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INTEXORGANIZATIONAL RELATIONS IN INDUSTRIAL SYSTEMS - A NETWORK APPROACH COMPARED WITH TRE TRANSACTION COST APPROACH

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Abstract

A network approach, as it is developed by some Swedish researchers in industrial marketing and international business (see e.g. Hägg & Johanson (ed.), 1982 and Hammarkvist, Håkansson & Mattsson, 1982) is compared with the transaction cost approach associated with Oliver Williamson (e.g. Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1981). The reason we make such a comparison is that we often get questions from colleagues in the scientific community, suggesting that what we try to do is rather similar to what the transaction cost approach is doing.

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Interorganizational Relations in Industrial Systems - A Network Approach **Compared** with the Transaction Cost Approach

The purpose of this **paper** is **to discuss some aspects** of relations **between** firms engaged in industrial production as **those** relations **are** postulated or described in two theoretical **approaches to** the **analyses** of industrial systems.

A <u>network</u> approach, as it is developed by **some** Swedish researchers in industrial marketing and international business (see e.g. Hägg 6 Johanson (ed.), 1982 and Hammarkvist, Håkansson & Mattsson, 1982) is **compared** with the <u>transaction cost</u> approach associated with Oliver Williamson (e.g. Williamson, 1975, 1979, 1981). The reason we make such a comparison is that we often get questions from colleagues in the scientific community, suggesting that what we try to do is rather similar to what the transaction cost approach is doing.

We present first the **basic** characteristics of **our "network"** and its inter-organizational relationsbips. This is followed by a short description of the transaction cost approach and some comments on the recent debate of Williamson's approach. We will finally proceed with our comparative analysis.

Industrial Networks1

In industrial systems firms **are** engaged in production, distribution and **use** of **goods** and services. We describe **such** systems as networks of **relationships** between firms. There is **a** division of **work** in **a** network which **means** that firms **are** dependent **on each** other. Therefore their activities need **to** be coordinated. Coordination is not brought **about**

¹This section is adapted from Johanson & Mattsson (1984).

through a central plan or an organizational hierarchy, "or does it take place through the price mechanismas in the traditional market model. Instead coordination takes place through interaction between firms in the network, where price is just one of several influencing conditions. The firms arefreetochoose counterparts and thus "market forces" are at play. To gain access, however, to external resources and make it possible to sellproducts, exhange relationshipshaveto be established with other firms. Suchrelationships take time and efforts to establish and develop, which constrains the firms' possibilities tochange counterparts. The "eed for adjustments between the interdependent firms as to quantity and quality of goods and services exchanged, and the timing of such exhange, call for moreor less explicit coordination through joint planing, or through power exercised by one party over the other. Each firm in the network has relationships with customers, distributors, suppliers etc. (and sometimes also directly with competitors) as well as indirect relations via those firms with the suppliers' suppliers, the customers' customers, competitors etc.

The networks are stable and changing. Individual business transactions between firms usually take place within the framework of established relationships. Evidently, some new relationships are established now and then and some old relationships are disrupted for some reason (e.g. competitive activities), but most exhange takes place within earlier existing relationships. However, those existing relationships are changing all the time through interaction between the firms in connection with transactionsmade within the relationship.

As an aspect of those relationships, bonds of various kinds are developed between the firms. We distinguish <u>technical planning</u>, knowledge, social economic, and legal bonds. These bonds can be exemplified by, respectively, product and process adjustments, logistical coordination, knowledge about the counterpart, personal confidence and liking, special creditagreements, and long-term contracts.

We stress complementary in the network. There are of course also important competitive relations. Other firms want to get access to specific exchange possibilities either as sellers or as buyers, and cooperating firms also have partly conflicting objectives.

The relationships imply that there are specific inter-firm dependence relations which are of a different character than the general dependence relations to the market in the traditional market model. A firm has direct and specific dependence relations to those firms with which it has exhange relationships. It has indirect and specific dependence relations to those firms with which its counterparts have exhange relationships, i.e. the other firms operating in the network where it is engaged.

To get established in a new market, that is in a network which is new to the firm, it has to build relationships which are new to itself and its counterparts. Sometimes this is <u>done by breaking old, existing</u> relationships and sometimes by adding arelationship to already existing ones. Initiatives can be taken both by the seller and by the buyer. A supplier can become established in a network which is new to the firm, because a buying firm takes initiative. S. Common

This model of industrial markets implies that the firm's activities in industrial markets are <u>cumulative processes</u> in the sense that relationships all the time are established, maintained, developed, and broken in order togive satisfactory, short-term economic return and tocreate positions in the network, securing the long-term survival and development of the firm. Through the activities in the network the firm develops the relationships which secure the <u>access to important</u> resources and the sale of its products and services.

Because of the cumulative nature of the market activities, network <u>position</u> is an important concept. At each point in time the firm has certain positions in the network. They characterize its relations to other firms, arearesult of earlier activities in the network both by the firm and by other firms, and constitute the base which gives the development possibilities and constraints of the firm in the network.

All the firms in the network have objectives regarding their future positions. Desired changes or defence of positions thus describe

important aspects of the firms' strategies. The strategies of firms can be complementarytoeach other or competitive or a combination of both.

A basicassumption in the network model is that the individual firm is dependent on resources controlled by other firms. The firm gets access to these external resources through its network positions. Since the development of positions takes time and efforts and since the present positions define opportunities and constraints for the futurestrategic development of the firm we look ar the firm's positions in the network as partially controlled, intangible <u>market assets</u>. Market assets generaterevenues for the firm and serve to give the firm access to other firms' internal assets. Because of the interdependenciesbetween firms, the use of the asset in one firm is dependent on the use of other firms' assets. Thus also the investment processes and their consequences are interdependent in the network.

Relationships in Industrial Networks

In industrial networks suppliers and customers establish, develop and maintain lasting relationships with each other. Such relationships may be significant to the parties. They may reduce costs of exhange and production, they may promoteknowledge development of the parties, they may give the parties some control over each other, they may be used as bridges over to other firms, and they may be used when mobilizing partners against third parties.

Basically an interfirm relationship is a <u>mutual orientration</u> of two firms towardseach other. This implies that the firms are prepared to interact with each other and expecteach other to do so too. We distinguish two separate, butcloselyrelated, types of interaction -exchange processes and adaptation processes (Hakansson (ed) 1982). <u>They constitute the dynamic aspects of relationships</u>. The mutual orientation implies also that the firms have mutual knowledge about each other and that they are aware of each other's interests and are

prepared to pay some attention to them. (Figurel).




Figure 1. Relationships and Interaction in Industrial Markets

The relationships arise through <u>exchange processes</u> between the parties. The positive inducements they offer each other is the primary feature of the exhange processes. Mutuality is an important aspect of the exhange process, the parties demonstrate that they respect each other's interests. A lasting relationship may emerge if the parties perceive a certain complexity or heterogeneity in exhange. This implies that a number of rather weak and long-term criteria enter into and become critical in the evaluation of the exchange. A situation emerges which is similar to what Blau (1968) has characterized as social exhange. He describes how a relationship evolves in such a case:

> "Social exhange relations evolve in a slow process, starting with minor transactions in which little trust is required because little risk is involved and in which both partners can prove their trustworthness, enabling them to expand their relation and engage in major transactions." (Blau, 1968, p. 454)

Single exhanges are in this case integral parts of a process in which the parties gradually build up a mutual trust in each other.

In supplier-customer relationships business exhange is an important aspect of this social exhange process and the gradual build up is well known among business men. "It takes time to become established as

a supplier", "we always test new suppliers for a long time before switching to them" and similar statements are typical.

The social exchange process implies that the relationships have an important social element. They have, however, important technical, logistical, knowledge, administrative and time elements also. The exhange process implies that the parties test how well they fit each other. The process is, however, not only a learning process, but also an <u>adaptation process</u>. In the course of the process anumber of problems usually emerge, the parties do not fit and a number of acti-vities can be carried out to eliminate the misfits. The parties adapt to each other and influence each other to adapt. This is a vital characteristic of the relationships.

Adaptations are made in a number of different dimensions. The firms can adapt to each other technically by modifying products or production processes. They may adapt logistically by adjusting stock levels or developing common delivery systems. Some adapt administratively by modifying planning or scheduling systems. Thus, on-line computer systems of firms are getting usual. They may also adapt financially by special ways of handling payments. Finally some firms adapt to each other with regard to knowledge by acting together in some technical development matters.

Some of the adaptations between firms take place in the form of specific investment6 or projects, such as acquisition of specific machinery or change of systems. To alarge extent, however, the adaptations occur through continuous processes as a result of day-to-day experiences. In total there is a close relation between the general exchange process and the adaptation processes. The more intensive the exhange process between the firms, the stronger will be the reasons to make adaptations. The type of adaptations is also related to the characteristics of the exhange, such as frequency, complexity and regularity.

A<u>daptations</u> are important for atleast three reasons. First. they strengthen the bonds between the firms. Through adaptations the firms

are getting increasingly dependent on each other. The supplier whose products or processes are modified so as to fit a specific customer's needsbecomes dependent on this customer. And acustomer who has adjusted production processes and scheduling systems to fit a suplier's capabilities is dependent on that supplier. The dependencies may be mutual, but they are not necessarily so, and in general it can be assumed that they aremore or less assymmetrical in the sense that one party is more dependent on the relationship than the other.

Second, the reinforcement of the relationships through adaptations make them more endurable which in turn brings about that disagreements as arulehaveto be handled within the frame of the relationships. A situation evolves in which "voice" is better as conflict resolution mechanism than "exit", since exit is not easy or attractive(cf Hirschman, 1970, p. 83). (p.83). This implies that the existence of relationshipsneed not make the firms passive, but they havetolearn other conflict solution methods than just switching tonew customers or suppliers. Those methods are of a more problem solving nature than is the exit method.

Third, the adaptations areimportant as they indicate that there is somespace change in the relationships. Everything is not given once and for all. Rather the two parties can adapt to fit each other better. At the same time, however, there are limits to those adaptations as all adaptations area kind of investment. The investment has to give some return which limits the total space of change. Furthermore, there are limits to the adaptations to specific counterparts without loosing one's own independence and identity.

Finally, the interaction processes create <u>adaptations</u> in <u>attitudes</u> and knowledge of the parties that is the mutual orientation is developed. This mutual orientation is manifested in common language regarding technical matters, rules of contracting, standardisation of processes, products and routines. More latent aspects of the mutual orientation may refer to views on business ethics, technical philosophy, and handling of organizational problems. A most important aspect of the mutual orientation is mutual knowledge, that is knowled-

ge which the parties assume each other to have about each other and which they draw upon in communicating with each other. This mutual knowledge may refer to resources, strategies, needs and capabilities of the parties, and in particular to their relationships with other firms. It is a subtle knowledge which is based on personal experience and takes time to develop.

Above we have characterized interfirm relationships as a mutual orientation of two firms towards each other. This mutual orientation implies that the firms are prepared to interact with each other. We have distinguished two related interaction processes, exhange and adaptation. We have also said that the mutual orientation is affected by the interaction processes between the firms. The mutual orientation is established, developed and maintained through interaction processes. Its strength and character are developed and maintained through interaction. Again, the mutual orientation constitutes the frame within which further interaction can take place.

We have also primarily characterized the interfirm relationships from a social viewpoint. However, it is important to keep in mind that the relationships are established and developed in order to perform the industrial activities in the firms. Thus, the needs of those activities will strongly affect the nature of the relationships developed with other firms. Technical, logistical, economic and other operative considerations will affect both the relationships and the interaction processes. The same is true for considerations of a strategic nature about the individual firms' objectives and activities as to their development and positions in the market. On the other hand, the industrial activities in the firms are modified and developed as a result of the interaction processes. (Figure 2)




Figure 2. Basic Causal Relations of the Model

Furthermore, we have discussed interfirm relationships without explicitly referring to individual actors. However, the mutual orientation between firms is principally a mutual orientation between individual actors in the firms. In some cases the mutuality is primarily a matter of interpersonal relationships between salesmen and purchasers, in other cases a number of persons on different levels and with different specializations may be mutually oriented towards each other. Correspondingly the interaction processes are carried out by individuals, but we have discussed them as taking place between the firms.

Our view on interfirm relationships implies that the development of the relationships is affected by developments in the technical, logistical, economic etc. systems in which the interaction is embedded. The view assumes, however, by no means that the characteristics of the relationships are determined by structural circumstances. There is always some discretion as to which relationships to develop in what respects and to that extent the view is voluntaristic. On the other hand, the possibilities to change the relationships through unitateral decisions are rather limited as the relationships are created and modified through the interaction between a number of persons.

The Transaction Cost Approach

In aperfect market transactions are carried out without transaction costs. Information is freely available, decision-making is rational, there always exist alternative suppliers and buyers, there are no carry-over effects from one period to the other of aspecific transaction between twoparties in the market. When these conditions are not upheld, transaction costs emerge because there is a need to devote efforts to organize, to carry out and to control transactions between interdependent actors. The transaction cost approach tries to explain the institutional form, i.e. the "governancestructure" (market, hierarchy or intermediate forms) for these transactions. Two behavioral characteristics are postulated: Decisions and actions are charaterized by bounded rationality and opportunistic behaviour. Under conditions of certainty it is possible ex ante to gather information and to specify contracts between supplier and buyer, to take care of various future contingencies and also ex post to control the fulfillment of the agreement between the parties. However, when uncertainty prevails contracts will be very complex and costly both to construct and to enforce, especially so in the small number bargaining case. "Small numbers" means that there are few if any alternatives open for abuyer or for aseller to replace the counterpart in a transaction. The major reason for this is that the asset specificity is high. Personal knowledge or skills, type of machinery or products, geographic location etc. are not homogeneous across the population of buyers or sellers. The higher the asset specificity, the more dependent will the parties be on each other and the higher the costs of switching to another party will become. Frequency of transactions also enters as a major concept in the analysis. If there areonly occasional transactions and the asset specificity is very high, there is no opportunity for vertical integration and the market transaction must be developed with the aid of some arbitrating agency. If the frequency is high and the asset specificity is high the transaction cost approach expectsvertical integration to take place. Bilateral market relations is the institutional form expected to be the most transaction cost efficient if the asset specificity is intermediate

(Williamson, 1981, Figure 1). Some empirical studies, with somewhat mixed results, have been carried out to test the hypotheses (e.g. Walker & Weber, 1984).

The transaction **cost** approach offers an explanation **to** why industries are characterized by large scale organizations. Under the label "theory of internalization" it has become one of the recently most discussed theoretical explanation for the existence of multinational corporations (Rugman, 1982).

The transaction cost approach has recently been rather extensively debated and criticized by economists and sociologists. "Neoinstitutionalists" (to be distinguished from the "new institutionalists!) critizise Williamson for believing in the neoclassical assumption that the most efficient institutional form will "survive" (Dugger, 1983).

The transaction **cost approach can** be used **as** an argument for vertical and **horizontal** integration, **since** the **use** of hierarchies rather than markets for **coordination** of interdependent activities may **economize** on transaction **costs**. The critics say that the transaction **cost concept** is **vague** and **even** ill-defined and that **there** is little if **any empiri**cal evidence that **economizing on** transaction **costs** is **a** good explanation or **even a** dominating **motive** for vertical integration (**e.g. Perrow**, 1986, Kogut, 1985).

Another major objection is that Williamson makes unrealistic **assump**tions **about** the **differences** between markets and hierarchies. Opportunism **also** exists within firms, organizations **are** not necessarily **able to economize** on bounded rationality, markets can **also** be characterized by assymetrical **power** relations (controlled by "fiat") etc. Another important issue in the **application** of transaction cost analysis, is the delimitation of the systems **to** be **compared**. The transaction is **a** dyadic relation, but the industrial system is made up of **many such** relations that **are more** or less interdependent. If **we pick** just one of **those** dyads and **change** the institutional form, e.g. through vertical integration, **also** the other dyads may be affected.

The efficiency of the wider system may verywellmove in the opposite direction from the efficiency achieved in the original dyad that was changed. It has also been argued that the basically neoclassical approach assumes that there is a unique and stable equilibrium indicating a single institutional form under specific circumstances. However, even casual observations show that integrated and nonintegrated arrangements co-exist.

Of the assumptions and major variables in the transaction cost model the postulate that mankind is basically "opportunistic with guile and deceit" has been questioned, both from an empirical and "moral" point of view.Especially, sociologists point out that economic relationships also contain elements of mutual trust and exhange of a social and cultural kind (Perrow, 1986).

A Comparison Between the Transaction Cost Approach and the Network Approach

We believe that there are some fundamental differences between the transaction cost approach and the network approach. These can be related to the theoretical foundations, problem orientation basic concepts, system delimitation and nature or relationships between firms.

- a) Differences in theoretical foundations. Williamson's approach lies firmly within the neoclassical framework focusing conditions for stable equilibrium. Ours does not. In the network approach the benchmark models of markets and organizations are not used. The "markets" are characterized by interaction in relationships where the parties have some control over each other and our organizations are not "pure" hierarchies. To us the legal frameworks of the transactions are less important and the boundaries of the individual organizations are unclear. The network approach rather viewsfirms as social units and is closer to social exchange theory. With regard to control assumptions it is based on resource dependence theory. (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978)
- b) <u>Differences</u> in <u>products</u> orientation. The transaction cost approach aims at explaining institutional governancestructures. Why and

when are activities coordinated within, rather than between, firms? Our basic interest lies in describing and explaining dynamic aspects of industrial systems and strategies pursued by firms in such systems. We arealso interested in the functional activities in the individual firm, especially those that are related to the exhange and adaptation processes (marketing, purchasing, R&D).

c) Williamson's <u>basic concepts</u>, with the exception of opportunism, can also be used to describe important characteristics of networks.

<u>Opportunism</u> is not by us regarded as a basic characteristic of the actors. As in social exchange theory, its correlate trust is an important concept in the network approach.

Bounded <u>rationality</u> is for us an implicit assumption, in the sense that actors need to handle information, learn by experience etc. More interesting than boundaries is the formation of newknowledge as to the handling of resources. An important source of knowledge in the firm is the interaction with other firms inside the network relationships.

<u>Uncertainty</u> is in our model also linked to the relationships in the network. The nature of the bonds and the degree of structuring of the network influence the degree and type of uncertainty. It is possible to influence the uncertainty both in Williamson's and in our approach. However, in Williamson's framework this influence seemsto be more related to the legal form of the transaction than in ours.

Asset specificity is very closely related to our stress on heterogeneity (se Hägg & Johanson, op.cit.), <u>mutual adaptation</u> and <u>market</u> assets. However, we basically disagree with Williamson when he argues that high degree of asset specificityleadstovertical integration. Asset specificity can be the result of internal activities in a firm, but we believe that it is mostly the result of interaction within inter-organizational relations. Thus, firms are using each others assets in a mutual adaptation process. Asset specificity is one reason why firms are dependent on external resources and devote important resources to investments in relationships. However, if all these resources should be "internalized", a company will find itself in an impossible "growth" situation. To us, a high degree of asset specificity, is the rulerather than the exception and that variable in itself can hardly explain integration. Furthermore, unless the production and demand capacities of supplier and userrespectively match each other, surplus supply or surplus demand must be sold/bought in the "market".

Small_numbers_bargajning is also for us a characteristic of the market as is a relatively high <u>frequency</u> of transactions_between parties. Since we are dealing with industrial systems, buyers seldom have only occasional need for a specific type of productor service. Even capital goods transactions are often part of longterm relationships, including transfer of service for the maintenance of the function performed by the capital good.

d) The system delimitation is different. The transaction cost approach bases its conclusions about governance structures on characteristics of aggregates of specific types of transaction relations. We look at relationships in networks in the context of other network relationships. The network approach bases its analyseson characteristics of systems of interdependent dyadic relations. Thus, if A first buys from B, but then merges with B, not only is the relationship between A and B changed (in ourframeworkperhaps not verymuch), but also A's relation to B's other customers, suppliers, competitors etc. From a transaction cost point of view, what might be gained in the A-B relationships that B had before the merger.

Another consequence of our system delimitation is that it is not possible to characterize the system as atypical market or atypical hierarchy. Different governancestructures co-exist (complementary or competitive) within this wider system.

It can be argued that whereas the function of the dyadic relation in the transaction cost approach is to analyse the boundaries of organizations and markets, their function in the network approach is to open the systems under study.

e) The most important difference is in the nature of the relationships. For us the industrial markets arecharacterized by lasting relationships between firms because such relationships can reduce costs of exhange and production and can promote knowledge development and change. Through lasting relationships firms do get somecontrolover each other and they get indirect access to assets in firms with whom they do not have direct relationships. The exchange and adaptation processarelooked upon as investment processes (of course not always successful ones!). "Mutual orientation" is developed. To Williamson such relationships hardly exist in markets, only within hierarchies. "Bilateral governance", which is Williamson's counterpart to our "relationship" is not considered a stable institutional form. To us the relationships between firms in networks are stable and can basically play the same coordinative and development function as intraorganzational relations. Through the relationships to customers, distributors, suppliers etc. a firm can reachout, to a quite extensive network. Such indirect relationships might be very important. They are not handled within the transaction cost approach.

Finally, an example which contrasts the transaction cost and the network approach in the analysis of a specificissue, i.e. internationalization of business (adapted from Johanson & Mattsson, op.cit.).

The theory of internalization(Rugmanop.cit.)assumes that a multinational enterprise has somehow developed a firm-specific advantage in its home market. Usually this is in the form of internally developed, intangible assets that give the firm some superior production, product, marketing andfor management knowledge. If this asset cannot be exploited and safe-guarded effectively through market or contractual transactions, an "internal market" has to be created. Expansions out-

side the firm's domestic market, given that local production is advantageous, will then take place through horizontal and/or vertical integration. The firm establishes, or buys, manufacturing plants outside of its home market. Thus the multinational enterprise exists because of "marker failure" or high "contracting costs". The firm wants to protect its intangible assets and to be able to control the price others pay for the use of these assets. There are, however, also costs of **internalizing** in the form of internal administrative systems and risk-taking. These costs of internalization will be lower the less different the foreign market is from the home market. Thus, the internalization model will predict that international expansion starts in "nearby" markets. The internalization model is not intended to explain processes. It tries to explain a specific economic institution, the multinational enterprise. But it says something about what according to the transaction cost approach are driving forces for international expansion of production of the firm.

It seems to be an implicit assumption in the internalization approach that the firm's development activities are "internal". In the network approach development activities to an important extent are dependent on the relationships with other firms, and thus on the network positions of the firm. Since international expansion is a process by which network positions are established and changed, international expansion as such influences the further development of the products, production processes, marketing behaviour, etc.

We said earlier that firms in networks invest in relationships with other firms. The positions thus created give access to external resources. Thus, the multinational enterprise to a larger extent enjoys direct relationships with customers and users in foreign markets rather than the indirect relations, through agents or licensees, that the less internationalized firm, operating only in its home market., has. This leads to a further observation linked to the network model. The multinational firm may use its network positions to effectively "externalize" some of its activities, without loosing control of its crucial intangible assets. The manufacturing value added by

multinational industrial **firms** might thus **decrease** due **to** increased "subcontracting".

It should be evident from **our discussion** that the **network** it quite different from the transaction **cost** approach. Since the **theoretical** bases and the problem orientations are different this is hardly astonishing.

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