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Is American Nationalism Changing?: Implications for Foreign Policy

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ABSTRACT

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This essay analyzes the degree of popular consensus about a nation's identity, core values, and mission as a source of social integration and a broad constraint on foreign policy-making. It identifies cosmopolitan liberalism, nativism, and multiculturalism as three rival ideologies of American nationalism, comparing their main principles and competing approaches toward integrating a diverse society. The paper presents a synthesis of recent survey evidence to assess the relative degree of support for these competing conceptions of American identity. The relationship of these conceptions to the foreign policy orientations delineated in how shifts in American nationalism may shape the general direction of foreign policy in the future.

INTRODUCTION

Nationalism is a dynamic phenomenon; it is bounded in time and space, fluctuating in intensity, becoming more or less homogeneous in content. Many formally independent political units around the globe today are not true nation-states. And even in countries inhabited by people actively self-conscious about their shared identity, there are shifts in commitment about the political community to which one wishes to belong. To claim that "nationality" is the fundamental element in shaping one's basic identity is to say very little when the attributes giving rise to a sentiment of uniqueness are malleable and vary so widely. Material, ideological and cultural distinctions often provide new options in the "daily plebiscite" that creates and reinforces a people's sense of commonality.

Although the United States often is viewed as possessing a consensual political culture, Americans have quarreled over what defines them as a nation. Values and symbols once shared have lost ground to new rivals, to an alternative construction of an "imagined community."¹ In the present era, a resurgence of ethnic consciousness has engendered a doctrine of social solidarity called "multiculturalism" that explicitly challenges the old ideal of e pluribus unum.

¹ The evocative term is Benedict Anderson's (1983).

This paper has three main purposes. The first is to outline the content of this new ideology and contrast it with older beliefs about American identity. The second purpose is to assess the pattern of current mass support for the contending nationalist ideologies through a synthesis of recent opinion polls to determine how the general public responds to the values and symbols embodied in them. Finally, we intend to explore the implications of shifts in popular belief about the American nation for the country's foreign policy in a changed international system. While we recognize that the attitudes and actions of political elites can profoundly influence the outlook of the general public, we also assume that mass opinion can constrain the choices of foreign policy decision-makers, although the strength of these constraints are likely to vary over time and from one policy area to another.² NATIONALISM AS IDEOLOGY, MYTH AND AGENT OF INTEGRATION³

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Nationalism as a doctrine asserts that a group of people united by characteristics that differentiate them, <u>in their own minds</u>, from others should be politically autonomous, that the nation and the state should be coterminous. From a psychological perspective, nationalism implies that membership in the nation is the most critical of all the loyalties an individual carries as part of his

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² This assumption is rejected by many students of international relations. For an excellent recent summary of the debate see O. R. Holsti (1992).

³ For a fuller theoretical development of these concepts see E. B. Haas (1986). We reiterate the point made there that an approach to nationalism that emphasizes choice among many possible bases of identity is not the only legitimate conceptualization of this highly contested cognitive artifact.

or her political identity. Accordingly, nationalism is successful when it takes precedence over available alternative foci of affiliation such as kinship, religion, economic interest, race or language. Nationalism thus invokes a principle of identity based on impersonal, vicarious ties; within one's imagined community, all strangers are kin.

By a <u>nationalist ideology</u>, we mean a <u>particular</u> body of arguments and ideas about what defines the nation--its members, its core values and goals, the territory it ought to occupy, and its relations to other nations. A nationalist ideology is an effort to give specific content and political direction to a group's consciousness of difference from other nations and their beliefs. Competition for power among adherents of different conceptions of a nation's mission, values, and institutions is common. Indeed, one task of a theory of nationalism is to account for the incidence and intensity of such strife. We use the term <u>national myth</u> to refer to the situation in which one nationalist ideology has come to prevail. In this circumstance, virtually everyone accepts one definition of the nation's identity and purposes as legitimate and understands, even if inchoately, what unites them to their fellow citizens.

National integration as we conceive of it is founded on a consensus about the symbols and values that demarcate oneself and one's fellow-nationals from other societies, a consensus that facilitates the resolution of internal conflicts through peaceful bargaining and compromise rather than protest and violence. In a

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"disintegrating" nation-state, the national myth collapses as various groups of citizens articulate rival nationalist ideologies. One possible outcome of this conflict over national identity is constitutional change; a more drastic result is the decomposition and reordering of existing states. The political implications of the current state of American nationalism should depend in part on where the United States is located on a continuum between full "integration" and "disintegration." Because the public opinion data required to track historical trends in national integration are lacking, we are forced to rely for this assessment on qualitative judgments of popular sentiment and inferences based partly on institutional characteristics.

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In our conception, a fully integrated nation-state has an agreed-upon formula for determining political succession that is consistently applied. There is agreement on the values to be taught in the public schools, so there should be little controversy over a generally prescribed school curriculum. Similarly, there should be agreement on the role of religion in public life, whether it is agreement on a state religion or on the religious neutrality of the state. By contrast, in a disintegrating nation-state political succession is problematic, the school curriculum is controversial, and the role of religious values is similarly unsettled. With respect to language policy, in the fully integrated condition one or more languages are accepted as the appropriate vehicle for conducting public life, whereas the official status of diverse languages is a matter of intense controversy under conditions of

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disintegration. Likewise, in the domain of foreign affairs, consensus about the national interest and the ready acceptance of changes in specific policies indicate a state of integration. In a disintegrating nation-state, one manifestation of the underlying conflict over the nation's "true" character and mission is likely to be disagreement about the identity of one's allies and enemies.

To locate the United States on this hypothetical integrationdisintegration continuum, we asked a panel of academic scholars of American history and politics to use these socio-political indicators to estimate the country's level of national integration at four times in modern history: 1930, 1950, 1970, and 1990. Figure 1 reproduces the instructions to the panelists and the descriptions of the polar states of integration and disintegration for each indicator.

Of the 28 experts we asked to participate in this exercise, 19 agreed. Table 1 reports the mean scores of the panel's ratings for nine indicators of national integration and for an Integration Index based on the average of these ratings. The standard deviations also listed in Table 1 indicate the degree of convergence in the panelists' assessments. While our experts generally agreed among themselves, there was a noticeable dispersion in their judgments of where the United States stood with regard to the role of religion and the extent of cultural uniformity at each of the four points in time.

The ratings of our panelists do not speak directly to the

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FIGURE 1

AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEGRATION PANEL QUESTIONNAIRE

Instructions: Below is a list of indicators of national "integration," which refer to certain characteristics of American society and politics. Please indicate where you believe the United States stood on each continuum of "integration" at four points in modern history: 1930, 1950, 1970, and 1990.

Fully Integrated	Fully Disintegrated
1. POLITICA	AL SUCCESSION
A formula for determining peaceful succession exists and is followed	No formula exists: OR one exist but is not consistently followed
consistently.	
Contant of sum 1 2. EDG	UCATION
Content of curricula in public	Conflict over which values shoul
schools contains agreed-upon core values.	be included in public school curricula.
3. RELIGION/RE	ELIGIOUS VALUES
Agreement on role religion, or	Disagreement on role religion,
core religious values, should or should not play in public life.	or core religious values, should or should not play in public life
4. CULTURAL UNIF	ORMITY/DIVERSITY
Agreement that cultural minorities	Minorities, or minority groups,
be assimilated into majority culture	challenge the value of assimila-
OR that minority cultures receive	tion into the majority culture
official recognition equal to that	OR majority questions the preserva
of the majority culture.	tion of separate minority cultures
5. LAN	
acceptable in public life.	Challenges to status of the dominant language.
6. CONSC	RIPTION
Conscription is accepted as	Legitimacy of conscription is
legitimate and draft evasion is minimal.	widely challenged and draft evasion is common.
7. FOREIG	N POLICY
There is a general willingness to	Foreign policy is highly
accept the government's definition	controversial and existing
of the country's external role.	policies (and changes in policy)
When policy is changed, public opinion goes along with the change.	are routinely challenged.
8. PEACEFU	
constitutionally-sanctioned	There are major groups that pro-
legal procedures can be used	claim constitutionally-sanctioned
effectively to alter policies.	legal procedures are inadequate mechanisms for policy change.
9. LEGIT	TIMACY
overnmental institutions are	There are substantial challenges
ccepted as morally valid.	to the moral validity of existing

to the moral validity of existing governmental institutions.

TABLE 1AMERICAN NATIONAL INTEGRATION PANEL RESULTS19 RespondentsComplete Integration-1; Complete Disintegration-5

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A. MEAN SCORES

ITEM	<u>1930</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1990</u>
Political succession formula agreed	1.16	1.10	1.21	1.21
School curricula consensus or not	1.42	1.47	2.84	3.50
Religious values in public life	2.24	2.03	2.66	3.21
Cultural uniformity/diversity	2.56	2.28	2.72	3.08
Single language accepted	1.16	1.10	1.68	2,89
Conscription accepted/rejected	1.69	1.32	3.53	3.44
Foreign policy controversial or not	1.97	1.42	3.74	2.71
Peaceful change procedures accepted	1.79	1.32	2.79	1.84
Overall government legitimacy	1.58	1.16	2.68	2.13
Integration Index	1.71	1.46	2.65	2.60
				2.00

B. STANDARD DEVIATIONS

<u>ITEM</u>	<u>1930</u>	<u>1950</u>	<u>1970</u>	<u>1990</u>
Political succession formula agreed	.501	.315	.419	
School curricula consensus or not	.607	.612	.834	.713
Religious values in public life	.823	.716		.928
Cultural uniformity/diversity	1.338	1.274	1.028	1.182
Single language accepted	.375		1.074	1.166
Conscription accepted/rejected	1.251	.315	.671	.937
Foreign policy controversial or not		.478	.920	.882
Peaceful change procedures accepted	.979	. 507	1.032	.732
Overall government legitimacy	.713	. 582	1.134	.834
Integration Index	.961	.375	. 749	.779
Bradion Index	.566	.347	. 588	.601

question of whether Americans' conceptions of national identity are changing. The evidence reported in Table 1 does, however, confirm one's intuitive sense that cultural and political fragmentation has increased since 1950, the perceived zenith of American national integration. Overall, the panelists consistently juxtaposed 1930 and 1950, the periods of high integration, with a more contentious later era. And though the average global ratings for 1970 and 1990 were quite similar, there were significant differences in how these periods were assessed with regard to specific facets of national integration. In 1970, perhaps the high water mark of protest against the Vietnam War, the foci of the perceived decline in normative consensus were foreign policy, the acceptance of conscription, and the legitimacy of existing political processes. Between 1970 and 1990, conflict on these civic issues subsided, to be replaced by more intense disagreements about the role of religion in public life, the content of a common culture, and the status of languages other than English.

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According to the judgments of our panel, then, conflict emanating from intensified ethnic and religious consciousness poses the main current challenge to the American national myth. But while recognizing a trend toward national fragmentation after 1950, the panelists regard the United States as still a relatively cohesive society. Even in 1970, the average Integration Index rating of 2.65 fell on the integrated side of the mid-point of our hypothesized continuum. Erosion, but not collapse is the summary judgment of this body of experts.

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THREE IMAGES OF AMERICAN IDENTITY

American elites have always faced the problem of creating a nation, a people with a common sense of we-feeling, from ethnically and culturally diverse groups. This section of the paper is a highly distilled account of the three main ideological solutions which have emerged and competed over the years. We label these contending nationalist ideologies cosmopolitan liberalism, nativism, and multiculturalism. Our outline is constructed from the writings, speeches, and programmatic pronouncements of prominent politicians, intellectuals, and publicists. Of course, those who articulated these ideologies were not united on every point. Given our present purposes, however, we choose to emphasize the fundamental themes of each point of view, admittedly overlooking many nuances and differences of opinion within the each perspective.

An Overarching Liberal Myth

Competition among rival conceptions of American identity has occurred within the context of a bedrock of agreement on liberal principles of government and belief in America's uniqueness. In most countries, national identity is expressed in terms of common linguistic, religious and racial characteristics, or what collectively we call culture or ethnicity. The foundations of American identity, however, were fundamentally different.⁴ Not ethnicity, but a commitment to liberal political principles was held out by the founding elite as the leaven of American identity.

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⁴ See P. Gleason (1980), and S. Huntington (1981).

Whatever one's ancestry or background, to be an American one had only to adhere to a set of ideals: liberty, individualism, popular sovereignty, and egalitarianism defined as equality of opportunity and respect, not equality of condition.⁵

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The founding elite had several reasons to downplay the role of a common ethnicity while elaborating the elements of a new national identity.⁶ One obvious motive was the need to attract new immigrants. Another was the desire to ensure the psychic separation from the mother country among the eight of ten Americans who were of British descent. Emphasizing acceptance of certain universal values as the unique feature of Americanism met these strategic imperatives.

This initial conception of American identity, therefore was, in principle at least, ethnically inclusive and unique. And to observers such as de Tocqueville, it commanded general acceptance in the early history of the new nation. This liberal, ideological definition of "Americanness" obviously excluded blacks and Native-Americans, consigned women to a lesser place, and sidestepped a deep-seated division of opinion on the subject of slavery. Nevertheless, the national myth in the early nineteenth century was liberal and cosmopolitan in spirit, if not in practice: American identity was equated not with blood but with shared democratic beliefs.

⁵ For descriptions of the American "creed" in these terms, see L. Hartz (1955), H. Kohn (1957), S. Huntington (1981), S.M. Lipset (1964), and J.R. Pole (1967).

⁶ P. Gleason (1980), <u>op. cit.</u>, pp. 32-33.

<u>Cosmopolitan Liberalism versus Nativism.</u>

Over the years, successive waves of immigration and the increasing ethnic diversity of America's population have engendered serious ideological challenges to the traditional, inclusive notion of national identity. What must be underscored, however, is that these critiques have not rejected all the core themes in the established national myth. What distinguishes these rival nationalist ideologies from the historically dominant creed is that they questioned the assumption that culturally diverse groups would or should readily assimilate to American ways.

The cosmopolitan version of liberal nationalism expressed great faith in the ability of American society to assimilate newcomers, who, if they worked hard, could achieve equality in reality as well as in principle. In fact, advocates of this outlook effectively excluded non-Europeans from full citizenship until the second half of the twentieth century, but cosmopolitan liberals did believe that any European immigrant could become a full-fledged American.

The arrival of massive numbers of non-English and non-Protestant immigrants, however, triggered feelings of exclusiveness and antiforeign sentiments among significant segments of American society, and incited "nativist" demands for a more restrictive definition of American nationality which stressed the importance of cultural homogeneity.⁷ Nativists could agree that the liberal political

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⁷ See the classic treatment of nativism in J. Higham (1985), and R. M. Smith (1988).

ideals embodied in the cosmopolitan national "creed" were inherently American <u>but</u> simultaneously maintain that only Anglo-Saxons possessed the moral and intellectual qualities required for democratic citizenship. In short, only some racial, religious, or ethnic groups could be "truly" American. In the years leading up to the Civil War, for example, the nativist movement stressed the Protestant character of American values, warning that the papist hold on the newly arrived Irish and German Catholics would prevent them from becoming completely loyal to their new country. Indeed, one response to these fears was the "common school", which developed in the 1840s and 1850s as an institutional device for inculcating the civil religion with its Protestant overtones.

In ideological terms, the outcome of the Civil War represented a victory for cosmopolitan ideals. The 13th, 14th, and 15th amendments to the Constitution expanded the legal boundaries of the national community to include blacks. Military service in the Union army was a powerful force for assimilating immigrants, and a badge signifying their common Americanness. In this context, the exclusionary rhetoric of the nativists lost resonance and interest in contrivances for Americanization such as the "common school" faded.

By the late 1800s, however, the task of integrating millions of new immigrants from southern and eastern Europe revived the idea that true Americanism required close conformity to the cultural majority in manners, language, and religion. At this juncture too, Social Darwinism furnished an additional, "scientific"

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justification for giving a narrow, ethnocentric cast to American identity. Nativists could claim that the laws of evolution proved the superiority of the Anglo-Saxon people and their culture. This racist doctrine was stretched to provide intellectual cover for the 1882 law banning the immigration of Chinese, denial of essential rights to blacks, and restrictions on the use of languages other than English in the schools.

The Ambiguous Meaning of the Melting Pot

In the context of increased immigration and nativist reaction in the early twentieth century, the melting pot became a metaphor for assimilation. In Israel Zangwill's words, "America is God's Crucible, the great Melting Pot where all the races of Europe are melting and re-forming!"⁸ This imagery is optimistic, portraying America as a place where ancestry and ethnicity are not barriers to opportunity and success. Confident in the absorptive capacities of America and sure of the desire of new immigrants to belong, the liberal interpretation of the melting pot regarded cultural integration as an automatic process requiring no active intervention.⁹

This melting-as-blending approach encompassed a belief in cultural pluralism. Its advocates believed that immigrants of diverse origin could acquire the American creed of representative democracy <u>and</u> retain the old rituals of their ethnic heritage. In fact, the mingling of varied cultural streams in the crucible of

⁹ P. Gleason (1980), pp.39-41.

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⁸ I. Zangwill (1914), p.33.

the melting pot would enrich popular culture without threatening the distinctive core of American national identity.

Nativists and those active in the Americanization movement had a different interpretation of the melting pot symbol. Doubting that cultural assimilation of the new wave of immigrants would be natural or easy, they insisted on the need for measures to speed the shedding of "foreign" ways in favor of the values and habits of the "older" Americans of Anglo-Saxon stock. Without a deliberate program to "Americanize" newcomers, an integrated, harmonious political community would be placed at risk. This melting-ascleansing approach thus outlined a monolithic conception of Americanness that required individuals to go beyond commitment to a political creed to embrace, in addition, speaking English, improving personal hygiene, eschewing alcohol, and attending a church.¹⁰

The imposition of restrictive immigration quotas overwhelmingly favorable to applicants from northwestern European countries by Congress in 1921 and 1924 represented a loss of faith in the capacity of even a carefully supervised melting process to sustain national unity. The new laws assuaged nativist anxieties and effectively removed language and immigration issues from the national agenda for the next forty years.

Liberalism and the Revival of Ethnicity

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The war against the Nazis did much to discredit racialist thinking and restore the hegemony of the cosmopolitan liberal image

¹⁰ See J. Higham (1985).

of national identity. The unifying experience of the military effort reinforced the image of America as a country in which people of diverse origins could live harmoniously. World War II also accelerated the economic and political mobilization of black Americans, making it harder for society to avoid confronting the "dilemma" of subscribing to egalitarian values while engaging in pervasive discrimination. And when America cast itself in the role of the leader of the "free world" against revolutionary communism, there could be no doubt that liberalism and capitalism were the core elements of the national ideology expounded by the dominant elite.¹¹

The interplay of political and demographic trends beginning in the 1960s, however, spawned a significant new challenge to the liberal image of American identity. The civil rights movement heightened attention to ethnic diversity. First blacks, and then other groups, increasingly emphasized the virtues of ethnic solidarity and distinctiveness. Blacks' disillusionment with the liberal ideal of a color-blind society grew in the face of political resistance to their demands for change and the failure of the War on Poverty and other government programs to redress economic inequalities between the races.¹² A recent manifestation of this intensified ethnic consciousness is the rising preference for "African-American" rather than "black" as а selfcategorization, a label which emphasizes non-European roots of

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¹¹ See H. McClosky and J. Zaller (1984).

¹² G. Orfield (1988).

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Immigration reform further enhanced the salience of ethnicity in American politics by creating a more differentiated society. The 1965 amendments to the Immigration and Nationality Act of 1952 abolished the discriminatory national-origins system and the explicit exclusion of Asians. The new law also raised the ceiling on the number of immigrants and gave priority to applicants with family members already in the United States. The result was a marked shift in the ethnic and linguistic background of recent immigrants. Since the passage of the new law, a rapid influx of immigrants from Asia and Latin America, along with ethnic differences in fertility rates, has greatly enlarged the segment of the U.S. population of non-European origin.

Making immigration and naturalization easier and eroding the legal distinctions between citizens and resident aliens can be seen as a realization of the cosmopolitan vision of America as a tolerant society with the capacity to assimilate people of any background. By the same token, the new philosophy in immigration law undermines the idea that there are any beliefs, rituals or obligations beyond lengthy residence that serve as tests of belonging to America.¹⁴

Multiculturalism and National Identity.

Multiculturalism refers to an evolving, loosely connected set

¹³ B. L. Martin (1991).

¹⁴ A. Wolfe (1990).

of beliefs, not to a well-organized movement.¹⁵ The early roots of contemporary "multiculturalism" in the United States were the "black power" movement of the late 1960s and its separatist offshoots. At that time also, Hispanic activists articulated the concept of language rights as a constitutional entitlement. Many advocated bilingual education as a vehicle for resisting cultural assimilation.¹⁶

Viewed as a distinct nationalist ideology, multiculturalism is based on the conviction that the image of America as a land of equal opportunity is not just exaggerated, but fraudulent. Advocates of multicultural nationalism explicitly reject the assimilationist ethos of the melting pot as oppressive and substitute the image of a "mosaic" as the ideal. A mosaic typically consists of differently colored tiles divided from each other by impenetrable grout; multiculturalism thus evokes a process of continuing separation rather than blending or cleansing as a metaphor for the relations among diverse ethnic groups.

At the core of multiculturalism, then, is an insistence on the primacy of ethnicity over the individual's <u>shared and equal status</u> as a citizen in shaping his or her identity and, derivatively, his or her interests. In sharp antithesis to liberal doctrine,

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¹⁵ Multiculturalism is an emotionally loaded term that has been used in sharply contrasting ways. What D. Ravitch (1990) calls "pluralistic multiculturalism" sounds substantially like the liberal version of the melting pot. What we call multicultural nationalism is more akin to Ravitch's conception of "particularistic multiculturalism."

¹⁶ See J. Citrin (1990) for a fuller discussion of the conflict over bilingual education.

multiculturalism construes racial group identity as the <u>preferred</u> choice of self-definition and validates the ongoing affirmation of ethnic distinctiveness. For multiculturalism, the ethnic group is the haven of individual personality, the very foundation of selfesteem. Living amongst "one's own" and conforming to their customs and values furnish a sense of comfort and security. By contrast, leaving the ethnic enclave, even to move up in personal status, consigns one to a permanent, restless anxiety.

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While giving priority to sub-national ethnic loyalties, multiculturalism retains an egalitarian perspective, regarding all the distinct cultures within the country as equal, morally and intellectually. For adherents of multiculturalism, no race, culture or language in a state should have a unique, superior status. Moreover, the government must strive to achieve equality in cultural recognition for all groups and to extend this condition to the political and economic realms. Multicultural education thus reverses the program of Americanization; it seeks to preserve, or even to enhance existing cultural differences, by emphasizing the study of non-European groups.

An important purpose of multiculturalism is to justify the claims of subordinate ethnic groups to a larger share of society's goods, both tangible and intangible.¹⁷ From this ideological perspective, ethnicity should determine the allocation of all important benefits, such as jobs, government contracts, places in universities, legislative seats, control of the curriculum in

¹⁷ See M. R. Olneck (1990), and J.B. Thompson (1984).

schools and colleges, time on public television, and so forth. In addition, multiculturalism holds that public policies must be evaluated in terms of their perceived potential for strengthening or weakening an ethnic group's unity and prestige. In short, the guiding principle of policy-making becomes communal representation.

Multicultural nationalism differs fundamentally from both its rival nationalist ideologies in conceiving of the United States as a confederation of groups rather than a community of autonomous individuals. By stressing the normative priority of ethnic group identity, it implies that no national creed does, can, or should exist and provides no ideological cement to combine diverse groups into a single "imagined community." Given that territorial secession is not a practical option in the American, as opposed to the Canadian, context, the ascendancy of multicultural nationalism would probably mean the advent of "consociational" modes of governance.¹⁸ Referring back to our concepts of national integration and disintegration, multiculturalism clearly has the potential to push the United States further toward the "disintegrated" side of the continuum, especially with regard to education, religion, cultural assimilation, and language.

PUBLIC IMAGES OF AMERICAN IDENTITY

What are the contours of current popular thinking about American national identity? In bringing together the scattered findings of recent survey research to assess the public's attachment to the symbols, values, and policies that are central to

¹⁸ A. Lijphart (1968).

the cosmopolitan liberal, nativist, and multicultural perspectives respectively, we anticipate that many citizens will embrace elements from more than one of these competing nationalist ideologies. As noted above, the American political tradition has affirmed <u>both</u> cultural assimilation and cultural pluralism without providing a simple recipe for how these goals can be attained simultaneously.

In the following analysis of current public opinion, we rely primarily on national survey data from the 1992 American National Election Study.¹⁹ We will often supplement these data with relevant findings from other recent national and California public opinion polls as well. It is important to note, however, that most of the available items, including some we designed ourselves, were not consciously developed to measure nationalist ideologies in a systematic way. Thus, our findings should not be taken as a comprehensive assessment of the public's reactions to every major theme enunciated by cosmopolitan liberals, nativists or multiculturalists. Our approach is simply to search for questions

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¹⁹ These data were collected by the Center for Political Studies, University of Michigan and made available through the InterUniversity Consortium for Political and Social Research and the UC Data Program, Survey Research Center, University of California, Berkeley. The 1992 NES was conducted using face-to-face interviews. Many of the 1992 NES questions we employ were developed and pre-tested in earlier national and California surveys, specifically, the 1991 NES Pilot Study, a June 1991 California Poll, and a February 1988 California Poll. For analyses of these earlier data see J. Citrin, B. Reingold, and D.P. Green (1990) and earlier version of this paper, the authors' "Is American Nationalism Waning?" presented at the 3rd Meeting of the Society for the Advancement of Socio-Economics, Irvine, California, March 1991.

that refer fairly directly to the symbols and values embodied in the rival images of American national identity and to present an initial sketch of the pattern of mass responses.

American Exceptionalism.

A June 1991 California Poll asked a statewide cross-section of respondents whether "there are unique American qualities that make us different from citizens of other countries?" The answer was overwhelmingly affirmative: 80% of the sample agreed that there are qualities that make America an exceptional society. When respondents named the specific qualities that made America unique, the refrain was clear and familiar to readers of de Tocqueville.

Respondents were permitted to mention up to two specific qualities, and 85% of all the comments that were made described American uniqueness in favorable terms. As Table 2 shows, fully 44% of the respondents who perceived Americans as somehow unique, focussed on their freedoms. Some made general reference to the greater freedom in America than elsewhere (21%), others to the prevailing "freedom of choice" (6%) and others to specific liberties such as freedom of speech (11%) and religion (3%).

A large group of those perceiving Americans to be unique (34%) focussed on the individualist ethos in the country; for example, 10% referred to Americans' "independent thinking" and another 5% commented on equal opportunity here. 12% named the extent of democracy as a uniquely American quality, and another 10% mentioned the valuable "mixture" of cultures and races in America, a point of view that is essential to the multicultural conception of national

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TABLE 2 IMAGES OF AMERICAN UNIQUENESS

Freedon	Total Comments*	(N=496)
Freedom:		(11-490)
Freedom Unspecified/Free Country Freedom of Speech	21&	(105)
Freedom of Choice	11	(54)
Freedom of Religion	6	(31)
Equal Rights	3	(16)
Other Comments	2	(8)
	1	(5)
<u>Individualism:</u>		
Free Thinking/Independent Thinkers	10%	/61)
American Dream/Everyone Can Get Ahead/Succeed	9	(51)
American Ingenuity/New Ideas	5	(45)
Americans are Individualists	4	(23)
American Work "Ethic"	3	(18) (16)
Americans are More Ambitious	3	(14)
Patriotism:	5	(14)
Patriotic/Americans Love, Take Pride In Their Country	68	(29)
Traditional Values (Families, Honor, etc.)	4	(20)
Americans Will Fight for What They Believe In Other Comments	2	(10)
ocher comments	3	(14)
<u>Culture and Diversity:</u>	•	•••
Melting Pot/Mix of Races and Cultures		
American Culture is Special	10%	(47)
Other Comments	3	(14)
	3	(15)
Economics:		
Standard of Living/Higher Standard of Living	6.	
Capitalist Society	68	(29)
Our Economy is Better/More Stable Economy	2 2	(10)
	2	(9)
Democracy:		
Democracy/Democratic Society	5%	(26)
Voting/Popular Control by Voting	3	•
Representative Government	3	(23)
Other Comments	1	(16)
	L L	(5)
Other Miscellaneous Comments:		
Americans are More Caring/More Generous Towards Others	78	(37)
Quality of Education/Everyone Has Right to Education	4	(20)
Other Comments	5	(20)
Source: June 1991 California Poll	_	,
$\mathbf{v} \mathbf{v} \mathbf{v} \mathbf{v} \mathbf{v} \mathbf{v} \mathbf{v} \mathbf{v} $		

Source: June 1991 California Poll

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* Percentages are based on the 496 respondents (80.4%) in this survey who stated that there were unique qualities that made Americans different from citizens of other countries. The figures in the table add up to more than 100% because respondents were permitted to make two responses when asked to name the specific qualities that were uniquely American. Categories comprising less than 2% are not listed separately, but are grouped as "Other Comments." identity. However, the main finding of Table 2 is the hold of the traditional image of America as a locus of personal liberty and individual opportunity.

Normative Beliefs about American Identity

To get at subjective conceptions of American identity more directly, respondents to the 1992 NES survey were asked to rate the importance of various qualities in making someone a "true American.²⁰ Among the attributes listed were both universalistic values such as social equality and self-reliance, which are prominently featured in the cosmopolitan liberal tradition, and particularistic characteristics such as believing in God and speaking English that express a more exclusionary version of American nationality. We should note that while it is plausible to assume that respondents regarded the characteristics of a "true American" as positive, we cannot be certain that the questions uniformly tapped normative rather than cognitive beliefs about national identity.

Table 3 reports overwhelming agreement that treating people of all races and backgrounds equally and striving to get ahead are vital features of American identity. Despite the enduring legal principle of separation of church and state, the idea that it is necessary to believe in God to truly belong in this country claims

²⁰ See J. Citrin, B. Reingold, and D. P. Green (1990) for an extended analysis of these items in a February 1988 California Poll.

TABLE 3 BELIEFS ABOUT AMERICAN IDENTITY^a

<u>Ouestion</u>: Some people say that there are certain qualities that make a person a true American. Others say that there isn't anything that makes one person more American than another. I'm going to read some of the things that have been mentioned. For each of the following, tell me how important you think it is in making someone a true American.

	Ex- tremely Import.	Very Import.	Somewhat Import.	Not at all Import.	Don't Know
Trying to get ahead					
on your own effort					
Total Sample (N=2304)	35%	45	14	5	1
White (1785)	35%	45	• •		
Black (290)	388	39	14	5	1
Hispanic (180)	318		15	7	2
[214	49	13	7	1
Treating people of all race	es				_
& backgrounds equally					
Total Sample (N=2305)	54%	38	6	2	0
White (1785)	51%				
Black (290)		40	7 .	1	· 0
Hispanic (180)	65%	30	2	2	Ō
	63%	34	2	1	Õ
Believing in God					Ũ
Total Sample (N=2305)	40%	28	15	16	0
White (1786)	37%	07			
Black (290)	55%	27	17	18	0
Hispanic (180)		28	8	9	0
	51%	28	11	10	0
Speaking English					-
Total Sample (N=2304)	30%	37	23	10	0
White (1785)	31%	36	00		
Black (290)	27%	30	23	10	0
Hispanic (180)	268		26	10	1
	203	41	23	9	0

^a Source: 1992 National Election Study

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widespread support.²¹ And although language can be a more restrictive basis for nationality, fully 67% of the respondents also endorsed the idea that knowing English was either "extremely important" or "very important" in making one a "true American." As we cautioned above, however, in saying that speaking English is very important in making one a true American, some respondents were identifying a prevalent empirical criterion rather than endorsing a normative definition of "Americaness."

It is apparent, then, that the conception of national identity held by many ordinary citizens simultaneously incorporates important tenets of the cosmopolitan liberal creed and exclusionary beliefs with nativist overtones. A substantial majority (76%) of the respondents in this 1992 national survey rated at least 3 of the 4 qualities listed in Table 3 as being "extremely" or "very" important for making one a "true American;" 41% thought they were all important. Whatever the dictates of strict logic, half of the respondents who felt that treating people of all backgrounds equally are important for defining American identity <u>also</u> believed that people who do not speak English well and lack religious faith

²¹ These questions were also asked in the 1991 NES Pilot Study and a 1988 California Poll. The distributions of responses in those surveys were generally similar to those reported in Table 3. Perhaps because of the relatively larger number of non-English speaking immigrants in California than in the nation as a whole, respondents in the state survey were somewhat more likely than those in either of the national surveys to endorse the idea that speaking English well is an important component of American identity. One other notable difference in the results of these sample to support the notion that believing in God is an important part of being a "true American."

are unqualified to be "true Americans."

As Table 3 shows, Hispanics and blacks were more likely to support the religious criterion of national identity, perhaps because of the relatively strong roles the Catholic and African American churches play in their respective communities. Not surprisingly, these minority groups were slightly more likely than white respondents to believe that treating people of all social backgrounds equally was an extremely important part of being American. We were surprised, however, to discover that neither blacks nor even Hispanics were more likely than whites to reject the idea that speaking English is a defining element of being American. Whatever the position of ethnic activists, among the general public the symbolic meaning of learning English as a rite of initiation to full citizenship is equally powerful among all three racial-ethnic groups.²²

Although we do not display these data here in the interest of brevity, further analysis of the 1992 NES survey indicates that age and education were consistently related to beliefs about American identity. The better-educated and younger groups were more likely to reject, verbally at least, the exclusionary definitions. This suggests that sympathy for the arguments of multicultural nationalism may grow in the future, due to generational replacement and increasingly higher levels of formal education.

Attitudes about the importance of individualism, religion, and

²² Unfortunately, there were too few Asian-American or Native American respondents in the sample to allow us to assess their opinions.

English-speaking to American identity were strongly related to the respondents' self-designated ideology. In each case, conservatives were much more likely than liberals to rate such qualities as "extremely" or "very important." However, these beliefs about American identity appear to cross party lines in such a way that Democrats and Republicans generally are in agreement.²³

Individualism versus Equality

The pervasive agreement that getting ahead on one's own is important in making one a "true American" reflects the country's persistent cultural emphasis on individual achievement. Polls typically show that two-thirds of both white and black Americans believe that hard work will lead to success and that people should strive hard to get ahead. Adherence to individualist values strongly influences mass preferences when it comes to proposed solutions for reducing inequality and enhancing the economic and social status of ethnic minorities and women. Preferential treatment for particular groups in the form of affirmative action "targets," "set-asides" or "quotas" ultimately rests on a principle of communal rights. As noted above, cosmopolitan liberalism rejects this idea, whereas multiculturalism promotes it.

Public opinion is consistently opposed to these types of preferential treatment for disadvantaged groups, even to make up

²³ For the most part, multivariate analysis confirms these bivariate relationships between beliefs about American identity and various social and political background characteristics. Ethnicity, age, and especially education and ideology have statistically significant independent effects on notions of what makes someone a "true American." Again, for the sake of brevity and simplicity, we do not present these data here, but will supply them upon request.

for past discrimination. The more explicitly a question about affirmative action raises the specter of a "quota," the more prevalent the negative response.²⁴ In the 1991 NES Pilot Study, 86% of the sample rejected the idea that good jobs should be reserved for racial and ethnic minorities in the same proportion that they make up of the overall population. The 1988 California Poll analyzed by Citrin, Reingold, and Green (1990) asked separately about preferential treatment in employment and college admissions for blacks, Hispanics, Asians, women, and "recent immigrants from eastern Europe." In every instance, at least two-thirds of the sample were opposed, indicating that broad value orientations rather than attitudes toward specific minority groups govern opinions on affirmative action policy.²⁵ In the June 1991 California Poll, respondents were quite evenly divided on the proposition that racial and ethnic groups are "represented best in politics" by leaders of their own background: 52% endorsed this multiculturalist doctrine. On the other hand, fully 65% opposed implementation of this ideal through special efforts to see that "the proportion of blacks and other ethnic minorities elected to public office matches their proportion in the population."

The 1992 NES survey confirms that blacks are more favorable to affirmative action than whites, with Hispanics falling in between.

²⁵ This is not to say that values are the sole influence on opinions about affirmative action. Clearly, group identifications and economic interests also play a part.

²⁴ S.M. Lipset (1991).

However, polls generally show that on questions that ask specifically about quotas, a majority of blacks also are opposed.²⁶ The racial divide is much more pronounced regarding the government's general responsibility to improve the social and economic status of minority groups. A large majority of black respondents consistently favor state intervention to help minorities, whereas the dominant position among whites is the individualist response that minorities "should help themselves."²⁷

American opinion on the proper balance between individualism and equality in the national myth clearly is divided. In spite of public opposition, members of some elites accept the idea of group rights associated with multiculturalism and have embodied their support in legislation. The unresolved tension between individual and group rights not only confounds the definition of the national self, but also may affect the kinds of political solutions America seeks to promote abroad. For example, advocates of cosmopolitan liberalism and multiculturalism might disagree about what stance to take on the issues of majority rule in South Africa and the reconstruction of Yugoslavia on purely ethnic lines.

Cultural Diversity and Immigration.

The 1992 NES survey found the public quite divided over whether different racial and ethnic groups in America should "maintain their distinct cultures" or "blend into the larger society as in the idea of a melting pot." While 47% opted for the

²⁶ S.M. Lipset (1991), p.31.

²⁷ S.M. Lipset (1991) p.33.

assimilationist idea of the melting pot, 33% chose the response favored by multiculturalism, and a substantial 18% volunteered "neither" or "both."²⁸ Strikingly, whites, blacks, and Hispanics did not differ in their responses to this question. In fact, differences in opinion among demographic groups were almost nonexistent, with age being the one exception. Young people were somewhat more likelv than their elders to favor the multiculturalist ideal of maintaining distinct sub-cultures over the cosmopolitan liberal notion of melting pot-as-blending (Pearson's r = .11).

The 1992 NES data reveal few links between attitudes toward the symbol of assimilation and other political preferences. Partisan and ideological self-identifications were completely unrelated to the "melting pot" question. Those who favored the melting pot were more likely to endorse the religious and linguistic criteria for making someone a "true American," (r = -.09) but there were practically no connections between answers to the "melting pot" question and the other normative beliefs about American identity we measured.²⁹

²⁸ Similar responses were given to this question in the 1991 NES Pilot Study: 53% of that sample favored the melting pot idea, 40% opted for the maintenance of distinct cultures, and 7% volunteered "neither" or "both."

²⁹ In the 1991 Pilot Study, the relationships between the melting pot question and the "true American" identity items were stronger and more consistent. Respondents who favored the melting pot idea were more likely to endorse both the linguistic and religious criteria for American nationality and less likely to stress the importance of treating people equally for making one a "true American." The correlation coefficients in the 1991 Pilot Study were -.12, -.14, and .10 respectively. One possible

The absence of significant social and political cleavages on this issue suggests that the melting pot symbol is, indeed, an ambiguous one among the American public. More importantly, many Americans may not consider maintaining one's ethnic heritage and blending into the larger society as mutually exclusive. Indeed, this is the position held by liberal writers such as Nathan Glazer and Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. They regard cultural pluralism as beneficial to the United States as long as it is not cast in terms that repudiate the unifying national creed. Perhaps if survey respondents were given the explicit option to endorse both assimilating into the larger society and maintaining elements of one's ethnic heritage, even more than 18% would have done so.

Popular culture exalts America's status as a "nation of immigrants," with the Statue of Liberty standing as the most prominent monument to the country's success in attracting and integrating people of disparate origins. Yet despite a diffuse symbolic attachment to America as a society that welcomes many and makes them into one, the evidence from recent polls points to considerable public ambivalence about new immigrants.

First of all, it is not popular to open the door to America wider. Only 8% of the 1992 NES respondents wanted the number of immigrants increased; 37% wanted the number kept the same, and 48%

explanation for these stronger associations is that in 1991 respondents were asked to indicate the strength of their preference for the melting pot idea, an approach that may elevate the salience of the question and result in more variance in responses.

wanted immigration reduced.³⁰ Of these, almost half said it should be decreased "a lot." A February 1992 Gallup Poll found that the proportion of Americans feeling that there is too much immigration into the United States has grown significantly since 1984.³¹

There was greater public concern about immigration from Latin America and Asia, the source of most newcomers since the mid-1960s, than from Europe.³² Another hint of the nativist preference for immigrants from Europe comes from the 1991 California Poll sample. Only 22% of these respondents stated explicitly that the United States should give priority to immigrants from certain regions, but nearly half of these advocated favoring Europeans over potential immigrants from Latin America, Asia, or Africa. Not surprisingly, the immigration issue appears to divide Americans on racial lines. In the February 1992 Gallup Poll, whites were more likely than nonwhites to say there is too much immigration from Latin America, Asia, and Africa. One other indicator of nativist sentiment is the finding that roughly seven in ten white Protestant respondents told Gallup they would be more likely to vote for a candidate who would

³⁰ The remaining 7% of the sample had no opinion on the issue.

³¹ L. Hucik (1992). More recently, the New York Times/CBS Poll (8. Nydans, 1993) and the Newsweek Poll (T. Morgenthau, 1993) reveal the same trends.

³² 69% of the sample felt that immigration from Latin America was too high, 58% said there was too much immigration from Asia, and 36% said there were too many immigrants now coming from Europe. Similarly, a July 1993 Newsweek Poll reports that approximately 50% of their national sample thought it should be more difficult for people from Asia and Latin America to immigrate to the United States, as compared to 39% who felt the same way about Eastern Europeans (Morgenthau, 1993:25).

restrict immigration.33

In the wake of highly publicized incidents of illegal immigration, a July 1993 Newsweek Poll indicated widespread anxiety about the problem. While 59% of a national sample agreed that "immigration was a good thing for this country in the past," 60% felt "it is a <u>bad</u> thing today." The same survey found that 66% of the public felt that immigrants today "maintain their own identity more strongly" and only 20% thought that the United States is "still a melting pot."34 A Gallup Poll also conducted in the summer of 1993 showed that 55% of a national sample agreed that "the racial and ethnic diversity of immigrants threatens American culture." Numerous polls have indicated pervasive current concern about the economic costs of immigration too. For example, the February 1992 Gallup survey also found that large majorities agreed that even though immigrants work hard and take jobs "Americans don't want," many "wind up on welfare and raise taxes for Americans" and others "take the jobs of U.S. workers."35

Table 4 presents the responses of the 1992 NES sample to questions about the impact of growing Hispanic and Asian immigration. The tendency to view the economic consequences as negative is clear. Regardless of whether the group referred to was Hispanic or Asian immigrants, large proportions of the respondents

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³³ L. Hucik (1992), p.1.

³⁴ These findings are reported in T. Morgenthau (1993).

³⁵ See also M. Puente (1993) and T. Morgenthau (1993) for more recent results that are similar.

TABLE 4

BELIEFS ABOUT IMPACT OF HISPANIC AND ASIAN IMMIGRATION^a

<u>Question</u>: Many different groups of people have come to the United States at different times in our history. In recent years the population of the United States has been changing to include many more people of Hispanic and Asian background. I'm going to read a list of things that people say may happen because of the growing number of Hispanic people in the United States. For each of these things, please say how likely it is to happen.

	Extremely	Very	Somewhat	Not	_
<u>Hispanics</u>	Likelv	Likaly	<u>Likely</u>	at all	Don'
Improve our culture with	new ideas and	Customs	LIKELY	<u>Likely</u>	<u>Know</u>
Total Sample (N-2244)	3%	13	48	34	•
-	-		40	34	3
White (1739)	28	10	48	37	•
Black (281)	5%	18	46	26	2
Hispanic (169)	10%	30	46	26 11	6
			-	TT.	4
Cause higher taxes due to	more demands	for public	services		
Total Sample (N=2239)	19%	36	35	7	2
			••	,	3
White (1735)	19%	37	34	7	•
Black (280)	20%	30	39	7	2
Hispanic (169)	21%	32	38	6	4
			50	0	3
Take jobs away from people	e already here	1			
Total Sample (N=2239)	20%	28	37	10	-
		20		13	2
White (1736)	19%	29	20	• •	
Black (280)	27%	26	38	12	2
Hispanic (168)	18%	20	30	14	2
	200	2 I.	36	21	3
					•
				Not	
Astana	Extremely	Very	Somewhat	Not at all	
	Likely	T 1 1 1	Somewhat Likely	at all	Don't
Improve our culture with r	Likely	T 1 1 1	Somewhat Likely		
	Likely	T 1 1 1	<u>Likely</u>	at all <u>Likely</u>	Don't <u>Know</u>
Improve our culture with r Total Sample (N=2239)	<u>Likely</u> new ideas and o	<u>Likely</u> customs		at all	Don't
Improve our culture with r Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737)	<u>Likely</u> new ideas and o	<u>Likely</u> customs 16	<u>Likely</u> 51	at all <u>Likely</u> 25	Don't <u>Know</u> 3
Improve our culture with r Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737) Black (278)	<u>Likely</u> new ideas and o 4%	Likely customs 16 16	<u>Likely</u> 51 52	at all <u>Likely</u> 25 26	Don't <u>Know</u> 3 3
Improve our culture with r Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737)	Likely new ideas and o 4% 4% 8%	Likely customs 16 16 15	<u>Likely</u> 51 52 47	at all <u>Likely</u> 25 26 24	Don't <u>Know</u> 3 3 6
Improve our culture with r Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737) Black (278) Hispanic (169)	Likely new ideas and o 4% 4% 8% 5%	Likely customs 16 16 15 20	<u>Likely</u> 51 52 47 51	at all <u>Likely</u> 25 26	Don't <u>Know</u> 3 3
Improve our culture with r Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737) Black (278) Hispanic (169) ause higher taxes due to	Likely new ideas and o 4% 4% 8% 5%	Likely customs 16 16 15 20	<u>Likely</u> 51 52 47 51	at all <u>Likely</u> 25 26 24	Don't <u>Know</u> 3 3 6
White (1737) Black (278) Hispanic (169) ause higher taxes due to	Likely new ideas and o 4% 4% 8% 5% 5% more demands f	Likely customs 16 16 15 20 For public s	<u>Likely</u> 51 52 47 51 services	at all <u>Likely</u> 25 26 24 19	Don't <u>Know</u> 3 3 6 5
Improve our culture with r Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737) Black (278) Hispanic (169) Gause higher taxes due to Total Sample (N=2239)	Likely new ideas and o 4% 4% 8% 5%	Likely customs 16 16 15 20	<u>Likely</u> 51 52 47 51	at all <u>Likely</u> 25 26 24	Don't <u>Know</u> 3 3 6
Improve our culture with r Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737) Black (278) Hispanic (169) Gause higher taxes due to Total Sample (N=2239)	Likely new ideas and o 4% 4% 8% 5% more demands f 11%	Likely customs 16 15 20 For public s 27	Likely 51 52 47 51 services 42	at all <u>Likely</u> 25 26 24 19 17	Don't <u>Know</u> 3 3 6 5
Improve our culture with r Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737) Black (278) Hispanic (169) Sause higher taxes due to Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737)	Likely new ideas and o 4% 4% 8% 5% more demands f 11% 11%	Likely customs 16 15 20 For public s 27 26	Likely 51 52 47 51 services 42 42	at all <u>Likely</u> 25 26 24 19 17 18	Don't <u>Know</u> 3 3 6 5 3 3 3
Improve our culture with r Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737) Black (278) Hispanic (169) Sause higher taxes due to Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737) Black (278)	Likely new ideas and o 4% 4% 8% 5% more demands f 11% 11% 12%	Likely customs 16 16 15 20 Cor public s 27 26 27 26 27	<u>Likely</u> 51 52 47 51 services 42 42 42	at all <u>Likely</u> 25 26 24 19 17 18 12	Don't <u>Know</u> 3 3 6 5 3 3 3 6
Improve our culture with r Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737) Black (278) Hispanic (169) Sause higher taxes due to Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737)	Likely new ideas and o 4% 4% 8% 5% more demands f 11% 11%	Likely customs 16 15 20 For public s 27 26	Likely 51 52 47 51 services 42 42	at all <u>Likely</u> 25 26 24 19 17 18	Don't <u>Know</u> 3 3 6 5 3
<pre>Improve our culture with r Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737) Black (278) Hispanic (169) Cause higher taxes due to Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737) Black (278) Hispanic (169)</pre>	Likely new ideas and o 4% 4% 8% 5% more demands f 11% 11% 11% 12% 13%	Likely customs 16 16 15 20 Cor public s 27 26 27 26 27	<u>Likely</u> 51 52 47 51 services 42 42 42	at all <u>Likely</u> 25 26 24 19 17 18 12	Don't <u>Know</u> 3 3 6 5 3 3 3 6
<pre>Improve our culture with r Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737) Black (278) Hispanic (169) Sause higher taxes due to Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737) Black (278) Hispanic (169) ake jobs away from people</pre>	Likely new ideas and a 4% 4% 8% 5% more demands f 11% 11% 12% 13% already here	Likely customs 16 16 15 20 cor public s 27 26 27 32	Likely 51 52 47 51 services 42 42 42 40	at all <u>Likely</u> 25 26 24 19 17 18 12	Don't <u>Know</u> 3 3 6 5 3 3 3 6
Improve our culture with r Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737) Black (278) Hispanic (169) Sause higher taxes due to Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737) Black (278)	Likely new ideas and o 4% 4% 8% 5% more demands f 11% 11% 11% 12% 13%	Likely customs 16 16 15 20 Cor public s 27 26 27 26 27	<u>Likely</u> 51 52 47 51 services 42 42 42	at all <u>Likely</u> 25 26 24 19 17 18 12	Don't <u>Know</u> 3 3 6 5 3 3 6 5
<pre>Improve our culture with r Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737) Black (278) Hispanic (169) Sause higher taxes due to Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737) Black (278) Hispanic (169) ake jobs away from people Total Sample (N=2239)</pre>	Likely new ideas and a 4% 4% 8% 5% more demands f 11% 11% 12% 13% already here 18%	<u>Likely</u> customs 16 15 20 For public s 27 26 27 32 30	Likely 51 52 47 51 services 42 42 42 40 36	at all <u>Likely</u> 25 26 24 19 17 18 12 11	Don't <u>Know</u> 3 3 6 5 3 3 3 6
<pre>Improve our culture with r Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737) Black (278) Hispanic (169) Sause higher taxes due to Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737) Black (278) Hispanic (169) ake jobs away from people Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737)</pre>	Likely new ideas and o 4% 4% 8% 5% more demands f 11% 11% 12% 13% already here 18% 18%	<u>Likely</u> customs 16 15 20 cor public s 27 26 27 32 30 30	Likely 51 52 47 51 services 42 42 42 40	at all <u>Likely</u> 25 26 24 19 17 18 12 11	Don't <u>Know</u> 3 3 6 5 3 3 6 5 2
<pre>Improve our culture with r Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737) Black (278) Hispanic (169) Sause higher taxes due to Total Sample (N=2239) White (1737) Black (278) Hispanic (169) ake jobs away from people Total Sample (N=2239)</pre>	Likely new ideas and a 4% 4% 8% 5% more demands f 11% 11% 12% 13% already here 18%	<u>Likely</u> customs 16 15 20 For public s 27 26 27 32 30	Likely 51 52 47 51 services 42 42 42 40 36	at all <u>Likely</u> 25 26 24 19 17 18 12 11	Don't <u>Know</u> 3 3 6 5 3 3 6 5

^a Source: 1992 National Election Study

thought that the influx of recent immigrants was "extremely" or "very" likely to raise taxes due to increased demands for social services and to "take jobs from people already here." In this survey, however, public fears about the <u>cultural</u> threat posed by ethnic change seem much more confined. And in the 1991 NES Pilot Study, only 22% of respondents in the national sample felt it was very or extremely likely that the growing number of Hispanics in the United States would threaten the place of English as the country's common language. On the other hand, according to the figures in Table 4, relatively few Americans see many benefits accruing from the increased cultural diversity engendered by either Hispanic or Asian immigration.

Table 4 also shows some differences of opinion between whites, blacks, and Hispanics, although the magnitude and direction of differences depend on which immigrant group and which potential consequence of immigration is considered. Blacks and Hispanics were more likely than whites to assert that immigration provides cultural benefits to America. Interestingly, blacks seemed the most worried and Hispanics the least nervous about the impact of both Hispanic and Asian immigration. These differences are not very large, however, especially in light of recent media attention to the inter-ethnic conflict in the inner cities.

To examine the connections between conceptions of American identity and opinion about immigration, we constructed Hispanic and Asian Impact Indices by simply summing responses to the three items

listed in Table 4.³⁶ The beliefs that religious faith, competence in English, and striving to get ahead on one's own are critical for defining the "true American" were quite strongly associated with anti-immigrant feeling as measured by these indices. The correlations between the Hispanic Impact Index and the beliefs that believing in God, speaking in English, and striving to get ahead on one's own are attributes of American identity were .22, .22, and .16 respectively. The equivalent associations with the Asian Impact Index were .24, .15, and .12, all statistically significant at the level.³⁷ Clearly, immigration policy is one .01 domain of government action that deeply engages underlying conceptions of national identity, but nationalist ideologies might well shape preferences on other specific policies too.

Language Policy.

Language is a potent ingredient in the formation of a common identity. To learn a language is an achievement that enables participation in a new culture; to lose one's original language is to lose access to an earlier group identity. Both cosmopolitan liberalism and nativism hold that linguistic assimilation is an important step on the road to acquiring an American identity. Multiculturalism, however, challenges the symbolic hegemony of

³⁶ The single "positive" item was recoded for purposes of consistency and respondents were given an index score with the potential range of 0 (all negative consequences "extremely likely") to 9 (all negative consequences "not likely"). The sample means were 3.60 for the Hispanic Impact Index and a more positive 4.13

³⁷ For a similar analysis of the California public, see J. Citrin, B. Reingold, and D. P. Green (1990).

English. Multiculturalism demands language rights in order to assure the maintenance of political identities based primarily on ethnicity. Its advocates call on the state to implement bilingual programs that whittle away the instrumental advantages of competence in English and safeguard the vitality of ethnic traditions. Demands for linguistic diversity, in turn, have sparked insecurity about national cohesion and fostered a movement to designate English as the official language of the United States.

We have already reported that knowing English is a powerful symbol of "true" Americanism among most social and political groups. Another indication of the potency of this linguistic criterion of civic identity is the finding that 60% of those surveyed in a February 1988 California Poll opposed the principle underlying the bilingual ballots mandated by law and agreed that "<u>citizens</u> (emphasis is our own) who can't read English shouldn't be allowed to vote." Both national and state polls consistently report majority support for the passage of a federal law designating English as the country's official language.³⁸ For example, 63% of the 1992 NES respondents held this opinion.³⁹ Support for "official English" was strongest among white respondents (68%). but approximately half (53%) of the black respondents and a substantial minority (38%) of Hispanic respondents also favored such a law.

³⁸ J. Citrin, D. P. Green, B. Reingold, and E. Walters (1990). ³⁹ The question asked, "Do you favor making English the

official language of the United States, meaning government business would be conducted in English only, or do you oppose such a law?"

Clearly, most nativists should favor "official English," whereas multiculturalists will oppose this as inegalitarian and oppressive. Yet the pattern of public opinion indicates that many Americans do not view language policy as posing a choice between forced assimilation and ethnic particularism. Bilingual education is a good case in point. A majority of the public clearly emphasizes the importance of learning and teaching in English, although they are divided when asked to choose between English-only instruction and a transitional period of bilingual education.⁴⁰ In the 1992 NES survey, 33% of the respondents chose the former, while 48% chose the transitional approach; only 18% favored the multiculturalists' goal of continuous instruction in both languages "so that children can keep up their native languages and culture if they choose.⁴¹ A January 1991 Gallup Poll found that 71% of registered voters, including 64% of those from families with a native language other than English, believed that maintaining the cultures that people bring with them to the United States is a private concern rather than the responsibility of the government or the public schools.

These data suggest anew that a large segment of the public conceives of American national identity as incorporating both assimilation and cultural pluralism. Disagreement arises, however, when people must choose how much weight to accord each value and

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 ⁴⁰ J. Citrin, D. P. Green, B. Reingold, and E. Walters (1990).
⁴¹ Interestingly, ethnic differences in opinion were very slight.

whether or not the government should actively promote the status of minority cultures.

<u>Overview</u>

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The images of national identity we have explored are intellectual constructs without established operational indicators for categorizing individuals as either cosmopolitan liberals, nativists, or multiculturalists. The use of the survey items summarized above to compare the level of popular support for rival nationalist ideologies thus is bound to entail somewhat arbitrary decisions concerning the meaning of particular responses. Nevertheless, there is some value in attempting such an assessment of current opinion, if only to provide a baseline for tracking future developments.

For heuristic purposes, then, we have constructed summary attitudinal indices by designating certain response options as "nativist" or "multicultural" and summing the number of such answers given by respondents in the 1992 NES survey. Table 5 provides the details and reports the aggregate distributions on the Indices of Nativism and Multiculturalism respectively. Clearly, both outlooks are minority viewpoints. Table 5 shows that 33% of the sample gave fewer than 3 "nativist" responses to the seven questions making up the index and only 10% offered as many as six "nativist" answers. The average Nativism Index score was a low 3.26. "Multicultural" opinions were even more scarce: 34% of the 1992 NES Pilot Study sample failed to give a single such response out of a possible 5 and only 12% gave 3 or more answers supportive

			TABLE 5		
OVERALL	SUPPORT	FOR	NATIVISM	AND	MULTICULTURALISMª

Nativism Index Score:	<u>0</u>	1	2	_3	_4	5	6	7
Percent of Respondents: (N=1873) ^b	5*	11	18	23	20	14	7	3
	<u>Mean Scores</u> Total Sample (N - 1873)					3.26		
	White (1473) Black (222) Hispanic (131)				3.31 3.13 2.92			

The Nativism Index was created by summing the number of the following responses:

STRONGLY FAVOR a law making English the official language of the U.S.

FAVOR conducting classes for immigrant children only in English

STRONGLY FAVOR blending into melting pot rather than maintaining distinct cultures

Believe it NOT AT ALL LIKELY that Hispanic immigration will improve our culture with new ideas and customs

Believe it NOT AT ALL LIKELY that Asian immigration will improve our culture with new ideas and customs

Think believing in God EXTREMELY or VERY IMPORTANT in making someone a true American Believe immigration from foreign countries to U.S. should be DECREASED

Multiculturalism Index Score: <u>0 1</u> 2 3 4 5 Percent of Respondents: 34୫ 32 21 9 2 1 (N-1926)^b <u>Mean Scores</u> Total Sample (N=1926) 1.17 White (1519) 1.06 Black (226) 1.56 Hispanic (134) 1.72

The Multiculturalism Index was created by summing the number of the following

STRONGLY OPPOSE a law making English the official language of the U.S. FAVOR conducting two sets of classes in immigrants' native language and English STRONGLY FAVOR maintaining distinct cultures rather than blending into melting pot Believe it VERY or SOMEWHAT LIKELY that Hispanic immigration will improve our culture with new ideas and customs Believe it VERY or SOMEWHAT LIKELY that Asian immigration will improve our culture with new ideas and customs

Source: 1992 National Election Study Ъ

Those who responded "Don't know" to one or more of the survey items used in this index were excluded from this analysis.

of multiculturalism. The average score on this Index was a mere 1.17.42

Black and Hispanic respondents scored significantly higher than whites on the Multiculturalism Index, but their average scores were still well below 2.0 (See Table 5). Younger respondents scored significantly lower on the Nativism Index and slightly higher on the Multiculturalism measure. Multiculturalism also found stronger support among college graduates than the less well-educated. Finally, both Indices were related to partisan and ideological leanings, with Republicans and conservatives predictably scoring higher on the Nativism Index and significantly lower on the Multiculturalism Index than Democrats and liberals.⁴³

A main conclusion of this review of current attitudes toward American identity, then, is that cosmopolitan liberalism remains the dominant outlook. The available evidence about the attitudes of blacks and Hispanics indicates somewhat more support for the multicultural perspective, but even among these segments of the general public the symbolic hold of the national creed of individualism and equality of opportunity is impressive.

Coexisting with this general belief in these cosmopolitan liberal virtues, however, is a noticeable acceptance of ideas traditionally associated with nativism, specifically that to be

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⁴² In constructing both scales, we excluded respondents who said "don't know" to any item.

⁴³ These relationships were confirmed by a multivariate analysis in which race, sex, age, income, education, party identification, and ideology were employed as predictors of the two attitudinal indices. Again, the data are available on request.

truly American one must speak English and believe in God. In addition, a large minority of the public accepts an important tenet , of multicultural doctrine, the value of maintaining one's original ethnic heritage. Hence, support for cosmopolitan liberalism, nativism or multiculturalism varies across issues. The same individual often endorses elements of all three outlooks, although at this juncture the separatist theme in multiculturalism appears to have a very limited appeal.

The pattern of mass opinion described above suggests that one possible future scenario for American nationalist ideology is the revitalization of the ideal of the melting pot modified somewhat by a more explicit commitment to cultural pluralism. But we have also introduced poll evidence pointing to the possibility of an alternative outcome. Anxiety about increasing immigration may be fueling a resurgence of nativist thinking. And the relatively greater sympathy of the young, the highly educated, and ethnic minorities for the ethos of multiculturalism suggests that over time demographic change will contribute to a further fraying of the cosmopolitan liberal national myth. At the very least, the recent wave of publications by political and intellectual elites on both sides of the multiculturalism debate (Aufderheide, 1992; Berman, 1992; Hollinger, 1993; Walzer, 1990; Schlesinger, 1991; Taylor, 1992; Gates, 1992; and West, 1993) suggests that the ideological content of American nationalism is at issue.

Nevertheless, the gulf between mass opinion and elite actions is significant. Whereas many legislative and judicial decisions at

both the national and state levels now allocate political and economic rewards on the basis of ethnicity, a majority of the public still rejects these types of efforts to achieve equality of condition across ethnic groups. When advocates of multiculturalism frame demands for change in the status of minorities in ways that challenge such core values, they tend to engender resistance and intensified ethnic conflict. Indeed, given that a sense of group consciousness develops partly in response to how one is defined by others, the assertion that ethnicity is the primary basis of political identity by one group often provokes a defensive reaction in others. One possible future, therefore, includes mutually reinforcing trends of increased support for multicultural nationalism among blacks and Hispanics and for nativism among whites. This development would further complicate the ability of national leaders to forge a consensual approach for redressing racial and ethnic inequalities.

FOREIGN POLICY IMPLICATIONS

We turn now to the possible relationships between competing conceptions of national identity and American foreign policy. How do cosmopolitan liberals, nativists, and multiculturalists define the nation's global mission? Will they differ or converge in their choice between unilateral American assertion as against multilateral action in international conflicts? Will they identify the country's foreign allies and antagonists in the same way? How do they choose between limiting American ties abroad as opposed to supporting wide involvement in relations with other countries? How would they define the national interest in international economic matters such as trade and foreign investment?

This search for the linkages between nationalist ideologies and foreign policy orientations requires some justification. Many scholars discount the influence of public opinion on foreign policy, arguing that mass preferences in this domain are too volatile and unstructured to either guide or constrain elite Converse's⁴⁵ demonstration actors.44 that there is little coherence among mass beliefs on specific issues, Miller and Stokes's⁴⁶ finding that congressional votes on foreign policy matters are virtually unrelated to representatives' perceptions of constituency opinion, and Cohen's⁴⁷ conclusion that the foreign policy bureaucracy tends to be indifferent to public opinion can be cited in support of this position.

There are a number of compelling reasons, however, for choosing to explore the <u>potential</u> impact of nationalist ideologies on foreign policy. Claims about the instability and incoherence of public attitudes should not be overstated. Converse himself⁴³ has noted the muscular quality of the public's cherished moral values è

⁴⁴ See the excellent review by O. R. Holsti (1992). G. Almond (1950), and W. Lippmann (1922), conclude that public opinion is of such low quality that it should not be allowed to sway foreign policy decisions.

⁴⁵ P. E. Converse (1964).

⁴⁵ W.E. Miller and D.E. Stokes (1963).

⁴⁷ B. Cohen (1973).

⁴⁸ See P. E. Converse (1964), and P. E. Converse and G. Markus (1979).

and emotionally significant group identifications, which plausibly include the nationalist beliefs of interest here. In addition, the negative evidence concerning the impact of public opinion on American foreign policy is time- and context-bound. It derives mainly from the Cold War period during which an ideological consensus prevailed; few then challenged the idea of a national mission to lead the "free world" against "communist imperialism." In the current era of a less structured international environment and considerable domestic value dissensus, there may be more scope for public attitudes to influence elite choices in foreign policy.

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Finally, the foreign policy agenda is increasingly crowded by issues such as immigration or foreign trade and investment that seem likely to engage firmly held mass conceptions of national or group identity. The line separating domestic from foreign policy issues is harder and harder to find. We wish to speculate about how competing nationalist ideologies may influence opinions across a range of foreign policy problems. Our speculations do not describe an empirical universe; they do suggest the range of ideological alternatives likely to shape that universe.

The epistemological status of these speculations can be described as "informed hypotheses." The hypotheses are "informed" in the sense that they are deductively derived from the typologies of nationalist ideologies and foreign policy orientations that are being juxtaposed here and appear to be consistent with informal evidence in the press and elsewhere. While we lack adequate systematic empirical data about the association between conceptions

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of national identity and foreign policy preferences among either elites or the mass public, we will examine the survey evidence available to us at this juncture and employ these results to guide our speculations about alternative futures. We strongly advocate the systematic collection and analysis of data to test these hypotheses concerning the linkages between nationalist ideologies and foreign policy attitudes.

The Historical Record

The American national creed was forged in the crucible of revolt against monarchical regimes in Europe. How to remain pure and democratic in a world in which morally corrupt regimes predominated was an early preoccupation of the founding elite. George Washington's recommendations were "splendid isolation" and freedom from foreign "entanglements." This isolationist impulse was the dominant element in America's highly circumscribed policy toward Europe through most of the nineteenth century. Thus, Americans sympathized with the European revolutionaries, but these feelings of ideological affinity did not impel supportive action in favor of "democracy." Nevertheless, the United States did warn the older powers early on that it regarded the western hemisphere as a special sphere of influence on which others should not encroach. This significant departure from isolationist purity was justified by the belief that American values and institutions were empirically unique and morally preeminent. The intellectual foundation for an activist foreign policy and a broadened civilizing mission thus was present from the beginning.

Nineteenth and early twentieth century isolationism was compatible with both cosmopolitan liberalism and nativism. Significantly, the same held true when the United States adopted a more interventionist foreign policy at the end of the nineteenth century. "Manifest destiny" is a justification of imperialism in terms of American exceptionalism. Many adherents of both nationalist ideologies supported the "open door" in China, mediating the Russo-Japanese War, fighting a war with Spain that led to the acquisition of territory and military bases in the Caribbean and Pacific, entering World War I, intervening in the Russian civil war, and organizing relief efforts to Europe. Woodrow Wilson pledged to make the world "safe for democracy" and was willing to commit the United States to participation in a collective security system. His isolationist antagonists, cosmopolitan liberals and nativists alike, agreed that the United States was the moral exemplar other states should emulate; they merely opposed the restrictions on America's own national sovereignty and the institutionalization of intervention that Wilson seemed willing to accept.

The course of American policy between 1890 and 1920 suggests that conceptions of national identity and foreign policy orientations are not always tightly linked. Cosmopolitan and nativist principles were both used to advocate either isolationism or international involvement, military as well as diplomatic. True, after World War II, the triumph of the cosmopolitan version of the national myth coincided with the general acceptance of America as

a global power that must be active abroad. But if almost everyone was briefly both a cosmopolitan liberal and an internationalist, there remained differences over the proper mix of military and nonmilitary techniques in defending or expanding "freedom" against communism. There was also disagreement as to whether democracy and capitalism together, or separately, ought to be considered the lodestar of the American example to inspire the world. Finally, Americans remained divided over whether international involvement ought to take the form of unilateral assertion or multilateral action legitimated by the United Nations.

Current Conflicts and Future Directions

The emergence of a multicultural nationalist ideology has complicated things further still. We cannot assume that the internationalist orientation will continue to determine the trajectory of American policy by relying on the support of cosmopolitan liberals alone. Nor is it clear that the past compatibility of both nativism and cosmopolitan liberalism with an activist foreign policy will persist. The decline of value consensus in America, as indicated by the longitudinal assessment of our panel of experts, and the end of the cold war persuade us to attempt a different kind of projection.

The limited data in the 1992 NES survey indicate some connections between the public's opinions about American national identity and their beliefs on foreign policy issues (See Table 6). To be sure, the statistical relationships are modest at best, but respondents who endorsed a militant foreign policy outlook were

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TABLE 6 CONCEPTIONS OF NATIONAL IDENTITY AND FOREIGN POLICY BELIEFS^a

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	GET	BELIEVE	TREAT	SPEAK	NATIV.	1
AID TO FMR. SOVIET	<u>AHEAD</u>	<u>GOD</u>	<u>EQUAL</u>	ENGLISH	INDEX	MULTI.
Increase (N-358/9)	80	14	16	16	2.85	INDEX
Same (901/2)	79	67	94	63	2.99	1.31
Decrease (866)	82	71	92	71	3.62	1.22
Cut Entirely (73)	86	82	89	75		1.07
(Pearson's R)	(06)	(09)	(.02)	(09)	4.25	0.92
	•	•	(102)	(09)	(.20)	(08)
U.S. STRONGEST						
Str Agree (N=493)	87	80	91	74	•	
Somewhat Agr (897/8)	81	69	93	74 70	3.75	1.04
Neither (282)	81	75	93		3.36	1.08
Somewhat Diaagr (437)	74	56	94	67	3.22	1.13
Str Disagree (179/80)	68	49 ·		. 56	2.86	1.35
B=== (=,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,,	(.14)		89	54	2.43	1.56
ISOLATIONISM	(.14)	(.21)	(.00)	(.17)	(22)	(.13)
Agree (587-8)	80	71				•
Disagree (1654-5)		74	91	73	3.62	1.11
5254gree (1054-5)	80	65	93	64	3.14	1.19
USE OF FORCE	(00)	(.09)	(03)	(.07)	(13)	(.03)
	·				· ·/	()
Extr Willing (119)	89	81	97	73	3.46	1.31
Very Willing (402)	85	79	92	75	3.52	1.16
Smwht Willing (1235-6)	81	67	94	65	3.23	1.11
Not Very Willing (439)		54	90	62	2.97	1.24
Never (62)	64	69	87	58	2.97	
	(.13)	(.17)	(.04)	(.11)	(10)	1.63
PERSIAN GULF WAR			()	(,,,)	(10)	(.03)
Right (1710-1)	82	68	93	67	3 30	
Depends (50)	84	70	96	68	3.30	1.10
Wrong (454-5)	75	66	92	65	3.07	1.44
	(.05)	(.02)	(.00)		3.19	1.39
DEFENSE SPENDING	()	(.02)	(.00)	(.01)	(03)	(.11)
1 Decrease (181-2)	73	61	90	(0 ·		
2 (278)	74	45		60 ·	2.85	1.62
3 (467-8)	80		92	56	2.83	1.28
4 (672)	80 81	60	93	62	3.06	1.16
5 (239)		71	93	69	3.41	0.95
6 (79)	84	78	93	72	3.75	1.06
7 Increase (67)	86	81	92	76	3.53	1.29
/ Increase (0/)	82	85	91	77	3.44	1.46
ITNTT TNDODWO	(07)	(21)	(.01)	(13)	(.16)	(08)
LIMIT IMPORTS						(,
Favor (1069-70)	83	71	93	68	3.46	1.11
Oppose (537)	79	55	92	63	2.90	1.21
	(.00)	(.14)	(02)	(.06)	(16)	(.04)
U.S. ECON PROBLEMS			-	- /	、 • • • • • •	()
Japan Unfair (757)	83	74	92	73	3.52	1.10
Both/depends (231/2)	78	68	92	65	3.14	1.08
Own Problem (1174-5)	79	63	93	63	3.10	1.22
	(.05)	(.12)	(03)	(.10)	(11)	
	-		/	()	()	(.05)

^a See Appendix A for question wording and number of cases for Nativism and Multiculturalism Indices. Source: 1992 National Election Study

more likely than their counterparts in the sample to emphasize the importance of religious faith and competence in English as determinants of Americanism. This tendency prevailed among those more willing to believe that the U.S. should maintain its position as the strongest military power in the world, more willing to support the use of force in foreign policy disputes, more reluctant to send aid to the former Soviet Union, and more opposed to reductions in defense spending. Respondents who were more likely to endorse a generalized isolationist stance, also were slightly more likely to feel that believing in God and speaking English well were important criteria for American identity.

Table 6 also examines the relationships between these specific foreign policy questions and our Nativism and Multiculturalism Indices. In large part, these data confirm the associations discussed above. Strong nativist sentiment was associated with a preference for cutting aid to the former Soviet Union, increasing defense spending, limiting foreign imports, wanting the United States to be the strongest world power, and isolationism. Multiculturalism as assessed by our Index was in most instances more closely tied to the opposing position on these foreign policy issues. Those who scored relatively high on the Multiculturalism Index also were somewhat more likely to criticize American involvement in the Persian Gulf War.

Finally, it is important to note that the consensus surrounding cosmopolitan liberal conceptions of American identity, which emphasize individualism and equality, rarely breaks down in the face of disagreements about foreign policy. The evidence of the available survey data is that among the general public cosmopolitan liberalism remains a relative bedrock that could provide support for diverse foreign policy positions.

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To formulate our hypotheses about the foreign policy implications of intensified rivalry among the three competing images of American identity, we shall extrapolate from the fragmentary empirical data in Table 6 and utilize the survey-based conceptualizations of broader foreign policy outlooks developed by Wittkopf, Holsti, and Rosenau.⁴⁹ They have observed the following four types of orientation:

1. <u>Hardliners</u> see the international environment as essentially threatening to the wealth and security of the United States. Because the world is seen as threatening, hardliners stress military preparedness and favor the use of force in defense of American interests;

2. <u>Isolationists</u> seek to safeguard the purity of American values and institutions by withdrawing from military action as well as by minimizing cooperative ties with other countries;

3. <u>Internationalists</u> stress the need for continuing U.S. leadership in the world and advocate military strength as essential for defending national interests, but also recognize the need for extensive cooperation with other countries. Internationalists are willing to channel U.S. actions through multilateral channels when

 $^{^{49}}$ E. R. Wittkopf (1986), and O. R. Holsti and J. Rosenau, (1990).

this seems effective for attaining national objectives; and 4. <u>Accommodationists</u> discount foreign military threats and view the international environment as benign. They focus on such issues as hunger, poverty, human rights and consequently stress non-military means for achieving foreign policy goals. This group prefers to work entirely through multilateral organizations on both security and non-military issues.

The Wittkopf-Holsti-Rosenau typology was based on a large body of survey data collected from elites. The diagnostic issue for differentiating among respondents' basic outlooks was the willingness to support the use of force in foreign affairs, clearly one of the most important choices governments must make. Our own inductively-developed typology of nationalist ideologies did not refer to this dimension, and none of the three competing conceptions of American identity explicitly opposes military action.

If, as we have speculated, the debate surrounding issues of multiculturalism fosters a growing challenge to the cosmopolitan liberal national myth, it should become more difficult to achieve a lasting consensus about American national interests and, consequently, about the content and style of foreign policy. More than in the recent past, future American foreign policy will have to be based on compromises among advocates of rival ideologies and on shifting coalitions of supporters. While this situation may allow for flexibility in action, it also heralds a greater degree of instability and unpredictability with respect to the commitment

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of national energy and resources to foreign affairs.

The emerging debate over America's national interest usually is attributed to the changes engendered by the collapse of communism. We suggest that the changing character of American society is another source of discord about the country's foreign policy. In our view, the dwindling of consensus about America's international role follows from the waning of agreement on what it means to be an American, on the very character of American nationalism. The domestic underpinnings for the long post-World War II hegemony of cosmopolitan liberalism and internationalism have frayed, quite apart from the fact that the United States no longer confronts a powerful military adversary.

How the balance of support for cosmopolitan liberal, nativist, and multicultural nationalist ideologies influences the choices to be made among the hardliner, isolationist, internationalist, and accommodationist modes of action is unlikely to be clear-cut or consistent on all issues. To repeat, opinions on foreign policy are not so tightly clustered and structured as to fit neatly into notions of national identity which have overlapping content. For example, while nativists and multiculturalists might diverge over immigration policy and humanitarian aid to third world countries, they could unite against cosmopolitan liberals in favoring a protectionist trade policy. In addition, many foreign policy problems simply are not framed in ways that readily engage nationalist attitudes.

We begin with the cosmopolitan liberals who are the foreign

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policy elite of both major American political parties. We expect they will continue to favor the active diffusion of democratic capitalism abroad. While conceding that the demise of the Soviet Union has created a more benign external environment in the security realm, cosmopolitan liberals will maintain that there remain potential threats to democracy, prosperity, and stability and they will not reject the use force in order to defend American interests.

Cosmopolitan liberals may be willing to employ accommodationist tactics. But such support for efforts to promote American policies--diplomatic as well as military--through the United Nations, NATO, or other multilateral institutions would be instrumental rather than a matter of ideological principle. The residue of the post-World War II experience and the current international role of the United States make it unlikely that most cosmopolitan liberals would embrace isolationism. But the record of the nineteenth century shows that these perspectives are not inherently incompatible. Their convergence, in our view, would occur only in the context of severe domestic problems. Finally, we think it would be highly unlikely for cosmopolitan liberals to follow a consistent hardline orientation because liberalism does not favor the use of force as a matter of principle even against enemies considered to be ideologically abhorrent, such as Muslim fundamentalists.

Nativists are not opposed in principle to cooperative relations with other countries, although they are more likely than cosmopolitan liberals to worry that such contacts might dilute

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cherished American values at home. Thus, nativists would be most likely to be concerned about foreign intrusions, whether through immigration or investment. It would be unlikely for nativists to embrace accommodationism, which calls for a trusting attitude toward all foreign countries, not to mention tolerance of other cultures and political systems. Nativists, we expect, will be more friendly toward Western European nations and indifferent, if not always hostile, to the concerns of the third world.

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Isolationism, with its overtones of American superiority, is more congenial than accommodationism to nativists. We would expect this outlook to spread among them in response to anti-American developments in foreign countries with which the United States was maintaining close ties, or to failed American actions abroad. More generally, nativists should be quicker than cosmopolitan liberals to demand forceful action against countries deemed to threaten core American values, and they do not place a high value on the support of other countries or international organizations. Therefore, nativists might embrace a hardline approach under conditions of sharp ideological challenge to the United States, such as continued terrorist attacks on Americans attributable to another state.

The linkages between multiculturalism and foreign policy orientations probably are looser than in the case of the other two nationalist ideologies. Multiculturalism stresses the need to promote and defend of the interests of ethnic groups in American society. The primary loyalty of multiculturalists is to a subnational unit; accordingly, the idea of a common <u>national</u> interest

that should guide foreign policy is problematic to them.

There are, however, foreign policy issues on which multiculturalists seem likely to favor the accommodationist position. Accommodationism is inherently sympathetic to the militarily weaker and economically poorer countries which are primarily in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. Accommodationist programs thus have a redistributive quality that dovetails with the multiculturalists' domestic agenda. As long as these programs-military, economic, cultural, or ecological--neither damage the cause of one's country of origin nor reduce one's ethnic group's share of domestic benefits, multiculturalists should approve of international cooperation. For the same reasons, it seems unlikely that multiculturalists would embrace the hardline perspective.

The assertion of the multicultural principle of communal rights in the foreign policy arena, however, is likely to be selective, in the sense that it should be tailored to assist one's ethnic "kin." American Muslims have circulated petitions calling for military action against Serbia, but there is no reason to expect multiculturalists of other backgrounds to be especially favorable to such intervention on behalf of Bosnia.

More generally, among multiculturalists as among cosmopolitan liberals, attitudes toward multilateral institutions probably will be governed largely, although not exclusively, by instrumental considerations. Multiculturalists are likely to favor the most effective kind of action on behalf on their foreign reference group, regardless of whether this takes a unilateral or e .

multilateral form. Their commitment to intervention on behalf of democracy, capitalism or ecology is likely to be tempered by priorities derived from ethnic loyalties. It is also conceivable, however, that multiculturalists will turn to isolationism if foreign involvements appear to endanger the entitlements for which they have fought. Ironically, this could result in a shaky alliance with nativists, whose domestic agenda is radically divergent.

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To conclude, in a future scenario where the cosmopolitan liberal conception of American identity loses strength in the face of advancing support for multicultural ideas and a concomitant nativist reaction, three alternative outcomes for foreign policy seem possible. The likely most is the continuation of internationalism led by cosmopolitan liberals with episodic and lukewarm support from the other two groups. Accommodationism based upon a coalition of cosmopolitan liberals and multiculturalists is possible, but not probable. Isolationism founded upon the unstable support of all three nationalist ideologies is likely only if American policy suffers repeated failures and disappointments at home and abroad. In particular, if the domestic economy fails to recover and race relations deteriorate further, we would expect support for internationalism to sharply wane and isolationism to gain adherents.

Is American nationalism changing? The survey evidence presents a mixed picture. One can certainly point to the staying power of the national creed observed by de Tocqueville. Precisely because of this, however, the tendency of multiculturalism to frame demands

for change in the status of minorities in ways that challenge core values seems bound to engender resistance and intensified ethnic conflict.

Because of the geographic dispersion of minority group populations in America if nothing else, a crisis of national identity here would not presage territorial disintegration. The United States is not the Soviet Union or Yugoslavia. On the other hand, the emergence of a coalition supportive of accommodationism might increase the public's willingness to accept new international institutions such as a North American Free Trade area. Diminishing the centrality of the <u>nation</u> as a focus of one's political identity not only creates space for the claims of ethnicity, but also makes room for a supranational challenge to the exclusive sovereignty of the nation-state within its present borders.

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APPENDIX A

FOREIGN POLICY SURVEY QUESTIONS AND NUMBER OF CASES (TABLE 6)

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	Number of C vism Index <u>M</u>	ulticulturalism Index
AID TO FMR. SOVIET: If you h budget this year, for which o like to see spending increased spending decreased?Aid to co Increase Same Decrease Cut Entirely	or the lottowing	programs would you
U.S. STRONGEST: Some people position as the world's strong continuing high defense spendi Agree Strongly		
	406	410
Agree Somewhat	744	770
Neither Agree nor Disagre	e 202	209
Disagree Somewhat	373	382
Disagree Strongly	145	152
ISOLATIONISM: I am going to repolicy and I would like you disagree. This country would be and did not concern ourselves world.	co tell me whet	ther you agree or
Agree	466	477
Disagree	1369	1411
USE OF FORCE: In the future h		
USE OF FORCE: In the future, he be to use military force to sol Extremely Willing	Jw willing should	the United States
Extremely Willing	ve international	problems
Very Willing	94	99
Somewhat Willing	335	338
Not Very Willing	1027	1056
Never Willing	360	375
	45	46
PERSIAN GULF WAR: Now we want war that took place in early 19 thing in sending U.S. military f we have stayed out?		the Persian Gulf we did the right ian Gulf or should

Did the Right Thing	1418	1456
Depends (Volunteered)	40	41
Should Have Stayed Out	366	378
		270

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APPENDIX A FOREIGN POLICY SURVEY QUESTIONS AND NUMBER OF CASES (TABLE 6)

> Number of Cases <u>Nativism Index</u> <u>Multiculturalism Index</u>

DEFENSE SPENDING: Some people believe that we should spend much less money for defense. Others feel that defense spending should be greatly increased. Where would you place yourself on this scale, or haven't you thought much about this?

I Greatly Decrease	150	154
2	235	244
3	400	414
4	561	575
5	202	204
6 7 (mart)	62	65
7 Greatly Increase	55	56

LIMIT IMPORTS: Some people have suggested placing new limits on foreign imports in order to protect American jobs. Others say that such limits would raise consumer prices and hurt American exports. Do you favor or oppose placing new limits on imports, or haven't you thought much about this?

Potton		
Favor	911	
Oppose		931
0PP026	448	
•	740	466

U.S. ECON PROBLEMS: Which of the following statements comes closer to your opinion--(1) Japanese companies are competing unfairly with American companies; or (2) the United States is blaming Japan for its own economic problems.

Both/depends (volunteered) Own Problem		643 195
Own Problem	988	195

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
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