

**JAPAN'S INITIATIVES IN SECURITY COOPERATION IN
THE STRAITS OF MALACCA ON MARITIME SECURITY
AND IN SOUTHEAST ASIA:
PIRACY AND MARITIME TERRORISM**

Andrin Raj

JIIA Visiting Research Fellow

Director for Centre
Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centre
Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia

**The Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA)
Tokyo, Japan 2009**

CONTENTS

1. Acknowledgments	4
2. Sources and Methodology	5
3. Malacca Straits: Map and Definitions	6
4. International Maritime Bureau Piracy Map 2008	7
5. Executive Summary: Straits of Malacca and its Historical Legacy	8
6. Introduction	10
7. Background	11
8. Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in the Straits of Malacca: Regional Trends and the nexus of Maritime Terrorism	14
9. The Straits: A High Risk Zone and the threat from Maritime Terrorism	16
Appendix: Reported Attacks in 2008	22
1. Chart A: Reported incidents of attacks (Jan-Dec 2008)	
2. Table 1: Location of actual and attempted attacks (Jan-Dec 2008)	
3. Chart B: Monthly comparison on attacks (Jan-Dec 2008)	
4. Chart C: Total incidents (Jan-Dec 2008)	
5. Chart D: Types of vessels attacked (Jan-Dec 2008)	
6. Chart E: Comparison of the type of attack (Jan-Dec 2008)	
7. Chart F: Flag states of vessels attacked (Jan-Dec 2008)	
10. Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Post Cold War	27
11. Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Relevance of the threat of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism and the changing structural and economic system	31
12. Japan's Initiatives and Contribution to the Safety of Sea-Lines of Communication in Southeast Asia: Piracy and Maritime Security in the Straits of Malacca	34
1) Japan's Policy Formulation in Piracy for Southeast Asia	
2) Japan's Earlier Efforts in Southeast Asia on Combating Piracy and Maritime Threats	
3) Japan's Current Policy on Piracy and the threat from Maritime Terrorism	

13. Japan’s role and approaches to Piracy and Maritime Terrorism	38
14. Japan Coast Guard (<i>JCG</i>): Current Capacity-Building Measures and inserts of <i>JCG</i> ’s operations on Cooperation, Piracy and Terrorism internationally	40
15. Conclusion	46
Appendix: Japanese Self Defense Force current operations and regional efforts in Piracy and Terrorism	47
Source: 1 st Tokyo-Seminar on Common Security Challenges “Future Cooperation among Defense Authorities in the Region”, 18 March 2009, Tokyo	
Appendix: Policies for Sea-Lines off Communication (<i>SLOC</i>)	49
Source: Provided by the Office of Strategic Planning, Japan Ministry of Defense (<i>JMOD</i>)	
Appendix: Japanese Aid to Malaysia – Official Development Assistance (<i>ODA</i>)	54
Source: Provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan	
Japanese Aid to Indonesia – Official Development Assistance (<i>ODA</i>)	58
Source: Provided by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan	
Appendix: International Maritime Bureau – IMO 2008 Annual Report	63
1. Table 2: Actual and attempted attacks by location (Jan-Dec 2008)	
2. Table 4: Status of ships during actual attacks (Jan-Dec2008)	
3. Table 5: Status of Ships during attempted attacks (Jan-Dec 2008)	
4. Table 6: Types of arms used during attacks (Jan-Dec 2008)	
5. Table 7: Comparison of the type of attacks (Jan-Dec 2008)	
6. Table 8: Type of violence to crew (Jan-Dec 2008)	
7. Table 9: Types of violence to crew by location (Jan –Dec 2008)	
8. Table 10: Types of arms used in geographical locations (Jan-Dec 2008)	
Notes	68

Acknowledgments

My analysis for this project paper draws considerably upon a wealth of data collected over a 3- month period of my fellowship at the Japan Institute for International Affairs, an affiliate of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, as an Asean Visiting Scholar. I would also like to take this opportunity to thank the Japan Institute for International Affairs for providing me with this fellowship. I would like to acknowledge their specific assistance and contributions as well as their support in working with me as a Visiting Fellow.

In particular, I wish to thank and congratulate the President of *JIIA*, Ambassador Yoshiji Nogami, on his new appointment and heading the Japan Institute for International Affairs; Ambassador Toshiyuki Fujiwara, the Executive Director of *JIAA* and a colleague of mine from the Strategic Communications Network (*TOD TURKEY*) set up in Istanbul, Turkey in spring of 2007, comprising 23 Strategic Centers from the Middle East, Asia and Northeast Asia, for giving me his constant support over my 3-month stay in *JIIA*. I appreciated his exceptionally warm hospitality of welcoming me into a team of highly professional Research Fellows, Research Assistants and administrative team that looked into the well being of my stay here at *JIIA*; the former Director General of *JIIA*, Mr. Seki Tomoda, who recently retired and was very welcoming, although we only had a little time spent together. I would like to congratulate and thank the current Director General, Ms. Naoko Saiki on her new post and appointment as well as the hospitality that she has given me over these couple of weeks.

I wish to thank current Fellows at *JIIA* on their support as well as research assistances that assisted me in many ways and whom I am grateful for their assistance.

I also would like to thank my appointed research assistant, Yayoi Sonoda for taking good care of my stay here at *JIIA* and in Tokyo. She has assisted me in all my meetings, getting relevant data and information for my project and assisting me whenever possible.

Lastly I would like to thank my advisor and supervisor, Vice Admiral (Ret) Hideaki Kaneda, whose guidance and support was vital in this project. Admiral Kaneda has given me his full support in assisting me as well as connecting me with key government officials and making my research a very rewarding one. Admiral Kaneda is renowned for his expertise on maritime security and is currently serving as a Senior Research Fellow for national security at the Mitsubishi Research Institute, Inc. Tokyo Japan.

Domo Arigato,

Andrin Raj

Source and Methodology

Much of the underlying for this report was compiled from a team of experts from various governmental agencies and research associations associated with piracy, maritime terrorism and terrorism, defense and security as well as the military and the coast guard of Japan under the supervision of my advisor Vice Admiral (*Ret*) Hideaki Kaneda. The core experts from the Japanese authorities were assigned at respective agencies covering the area of my paper. This is to ascertain a detailed research protocol designed to ensure the credibility of data. Some data attained will not carry disclosed source for security reasons. Sources for most specific statistics and references are cited using endnotes.

Piracy and armed robbery against ships data and graphs are from the *ICC* International Maritime Bureau, International Maritime Organization (*IMO*) and sources from the Malaysian Piracy Reporting Centre. Maps and definitions provided by Malaysian International Shipping Cooperation (*MISC*). The Japanese data on Piracy and Maritime Piracy are attained from the Japanese Coast Guard and from the Ministry of Defense Naval Office, Ministry of Defense Strategic Planning Office and National Institute for Defense Studies Japan.

Other sources of information on international relations and Southeast Asia relations have been derived from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Japan from relevant departments such as Maritime Security Policy Division, Southeast and Southwest Asian Affairs Department-Asian and Oceanian Affairs Bureau, Policy Coordination Division-Foreign Policy Bureau and First Country Assistance Planning Division - International Cooperation Bureau.

Relevant other data was compiled from the Ocean Policy Research Foundation of Japan (*OPRF*), Research Institute for Peace and Security (*RIPS*), National Defense Academy and former retired Rear Admiral Yukinori Togo from the Japanese Navy and who commanded the Japanese operations in Operation Enduring Freedom in the Gulf of Aden.

Malaysian data compiled by interviews from abroad with the Ministry of Defense Malaysia, some consultation with the Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency on security related equipment, US Embassy of Malaysia, Defense Services Office prior to paper write up as well as with Maritime Experts from the Maritime Institute of Malaysia (*MIMA*).

Sources are also derived from my own experience in researching piracy, terrorism, defense and security issues. Relevant other issues pertaining to military scope and views are also derived from my experience as a *US* Army Cadet Officer and acting as a consultant for *TASK Int.* of the *UK* on special operations training for the Malaysian Special Forces on countering terrorism. Other sources of information are derived from my colleague Dr. Rohan Gunaratna, Head of the Centre of Political Violence and Terrorism (*ICPVTR*). Actual travels to Thailand and Indonesia on studying terrorist groups in the past and from on going research on piracy and terrorist activities.

MALACCA STRAITS: MAP & DEFINATION

Malaysian International Shipping Cooperation (MISC)

Malacca Straits map & definition



From Laem Phra Chao (7°45'.5N, 98°18'.5E) south-eastwards along the western coast of the Malay Peninsula to **Tanjung Piai** (1°15'.9N, 103°31'.0E); thence south-westwards to **Pulau Iyu Kecil** (1°11'.4N, 103°21' 2E); thence south-eastwards to the northern extremity of **Pulau Karimun Kecil** (1°09'.9N, 103° 23'.4E); thence westwards to **Tanjung Kedabu** (1°05'.7N, 102°59'.0E) in Sumatera; thence north-westwards along the coast of Sumatera to **Ujung Baka** (5°39'.5N, 95°26'.0E); thence north-eastwards to **Laem Phra Chao**.




© Copyright reserved **MISC BERHAD**

12 September 2006

PIRACY ATTACKS IN 2008

International Maritime Bureau (IMB)



SOURCE: IBM

Executive Summary: Straits of Malacca and its Historical Legacy

Piracy in Southeast Asia is as old as seaborne trade that dates back to the early archipelago settlements around the littoral states in the Straits of Malacca as well as the east towards the Philippines and during the European colonization. The beginnings of these settlements were also a haven for the growth of maritime piracy and armed robbery.

Piracy continues to persist in today's international waters and the threat of maritime terrorism is steadily growing as well, in particular of the Straits of Malacca where the paper will concentrate on. The Straits of Malacca have been the main connecting link between Europe, the Middle East and South Asia on one side and Southeast and East Asia on the other. A constant stream of merchandise and trade has flown through the passage from the East to West and West to East.

Before the islands and peninsulas bordering the Straits were carved up by colonial powers from the 16th century onwards, the Straits linked Sumatra, the Riau Islands and the Thai-Malay Peninsula into one cultural region with many cross-cutting ethnic ties, trans-straits kingdoms, networks of trade and religion. These links were somewhat reduced but by no means cut by colonial and post-colonial governance, rivalries and systems of domination.

In the early phases of the newly independent littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia, cross-Straits connections declined but started to develop more forcefully with economic growth and development in the 1980s. At the same time the Straits of Malacca maintained and increased its position as the world's most important shipping lane, more so than the Panama Canal or the Straits of Gibraltar. Estimate differs, but as of now more than 60,000 vessels per year and more than one third of the tonnage of world shipping passes through the roughly 100 km of the Straits of Malacca each year. Sea traffic now is regulated but sovereignty is strictly guarded by the littoral states. However the United States has been politically using preemptive diplomacy towards the littoral states to internationalize the Straits.

The threat of piracy and maritime terrorism has also been a critical factor in addressing the Straits of Malacca as well as the political dynamics and security approaches that are increasingly of vital importance to the littoral states, as pressure from the international community brings forth a new era of security and political concerns. The Straits is now considered an even more strategic location for acts of piracy and maritime terrorism to flourish and to hinder the economies of the world. As much as the Straits is considered "safe" we must not take this for granted as this will be the "grey" area of a "soft" target by the Southeast Asia terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah.ⁱ

This group has issued warnings and has strong links with the Free Aceh Movement (*G.A.M.*), as well as other terrorist organizations operating in the Southeast Asia region. A spokes person of the Free Aceh Group has criticized international seafarers of not abiding with *G.A.M.*'s recognition on its claim to sovereignty and of using its waterways although

than the area of Aceh came under the rule of Indonesia. My paper will highlight the close proximity of piracy and maritime terrorism in the Straits of Malacca and the importance to acknowledge, that acts of maritime terrorism is in fact a reality and the terrorist group Jemaah Islamiyah can be intertwined together in respect to the growing threat of terrorism in Southeast Asia.

The paper will look into the piracy and maritime terrorism in the Straits of Malacca as well as some area of concern in the sea-lines of Southeast Asia in respect to the Philippines and the Straits as “*high risk*” zone. Inserts from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on the Official Development Assistance (*ODA*) to Malaysia have been attached for Malaysian viewers.

I will then probe into the security cooperation and the institutions that play a role within the security aspect of the Straits. Further to that I will draw upon the Japanese current initiatives in working with Malaysia and the littoral states on a whole. I will then identify the initiatives taken, the role and approaches to piracy and maritime terrorism from the Japanese perspective.

.....

Introduction

The geographical location of maritime Southeast Asia has led to its archipelagic waterways assuming immense global criticality for piracy and maritime terrorism. The Malacca Straits is one of the world's most vulnerable areas because of their high potential for political conflict and environmental disaster. The effective management of a regional problem for piracy and maritime terrorism in the Southeast Asian region of the Straits of Malacca demands understanding of current political dynamics and security approaches.

Cross-boundary social networks are ethnically diverse but closely integrated. Thus, the Straits' culture and bio-diversity bear great opportunities for the economic and social development of the littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia as well as for Thailand. Peace and stability in the region are a precondition for regional development, uninterrupted energy supplies and international trade between the European Union and East Asia.

Of immense importance will be the creation of a space for dialogue and contacts between stakeholders who have interest in coping with pirate and maritime attacks in this region, whether they be end users of energy resources traversing the waterway or the littoral states trying to enhance their own security situation.

Piracy continues to persist in today's 21st century settings and in itself both directly and indirectly manifests a range of related social, historical, geo-political, security and economic issues. Piracy has permeated the world of maritime domain throughout history and in contemporary times, the waters of Southeast Asia serves as a dominant region for both occurrence of this activity and the challenges it poses as well as its new form of the involvement of maritime threats from terrorism.

Background

The Straits of Malacca commands a navigational water route for nearly sixty percent of world trade as well as one of the busiest waterways in the world with more than sixty thousand ships passing through per annum. The drop in piracy attacks over the couple of years does not necessarily mean a safer passage for vessels with the littoral states assuring its security. As such, the threat of a large-scale maritime terrorist attack may be overlooked. Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah have infact sent out warnings on potential attacks on countries economies through navigational routes and this makes the Straits of Malacca a potential maritime target.

The international community such as the Joint War Committee (*JWC*) representing the London marine insurance and Ageis Defense Services has declared in its risk assessment that a maritime terrorist and piracy attack in the Straits of Malacca is a potential threat. Intelligence and information gathered from Piracy, Jemaah Islamiyah operating in Southeast Asia and the threats from the Free-Aceh Movement (*G.A.M*) on hijacking vessels, clearly indicates the level of penetration of terrorist organization infiltrating piracy operations in the Straits of Malacca.

Although the littoral states and to some extend the ship owners association has regretted over the decision of the *JWC*, it is without a doubt that we must be prepared for a maritime attack. A warranted lack of evidence pointing to an immediate threat from maritime terrorism and to completely rule out the possibility of an attack in the Straits would be an incorrect assessment.

In one of my previous mentioned articles on the Somali maritime piracy and terrorism issue, these “pirates” are no “*Pirates of the Caribbean*”.ⁱⁱ The piracy in the Straits of Malacca has been penetrated by terrorist organizations such as Jemaah Islamiyah’s and its role in supporting the *G.A.M.* movement in Aceh, in the north part of Sumatra as well as in the region around the Philippines where the Morro Islamic Liberation Front (*MILF*) and the Abu Sayyaf Group (*ASG*) have conducted acts of maritime terrorism in Davoa city and Manila Bay. Foreign terrorist organizations are also working in *Southeast Asia* as evidence and sources have proved that “*Cheznya*” terrorist “*modus operandi*” was uncovered in a bombing in the Patani area some six years ago. A relatively important noteworthy quote from a colleague of mine; “*Terrorist needs to be lucky once, we need to be lucky all the time*”.

These pirates are well-trained “*militia*”, incorporating “*military style*” tactics that no “*normal*” pirate is aware of. There is no way a “*regular*” person can perpetrate this act, as one needs to be trained in engaging a vessel which is probably more than a hundred feet in length and about fifty feet in height. One needs skills of engaging a vessel, expertise on boarding a vessel, which means traveling at a speed, to keep up with the vessels speed and maneuvering next to it.

It is believed that ex-military personnel or renegade soldiers of “*special forces*” training are engaged in such piracy attacks. They may come from any part of the Southeast Asia region. The trainings are provided by them as well as Jemaah Islamiyah operating training cells in Southern Philippines and Indonesia and to some extend in Thailand, which the authorities have come hard upon after the 911 attacks, and in curtailing the growth of these training cells and the involvement of *Jl*. Terrorist operatives are well trained and are well prepared for a major maritime attack in the Straits of Malacca. The bombing of the *USS Cole* off Yemen is not a “*failure*” but a means of education, learning, and training for a “*bigger*” attack to come.

As the issue of “*sovereignty*”, is the most controversial issue pertaining to the Straits of Malacca, the littoral states have to address these issues on the fact that an eventual maritime attack might cause a massive large-scale economic disaster not only regionally but also globally. The Straits of Malacca remain vulnerable to the threat of maritime terrorism, as littoral states do not have the experience neither the capabilities to respond to an attack. If an attack were to occur in the Straits of Malacca from a hazardous chemical cargo, it would take a couple of weeks to actually respond to it, as there are no measures taken or planned for a maritime attack in the Straits.

Though disaster management trainings are conducted, there is no such facility or organization that can be deployed rapidly to a disaster. Appropriate measures need to be taken seriously in terms of training, responding, information and intelligence sharing among littoral states as well as partnering with the international community on securing the Straits and to establish an organization within the littoral states for disaster relief and support. This organization should be solely responsible for disasters and to manage a pool of expertise as well as with equipment and support salvage and respond boat or ship units.

The littoral states have to also compromise in the cooperation of international joint patrols and sea borne trainings offered by many international maritime agencies. The littoral states can monopolize Asean countries expertise such as the Japanese Coast Guard who has the expertise and experience accumulated in sixty years. The Japanese Coast Guard has conducted joint patrol trainings with the Philippines Coast Guard recently as of last year and Thailand will probably be following suit as well as Singapore.ⁱⁱⁱ The *JCG* training vessel *Kogima* will be leaving Japan in April of this year bound for the Asia region on a capacity building program for a three-month voyage.^{iv}

It is wise to be practical in addressing the issues of piracy and maritime terrorism rather than to harp on “*sovereignty*” issues. All nations, due to past experiences from war or political issues need to deal, address and to be realistic in the security of the Straits and the fight of the “*war on terror*”. The “*terrorist*” is not going to wait for the littoral states to solve its “*sovereignty*” problems. As can be seen from evidence presented above, the Straits of Malacca is “*open*” access to a possible maritime attack. One area that concerns me most is the upper north region of Aceh and the coastal town of Bireuen where potential attacks can be perpetrated due to the lack of surveillance and the wide open international waters leading into the mouth of the Straits and the other at the island off Pulau Karimun and heading down south into the Indonesian waters towards the east. The other area of concern is that Al-Qaeda has shown us attacks from land and air with great destruction so as Jemaah Islamiyah in the Bali bombings. In my opinion, the next attack will be a major maritime attack.

As much as Piracy is an issue, we must also be aware that maritime terrorism is also a potential threat in the Straits of Malacca. We have seen maritime terrorism in the Philippines and acts of terrorism within the Southeast Asia region mainly in Indonesia and Southern Thailand during which a rein of terror struck in the Southeast Asia and worst hit in Indonesia and we cannot deny the fact that a maritime attack is possible. The Threat of Jemaah Islamiyah and its supporting terrorist organizations operating in Southern Philippines, Southern Thailand and Indonesia is no doubt engaged in preparing for a maritime attack in an effort to cripple the Asian and International economies.

Piracy as it remains a hot issue in Southeast Asia has seen more than 60 actual attacks and more than 19 attempted acts of piracy against vessels in the Straits of Malacca.^v Malaysia too has been victimized by piracy attacks and the Malaysian authorities have been making great efforts in securing the Straits from threats of piracy. The Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (*MMEA*) together with the Marine Police force, the Royal Malaysian Navy and the Royal Malaysian Customs have been actively cooperating with one another in combating the threats of piracy as well as other forms of transnational crimes operating within the Straits of Malacca. However, there is a need to upgrade and train the newly set up *MMEA* as the lack of resources, expertise, and equipment is hindering some of its efforts. Among the littoral states, Indonesia has seen some of the worst hit in comparison to other littoral states.

The Straits is an important navigational route for Japan's trade and commerce. Piracy and maritime terrorism is of particularly a major concern to Japan, because Japan lacks energy and has to import oil from the Middle East, and this oil inevitably passes through the Straits of Malacca. Having 50% of its energy resources and some 90% of its oil coming from the Middle East, there is absolutely a lot for Japan to be concerned about the Straits in terms of piracy and maritime attacks.^{vi}

With increasing frustrations at the mostly-ineffective associations of Southeast Asian Nations efforts at countering and combating piracy, Japan announced its intentions of sending its Coast Guard vessels to Southeast Asia to conduct joint patrol exercises with *ASEAN* nations. Current capacity building programs are in the pipeline with Japan for the littoral states. One such exercise was conducted last year with the Philippines Coast Guard and to be followed suit with other countries such as Thailand and Malaysia in the near future.^{vii}

Besides oil, Japan is also the world's largest importer of liquefied natural gas (*LNG*) and Indonesia has traditionally been the world's largest exporter, though the *LNG* fields are now depleting in Indonesia. But nevertheless, a large volume still heads to Japan passing through the Indonesian waters. The Japanese government has prompted its Maritime Self - Defense Force (*MSDF*) to consider how it might protect Japanese vessels using these sea-lanes. According to a study, some 20% of all ships transiting the Straits are said to be of Japanese owned.^{viii}

Japan's motivation for mobilizing its forces for anti-piracy efforts has been a source of speculation. Japan has been actively canvassing support for the United Nations Security Council (*UNSC*) to obtain a permanent membership within *UNSC*. A new proposed security strategy for Japan, "*Multilayered and Cooperative Security Strategy*" will be introduced in the near future and it could very well lay out a new security framework for Japan. This will also allow the Japanese Self-Defense Forces to address the overall security issues pertaining to Japan as well as elements in the issues to piracy and maritime terrorism.

Piracy and Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia: Regional Trends and the nexus of Maritime Terrorism

By the end of the third quarter of 2008, the region in Southeast Asia recorded some 60 cases of piracy and armed robbery incidence for the year. This is one of the lowest in comparison from the last five years. With regards to actual attacks, 18 such attacks occurred during the third quarter of 2008.

The trends are basically theft and armed robbery that make up the actual attacks during the last quarter of 2008. Most of the reported cases in 2008 have been in theft and armed robbery. A report from the Research Institute for Peace and Security (*RIPS*) states, although there was only one reported hijacking incident during the last quarter of 2008, it serves as a reminder “*that there are more than just petty thieves in these waters*”.

The statement above, may suggests that the theft and armed robbery may not be confined to “*poor fisherman*” but more of a serious threat to maritime security. We must not be complacent on the fact that as much as piracy is a main concern in the Straits of Malacca the possibility and the threat of maritime terrorism should not be overlooked.

On the current attacks reported, no firearms were reportedly used during such attacks in the last quarter of 2008.^{ix} Basic weapons such as “*parang*” (sword welding type) and knives were the weapons of choice. The piracy in the Gulf of Aden, however are much more sophisticated as the pirates are well armed with semi and automatic weapons, Rocket Propelled Guns (*RPG*), Global Positioning Systems (*GPS*), modern and fast speedboats and are acquiring more mileage in terms of its weapons as well as its sophistication methods.

The Asian archipelago is a haven of arms smuggling especially around the Sulawesi waters and also the southern part of Thailand. In time these pirates will arm themselves with weapons as their counterparts in the Gulf of Aden and it will be a matter of time before they engage in acts of maritime terrorism. We must note however most of the information provided for the Asian reports does not literally furnish information related to weapons used specifically. These are a constant need to gauge information on trends and potential violence that takes place in the regional waters of the Straits.

The current wave of attacks on vessels transiting the Straits and most susceptible to attacks are those with lower freeboards, slower speed and with little or none security measures put in place. Most of the attacks during 2008 in the Southeast Asia region were targeted at Tankers as compared to other vessels transiting the Straits.

The area where most attacks occurred is in the Indonesian waters, but nevertheless, we should be vigilant on the whole of the Straits as piracy and maritime terrorism can just about occur at any juncture of the waterways particularly the Straits of Malacca. A number of attacks also occurred in the Southern part of the Philippines and in the waters in Vietnam. In a report by International Maritime Organization (*IMO*), the last quarter of 2008 reported

incidents took place during vessels berthing, but more serious attacks took place further offshore, targeting steaming vessels.^x The last quarter of last year also saw a reported hijacking incident of the east coast of Malaysia in the Tioman Island where pirates absconded with a tug after landing crewmembers of the island.

Recently in February of 2009, the first attack and hostage taking took place at the Northern part of the Straits, where in a previous published article stressed the lack of security and potential site for an attack.^{xi} The International Maritime Reporting Centre confirmed a Singapore managed tug and barge had been attacked and two crewmembers had been kidnapped in the Malacca Straits.^{xii} This is the first attack after a long lull in kidnap-and-ransom case in the Straits, a once afflicted waterway, between peninsular Malaysia and Indonesia's Sumatra Island.

The threat of maritime terrorism is a “*real*” threat in the Southeast Asia region and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (*MILF*), has proved what terrorist organizations are capable off in a maritime attack. In April of 2003, the *MILF* carried out one of the biggest maritime terrorist attacks in the Philippines. The attack took place at a busy seaport in Davoa City with major casualties. The *MILF* has also carried out similar attacks in Philippines shipping industry, mainly placing bombs on domestic inter-island ferries transporting members of the Philippine Armed Forces to and fro from the Mindanao Island and other such attacks on civilian lives around the region as well as the Abu Sayyaf Group on the Super ferry attack in February of 2004. It has been noted that terrorist groups in the Philippines, while advocating independence in the southern part of the Philippines were making a living as pirates in the Sulu Seas.^{xiii}

As piracy is frequent in Southeast Asia, terrorists have found it an attractive cover for maritime terrorism. Although the motives of pirates may differ from terrorist objectives, we must address the fact that terrorist organizations can and will infiltrate the villages where pirates operate in order to get their support and in the long term support the villages for “*economic prosperity*”. The former pursues economic gains but by becoming bolder and stronger in their efforts, may latter advance to political objectives. This is where the issues pertaining to terrorist objectives can play a hand in assisting the former.

Terrorist groups operating in Southeast Asia, such as Jemaah Islamiyah have strong links to Al Qaeda and have been operating closely with the Free Aceh Movement (*GAM*), the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (*MILF*), the Abu Sayyaf (*ASG*) as well as many other small insurgencies uprising in the Southern Thailand of the Patani United Liberation Organization (*PULO*) and Barisan Revolusi Nasional (*BRN*). There are reports from the Thai authorities that the influence is coming from international terrorist organizations.^{xiv} Groups such as the Kumpulan Mujahedin Malaysia (*KMM*) a.k.a Kumpulan Militan Malaysia (*KMM*) have had strong links to the Al Qaeda while operating in Malaysia prior to the 911 attacks.

Terrorist groups regard seaports and Sea-Lines of Communication (*SLOC*) network an attractive target because they lie in the intersection of terrorist intent, capability, and opportunity. The growth of commercial shipping in Southeast Asia makes the challenge of piracy and maritime terrorism in the region alarming. The U.S. Coast Guard Intelligence Coordinating Centre has reported in 1999, that it forecasted the world commercial shipping industry to increase enormously by 2020 and that this will trigger the proliferation of transnational crime and terrorism at sea.^{xv}

The four major world's busiest shipping routes are in Southeast Asia, ie: the Malacca Straits, Sunda, Lombok, and Makansar straits. As stated earlier in the paper, 60% of the world's annual merchant fleet transits these straits, and more than 15% of the value of world trade passes through Southeast Asia.^{xvi} These figures are projected to grow over the years and it commands some strategic thinking to protect it from major disasters that may be potentially harmful to the economies of the world. The Straits of Malacca is a maritime gateway between the Indian Ocean and the Pacific Ocean and it will remain a world centre of maritime activity. We must realize that if piracy is capable of many sophisticated attacks, why terrorist groups can't be considered the same and the possibility of engaging pirate's assistance!

If a terrorist group hijacks a vessel and turn it into a "floating" bomb to destroy ports or oil refineries (these are many along the Straits of Malacca) the effect would be catastrophic. And attack such as that would cripple world trade and slow down international shipping as well as spreading the fear. The prospect of such a maritime incident is not remote. Container vessels, where, highly vulnerable and the possibilities of its being used as a weapon of mass destruction has been documented.^{xvii} Thus, maritime terrorism in Southeast Asia and in particular the Straits of Malacca must no longer be considered as a question but rather of when and where. I have been adamant about the fact that a maritime terrorist attack is not too far away. We cannot and never be able to stop one from occurring but we need to strategically think of how to prevent and respond to a maritime disaster.

The Straits: A High Risk Zone and the threat from Maritime Terrorism

A maritime terrorist attack in this economically strategic waterway would certainly have potential to cause a large-scale economic impact, not just regionally but on a global scale. The 911 terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in September of 2001, brought about a major discussion with *IMO* on the vulnerability of shipping to terrorism.^{xviii} The underlying issues put forth in this meet were to ensure the security and contents of the containers in transit, to vet crewmembers, the transport of biological and chemical weapons, attacks on vessels and their use as weapons. On this accord, the creation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (*ISPS*) code was implemented. The measures taken on this new security agreement for Port security made it a top priority for all Port facilities to adhere to the regulations set forth on the pretext of the above set standards.

In the wake of the 911 attacks, most government agencies stepped up its security measures to prevent any further terrorist attacks within their home ground. Such comparison in security measures for instance, is the aviation sector that got the most attention and immediately had a considerable improvement world over. But less can be said about the maritime sector as it seemed to provide terrorist with easy excess of soft targets. Although a range of security measures have been implemented, it is still much easier for a terrorist to hijack a vessel or use it as a “floating” bomb than an airplane^{xix} As much as piracy and maritime terrorism may differ from the views of security experts, there is a distinct fact that the two can be of the same in objectives.

Piracy can be defined in a much-concentrated aspect such as “political piracy” motivated by political ideologies rather than economic gains. The act of political piracy is for the purpose of generating funds for political ideological or religious struggle. Thus, maritime terrorism can be perpetrated in order to promote a political, ideological or religious cause. In contrast to these issues, a number of attacks have occurred in the northern part of Sumatra near the Acehese coast and off the coast of the Indonesian down towards the south part of Singapore and the Philippines coastal waters near the Mindanao Island associated with terrorist organizations such as the *MILF* and *ASG*.

There are reports that terrorist had used pirates in attacks using their boats as well as using their expertise to assist a terrorist motivated objective.^{xx} Indonesian’s of origin decent who are from marginalized groups, mostly perpetrates the current piracy attacks in the Straits and east towards the Indonesian waters for political and economic gains. In the Southeast Asian waters and near the Mindanao island, they are mostly perpetrated by the *MILF* and the *ASG* both acting as pirates and terrorist operations for a political and religious struggle. Earlier pirates from the Philippines were also marginalized groups who turned to piracy for a living. However, it must be noted that the *GAM* movement has also operated as pirates and terrorist.

This is relatively by far in comparison of the earlier pirates who were predominately of, from east Asia who settled in the costal area of Malaysia, Sumatra and Indonesia and operated till the late 20th century. This is not true of the current pirates operating in Southeast Asia today, as acts of piracy and the nexus of terrorism are intertwined in the new era of extremist “*Jihadism*” fighting for a religious course in Southeast Asia. With regards to these attacks, one can wonder if it is for economic gains or pure political efforts to help maintain the struggle of a political ideological course that is occurring in the Acehese region, the Southern Thai uprising, and the Southern Philippines of the Mindanao Island where terrorist organizations are operating on a political as well as religious struggle.

In contra to *IBM* reports on weather *GAM*’s involvement played a role in certain attacks in the northern part of Sumatra, we must acknowledge, that there is information given and that there is information withheld from being given out to certain quarters of the public pertaining to issues due to security concerns.^{xxi} As operational experts and military experts on the ground, different scenarios are told and kept for security reasons. Another report

from Washington states that in 2001 and 2002 there were reported cases of kidnappings, hijacking of vehicles associated with *GAM*.^{xxii} These incidents of kidnappings and hijackings of vehicles are for a certain perpetrated act that was used for ransom and political trade offs. Vehicles hijacked were for transportation of *GAM*'s operational activities and using vehicles for bombing in strategic locations where the Indonesian military operated prior to the cease-fire and peace accord.

As much as the cease-fire and peace efforts are being established, I am not too sure of the real political goals of *GAM*'s leadership! I say this because there is strong evidence that shows *GAM*'s involvement in piracy and other acts of terrorism within the Aceh region and the waters of northern Sumatra. We must note that as much as *GAM* openly rejects Al Qaeda and Jemaah Islamiyah involvement, there is strong support from *GAM* in regards to its core religious ideological perspective to Al Qaeda and *Jl*.^{xxiii}

Hence, the same objectives can be driven together in a more profound way in using maritime terrorism to shape its core ideological goals. Evidence gathered from Jemaah Islamiyah and supported by Al Qaeda shows prove that the militant religious extremist group in this region is indeed set out to make the Southeast Asia region an Islamic hegemony based on extremeness ideological beliefs.^{xxiv} In keeping with its ideological beliefs, *Jl* will continue to act on all approaches in respect to the call for "*Jihadism*" towards the "*West*" and nations that are allied to the "*West*" in particular to the United States. Singapore authorities uncovered plans of an attack on US naval vessels transiting the Johore Straits in 2001. Seized documents included maps; operational planning and video footage had been made for a maritime suicide attack on US naval ships.^{xxv}

Information gathered from intelligence sources, as reported in the media, states that such possible maritime attacks are possible than initially imagined. The Director of Indonesia's State Intelligence Agency in 2004 confirmed that such attacks on shipping in the Straits of Malacca had been planned by captured *Jl* operatives in detention who had admitted to it.^{xxvi} *US* intelligence also reported the same time that they had intercepted *Jl*'s communication activities revealing a plot to seize a vessel using local pirates. The possibility of using the vessel and arming it with explosives to either direct it towards another vessel or just sinking it in the busy sea route of the Straits is something not to be overlooked.^{xxvii} This clearly determines a clear interest for these militant groups operating in the Southeast Asia region to pursue maritime targets with pirates operating in the Straits of Malacca or even around the *SEA* region.

In light of Singapore's view on the nexus of piracy and terrorism, it is convinced by its intelligence report that piracy and terrorist have joined forces to target the island republics' port and shipping facilities and hence in December of 2003 warned that an attack in the Straits is real and imminent. In the same statement it concluded that due to the number of pirate attacks at the southern end of the Straits made it extremely difficult to distinguish criminal acts of piracy from potential acts of terrorism and that no distinction should therefore be made between piracy and terrorism.^{xxviii} The discourse from Singapore did not

warrant a course of concern to either Malaysia or Indonesia, which viewed the issues as not a worrisome threat.

In 2000 the *ASG* landed on the island of Sipadan and kidnapped twenty-one Malaysian and foreign tourist from the resort island and took them hostage. The incident was a watershed for Malaysia, as it seemed incapable of safeguarding its sovereign territory from foreign intrusions. Prior to the press release on the above kidnappings and hostage takings, the authorities reported that it was “*pure act of piracy*” and it should not be considered as a terrorist operation. Further to this, what was seen as a “*pirate*” attack, turned out to be a terrorist “*modus-operandi*” in full fledged camouflage outfits when they literally landed on the island, equipped with semi and automatic weapons. The fact also remained that they did not take food and other essentials was something to be concerned about, as usually pirates will take whatever they can get their hands on. The reality of these attacks can very well justify the means of terrorist groups operating within the Southeast Asia region to be of a major threat to maritime operations and attacks along the coastal waterways of Southeast Asian waters on the Sea-Lines of Communication (*SLOC*).

In addition to the high number of pirate attacks in the region, a number of which have involved the hijacking of more high-risk vessels, such as *LNG*, crude oil or other such inflammable chemical containers has led to worry that terrorist could use copycat methods to takeover a vessel for more sinister reasons. They could also higher local pirates to accomplish these attacks. A visit by Vice Admiral Terry Cross of the U.S. Coast Guard to Malaysia in 2005 told the media that the ease with which pirate attacks were taking place in the Straits of Malacca could “*alert terrorist to the opportunities for seizing oil tankers*” and that “*these could be used as floating bombs*”.^{xxix} Similar remarks have been made by *IMO* on the hijacking of the *MT Tri Samudra* by pirates in the Straits of Malacca on its cargo of inflammable petrochemical products in 2005.^{xxx}

LNG tankers and their potential role in a scenario of this kind have probably received the most attention from security experts. In its liquid state, natural gas is not explosive, and it is in this form that it is shipped in large quantities via refrigerated tankers. Once in the open air, *LNG* quickly evaporates and forms a highly combustible visible cloud. It has been reported that if ignited the resulting fire could be hot enough to melt steel at a distance of 1,200 feet, and could result in second-degree burns on exposed skin a mile away.^{xxxi}

A fire of this magnitude would be impossible to extinguish and contrary to the littoral states of preparedness, they would not be able to handle the claustrophobic burning of the *LNG*. The fire will burn until all fuel is absorbed. The impact of such an attack in a port like Singapore would be devastating. There would be loss of life and severe structural damage in the immediate area. The most likely way a terrorist group would carry out such a major attack is using an *LNG* tanker rather than any other cargo, whereby to create an explosion onboard the vessel as it is rammed into the target. Although crude oil can be devastating, in my opinion is not of particular interest to terrorist groups to mount an attack using crude oil containers.

The risk from a vessel carrying chemical products is also worrisome. Chemical products may pose a toxicity risk in addition to being highly volatile. Like *LNG* tankers, chemical tankers are designed with maximum provisions for safety. The vessels are designed in such a way as to maintain space between tank walls to prevent incompatible cargos from coming into contact with each other. The safeguards in place, however, may not always be sufficient and may not be designed to guard against deliberate sabotage. In addition, general cargo vessels and container ships, which do not have such safeguards in place, are also sometimes used.

Other threats scenarios that terrorist groups can claim are mining the Straits and blocking sea traffic. There are two variations on this issue, both, which are equally alarming. Terrorist groups can mine the Straits and alert the authorities or because a ship had hit a mine. The second would be terrorist claiming to have mined the Straits and simulating a mine attack on a ship to add credibility to their claims. After all, if there were little or no information on the exact locations within the Straits that had been mined, the impact would be of great concern to seafarers, as it would mount a concern for security in using the Straits. This will force shipping traffic to close and forcing vessels to reroute around the Lombok and Sunda Straits. This in turn will cause severe delays to the shipping industry on their consignments.

The risk is too high to not look into terrorist capabilities. As it has not been widely discussed, the use of Surface-to-Air-Missile (*SAM*) or Rocket Propelled Guns (*RPG*) is yet another threat from terrorist operatives. Terrorist operating from one of the small islands around Singapore, which are Indonesian territories and the waters near it, are potential threats to Singapore or even the Malaysian aviation industry. A *SAM* or an *RPG* launched or fired upon from a terrorist boat or a vessel hijacked by terrorist can bring down a commercial airline. This would be of concern to Singapore, as planes coming into land must make their descent over the busy shipping lanes at the Singapore Straits. Even though security measures are put in place for this but the same cannot be said on vessels passing offshore. These *SAM*'s and *RPG*'s have a range which puts aircraft landing or in holding pattern waiting to land well within their targeting capabilities. The shortfalls outweighs the law enforcement agencies as they can do very little to reduce this particular type of threat.

The outcomes of such incidents over the past years in regards to piracy and maritime terrorist attacks taking place within the region greatly identify the current threat it imposes on maritime security. As far as it would seem difficult for *JJ* or other terrorist groups to launch a maritime terrorist attack in the Straits of Malacca, such a scenario should by no means be disregarded in the efforts to provide safe and secure waterways of the Straits of Malacca. Although there has not been a major attack in the Straits, there should not be any doubts about terrorist capabilities to conduct such an attack.


The conveyance of *Weapon of Mass Destruction (WMD)* in cargo containers is within the realm of possibility for terrorist organizations. Al Qaeda in 2003 had sought information on cargo containers with *WMD* cargo and Khalid Shaikh Mohammed the than No. 3 man of Al Qaeda offered USDA 200,000, in exchange for access to cargo containers heading into the port of New York with *WMD's* on board.^{xxxii}

Regional authorities should not exclude an endangering nexus between piracy and maritime terrorism or any other activity that has devastating impact on the maritime trade. It makes sense in the terrorist drive for a maritime expertise. Cooperation between these two groups is also rational in terms of mutual gain. The case of Acehness rebels financing their activities through piracy substantiates the basis for mutual gain between terrorist and pirates as a whole.^{xxxiii}

In gauging the threat posed by maritime terrorism lies not only in an assessment of the capabilities and motivations of the terrorist groups themselves, but also in an understanding of the maritime environment, shipping practices, the vulnerabilities of the commercial shipping industry and the response capabilities of those agencies tasked with safeguarding the regions waterways. Uninformed claims regarding potential maritime terrorist risk and threats, which are based on a misunderstanding or complete lack of knowledge of key factors, has led to a misinterpretation of the threat from maritime terrorism. This must be rectified if there is to be any hope of reducing the threat.

REPORTED ATTACKS IN 2008

CHART A: the following locations shared more than two thirds of the total reported incidents: i.e. 216 from a total of 29 reported attacks for the period. The chart however does not specify acts of terrorism.



SOURCE: IMO

TABLE 1: Locations of ACTUAL and ATTEMPTED attacks in Southeast Asia Piracy & Armed Robbery: January – December: 2003 – 2008

Locations	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
-----------	------	------	------	------	------	------

SEA Indonesia	121	94	79	50	43	28
Malacca Straits	28	38	12	11	7	2
Malaysia	5	9	3	10	9	10
Myanmar		1				1
Philippines	12	4		6	6	7
Singapore Straits	2	8	7	5	3	6
Thailand, Gulf of Thailand	2	4	1	1	2	

SOURCE: IMO

CHART B: PIRACY & ARMED ROBBERY – IMO 2008

ICC-IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report – Annual Report 2008

CHART B: Monthly comparison of incidents during January – December 2008




Chart C: Total Incidents as per region of the world January – December 2008




CHART D: PIRACY & ARMED ROBBERY – IMO 2008

ICC- IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report – Annual Report 2008

**Chart D: Countries where five or more incidents have occurred
January – December 2008**





CHART E: PIRACY & ARMED ROBBERY – IMO 2008

ICC- IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report – Annual Report 2008


CHART E: Types of vessels attacked for the year 2008



FLAG STATES OF VESSEL ATTACKS – IMO 2008

ICC-IMB Piracy and Armed Robbery Against Ships Report – Annual Report 2008

CHART F: Flag States whose vessels attacked ten times or more from January – December 2008



Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Post Cold War

Southeast Asia is a relatively stable region in which the maturity of the *ASEAN* members had made significant contributions to management of disputes between member states. The principles set forth in the *ASEAN* way and “*non-interference*” was enshrined in the Bangkok Declaration in 1967 to reaffirm the aims of the United Nations charter to protect nations from external interferences. It was later supported by the 1971 Zone of Peace, Freedom and Neutrality (*ZOPHAN*) Declaration.^{xxxiv}

After the collapse of the Soviet Union the tensions were somewhat forward looking for the *ASEAN* members in terms of its economic growth. The Treaty of Amity and Cooperation concluded for the peaceful settlement of intraregional disputes in a framework of absolute respect for states sovereignty and was originally concluded in 1976.^{xxxv} The collapse of the communist inspired ideologies and the general reconciliation between the communist and free market states evolved and hence the communist insurgencies were localized and almost all of its states had earned unquestioned international legitimacy.^{xxxvi}

The above revolutionary changes that were seen at the end of the Cold War complemented the regional dynamics already in motion, which included domestic security, rapid economic development, and maturing of regional identity to produce an environment conducive to increased cooperation and reorganization of security priorities in Southeast Asia. The maritime security cooperation developed during the decade following the Cold War termed as “*particularly noteworthy*” and notable.^{xxxvii}

Several Asean security measures already in place such as the Five Power Defense Arrangements (*FPDA*) and various *U.S.* security agreements were followed by a handful of new institutions emerging on security concerns, such as the Indonesia South China Sea Workshop (*SCS*) to reduce the likelihood of interstate conflict in the South China Sea, the Council for Security Cooperation in the Asia Pacific Maritime Cooperation Working Group (*CSCAP-MCWG*), the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (*APEC*), Working Group on Maritime Security, and the Western Pacific Naval Symposium (*WPNS*) tackled the Southeast Asian security issues within the broader Asia-Pacific maritime context although the progress was limited to transparency, dialogue and pledges of greater future cooperation and other maritime confidence and security building measures (*MCSBMs*).^{xxxviii} Of the many military-to-military pairings on operationalized cooperation naval exercise programs since 1993 the Malsindo operation was seen to be the most operationalized cooperation between the littoral states of the Straits of Malacca.

The events that took place from 2000 onwards propelled the Southeast Asian governments into the new millennium of maritime security threats. The first ferry bombing in the Philippines by the *MILF*, the bombing of the *USS Cole*, although this occurred in the Gulf of Aden generated fears of the same in Southeast Asia and the amphibious assault of the *ASG* in the Sipadan island of Malaysia kidnapping of western tourist and Malaysians, demonstrated the capabilities of Southeast Asian terrorist groups in maritime attacks. The

events of the September 11 attacks of the Twin Towers in New York, the bombing of the ferry *Kalifornia* in Maluku Archipelago and the Al Qaeda plots to attack several international targets discovered by Singaporean authorities initiated the “*age of terror*”. While, some Southeast Asian leaders and captains of the industry remain “*in denial*”, terrorism has become the preeminent security threat in the region and maritime terror is recognized as a serious threat to the Sea-Lines of Communication (*SLOC*) in the Southeast Asian waters.

Security cooperation within Southeast Asia is developing rather quickly than before. States have committed themselves to commitment in expanding *MCSBMs* and operationalized cooperation. The security measures that have been oriented are towards transnational threats such as piracy and maritime threats including terrorism. Several new arrangement have been created and renewed cooperation include the 2003 *ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF)* to combat piracy and other threats of maritime concerns and a working program to implement the “*ASEAN Plan of Action*” to combat transnational crimes. In 2004, Singapore’s accession into the “*Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety and Maritime Navigation*” (*SUA*) in Rome, Italy and put a step toward a regional acceptance of the *SUA* Convention.

The wake of 911 prompted the United States in its counter measures with “*operational interstate cooperation on counterterrorism packages*” and in its bilateral exercises with the Southeast Asian nations. The U.S. sent its naval forces to assist the Philippines in the fight against terrorism against the *ASG* operating in the Mindanao Island of the Philippines. In light of this, Malaysia and Thailand’s concerns about insurgents and terrorist groups operating within their shores had invigorated cooperative maritime patrols in the northern part of the Straits.

The littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia in 2004 took a decisive security measures to combat the threat of piracy and armed robbery as well as non-traditional threats to maritime security in the Straits. In July of 2004 the three littoral states signed an agreement on coordinated joint patrols along the Straits and hence “*Operation Malsindo*” was established.^{xxxix} The trilateral coordinated patrols are jointly operated by the three littoral states in patrolling the Straits to combat piracy, armed robbery, and smuggling as well as to secure the Straits from maritime threats. These Security measures are part of the other existing security measures that have taken place within the Southeast Asia region in regards to maritime security since the cold war ended.

However, the shipping industry privately lamented the bilateral coordination, as little more than exchange of schedules, to which in many cases, partners did not adhere to the agreement. The fact that the agreement was endorsed strongly by regional media and the positive public response to the cooperation patrols demonstrated the desire of governments to appear committed to the program and to give wide spread support to the project. In line with this security measures, governments of Japan, Thailand, Philippines, India and China have expressed their willingness to cooperate in the joint patrols. From opinions gathered

from sources, it is widely known that the joint patrols are not operating as it should be and therefore provides ineffective operations to combat such maritime threats.

In response to a more concerned centre for information gathering and sharing, sixteen countries including *ASEAN* members and Japan, South Korea, China, India, Bangladesh and Sri Lanka signed an agreement on the establishment of the Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (*ReCAPP*) in November of 2004. The government of Japan led by Prime Minister Junichiro Koizumi in 2001 at the ASEAN-plus Three Summit in Brunei first proposed the agreement. *ReCAPP* in which it was to maintain a database, conduct analysis, and act as an information clearing house was however in months of a deadlock as to where it should be located. There were underlying issues pertaining to information being misrepresented. This was with regards to *IMO*'s reporting centre in Malaysia that reported incidents in Indonesia although it happened in the waters of Malaysia.^{xl}

After a three-year deadlock from 2001, *ReCAPP* was finally established in Singapore and it was open to signatories on the 28 of February 2005. "*ReCAPP is the first regional government-to-government agreement to promote and enhance cooperation against piracy and armed robbery in Asia*".^{xli} This is a positive step, being an indigenous pan-Asia initiative devised primarily to deal with piracy, a phenomenon most conspicuous in Southeast Asia. The location set in Singapore shows the willingness of certain countries to compromise in order to advance maritime security issues in the Southeast Asia region. Although, members are not obligated to any specific action other than information sharing that they deem pertinent to imminent piracy attacks. However Malaysia and Indonesia have not agreed on signing the memorandum agreement due to "*political*" issues.

Since it was the Japanese government initiatives initially to set up *ReCAPP*, the government took a study tour to the Southeast Asia region, meeting with littoral states as well as with signatory members last year to hear their plight on the issues pertaining to the establishment of *ReCAPP* and discovered some flaws within organization.^{xlii} The Japanese government, although has put in much efforts in the setting up of *ReCAPP* is currently rectifying some issues within *ReCAPP*. The newly established Maritime Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Japan is currently addressing these issues and hopefully makes some amendments to it.^{xliii}

In March of 2009, Singapore proposed the *ASEAN* nations within the *Asean Regional Forum (ARF)* to move beyond the dialogue issues and hold a Maritime Security Exercise for the Asean Security Forum to improve its ability to deal with terrorist and other maritime threats. The Defense Minister, Teo Chee Hean made a statement that a "collectively" maritime security cooperation is needed within the Asean militaries and their counterparts to address the security threats in the region's waters.^{xliv} The move is a bold approach, but *ASEAN* nations have to take heed on the statement and collectively move forward in the dialogue rather than "*shuttle*" the fact that a maritime threat is not possible.

In addressing the issues to maritime threats, these many developments above constitute a significant progress in securing the Straits as well as the Southeast Asian waters. In respect to the many developments on dialogue, information sharing and the enhancement of states firmly committed in their efforts against maritime threats are still insufficient to counter the growing maritime threats in the region. The territorial disputes still surrounding some states need to be seriously looked into, as it will have serious implications on the security of Southeast Asia. Although most of the territorial claims by Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia have now been solved through the International Court of Justice (*ICJ*).

Most alarming are the issues pertaining to the South China Sea's where Malaysia, Indonesia, Brunei, Philippines, Vietnam, China and Taiwan assert conflicting claims to sea and island territories.^{xlv} These claimants are deemed to be of vital importance due to the vast petroleum resources available around the archipelagic waters of the South China Sea. Violent claims of threats from claimant countries of the islands have seen near real life "open warfare" occurring and in one incident two claimant countries nearly engaged in a firing incident between each other.^{xlvi} The threat clearly exists and the current volatile situation can trigger of a political or military event although a declaration from the *ASEAN* members and China on the "Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea" was agreed on in 2002. Though the code of conduct exists, the South China Sea remains a flashpoint.

As much as the *APEC-ARF* cooperation is concern, we must note that the original idea of the *APEC* was to discuss regional economy, cooperation, trade and investment and the *ARF* to foster constructive dialogue and consultation on political and security issues of common interest and concern and to make significant contributions to efforts towards confidence-building and preventive diplomacy in the Asia-Pacific region.^{xlvii}

To lump security, maritime threats, piracy and maritime terrorism as well as other security issues all into "one basket" is not a productive way to deal with the challenges of current threats surrounding the *Asean* region in terms of piracy and maritime security threats. We need security experts and not policy makers, as they are not able to visualize real threats. We cannot have government officials making proactive decisions, as they can be biased to certain issues pertaining to their national interest. The *Asean* charter on non-interference based on sovereignty issues, which was mandated only in recent times, is of a hindrance for developing states and states within the Southeast Asia region.

From my point of view, the reason of such decisions on matters concerning non-interference by all *Asean* nations is not so much for national interest but a means to politically control its nations from outside interference in such affairs pertaining to internal humanitarian issues, race, religion, freedom of speech and the right to protest against governments as well as any security threats deemed fit to the political powers in control. This also boils down to the reason of third world and developing nations in the *Asean* region, holding strongly on these fundamentals of non-interference as to stay in power. By having the charter in place, the international community is refrained from interfering in all *Asean* nations, with regards to the above-mentioned issues. The Southeast Asia nations in

particular, are very volatile in sense of its political and economic instability. Asean Secretary General Surin Pitsuwan, in Bangkok made a statement on the issue of non-interference, “*The principle of non-interference restricts Asean and limits the group’s options for preventive diplomacy and conflict resolution*”.^{xlvi} It has been noted that “*nationalistic*” issues can hinder security cooperation within the Asean region.^{xlix}

An example of the above statement can be directed to the developments of the European Union’s external security policies, on its multilateral efforts in addressing the common security concerns internally and externally within the *EU* nations. The common goal employed, emphasizes on detailed specific security measures rather than a “*wide*” outlook of many issues in similar organizations within the Asean groupings and the in capabilities of certain non-functioning agencies in the Asean region.

In view of the current security challenges within the Straits of Malacca and Southeast Asia, a relatively new framework should be in placed. Such as the establishing of a new multi operational body, relative to addressing security cooperation and issues with regards to security and threats within the region, with emphasis “*only*” on threats pertaining to piracy, terrorism, maritime security, transnational crimes, proliferation of weapons of mass destruction and their delivery means and disaster response. The new framework should include experts from all fields of the security and disaster area and should be from the private and public sectors and should be made transparent and not bias on its stand towards the *Asean* nations with regards to security measures. This excludes the earlier security frameworks initiated by *Asean*. The cooperation can be placed and supported by the ASEAN nations with funding capabilities as well as foreign aid.

Security Cooperation in Southeast Asia: Relevance of the threat of Piracy and Maritime Terrorism and the changing structural and economic system

The factors enabling greater cooperation, between the littoral states and the greater Southeast Asia are due to the reason of structural, normative and economic changes to the regional system within Southeast Asia. This also includes maritime security cooperation. These changes are a direct result of the global recognition of terrorism as a preeminent security threat, while others are a continuation of the older regional trends already visible in the post-Cold War era. The current changes in security cooperation within the littoral states and in Southeast Asia can be distinguished by factors such as relaxing sovereignty sensitivities, extra regional power interest, increased prevalence of cooperation norms, improving state resources, and increasing prioritization of maritime security. Although the above factors are considered an importance to the regional developments in security, it is not necessarily distinct, they are analytical concepts used to describe interrelated and complementary themes present in the evolving regional trends.

One of the many factors of pertaining the Malacca Straits and Southeast Asia is the sovereignty issue. They are considered to be of top most important in determining and defining the roles in the foreign policy formulations of these states. The non-interference is

the “*bedrock*” towards interregional relations and constitutes the most powerful inhibitor of maritime cooperation within Southeast Asia. Also most coastal states rely heavily on offshore economic resources, which is rich in oil. Not surprising, why most of these states are very sensitive about foreign interference besides the threat on national security.

According to a source from the Malaysian Ministry of Defense, Malaysia is very concerned about foreign involvement in the Malacca Straits, as it can be a violation of its non-interference policies in its territorial waters and see it as a national threat. The need for capacity building programs however has been a top priority in the piracy issue as well as in maritime terrorism.¹ Although these capacity building programs are viewed as important measures to be addressed, such as joint exercise patrols or information sharing, they are still cautioned about the idea. There are “*tell tale*” signs however, that there is a changing mindset on the issues pertaining to sovereignty in the maritime area in terms of “*relaxing*” some issues, in view of the current threats from piracy and maritime terrorism.

Recent developments into a more concerned security need in the Malacca Straits and around the Southeast Asia region have also seen states need for legal restrictions on shipping in their territorial waters as well as on historical events that saw foreign powers operating in these waters and to some extent to specifically undermine the security of some states. Even, as stated above, states have also been increasingly cooperating with one another and to a certain level to allow some infringement into their sovereignty in the effort to improve maritime security.

The events such as the Litigan and Sipadan Islands on using the *ICJ* as a “*pacifier*” and the presence of U.S. personnel in their ports shows the willingness of the *Asean* nations to cooperate amicably. These security measure are also part of the *IMO*'s and U.S. security standards of which a few arrangements have been in place in principle. The decision of Malaysia and Indonesia on the escort operations of the Indian and U.S. warships operating in the Straits, although it can be construed as a violation of sovereignty sensitive states as akin to law enforcement.

The coordinated patrol termed the “*Eye in the Sky*” (*EIS*) initiative commenced in 2004, with the littoral states and Thailand under the Malacca Strait Sea Patrol (*MSSP*) allowing for greater surveillance in the Straits. The coverage however is too large an area to realistically cover most parts of the Malacca Straits due to grey areas and certain sovereignty issues near the Acheh region for example. This is a likely area of piracy and maritime threats to occur. However, this new initiative supplements the current joint patrols on waterborne patrolling by adding aerial anti-piracy surveillance of the Straits.^h

In regards to this, *EIS* welcomes international participation on a voluntary basis. Indonesia also has set up a coast guard unit called the Indonesia's National Security Coordination Agency or in short “*Bakorkamla*” in order to facilitate coordination among maritime law enforcement agencies in Southeast Asia. The efforts initiated by the littoral states have seen

seriousness in combating piracy and maritime threats in the Straits as well as the Southeast Asia region with practical cooperative measures undertaken.

Efforts by the governments of Japan, South Korea and China have prompted new avenues of capacity building programs within the states as well as major initiatives currently taken by Japan in supporting the littoral states and in particular Malaysia on its newly formed Malaysia Maritime Enforcement Agency (*MMEA*). The Japanese “Official Development Assistance” (*ODA*) has been contributing large amounts of funding to Malaysia and Indonesia in respect to piracy and terrorism. This amount of funding is stated towards the end of my paper on the Japanese aid to Malaysia and Indonesia. Similar organizations from Japan have taken a role in addressing the issues of piracy and maritime terrorism and in engaging in capacity building programs in Malaysia and elsewhere within Southeast Asia.

The U.S. led program on its Regional Maritime Security Initiative (*RMSI*), however, was not so welcoming and was criticized by Malaysia, Indonesia and Singapore when Admiral Fargo in 2004 made a statement in the media on the role of *RMSI* in having U.S. Special Forces and U.S. Marines would be deployed to safeguard the Straits. The U.S. State Department concerned about what it will trigger in further diplomacy with the littoral states, quickly responded that it was a misleading statement reported by the media on the proposed regional security measure under the *RMSI* framework. Still at large, this arrangement has not taken off completely and has been in a deadlock situation ever since, with little or no significant improvements on its capacity to further strengthen security efforts as well as the lack of support from some *Asean* nations.

By far, most of the security cooperation within the Southeast Asia and in particular the Straits of Malacca has steadily improved over the post cold-war era. The need to cooperate on a diplomatic level and to address sovereignty issues is greatly needed to overcome the current volatile region. This makes it more relevant when the threat of piracy is now in the nexus of terrorism and the threat of maritime terrorism is increasing. The Southeast Asia archipelago and the Straits of Malacca, demand a more practical solution in order to evade the threat of a maritime attack and other security threats. Responses to and from a maritime attack needs to be in placed immediately as they are lacking considerably.

Recently, the Ministry of Defense of Japan organized the “*1st Tokyo Seminar on Common Security Challenges: Future Cooperation among Defense Authorities in the Region*”.^{lii} In regards to the forum, issues pertaining to piracy and maritime threats were not specifically addressed. The *Asean* speakers seem to hold an ambiguous view in relation to a possibility of a major maritime terrorist threat. One cannot but wonder if this is owing to the non-interference policy of *Asean*. In a statement made by one of the speakers, it was noted that International Terrorism was not a prime concern and that terrorist activities around the world and in particular, Southeast Asia was subdued to major enforcement crackdowns.

This is an alarming statement, as International Terrorism does not have to be “*internationalized*” any longer. The homegrown and sleeping cells in Southeast Asia are

very much alive and capable of major attacks within their “backyard” and have long been infiltrated by Al Qaeda in its support to *JJ*. We must note however, the second largest terrorist organization operating in the world in regards to geographical area, remains in Southeast Asia and Jemaah Islamiyah is of that organization. Evidence attained from captured *JJ* members has clearly indicated the rise of “*Islamic Extremism*” and its aim is to transform the Southeast Asia region to a “*Pan-Islamic State*”. We must not compare, Hamas, Hezbollah and other terrorist organization to Jemaah Islamiyah as their reach is global and Al Qaeda uses *JJ* as its main front in Southeast Asia.^{liii}

Japans Initiatives and Contribution to the Safety of Sea-Lines of Communication in Southeast Asia: Piracy and Maritime Security in the Straits of Malacca

1. Japan’s Policy Formulation in Piracy for Southeast Asia

The threat of piracy and maritime security concerns many nations, but it particularly alarms Japan, a state vitally dependent on the flow of resources through the pirate-infested waters of Southeast Asia. Japan being the third major economy of the world, uses the Straits of Malacca for most of its trade from the east to the west and in particular oil to its growing energy needs. The end of World War II saw a turning point in Japanese policies as well as its formation of the Japanese Self Defense Forces in post World War II.

The Japanese military was seen as one of the most feared and capable force in World War II in the Asia-Pacific region, although now it has subdued its image after its surrender to the United States in 1945, ending the Asia-Pacific wars. The Japanese Self Defense Forces today, comprising the Army, Navy and Air force still possesses a highly capable force, it is however restricted by its constitution from operating as a traditional military force. It also commands a high level capability of its maritime force. Japan being a coastal state, has also one of the most capable Coast Guards in the world in comparison with the U.S. Coast Guard. The Japanese Coast Guard or rather referred to as the *JCG*, though not part of the *JSDF* is also restrained by antimilitarist prohibitions.

In the mid-1990s, concerns over the piracy threats triggered a change in Japan’s policies and outlook. This in turn initiated a significant effort aimed at leading a regional effort to cooperatively eradicate the threat of piracy in Southeast Asia. In its earliest initiatives, its policies did very little and had mixed success in addressing the issues and one of its proposed efforts was the standing ocean-peacekeeping fleets in conducting multinational patrols in both territorial and international waters, made very little progress. By far though, at a bilateral level, Japanese initiatives have been quite successful over the years.

In view of the threat posed by piracy and maritime threats including maritime terrorism, the Japanese government took two basic principles on anti-piracy measures.^{liv}

1. Cooperation on global basis

- a. Addressing the issues of piracy at meetings related to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (*U.N. General Assembly, U.N. Informal Consultative Process, etc*)
- b. Promotion of the accession of other countries to related conventions, such as the Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation (Rome Convention)
- c. Promotion of cooperation in the International Maritime Organization (*IMO*)

2. Cooperation in Asia

On the basis of the idea that antipiracy measures in Asian waters should be advanced on the initiative of Asian countries themselves, Japan has implemented the following specific policies to promote cooperation among Asian countries:

- a. Study of the development of a regional cooperation agreement on antipiracy measures
- b. Maintaining the momentum against the piracy problem and engaging the problem in international meets with the ASEAN + 3 (Japan, China, South Korea) and calling for the signing of the Rome Convention
- c. Support for poverty countermeasures in the region where incidents of piracy occurs
- d. Support for strengthening of self-protection by ship-owners and cargo owners (cooperation with national ship-owners' associations in the ASEAN countries)

2. Japan's Earlier Efforts in Southeast Asia on Combating Piracy and Maritime Threats

In 2000, Japan organized the first ever Anti-Piracy meeting in Tokyo inviting the Asian countries. This was in relevance to the November 1999 ASEAN + 1 (Japan) summit held in Manila that brought about, then Prime Minister Keizo Obuchi's proposed meeting on combating piracy and armed robbery against ships.

Following the meeting that took place in Tokyo of 2000, a proposal by then Minister of Foreign Affairs Yohei Kono, the Japanese government dispatched the "Mission for Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships to the Philippines, Malaysia, Singapore, and Indonesia to conduct a survey and exchange opinions on specific cooperation and assistance measures with the four Asean countries."^{iv}

Though the Japanese government has initiated certain policies for Southeast Asia, it is not an easy task to develop a proper framework in regional efforts as it directly relates to concerns of national sovereignty in the region as well as to the littoral states that governed

the Straits of Malacca. Further to this a similar conference took place in Singapore and Brunei in 2001, which the later developed a proposed a convening of government-level working group of experts to study to formulation of a regional cooperation agreement related to antipiracy measures.^{lvi} The ASEAN side highly evaluated Japan's initiatives and cooperation on the above issues.

Also in 2000, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Ministry of Transport (*now the Ministry of Land, Infrastructure and Transport*) the Japan Coast Guard organized a regional conference on combating piracy and armed robbery supported by the Nippon Foundation. Coast guard agencies, maritime policy makers, ship-owners associations the *IMO* and ten ASEAN members represented the conference. As a result of the conference a "*Model Action Plan*" was drawn up in indicating specific guidelines to be followed by maritime policy makers and private-sector parties in maritime issues pertaining to piracy and armed robbery from the coast guard efforts to tackle the problem.^{lvii}

Apart from the above initiatives taken by the Japanese, a follow-up survey team from Japan visited Malaysia, Singapore, Indonesia and the Philippines comprising members of the Ministry of Transport, the Japan Coast Guard and Japan International Cooperation Agency (*JICA*). The issues addressed during those visits were based on the promotion of regional cooperation on antipiracy measures, a follow-up of the regional conference on combating piracy and armed robbery and Japan's cooperation and assistance programs and understanding the urgent needs from these governments.^{lviii}

In view of this visit the dispatching of maritime coast guards for combined patrol exercises, the holding of an experts' meeting, human resource exchange and training as well as technical assistance and a seminar on maritime law enforcement and coordinated patrols was put forward and most of it had been carried out since 2000. In 2001, a conference on Asian Cooperation on combating piracy was held to address the increasingly heinous and organized crimes relating to piracy and the information was disseminated to the participating countries and the also the future regional cooperation measures was discussed. The conference concluded on a multi regional cooperation, which was indispensable between the ASEAN countries in a number of factors relating to antipiracy.^{lix}

3. Japan's Current Policy on Piracy and the threat from Maritime Terrorism

"Terrorism is an immediate threat to Japan as in addition to the international terrorist organization Al-Qaeda, there are new threats from extremist in various regions which have been influenced by Al Qaeda's ideology. International terrorism has occurred in Southeast Asia which has close ties with Japan and which has accepted many Japanese travelers. Japan has been named as a target of terrorism in a statement issued by Al-Qaeda. Additionally, in the past, persons associated with terrorist organizations illegally entered Japan".^{lx}

Japan's efforts in the Asean region, in ensuring maritime security with regards to piracy and terrorism in the Straits of Malacca and Southeast Asia have received a great deal of

attention in recent years by the *Asean* nations. Japan's primary concerns and focus within the Straits and Southeast Asia has resulted in closer cooperation and capacity-building programs with the 3 littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia as well as its newer initiatives towards Thailand and the other *Asian* region in terms of maritime security cooperation. Although issues pertaining to the divergence of interest in institutional settings pose some obstacles, Japan is still moving ahead with its initiatives in responding to the needs of the Asean nation, in particular to the threats of piracy and maritime terrorism in the Straits and Southeast Asia.

As Japan's economy depends heavily on the safe passage of ships through the Straits of Malacca, Japan has long cooperated with the littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia in the area of navigational safety and seabed mapping on joint research. The increased threat of piracy and maritime terrorism in the Straits has resulted in increased Japanese funding through the "*Official Development Assistance*" program in anti piracy as well as in maritime threats from terrorism.

The Japanese Coast Guard has aided in the patrolling of the Southeast Asian waters and has carried out numerous joint exercise training with maritime counterparts from the Philippines, Thailand, Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia.^{lxi} The Japanese government's engagement within the littoral states of Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia is emphasized on the Asean Charter of non-interference on the sovereignty of the 3 littoral states and are currently focusing on cooperative capacity-building programs. The Japan International Cooperation Agency (*JICA*) has been given the task to assist the capacity building programs together with the Japanese Coast Guard.^{lxii} I will later explain on some of the training programs proposed by the *JCG* with regards to *JICA*'s involvement on the "*Brief*" section on the *JCG*.

Japan's multilateral efforts in addressing the piracy and maritime terrorism issues have also promoted bilateral cooperation within the region. The Japanese government for projects on piracy related issues has financed the *IMO* significantly in its more forward approach to security measures in the Straits and the Ocean Foundation has also provided assistance funding for the *IMO* Anti-Piracy Centre in Kuala Lumpur. The *APEC* Counter-Terrorism Task Force, "*Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting*" was held in Tokyo in 2004. In 2005 the "*Asean-Japan Seminar on Maritime Security and Combating Piracy*" was held in Tokyo to review the progress of the implementation of the International Ship and Port Facility Security (*ISPS*) code by Asean members.

Japan in a meeting in Kuala Lumpur with the *IMO* held in 2006, proposed voluntary to share the cost for safety, security and environmental protection of the Straits of Malacca and the Singapore Straits. The establishment of the information-sharing centre *ReCAPP* in Singapore however does not cover terrorism, smuggling and illegal migration in its agreement. The rule of the Law of the Sea will be the jurisdiction for this agreement and armed robbery for which it traditionally belonged to the littoral states. In view of *ReCAPP*'s operational personnel, it is represented by the countries signatories voluntarily

on its choosing of either a civilian or by military participation. Japan has also provided funding contributions to train both civilian and military personnel for *ReCAPP*'s operations in Singapore.

In a recent meeting with key officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Japan, a new Maritime Agency has been established within the Ministry in December of 2008. The Maritime Security Policy Division, Foreign Policy Bureau will be solely responsible for all maritime security measures globally. A Director of Operations within the Ministry heads the agency. The new effort in place by the Japanese government is to address the growing threats of piracy and maritime security as well as maritime terrorism.

Although somewhat new, the agency has begun international visits to Djibouti in the African Horn to assess the piracy issues as well as to Southeast Asia in meeting government heads in respect to rectifying issues concerning *ReCAPP*, primarily with the littoral states of Malaysia and Indonesia.^{lxiii} Apart from the government cooperative measures, private institutions from Japan have played an important role in assisting the littoral states with regards to Malaysia, with the Nippon Foundations efforts in providing funding as well as patrol boats for the newly established *MMEA*.

As much as Japan's strategic significance of the Straits of Malacca and the Southeast Asian waters, Japan has focused primarily on civilian cooperation rather than military cooperation and has refrained from utilizing its Maritime Self-Defense Force in the region other than disaster relief missions and such as the Tsunami relief efforts in the Straits of Malacca in 2004.

Japan's role and approaches to Piracy and Maritime Terrorism

In view of the Japanese governments role and approaches towards piracy and maritime terrorism, it is very clearly represented in the government's policy to eradicate the current threats posed by these groups operating in international waters as well as the threat of terrorism within the nexus of "*piracy and maritime terrorism*". Japan has been named as a target country by terrorist organizations, and the eradication of international terrorism is an issue for the government of Japan. In line with the United Nations (*UN*) Security Council Resolution 1368, which calls for further efforts to prevent and suppress terrorist acts, the countries of the world including Japan are making efforts as one for eradicating and preventing terrorism activities.

Terrorism has no national boundaries neither is it restricted to certain nations. It is a major global issue that directly affects all nations be it developing or the international community in developed nations. To address the issue further, terrorist groups and their methods are diversifying, making it even more necessary to enhance international cooperation for countering terrorism activities. Its role of addressing the maritime issues is related closely with direct threat to Japanese nationals involved in maritime transport and to the Japanese economy. Japan has engaged in working with improving the laws of enforcement of the

littoral states, enhancing information sharing, developing human resources and other security measures. This includes its new *ReCAPP* institution where it played a distinct role of entering it into force in 2006.

In respect to issues pertaining to piracy and maritime terrorism the government and private sector in Japan have been working cooperatively in providing assistance to the littoral states in enhancing safety and security of the Straits. As much as there is a need in for navigational safety concerns, the private sector will also play a key role in carrying out various capacity building projects in the region.

A relative new milestone agreement was reached in 2005 and 2006 on co-operation over the Straits of Malacca and Singapore. The framework, which includes all three littoral states in working together in enhancing navigational safety, security and environmental protection, was formally agreed.^{lxiv} Dubbed the “Co-operative Mechanism” was conveyed by the *IMO* in Singapore. The mechanism will provide a basis for dialogue between littoral states, user States and users of the Straits, which include a structured framework for co-operation with the international community. It will provide a platform for three main categories such as a forum on regular dialogue, a committee to coordinate and manage specific projects and a fund to receive and manage financial contributions.

The current activities of the Japan Coast Guard in assisting, in particular the Southeast Asia nations on the fight against piracy and terrorism have been very much a success. Programs conducted by them have assisted all the littoral states as well as other stakeholders of the Southeast Asian nations. The JCG working in its capacity to be a leading role player in addressing the maritime security threats has remarkably transformed its organization into multi co operational agency.

Established in 2001, the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law became Japan’s security measures against terrorism in response to the terrorist attacks in the USA in September of 2001. Cooperation and support activities, search and rescue activities, relief activities for victims were stipulated under the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law. Various activities were carried out after inception of the law and replenishment activities were also carried out for various ships operating under the law. This also enabled the JSDF to carry out military support measures in the Gulf of Aden as well as globally in response to the threats of piracy and armed robbery and terrorism.

The Maritime Self-Defense Force works as a replenishment support on the Maritime Interdiction Activities (*MIA*) for various countries. These replenishment activities are limited to the support of anti-terrorism relief’s. Current deployment is to the Gulf of Aden for Operation Enduring Freedom (*OEF*) on piracy related incidents. Maritime activities around the globe includes the Indian Ocean where the Japanese Navy is operating in assistance to the Indian Navy on intercepting and deterring maritime movements of terrorist, their weapons and drugs. The Indian Ocean is constantly monitored, and radio inquiries and inspections on board are being conducted to navigating vessels. Beyond the Indian Ocean,

the MSDF have engaged in various other support activities around the world based on the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law.

Japan Coast Guard (JCG): Current Capacity-Building Measures and inserts of JCG's operations on Cooperation, Piracy and Terrorism internationally

The Japan Coast Guard (*JCG*) headquarters in Hakuda, last year announced a consensus to support capacity building programs with existing international coast guards around the world and in particular the Asean and the Indian authorities to help train and provide logistical support.^{lxv}

The Japan Coast Guard is playing a major role in addressing the threat of piracy and armed robbery, smuggling and terrorism. They have engaged in many capacity building programs around the world as well as to provide trainings for major governments. One of the missions is the initiative taken for the Straits of Malacca in assisting the new-formed Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency (*MMEA*) in capacity building and training programs of *MMEA* personnel.

The Japan Coast Guard has been in existence for the last sixty years and is capable in providing the region in particular of the Straits with its expertise in addressing the piracy threats. The three littoral states comprising Malaysia, Singapore and Indonesia have had the *JCG* assist in many different capacity building programs. Current joint patrol trainings have included the Philippines and Singapore as recent as last year

The second initiative is the “*New Maritime Training Program*” that will be introduced by the *JCG* in April of 2009. The program will be launched in the third quarter of 2008 and the first thirty personnel will come from Malaysia, Thailand and the Philippines as these countries have been classified as a Maritime Agency organization. The constitution of Japan on support of such nature should not be related to military as well as the adherence of the Japanese government on the non-interference charter.

JCG requires a member for this training purpose to be free from military jurisdiction and run separately by an appropriate ministry not related to military. This will be a long-term endeavor by *JCG*. In line with the trainings conducted in Tokyo, the *JCG* hopes that in the long run, officers trained by *JCG* can return home to train new personnel in their home bases.

The program is entrusted under the Japan International Cooperation Agency (*JICA*) for a period of 3 years and will be closely monitored by *JCG*. These trainings will be run by the *JCG* at their training facility. After the initial 3 years, more countries will be included into the program. The program will run for 6 months and the first training program will commence in August of 2009. Selection of personnel will take effect in April of this year. The program is wholly sponsored and supported by the *JCG*.

With regards to the above training programs and cooperation, the *Kogima*, a training JCG vessel has been engaged in joint patrol trainings with the Philippines and India since last year. The *Kogima* leaves on a 3-month voyage for its capacity building cooperation visits around the world. Littoral states can take the initiatives to request the *Kogima* from the JCG's office of education and training department for courtesy call visit to their ports.


The JCG has also provided government based technical cooperation and international disaster relief systems such as:

JCG's Technical Training Program

1. Group training course in Maritime Search and Rescue and Disaster Prevention (from 1983)
2. Group training course in Marine Pollution Surveillance and Control (from 1983)
3. Group training course in Oceanography and Data Processing (from 1971)
4. Country focused training course in Maritime Law Enforcement Seminar (from 2001)

JCG's Disaster Relief System

The Japan's International Disaster Relief System



JCG's Dispatching of Long-term Experts

1. JCG dispatched the following long term experts in 2006:
 - Indonesia from 2003 for the Ministry of Communication to strengthen Maritime Safety System
 - The Philippines from 2000 for the Maritime Search and Rescue System

JCG's Dispatching of Long-term Experts-Technical Cooperation Projects

1. Philippines from 2002 and from 2008 – Philippines Coast Guard
2. Malaysia from 2005 – Malaysian Maritime Enforcement Agency
3. Indonesia from 2008 – BAKORKAMLA: Maritime Security Coordination Board & Maritime Search and Rescue System

From the above, the littoral states and the Southeast Asia nations can leverage on the capacity building program offered by the Japanese government on addressing threat of piracy, maritime terrorism as well as disaster relief operations and trainings. Below are the current capacity building programs initiated by the *JCG* in its international joint program.

JAPANESE COAST GUARD (JCG)

Cooperation with Relevant Foreign Organizations

Connecting Through the Ocean

Building broad based cooperation through JCG's diversification and internationalization

■ Cooperation with Relevant Foreign Organizations

Japan having its national borders with neighboring countries at the sea, Japan Coast Guard is conducting various operations at sea in consideration of the international affairs.

Due to the recent economic development and changes in international manufacturing in such countries as China, Russia and India, the flow of products, people, capital and information have greatly increased. Along with this active exchange, it has been pointed out that an environment has been created that makes it easier to carry out international terrorism and international crime.

Maintaining security and ensuring safety at sea is important for ensuring the stability of our nation's activities, and for that reason, it is necessary for JCG to cooperate with related international organizations.

JCG is strategically and actively promoting international cooperation in four areas: multilateral cooperation, bilateral cooperation, support for improving the capabilities of Coast Guard organizations in Asian nations, and support for international organizations.



The North Pacific Coast Guard Summit (Saint Petersburg, Russia)



Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies meeting (Singapore)



Meeting of Heads of Maritime Control Authority between Japan and China (Qinghai, China)



Japan-Russia combined exercise (Offshore of Otaru)

JAPANESE COAST GUARD (JCG)

Cooperation with Relevant Foreign Organizations

(1) Multilateral Cooperation

JCG has proposed holding a "Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting" to be participated in by Asia's 18 countries and regions, as well as a "North Pacific Coast Guard Forum" to be participated in the six Northern Pacific Ocean nations, to promote a new framework for multilateral cooperation. Through these initiatives, we will strategically and actively promote cooperation for ensuring safety and maintaining security with countries in Asia and the Northern Pacific Ocean region, which is of the utmost importance to Japan.

(2) Bilateral Cooperation

In order to maintain maritime order, JCG has been establishing and strengthening bilateral relationships with neighboring countries such as Korea, China and Russia, as well as India, which oversees the Indian Ocean, which is an important oil route.

At the same time, JCG is actively participating in bilateral and multilateral operations, meetings and combined exercises, and specialized fields such as search and rescue, ocean contamination, maritime safety and security at sea.

In addition, JCG is establishing technological cooperation with Great Britain and Korea in the field of hydrographic information.

(3) Support for Improving the Capabilities of Coast Guard Organizations in Asian Nations

JCG strongly supports capacity building of relevant countries, as a policy against piracy and armed robbery occurring in the oceans around Southeast Asia. Every year we conduct combined exercises by dispatching patrol vessels and aircraft. We dispatch experts and accept trainees from relevant countries for human resource development in those countries by providing our extensive knowledge and skills. In addition, we have continuously supported the efforts of neighboring Asian countries to establish maritime law enforcement agencies.

Furthermore, JCG is offering technological support to Sri Lanka for creating their tsunami disaster prevention policy and for tsunami disaster prevention policy in coastal regions of India.

(4) Support for International Organizations

JCG participates in activities of the International Maritime Organization (IMO), International Hydrographic Organization (IHO), International Association of Marine Aids to Navigation and Lighthouse Authorities and other international organizations.

In addition, JCG participates in international disaster relief activities to countries that have sustained large-scale damage from natural disasters.

JCG promotes necessary international cooperation, so that it may carry out its duties as appropriate.



Japan-India combined exercise (offshore of Nagoya Harbor)



A maritime law enforcement seminar to the Philippine Coast Guard



Japan Disaster Relief Team during a natural disaster in Pakistan

JAPANESE COAST GUARD (JCG)

Countering Terrorism and Piracy Countermeasure

■ Countering Terrorism

In response to the growing threat of grave terrorist acts ever since the simultaneous terrorist attacks against the United States in September 2001, security by surveillance vessels and aircraft is being strengthened at critical facilities along the coast, such as at nuclear power plants, and organizations involved in maritime activities are being asked to take measures to strengthen their own security measures. With regards to the security of nuclear power plants in particular, JCG is implementing measures to exchange information with police and power companies, as well as conducting joint drills so that we can respond effectively if an accident occurs. In addition, in accord with the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code JCG is carrying out appropriate controls for vessels that enter Japanese ports from abroad and more precise port call regulations, the submission of crew lists in advance of entry was mandated in February 2007. In international ports, JCG is taking measures against terrorism with Principal Field Officers for Seaport Security and Crisis Management, who are tasked with building cooperative relationships with relevant organizations and strengthening port policies.

Also, we participated in the maritime intercept operations of the "Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)" hosted by the Japanese government in October 2007.

Proliferation Security Initiative (PSI)

PSI (Proliferation Security Initiative) is an effort to consider measures participating countries can jointly take within the limits of international and domestic law, in order to crack down on the spread of weapons or missiles of mass destruction and their associated materials, which pose a threat to the peace and safety of the international community.

■ Piracy Countermeasures

As countermeasures against piracy in South East Asia area, JCG sends ships and air crafts to the area.

In addition to carrying out patrols on high sea, JCG conducts combined exercise, enhances information exchange and improves cooperation and collaboration with the relevant organizations, supports improving in order to develop their law enforcement capability.

In September 2006, "Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)" went into effect. Based on ReCAAP, JCG sends personnel to the "Information Sharing Center" that was established in Singapore based on ReCAAP. JCG is actively making efforts for piracy countermeasure activity through this agreement too.

In January of 2007, Piracy Countermeasure office was established in JCG headquarters. This office is playing the main role to promote these JCG's piracy countermeasures.

Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)

The Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP) was proposed by Japan, and was established to promote regional cooperation for piracy countermeasure in Asia. The agreement was concluded in November of 2004 and went into effect in September of 2006. Its primary contents are to establish a system for information sharing and enhancing cooperation through Information Sharing Center.



A patrol vessel guarding a high-priority facility



An onboard search of a vessel carried out under the International Ship and Port Facility Security Code



Joint anti-terrorism training with relevant organizations



Joint anti-piracy training (Sumat)

Conclusion

The threat of piracy and the nexus of terrorism should not be separated and should be considered in the same principle. Terrorism remains a serious threat that no nation should come to compromise, especially when civilian lives are concerned. Any threats of terrorism be it political or religious should be addressed accordingly with no exemptions on any bias towards these extremist groups operating internationally. Regions in the Southeast Asia should come hard on extremist group operating within their boundaries and should illegalize any group that portrays any signs of extremism.

Due to political and religious reasons, some *Asean* nations are reluctant of illegalizing groups that have been branded by the international community as terrorist groups due to sensitivity issues. Current terrorism activities in Indonesia have had a major affect on the countries tourism, foreign direct investment, trade and other areas for example. This could happen to any nation within the realm of terrorist control.

The threat of maritime terrorism is real and the Straits of Malacca is a potential risk zone for a major attack. The international community is making great efforts against maritime terrorism. However everything is prevention and treatment of an anticipated attack. The efforts of the international community must continue to foster better understanding of the issues and to eradicate the threat of piracy and terrorism.

We have noted the many obstacles hindering the security concerns of the *Asean* nations, the cooperative stand of the Japanese government support to the Malacca Straits and the Southeast Asian nations on piracy related issues and maritime security threats from terrorism. One significant challenge, which needs to be dealt urgently, is the issue of the non-interference charter. Distinct and specific directions are needed to stop maritime terrorism and deterrence to terrorism.

Issues with regards to regional security and the redress of terrorism is a primary concern that should also be carefully examined by government authorities. A new framework should be in placed with regards to Piracy and Maritime Terrorism, which deals specifically on the threats of Piracy and Terrorism. With regards to the littoral states, excluding Singapore on the pretext of its views in improving the security of the Straits, Malaysia has in many ways also moved forward and its changing attitude towards international assistance may or even encourage the policies of its larger and more reluctant littoral neighbour, Indonesia, to follow suit.

Japanese Self Defense Force current operations and regional efforts in Piracy and Terrorism

Appendix: Source; 1st Tokyo-Seminar on Common Security Challenges “Future Cooperation among Defense Authorities in the Region”, 18 March 2009, Tokyo

Maritime Security

While threats to maritime security are manifold such as armed conflict, accidents, and marine pollution, one of the greatest threats in the Southeast Asian waters is crimes at sea, such as piracy and smuggling and trafficking in arms, drugs and persons.

Japan's Efforts

In order to strategically examine the maintenance of maritime order and preservation of safe sea transportation lines, the Ministry of Defense has established a section for maritime policy in its Bureau of Defense Policy. As countermeasures against piracy in Southeast Asia area, Japan Coast Guard sends ships and aircrafts to the area. In addition to carrying out patrols on high seas, JCG conducts combined exercise, enhances information exchange and improves cooperation and collaboration with the relevant organizations, in order to develop their law enforcement capability.

- Regional Cooperation Agreement on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships in Asia (ReCAAP)⁴
- Grant aid to regional coast guard agencies (provision of patrol vessels, improvement of port facilities security)
- Helping establishing regional coast guard agencies (Philippines, Indonesia, Malaysia)
- Enhancing partnerships between/among coast guard agencies (holding of seminars and meetings, including Regional Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, Asian Cooperation Conference on Combating Piracy and Armed Robbery against Ships, Heads of Asian Coast Guard Agencies Meeting, Asia Anti-Piracy Challenges, Maritime Drug Law Enforcement Seminar (MADLES))
- Enhancing law enforcement capability of regional coast guard agencies (e.g., training junior officers)
- Co-chair of the ARF Inter-session Meeting (ISM) on Maritime Security

Regional Efforts

1) Regional Fora

- ARF ISM on Maritime Security (1st meeting was co-chaired by Japan, Indonesia and New Zealand)
- APEC Maritime security is given emphasis under STAR (Secure Trade in the APEC Region) initiative
- North Pacific Coast Guard Forum (Japan, China, ROK, Canada, Russia, US), Western Pacific Naval Symposium (WPNS) etc.

2) Bilateral and Multilateral Maritime Security Cooperation

- Coordinated patrols between and among the Indonesian, Malaysian, Singaporean, and Thai Naval Forces (INDOSIN, MALINDO, MASLINDO, the Malacca Straits Patrol (MSP) Agreement)
- Aerial patrol “Eyes in the Sky” among Indonesia, Malaysia, Singapore, and Thailand
- Joint naval exercises with user states
 - United States (CARAT (Cooperation Afloat Readiness and Training))⁵
 - India (Singapore-India Maritime Bilateral Exercise: SIMBEX, Indonesia-India coordinated patrol: INDINDO)
- Multilateral joint exercises (Pacific Reach, Search and Rescue Exercise (SAREX), Multilateral Joint Marine Exercises, Joint Exercise to Fight Piracy, Five Power Defence Arrangements⁶)

Common Agenda in the Region

- Capacity building and training of officials of regional navies and coast guard agencies in order to address crimes at sea such as piracy
- Enhancement of partnerships and coordination between coast guard agencies and maritime defense forces (regional efforts may encounter problems in coordination since relevant agencies to address piracy and other crimes at sea are not necessarily the same)
- Enhancement of partnerships between/among relevant law enforcement agencies both within and between regional countries

⁴ ReCAAP, which was proposed by Japan, was concluded in November 2004. The Information Sharing Center was established in Singapore in November 2006. The 14 member countries are Japan, China, ROK, India, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, and eight ASEAN countries except Indonesia and Malaysia. Indonesia and Malaysia participate as observers.

⁵ CARAT is an annual series of bilateral maritime training exercise between the United States and Brunei, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, and Thailand.

⁶ Malaysia, Singapore, Australia, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom

Terrorism

Indonesia experienced a series of terrorist attacks from 2002 to 2005. Jemaah Islamiyah, an Islamic terrorist organization, is strongly suspected of carrying out these bombings. Thanks to steady progress on national and regional counter-terrorism measures, there have been no large-scale terrorist attacks reported since 2006. Nevertheless, terrorism continues to threaten national political stability in the Philippines and the southern part of Thailand. Terrorism remains to pose greatest threat to peace and security in the region.

Japan's Efforts

The 9.11 attacks on the US led to the enactment of the Anti-Terrorism Special Measures Law and the succeeding law, the Replenishment Support Special Measures Law, was enacted in January 2008. On the basis of these laws, the MSDF has been conducting replenishment activities in the Indian Ocean. Japan places high priority on capacity-building assistance to developing countries. Japan implements capacity-building assistance utilizing Official Development Assistance (ODA), especially in the Southeast Asian region. Specifically, Japan has accepted trainees, dispatched experts, provided relevant equipment, and held seminars in the following areas: (1) immigration control, (2) aviation security, (3) port and maritime security, (4) customs cooperation, (5) export control, (6) law enforcement cooperation, (7) combating terrorist financing, (8) counter-chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear (CBRN) terrorism, and (9) international counter-terrorism conventions and protocols.¹⁰

- Introduction of a new assistance scheme, the Grant Aid for Cooperation on Counter-Terrorism and Security Enhancement (2006: USD 62million, 2007: USD 65million). To the ASEAN countries, it has begun to apply the Japan ASEAN Integration Fund (JAIF) (USD 68million) established in March 2006.
- Provision of technical assistance and relevant equipment
- Hosting of the ASEAN-Japan Counter Terrorism Dialogue
- Hosting of various seminars and meetings

Regional Efforts

Regional countries, especially law enforcement agencies, are promoting cooperation with emphasis on information sharing and capacity building.


- Establishment of counter-terrorism centers (Southeast Asia Regional Centre for Counter-Terrorism (SEARCCCT), Jakarta Center for Law Enforcement Cooperation (JCLEC))
- Joint statements and conclusion of treaties (ASEAN Convention on Counter Terrorism (ACCT))
- Cooperation with extra-regional countries, especially the United States and Australia
 - US: economic and military assistance, International Military Education and Training (IMET), joint military exercises (Balikatan (US-Philippines), Cobra Gold (US, Thailand, Singapore, Indonesia and Japan))
 - Australia: economic and military assistance, joint military exercises between Australia's Special Forces and Indonesia's Special Forces, *Kopassus*.
- Cooperation between and among ASEAN countries (information sharing between/among law enforcement agencies, holding of relevant seminars)
- Cooperation through regional fora
 - ARF (ARF Inter-sessional Meeting on Counter-Terrorism and Transnational Crime, various joint statements against terrorism)
 - APEC (various measures with the aim to secure the region's economic, trade, investment, and financial systems: Establishment of Counter-Terrorism Task Force (CTTF), STAR (Secure Trade in the APEC Region) initiative)
- Asia/Pacific Group on Money Laundering (APG)

Common Agenda in the Region

- Addressing gaps in counter-terrorism capacity among regional countries
- Strengthening border security and immigration control
- Strengthening partnerships between defense and law enforcement agencies
- Balancing between tightening domestic political stability and protection of human rights

¹⁰ MOFA, *Diplomatic Bluebook 2006*, p. 138.



POLICIES FOR SEA-LINES OF COMMUNICATION (SLOC) - JMOD



Japan's SLOC (Import&Export)

Import (67,344 trillion yen : FY2006)


Export (75,246 trillion yen : FY2006)



Strategic Objectives on SLOC Stability

- Increasing Stability of SLOC in Peacetime to Reduce Transportation Cost
- Providing "Stability of SLOC" as International Public Goods to Strengthen Political Presence
- Building Regional Cooperation through Defense Cooperation for SLOC Stability
- Preventing Denial of Japan's SLOC in Wartime


Regional Approach



5

Effect on Security Environment caused by melting ice-cap due to Climate Change

Sept. 2002



Sept. 2007



Melting arctic ice-cap (IPCC Report (Nov, 2007))

○ Arctic ice-cap has been getting smaller since 1978, by 2.7% over the last 10 years (by 7.4% in summer)

○ Arctic ice-cap is projected to disappear in summer by the time of 2070

Opening of Northern Sea Route

○ In the summer of 2007, North-West Route (North America) was temporarily open.

○ Merits such as shortening of sea route, reducing toll of canals and fuel cost etc

Easier access to seabed resources

○ There may be 25% of hydrocarbon resources in the world on seabed of arctic sea

○ Continental Shelves can be extended if there are scientific grounds according to UNCLOS

○ Change of SLOCs

○ Conflicts among coastal states over sovereign use of sea route

○ Effect on postures & operational doctrines of coastal states

○ Coastal states getting more assertive about their rights over continental shelves

○ Reemerging conflicts over territories

○ Military operations aimed at securing maritime interests

Developing Policy Recommendation

- Strengthening Cooperation with Maritime Countries
- Supporting Regional Efforts for SLOC Stability
- More Active Commitment on SLOC Stability by Japan

7

Strengthening Cooperation with Maritime Countries

- Promoting SLOC stability cooperation * among JPN-US-AUS(-ROK)
(* cooperation through defense dialogue, information sharing, joint exercise etc)
- Promoting SLOC stability cooperation with ASEAN countries
- Promoting US-India(-JPN) SLOC stability cooperation based on shared strategic concern with India
- Promoting defense exchange with PRC

8

Supporting Regional Efforts for SLOC Stability such as Capacity-Building

- Building capacities of Southeast Asia countries
- Supporting regional efforts for SLOC stability such as AUS-ASEAN countries cooperation; India-Indian Ocean countries cooperation

9

More Active Commitment on SLOC Stability by Japan

- Denial of use of SLOC by entities posing threats to int'l peace and security under current legal framework (OEF-MIO, PSI or various international exercises)
- Increasing efforts for SLOC stability in Northeast Asia through Japan-US defense cooperation
- Discussions under way to establish new legal framework to secure maritime security (which copes with WMD proliferation, international terrorism and piracy etc effectively)

10

JAPANESE AID TO MALAYSIA OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT ASSISTANCE (ODA)

Overview of Economic Cooperation to Malaysia

September, 2008

Ministry of
Foreign Affairs

1. Priority Areas

The Japanese government established "Japan's Country Assistance Program for Malaysia" in February 2002, and it has implemented assistance identifying following four areas.

- Assistance for the enhancement of Malaysia's economic competitiveness
 - (a) Sophisticating and Improving the efficiency of the manufacturing industries
 - (b) Support for IT
 - (c) Fostering and strengthening of sectors by utilizing Malaysia's existing resources
- Developing human resources with high levels of knowledge and skills for the future
- Assistance for environmental conservation and sustainable development
 - (a) Environmental conservation
 - (b) Improvement of living environments
- Assistance for the narrowing of income and other gaps
 - (a) Reducing gaps
 - (b) Advancing the status of women in rural areas

"Japan's Country Assistance Program for Malaysia" has been examined for its revision.

2. ODA to Malaysia

(unit: 100 million yen)

Fiscal Year	Loan Aid	Grant Aid	Technical Cooperation (JICA)
2003	—	0.36	27.31
2004	—	0.09	22.91
2005	76.44	0.33	17.23
2006	—	0.08	13.99
2007	—	5.08	10.46

Notes) Loan Aid and Grant Aid are on an E/N basis, and technical cooperation is on a JICA's disbursement basis.

3. Overview of Loan Aid

In the past, loan aid was provided mainly for economic infrastructure such as electric power facilities, railways, and airports. In recent years, as Malaysia was classified as an upper-middle-income country, the loan aid is provided only for "environmental improvement", "human resources development", "disaster prevention", and "narrowing the income gap".

[Recent Projects]

Higher Education Loan Fund Project(Ⅲ)
FY2005
7,644 million Yen

JAPANESE AID TO MALAYSIA OFFICIAL DEVELOPMENT AID (ODA)

4. Overview of Grant Aid

Malaysia has achieved its economic development, so that since 1991 Malaysia has already "graduated" from receiving grant aid except grand aid for cultural grassroots project, grassroots human security project, and cooperation on counter terrorism security enhancement etc.

[Recent Projects]

The Project for Improvement of Equipment for Maritime Security Enhancement (1/2)
(Grant Aid for Cooperation on Counter Terrorism Security Enhancement)
FY2007
473 million Yen

5. Overview of Technical Cooperation

Regarding technical cooperation, Japan has been assisting such as human resources for sustainable development.

[Recent Projects]


Bornean Biodiversity and Ecosystems Cooperation Programme Phase2
(Technical Cooperation project)

Project for Human Resource Development in the Intellectual Property Right's Administration
(Technical Cooperation project)

Strengthen and Enhance the Capabilities and Capacities of DOSH to Enforce the Laws Related to Occupational Safety and Health
(Technical Cooperation Project)

The Study on Improvement of Planning Capability in Sewage Sector
(Development Study)

Recent ODA Projects



[Capacity Building on Social Welfare for Persons with Disabilities]
[Strengthen and Enhance the Capabilities and Capacities of DOSH to Enforce the Laws Related to Occupational Safety and Health]
[Project for Human Resource Development in the Intellectual Property Right's Administration]
(Technical Cooperation)



~Third Country Training Program~

Technical and financial support has extended to Malaysia for South-South Cooperation. In FY2007, the third country training programs such as "Promotion and Management of Small and Medium Enterprises", and "Environmental Protection", "Tax Administration" were held.

ODA to Malaysia

(unit : 100 million yen)

Fiscal Year	Loan Aid	Grant Aid	Technical Cooperation (JICA)
2005	76.44 Higher Education Loan Fund Project (III) (76.44)	0.33 Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Project (0.33)	17.23 Acceptance of technical training participants 441 Peoples Dispatch of technical cooperation experts 91 Peoples Members of study teams dispatched 72 Peoples Provision of equipment (0.56) Dispatch of Japan overseas cooperation volunteers 40 Peoples
2006	-	0.08 Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Project (0.06) Grant Assistance for Cultural Grassroots Project (0.02)	13.99 Acceptance of technical training participants 440 Peoples Dispatch of technical cooperation experts 95 Peoples Members of study teams dispatched 63 Peoples Provision of equipment (0.06) Dispatch of Japan overseas cooperation volunteers 30 Peoples

Notes) Loan Aid and Grant Aid are on an E/N basis, and technical cooperation is on a JICA's disbursement basis.

ODA to Malaysia

(unit: 100 million yen)

Fiscal Year	Loan Aid	Grant Aid	Technical Cooperation (JICA)
2007	-	5.08 The Project for Improvement of Equipment for Maritime Security Enhancement (1/2) (4.73) Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Project (0.25) Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Projects (0.10)	10.46 Acceptance of technical training participants 344 Peoples Dispatch of technical cooperation experts 74 Peoples Members of study teams dispatched 55 Peoples Provision of equipment (0.003) Dispatch of Japan overseas cooperation volunteers 34 Peoples

Notes) Loan aid and Grant Aid are on an E/N basis, and technical cooperation is on a JICA's disbursement basis.

ODA to Malaysia (Development Study)

Fiscal Year	Projects	Term
FY2004	The Study on National Waste Minimization in Malaysia	July 2004-June 2006
FY2005	The Study on Improvement of Planning Capability in Sewage Sector	January 2006-November 2008
FY2006, 2007	--	

Japanese Aid to Indonesia Official Development Assistance (ODA)

Overview of Economic Cooperation to Indonesia

April 2008
Ministry of Foreign
Affairs

1. Priority Areas

According to "Japan's Country Assistance Program for Indonesia" (November 2004), Japan's ODA to Indonesian is focused on the following three priority areas.

(1) Assistance for Promoting "Sustainable Growth by Small and Medium Enterprises (SMEs) and Private Sectors"

- Securing sustainability of economy
- Development of economic infrastructure for improving investment environment
- Promotion of SMEs and private sectors
- Improvement of laws and regulations of Economic activities
- Financial Sector Reform, etc

(2) Assistance for "Building Democratic and Fair Society"

- Poverty Reduction
- Enhancement of employment, income, and welfare by developing agricultural and fishery villages
- Improvement of public services including education, health and medical care, etc.
- Governance
- Improvement of judicial and police systems
- Decentralization, etc
- Environmental preservation and disaster prevention, etc

(3) Assistance for "Peace and Stabilization"

- Peace building and supporting reconstruction for Aceh, Maluku, Papua, etc
- Enhancement of security
- Prevention of terrorism
- Prevention of piracy and reinforcement of marine security, etc

2. ODA to Indonesia

(unit: billion yen)

Fiscal Year	ODA Loan	Grant Aid	Technical Cooperation (JICA)
FY 2002	88.939	7.296	10.632
FY2003	104.634	5.016	9.101
FY2004	114.829	18.543	7.987
FY2005	93.005	6.332	8.522
FY2006	125.234	5.371	7.785

Notes) ODA loan and grant aid are on an E/N basis, and technical cooperation is on a JICA's disbursement basis.

3. Overview of ODA Loan

The Japanese government extends to Indonesia ODA loan with a focus on "sustainable growth by SMEs and private sector". Priority for assistance is given to such projects for development of economic infrastructure, that would improve investment environment in Indonesia. Besides five projects such as Railway Double Tracking on Java South Line Project, the GOJ decided to extend program loans (Non-project loans extended for the promotion of economic development plans) worth 45.3 billion yen in FY 2007. For assistance in response to the major earthquake off the coast of Sumatra and tsunami in the Indian Ocean and enhancing peace building of Aceh, ODA loans for construction of the hydroelectric power plant, roads, and drainage were decided to extend in FY 2006. The total amount of ODA loan by the end of FY 2006 was 4 trillion 165.9 billion yen (E/N basis). Indonesia is the largest recipient of ODA loan in total.

Japanese Aid to Indonesia Official Development Assistance (ODA)


4. Overview of Grant Aid

Grant aid is given mainly for the development of infrastructure, water supply, contributing to poverty reduction in eastern Indonesia and for the prevention of piracy to enhance security. For assistance in response to the disaster of earthquake in Central Java in May 2006, seamless assistance from emergency stage to reconstruction stage was made. The total amount of grant aid by the end of the FY 2006 was 252.5 billion yen (E/N basis).

5. Overview of Technical Cooperation

The technical cooperation has been extended to Indonesia for human resource development as shown below.

- Assistance for enhancing governance, democratization of national police which became independent of national army
 - Assistance for proper functioning of central government and enhancing public services of local governments in accordance with legislation of decentralization
 - Assistance for promotion of various reforms in fiscal and financial sector since Asian financial crisis
- The Japanese government has been promoting coordination between grant aid and technical cooperation. The total amount of technical assistance by the end of FY 2006 was 283.0 billion yen (JICA's disbursement basis).



Japanese Aid to Indonesia Official Development Assistance (ODA)

ODA to Indonesia

(unit: billion yen)

Fiscal Year	ODA Loan	Grant Aid	Technical Cooperation (JICA)
2004	114.829	18.543	7.987
	Lower Solo River Improvement Project (II) (9.345)	The project for Bridge Construction in the Central and North Sulawesi Provinces (0.675)	Acceptance of technical training participants 1,387 peoples
	Komerling Irrigation Project (II-2) (13.790)	The project for Rehabilitation of Gresik Steam Power Plant Units 3 and 4 (0.512)	Dispatch of technical cooperation experts 1,356 peoples
	Urgent Disaster Reduction Project for Mt. Merapi/Progo River Basin and Mt. Bawakaraeng (16.436)	The project for Improvement of Research Facilities for Biodiversity Conservation and Utilization (0.214)	Members of study teams dispatched 532 peoples
	Ulubelu Geothermal Power Plant Project (20.288)	The project for Improvement of the Security Equipment in Major Airports and Ports Facilities (0.747)	Provision of equipment 0.406
	Asahan No.3 Hydroelectric Power Plant Construction Project (Engineering Services) (0.864)	The project for Enhancement of the Civilian Police (0.518)	Dispatch of Japan overseas cooperation volunteers 22 peoples
	Keramasan Power Plant Extension Project (9.736)	The project for Improvement of Medical Care of Public Hospitals in West Kalimantan Province (0.435)	
	North Java Corridor Flyover Project (4.287)	The Project for Human Resource Development Scholarship (0.301)	
	Tanjung Priok Access Road Construction Project (I) (26.306)	Emergency Grant Aid for Emergency Food and Medical Equipment Equivalent (0.165)	
	Development of Faculty of Medicine and Health Sciences of Syarif Hidayatullah State Islamic University (2.983)	Food Aid (0.150)	
	First Development Policy Loan (10.704)	Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Projects (0.056)	
		Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Project (0.168)	
		Non-Project Grant Aid(Assistance in Response to the Sumatran Earthquake and Tsunami Disaster in the Indian Ocean) (14.600)	

Notes) ODA loan and grant aid are on an E/N basis, and technical cooperation is on a JICA's disbursement basis.

Japanese Aid to Indonesia Official Development Assistance (ODA)

ODA to Indonesia

(unit: billion yen)

Fiscal Year	ODA Loan	Grant Aid	Technical Cooperation (JICA)
2005	93.005	6.332	8.522
	Tanjung Priok Access Road Construction Project (ii) (26.620)	The project for Bridge Construction in the Central and North Sulawesi Provinces (0.240)	Acceptance of technical training participants 949 peoples
	Asahan No.3 Hydroelectric Power Plant Construction Project (27.642)	The project for Improvement of Research Facilities for Biodiversity Conservation and Utilization (1.755)	Dispatch of technical cooperation experts 231 peoples
	Kamojang Geothermal Power Plant Extension Project (Engineering Services) (0.996)	The project for Rehabilitation of Gresik Steam Power Plant Units 3 and 4 (1.473)	Members of study teams dispatched 642 peoples
	Integrated Water Resources and Flood Management Project for Semarang (16.302)	The Project for Human Resource Development Scholarship (0.377)	Provision of equipment 0.395
	Professional Human Resource Development Project (iii) (9.717)	Emergency Grant Aid for Malnourished Children of Eastern Indonesia (0.167)	Dispatch of Japan overseas cooperation volunteers 31 peoples
	Second Development Policy Loan (11.729)	The project for Bridge Construction in the Province of NUSA TENGGARA TIMUR (0.173)	
		Emergency Grant Aid for Vaccination against Polio (0.193)	
		The project for Capacity-building of the Indonesian National Police (0.449)	
		Grant Assistance for Underprivileged Farmers (0.380)	
		the Programme for Peace Building and Reintegration Assistance to Amnestied GAM Prisoners Recipients, Demobilized GAM Combatants and Conflict-affected Communities throughout Aceh (1.000)	
		Grant Assistance for Grassroots Human Security Project (0.115)	
		Grant Assistance for Japanese NGO Projects (0.010)	

Notes) ODA loan and grant aid are on an E/N basis, and technical cooperation is on a JICA's disbursement basis.

Japanese Aid to Indonesia
Official Development Assistance (ODA)

ODA to Indonesia

(unit: billion yen)

Fiscal Year	ODA Loan	Grant Aid	Technical Cooperation (JICA)
2006	125.234	5.371	7.785
	(1.889)	(0.203)	1,108 peoples
	(4.498)	(0.366)	413 peoples
	(10.119)	(0.130)	515 peoples
	(0.981)	(1.921)	0.219
	(7.801)	(0.890)	22 peoples
	(6.373)	(0.525)	
	(23.519)	(0.200)	
	(26.016)	(0.555)	
	(11.593)	(0.375)	
	(2.911)	(0.150)	
	(11.777)	(0.037)	
	(11.777)	(0.019)	

Notes) ODA loan and grant aid are on an E/N basis, and technical cooperation is on a JICA's disbursement basis.

TABLE 2: ACTUAL and ATTEMPTED attacks by location, January – December 2008

Location	ACTUAL ATTACKS				ATTEMPTED ATTACKS	
	Boarded	Hijacked	Detained	Missing	Fired Upon	Attempted Boarding
S E ASIA Indonesia	25	1			1	1
Malacca Straits						2
Malaysia	7	3				
Myanmar						1
Philippines	5					2
Singapore Straits	5					1
FAR EAST Vietnam	10					1
INDIAN Bangladesh	12					
SUB CONT India	9					1
Sri Lanka						1
SOUTH Brazil	1					
AMERICA Colombia	1					
Ecuador	2					
Haiti	2					
Peru	4					1
Venezuela	3					
AFRICA Angola	2					
Cameroon	2					
Congo	1					
Dem. Republic Congo	1					
Equatorial Guinea	1					
Ghana	6					1
Gulf of Aden	2	32			31	27
Ivory Coast	3					
Kenya					1	1
Liberia	1					
Morocco						1
Mozambique	2					
Nigeria	27	3			5	5
Somalia		10			8	1
Tanzania	14					
Togo	1					
REST OF WORLD France	1					
Seychelles	1					
Sub total	151	49			46	47
Total				293		

TABLE 4: Status of ships during ACTUAL attacks, January - December 2008

LOCATION		BERTHED	ANCHORED	STEAMING	NOT STATED
S E ASIA	Indonesia	2	13	11	
	Malaysia	1	4	5	
	Philippines		3	2	
	Singapore Straits		1	4	
FAR EAST	Vietnam	1	8	1	
INDIAN	Bangladesh	2	9	1	
SUB CONT	India		8	1	
SOUTH AMERICA	Brazil		1		
	Colombia		1		
	Ecuador		2		
	Haiti		2		
	Peru		4		
	Venezuela		1	1	1
AFRICA	Angola		2		
	Cameroon	1		1	
	Congo		1		
	Dem. Republic Congo		1		
	Equatorial Guinea			1	
	Ghana		6		
	Gulf Aden			34	
	Ivory coast		3		
	Liberia	1			
	Mozambique	1	1		
	Nigeria	8	14	8	
	Somalia			10	
	Tanzania		7	7	
	Togo		1		
France		1			
REST OF WORLD	Seychelles		1		
	Sub Total	17	95	87	1
	Total			200	

**TABLE 5: Status of ships during ATTEMPTED attacks,
January – December 2008**

LOCATION	BERTHED	ANCHORED	STEAMING	NOT STATED
S E ASIA				
Indonesia			2	
Malacca Straits			2	
Myanmar		1		
Philippines			2	
Singapore Straits			1	
FAR EAST				
Vietnam		1		
INDIAN				
Bangladesh				
SUB				
India		1		
CONT				
Sri Lanka			1	
AMERICA				
Peru		1		
AFRICA				
Gulf of Aden			58	
Ghana		1		
Kenya	1		1	
Morocco	1			
Nigeria		4	6	
Somalia			9	
Sub Total	2	9	82	-
Total			93	

TABLE 6: Types of arms used during attacks, January - December 2003 - 2008

Types of Arms	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Guns	100	89	80	53	72	139
Knives	143	95	80	76	67	68
Not stated	168	130	103	100	110	80
Other weapons	34	15	13	10	14	6
Total at year end	445	329	276	239	263	293

TABLE 7: Comparison of the type of attacks, January - December 2003 – 2008

Category	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Attempted	93	77	52	56	62	47
Fired upon	20	13	19	7	14	46
Hijack	19	11	23	14	18	49
Missing	2	-	-	-	-	-
Boarded	311	228	182	162	169	151
Total	445	329	276	239	263	293

TABLE 8: Types of violence to crew, January – December 2003 – 2008

Types of Violence	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
Taken hostage	359	148	440	188	292	889
Kidnap/Ransom		86	13	77	63	42
Crew threatened	65	34	14	17	6	9
Crew assaulted	40	12	6	2	29	7
Crew injured	88	59	24	15	35	32
Crew killed	21	32	-	15	5	11
Missing	71	30	12	3	3	21
Total	644	401	509	317	433	1011

TABLE 9: Type of violence to crew by location, January - December 2008

Location	Taken Hostage	Crew Threatened	Crew Assault	Crew Injured	Crew Killed	Missing	Kidnap
S E ASIA Indonesia	16	4		2		6	
Malaysia	26		1	1			
Singapore Straits	2						
Philippines				9	7	1	
FAR EAST Vietnam		4					
INDIAN SUB CONT Bangladesh	1			1			
AMERICA Brazil			2				
Colombia	1						

TABLE 10: Types of arms used by geographical location, January - December 2008

LOCATIONS		Armed with Guns	Armed with Knives	Other Weapons	Not Stated
S E ASIA	Indonesia	4	13	1	10
	Malacca Straits				2
	Malaysia	4	3		3
	Myanmar				1
	Philippines	2	3		2
	Singapore Straits	1	4		1
FAR EAST	Vietnam		5		6
INDIAN	Bangladesh	1	5	1	5
SUB CONT	India		3		7
	Sri Lanka				1
AMERICA	Brazil			1	
	Colombia	1			
	Ecuador				2
	Haiti		1		1
	Peru		3		2
	Venezuela	2			1
AFRICA	Angola				2
	Cameroon	1		1	
	Congo				1
	Dem. Republic Congo				1
	Equatorial Guinea	1			
	Ghana		4		3
	Gulf of Aden	85			7
	Ivory Coast		2		1
	Kenya	1			1
	Liberia		1		
	Morocco				1
	Mozambique		2		
	Nigeria	18	10	2	10
	Somalia	17			2
Tanzania		8		6	
Togo		1			
REST OF WORLD	France	1			
	Seychelles				1
	Sub total	139	68	6	80
Total		293			

Notes

- ⁱ Maritime Terrorism and Piracy in the Straits of Malacca: A Potential Risk That Needs To be Taken Seriously; Turkish Weekly Journal; Andrin Raj, Visiting Research Fellow, Japan Institute for International Affairs and Security & Terrorism Analyst, Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centre
- ⁱⁱ The Somalian Straits and Maritime PT Syndrome Linked to Terrorist Organization and the Use of Private Military Companies; The Turkish Weekly Journal; Andrin Raj, Visiting Research Fellow, Japan Institute for International Affairs & Security & Terrorism Analyst, Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centre
- ⁱⁱⁱ Source: Japan Coast Guard; interview with Director Education & Training & Division, Osamu Etani
- ^{iv} Source: Japan Coast Guard; interview with Director Education & Training & Division, Osamu Etani
- ^{vi} Source: Interview with Mr. Michio Harada, Director, Maritime Security Policy Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 2009
- ^{vii} Source: Japan Coast Guard; interview with Director Education & Training & Division, Osamu Etani
- ^{viii} David Adam Stott; “Japan and Indonesia Boost Military Ties as Ship Arrives in Jakarta” Shingetsu Newsletter No.19, June 20,2005
- ^{ix} International Maritime Bureau (IMO); Piracy Reports
- ^x IMO 2008 Annual Report
- ^{xi} Maritime Terrorism and Piracy in the Straits of Malacca: A Potential Risk That Needs To be Taken Seriously; Turkish Weekly Journal; Andrin Raj, Visiting Research Fellow, Japan Institute for International Affairs and Security & Terrorism Analyst, Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centre
- ^{xii} IMO press statement February 2008 News Straits Times
- ^{xiii} “The Threat of Maritime Terrorism and Responses: The Zone of Threat and the Sea-Lanes in a Global Strategy Map”; by Kazumine Akimoto
- ^{xiv} The Jamestown Foundation: www.jamestown.org
- ^{xv} U.S. Coast Guard Report: Official Paper
- ^{xvi} Naval War College Review: 2005
- ^{xvii} Michael Richardson, A Time Bomb for Global Trade: Maritime-Related Terrorism in the Age of Weapons of Mass Destruction 2004
- ^{xviii} Jayant Abhyankar; Piracy, Armed Robbery and Terrorism at Sea: A Global and Regional Outlook
- ^{xix} Stefan Eklof Amirel; Political Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: A Comparison between the Straits of Malacca and the Southern Philippines: Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits 2006
- ^{xx} Source: Undisclosed
- ^{xxi} Stefan Eklof Amirel; Political Piracy and Maritime Terrorism: A Comparison between the Straits of Malacca and the Southern Philippines: Piracy, Maritime Terrorism and Securing the Malacca Straits 2006
- ^{xxii} Kristen Schulze, “The Free Aceh Movement (*GAM*): Anatomy of a Separatist Organization”, Policy Studies 2 (Washington D.C: East-West Centre Washington, 2004
- ^{xxiii} Source: Undisclosed
- ^{xxiv} Source: Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centre: Training Manuals
- ^{xxv} White Paper: The Jemaah Islamiyah Arrest and the Threat of Terrorism, Ministry of Home Affairs of the Government of Singapore (Singapore: Ministry of Home Affairs, 2003)
- ^{xxvi} A.M. Hendropriyono, “RI-S’pore ties: Opportunity Lost”, Jakarta Post, 25 August 2004
- ^{xxvii} Philip Sherwell, Massoud Ansari and Marianne Kearney, “Al Qaeda terrorist plan to turn tanker into a floating bomb”, The Telegraph, Internet edition 12 September 2004
- ^{xxviii} Piracy equals terrorism on troubled waters: Minister” Agence France Presse, 21 Dec 2003; www.singapore-window.org
- ^{xxix} The Straits Times, April 18, 2005
- ^{xxx} The Business Times Singapore, March 15, 2005
- ^{xxxi} Council of Foreign Relations, February 11
- ^{xxxii} “The Threat of Maritime Terrorism and Responses: The Zone of Threat and the Sea-Lanes in a Global Strategy Map”; by Kazumine Akimoto
- ^{xxxiii} Graham Ong; Pre-empting Maritime Terrorism in Southeast Asia; 29 November 2002

- ^{xxxiv} Regional Security in Southeast Asia: Beyond The Asean Way; Melly Cabarello, Institute of Southeast Asian Studies
- ^{xxxv} Treaty of Amity and Cooperation in Southeast Asia Indonesia, 24 February 1976; Association of Southeast Asian Nations: www.aseansec.org/1217.htm
- ^{xxxvi} Muthiah Alagappa, “The Dynamics of International Security in Southeast Asia: Change and Continuity”, Australian Journal of International Affairs 45,no.1 (May 1991), p.1
- ^{xxxvii} Stanley Weeks, “New Initiative for Maritime Cooperation,” paper presented at the Institute for Defense and Strategic Studies, Maritime Security Conference 21 May 2004
- ^{xxxviii} Sumihiko Kawamura, “International Cooperation for SLOC Security,” Maritime Security Cooperation in the Asia-Pacific toward the 21st Century, ed. Dalchoong Kim, Seo-Hang, Lee and Jin-Hyun Paik (Seoul: Yonsei Univ.2000, p.96
- ^{xxxix} Yaleglobal online: www.yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article
- ^{xl} Gary R.M. Yusof, “Upaya Indonesia Memenangkan Terrorism Sebagai Implikasi Keputusan Politik Internasional/Regional’, paper presented at Maritime Terrorism Seminar, Indonesia, 25 September 2003
- ^{xli} Fact sheet On The ReCAAP Agreement On Combating Piracy & Armed Robbery Against Ships In Asia”; www.apm.mot.gov.sg/data/ReCAPP
- ^{xlii} Source: Undisclosed
- ^{xliii} Source: Interview with Mr. Michio Harada, Director, Maritime Security Policy Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 2009
- ^{xliv} <http://www.aseansec.org/afp/100p.htm>
- ^{xlv} The islands in question include the Spratly, Paracel, and the Natuna archipelagoes, with the Spratly Archipelago being the most contentious
- ^{xlvi} Source: Undisclosed
- ^{xlvii} <http://www.aseanregionalforum.org/AboutUs/tabid/57/Default.aspx>
- ^{xlviii} <http://www.straitstimes.com/vgn-ext-templating/v/index.jsp?vgnextoid=409787f9f97cf110VgnVCM100000430a0a0aRCRD&vgnextchannel=04f0758920e39010VgnVCM1000000a35010aRCRD>
- ^{lix} Dr. Seiichiro Takagi, Professor, Aoyama Gakuin University, Japan: “1st Tokyo Seminar on Common Security Challenges: Future Cooperation among Defense Authorities in the Region”; organized by the Ministry of Defense, Japan, March 18, 2009 at the Keio Plaza Hotel, Tokyo (*note: the region was not specified in the forum*)
- ^l Source: Ministry of Defense, Malaysia
- ^{li} “Eye in the Sky” Initiative; www.marinetalk.com/articles-marine-companies/art/Eye-in-the-Sky-Initiative-B13/16/09
- ^{lii} “1st Tokyo Seminar on Common Security Challenges: Future Cooperation among Defense Authorities in the Region”; organized by the Ministry of Defense, Japan, March 18, 2009 at the Keio Plaza Hotel, Tokyo (*note: the region was not specified in the forum*)
- ^{liii} Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centre: Training Manuals
- ^{liv} <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/piracy/problem0112.html>, 2/20/2009
- ^{lv} <http://www.mofa.go.jp/policy/piracy/problem0112.html>, 2/20/2009
- ^{lvi} Ibid
- ^{lvii} Ibid
- ^{lviii} Ibid
- ^{lix} Ibid
- ^{lx} Statement by the Japan Ministry of Defense in their published folder on terrorism
- ^{lxi} Source: Japan Coast Guard; interview with Director Education & Training & Division, Osamu Etani
- ^{lxii} Ibid
- ^{lxiii} Source: Interview with Mr. Michio Harada, Director, Maritime Security Policy Division, Foreign Policy Bureau, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, February 2009
- ^{lxiv} Source: Ocean Policy Research Foundation; “Briefing 29/2007, 18 September 2007
- ^{lxv} Source: Japan Coast Guard; interview with Director Education & Training & Division, Osamu Etani

Andrin Raj (andrin.raj@stratad.net) is a Visiting Research Fellow at the Japan Institute for International Affairs (JIIA) & Director/Security and Terrorism Analyst for Stratad Asia Pacific Strategic Centre (SAPSC). The views expressed are of his own and does not reflect those of JIIA and SAPSC. No part of this paper is to be reprinted or reproduced except by permission of JIIA or by the author.