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INTERSUBJECTIFICATION IN COGNITIVE GRAMMAR: REFLECTING ON ENGLISH AND POLISH REFLEXIVES

Abstract

The paper provides a cognitive grammar analysis of reflexivization phenomena in English and Polish. Three separate although related claims are made: (i) underlying reflexivization phenomena is the *intersubjectification* process which involves the so-called *reference point relationship*; (ii) the intersubjectification process takes place in the *Current Discourse Space – CDS* (Langacker 2008), whereby the degree of the antecedent's *accessibility* for the reflexive pronoun is established; (iii) while in Polish, the antecedent's accessibility is closely linked to the detransitivization process, in English, it is determined by the *accessibility hierarchy* in the sense of Kuno (1987).

1. Reflexives in English and in Polish. Basic facts

Generally, two types of reflexives have been distinguished in English: the *reflexive-self* as in the examples in (1) through (5), and the *emphatic -self* as in (6) through (8):[1]

(1) a. John saw *himself* in the mirror.
  *b. *Himself* saw John in the mirror.

(2) John bought *himself* a nice jacket yesterday.

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[1] We will have nothing to say about the so-called reciprocal reflexive *each other*, which requires an antecedent in the plural, whose distribution is governed by the *clause-mate condition* (cf. note 2); nor shall we examine its Polish equivalent, *jeden drugiego*, found in sentences such as *I wtedy jeden chłopiec uderzył drugiego* 'And then one boy hit the other'. The Polish

(3)   John told Greg a story about *himself.*

(4)   John believes S[*himself* to be a genius].

(5)   *John believes S[that *himself* is a genius].

(6)   a.   John bought Mary a bunch of flowers *himself.*
       b.   *Himself*, John bought Mary a bunch of flowers.
       c.   ?John *himself* bought *himself* a nice jacket yesterday.
       d.   John *himself* believes S[that Mary is a genius].

(7)   All my family, including *myself*, went to the seaside.

(8)   A picture of *himself* that hangs in the gym hall seems to appear to amuse John.

The ungrammatical sentences in (1b) and (5) show that a reflexive-self may neither precede its antecedent (here *John*) as in (1b), nor can it appear in a clause other than its antecedent, as documented by (5).[2] Also, as illustrated by (3), a reflexive can co-refer with either the subject or the object of a sentence. In contrast, an emphatic-self seems to appear practically in all places in a sentence as (6) through (8) clearly show.[3]

 Turning to Polish, one can distinguish three kinds of reflexives: (i) the case-marked *siebie* reflexive in the object, as illustrated in (9), (10), (11), (12) and (13), (ii) the clitic *się*, which, generally, replaces the *siebie* form, as in (14), and appears in a number of *się*-forms such as impersonal constructions as in (15), (16) and (17), middle voice constructions (cf. (18)) and ergative forms (cf. (19))[4] and (iii) the case- and gender-marked emphatic *sam*, as in (20) and (21):

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  reciprocal form is not formally a reflexive. Still, treating, as we do, *reciprocity* in Polish as a semantic/conceptual category; we will discuss it in the context of the *detransitivization* process as signaled by the Polish reflexive *siebie/się*.

2   The example in (5) thus violates the so-called *clause mate* condition: *myself* is in the embedded clause, while its antecedent, *John*, appears in the main clause. The example in (4), however, is problematic: although *myself* and *John* are in two separate clauses, the sentence is grammatical. To salvage the clause mate condition the so-called *subject raising rule-to-object* was proposed in the generative literature, which moved *myself*, the subject of the embedded clause, to the object position of the main clause (hence the name of the rule, cf. Postal 1974). Chomsky (1973) rejected this solution. On his analysis the ungrammaticality of (5) was attributed to the fact that, in contradistinction to (4), the reflexive in (5) appears in a tensed clause (i.e. a clause that contains a finite form of the verb) and thus violates the so-called *Tensed-S-Condition*.

3   The sentence in (8) contains *a picture noun*, i.e. a nominal phrase such as *a picture of himself*, *a film about herself*, *a novel about ourselves*, etc. (cf. Warshawsky-Harris 1965; Jackendoff 1972). Because picture nouns, just like emphatics-self, seem to violate all conditions on reflexivization in that they can precede their antecedents and appear in clauses other than their antecedents (i.e. they violate the *clause-mate condition*), they have been treated as emphatics themselves (cf. Helke 1971; Leskosky 1972; Verheijen 1983; also Kardela 1985). For an in-depth analysis of reflexives in the generative grammar framework, see, for instance, Postal (1971) and Jackendoff (1972); for an extensive treatment of reflexives in Polish, see Wilczewska (1966), Szlifersztejnowa (1968), Kański (1986), Kubiński (1987), Szymańska (2000), Drogosz (2008), *inter alia*.

4   Ergative verbs can be used both intransitively, as illustrated by (19), or transitively, as in a sentence such as *Jan zagotował wodę* 'John boiled the water'.

(9)   Marek zobaczył *siebie* w lustrze.
      Mark saw himself-Acc. in the mirror.

(10) Piotr kupił *sobie* płaszcz.
      Peter bought himself-Dat. a coat.

(11) Jan dużo mówił Marysi o *sobie*.
      John told Mary a lot about himself/*herself.

(12) Jan obiecał Marysi S[– kupić *sobie* książkę o sztuce etruskiej].
      John promised Mary to buy himself/*herself a book on Etruscan art.

(13) Ola kazała Janowi S[– kupić *sobie* płaszcz].
      Ola asked John S[– to buy himself/herself a coat].

(14) Marek już umył *się* i ogolił.
      Mark has just washed and shaved himself.

(15) Tu *się* dużo czyta i pisze.
      One reads-refl. and writes a lot here.

(16) Nie odrobiło *się* pracy domowej, co?
      One not has done-refl. his homework, eh?

(17) Bawiono *się* całą noc.
      One/they were partying *się*-refl. all night.

(18) Te telewizory bardzo dobrze się sprzedają.
      These TV-sets sell *się*-refl. very well.

(19) Woda właśnie *się* zagotowała.
      The water *się*-refl. has just boiled.

(20) Grzegorz nakręcił ten film *sam*.
      Greg has shot this film all by himself/alone.

(21) *Sam* Piotr niewiele o *sobie* mówi.
      Lit. *Sam*-emph. Peter speaks very little about himself.
      Peter himself speaks very little about himself.

Generally, reflexives in Polish are subject bound, as indicated by (11) and (12), where the reflexive *sobie* co-refers only with the subject *Jan*, not with the object *Mary*. However, when a reflexive appears in infinitive clauses with object controlled main clause verbs such as *kazać* 'ask (sb to do sth), tell (sb to do sth)', as in (13), the reflexive can be either subject- or object-bound. Also observe that, similar to the English usage, cf. (6c), the emphatic *sam* in Polish can appear together with a regular reflexive, as shown in (21).

2. Reflexives as reference-point phenomena

In Langacker's theory reflexives are treated as reference point phenomena, along with personal pronouns, possessives and the so-called raising constructions. The general reference point configuration for the pronoun-antecedent configuration looks as follows (Langacker 2000: 238):

R = reference point (antecedent)   T = target (pronoun)
D = dominion   C = conceptualizer

Fig. 1. Pronoun-antecedent configuration

Underlying the configuration in Fig. 1 is the so-called *reference point* relationship, a mental relationship holding between the conceptualizer, C, and the object of conceptualization, T (target), established via the reference point, R. Specifically, as observed by Langacker (2000: 238) a pronoun, T (target), which profiles a thing specified for person and number, invokes the appropriate discourse context, equating its profile with a reference point, R, a salient entity of this context. With the *dominion*, D, established by the reference point, the conceptualizer has access now – via the referring expression (i.e. the pronoun – T) – to a potential antecedent.

For our analysis to go through it is important to assume that:

i.   every nominal can be potentially treated as a reference point, R (hence become the pronoun's antecedent), where reflexive pronouns are, in contrast to fully fledged noun phrases, markers of what we would like to call *high-degree coreference* expressions. Reflexives form an *accessibility scale* – from *low accessibility signals* like fully fledged noun phrases, to *high accessibility units* (or *high-degree coreference* expressions) like personal pronouns, reflexive pronouns or zero anaphors. Following Kemmer (1995: 55), we will define accessibility as "the degree of ease with which a discourse referent [antecedent – H.K.] can be identified or 'picked out' mentally via the use of a given referring element";

ii.   accessibility is determined by the *intersubjectification* process, whereby the lower the *accessibility degree* of the referring expression, the greater the degree of intersubjectivity is claimed to be involved in the pronoun-antecedent relation. Viewed through the prism of Fig. 1, the lower the values of a referring expression's accessibility, the further away from T on the R-T axis the reflexive's *accessibility value* is likely to be located.

iii. the antecedent's accessibility in Polish should be seen in terms of the *detransitivization* process rather than in terms of the *accessibility hierarchy* in the sense of Kuno (1987).

In connection with (i), consider the following sentences:

(22) Orły rodzą *orły*.
       Eagles give birth to eagles.
       (i.e. Outstanding individuals beget outstanding offsprings.)

(23) Tom saw *an/the elderly, tired man with gray hair* in the mirror.

(24) Tom saw *himself* in the mirror.

(25) Mary went to Warsaw and Peter – to Cracow.

The respective referring expressions in these sentences: *orły* 'eagles' in the object position in (22), *an elderly, tired man with gray hair* in (23), *himself* in (24) and the *null element* (gap – zero anaphor), left after the deletion of *went* in (25), represent the varying degrees of accessibility signals in the pronoun-antecedent relationship. Thus whereas *himself* and the null anaphor in (24) and (25), being high-degree coreference expressions, strongly suggest the presence of a potential antecedent in the discourse (i.e. *Tom* and *went*, respectively), the fully fledged noun phrase *an elderly, tired man with gray hair* only "weakly" points to the antecedent *Tom*. Notice that (22) does not exhibit even a weak coreference relationship between the two noun phrases: the expression *orły* in the object can hardly be treated as a referring expression pointing at the (presumed) antecedent *orły* in the subject position.

   Turning to (ii), we need to introduce two important concepts: the idea of subjectification, which we will discuss in the context of so-called *viewpoint reflexives*, and the concept of intersubjectification, which will be discussed in the context of emphatic reflexives.

3. Viewpoint reflexives and subjectification

Consider the following two sentences involving *viewpoint point*, fist analyzed by Cantrall (1974: 146; adapted):

(26) a. The adults in the picture are facing away from us, with the children placed
          behind *them*.
      b. The adults in the picture are facing away from us, with the children placed
          behind *themselves*.

Although the (a) and (b) sentences of (26) describe a scene in which the adults have their backs turned to an observer of the picture, with the children standing behind them, the reflexive (unlike the pronoun *them*) is acceptable only under the interpretation that the children stand behind the women as seen *from the women's point of view*. That is, by uttering (26b) the speaker is watching the scene from the women's *vantage point*, feeling some sort of empathy with them. Seen from a Cognitive Grammar standpoint, this means that the speaker is on-stage, i.e. he "subjectifies" with his feelings the whole scene involving the women and the children who pose for a photo shoot. This requires a comment.

   One of the basic human abilities is *subjectification*, or *virtual motion*, a dimension of *imagery*, i.e. "the construing of the scene in alternate ways" (Langacker 1988: 63).

Subjectification is a gradual process, where the so-called *OVA relation* (objective viewing arrangement) between the conceptualizer and the object of his/her conceptualization is replaced, via *attenuation*, by the *EVA relation* (egocentric viewing arrangement), as shown in Fig. 2 (Langacker 2000: 298; modified).

Fig. 2(a) represents the OVA configuration: the bold arrow stands for the objective relation which obtains between a trajector such as an agent or an instrument, and the landmark, an entity which could be a patient. C is the conceptualizer, who is *off-stage* and who mentally *scans* the relation between tr and lm. Broken arrows symbolize the process of scanning which takes place in the so-called *processing time* (T), i.e. the time through which the given conceptualization develops. The broken heavy arrow in Fig. 2(b) symbolizes the *attenuation* of the OVA relation; the conceptualizer is still scanning the scene, but the relation between tr and lm is motivated to a lesser extent. The objectively existing motivation between lm and tr disappears in (c), where tr and lm are linked by the subjective relation, established now by the conceptualizer's mental operations alone.[5] The *virtual* (or *fictive*) *movement* that takes place here, is, on Langacker's analysis, represented by the movement of the trajector (cf. Langacker 2000: 300):

The (a) and (b) diagrams in Fig. 3 represent the subjectification process seen from the point of view of the mental scanning performed by the conceptualizer. Whereas in (a) the conceptualizer traces the physical motion of, say, the balloon (trajector); in (b), C follows— subjectively—the same path as in (a), locating this time the trajector, say the cliff rising, with respect to a certain reference point R. The scene is construed subjectively in (b) precisely because the conceptualizer assumes the vantage point of R and, moving along, establishes now – in the absence of any physical movement – the mental link alone between lm and tr.

This brings us to the emphatic reflexives and associated with them, the intersubjectification process.

4. Emphatic reflexives and intersubjectification

As already remarked, all reflexive pronouns are markers of high coreference in a discourse, signaling the presence of a potential antecedent; for Kemmer (1995), they are "unexpected" as discourse roles. This is especially true in the case of the emphatic-self, in which case, according to Kemmer (1995: 57):

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[5]   To illustrate, the (a) example below is an OVA configuration, whereas (b) represents the EVA relationship.

      a.   The balloon is rising up to three thousand feet.
      b.   The cliff is rising two hundred feet high above the lake level.

In (a) the movement is real: the conceptualizer is following the movement of the balloon rising. In (b) the movement is virtual: it is not the cliff that is moving up high, but rather the conceptualizer is "moving mentally" along the ridges of the cliff.

Fig. 2. Subjectification

Fig. 3. Subjectification as TR-movement

it is necessary to consider the meaning of emphatic *-self* in terms of the relation of its referent to speaker expectations. In most general terms, emphatic *-self* is a signal that the discourse referent indicated by *-self* is a referent that is to some degree unexpected in the discourse role or clausal role where it occurs. In other words, some other potential referent or referents might have, for whatever reason, been more likely or expected. The *-self* form functions, in fact, to exclude any alternative potential referents that might have been expected to occur instead of the one the *self*-marked noun phrase refers to.

Seen in discursive terms, the role of the emphatic-self, Kemmer observes, is to identify recurrent discourse patterns, the most important of which is the *topic pattern*, represented by a formula: *Topic → shift of topic to associated entity → unexpected shift back to topic*, where "→" stands for temporal sequence. The topic pattern, Kemmer further notes, following Langacker (1993), can readily be recast in terms of the reference point relationship, "a conceptualisation used as a way of accessing other conceptualisations" (Kemmer 1995: 58). As an example illustrating the above topic pattern formula Kemmer offers the following piece of narration from the *New York Times Magazine* (Kemmer 1995: 58):

(several leading figures were revealed as Stasi agents)

    Chief among them was Sacha Anderson, an ultra-hip writer, publisher, ceramic designer and musician. Revelations about the extent of his betrayals have astonished and enraged many of the people who lived and worked with him.

    A strange day in Berlin: I spent the morning with one of the people Anderson spied on, the writer Lutz Rathenow, and the afternoon with Anderson <u>himself</u>. [The article goes on to describe both meetings.] (NY Times Magazine, 12 April 1992: 50)

Notice that, in accordance with the topic pattern formula, Anderson is introduced first as a local topic. Then attention is shifted to Rathenow and others, who had been spied on by Anderson; Anderson functions as a reference point for all these individuals. Then the emphatic *himself* appears, excluding "the others" and thus pushing the discourse back to Anderson, the reference point of the local discourse.

    The question now is this: How can the discourse-governed emphatic-antecedent relationship be accounted for in the Cognitive Grammar model? In order to answer this question we have to introduce the notion of the *Current Discourse Space* and the *mind reading* strategy.

    First, we have to define the term "intersubjectivity" itself. Zlatev et al. (2008: 3) offer the following characteristic of intersubjectivity:

i.   human beings are primordially connected in their subjectivity, rather than functioning as monads who need to "infer" that others are also endowed with experiences and mentalities that are similar to their own;

ii. the sharing of experiences is not only, not even primarily, on a cognitive level, but also (and more basically) on the level of affect, perceptual processes and conative (action-oriented) engagements;

iii. such sharing and understanding is based on embodied interaction (e.g. empathic perception, imitation, gesture and practical collaboration);

iv. crucial cognitive capacities are initially social and interactional and are only later understood in private or representational terms.

As put succinctly by Rembowska-Płuciennik (2012: 107), subjectivity is "the ability to think about the reasoning of others as well as the ability to mentally represent the current, recollected as well as a fictitious state of someone else's mind",[6] where "thinking about the reasoning of others" involves what is known in cognitive psychology and philosophy under the term of *mind-reading*. The idea of mind reading, which is referred to by Langacker as "the apprehension of other minds", can be presented as in Fig. 4 (Langacker 2007: 183; modified).

    S symbolizes *speaker*, H stands for *hearer* and G for the *ground*. In the case of the discourse participants' mind integration, the speaker and the hearer switch roles. In one speech event, represented by Input Space 1, the speaker (S) addresses the hearer (H); in the other speech event, represented by Input Space 2, it is the hearer that addresses the speaker. The blend represents the *canonical speech event scenario*, where the

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6   The translations from the Polish is mine.

Fig. 4. The apprehension of other minds (mind reading)

Fig. 5. The Current Discourse Space (modified)

roles of the discourse participants overlap: the current speaker (S) is also the potential addressee (H′), while the current addressee (H) is also the potential speaker (S′).

It should be obvious now that mind integration plays a crucial role in the management of contextual knowledge by the discourse participants in their interpretation of words, sentences, and larger portions of linguistic structure, as it is context that provides "additional aspects" of linguistic meaning. In particular, when engaged in verbal interaction with the addressee, the speaker establishes with the latter the common interpretational basis of what is being said, including the *Current Discourse Space* (CDS), from which all expressions are abstracted. The CDS can be presented as in Fig. 5 (Langacker 2008: 466; modified).

The diagram, which is a modified version of Langacker's representation of the usage event, depicts a "discursive transaction" between S and H, a context-based "common interpretational basis" (Langacker 2008: 466). This common interpretational basic includes the CDS (upper box in the diagram) and the "negotiated" meaning of a linguistic expression (here: *the black cat*; lower box). The CDS consists of three basic elements: the *current usage event*, the *previous usage event*, and a usage event that can be *anticipated*. This arrangement holds at all "levels" of conceptual organization, including all linguistic "levels". Thus, according to Langacker, expressions such as *thus, therefore, this being the case*, etc. point to the presence of a previous usage event, whereas expressions such as, say, *if, when*, etc., because they induce expectations, are to be taken to signal the existence of anticipated usage events. The current usage event consists of so-called *objective content* (OC), i.e. the situation or a thing conceptualized that is communicated between the speaker (S) and the hearer (H). S and H form what is called the *ground*, i.e. persons and circumstances accompanying the production and understanding of utterances.

Now, we wish to claim that the "intersubjective negotiation" of meaning between the speaker and the hearer – of what has been said – takes place in the CDS, as presented diagrammatically in Fig. 6.[7]

Figure 6 presents the conceptual integration-based negotiation of meaning between the speaker and the hearer in discourse. Based on the analysis of a sentence or a text, which is the *objective content* of the CDS (cf. Fig. 5), the speaker and the hearer each evoke their own input space (in order to "apprehend each other's mind") and arrive – during the meaning negotiation process – at the common interpretation of what the subject of their discursive exchange is. It is precisely this kind of negotiation, we would like to claim now, that is involved in all aspects of language use, including the establishment by the conceptualizer of the (degree of) antecedents' accessibility

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[7]   Because the term "conceptualizer" is used by Langacker with reference to both the speaker and the hearer, we can avoid answering here the otherwise important question: "Who does the speaking and who does the listening". Still, *toutes proportions gardées*, one can draw interesting parallells between the way a literary text is read by the reader and the strategy of linking a reflexive with its antecedent. In the case of a literary text the reader intersubjectifies the text by "entering into a dialogue with it (and ultimately, with the author; see a discussion in Kardela, Kędra-Kardela 2014); in the case of the reflexive-antecedent relation, a similar intervention takes place: the conceptualizer while scanning the text isolates an NP which is likely to become the antecedent for the reflexive.

Fig. 6. The intersubjective negotiation of meaning

for reflexives. In what follows we will formulate the accessibility parameters for the reflexive-antecedent relation integrating them with the general reference point configuration for reflexives.

5. The accessibility parameters for reflexives

In Section 3 we noted that the degree of antecedents' accessibility for reflexives is determined by the *intersubjectification* process, whereby the lower the accessibility degree the referring expression displays, the greater the degree of intersubjectivity is judged to be involved in the pronoun-antecedent relation. In particular, we formulated a generalization according to which the lower the values of the accessibility degree an expression has, the further away from T on the R-T axis in Fig. 1 the *accessibility value* for the reflexive will be located. In what follows we formulate a number of parameters for reflexives which will help "gauge" the distance between R and T on the R-T axis.

Let us start with English reflexives. Suppose that these referring expressions do indeed signal the existence of the reference point configuration which underlies the reflexive-antecedent relationship. Suppose further that this relationship, expressed on the R-T axis in Fig. 1, exhibits *prototype effects* in the sense of Lakoff (1987) in that the particular instance of the reflexive can be seen to be located nearer or farther away from T, in accordance with the accessibility scale. The scale involves two different yet closely related sub-scales: a syntactic and a semantic scale. The accessibility

scale for the English reflexives might look as follows (based on Kuno 1987; after Deane 1992: 206–207):

(27) The accessibility scale for English reflexives:

i. *Syntactic Scale*: The accessibility of the subject of a verb for a reflexive varies in strength according to the syntactic role of the anaphor, and is:
    Strongest: the verb's direct object anaphor: *John washed* <u>himself</u>; *John bought* <u>himself</u> *a new jacket*;
    Middle: object of a preposition anaphors, e.g. *John talked to Greg about* <u>himself</u>;
    Weakest: picture nouns (and generally, long distance reflexives), e.g. *A picture of* <u>himself</u> *hanging on the wall is believed by Mary to frighten Tom*.
ii. *Semantic scale*: The accessibility of the subject of a verb for a reflexive varies in strength according to the semantic/discourse nature of the reflexive, and is:
    Strongest: Definite animate NP, e.g. *John washed* himself;
    Middle: Definite inanimate NP (cf. Fiengo 1980: 52), e.g. *That clay tablet deciphered* <u>itself</u>; *The gears on this bicycle shift* <u>themselves</u>; *Foreign cars sell themselves*;
    Weakest: indefinite pronouns (*everybody*, *nobody*, *somebody*), e.g. *Somebody hasn't shaved* himself *today, eh?* (X reproaches Y for not having shaved himself); viewpoint reflexives, e.g. *Near* <u>himself</u>*, John saw a big spider*.

Turning to Polish, we propose to define accessibility not in terms of the "accessibility of a subject of a verb", as stated in the above scale for the English reflexives, but in terms of the degree of *detransitivization* as signaled by the presence of the reflexive *siebie/się* form in the sentence/text. The reason for this is that Polish (i) makes extensive use of the clitic *się* rather than *siebie*, replacing the latter in the direct object position in a sentence,[8] and (ii) the reflexive *się* is associated with a number of *semantic* phenomena linked with transitivity relations such as *reciprocality*, *ergativity* or *absolute construal* in the sense of Langacker (1991).

We can define ditransitivization as a process in which a transitive construction loses its "transitive qualities". As already remarked, among the markers signaling such a process are the reflexive *siebie* and its cliticized variant *się*.[9] The ditransitivization process is subject to the *Transitivity Hierarchy*, which can be formulated as follows (based on Maldonado 1992: 63):

(28) The *Transitivity Hierarchy*

transitive > reciprocal > ⟨ reflexive-*siebie*

reflexive-*się* > ergative > middle > absolute[10]

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8   Thus it is more appropriate to say in Polish *Jan umył* się rather than *Jan umył* siebie 'John washed himself', although when used in the Dative, only the reflexive *siebie* can be used: *Jan kupił sobie* /*się/ *płaszcz* 'John bought himself a jacket'.
9   The role of the emphatic *sam* is different. Like the emphatic –self in English, *sam* is associated with the topic and the topic shift, hence not subject to the Transitivity Hierarchy.

The hierarchy accounts for the degree of transitivity a particular sentence displays in relation to a fully transitive construction, where a prototypical transitive construction can be defined as follows (cf. Taylor 1995: 206–207; adapted):

(29) The prototypical transitive construction

i.   The construction describes events involving two, and only two participants, encoded by the subject and direct object Nps, respectively;
ii.   The two participants are highly individuated, i.e. they are discrete, specific entities […] distinct both from each other, and from the background environment;
iii. The event is initiated by the referent of the subject NP, i.e. by the agent. […] the subject NP is the sentence topic […];
iv.   The agent acts consciously and volitionally, and thus controls the event […] the agent is typically a human being;
v.   As a consequence of the agent's action, something happens to the patient, i.e. the referent of the object NP […];
vi.   After the occurrence of the event, the patient is in a different state from before the event […];
vii. [According to Givón (1993, 2: 46), the verb of the prototypical transitive clause codes an event that is compact (non-durative), bounding (non-lingering), sequential (non-perfect), and realis (non-hypothetical). The prototypical is thus a fast-paced, completed, real and or/cognitively salient change – H.K.];
viii. The event has a causative component – the agent's action causes the patient to undergo a change;
ix.   Typically, agent and patient are not only clearly differentiated entities; often they also stand in an adversative relationship.

Consider the following examples:

(30) Janek uszkodził rower Piotrka. (transitive)
      John damaged Peter's bike.

(31) Kibice bili *się*. (reciprocal).
      The football fans beat each other bloody.

(32) Jan umył *się*. (reflexive)
      John washed himself.

(33) Drzwi otworzyły się. (ergative)
      The door opened.

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[10] In Ronald Langacker's model of Cognitive Grammar, an event can be viewed from two perspectives: from the *energetic chain perspective* (or *force dynamics perspective*) and from the *absolute* (or *zero construal*) standpoint. While under the force dynamics construal, an event is seen as involving the flow of energy being transmitted from one participant (Agent) to another participant (Patient) (Langacker 1991: 283), under the absolute construal, no causer of the event is absent and the event "just unfolds" (see a discussion in Langacker 1991; also Kardela 2000).

(34) Te pomidory dobrze się sprzedają. (middle)
      These tomatoes sell well.

(35) Jan się długo namyślał. (absolute)
      John was brooding (what to do).

The most prototypical instance of the transitive construction is (30), which satisfies all the conditions stated in (29); it also occupies the highest position in the Transitivity Hierarchy as stated in (28). Less prototypical is (31), which does not satisfy condition (29vii), because in this case, the clitic *się* "weakens", to use Barbara Dancygier's (1997: 313) wording, "the salience of the distinction between the semantic roles". The least prototypical construction is (35), which meets none of the conditions specified in (29) and is localized at the very end of the Transitivity Hierarchy.

6. Putting it all together: Reference point again

We can present now a unitary account of reflexives in Polish and English based on the combined ideas of reference point and intersubjectification-driven negotiation of meaning. Consider the diagram in Fig. 7.

The diagram shows the accessibility values for English and Polish reflexives on the R-T axis of the reference point relationship, established as a result of the intersubjectification process operating on the reflexive-antecedent configuration. Whereas the values closer to T are associated with a lesser degree of the conceptualizer's intersubjectivity, the values closer to R involve a greater degree of the conceptualizer's mental effort in following the R-T path, hence they display a higher degree of intersubjectivity. Consider first (46) and (47). The accessibility values for the respective reflexives are very high here: the accessibility value of *siebie* in (46) is high on the Transitivity Hierarchy and so is the accessibility value for *himself* on the Accessibility Scale of (27). (Note that *himself* is the verb's direct object anaphor and its possible antecedent is a definite animate NP.) Equally strong accessibility values should be attributed to the emphatics *sam* in (44) and to *myself* in (45), which, as already stated, are associated with discourse-related topicalization, and to the picture noun, *a picture of himself* in (43), which, effectively, possesses all the features of an English emphatic-self. Next come the reflexives in (41) and (42). Notice that the reflexive *himself* in (42) is a prepositional object anaphor (and not a direct object anaphor), hence its accessibility value, as evidenced by the ambiguity of the sentence, should be judged to be relatively low. A relatively low accessibility value should also be attributed to the reflexive *sobie* in (41). Because the sentence *Ola kazała Janowi kupić* sobie *płaszcz* codes two events, associated with the verb *kazać* 'tell, ask' and the verb *kupić* 'buy', the Transitivity Hierarchy, which is valid for a simple sentence only, does not apply in this case. This being so, the disambiguation will therefore require a great degree of "intersubjective intervention" on the part of the conceptualizer. Still lower accessibility values have the reflexives *się* in (40) and *himself* in (39). In (40), the understood subject "you" is a very weakly individuated

Fig. 6

T

D

person
number
etc.

Discourse Context

R

C

(36) *Jan długo się namyślał* (cf. (35))
(37) *The gears on this car shift* themselves
(38) *Te pomidory dobrze się sprzedają* (cf. (34))
(39) *Somebody hasn't shaved* himself*, eh?*
(40) *Nie odrobiło się pracy domowej, co* (cf. (16))
(41) *Ola kazała Janowi kupić sobie płaszcz* (cf. (13))
(42) *John told Greg a story about* himself
(43) *A picture of* himself *hanging on the wall frightens Tom*
(44) *Grzegorz nakręcił ten film sam* (cf. (20))
(45) *All my family, including* myself *went to the seaside*
(46) *Jan zobaczył siebie w lustrze* (cf. (1))
(47) *John saw* himself *in the mirror*

Fig. 7. The intersubjectified reference point-based reflexive-antecedent relationship

participant (cf. (29ii)): it can only be inferred from the discursive context; in (39), a likely antecedent for *himself* is *somebody*, which has the weakest accessibility on the semantic scale of (27ii). The examples in (36) and (37) are middle voice constructions: the English reflexive *themselves* in (37) has the definite inanimate subject as its potential antecedent, hence its relatively low accessibility value. The accessibility value for the reflexive *się* in (38) is equally low, as in this case the reflexive is a Middle Voice marker. Finally, we have (36), in which *się* marks the absolute construal of the event coded by the sentence.

7. Conclusion

Our discussion can be summarized in points as follows:
i.   Reflexives form an *accessibility scale* – from *low accessibility signals* to *high accessibility units*, depending on how much mental effort is required for a conceptualizer to identify a discourse referent (antecedent);
ii.   Accessibility is defined by the *intersubjectification* process, whereby the lower the *accessibility* of the referring expression (i.e. reflexive) is, the greater the degree of intersubjectivity is held to be involved in the pronoun-antecedent relation;
iii. While in English the accessibility is defined in terms of the "accessibility of a subject of a verb", in Polish, the degree of the antecedent's accessibility should be seen in terms of the detransitivization process which affects the reflexive-antecedent configuration.

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