

details of Martí's relationships with Máximo Gómez and Antonio Maceo, the earliest literary criticism of Martí's writing, and the specifics of Martí's whereabouts during the crucial period preceding his return to Cuba in 1895. Again, it should be stressed that Ripoll's work will be best appreciated by the serious Martí scholar rather than by nonspecialists.

Professor Foner's *Inside the Monster* is the first of a projected three-volume collection of translations designed "to give English-reading audiences their first opportunity to become acquainted with the wide scope of his (Martí's) thought." The volume includes a forty-page introductory study as well as copious notes by the editor. In the reviewer's opinion, Foner treats his material fairly and does not contribute to what Luis Baralt has decried as "a recent trend . . . which makes Martí out to be a forerunner of the Communist takeover in Cuba." Yet the fact that Foner has selected for inclusion in this volume some of Martí's strongest indictments of the United States could easily lead unwary readers into making hasty judgements about the Cuban's basic view of the country in which he spent some fourteen years of his life.

At any rate, Foner's collection makes fascinating reading: Martí's articles dealing with racial and labor strife are especially vivid, covering as they do the tumultuous 1880s and early 1890s. Elinor Randall's translations read very well and are a welcome addition to those available in the earlier books of Juan de Onís and Luis Baralt.

Pennsylvania State University

MARTIN S. STABB

La formación del estado populista en América Latina. By OCTÁVIO IANNI. México, 1975. Ediciones Era. Tables. Pp. 177. Paper.

Combining critical assessment of other theorists' treatment of populism (Germani, di Tella, Graciarena, Angell) with a neo-Marxist interpretation of socio-economic change in Latin America since Independence, Octávio Ianni analyzes the rise of populism and the populist state in Latin America. Referring especially to the cases of Cárdenas in Mexico, Vargas in Brazil, and Perón in Argentina, Ianni offers what he says are new hypotheses to explain the populist phenomena in Latin America (p. 26).

According to Ianni, despite the unique aspects of Latin American national development, significant events in the history of each nation are linked to, and determined by, decisive moments in the history of

international capitalism (p. 23). During the nineteenth century, Latin America was dominated by the “oligarchic state,” a regime controlled by the agrarian and mining bourgeoisie. These elites were dependent upon foreign imperialism (British and later the United States).

At this stage in the development of Latin America, relations of production were not entirely capitalist; semi-feudal and patrimonial relationships provided the basis for the patrimonial politics of the oligarchic state (pp. 70–76). Oligarchic rule combined the symbols of liberalism (e.g., liberal constitutions) with patrimonial practice and values: “power is exercised by a system of *caciquismo* in which the peak of the pyramid is occupied by the *gran cacique nacional*” (p. 79).

Gradually new class relations emerged with urbanization, rural-urban migration, industrial development and the growth of the service sector to produce contradictions between industrialization, national development and the economic dependence characteristic of the oligarchic state (p. 93). The industrial bourgeoisie, the proletariat and certain sectors of the middle class, including military and intellectuals, formed multi-class alliances to challenge the oligarchic state. International economic crises—World War I, the crash of the stock market, World War II—set the stage for populism in Latin America. Populism “corresponds to a particular phase of the transformation of the capitalist state, in which the agro-export bourgeoisie and the bourgeoisie based in mining and commerce, in different combinations in each country, lose their monopoly on political power to the benefit of new urban social classes” (pp. 165–166).

But whether populism is democratic or dictatorial, Ianni asserts that it is full of contradictions stemming from the fundamental antagonisms of the classes that compose the populist coalitions. For a while the workers are used as instruments of the industrial bourgeoisie, accepting the rallying cries of development, nationalism, “social peace,” and “class harmony” (p. 121). Eventually, however, the underlying contradictions between the populism of the proletariat and that of the bourgeoisie corrode the populist alliance—even when the “illusions of consumption and social mobility” blind the workers to the antagonism between their interests and those of the bourgeoisie (p. 153).

If a crisis develops, the bourgeois leaders in the multi-class coalition drop their proletarian allies for less dangerous instruments. If the crisis is severe, the military intervenes. Thus, while populism is an expression of changing socio-economic conditions and heralds

the end of the oligarchic state, it allows only a subordinate role to the proletariat and does not truly end the alliance between the national bourgeoisie and imperialism (pp. 175–177).

Ianni does an excellent job of delineating certain aspects of populism in a clearly written and well organized way. But those familiar with neo-Marxist analytics, dependency theory, and the outlines of Latin American political economy since independence will find almost nothing really new in this book beyond a synthesis and critique of the work of several other theorists who have dealt with populism in Latin America. No new empirical material is presented and the theoretical discussion is only lightly applied to the cases of Mexico, Brazil and Argentina.

For those who reject this mode of class analysis and dependency theory, the lack of documentation or illustration will surely reinforce their prejudices. For example, Ianni claims that populism involved mobilization of urban bourgeois elements, proletarians, and elements of the urban middle class against the agrarian bourgeoisie. No doubt, this was the case in parts of Latin America. But in what way did the Vargas government attack the agrarian bourgeoisie? No land reforms were proposed and rural labor organizations were discouraged. What of Chilean “populism” (the Popular Front and onward through the 1940s)? Here the Communists and Socialists joined in a multi-class alliance which explicitly agreed to suspend rural labor movements and protect the hacendados in the name of “social peace.” Again, the populist phenomena, including the class alliances, were more complex than Ianni suggests. This complexity and the variations of populism in Latin America make essential a more detailed and careful empirical study and less mechanistic application of dependency theory and class analysis.

San Diego State University

BRIAN LOVEMAN

Trade and Hemisphere: The Good Neighbor Policy and Reciprocal Trade. By DICK STEWARD. Columbia, 1975. University of Missouri Press. Bibliography. Index. Pp. ix, 307. Cloth. \$12.50.

In *The Making of the Good Neighbor Policy* (1961), Bryce Wood wrote that the reciprocal trade agreements program made a “great contribution . . . to the development of that broader reciprocity” (pp. 286–287) which was the anticipated result of the Good Neighbor policy. Perhaps because Wood abstained from a detailed investiga-