the context for park site
selection can be briefly sketched as follows.

During the study, the Hayes District was primarily a residential
community covering about 360 acres in the city's Northeastern section.
Of the 1,500 homes in the District, 95% were single family houses.
Although no detailed survey had been made as to the physical conditions
of the houses in the District, a "conservative" estimate would have
been about 30% in substandard conditions, half of which could be called
dilapidated.

There were about 35 businesses in the District, whose clientele
were primarily drawn from outside the district. The few businesses that
serve mostly the Hayes District were, to a large extent, in substandard
buildings with no off-street parking.

Community facilities serving the District were: one public
elementary school, three churches and an old fire house converted into
a youth center. There were no parks in the District itself.

There are approximately 12 1/2 miles of streets in the District;
about 1/2 were either unpaved or in substandard condition with only
a narrow paved strip down the middle of the right-of-way.

Of the residents, approximately 35% were black, 55% were 65 years
or older, and 75% made $5,000 a year or less.[1]

In relation to the whole Northeastern section of the city the
Hayes District represents a fair approximation of the average neighbor-
hood, it is not the most blighted area, nor is it the most prosperous.
When compared to overall McCannville residential standards, it was
easily a substandard neighborhood.

## Background of the Park Site

The initial idea of a park for the Hayes District was developed
by the McCannville City Planning Commission,[2] the city agency respon-
sible for long range comprehensive city planning. The MDC was advised
of this plan, and agreed to incorporate the proposed park site in its
application to HUD for Neighborhood Development funds.[3] When the program
was approved by HUD, and the funds allocated, the Commission was committed
to developing a park in the Hayes District. As far as the park was
concerned, the Commission's goal became the coordination of the Hayes
District Community Association (HDCA) with the various city agencies

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1. Taken from a document about the "Hayes District" written by the
author while an employee of the Commission.

2. Commission document concerning citizen participation in the
"Hayes District," September 11, 1970, p. 4.

3. The Neighborhood Development Program is a federally funded
urban renewal program to which the Commission applied and received funds
for the administration of.

for the approval and execution of the park site portion of the Neighborhood Development Program (NDP) plan. The citizen participation staff of the MDC received the assignment of gaining citizen approval for the Commission's planned park. Since the park was included in the first year's program, HUD required that it be 80% completed by the end of the "action" year. (The action year was from July 1, 1970 to June 30, 1971.) Thus, early resident approval of the park site was imperative.

## Park Site Selection

The MDC set the HDCA approval date for the park site as the 15th of April, 1970. In February, the director of citizen participation for the MDC informally brought the park site topic to the attention of the chairman of the HDCA. After several informal discussions, the chairman agreed to support a Commission planned park for the neighborhood. With the support of the chairman, the director of citizen participation next secured the support of the executive board of the HDCA. This was accomplished over a period of approximately two weeks.

The first official public mention of a park for the Hayes District was in a general membership meeting. General membership meetings of the HDCA were open to all residents of the District. The meeting of the HDCA was held on March 10, 1970. The director of citizen participation for the Commission "requested that the executive board meet with the Park Bureau and other appropriate agencies in order to determine the location of the park." (HDCA General Membership Meeting, March 10, 1970).

There was no action taken on this request at this meeting; however,

the supposition that there would be a park in the District had been introduced, made formal record of, and received no opposition. On the 24th of March, the executive board of the HDCA had a regular meeting. At this session, the director of citizen participation "asked" that a special subcommittee of the HDCA be formed to "consider the location of a park site and work with the Park Bureau, City Planning Commission, MDC and other appropriate agencies in developing the park." (HDCA Executive Board Minutes, March 24, 1970). A subcommittee was formed called the Physical Planning Committee, made up of executive board members of the HDCA.

It is important to note that a tentative park site location had been developed by the City Planning Commission in conjunction with the MDC and other "appropriate agencies," prior to any actual resident involvement in the actual planning.

At this meeting, a Mr. Thomas[1] was elected by the executive board to be the HDCA's planning consultant. Mr. Thomas was a resident of the District and had been an active member of the HDCA since its inception. Mr. Thomas was also a registered architect. (Several days after his election to his new post, Mr. Thomas was placed on the MDC payroll as the planning consultant to the Hayes District.) When asked by the chairman of the HDCA to act as the consultant to the Physical Planning Committee, he accepted.

On March 31, the Physical Planning Committee held its first meeting. Attending this meeting were the seven executive board members

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1. Fictitious name.

appointed to the committee and nine MDC members. After an election of officers for the committee, Mr. Thomas introduced the proposed park site. The nine MDC staff were there to primarily answer questions about the park site design and location. There was no opposition to the proposed plan. Mr. Thomas "reported that with this map (map refers to a map of the Hayes District) and the budget information, he would be able to work out a recommendation to the committee as to the park for the next meeting." (HDCA Physical Planning Committee, March 31, 1970).

On April 6, the Physical Planning Committee approved the park site. This meeting was attended by five committee members and eight MDC staff, including the executive director of the Commission. The vote to accept the plan was unanimous.

Only one plan was presented to the committee, and only their approval of it was sought. There was virtually no citizen input in the design of the plan, nor was it sought, or asked for by the Commission.

April 14 was the date set for the general membership meeting of the HDCA in which formal, public accpetance of the park site was to be attained. Since the chairman, the executive board and the Physical Planning Committee of the Association were already committed to supporting the plan, the Commission was relatively confident of its approval by the general membership.

Mr. Thomas introduced the proposed park site to over 100 residents attending the meeting (a record attendance for an HDCA meeting), by stating that the boundaries of the park had been selected by the members of the Physical Planning Committee (Physical Planning Committee, March 31, 1970) of the HDCA. After his presentation of the site to the residents, the MDC staff attending the meeting were available to answer residents'

questions.

The unexpected happened; small groups of the residents began to strongly oppose the plan. It had become obvious to them that they were not being asked to participate in planning or decision making, but to approve an already existing plan. The issue became either accepting the plan, or not having a park in the neighborhood. This put tremendous pressure on the chairman and the executive board, not to mention the MDC staff present. The leadership of HDCA and the technical "expertise" of the staff had been seriously challenged. The struggle between the residents and the leadership of the HDCA and the MDC staff continued for well over an hour. A staff member (an engineer) suggested that an alternative plan be drawn up and presented at another meeting, thereby offering the residents a choice. As this became a motion and was being voted on, the chairman of the Physical Planning Committee moved that the plan presented be tentatively approved. (This motion was made at the personal and private request of the director of citizen participation for the MDC.) Both motions were passed by majority vote of the membership. The next meeting of the HDCA general membership was set for April 20.

During the six days that ensued between the first and second meetings, the original plan was designated by the Commission as Plan A, (Figure III), while the alternate plan was to be known as Plan B, (Figure IV). Plan B was of rather interesting design in that it was cut in half by one of the neighborhood's largest arterial thoroughfares, which meant: (1) that the park would be a potential trap for children playing on the fringes of the park near the road; or (2) that the road

FIGURE III                    THE HAYES DISTRICT                    32
                              MDC Park Plan A

Hayes School

FIGURE IV          THE HAYES DISTRICT                    33
                    MDC Park Plan B



Hayes School

itself would be closed, thereby diverting the thru traffic into the residential streets around the park. The Commission decided it would be best to close the street.

Prior to the April 20 meeting of the HDCA, the citizen participation staff was able to reaffirm the support of the chairman, the executive board, and the Physical Planning Committee.

At the April 20 general membership meeting, Mr. Thomas presented both Plan A and Plan B to the residents. But now the issue had become whether to choose Plan A or Plan B, and not whether or not to have a park in the District. The residents, with very little staff assistance, decided that Plan A was superior to Plan B, and passed it by a majority vote.

In sum, the MDC was able, through the use of what I have identified as a working model, to achieve its goal, the selection and approval of a park site by the residents of the Hayes District, thus satisfying the requirement for citizen participation in the planning and development of community projects. In attaining resident approval for the park, the Commission used both implicit and explicit coercion; it largely distorted the goal of citizen participation as outlined by HUD, and it differentially enforced not only HUD regulations but its own regulations as well. An informal working model of citizen participation was developed in order to facilitate greater passage of the park site by the residents. The director of citizen participation, with the aid of an assistant, the author, successfully and informally contacted and received the support of the chairman of the HDCA, the Executive Board, and the Physical Planning Committee, prior to any formal meeting of the HDCA or any of its subcommittees. The informal model continued in

operation until final passage of the site by the general membership of the HDCA. Thus, in the selection of a park site in the Hayes District, both real and ideal models of citizen participation were illustrated as well as the concepts of coercion, distortion of goals and the differential enforcement of rules and regulations.

CHAPTER IV

FINDINGS: IDEAL AND WORKING MODELS

A Working Model: An Urban Renewal Agency

In the selection of a working model to illustrate the theoretical

concepts of this paper, an urban renewal bureaucracy was chosen. The

reasons for this choice were: (1) the nature of a federal non-profit

organization seemed amenable to this kind of study; (2) the public

"accountability" (public accountability is that aspect of control,

both overt and covert, that a society maintains over institutions

accountable to it to furnish explanations for its activities) of a

federal bureaucracy; and (3) the author's nine month participant-

observation experience within an agency of the bureaucracy.

With these points in mind, we will initially examine the action

agency itself, before presenting an overview of the whole bureaucratic

system. I have chosen to call this action agency the McCannville

Development Commission (MDC), as opposed to using its real name, for

my purposes here are academic. That is, the primary interest of this

study is the examination of some of the operational functions of a

complex organization, and is not intended to be material for an expose.

Likewise, the city that supports the Commission will be known as

McCannville. This city is located on the West coast and has a population

of a half million, of which 50,000 are minority group members (non-

whites, primarily blacks).

The McCannville Development Commission is responsible for all urban
renewal activities in the city; however, due largely to the availability
of federal funds for urban renewal in black districts, many of the Com-
mission efforts are focused in the black inhabited Northeastern section
of the city, (a topic to be dealt with in subsequent pages). The Com-
mission was established by McCannville voters through a city charter
amendment in 1958, and charged with the following:

> . . . the Department of Development and Civic Promotion. It
> is responsible for McCannville's urban renewal programs and
> assists in the promotion of commercial and industrial develop-
> ment. One of the Commission's major objectives has been to blend
> citizen participation with the roles of local, state and federal
> agencies in the planning and development of its projects.
> (Taken from the actual Urban Renewal Commission's definition
> of its role in the community, published in mimeograph form.)

Simply then, the MDC is responsible to the City Council of McCann-
ville for the city's urban renewal, with a pledged emphasis on citizens'
participation. To carry out this goal, the Commission was organized
with a single chairman at its head, four commissioners and an executive
director with a staff of approximately sixty to administer its various
programs. The formal organization and power structure are illustrated
in Figure V. It closely follows the Weberian ideal model, in that it
is headed by a chairman who wields ultimate power and authority, support-
ed by four commissioners subordinate to him, but superordinate to the
administrative staff: an executive director subordinate to the chairman
and the commissioners, but superordinate to his staff, etc. Lines of
formal communication generally follow the vertical lines of authority,
i.e. the submission of monthly activities reports initiated in a field
office will follow the vertical channels of authority as illustrated in
Figure V. It is important to note that most formal activities (those of

## FIGURE V

### THE IDEAL MODEL

```
                                    ┌──────────┐
                                    │ Chairman │
                                    │   MDC    │
                                    └──────────┘
┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐ ┌──────────────┐
│1             │ │2             │ │3             │ │4             │
│ Commissioner │ │ Commissioner │ │ Commissioner │ │ Commissioner │
└──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘ └──────────────┘

                                    ┌──────────┐
                                    │Executive │
                                    │Director  │
                                    └──────────┘
┌────────────┐   ┌────────────┐   ┌────────┐
│Consultants │   │ Citizen    │   │ Staff  │
│& Legal     │   │Committees  │   │        │
│Advisor     │   │            │   │        │
└────────────┘   └────────────┘   └────────┘

                                    ┌──────────┐
                                    │Assistant │
                                    │Director  │
                                    └──────────┘
                        ┌────────────────┐   ┌──────────────┐
                        │   General      │   │  Funding     │
                        │ Administration │   │ Applications │
                        └────────────────┘   └──────────────┘

                                    ┌──────────┐
                                    │ Director │
                                    │    of    │
                                    │Operations│
                                    └──────────┘
┌──────────────┐ ┌─────────┐ ┌────────────┐   ┌────────────┐ ┌───────────┐ ┌───────────┐
│Rehabilitation│ │ Finance │ │Engineering │   │ Relocation │ │ Community │ │ All Field │
│Section       │ │ Section │ │ Section    │   │  Section   │ │ Services  │ │ Projects  │
└──────────────┘ └─────────┘ └────────────┘   └────────────┘ │ Section   │ └───────────┘
                                                             └───────────┘
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
1.  The black line  represents the formal "chain of command" and communication channels with the broken line illustrating supporting staffs.

2.  The Director of Operations is subordinate to the Assistant Director in the command chain, but under the Executive Director on operations under his control.

of a routine nature), generally follow the public ideal model. When
an activity or decision does not require a policy type decision, the
public model is followed. The reason for the presentation of the Weber-
ian like ideal model, to the public and the staff itself, appears to
be the legal requirement of public accountability of the Commission.
The nature of urban renewal activities in a community and the expen-
diture of federal funds place the Commission under the scrutiny of
monitoring agencies of all kinds, the mass media, groups and clubs
of every description, as well as private citizens. Therefore, whenever
possible, the Commission presents itself as the ideal model bureau that
is run by rational, logical design, with an expert technical staff,
maximum citizen input, and an equalitarian chain of command. Figure V
then represents the formal public organization of the Commission's
hierarchical structure.

Figure VI illustrates the actual working model when other than
routine matters are at issue, i.e. policy making, press releases
(other than routine), hiring and firing of staff, special problems,
etc. While activities carried out under the formal model are carefully
documented and "filed" as a matter of public record, meetings of the
working model tend to be informal and unrecorded, thus the working model
exists in quasi-secret form. This modification of the ideal model is
necessitated by: (1) a need to by-pass channels when a time element is
involved; (2) the ineptitude of certain staff members in critical posi-
tions; (3) the generally clumsy nature of the ideal model; and (4) the
unique position and personal capabilities of the five members of the
working model to actually run the Commission somewhat competently.

# FIGURE VI

## THE WORKING MODEL

```
                            ┌──────────┐
                            │ Chairman │
    ┌ ─ ─ ─ ─ ┐ ┌ ─ ─ ─ ┐   │   MDC    │   ┌ ─ ─ ─ ─ ┐   ┌ ─ ─ ─ ─ ┐
    |         | |       |   └──────────┘   |         |   |         |
    └ ─ ─ ─ ─ ┘ └ ─ ─ ─ ┘                  └ ─ ─ ─ ─ ┘   └ ─ ─ ─ ─ ┘
                            ┌──────────┐
                            │Executive │
  ┌─────────┐  ┌ ─ ─ ─ ┐   │ Director │
  │  Legal  │  |       |   └──────────┘
  │ Advisor │  └ ─ ─ ─ ┘  ┌────────┐
  └─────────┘             │ Staff  │
                          │(Special│
                          │ Ass't) │
                          └────────┘   ┌ ─ ─ ─ ┐
                                       |       | ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─ ─
                                       └ ─ ─ ─ ┘   ┌ ─ ─ ─ ┐ ┌ ─ ─ ─ ┐
                                                   |       | |       |
                                                   └ ─ ─ ─ ┘ └ ─ ─ ─ ┘
                            ┌──────────┐
                            │ Director │
                            │    of    │
                            │Operations│
                            └──────────┘
  ┌ ─ ─ ┐ ┌ ─ ─ ┐ ┌ ─ ─ ┐           ┌ ─ ─ ┐ ┌ ─ ─ ┐ ┌ ─ ─ ┐
  |     | |     | |     |           |     | |     | |     |
  └ ─ ─ ┘ └ ─ ─ ┘ └ ─ ─ ┘           └ ─ ─ ┘ └ ─ ─ ┘ └ ─ ─ ┘
```

The connecting black line represents the actual "working" hierarchy of those who actually make decisions within the Commission.

The point is that the Commission maintains two hierarchies. The first is a formal public presentation of the agency which is similar to the Weberian model of a rational monolith, with relationships of super and subordination, supported by expert technical staffs. The reason for this phenomenon is largely due to the public accountability of the Commission and the consequent need to demonstrate its rational, professional, equalitarian nature, hence the adoption of the Weberian model. The second is the working model, made up of those elements within the agency that actually wield decision making power.

## Organizational Structure of the Urban Renewal Bureaucracy

The organizational structure of the urban renewal bureaucracy is in itself relatively simple. It, like the action agency, adheres to a Weberian like public model while often working through a modification of that model in attaining its goals. The ideal, or public model, may be defined as rigid, rational and formal organization with highly defined authority and communication channels, with the amount of power regulated by the position of the office within the hierarchy of the bureaucracy. Theoretically, each bureau has its defined jurisdictional area arranged vertically in a Weberian styled ideal hierarchy. That is, each bureau has its areas of responsibility, power, and control in relationship to the bureaucracy as a whole.

The controlling agency of this bureaucracy is the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD), which "governs" its subordinate bureaus through a system of rules, laws and regulations, and the allocation of federal funds. Thus, the administrators of HUD or bureau A, maintain their superior position as the head bureau with overriding

authority over their subordinate bureaus. Though each of the subordinate bureaus is obligated to follow HUD's dictums, they in turn may require a subordinate bureau to follow rules and/or regulations that they may design. The administrators of bureau C, in other words, may be required to follow both A's and B's regulations (with A's regulations having priority), create further regulations for its own jurisdictional area and add still more requirements on to the action agency, bureau D, thus D must follow the regulations of A, B, and C.

Though HUD maintains several hundred action agencies, and several regional offices throughout the country, this study will focus on a model that is indicative of the bureaucracy, but limited to one regional office and one action agency (see Figure VII).

This model, like the action agency's ideal model, is widely publicized and adhered to for most routine administrative activities— for the same reason, public accountability. HUD, and the entire urban renewal bureaucracy, including this model, is being continually examined, probed, investigated and monitored, by Congress, the mass media, interest and pressure groups, revolutionaries of all types, minority groups of every description, etc. A Weberian like model provides a structure for a maximization of accountability through rationalized administration, in that each bureau is responsible for its jurisdictional area with ultimate responsibility and authority at the top, the head bureau.

The ideal model represents the organization of public record, like the action agency, the formal rules and regulations; the accounts of bureaucratic activities; the dispensing and withdrawing of funds from a program or project all follow this model.

FIGURE VII

THE URBAN RENEWAL BUREAUCRACY:  IDEAL MODEL



A.  Department of Housing and Urban Development:  Washington, D. C.

A1. Department of Housing and Urban Development:  Regional Office, San Francisco, California.

B.  City Council:  McCannville.

C.  Model Cities Citizen Planning Board:  McCannville.

D.  McCannville Development Commission.

However well designed, the ideal type bureaucracy often requires modification in light of: (1) fortuitous events; (2) time limitations; (3) personnel weaknesses in critical positions within the bureaucracy; or (4) bureaucratic "red-tape." As a result, the most common modification of the ideal bureaucracy is illustrated in Figure VIII.

The solid arrows represent lines of authority on a superordinate basis--while the broken arrows illustrate channels of communication. This figure demonstrates the rigidity of the ideal model, in that lines of authority and communication are arranged in terms of Weber's ideal model.

This model is most often used when there is a time limitation involved that precludes the use of the ideal model. An empirical example of the use of the working model involved the sudden availability of $100,000 that needed to be dispensed to an action agency within (apparently) several hours. When the MDC was selected as a candidate for these funds, it was notified by telephone from the HUD offices in Washington, D. C., and given several hours to reply via the same media. The working model of the action agency (see Figure V) responded by holding an immediate conference, and a decision was made to accept the $100,000. The total time element involved from the initial receipt of the HUD notification of the funds, to acceptance, to HUD confirmation of the additional funds, was approximately two and one half hours. The next day the staff of the MDC was verbally notified of the grant, but was warned that it was still a secret, and not yet ready for public consumption. In the meantime, as per HUD request, the MDC prepared a formal application for the additional $100,000 to "supplement" the already

FIGURE VIII

AN URBAN RENEWAL BUREAUCRACY:   AN EMPIRICAL EXAMPLE



A.    Department of Housing and Urban Development:   Washington, D. C.

A1.   Department of Housing and Urban Development:   Regional Office,
      San Francisco, California.

B.    City Council:   McCannville

C.    Model Cities Citizens Planning Board:   McCannville

D.    McCannville Development Commission


       This figure demonstrates a modification of the ideal public
model.   It is important to note that the modification is not an ex-
clusive one, nor is it permanent, and that the public model is always
in some form of operation.   This particular modification illustrates
HUD by-passing bureaus, A1, B and C, dealing directly with the action
agency, the McCannville Development Commission.

approved and funded Neighborhood Development Program under the current administration of the MDC. This application contained all the supporting data explaining the need for the additional funds. Once the application was approved by bureaus B and C, a senator from the state made a personal radio announcement of the additional $100,000 granted to the McCannville Development Commission for urban renewal. No formal records were kept of the telephone conversations or agreements, only file copies of the formal application. This type of activity was not uncommon, and the results were fruitful in that: (1) the modification of the ideal model met the time requirement; (2) public accountability was met by filing a formal application through channels before it was publicly announced; and (3) a senator was able to make some "political hay" by announcing the "award" of the additional funds to the Neighborhood Development Program.

It is through the <u>unrecorded</u> modification of the ideal model that many critical decisions are made that affect the entire bureaucracy and urban renewal. However, it is normally the ideal formal model that comes under the public's scrutiny and comment.

The existence and the use of working models within the bureaucracy is a classic example of the differential enforcement of rules and regulations by the head bureau. Normative standards established by the administrators of HUD require that the designated channels of the ideal public model be used for reasons of public accountability, failure to comply with this standard without the explicit approval of HUD may mean actual loss of funds for existing or future programs. HUD, however retains overriding authority of the established bureaucratic mechanisms

and may significantly compromise the ideal model in the attainment of its goals. As demonstrated in the empirical example, HUD by-passed bureaus A,B, and C and chose to deal directly with bureau D. Bureaus subordinate to HUD likewise maintain working models and use them in appropriate situations. The "appropriateness" of the use of the working model is largely determined by HUD. The existence of the normative standards allows HUD to control its subordinate bureaus through the exercise of its sanctioning power.

## Bureaucrats and Residents

Maximization of citizen participation in the urban renewal process is a goal of the bureaucracy. It will be through the concept of citizen participation that the theoretical concepts of this paper will be further examined.

HUD has issued several directives pertaining to the role of citizens' participation on the action agency level (HUD RHA 7100.1). The following are two abstracts taken from those directives.

> Requirements for Citizen Involvement. A guiding principle of Departmental policy is to insure that citizens have the opportunity to participate in policies and programs which affect their welfare. Therefore, the workable program requires clear evidence that the community provides opportunities for citizens, including those who are poor and members of minority groups, to participate in all HUD assisted programs . . . The community will also be expected to show what progress has been made during each certification period to achieve an adequate and effective degree of citizen involvement.

A more explicit statement appeared in a similar document of later publication (HUD RHA 7217.1):

> It is HUD policy to assure that maximum opportunities are provided for citizen involvement in the planning, development and execution of programs assisted by the Department. Citizens should have clear and direct access to decision-making in all stages of the urban renewal process.

These statements represent HUD's basic public position on citizen participation. When transmitted through the bureaucracy to the action agency the policy becomes a requirement and a continual goal to be achieved over a period of time. HUD, however, leaves the choice of mechanism for the exercise of citizen participation to the local community and the structure of the particular agency.

To the action agency, then, the requirement for citizen participation in its programs becomes a part of its overall operation. In the case of the MDC, a separate staff section was designed to manage, report, organize and direct citizen participation as it related to Commission projects. During the period of this study, the citizen participation staff was the largest department in the agency with more than seventeen members.

HUD's requirement is relatively simple; citizens of the communities involved in HUD sponsored programs will participate in the planning, development and execution of those programs. The mechanism(s) through which this process occurs is largely left up to the action agency, but HUD requires that some sort of measurement of citizen participation be reported and that the process be continually expanding and improving. The coercive nature of this program is manifested through HUD's ability to deny or grant federal funds to action agencies. If the residents of a project area complain too bitterly about the action agency's tactics, programs and staffs involved in citizen participation, the action agency is given opportunities to defend itself, but if the negative pressure on the part of the residents continues the agency stands a chance of not being funded for that particular project the

following year, or having the funds simply withdrawn. What the HUD

citizen participation policy has come to mean on the action agency level

in essence is, citizens need to be "neutralized" through the partici-

pation process so that public dissention and opposition to urban renewal

projects may be minimized. Action agencies receive no additional awards

of funds for citizen participation, but stand to lose greatly from

citizen opposition, not only locally through civic and court actions

and an unpopular press, but may be denied funds for their projects

from HUD. Denial of federal funds would mean all but closure to the

MDC. Though HUD requires citizen participation, it has developed no

monitoring system for it, and seems to have little interest in it out-

side of a monthly numerical account of it, unless there are opposition

and citizen complaints. HUD will tolerate distortion of this goal,

until residents publicly demonstrate dissatisfaction; then it retains

the right to sanction the action agency involved.

Citizen participation is not in itself a genuine process, but a

constraining mechanism which this bureaucracy must contend with in

achieving its goals.

> The lesson for the community organization is plain: the
> function of citizen participation is to support, not to
> create. The function of the professional is to create
> (Kramer and Specht, 1969:57).

The MDC views citizen participation as still another obstacle in

the process of urban renewal. It, at the same time, realizes the

essence (as previously discussed) of the HUD requirement and submits

monthly reports of citizens' participation in its various projects.

To the Commission, the idea of ordinary citizens actually taking

part in complex planning, design and execution of complex urban renewal

projects seems much beyond the capabilities of any citizenry.

> Such people are usually the objects of civic action; they are acted upon by others. but rarely do they themselves initiate action. As a result they often develop a keen sense of the difference between "we" and "they"--"they" being outside, city-wide civic and political forces which seek to police them, vote them, and redevelop them (Spiegel, 1968: 51).

Basically citizen participation for the "average" citizen in the project areas is beyond his means of experience in organized endeavors of this nature, and in excess of his time available for this kind of activity.[1] It is a relatively easy process to obtain consent to renewal plans when people are thinking in terms of general goals and community-wide benefits, but it has proven much more difficult when the same people are shown the same set of facts in terms of personal threats and costs. As a consequence, through HUD sanction, the MDC, and most other action agencies, have chosen to work through neighborhood organizations representing the project areas involved. Thus, programs and projects are sold to the residents on a broad good-for-the-commonwealth basis.

Ideally, the concept of citizens' participation recognizes the vested interests and concerns of the residents involved in the projects themselves, and as such, places some part of the power to shape or respond to such programs in their hands (Spiegel, 1968). But the ideal rarely becomes the real. The complexity of the factors involved in urban

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1. Through the participant-observation experience, I learned that a majority of the population of the Hayes District shared little interest in the concept of citizen participation, unless the fate of their own personal property was involved.

planning require the combined skills of city planning specialists,

engineers, architects, relocation staffs, finance experts, etc., but Con-

gress, with the advent of the anti-poverty program, has required admin-

istrative agencies spending federal funds to maintain active programs

of citizen participation. HUD has responded by developing a policy

requiring citizen participation on the action agency level, but leaving

the mechanism for it largely up to the action agency itself. The result

has been the formal accounting of citizen participation through re-

ports submitted to HUD on some type of regular basis, usually monthly.

In order to better facilitate the administrative mechanisms of HUD,

the citizen participation data (which is in reality largely subjective)

is translated into numbers and given the required simulacrum of object-

ivity.

The MDC has translated the citizen participation concept into

terms of citizen neutralization as previously stated. Public, com-

munity confirmation and sanction of Commission urban renewal plans,

is a useful mechanism in quelling the opposition of individual residents

within the neighborhood and keeping publicity about its activities

favorable.

## The Role of the Community Association in Relation to Achieving Bureau-cratic Goals

In an attempt to deal with the potentially unwieldly and chaotic

process of citizen participation, HUD early in 1969 developed the

concept of a Project Area Committee.

> A Project Area Committee (PAC) made up of residents of a
> project area, shall be established for each urban renewal
> project in which residential . . . activities are contempla-
> ted . . . The (action agency) shall work closely with the
> PAC to assure that project residents participate in the form-
> ulation and execution of plans for renewal of the area and
> improvement of the condition of its residents (HUD RHA 7217.5).

In essence, this was a tremendous assist to the action agencies. It, for all practical purposes, meant the end of dealing with individual residents on matters of citizen participation, as they were now referred to their PAC. At this point the MDC was able to deal with one organization per project area, which greatly simplified its task. Regular meetings were established, chairman and executive board members elected by local residents, and the Commission retained tight control.

The MDC organized the first PAC in McCannville and literally prepared the agendas for the meetings, typed the minutes, provided the meeting places and served refreshments. The records of the PAC's meetings were (and still are) kept in the MDC files. Citizen participation in McCannville was under the tight control of the MDC.

It did not take long, however, for at least some residents of the communities involved to sense that this process of participation was not all genuine, and low-keyed opposition began to be heard. At this point the citizen participation staff of the MDC realized that future PAC sanctions of MDC urban renewal programs might be jeopardized, and as a consequence two adjustments were made: (1) the manipulation of the appearance of power; and (2) the development of options to simulate choice.

First, the Commission realized that as long as the residents felt controlled by MDC, there would be reasonable grounds for opposition to its programs. As a result the Commission began to play only a minor role in public PAC meetings, answering an occasional technical question, serving refreshments, handing out agendas, and so on. Nothing really changed, only the manipulation of the appearance of power to the chairman of the PAC and their executive boards. Hence, the Commission

monopolized on the fact that the source of power most easily manipulated is the sense of leadership in organized groups (Kramer and Specht, 1969:52). The chairman and his executive board would always meet with the Commission staff several days prior to the public general meeting. It is at these meetings that the Commission let its desires and needs be known. Opposition and problems are resolved at this level before the general membership ever becomes involved. In nearly all cases involving the Hayes District Community Association the decisions are made to support the Commission program prior to the general membership meeting. It is at this level that whatever compromises are required are made, so that at regular public meetings of the Project Area Committee (PAC), the Commission is sure of support from the chairman and the executive board.

Figure IX represents a sequential list of meetings, their topics, and the ratio of MDC staff to HDCA members. It is important to note the attendance of MDC staff to HDCA meetings fluctuated with the nature and purpose of the meeting--the more critical the meeting in relation to MDC programming the more staff present.

A ratio of nearly one to one of staff to members, when a critical decision was to be made, leaves little doubt as to the nature of citizen participation in McCannville. The following quotation is not a universal truth, but it is indicative of the situation:

> Sometimes when the community begins to ask hard or embar-
> rassing questions, professionals retire beneath a mantle of
> experience and qualifications to demand that their judgments
> be accepted as revealed truth; administrators retreat behind
> a smoke screen of procedural objectives (Spiegel, 1968:67).

FIGURE IX

HDCA MEETINGS – MAY 2, 1969 TO APRIL 20, 1969

| 5/2/69 | Type:<br>Purpose:<br><br><br><br>Ratio: | Executive Board<br>MDC Introduces Neighborhood Development Program to Executive Board<br>(Nonpolicy Making)<br>2 MDC Staff – 10 Members (1:5) |
|---|---|---|
| 11/16/69 | Type:<br>Purpose:<br><br>Ratio: | General Membership<br>Election of Officers (Nonpolicy Making)<br>2 MDC Staff – 27 Members (1:3.5) |
| 11/19/69 | Type:<br>Purpose:<br><br><br>Ratio: | General Membership<br>Introduction of Neighborhood Development Program's Financial Aid Program (Noncritical Policy Making)<br>4 MDC Staff – 20 Members (1:5) |
| 12/9/69 | Type:<br>Purpose:<br><br>Ratio: | Executive Board<br>Budget for Citizens' Participation (Policy Making)<br>3 MDC Staff – 10 Members (1:3.3) |
| 1/7/70 | Type:<br>Purpose:<br><br>Ratio: | Executive Board<br>Acceptance of NDP Proposal (Critical Policy Making)<br>12 MDC Staff – 9 Members (1:.75) |
| 1/13/70 | Type:<br>Purpose:<br><br>Ratio: | General Membership<br>Orientation to NDP by Staff (Policy Making)<br>8 MDC Staff – 20 Members (1:2.5) |
| 1/27/70 | Type:<br>Purpose:<br><br>Ratio: | Executive Board<br>NDP Proposal and Changes (Policy Making)<br>6 MDC Staff – 13 Members (1:2.1) |
| 2/10/70 | Type:<br>Purpose:<br><br>Ratio: | General Membership<br>Financial Assistance Program under NDP (Noncritical)<br>9 MDC Staff – 33 Members (1:3.7) |

FIGURE IX continued . . .

| 2/16/70 | Type: | Executive Board |
| | Purpose: | Final Approvel of NDP Proposal (Critical Policy Making) |
| | Ratio: | 6 MDC Staff - 10 Members (1:1.6) |

| 3/10/70 | Type: | General Membership |
| | Purpose: | Introduction of Park Site Concept (Noncritical) |
| | Ratio: | 10 MDC Staff - 24 Members (1:2.4) |

| 3/31/70 | Type: | Physical Planning Committee |
| | Purpose: | Park Site Location (Critical Policy Making) |
| | Ratio: | 7 MDC Staff - 5 Members (1:1.4) |

| 4/5/70 | Type: | Physical Planning Committee |
| | Purpose: | Park Site Plan Approval (Critical Policy) |
| | Ratio: | 8 MDC Staff - 5 Members (1:.72) |

| 4/14/70 | Type: | General Membership |
| | Purpose: | Park Site Approval (Noncritical Policy) |
| | Ratio: | 9 MDC Staff - 102 Members (1:12.7) |

| 4/20/70 | Type: | General Membership |
| | Purpose: | Park Site Approval (Noncritical Policy) |
| | Ratio: | 9 MDC Staff - 115 Members (1:12.4) |

The critical question seems to be whether or not the conditions necessary for successful citizen engagement in urban renewal are tolerable to the administrative, political and professional establishment in whose hands the initiation of such activities lies. For citizen participation is a social invention developed outside of the urban renewal bureaucracy and merely affixed to it. The concept of ordinary citizens taking part in improving the community is certainly in keeping with the American ideal of democracy. One finds little fault with the concept of citizen participation, but its practical application to urban renewal activities had certainly fallen short of any original expectations (in reality). Simply, federally sponsored urban renewal projects require dealing successfully with almost endless amounts of red tape. It has taken a long time for action agencies, model cities administrators and city governments to acquire the knowledge and experience required for this. Any expectations that citizens of a given urban renewal project have the time, interest and skills required for meaningful participation falls in the realm of the ideal.

Although HUD requires citizens' participation on the part of its agencies it has also demanded, in the case of the MDC, that eighty percent (80%) of the work be completed in the first year's proposal in the Neighborhood Development Program, or the second year's funds would not be allocated. The impact of this requirement was to almost totally nullify all but token citizen participation in the Hayes District, for it put the Commission on a rigid time schedule for the accomplishment of certain tasks.

Figure X is a timetable established by the MDC for the addition of two lots to the park site in the Hayes District.

FIGURE X

PROPOSED TIMETABLE FOR PROCESSING THE HAYES DISTRICT
URBAN RENEWAL PLAN SUPPLEMENT[1]

Purpose of Supplement:  Addition of two lots to Park at Corner of

Claremont and Oneonta.


Date

July 21         Approval of Hayes District Community Association's
                Physical Environment Committee.

July 28         Approval of HDCA Executive Committee.

August 4        Verbal contact, by telephone, with city agencies asking
                approval.

August 7-11     Draft supplement.

August 12       Mail copies of urban renewal supplement to HUD, Model
                Cities Citizen Planning Board, consultants and the
                president of the HDCA.

August 14       Receive written agreements from city agencies.

August 17       MDC resolutions approving supplements.

August 19       Meeting of the HDCA general membership to approve addition
                to park.

August 21       Mail copies of supplement to Model Cities Special Projects
                Committee.

August 26       Approval of Special Projects Committee.

September 1     Receive HUD approval of supplement.

September 1     Approval of city council.

September 1     Approval of Model Cities Citizens Planning Board.

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    1.  Taken from the actual Commission's timetable for the Hayes
District.

The HUD requirement for eighty percent (80%) project completion
of the first year's program or no funds for the second year is coercion.
For the MDC, the Neighborhood Development Program provides approximately
seventy-five percent (75%) of its operating funds. Consequently, citizen
participation becomes citizen neutralization so that the necessary work
may be completed and the time schedule met. Seventeen full-time Com-
mission staff are assigned to insure the success of this process.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS

## What Has Been Discussed: A Brief Summary

A Weber like ideal type bureaucracy has become the public model for an urban renewal bureaucracy. The Weberian style model affords maximum public accountability while maintaining a rational, logical structure of inter-bureau relationships. The publicly presented image of the urban renewal bureaucracy is one of a smoothly and efficiently functioning organization based upon equalitarian principles. This image is so critical to the overall public perspective of the bureaucracy that the administration of it carefully records and documents the functioning of the Weberian model. What Weber intended to be an ideal type description of bureaucracy has manifested itself in the urban renewal bureaucracy as an ideology. For the Weberian like ideal type model has become the publicly presented image of the bureaucracy, and as such is related to the American political concept of a democratically run institution. The ideal model satisfies the political aspects of the federally run institution in relation to public accountability, while the working models tend to be actually responsible for carrying out the urban renewal processes. Because of the ideologic nature of the ideal model, records of its operation are carefully maintained in order to demonstrate the bureaucracy's commitment to it. No records tend to be kept of the activities of the working models because of the obvious contradictions to the ideal model; therefore,

working models tend to be quasi-secret in nature. Thus, whatever information is gained from or about the urban renewal bureaucracy is usually in keeping with the functioning of the ideal model.

Citizen participation was affixed to the ideal model by the Congress of the United States. The concept of citizen participation would logically seem to be an extention of the ideology attached to the ideal model. That is, an enlightened citizenry assisting a democratically run bureaucracy was viewed by Congress as logical and desirable.

The bureaucracy responded by formally incorporating citizen participation into the functioning processes of its ideal model. How the ideal and working models of an action agency dealt with citizen participation was the essence of this thesis.

During a nine month participant-observation study of an action agency, the "MDC," the author became aware of the models operating within the ideal public model. These "other" models were designated real or working models, and it was noted that they tended to exist on both inter-bureau and bureau levels. These working models seemed to have more power in the actual administration of urban renewal activities than the ideal model. Working models co-exist with the ideal type, but because of their contradictory nature in relation to the ideal model, their activities tend to be unrecorded.

Whereas, the operation of the ideal type model is theoretically based upon concepts like cooperation, equalitarian principles, and adherence to an established hierarchy of authority, the working model seems to function on concepts like coercion, differential enforcement of rules and regulations, and the distortion of goals. It is important to note that the function of both real and ideal models is to achieve

the formal goals cf the bureaucracy.

Chapters three and four illustrate the concepts of real and ideal models on inter-bureau and bureau levels respectively. The concept of citizen participation as a requirement in the urban renewal process on both levels provided a focus for the demonstration of both real and ideal models.

## Some Lessons Learned

What essentially happens in the urban renewal bureaucracy is that the administration views its goals in terms of the overall society; consequently the importance of the "end results" seems to have precedence over how they are accomplished; i.e. if the pervasive society is supportive of the ideal model and its goals, the urban renewal bureaucracy reports its activities in those terms—regardless if it functions in those terms or not.

The result of these phenomena, in terms of the effect on those individuals subject to the urban renewal process, are considerably consequential in that they are further removed from realizing any "voice" in the urban renewal process in their neighborhood. The resident is nearly totally "neutralized" by the concept of citizens' participation itself. He is officially required to use the mechanism of the Project Area Committee, i.e. the HDCA, to voice his opinion on policy and decision making. The existence of MDC established citizen participation mechanisms tend also to mean MDC control over its activities; the resident then, is forced to deal with an exclusive mechanism for the exercise of his "right" to participate in the urban renewal process. The residents tend to be "co-opted" by an organization that was formally

established to insure their active participation in the urban renewal process. Thus, if a resident wants to oppose an MDC plan or program he must do so through the Project Area Committee, which, as has been illustrated, is largely controlled by the MDC. If the resident wishes to carry on his opposition, it will be in terms of opposing his neighbors' approved programs and plans, for the MDC uses the project area committees to gain public neighborhood consent and approval for its programs. Thus, the resident is faced with opposing his friends and neighbors instead of the Commission.

Although the study of real and ideal bureaucratic models is not new to sociology, the study of them in relation to particular bureaucracies can make additions to the understanding of them. The complexity of our society may be mirrored in the complexity of our bureaurcracies, and efforts to further the understanding will hopefully be beneficial to the society.

In addition to gaining general understandings of the functioning of a bureaucracy and how that functioning affects those parts of society that it comes in contact with, specific knowledge of working and ideal models may advance the ability of individuals who must deal with bureau-cracies on the level discussed in this thesis to cope with them. With an understanding of the existence of working and ideal models, citizen groups, such as the HDCA, might be made sophisticated, more knowledge-able, and perhaps even more powerful in taking part in the actual urban renewal process. If these thoughts seem a bit idealistic, the author pleads guilty.

## Thoughts for Future Study

This thesis illuminates the need for future study in the operation

of working and ideal models in complex organizations. The implications

of their existence and operation in the urban renewal bureaucracy

raises the question of the extent of their universality in other complex

organizations, and of the extent that the organization's "client" may

or may not be subject to the operation of both working and real models.

With the advent of state revenue sharing, the speculation that citi-

zen participation would be even further diluted, is not an unreasonable

forecast. For whatever cursory control that the administrators of HUD

maintained over the action agency in the realm of citizen participation

would be given up to individual states, and consequently to the cities

carrying out urban renewal projects within the state, a probable result

being the concept of city-wide citizen participation, regulated by the

action agency rather than citizen participation in each project area.

Consequently, in the city-wide race and competition for available funds,

the best organized, influential, powerful, and politically adept

groups would undoubtedly receive preferential treatment, leaving those

groups with little organization and resources with little hope of

assistance.

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