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# INTEREST RATE RISK AND CAPITAL ADEQUACY FOR <br> TRADITIONAL BANKS AND FINANCIAL INTERMEDIARIES 

J. Huston McCulloch

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#### Abstract

Traditionally, banks and financial intermediaries borrow short and lend long. This causes a risk of negative net worth (and failure, under simplifying assumptions), because the present discounted value of the assets is more volatile than that of the liabilities.

This paper utilizes a new option pricing model for speculative assets whose log price relative is a symmetric stable Paretian random variable. This model is used to empirically evaluate the probability of failure and fair value of deposit insurance as a function of capitalasset ratio for a bank with demand liabilities and longer term, default-risk-free, perfectly marketable assets. The maturities used for the assets range from three months to 30 years (in order to incorporate thrift institutions). Implications for reserve requirement policy and for liability management are discussed.


J. Huston McCulloch
Department of Economics
Boston College
Chestnut Hill, MA 02167

617/969-0100, Ext. 3686

## INTRODUCTION

The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation, and various state Mutual Savings Bank insurance plans guarantee deposits in banks and kindred financial intermediaries against many kinds of risk. To mention a few of these, we nave the risk that the bank's management will be dishonest or incompetent, residual undiversified default risk, illiquidity risk which arises from the imperfect marketability of the bank's assets, foreign exchange risk, and finally, pure interest rate risk.

In this study, we address only the last of these types of risk. We do not deny that tne other categories are important, often more important than pure interest rate risk. However, the pure interest rate risk is particularly interesting in view of the traditional practice of financial intermediaries of "transforming maturities" by borrowing short and lending long. We quantify the value of this insurance empirically, using a Paretian stable option pricing model.

These results can be applied in one of two ways. Currently, banks all pay a given premium to the insuring agency, and are subjected to a more or less arbitrary set of regulations regarding capital structure and activities, intended to make them fairly safe from failure. Mayer (1965) has proposed a graduated deposit insurance plan, under which banks would be allowed (within reason) to take whatever capital position and risks they choose, and in exchange would be required to pay a premium that covered the fair
value of insurance for the risk category chosen. Given the riskiness of the bank's activities, the fair value of such insurance will decline as the bank's capital-asset ratio increases, because the more capital the bank has, the larger the share of any losses on the assets that will be borne by the bank's stockholders, rather than by the insuring agency. Therefore, for any given premium and riskiness of operations there will be some amount of capital that will be adequate to make the premium in question cover the fair value of insurance for the bank. Sharpe (1978) has proposed that this be the criterion for deciding whether or not a given bank's capital is "adequate." There is no essential difference between the two proposals, since they are just two ways of interpreting the same underlying relationship between permissible risk, adequate capital, and fair premium.

## CAPITAL AND THE DIVISION OF LOSSES

To simplify the analysis, we will concentrate on a "traditional bank," which has demand or virtually demand liabilities, and longer term assets. We will assume these assets are perfectly marketable with no transactions costs, and that there is no risk of default or possibility of being called before maturity. At first we will assume that the bank's entire portfolio is invested in one type of asset, and in one maturity. Later we will relax many of these assumptions.

Let $A_{0}$ be the initial value of the bank's assets and $L_{0}$ be the initial value of its liabilities, so that

$$
\begin{equation*}
c=A_{0}-L_{0} \tag{1}
\end{equation*}
$$

is the initial economic value of its capital. Define

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathrm{q}=\mathrm{C} / \mathrm{A}_{0} \tag{2}
\end{equation*}
$$

as its initial capital-asset ratio, so that

$$
\begin{equation*}
L_{0}=A_{0}(1-q) \tag{3}
\end{equation*}
$$

Let $\tilde{A}$ be the random value of the bank's assets when it is next examined. If $\tilde{A}$ is greater than $A_{0}$, so that the bank has excess capital, we assume the bank will be allowed to distribute this excess capital to shareholders in order to return its capitalasset ratio to $q$. If it is less than $A_{0}$, the examiners will require the shareholders to restore the deficient capital. If they do not, the bank will be liquidated. The shareholders could restore the capital by putting up more money of their own, by selling new stock on the open market so as to dilute their own stock, or by following a policy of retaining some of the anticipated return on tne assets as a buffer against unanticipated capital losses. As long as $A$ is above $L_{0}$, so that their stock has positive net worth, tney will choose to replenish the capital by one of these means. However, if $\tilde{A}$ is below $L_{0}$ (tnat is, if $\tilde{A} / A_{0}$ is below l-y), they will (abstracting from tne value of the bank's charter and customer relationships) prefer to abandon the bank and let the insuring agency pay off the depositors, taking a loss of $L_{0}-\tilde{A}$. Since the shareholders reap the unanticipated capital gains if $\tilde{A}$ is unusually high, but do not take all the
losses if $\tilde{A}$ is unusually low, the insuring agency would have to charge some positive insurance premium $I$ in order to compensate itself for the risk of having to take up part of the losses.

This premium should be retained by the party guaranteeing the deposits even in years when there are no failures, since the risk cannot be expected to average out over banks in any given year. Insurance against loan default or against embezzlement may behave to a large extent like casualty insurance, in which the premiums can be expected to pay off the losses in each year, but insurance against interest rate risk is undiversifiable. In most years, no banks will fail from this cause, but occasionally - once every 10 or 100 years, depending on the risks the banks take - all the banks will be in trouble.

THE VALUE OF DEPOSIT INSURANCE
Formally, deposit insurance is equivalent to an option on the bank's assets. Deposit insurance essentially gives the banking firm (construed to include both depositors and shareholders) a "put" option, entitling it to sell the bank's assets to the insurer at a prearranged "execution price," determined by the nominal value of the bank's liabilities. The liability-asset ratio, $1-q$, may therefore be thought of as the execution pricecurrent price ratio in a put option contract.

Robert Merton (1977) has thus applied the well-known BlackScholes option pricing formula to the problem of evaluating bank deposit insurance. However, this formula relies on the strong assumption that $\tilde{A}$ is log-normal. The distribution of most prices, including the prices of interest-bearing securities, seems to be
much too fat-tailed or leptokurtic to be consistent with a simple normal or log-normal distribution.

We therefore assume that the logarithm of $\tilde{A}$ is instead distributed according to the symmetric Paretian stable class of distributions, whose use in financial applications has been pioneered by Mandelbrot (1963), Fama and Roll (1968, 1971), and Roll (1970). If $\tilde{A}$ itself had a symmetric stable distribution, there would be a small but positive probability that the value of the assets would actually go negative. By making its logarithm symmetric stable, we eliminate this possibility.

Symmetric stable distributions are characterized by three parameters: the "characteristic exponent" $\alpha$, which governs how fast the tails taper off, the "standard scale" $c$, which roughly equals the semi-interquartile range, and the mean.

The characteristic exponent may range between 0 and 2 , though in financial applications it is ordinarily assumed to be between 1 and 2. When it equals 1 , the Cauchy distribution results, and when it equals 2, the normal (Gaussian) distribution is obtained. Except in the limiting normal case, the variance is infinite, which is why we must use the "standard scale" in place of the standard deviation to characterize its spread. If we were to restrict ourselves to the normal distribution, we would greatly underestimate the probability of a large, sudden change in the value of the bank's assets, and hence would greatly underestimate the fair value of insurance.

Figure 1 shows how the bell-shaped probability density function of the symmetric stable distribution changes with $\alpha$. In all three cases, the standard scale is chosen to be 1.0 , so that the probability is roughly 0.5 that $\tilde{x}$ will lie between +1 and -1 on the horizontal


Figure 1
THE EFFECT OF THE CHARACTERISTIC EXPONENT
axis. When $\alpha$ is less than 2.0 , the curve has a higher mode, lower shoulders, and higher tails than the familiar normal distribution. Note that the normal density virtually disappears by $\tilde{x}=5.0$.

Figure 2 shows how the stable density function is affected by the scale parameter $c$. In each case, the characteristic exponent equals 1.5 , the intermediate case of Figure 1 . If $c$ is 2.0 instead of 1.0 , the distribution has the same shape, but is twice as spread out (and has only half as high a mode, in order to continue to integrate to unity). When $c$ is 0.5 instead of 1.0 , it is more squeezed together. The mode is now at . 576, which is offscale in Figure 2. Note that the tails are still perceptibly above zero at $\tilde{x}=6.0$, which corresponds to 12 standard scales. For the normal distribution $(\alpha=2.0)$, the standard scale exactly equals the standard deviation divided by $\sqrt{2}$, so that 54.7 percent of the probability density lies between $+c$ and $-c$. For the Cauchy distribution ( $\alpha=1.0$ ), exactly 50 percent of the probability density lies between $+c$ and $-c$.

In two papers, the present author has developed some of the properties of stable distributions in a continuous time context, and has developed an option pricing formula based on the logsymmetric stable distribution. In continuous time the sample path of a process governed by these distributions is full of discontinuities. Therefore even if the regulators are continually vigilant--essentially examining the bank continuously--there is some possibility that the value of the bank's assets may change so suddenly that net worth will be deeply negative before they have a chance to close it. If the bank's assets fell in value, but not by enough to wipe out its capital, the regulators could either insist on a capital injection or else raise the premium for insurance in keeping with the deteriorated capital ratio of the bank. Therefore, with continuous examination, the only way the bank could fail is through a single discontinuity


THE EFFECT OF THE SCALE PARAMETER
large enough to wipe out the bank's capital; that is, a change in $\log A$ greater than $\log \frac{A_{0}}{L_{0}}=-\log (1-q)$. In McCulloch (1978a), it is shown that the annual rate of occurrence of such discontinuities is

$$
\begin{equation*}
\lambda=\frac{k_{\alpha}}{2}\left(\frac{c_{0}}{-\log (1-q)}\right)^{\alpha} \tag{4}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $c_{0}$ is the standard scale of $\log \tilde{A}$ that accumulates in one year, and $k_{\alpha}$ is a constant (depending on $\alpha$ ) that is tabulated in that article. For the sake of illustration, $k_{1}=.6366$, $k_{1.5}=.3989$, and $k_{2}=0$. (Since $k_{2}=0$, a normal diffusion process never, with probability 1 , has discontinuities.)

When a change in the value of the bank's assets sufficiently large to close the bank suddenly occurs (or is suddenly perceived to have already occurred), the change is likely to have been more than large enough to have wiped out the bank's capital, imposing some losses on the insuring agency. In McCulloch (1978b) it is shown that the fair value of these losses is given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{I}{A_{0}}=\lambda H(1-q, \alpha) d t \tag{5}
\end{equation*}
$$

where $H()$ is a function which is tabulated in that article, $I$ is insurance, and dt is the life of the "option" (or examination period), which approaches 0 . Thus the value per year of insurance, computed (as is conventional) as a fraction of liabilities, is

$$
\begin{equation*}
\pi=\frac{I}{L_{0} d t}=\frac{\lambda H(1-q, \alpha)}{1-q} \tag{6}
\end{equation*}
$$

This equation, in conjunction with (4), tells us how to compute the fair value of insurance from $q, \alpha$, and $c_{0}$.

THE DATA

In order to evaluate formulas (4) and (6), we need empirical values for $c_{0}$ and $\alpha$ for idealized default-free, perfectly marketable assets, of various maturities. U.S. Treasury securities are default-free, and very highly marketable, so we will use their empirical behavior as a proxy for the idealized assets we desire.

For each of several key maturities, we would like estimates of $c_{0}$ and $\alpha$ for three types of asset a bank or thrift institution might hold: single payment or "discount" instruments, "par bonds", by which we mean coupon bonds that happen to be selling exactly at par, and "amortized" loans that pay a constant amount each month with no balloon at final maturity. We cannot use raw Treasury securities price behavior to estimate these parameters directly, since the Treasury issues no marketable amortized securities, since its discount instruments (Treasury bills) have maturities only out to one year, and since most outstanding Treasury bonds are ordinarily selling substantially above or below par, depending on their coupon rates, and in any event, do not coincide with the key maturities we would like to investigate.

However, we can bypass this problem by curve-fitting a "discount function" to empirical Treasury quotations, and using this smooth function to construct a synthetic price for any type or maturity of security we care to define. For this purpose we employ the author's cubic-spline term structure curvefitting program, developed wnile at NBER-West. This version of
the program is a modification of the tax-adjusted term structure program developed in 1973 for the U.S. Treasury, and described in McCulloch (1975 a). The new modifications account precisely for the fact that the coupons on Treasury bonds arrive semiannually. For the sake of convenience and computational speed, the version developed for the Treasury assumed a continuous stream of coupons, which slightly distorts the shape of the term structure in the maturities where bonds and bills interface.

The data base we have available consists of bid and asked quotations for U.S. Treasury securities for the last business day of each month, from the end of December 1946 to the end of May 1977, a total of 366 months. Since these dates represent the dividing line between two months, they could equally well be associated with either month. We will refer to them in this paper as representing the "beginning" of the subsequent month, i.e., January 1947 to June 1977. In fact, the quotations are for actual delivery and payment early in these montins, about two business days after the quotation date. The data for January 1947 to April 1966 were collected by Reuben A. Kessel from the quotation sheets of Salomon Brothers, and were processed under the supervision of Merton H. Miller and Myron Scholes. The data for May 1966 to June 1975 were collected from Salomon Brotners quotation sheets by Joel Messina and obtained with the assistance of Jay Morrisson. The data for July 1975 to June 1977 were collected from Wall Street Journal composite dealer quotations by Krista Chinn under the direction of the present author.

All tax-exempt securities were rejected as being nonrepresentative of the market as a whole. (By the mid-1950's all but a handful of these had disappeared). "Flower bonds" often sell at a price premium because they can be surrendered at par value in payment of estate taxes if they are owned by the decedent at the time of his death. It was not practical to omit all of them, because for many years they constituted most if not all of the long-term securities. The following compromise was adopted for flower bonds: Those that l) were selling below par; 2) matured after 1982; and 3) were selling within $\$ 4$ per $\$ 100$ of face value of the lowest priced flower bond were excluded. Any that did not meet all three of these criteria were included. ${ }^{1}$ No attempt was made to compensate for the price discount that existed on many bonds in the earlier part of the period because of their ineligibility for commercial bank purchase. This discount was greatly reduced after the Accord of March 1951, and most of these bonds became eligible by the mid-1950's. Except for the tax-exempts and selected flower bonds, almost all U.S. Treasury Bills, Notes and Bonds were included. It would have been desirable in principle to exclude callable bonds, but this was not practical, since they constitute almost all of the longer-term securities for many years. Therefore they were treated as maturing on the final maturity date if selling below par, and as maturing on the call date if selling above par.

[^0]For each time $t$, a discount function $\delta(t, m)$ was fit to the bid-asked mean prices of the securities available. This function gives the present value, as a fraction of unity, of a dollar to be repaid after maturity $m$, i.e., at future time $t+m$. The price $a(t, m)$ of an amortized loan paying one dollar per year in continuous installments for $m$ years can be derived from the discount function as follows:

$$
\begin{equation*}
a(t, m)=\int_{0}^{m} \delta(t, \mu) d \mu \tag{7}
\end{equation*}
$$

Finally, the par bond yield $y(t, m)$ that gives the coupon rate (as a fraction of unity) that would be necessary to make a con-tinuous-coupon bond just sell at par can be derived as follows:

$$
\begin{equation*}
y(t, m)=\frac{1-\delta(t, m)}{a(t, m)} \tag{8}
\end{equation*}
$$

A batch version of the FORTRAN IV program that was used to curve-fit the term structure, together with series from which $\delta(t, m), Y(t, m)$, and $a(t, m)$ can be readily derived, are available from the NBER in New York, and further documentation will be available in the near future. The NBER takes no responsibility for either the program or the data, however.

PARAMETER ESTIMATES

At time $t$, a pure discount security with maturity $\Delta t$ can be purchased for $\delta(t, \Delta t)$ dollars. At time $t+\Delta t$, it can be sold (i.e. cashed, since it has just matured) for 1 dollar. The log price relative on this investment is

$$
\begin{equation*}
\log \frac{1}{\delta(t, \Delta t)}=-\log \delta(t, \Delta t) \tag{9}
\end{equation*}
$$

The log price relative over the same holding period of duration $\Delta t$ on an investment in a security with any longer maturity is random, since it depends on an unknown future price. However, its expected value will approximately equal (9), since investors have the option of investing in any maturity, and compare expected returns on all of them. In practice, the expected $\log$ price relative will'be slightly higher, the longer the maturity, because of a reliable, but small, liquidity premium. (See McCulloch, 1975b) Therefore the realized log price relative on a longer maturity security, minus expression (9) (i.e., plus log $\delta(t, \Delta t)$ ), will equal the unanticipated return plus a small, relatively constant liquidity premium. For a pure discount security with initial maturity $m$, this difference is given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
\log \frac{\delta(t+\Delta t, m-\Delta t)}{\delta(t, m)}+\log \delta(t, \Delta t) \tag{10}
\end{equation*}
$$

since after $\Delta t$ has elapsed, it can be sold for $\delta(t+\Delta t, m-\Delta t)$.
For coupon bonds and amortized loans, our problem is somewhat complicated by the payments that arrive during the nolding
period, i.e. between $t$ and $t+\Delta t$. We will therefore consider the log price relatives of modified bonds and amortized loans, that have had these first few payments removed. Such a modified par bond can be purchased at time $t$ for $1-y(t, m) a(t, \Delta t)$. When it is sold at $t+\Delta t$, its principal is worth $\delta(t+\Delta t, m-\Delta t)$, and its coupons are worth $y(t, m) a(t+\Delta t, m-\Delta t)$, so the amount by which its log price relative exceeds that on a discount security with maturity $\Delta t$ is given by

$$
\log \frac{\delta(t+\Delta t, m-\Delta t)+y(t, m) a(t+\Delta t, m-\Delta t)}{1-y(t, m) a(t, \Delta t)}
$$

$$
\begin{equation*}
+\log \delta(t, \Delta t) \tag{11}
\end{equation*}
$$

Our modified amortized loan can be purchased at time $t$ for $a(t, m)-a(t, \Delta t)$, and sold at $t+\Delta t$ for $a(t+\Delta t, m-\Delta t)$, so the relevant difference is given by

$$
\begin{equation*}
\log \frac{a(t+\Delta t, m-\Delta t)}{a(t, m)-a(t, \Delta t)}+\log \delta(t, \Delta t) . \tag{12}
\end{equation*}
$$

The monthly standard scale $c_{\text {lmo }}$ and the characteristic exponent of the unanticipated returns were estimated for each of the three types of asset using the methods suggested by fama and Roll (1971), for both the entire post-Accord period (roughly the last 26 years), and for the last 10 years. Prior to the Accord of March 1951, the Federal Reserve System artificially stabilized interest rates on U.S. Treasury securities. Since that period is not representative of what may be expected in
years to come, we did not make any use of that part of our data set. Table 1 shows our standard scale estimates, based on the .28 and . 72 fractiles of the distributions of expressions (10)(12). In Table 1, these values are multiplied by 100 in order to express them as percentage unanticipated changes. These figures mean that in roughly half the months observed, the unanticipated capital gain or loss on the asset indicated was within the value indicated, as a percent of the initial value of the asset. The standard scale for unanticipated changes accumulated over one year, $c_{0}$, can be computed from these values by equation (13), to be introduced presently.

In Figures 3 and 4, these standard scale estimates are plotted versus maturity on double logarithmic graph paper. We see that for maturities under one year, discount instruments and par bonds are virtually indistinguishable, but that the difference becomes important after five years or so. Amortized loans behave very much like par bonds with half the terminal maturity.

For the post-Accord period, we have a full 314 observations for maturities 10 years or less, 274 observations for the 20 year maturity, and only 64 observations for the 30 year maturity. In Figure 1, which is based on this period, we see that the 20 year maturity standard scales lie almost on a straight line extrapolated from the 5 and 10 year points, at least for discounts and par bonds. The 30 year standard scales seem not to lie on the curve derived from the shorter maturities. We attribute this to the fact that we have only a highly curtailed sample for the 30 year maturity, which apparently is not representative

## Table 1

## STANDARD SCALE OF UNANTICIPATED LOGARITHMIC RETURNS

$100 c_{1 m o}$

Discount
Maturity
Instruments

Par
Bonds
Amortized Loans

Last 26 years (post-Accord)

| 3 mor | .0282 | .0281 | .01609 |
| :--- | :--- | :--- | :--- |
| 6 mo | .0698 | .0695 | .0333 |
| 1 yr | .141 | .1378 | .0686 |
| 2 yr | .280 | .268 | .1435 |
| 5 yr | .588 | .523 | .277 |
| 10 yr | .861 | .698 | .481 |
| 20 yr | 1.29 | .878 | .648 |
| 30 yr | 1.28 | .849 | .605 |

Last 10 years

| 3mo | . 0462 | . 0459 | . 0254 |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| 6 mo | . 1159 | . 1137 | . 0684 |
| lyr | . 253 | . 247 | . 1241 |
| 2 yr | . 492 | . 465 | . 264 |
| 5 yr | . 866 | . 730 | . 492 |
| 10yr | 1.280 | . 945 | . 695 |
| 20yr | 2.91 | 1.437 | 1.132 |
| 30 yr |  |  |  |
| 20yr* | 1.887* | 1.223* | . 980 * |
| 30yr* | 2.45* | 1.422* | 1.199* |

*extrapolated

Figure 3
STANDARD SCALE OF UNANTICIPATED RETURNS
(Post-Accord)


STANDARD SCALE OF UNANTICIPATED RETURNS<br>(Last 10 years)


of the period as a whole. We therefore believe that if we had a full 314 observations for the 30 -year maturity, its standard scale would lie on a relatively straight line, or at least on a smooth curve, with the shorter maturities, when plotted on double logarithmic graph paper.

For the past 10 years, the sample falls off even faster. We have a full 120 observations for maturities 10 years or less, 85 observations (some $30 \%$ fewer) for the 20 year maturity, and no observations at all for the 30 year maturity. We see from Figure 4 that here even the 20 year maturity standard scales do not seem to line up with the shorter maturity standard scales. We attribute this to the fact that the 20 year maturity sample size is more curtailed, in percentage terms, and therefore less representative, here than for the post-Accord period. If we had a full 120 observations for the 20 and 30 year maturities, it seems reasonable to believe that they would lie on a straight line extrapolated from the 5 and 10 year points. These maturities are of potential interest, especially in the case of thrift institutions, so it is important that we have reasonable estimates for these values. The straight line double logarithmic extrapolations seems more reasonable than the curtailed-sample actual estimates, so we will use the extrapolated values to evaluate our formulas for these maturities. These extrapolated values are indicated with asterisks in Table 1.

Table 2 shows estimates of the characteristic exponent, using the estimator $\hat{\alpha} .95$ suggested by Fama and Roll. This

## Table 2

## CHARACTERISTIC EXPONENT

$\alpha$

|  | Discount | Par | Amortized |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
| Maturity | Instruments | Bonds | Bonds |

Last 26 years (post-Accord)

| 3 mo | 314 | 1.36 | 1.36 | 1.52 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 6 mo | 314 | 1.43 | 1.44 | 1.39 |
| 1 yr | 314 | 1.25 | 1.24 | 1.24 |
| 2 yr | 314 | 1.37 | 1.29 | 1.31 |
| 5 yr | 314 | 1.28 | 1.35 | 1.24 |
| 10 yr | 314 | 1.33 | 1.28 | 1.35 |
| 20 yr | 274 | 1.49 | 1.68 | 1.59 |
| 30 yr | 64 |  |  |  |

Last 10 years

| 3 mo | 120 | 1.54 | 1.54 | 1.65 |
| ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: | ---: |
| 6 mo | 120 | 1.52 | 1.51 | 1.77 |
| 1 yr | 120 | 1.41 | 1.41 | 1.45 |
| 2 yr | 120 | 1.47 | 1.47 | 1.52 |
| 5 yr | 120 | 1.35 | 1.35 | 1.48 |
| 10 yr | 120 | 1.39 | 1.32 | 1.36 |
| 20 yr | 85 | --- | 1.60 | 1.69 |
| 30 yr | 0 | - | - |  |

estimator of $\alpha$ is omputed from the .05 and .95 fractiles of the observed distribution. Except for the curtailed-sample 30-year maturity, most of the estimates for the last 26 years lie in the range 1.24 to 1.39 . The values for the last 10 years are considerably higher. Except for the curtailed-sample 20-year maturity and amortized loans with 3 to 6 months' maturity (not an important class of assets), most of the estimates lie in the range 1.35 to 1.52 .

Examination of the raw data suggests that the volatility of interest rates has been relatively constant over the last 10 years, while it has undergone significant changes over the last 26 years. The early 1950's and 1960's were periods of relatively low interest rate volatility, while the late 1950's and the most recent 10 years were periods of relatively high interest rate volatility. When stable variables having the same characteristic exponent but different standard scales are mixed together, the resulting sample distribution tends to have fatter tails than do the distributions of the variables thus mixed. The estimator $\hat{\alpha}_{.95}$ would therefore tend to come out lower than the true characteristic exponent of the distributions generating the variables mixed. This may explain why the estimates for the last 26 years come out lower than for the last 10 years: Unanticipated returns may have had a relatively constant characteristic exponent in the range 1.35 to 1.52 , but a standard scale that has changed gradually over time giving biased estimates of $\alpha$ when the whole period is pooled. It is therefore reasonable to assume that in the immediate future, unanticipated returns will have
roughly the standard scale of the last 10 years, with $\alpha$ in the range 1.35 to 1.52 . The probability of default and fair value of insurance are sharply declining functions of the characteristic exponent (except for extremely risky banks), so in order not to overstate these values, we will use a relatively high value of $\alpha$ in this range, namely 1.5 , in all our calculations below.

In the long-run future, we may expect the standard scale of unanticipated changes to either rise or fall from its level of the last 10 years. We could probably approximate this compound distribution with a stable distribution using the standard scale and (apparently biased) characteristic exponent values estimated for the entire post-Accord period. However, this could actually give higher estimates of bank riskiness than would obtain using the past 10 years' estimates, in spite of the lower standard scales, because of the powerful effect of the lower $\alpha$ we would be forced to use in order to capture the uncertainty in the standard scale. In the interest of keeping our estimates on the conservative side, we will therefore use the standard scale estimates for the past 10 years (as extrapolated in the case of the 20 and 30 year maturities), in conjunction with an $\alpha$ value of 1.5 for all maturities and types of asset. ${ }^{2}$

[^1]CAPITAL ADEQUACY: THE PROBABILITY CRITERION
Formula (4) above is based on the one-year standard scale $c_{0}$, while our monthly data have given us the one-month standard scale $\mathrm{c}_{1 \mathrm{mo}}$. For stable distributions the standard scale accumulates according to the rule

$$
\begin{equation*}
\mathrm{c}_{0}^{\alpha}=12 \mathrm{c}_{1 \mathrm{mo}}{ }^{\alpha} . \tag{13}
\end{equation*}
$$

Therefore, in place of (4) we may use

$$
\begin{equation*}
\lambda=6 k_{\alpha}\left(\frac{c_{1 m o}}{-\log (1-q)}\right)^{\alpha} \tag{14}
\end{equation*}
$$

to evaluate the annual rate of failure. Recall that $\mathrm{k}_{1.5}=.3989$.
Table 3 shows the probability per year of failure for various capital-asset ratios and eight key maturities, using formula (14). At the high extreme, we see that a bank with $1 \%$ capital and a portfolio consisting of nothing but hypothetical 30 -year "Treasury bills" would have a failure rate of $911 \%$ per year. By this we mean that we would expect it to fail about 9.11 times per year, assuming it were reorganized immediately after each failure. At the low extreme, we see that a bank with $90 \%$ capital and which rolls over from month to month in 3 -month par bonds has a failure rate of $.000675 \%$ per year. That is, the expected time until its next failure is $1 / .00000675=148,000$ years, or something like 25 times the length of recorded history.

In between these extremes, we find more down-to-earth values. The average capital-asset ratio for the domestic operations of U.S. commercial banks is around 7\%. If such a
Table 3. AVERAGE ANNUAL RATE OF FAILURE (PERCENT). 100 入

| Capital- <br> Asset <br> Ratio | Maturity Asset |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 3 mo | 6 mo | 1 yr | 2 yr | 5 yr | 10 yr | 20 yr | 30 yr |
| Discount Instruments |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1\% | 2.35 | 9.38 | 30.2 | 82.0 | 191.4 | 344 | 617. | 911. |
| 2\% | . 827 | 3.29 | 10.60 | 28.7 | 67.1 | 120.7 | 217. | 319. |
| 4\% | . 288 | 1.145 | 3.69 | 10.02 | 23.4 | 41.8 | 75.4 | 111.3 |
| 7\% | . 1216 | . 483 | 1.558 | 4.23 | 9.87 | 17.73 | 31.8 | 46.7 |
| 10\% | . 0695 | . 276 | . 890 | 2.42 | 5.64 | 10.14 | 18.14 | 26.9 |
| 15\% | . 0363 | . 1443 | . 465 | 1.260 | 2.94 | 5.29 | 9.49 | 14.01 |
| Par Bonds |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1\% | 2.34 | 9.10 | 29.3 | 75.3 | 148.3 | 218. | 321. | 403. |
| 2\% | . 821 | 3.19 | 10.25 | 26.5 | 52.0 | 76.6 | 112.5 | 141.4 |
| 4\% | . 285 | 1.112 | 3.57 | 9.20 | 18.11 | 26.7 | 39.3 | 49.2 |
| 7\% | . 1206 | . 469 | 1.503 | 3.89 | 7.64 | 11.25 | 16.56 | 20.8 |
| 10\% | . 0689 | . 269 | . 860 | 2.22 | 4.37 | 6.44 | 9.47 | 11.87 |
| 15\% | . 0360 | . 1400 | . 450 | 1.158 | 2.28 | 3.36 | 4.94 | 6.18 |
| 30\% | . 01108 | . 0431 | . 1382 | . 357 | . 702 | 1.031 | 1.520 | 1.904 |
| 60\% | . 00269 | . 01046 | . 0335 | . 0866 | . 1704 | . 251 | . 369 | . 463 |
| 90\% | . 000675 | . 00263 | . 00843 | . 0218 | . 0428 | . 0629 | . 0926 | . 1161 |
| Amortized Loans |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| 1\% | . 961 | 4.25 | 10.38 | 32.2 | 82.1 | 137.6 | 231. | 312. |
| 2\% | . 337 | 1.491 | 3.64 | 11.31 | 28.8 | 48.2 | 80.9 | 109.4 |
| 4\% | . 1174 | . 519 | 1.268 | 3.94 | 10.03 | 16.80 | 28.2 | 38.1 |
| 7\% | . 0495 | . 219 | . 535 | 1.660 | 4.23 | 7.09 | 11.89 | 16.06 |
| 10\% | . 0284 | . 1251 | . 306 | . 949 | 2.42 | 4.05 | 6.79 | 9.19 |
| 15\% | . 01478 | . 0654 | . 1598 | . 495 | 1.262 | 2.12 | 3.54 | 4.79 |

bank held a portfolio of one-year maturity par bonds (which is actuallysomewhat less than the present average maturity of U.S. commercial bank assets), its mean rate of failure would be $1.503 \%$ per year, and its expected life to next failure would be about 66 years, so that it would probably outlive its present management and depositors. ${ }^{3}$ If it were to reduce the maturity of its assets to six months, its failure rate would fall to $0.469 \%$ per year, giving it an expected life of some 213 years.

On the other hand, a thrift institution with $7 \%$ capital and a portfolio of 20 -year amortized mortgages has an annual rate of occurrence of insolvency of $11.89 \%$. For such an institution, a year sufficiently bad to actually make its net worth (based on market value) negative would come roughly about once every 8.41 years. 1966 and 1969 may have been recent examples of such years. The authorities did not actually close the S\&L's en masse in those years, but rather imposed ceilings on the rates they were allowed to pay when competing for deposits. The monopoly-like profits these ceilings gave to the thrift institutions served eventually to restore their battered capital positions.

Throughout Table 3, we see that the probability of failure increases sharply with asset maturity, and declines dramatically with capital-asset ratio. There is therefore a considerable trade-off between capital and this measure of risk.
${ }^{3}$ Using the same 10 -year $c^{\prime}$ mo of .00247 and the actual point estimate of $\alpha$ of 1.41 , this failure rate would instead be $2.30 \%$. With the 26 -year $c_{1 m o}(.001378)$ and $\alpha(1.25)$ it is $2.25 \%$.

The data from Table 3 for par bonds is plotted on double logarithmic graph paper in Figure 5. A smooth curve has been fit to the points for each capital-asset ratio. This diagram essentially depicts a relationship between three variables: maturity, capital-asset ratio, and probability of default. We can use this diagram to derive another way of looking at this relationship, as follows: for any probability (or equivalently, expected longevity) we are particularly interested in, say 1\% (100 years) or $4 \%$ ( 25 years), we can pick off a set of maturity/ capital asset ratio points that give just the probability selected. Figure 6 shows the results of this procedure. This diagram essentially tells us how much capital is adequate to keep the probability of default below any given level chosen, as a function of maturity. For example, $9.0 \%$ capital would be necessary to reduce the probability of default to $1 \%$ for a bank with a portfolio of 1 year par bonds. A mere $2.0 \%$ capital would be adequate for this bank if we were content to let it fail once every 10 years, but $34 \%$ capital would be necessary if we insisted that it not fail but once in a millenium. Similar diagrams could be constructed for discount instruments or amortized loans.

## Figure 5

AVERAGE RATE OF FAILURE (Par Bonds)


Par Bond Maturity

Figure 6


CAPITAL ADEQUACY: FAIR INSURANCE CRITERION
Table 4 shows the annual value of deposit insurance, expressed as a percentage of liabilities. At the upper extreme we see that our bank with $1 \%$ capital and 30 -year Treasury bills would have to pay the FDIC at the rate of $15.4 \%$ of its liabilities per year in order to compensate the FDIC for the risk it would run by insuring it. Again, the lower extreme is given by a bank with $90 \%$ capital and a portfolio of 3 -month par bonds. This bank would only have to pay the FDIC a sum equal to $.000444 \%$ of its liabilities per year (i.e., 0.0444 basis points) in order to fully compensate the FDIC.

Our bank with $7 \%$ capital and l-year par bonds should be paying a premium of 13.9 basis points. ${ }^{4}$ The actual premium charged is set at $1 / 12 \%$ of liabilities ( 8.33 basis points), regardless of the risk the bank takes. Therefore, even this relatively safe bank imposes an interest rate risk on the FDIC that is greater than the total premium charged to cover all the different types of risk we discussed in the Introduction.

The fair value of insurance increases sharply with asset maturity in Table 4. The hypothetical thrift institution we discussed in the previous section, with $7 \%$ capital and a portfolio of 20-year mortgages, imposes a liability worth 110. basis points on its insuring agency. This high a premium would make a substantial dent in the gross return it makes on its assets. If it

[^2]Table 4. ANNUAL VALUE OF INSURANCE AS A PERCENTAGE OF LIABILITIES. $100 \pi$

| $\begin{aligned} & \text { Capital- } \\ & \text { Asset } \\ & \text { Ratio } \end{aligned}$ | Asset Maturity |  |  |  |  |  |  |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: | :---: |
|  | 3 mo | 6 mo | 1 yr | 2 yr | 5 yr | 10 yr | 20 yr | 30 yr |


| Discount | Instruments |  |
| :---: | :---: | :---: |
| $1 \%$ | .0397 | .158 |
| $2 \%$ | .0262 | .104 |
| $4 \%$ | .0167 | .0665 |
| $7 \%$ | .0113 | .0448 |
| $10 \%$ | .00860 | .0341 |
| $15 \%$ | .00616 | .0245 |

Par Bonds


00554 .175
.115
.0736
.0496
.0378
.0271





Amortized Loans

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were actually charged this premium, it would quickly try to change the structure of its balance sheet. (In practice, U.S. thrift institutions have an average capital ratio more like $6 \%$, which would make the fair premium even higher. On the other hand, many mortgages are paid off early, making their effective maturity considerably less than their nominal maturity.)

The data for par bonds from Table 4 have been plotted in Figure 7. This graph can be used to find combinations of maturity and capital that generate any particular insurance value we might be interested in. This derived relationship is shown in Figure 8.

From Figure 8 we see that $14 \%$ capital would be necessary to make the actual premium of $1 / 12 \%$ adequate for a bank whose assets consist of one-year bonds. In order for $7 \%$ capital to be adequate, its assets could have no more than 0.73 year ( 8.8 month) maturities.

In Figure 8, we also include a line for a premium of $1 / 48 \%$. This value is of interest, since in recent years the FDIC has rebated approximately half of the official premium back to the banks, making the total premium more nearly $1 / 24 \%$, and since this reduced premium has to cover many other types of risk beside pure interest rate risk. If these other types of risk use up half of the reduced premium, that leaves only $1 / 48 \%$ (2.08 basis points) to cover interest rate risk. We see that asset maturities would have to be reduced to about 0.34 years ( 4.1 months) in order to make capital adequate with this low an effective premium. One-year assets would require $51 \%$ capital.

Figure 7
anNual value of insurance as a percentage of liabilities
(Par Bonds)


## Figure 8



Using the rival normal assumption, Merton (1977, 10-11) estimates the fair value of insurance for $a$ bank with 10 percent capital and a portfolio of long-term U.S. government bonds as being in the neighborhood of six basis points (Merton's tau equals 0.003 ), if the bank is annually inspected. We see from Table 4 that with 10 percent capital and 20 -year par bonds, the value of the risk is actually more like 117 basis points per year. As the bank becomes safer, so that we are concerned with events even further out on the tail of the distribution, the difference becomes still more striking. With 15 percent capital and 20 -year par bonds, we estimate 83.8 basis points, while Merton's estimate drops below one basis point. Thus, the normal assumption leads to substantial underestimation of the value of bank insurance.

## MIXED MATURITY PORTFOLIOS

The fair premium formula for a bank with a given capitalasset ratio is proportional to $c_{0}^{\alpha}$, where $c_{0}$ is the annualized standard scale of the unanticipated change in the logarithm of the value of the bank's assets, assumed thus far to be of one type. If the bank has a mixed portfolio of assets, we must instead base our calculation on the variability of the mixed portfolio. While the product of $n$ log-stable variables with the same $\alpha$ is log-stable, their sum is not precisely log-stable. Nevertheless, the sum is approximately log-stable. We will therefore treat the mixed portfolio as if it really were logstable, with standard scale $c_{p}$.

Consider a bank with $n$ types of asset, each of whose returns are log-stable, and demand liabilities with fixed value. Asset i, which by itself has annualized standard scale $c_{i}$, forms fraction $\theta_{i}$ of the bank's assets, where

$$
\begin{equation*}
\sum_{i=1}^{n} \theta_{i}=1 \tag{15}
\end{equation*}
$$

The effective standard scale of the approximately log-stable mixed portfolio depends in a complicated way on the correlation of unanticipated returns for the different assets. Two cases are mathematically tractable: that of zero correlation, in which case we would have

$$
\begin{equation*}
c_{p}^{\alpha}=\sum_{i=1}^{n} \theta_{i}^{\alpha} c_{i}^{\alpha}, \tag{16}
\end{equation*}
$$

and that of perfect positive correlation, in which case we would have

$$
\begin{equation*}
c_{p}=\sum_{i=1}^{n} \theta_{i} c_{i} \tag{17}
\end{equation*}
$$

In actual fact, interest rate movements are highly (though by no means perfectly) correlated across maturities, which means that the unanticipated returns for different maturities will also be highly and positively correlated. We therefore regard (17) as a much better approximation to the truth than (16).

Equation (17) can therefore either be used directly for a bank with mixed assets, or else a "pure" fair premium $\pi_{i}$ can be found from Table 4 or Figure 7, and these pure premia mixed to obtain a premium $\pi_{p}$ for the entire portfolio, by using the formula

$$
\begin{equation*}
\pi_{p}=\left(\sum_{i=1}^{n} \theta_{i} \pi_{i}^{1 / \alpha}\right)^{\alpha} \tag{18}
\end{equation*}
$$

For example, suppose a bank with $7 \%$ capital held $90 \%$ of its assets in 3 -month Treasury bills (which would require a premium of 1.13 basis points by themselves), and $10 \%$ of its assets in 10 -year bonds selling near par (requiring 104. basis points by themselves). The composite premium required for pure interest rate risk would then be

$$
\begin{align*}
\pi_{p} & =\left(.9(1.13)^{1 / 1.5}+.1(104)^{1 / 1.5}\right)^{1.5} \\
& =5.69 \text { basis points. } \tag{19}
\end{align*}
$$

Interestingly, this is less than $10 \%$ of the 104. basis point premium required for a pure 10 -year bond portfolio, because of the nonlinear form of (18).

Formula (18) has an important implication for reserve policy. Consider a bank that holds fraction $r$ of its assets in the form of cash reserves, and the remainder in a portfolio which by itself would require premium $\pi$. Formula (18) then implies that its composite premium should be

$$
\begin{align*}
\pi_{p} & =\left(r \cdot 0+(1-r)_{\pi}^{1 / \alpha}\right)^{\alpha} \\
& =(1-r)^{\alpha} \pi \tag{20}
\end{align*}
$$

Differentiating this formula with respect to $r$ yields

$$
\begin{equation*}
\frac{\partial \pi p}{\partial r}=-\alpha(1-r)^{\alpha-1} \pi \tag{21}
\end{equation*}
$$

so that cash reserves reduce the bank's fair premium, but by an amount that diminishes as $r$ increases. The maximum reduction therefore occurs at $r=0$ :

$$
\begin{equation*}
\left.\frac{\partial \pi_{p}}{\partial r}\right|_{r=0}=-\alpha \pi \tag{22}
\end{equation*}
$$

Let $i$ be the expected return on the bank's risky assets. If cash reserves pay no interest, this is essentially the opportunity cost to the bank of holding reserves. As long as i is greater than $\alpha \pi$, which it almost surely would be, the bank only
stands to lose by holding reserves, even the first few dollars of reserves that have the greatest impact on its fair premium. With a fair premium, the only reason the bank would voluntarily hold zero-interest cash would be to minimize transactions costs (which we have assumed away in the present paper). The size of the inventory it would hold for this purpose could be modelled along the lines of the Baumol or Miller and Orr cash balance models. Zero-interest cash reserves therefore seem to be a relatively expensive way of providing bank safety. As long as banks pay a fair premium, coaxing them into short maturity assets, there seems to be no reason to require them to hold any cash reserves at all.

## LIABILITY MANAGEMENT

In this paper, we have dealt only with a "traditional bank" that has only demand or virtually demand liabilities. In recent years, banks have relied increasingly on longer-term liabilities or certificates of deposit in order to partially hedye their long-term assets. This is a desirable development, which would greatly reduce the riskiness of banks. If a bank perfectly matched its asset and liability maturities, it would have no interest rate risk at all. With a little capital, it would have the flexibility of not having to match perfectly, and could still maintain zero interest rate risk, provided each contracted disbursement was preceded by contracted receipts. However, bank capital is limited, so the match would have to be relatively close.

If all intermediaries tried to match maturities in this manner, they would have to juggle the term structure of interest rates around until savers and borrowers were coaxed into the same maturities. Elsewhere we have argued that this matching would improve the efficiency of the intertemporal economy. We argue that the traditional practice of mismatching maturities (which we call "misintermediation") actually leads to disequilibrious fluctuations in macroeconomic activity.

We have made no attempt in the present paper to deal with the difficult problem of how the fair premium should be calculated for a bank with general mixed asset and liability maturities. Average duration is of little help, since the asset and liability
payment profiles could have very different shapes, and still represent the same average duration. If all the assets have one maturity, and the liabilities have another maturity, the bank is roughly equivalent to one with demand liabilities and assets with maturity equal to the difference. Thus, a thrift institution with 20-year assets and one-year liabilities is roughly equivalent to one with 19-year assets and passbook liabilities.

Clearly if thrift institutions are to continue to grant longterm martgages (as they should), they must hold comparably longterm liabilities in order to avoid expensive interest rate risk. Present restrictions on the terms they may offer on retail CD's should therefore be removed. In particular, these CD's should not be subject to artificial penalties if the depositor wishes to rediscount his deposit on terms that are favorable to the bank, should be negotiable or assignable in order to guarantee the depositor competitive rediscount terms should he change his financial plans, and should place no fixed dollar obligation on the bank prior to the agreed upon maturity.

The "Liquid Asset Mutual Funds" that appeared in the early 70's represent another type of intermediary with perfectly matched asset and liability maturities and therefore no interest rate risk. Here the liabilities are actually shares in the current market value of the assets. The depositors are in effect selfinsuring against the small interest rate risk inherent in the fund's short-term assets. However, the fund's assets are so stable in value that the depositor (shareholder) can be virtually assured of his deposit's current value. Therefore it is practical
to allow the depositor to write checks against the current value of his shares. Many of these funds indeed allow such checks, though at present only for relatively large amounts, such as $\$ 500$ or over. These funds present an interesting alternative to the traditional bank.

INDEXED AND VARIABLE RATE LOANS

Much of the volatility in interest rates in recent years has been due to the uncertainty of inflation. Long-term loan assets that are indexed to the cost of living would therefore probably have a substantially more certain return over a short holding period, and therefore might justify lower insurance premiums, provided they were offset on the balance sheet by an equal value of indexed liabilities.

Indexed loans would have the additional advantage of reducing default risk, since a sudden unanticipated end to inflation today when nominal interest rates contain a substantial inflation premium would make it just as difficult for borrowers to repay as it was for them in 1929-1933, when there was a sudden unanticipated deflation while homeowners and farmers were committed to interest rates that would have been appropriate for constant prices. Defaults on such loans were a major cause of the wave of bank failures during those years. A sudden end to inflation could cause comparable problems today, unless bank balance sheets are indexed to the cost of living.

In spite of their desirable properties, indexed loans have apparently been, until very recently, illegal and unenforceable in the courts, under the second sentence of the 1933 Gold Clause Joint Resolution. (See Aztec Properties vs. Union Planters National Bank, 530 SW 2d, 760-761, and the U.S. Supreme Court Cases cited there.) It was not until October 1977 that this law was repealed.

Denied indexed loans as a means of avoiding inflation uncertainty in long-term nominal interest rates, many banks have turned to "variable rate loans", whose nominal interest rates are tied to some index of short term nominal interest rates. These loans substitute a series of relatively accurate short-run inflation forecasts for a relatively inaccurate long-run inflation forecast, so they do reduce inflation uncertainty to a degree, though not entirely. The effective maturity of these variable-rate loans is ambiguous for our purposes. If they had the same default risk as ordinary loans, they could be taken as having maturity equal to their interest computation interval, rather than the longer, actual maturity of the loan. However, since they leave the real interest rate on long-term loans uncertain, the real portion of the interest rate risk is borne by the borrower, rather than by the bank. On paper, the bank does not face real interest rate risk from these loans, but in practice, the real interest rate risk may simply be disguised as default risk. All in all, these variable rate loans are inferior substitutes for fixed-rate indexed loans. Unless there are other hidden legal barriers to indexation, variable rate loans will probably soon disappear.

THE "GOING BUSINESS" VALUE OF THE BANK

For our calculations above, we have assumed that as soon as a bank has negative net worth (based on current market value of assets), the stockholders will take the option of allowing the bank to be liquidated, so that their stock becomes worthless and the insuring agency pays off the depositors in full. In practice, a bank with negative net worth may actually be financially viable, in the sense that eventually it may be able to pay off its liabilities with interest out of the income from its assets.

There are two reasons it may be able to do this. The first is the value of its customer relations. In fact financial markets are not perfect, so that the bank receives a sort of rent from the fact that it has evaluated the creditworthiness of certain customers who are unknown to other banks. To the extent this is true, the shareholders will be willing to put up additional capital or to dilute their own stock with outside capital in order to prevent the bank from being liquidated. Market imperfections are the stuff day-to-day business is made of, so it is important that a bank with negative net worth based on tangible assets be given a fair chance to raise more capital before liquidating it.

The second reason is the monopoly value of the bank's charter. Since 1935, entry into banking has been severely restricted. The value of the existing charters has been further enhanced by the zero interest ceiling on checking accounts (outside of New England), and by Regulation Q-type ceilings on time and savings account interest.

Rather than destroy the monopoly value of the charter of a bank that is unable to meet its current obligations by liquidating it immediately, the policy of the FDIC has usually been to manage its receivership of the bank so as to recover as much as is possible for the shareholders. Because of the monopoly rents to the bank's charter, it may well be able to recover something, or even put the bank back into business, in spite of the fact that its net worth based on tangible assets had once been negative.

The above-mentioned restrictions on competition cannot be considered in isolation from the issue of bank safety. They were originally introduced shortly after the massive bank failures of 1929-1933 in the hopes that greater profitability would make banks safer. This hope was illusory. Pouring profits into a bank in order to make it safer is comparable to trying to carry water across a room in a sieve: the profits may immediately flow out of the bank in the form of dividends to shareholders. The monopoly profits might instead be retained and added to economic capital, and to that extent would indirectly make the bank safer. But the bank would be just as safe if the capital were raised by any other means.

If banks paid competitive interest on deposits, but were charged a fair premium for deposit insurance, they would be forced to pass the premium on to depositors, in the form of reduced interest. Therefore fair insurance would cost the demand deposit owner several basis points, depending on the maturity of the bank's assets. The above restrictions on competition, on the other hand,
cost the depositor several hundred basis points. They are therefore an extremely costly, not to mention ineffective, means of providing bank safety. In a study of bank risk and capital adequacy, they cannot be taken as immutable institutional background, since they exist in the name of bank safety. If they were abolished, a large part of the "going business" value of the bank would be eliminated. The simple model we have used above would then be a more realistic one.

## CONCLUSION

It should be remembered that the estimates in this paper are only point estimates. By using as high a value for the characteristic exponent as seemed justified by the data, we have tried to make our estimates of the fair value of insurance err, if anything, on the low side. These estimates might be improved upon, possibly by using the maximum likelihood estimating procedures for stable parameters that have been recently developed by William DuMouchel of the MIT Mathematics Department, or possibly by using an alternative leptokurtic distribution model, such as Student's $t$. All these procedures will give different point estimates. Nevertheless, the burden of proof should be on the banks to show at a high level of significance that the premium they are paying to governmental insuring agencies is at least sufficient to cover the fair value of insurance for the risks that they are incurring.

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[^0]:    ${ }^{1}$ See McCulloch (1975a, 817-822) for further discussion of these estate tax bonds.

[^1]:    ${ }^{2}$ In footnotes 3 and 4 below, the effect of alternate values of $c_{0}$ and $\alpha$ will be illustrated.

[^2]:    ${ }^{4}$ With the same $c_{1 m o}$ but $\alpha=1.41$, this value becomes 23.4 basis points. With $c_{1 m o}=.001378$ and $\alpha=1.25$, it becomes 27.3 basis points. Thus our estimates are, if anything, definitely on the low side. Compare footnote 3.

