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Henry Hansmann

Yale Law School

Reiner Kraakman

Harvard Law School

Richard Squire

Fordham University School of Law, rsquire@law.fordham.edu

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Recommended Citation

Henry Hansmann, Reiner Kraakman, and Richard Squire, *Law and the Rise of the Firm*, 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1335 (2005-2006)

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LAW AND THE RISE OF THE FIRM

Henry Hansmann,* Reinier Kraakman,** and Richard Squire***

Organizational law empowers firms to hold assets and enter contracts as entities that are legally distinct from their owners and managers. Legal scholars and economists have commented extensively on one form of this partitioning between firms and owners: namely, the rule of limited liability that insulates firm owners from business debts. But a less-noticed form of legal partitioning, which we call "entity shielding," is both economically and historically more significant than limited liability. While limited liability shields owners' personal assets from a firm's creditors, entity shielding protects firm assets from the owners' personal creditors (and from creditors of other business ventures), thus reserving those assets for the firm's creditors. Entity shielding creates important economic benefits, including a lower cost of credit for firm owners, reduced bankruptcy administration costs, enhanced stability, and the possibility of a market in shares. But entity shielding also imposes costs by requiring specialized legal and business institutions and inviting opportunism vis-à-vis both personal and business creditors. The changing balance of these benefits and costs illuminates the evolution of legal entities across time and societies. To both illustrate and test this proposition, we describe the development of entity shielding in four historical epochs: ancient Rome, the Italian Middle Ages, England of the seventeenth to nineteenth centuries, and the United States from the nineteenth century to the present.

* Augustus E. Lines Professor of Law, Yale Law School.

** Ezra Ripley Thayer Professor of Law, Harvard Law School.

*** Visiting Scholar, Yale Law School. For helpful discussions and comments, we would like to thank Barry Adler, John Armour, John Baker, Lucian Bebchuk, Margaret Blair, Eva Cantarella, Brian Cheffins, Charles Donahue, Wolfgang Ernst, Eilis Ferran, Bruce Frier, Francesco Galgano, Joshua Getzler, Clayton Gillette, Avner Greif, Timothy Guinane, Ehud Kamar, Louis Kaplow, Meir Kohn, Timur Kuran, John Langbein, Mike Macnair, Richard Nolan, Ulrike Malmendier, Joseph McCahrey, Randall Morck, Richard Nolan, Theo Raaijmakers, Larry Ribstein, Lynn Stout, George Triantis, and James Whitman. We particularly would like to thank Robert Jackson, who offered extensive and invaluable editorial suggestions, and Marina Santilli, who made major contributions to our research. We also are grateful to those who gave us comments at the NBER Workshop on Economics of Organization (Cambridge, Mass.) and the CEPR Conference on Understanding Financial Architecture (Oxford); in law faculty workshops at Cambridge, Chicago, Columbia, Harvard, Michigan, Northwestern, NYU, Oxford, Pennsylvania, Texas, Tilburg, Vanderbilt, and Yale; in business faculty workshops at Harvard and Stanford; and in economics faculty workshops at CERGE-ET (Charles University, Prague) and the University of Zurich. For research assistance we are indebted to April Andersen, Elizabeth Arens, Charles Ching, Rebecca Deutsch, Ofer Eldar, Andreas Fleckner, Stacey Delich Gould, Veronica Grembi, Nikesha Jindal, Charles Korsmo, Saura Masconale, Jeanne McHale, Dustin Osborn, Jennifer Ottman, Christina Padden, Jay Readey, Alexandra Schimmer, Joshua Tate, and very especially to Jonathan Nygren and Robert Schuwerk. Generous research support was provided by the Yale Law School; by the Harvard Law School Faculty Summer Research Program and the Harvard Law School Program in Law, Economics, and Business, which is funded by the John M. Olin Foundation; and by the NYU School of Law.

I. INTRODUCTION

Economic activity in modern societies is dominated not by individuals, but by firms that own assets, enter contracts, and incur liabilities that are legally separate from those of their owners and managers. A universal characteristic of these modern business firms is that they enjoy the legal power to commit assets that bond their agreements with their creditors and, correlatively, to shield those assets from the claims of their owners' personal creditors. This legal characteristic — which two of us previously termed *affirmative asset partitioning*,¹ and which we here call *entity shielding*² — has deep but largely unexamined roots in the history of Western commercial law. In this Article we analyze, in economic terms, the evolution of commercial entity shielding from Roman times to the present. Our object is not only to understand the past, but also to shed light on the foundations of modern business entities and on their likely course of future development.

Previous work on the legal history of firms has focused on limited liability — a form of *owner shielding* that, by protecting personal assets of firm owners from the claims of firm creditors, is the functional inverse of entity shielding. Although the matter is complex, we believe that this emphasis is misplaced. While limited liability has evident and important functional complementarities to entity shielding, it is neither necessary nor sufficient for the creation of business firms as separate and distinct economic actors. Firms can prosper without limited liability, but significant enterprises lacking entity shielding are largely unknown in modern times.

A critical historical question is why entity shielding appeared where and when it did. We take steps toward an answer by analyzing four Western commercial societies: ancient Rome, medieval and Renaissance Italy, early modern England, and the contemporary United States. We view the analytical relationship between history and economics bidirectionally. On the one hand, we seek an initial explanation of the incidence of entity shielding by making a qualitative tally of its likely economic costs and benefits within each society. At the same time, we also use the historical record to deepen our understanding of which economic costs associated with entity shielding were most important in constraining and shaping its development.

We begin by describing entity shielding and outlining its economic benefits and costs. We then conduct our historical survey. We con-

¹ See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, *The Essential Role of Organizational Law*, 110 YALE L.J. 387, 393–95 (2000).

² We also discuss entity shielding in Henry Hansmann, Reinier Kraakman & Richard Squire, *The New Business Entities in Evolutionary Perspective*, 2005 U. ILL. L. REV. 5, 11–13.

clude by describing the relationship between the economics of entity shielding and the policy challenges that will shape the future evolution of the commercial firm.

II. ASSET PARTITIONING AND ENTITY SHIELDING

A variety of sanctions have been used across history to enforce contracts, including debtor's prison and enslavement. The principal sanction employed by modern legal systems, however, is permitting an unpaid creditor to seize assets owned by the defaulting promisor. When an individual enters into a contract, modern law in effect inserts a default term by which the individual pledges all his personal property to bond his performance. A similar legal rule applies to business corporations: unless the contract states otherwise, all assets owned by the corporation bond its obligations. Individuals (or rather, their personal estates) and corporations are thus both examples of *legal entities*, a term we use to refer to legally distinct pools of assets that provide security to a fluctuating group of creditors and thus can be used to bond an individual's or business firm's contracts.³

Special legal rules, which we term rules of *asset partitioning*,⁴ are required to determine which entities bond which contracts, and which assets belong to which entities. Often, the asset partitioning between entities is complete: the creditors of one entity may not levy on assets held by another. But asset partitioning can also be partial, as in the modern general partnership: personal creditors of partners may levy on firm assets, but only if the partnership creditors have first been paid in full. As this example suggests, the separation between the assets of a commercial firm and those of its owners comes in two forms, depending on which set of assets is being shielded from which group of creditors. We label the two forms *entity shielding* and *owner shielding*.

A. Entity Shielding as the Foundation of Legal Entities

The term *entity shielding* refers to rules that protect a firm's assets from the personal creditors of its owners. In modern legal entities, entity shielding takes three forms:

Weak entity shielding grants firm creditors priority over personal creditors in the division of firm assets, meaning that the personal creditors of owners may levy on firm assets, but only if the firm credi-

³ When an individual enters into a contract, the new promisee joins the group of creditors whose claims are backed by the individual's assets. And when an individual satisfies his contractual obligation to a promisee, that promisee leaves this group of creditors. In effect, the security afforded by the individual's assets "floats" over a shifting set of creditors.

⁴ We previously introduced this term in Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 1, at 393-94.

tors have first been paid in full. As noted, this rule characterizes the modern general partnership.

Strong entity shielding adds a rule of *liquidation protection*⁵ to the protections of weak entity shielding. Liquidation protection restricts the ability of both firm owners and their personal creditors to force the payout of an owner's share of the firm's net assets. The restriction on firm owners is conceptually distinct from the restriction on personal creditors, but for reasons we will explore these traits usually come paired. The modern business corporation provides a familiar example of strong entity shielding: not only do corporate creditors enjoy a prior claim to the corporation's assets, but they are also protected from attempts by a shareholder or his personal creditors to liquidate those assets.⁶

Complete entity shielding denies non-firm creditors — including creditors of the firm's (beneficial) owners, if any — *any* claim to firm assets. Common contemporary examples of entities with this trait include nonprofit corporations and charitable trusts. The personal creditors of the managers and beneficiaries of such an organization do not enjoy any claim to its assets, which only bond contractual commitments made in the name of the organization itself.

All entity forms used by modern commercial firms exhibit entity shielding. And, as we explain below,⁷ entity shielding, unlike owner shielding, can be achieved only through the special property rules of entity law. For this reason, we believe that entity shielding is the *sine qua non* of the legal entity,⁸ and we divide legal entities into *weak entities*, *strong entities*, and *complete entities* based on the degree of entity shielding they provide.⁹

⁵ We previously introduced this term in *id.* at 403–04.

⁶ Corporation statutes generally require that a majority or supermajority of shareholders vote to authorize dissolution. *See, e.g.*, DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 8, § 275 (2001). Thus, only a creditor seizing shares constituting a majority also possesses the power to force a corporate liquidation.

⁷ *See infra* section II.C, pp. 1340–43.

⁸ Previous literature has described organizational forms using various terms, including “legal entities,” “legal persons,” and “juridical persons.” The definitions offered for each are various and vague, and scholars have disputed the set of entities included in each definition. For example, there is ongoing debate over whether and when the general partnership became a legal entity. *See* ROSCOE T. STEFFEN & THOMAS R. KERR, *CASES AND MATERIALS ON AGENCY-PARTNERSHIP* 21 (4th ed. 1980) (collecting sources). We believe that by equating the term “legal entity” with the presence of entity shielding, we create a nomenclature that is easy to apply and that captures the primary purpose of entity law. This approach settles the controversy about the partnership: it is an entity, albeit a weak one, and has been so under Anglo-American law since it acquired a rule of weak entity shielding more than 300 years ago.

⁹ While the Anglo-American legal literature has heretofore had no name for the concepts that we term *entity shielding* and *asset partitioning* and has — surprisingly — largely neglected these concepts in general, the civil law literature is more self-conscious about the issue. In particular, the civil law has long deployed the concept of a *separate fund* or *separate patrimony*. This concept comprises a broad and somewhat vague category of arrangement commonly described — in

B. Forms of Owner Shielding

In contrast to entity shielding, *owner shielding* refers to the rules that protect the personal assets of a firm's owners from the firm's creditors. Owner shielding is not central to the purpose of legal entities in the way that entity shielding is. Not all modern entity forms provide owner shielding, the most conspicuous example being the modern American general partnership, which since 1978 has allowed partnership creditors to lay claim to the partners' personal assets in bankruptcy on equal footing with the partners' personal creditors.¹⁰ Owner shielding is also significantly easier to achieve by contract, and thus without resort to the fiat of a legal form, than is entity shielding. Nonetheless, owner shielding has an important supporting role to play in the story of legal entities, and we therefore describe a few forms that it can take:

Weak owner shielding is the mirror image of weak entity shielding; it grants priority to personal creditors over firm creditors in the division of the owners' personal assets. Weak owner shielding characterized general partnerships in the United States for two centuries prior to 1978 and continues to characterize English partnerships today.¹¹

the most general terms — as involving a group of assets set apart for a particular purpose. Creditors' rights are an important consideration in determining the presence (or consequences) of a separate fund, and the presence of a separate fund is commonly considered an aspect of the much-disputed concept of a *juridical person*, though the presence of a separate fund does not necessarily indicate a distinct juridical person. See, e.g., Lina Bigliuzzi Geri, *Patrimonio autonomo e separato*, in 32 ENCICLOPEDIA DEL DIRITTO 280 (1982). Consequently, situations said to involve a separate fund often in application parallel those that, in our terminology, involve asset partitioning, and in particular seem to include arrangements that involve entity shielding. We focus here on a narrower range of institutions — principally commercial firms — and seek to offer, by means of the several degrees of entity shielding and owner shielding that we identify, a clearer and more refined categorization of the ways in which one set of assets is “separated” from another. Beyond this, we offer a functional (more precisely, an economic) analysis of entity shielding and its evolution that is largely absent from the civil law literature. See also Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 1, at 438–39.

¹⁰ See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 723, 92 Stat. 2549, 2606–07 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 723 (2000)).

¹¹ See *Rodgers v. Meranda*, 7 Ohio St. 179 (1857) (articulating a rule of weak owner shielding in the United States); STEFFEN & KERR, *supra* note 8, at 806 (noting that *Rodgers v. Meranda* formulated the majority rule in the United States prior to 1978); Larry E. Ribstein, *The Important Role of Non-Organization Law*, 40 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 751, 774 (2005) (noting that Great Britain has retained “dual priorities” or the “jingle rule”). There are two important variants of weak owner shielding. In one, which characterized the general partnership in the United States before 1978, the owners of the firm are jointly and severally liable for all firm debt, although their personal creditors enjoy a prior claim on their assets. In the other, which characterized California business corporations from 1849 to 1931, each owner is responsible only for his proportional share of firm debt. See Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, *Toward Unlimited Shareholder Liability for Corporate Torts*, 100 YALE L.J. 1879, 1924–25 (1991). Tradable shares will tend to be more liquid when a firm has pro rata, rather than joint and several, owner liability — although, as we will show in later sections, historical examples of firms with both joint and several liability and tradable shares can be found.

Complete owner shielding fully severs the claims of firm creditors to the personal assets of owners, thereby restricting those creditors to the assets held by the firm itself. A familiar example is the rule of limited shareholder liability in modern business corporations. We use the terms *complete owner shielding* and *limited liability* interchangeably in this Article.¹²

C. *Entity Shielding Requires Law; Owner Shielding Does Not*

Although the concepts of entity shielding and owner shielding are both important for understanding the pattern of creditors' rights in modern business firms, only entity shielding clearly requires special rules of law. Owner shielding, by contrast, can often be achieved through contract.

It would be practically impossible in most types of firm to create effective entity shielding without special rules of law. Entity shielding in general limits the rights of personal creditors by subordinating their claims on firm assets, and strong entity shielding additionally impairs the ability of personal creditors to liquidate firm assets. Although a firm's owners in theory could achieve either of these results by negotiating for the requisite waivers in all contracts with their personal creditors, the negotiation of such waivers — beyond involving high transaction costs — would be fraught with moral hazard.¹³ Each waiver would improve the position of firm creditors and thus benefit all firm owners by decreasing the firm's borrowing costs. But each waiver would also increase personal borrowing costs, and that cost would be borne entirely by the owner who negotiated the waiver. Each owner would thus face an incentive to act opportunistically by omitting the waivers from personal dealings. Moreover, other owners and firm creditors would find such omissions costly to police, given the significant freedom individuals enjoy in their personal dealings. A larger number of owners exacerbates the problem by making monitoring more difficult and by heightening the conflict between personal and collective interests. And the policing problem is further compounded if ownership shares are freely transferable. These problems can be solved only by impairing the rights of personal creditors without their contractual consent (and often even without notice). Doing that re-

¹² We have assigned the labels "weak" and "complete" to these two forms of owner shielding to reflect symmetry with the similarly named forms of entity shielding. We do not include "strong" owner shielding because the pattern of rights that it would entail — firm creditors enjoying a subordinated claim on the firm owners' personal assets but not an ability to force liquidation of those assets — is not found among standard legal entity types.

¹³ This analysis is explored at greater length in Henry Hansmann & Reinier Kraakman, *Property, Contract, and Verification: The Numerus Clausus Problem and the Divisibility of Rights*, 31 J. LEGAL STUD. 373, 406-07 (2002).

quires a special rule of property law for assets committed to the firm.¹⁴ Entity law provides that rule.

By contrast, owners can endow a firm with a substantial degree of owner shielding — and limited liability in particular — by requiring firm agents (including the owners themselves when they act on behalf of the firm) to negotiate clauses in the firm's contracts whereby firm creditors agree to limit or waive their right to levy on the owners' personal assets.¹⁵ Although this system also entails some moral hazard, the effect is relatively modest. While the cost of omitting the requisite waiver is spread among all owners in the form of increased risk to their personal assets, the benefit of lower firm borrowing costs is shared among them as well, reducing the opportunity for each owner to profit at the expense of the others.¹⁶ Moreover, if basic rules of agency law apply, owners can protect themselves by specifying that the authority of firm agents to bind the owners extends only to firm assets and not to personal assets. The effectiveness of this approach can be enhanced by inserting terms such as "limited" into the firm's name and letterhead to notify third parties that the authority of firm agents is circumscribed. That was, in fact, the approach used by many English joint stock companies before English common and statutory law made limited liability the default rule for such firms.¹⁷

Our assertion that entity law is necessary for the liquidation protection that characterizes strong entities such as the corporation requires a qualification. We have defined liquidation protection to comprise two components: liquidation protection against owners, which denies owners the right to make unilateral withdrawals from their share of firm assets; and liquidation protection against creditors, which bars the personal creditors of an owner from forcing asset withdrawals to satisfy the owner's personal debts.¹⁸ Although entity law has some role to

¹⁴ For a comparison of property law and contract law, see *id.* at 409–15.

¹⁵ We are referring here to contractual liability only. Limited liability toward most tort claimants, which is today a universal attribute of business corporations, is by nature nonconsensual and thus could not be achieved by contract alone. Limited liability toward involuntary creditors, however, has been relatively unimportant to the economics of business firms until very recently, and there is reason to doubt its efficiency. See Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 11.

¹⁶ As others have pointed out, the symmetry we describe between personal costs and personal benefits can break down because an adverse selection problem may arise — shares in a firm without limited liability will be more valuable to the poor than to the wealthy. See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook & Daniel R. Fischel, *Limited Liability and the Corporation*, 52 U. CHI. L. REV. 89, 94–95 (1985). Our point is not that creating owner shielding by contract eliminates incentive problems, but rather that the problems are more acute in the case of entity shielding. While the benefits of waiving entity shielding are entirely concentrated upon the contracting party, the benefits of waiving owner shielding are largely externalized to other owners.

¹⁷ It was some time, however, before the English courts gave their clear blessing to this approach. See *infra* p. 1381.

¹⁸ In a previous work, two of us focused principally on liquidation protection against creditors as defining strong entity shielding (there termed "strong form" affirmative asset partitioning). See

play in securing both attributes, it is important primarily for shielding firm assets from personal creditors. As far back as we can see, business partners commonly entered into enforceable agreements among themselves not to withdraw from a firm prior to a defined term or without common consent.¹⁹ Here as elsewhere, courts were sometimes reluctant to enforce perpetual restrictions on the free alienation of property. In addition, sanctions for breach often are limited to provable damages, which can be inadequate to deter inefficient withdrawals.²⁰ Strong entities such as the corporation, whose shield against owner withdrawals is enforceable in perpetuity, thus offer a more secure commitment than partnership agreements. But the role of entity law in providing liquidation protection against owners is nonetheless one of degree rather than kind. By contrast, special rules of entity law are essential for liquidation protection against creditors because a mere contract among owners to waive their withdrawal rights would not bind their personal creditors. Furthermore, attempts to secure contractual waivers from the creditors themselves would be hindered by the moral hazard already described. For analogous reasons, firms may need special rules of entity law to deny withdrawal rights to involuntary transferees²¹ such as the owner's heirs.²²

Scholars have argued recently that the corporate form's historical importance lies principally in the fact that it, unlike the partnership, provided liquidation protection against owners and thereby enabled owners to lock in their investments.²³ We agree with these commenta-

Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 1, at 434–35. We observed, however, that liquidation protection against owners in its more extreme forms arguably requires law as well. *See id.* at 435. Thus, the two forms of liquidation protection are highly complementary, and liquidation protection against owners can be properly considered an element of asset partitioning. *See id.*

¹⁹ *See* Larry E. Ribstein, *Why Corporations?*, 1 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 183, 193–94 (2004) (discussing the enforceability of withdrawals from partnerships).

²⁰ *See* Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, *Corporate Governance and the Plight of Minority Shareholders in the United States Before the Great Depression* 10 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10,900, 2004), available at <http://www.nber.org/papers/w10900>.

²¹ The right to examine a firm's articles of association arguably provides voluntary transferees, such as purchasers of shares, with sufficient notice of restrictions on withdrawal rights, making special legal rules unnecessary for this purpose. On the other hand, providing for a form such as the business corporation in which liquidation protection against creditors is the default legal rule would facilitate regular trading on anonymous markets. A default provides low-cost notice to all owners and creditors — including both business and personal creditors — of the nature of the liquidation rights involved. For a general analysis of the role of law in structuring property rights, with emphasis on the issue of notice (more properly, verification) and with further discussion of situations analogous to those involved here, see Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 13.

²² Margaret Blair provides evidence that a desire to constrain the rights of an owner's heirs was an important reason for preferring corporations to partnerships in the United States during the nineteenth century. *See* Margaret M. Blair, *Locking in Capital: What Corporate Law Achieved for Business Organizers in the Nineteenth Century*, 51 UCLA L. REV. 387, 446 (2003).

²³ *See id.*; Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, *supra* note 20, at 7–11.

tors — indeed, it has long been conventional wisdom²⁴ — that investor lock-in is an important function of the corporate form. But, as we indicate above, neither the corporation nor any other entity form is a prerequisite for liquidation protection against owners. Liquidation protection against creditors, in comparison, clearly depends on the special rules of property law that characterize legal entities. Moreover, the economic benefits of liquidation protection against owners are highly circumscribed unless backstopped by liquidation protection against creditors. For these reasons, our theoretical and historical analysis of strong entities such as the corporation emphasizes the essential role played by such entities in shielding firm assets from the personal creditors of the firm's owners.

In summary, the primary virtue of legal entities is that they impose property rules that slice through the obstacles to pursuing entity shielding by contract. But this virtue is also a potential vice, since a legal device that enables an individual to impair the rights of creditors without their consent invites abuse. In the next section we discuss the nature of that abuse, as well as other aspects of entity shielding's costs and benefits.

III. THE ECONOMICS OF ENTITY SHIELDING

Although the benefits of owner shielding in the form of limited liability have been well rehearsed in the literature,²⁵ comparatively little attention has been paid to the economics of entity shielding. We examine the economics of entity shielding here. The costs and benefits we identify are vital to understanding both the evolution of legal entities through history and the policy tradeoffs that organizational law presents today.

A. *The Benefits of Entity Shielding*

Enabling individuals to organize legally distinct asset pools provides important economic benefits by reducing information costs for prospective lenders and solving problems associated with joint ownership. The first three benefits that we describe here require only prior-

²⁴ See, e.g., NORMAN D. LATTIN, *LATTIN ON CORPORATIONS* 15–16 (2d ed. 1971); JONATHAN SOBELOFF, *TAX AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION ASPECTS OF SMALL BUSINESS* (4th ed. 1974), reprinted in DAVID R. HERWITZ, *CORPORATIONS COURSE GAME PLAN* 30, 36–37 (1975).

²⁵ See, e.g., FRANK H. EASTERBROOK & DANIEL R. FISCHEL, *THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF CORPORATE LAW* 40–62 (1991); Easterbrook & Fischel, *supra* note 16, at 93–97; Paul Halpern, Michael Trebilcock & Stuart Turnbull, *An Economic Analysis of Limited Liability in Corporation Law*, 30 U. TORONTO L.J. 117, 147–49 (1980); Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 1, at 428–39; Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 11, at 1919–20; Susan E. Woodward, *Limited Liability in the Theory of the Firm*, 141 J. INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 601 (1985).

ity of claim for firm creditors, and thus are advantages of all forms of entity shielding. The remaining benefits result primarily from liquidation protection, and thus generally arise only in strong entities such as the business corporation.

1. *Lower Creditor Monitoring Costs.* — All forms of entity shielding reduce creditor monitoring costs by protecting creditors from risks they cannot easily evaluate. We explain this point through use of a historical hypothetical.²⁶

Imagine a Florentine merchant of the Middle Ages who is a partner in several partnerships.²⁷ Among these are a wool cloth manufacturing partnership in Florence, a commodity trading partnership in Bruges, and a banking partnership in Rome. Suppose further that the law does not provide entity shielding to partnerships.²⁸ If the default rule among partners is joint and several liability for partnership debt (which was the case then as now), creditors of the Bruges firm would have the right to levy on all assets owned by the Florentine merchant wherever located, including his shares of the firms in Florence and Rome. Thus, a failure of the trading firm in Bruges to pay its debts would threaten the security available to creditors of the partnerships in both Florence and Rome. And because of our assumption that the partnerships in Florence and Rome lack entity shielding, the claims asserted against them by the creditors of the failed Bruges partnership would be equal in priority to the claims of those partnerships' own creditors. To determine the creditworthiness of the Florence manufacturing firm, a would-be creditor — such as a raw wool supplier selling on credit — would thus need to assess not only that firm's prospects, but also the prospects of the trading firm in Bruges and the banking firm in Rome. But obtaining information about businesses in Bruges and Rome would likely be costly for a creditor in Florence, and a raw wool supplier would likely be in a better position to evaluate a firm in the cloth manufacturing industry than to evaluate firms in the banking or trading industries. In short, without entity shielding, a creditor of a firm is vulnerable to the fortunes of all business and personal affairs of all firm owners, regardless of his capacity to monitor those affairs.

If, however, the partnership in Florence were endowed with entity shielding, even in just the weak form, a would-be creditor of that firm could focus principally on evaluating that firm's own assets and prospects. He would need to be less concerned with the affairs of opera-

²⁶ For a more thorough treatment, see Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 1, at 398–403.

²⁷ The Medici family's businesses, for example, were organized in this manner. See *infra* pp. 1373–74. So were those of Francesco Datini. See IRIS ORIGO, THE MERCHANT OF PRATO 109–14 (Penguin Books 1992) (1957).

²⁸ We discuss the actual state of medieval law on these and other matters in *infra* section V.B, pp. 1366–72.

tions in Rome and Bruges because creditors of those firms would be able to levy on the assets of the partnership in Florence only after he had been paid in full. In short, entity shielding would dedicate the Florence partnership's assets principally to that partnership's own creditors. Although this necessarily distributes value away from the creditors of the Bruges and Rome partnerships, that effect can be offset if those partnerships are also given entity shielding. By this means, all creditors could enjoy a reduction in the cost of appraising the security of their claims, permitting in turn a decrease in each firm's cost of credit. Entity shielding thus promotes specialization, permitting creditors to limit the risks they face to those businesses that they know particularly well or that they can monitor with particular ease.²⁹

Limited liability and other forms of owner shielding have the converse effect because they distribute the value of non-firm assets away from the firm's creditors. This too can reduce monitoring costs.³⁰ But owner shielding does not protect a firm's assets from non-firm creditors. Endowing our hypothetical Florence partnership with limited liability, for example, would not prevent the creditors of the Bruges and Rome partnerships from asserting claims to the Florence partnership's assets equal in priority to the claims of the Florence partnership's creditors, and consequently would not reduce monitoring costs for the Florence firm's creditors to the same degree that entity shielding would.³¹ As between the two main forms of asset partitioning, then, entity shielding is the more effective for demarcating a subset of assets and pledging them to a specialized group of creditors.

²⁹ On the same principle, a firm and its owners can often reduce the monitoring costs of creditors if the firm's assets (already protected from personal creditors) can be subpartitioned again and pledged to subsets of business creditors with specialized lending expertise in particular lines of business. This benefit is one of the principal reasons for the formation of wholly owned corporate subsidiaries and other special-purpose entities. See Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 1, at 399-401.

³⁰ Owner shielding will reduce creditor monitoring costs if non-firm creditors enjoy an informational advantage in non-firm assets for the same reason that entity shielding creates value if firm creditors have an advantage in firm assets.

³¹ It might be objected that endowing all the firms with limited liability would achieve the same result as does endowing them with entity shielding. For example, if the firms in Bruges and Rome both featured limited liability, then creditors of those firms would have no right to proceed against the other assets of the Florentine merchant, and thus they would have no claim to his share of the partnership in Florence. But to consider this approach reliable, a creditor of the Florence partnership would have to verify that the Bruges and Rome firms had and maintained limited liability, which is likely to be expensive from a distance. Moreover, the creditor in Florence would continue to face the risk that the Florentine merchant might form yet another firm lacking limited liability, personally guarantee the debt of the Bruges or Rome firms, or run up non-business, consumer debt. If, on the other hand, the firm in Florence were endowed with entity shielding, the creditor of that firm would be protected against all of these possibilities. Consequently, limited liability is not an adequate substitute for entity shielding in reducing the costs of monitoring for firm creditors.

2. *Reduced Managerial Agency Costs.* — By attaching creditor rights to specific asset pools, all forms of entity shielding can reduce the risk to firm owners that a firm agent will engage in excessive borrowing. To illustrate, imagine again our wealthy Florentine merchant who funds a textile firm in Florence, a commodity trading firm in Bruges, and a bank in Rome. The merchant can choose between two partnership structures: a single, large partnership in which each of the three shops' managers is a copartner; or three two-person partnerships, one for each local manager and shop, with each local partnership providing entity shielding. If the merchant fears that his manager-partners will borrow too much on the firm's account (for either business or personal purposes), the merchant will often prefer the three-partnership structure. Under the single-partnership structure, each manager-partner could offer to bond his debt with the assets of all three shops. By contrast, under the three-partnership structure, creditors who deal with each manager-partner will enjoy a prior claim only to the assets in that manager's shop, while their claim to assets in the other shops will be subordinated. In case of a bankruptcy, then, entity shielding will increase the degree to which the creditors of a particular shop must bear the costs of excessive borrowing by that shop's manager. Knowing this, these creditors will often be more restrained in their lending *ex ante*, thereby effectively disciplining the deviant manager.³²

In this example, creditor rights are used to reduce the principal equity holder's agency costs. We do not know how important entity shielding was as a device for controlling agency costs in this fashion as a historical matter. With respect to the modern world, however, George Triantis has made the related argument that equity carve-outs, which give minority shareholders a stake in corporate subsidiaries, can reduce agency costs by limiting the ability of the parent company's management to shift assets among subsidiaries.³³

3. *Reduced Administrative Costs of Bankruptcy.* — Just as all forms of entity shielding enable creditors to specialize in particular asset pools, they also enable bankruptcy courts to specialize, with com-

³² The merchant could limit the borrowing of his individual managers even more tightly if he could organize each of his shops as a corporation that accorded him and the other shops the protection of limited liability. See Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 1, at 425. Of course, medieval Florentine merchants did not enjoy the option of incorporating, although in the fifteenth century they did enjoy access to another limited liability form, the *accomandita*. We discuss medieval organizational law in detail in *infra* Part V.

³³ See George G. Triantis, *Organizations as Internal Capital Markets: The Legal Boundaries of Firms, Collateral, and Trusts in Commercial and Charitable Enterprises*, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1102, 1124–27, 1134–35 (2004). Of course, on Triantis's account, it is minority shareholder rights — not creditor rights — that serve as the instrument for tying the hands of managers and thereby limiting agency costs.

parable benefits. To illustrate, let us continue with our example of the medieval Florentine merchant and consider the implications of a failure of his banking firm in Rome to pay its debts. Assume that — as was typical practice then as now³⁴ — the bankruptcy court in Rome employs a pro rata rule, under which each creditor who files a proper claim receives a fraction of the debtor's assets equal to the creditor's proportionate share of the firm's total liabilities.³⁵ Thus, to ensure a proper payout according to the pro rata regime, the Rome bankruptcy court would have to assess not only the value of the Rome banking firm, but also the ratios between assets and debts of the firms in Florence and Bruges. To omit this step might impair the rights of the creditors of the Florence and Bruges firms, as those creditors would (in the absence of entity shielding) enjoy equal claims to all of the Florentine merchant's assets wherever found, and the Florence and Bruges firms might be in even worse financial shape than the Rome firm. The other partners of the Rome firm would also probably have their own creditors from outside business and personal dealings, and the court would similarly need to factor the value of those creditors' claims into the payout calculation. Even if a bankruptcy court in Rome could exercise jurisdiction over all of these assets and creditors, the necessity of assessing all relevant values in order to determine the proper payout to each creditor would be highly costly in terms of time, judicial resources, and the potential for error.

Endowing the firms with entity shielding would significantly alleviate these problems. Because the creditors of the Rome banking firm would then enjoy a prior claim to firm assets, a bankruptcy court in Rome could begin distributions to firm creditors as soon as it had evaluated the Rome firm's assets and debts without concern that this might compromise the rights of creditors elsewhere. Even if firm assets remained after firm creditors were paid — an unlikely event in any case given that the firm has defaulted on its debt — those assets could be distributed to creditors with subordinated claims, such as those of the Florence and Bruges firms, in subsequent proceedings.

³⁴ Pro rata payment of creditors was the clear rule of bankruptcy throughout Italy starting in the thirteenth century. UMBERTO SANTARELLI, *MERCANTI E SOCIETÀ TRA MERCANTI* 83–84 (2d ed. 1992).

³⁵ The only other practical allocation rule that removes incentives for inefficient runs on a firm's assets is one of temporal priority, in which a creditor who lent first is paid in full before anything is paid to a creditor who lent later. Ancient Rome evidently used a variant of this rule, *id.* at 83, but both medieval and contemporary courts rejected it, evidently for reasons of administrative simplicity. See UMBERTO SANTARELLI, *PER LA STORIA DEL FALLIMENTO NELLE LEGISLAZIONI ITALIANE DELL'ETÀ INTERMEDIA* 264 (1964); *infra* p. 1366–67; *infra* p. 1380 (noting the emergence of early modern English pro rata bankruptcy). The advantages that entity shielding offers to the administration of a pro rata bankruptcy system also extend to a bankruptcy system that distributes assets based on temporal priority.

The result would be a pro rata bankruptcy system that is less costly to administer and that can begin paying creditors more quickly. And the prospect of faster payments to creditors should, in turn, result in lower borrowing costs. Carrying the thought experiment forward, it is difficult to imagine how a modern court could efficiently administer the bankruptcy of a large public corporation without some means of separating the corporation's assets and creditors from the myriad and far-flung assets and creditors of the corporation's many shareholders. Entity shielding is that means.

4. *Protection of Going-Concern Value.* — When a rule of liquidation protection is added to priority of claim for entity creditors — thereby increasing the degree of entity shielding from weak to strong — further benefits can be realized, perhaps the most important of which is protection of a firm's going-concern value.³⁶ The right to withdraw assets at will can be valuable to an owner of a firm. But the cost of the destruction of going-concern value caused by withdrawal would be spread across all owners, with the consequence that individual owners in a multi-owner firm would face an incentive to exercise the withdrawal right when withdrawal is personally beneficial but socially inefficient.³⁷ For this reason, firm owners often mutually agree

³⁶ See Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 1, at 403–04. Going-concern value is the value of the firm as an operating entity, as distinct from the “liquidation value” that the firm's assets would fetch if sold.

Whenever a firm's assets are endowed with liquidation protection, we expect them also to be subjected to priority of claim for firm creditors. There are several reasons for this. First, firm-specific assets that call for liquidation protection are likely to be of the type that firm creditors are in the best position to value and monitor. Therefore, when liquidation protection is efficient, priority of claim for firm creditors in firm assets is likely to be efficient as well. Second, in a firm with liquidation protection, firm creditors are likely to have *de facto* priority in firm assets. Any distribution of assets to one owner will increase the burden on remaining owners to cover firm debt, and firm owners will therefore tend to resist distributions of firm assets until firm creditors have been paid in full. Finally, transferring to firm creditors priority of claim in the assets of a firm that has liquidation protection should create social value. This is because creditors will tend to value assets more highly if those assets are available to the creditors immediately upon a default event, and the consequence of liquidation protection is that firm creditors retain the ability to levy on firm assets when their debtor (the firm) defaults, but personal creditors lose the ability to levy on firm assets when their debtors (the owners) default.

This analysis seems to fit the facts, as we are unaware of an historical example of an entity form that provided liquidation protection but not priority of claim for firm creditors. For these reasons, we define strong entity shielding to include both liquidation protection and priority of claim for entity creditors.

On the other hand, as we explain below, liquidation protection entails costs that are not associated with priority of claim for entity creditors. Consequently, priority of claim may be efficient in firms in which liquidation protection is not, an observation that seems to explain the continuing demand for the pattern of entity shielding seen in weak entities such as the partnership.

³⁷ The incentive to withdraw may arise from a sudden need for liquidity on the part of the individual owner. But neither asymmetry of interests among owners nor a special need for liquidity is necessary for the threat of inefficient withdrawal to arise. Absent liquidation protection, an inefficient run on a firm's assets by its investors can develop whenever going-concern value is

to waive their withdrawal rights for a specified period (as in a partnership for a term) or until a majority of owners votes to liquidate (as in a business corporation). The degree to which the cost of withdrawal is externalized increases with the number of owners, making liquidation protection more valuable as owners become more numerous.³⁸

To be fully efficient, the waiver of the withdrawal right must also bind the owners' personal creditors. Otherwise, when an owner defaults on personal debt, that owner's creditors will face the same incentive to force an inefficient liquidation of firm shares. Moreover, if waivers by owners of withdrawal rights do not bind personal creditors, then each owner will face an incentive to engage in an inefficient level of personal borrowing — in effect, to sell the withdrawal right at too cheap a price — because part of the cost of each owner's personal insolvency will be externalized to the other owners. Thus, contemporary entities that provide liquidation protection against owners also provide liquidation protection against creditors.³⁹ For example, shareholders of a modern business corporation cannot force liquidation of their investments unless they control a majority of shares. This rule also applies to a minority owner's personal creditors, who may — if the owner defaults on personal debts — seize the owner's shares but not the underlying corporate assets. We thus, as indicated above,⁴⁰ include

greater than liquidation value, owners have agreed that the payout to a withdrawing owner should reflect the firm's going-concern value, and some owners believe, reasonably or not, that other owners may withdraw their investments. The problem is a multi-person prisoner's dilemma. See HENRY HANSMANN, *THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE* 55–56 (1996).

³⁸ By enabling firms to have more owners, liquidation protection also increases the amount of capital that any particular firm can raise, and thus makes it less costly for a firm to achieve the optimal scale associated with an asset-intensive production technology. Blair makes the converse point about the traditional partnership when she notes that the problems associated with its lack of liquidation protection increase as the partnership grows. See Blair, *supra* note 22, at 412.

³⁹ We generally would not expect, and in fact find few examples of, firms with liquidation protection against creditors but not against owners. Liquidation protection makes sense only if its benefits in terms of protecting going-concern value exceed its costs, which — as we explore more fully *infra* section III.B, pp. 1350–54 — consist of illiquidity and increased risk of exploitation by control persons. By dint of their typical position as strangers to the firm, personal creditors are more vulnerable to control-person opportunism than are a firm's owners. Consequently, liquidation protection against creditors is likely to be inefficient in a firm if liquidation protection against owners is inefficient as well. A rule of liquidation protection against creditors in the absence of similar protection against owners thus might not provide significant social value, and courts would have good reason to suspect that owners seeking such a rule intend merely to expropriate personal creditors. Despite this line of analysis, we do note that American courts in the late nineteenth century began denying requests by personal creditors for the remedy of liquidation in cases in which alternative remedies appeared adequate to safeguard the creditors' interests. This position seemingly resulted from the increased confidence of American courts in their ability to protect those creditors by evaluating partnership interests and arbitrating internal partnership disputes. See *infra* pp. 1388–89.

⁴⁰ See *supra* p. 1338.

liquidation protection against both owners and creditors in our definition of strong entity shielding.

5. *Capital Accumulation and Investment Diversification.* — By reducing the need for a firm's owners to monitor one another's non-firm financial affairs, entity shielding reduces the costs to owners of bringing on additional equity investors, especially when they are not family, friends, or others who are particularly easy to monitor or trust. Entity shielding thus makes it easier for individuals to make equity investments in multiple firms, and hence to diversify risk. While this is true for all types of entity shielding, it is particularly true for strong entity shielding because of the advantages of liquidation protection.

6. *Transferable Shares.* — For the same reason that liquidation protection reduces the need for owners to monitor one another's personal affairs, it also reduces the importance of restrictions on who may become an owner, and thus promotes free transferability of shares. Although previous commentators have claimed that limited liability is the foundation of share transferability,⁴¹ limited liability is in fact neither necessary nor sufficient for that purpose. It is unnecessary because pro rata shareholder liability is consistent with a liquid market in shares; firms with unlimited liability have been traded in public markets into the twentieth century.⁴² And it is insufficient because, unlike strong entity shielding, it does not neutralize the risk that shares will end up in the hands of individuals likely to threaten the firm's going-concern value through excessive personal borrowing.⁴³ It is therefore not surprising that, though firms with freely tradable shares have sometimes lacked limited liability, it appears that they have always had strong entity shielding.

B. *The Costs of Entity Shielding*

If entity shielding in commercial firms brought nothing but benefits, we might expect to find firms with entity shielding throughout history. But as we explain in our historical sections, commercial firms with entity shielding arose only gradually, appearing at first in circumscribed contexts and forms. This suggests that entity shielding brings significant costs as well as benefits. We survey here the costs that seem most important.

⁴¹ See, e.g., EASTERBROOK & FISCHER, *supra* note 25, at 42; Woodward, *supra* note 25, at 601.

⁴² See PHILLIP I. BLUMBERG, *THE LAW OF CORPORATE GROUPS* 41-42 (1987); Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 11, at 1895; David W. Leebron, *Limited Liability, Tort Victims, and Creditors*, 91 COLUM. L. REV. 1565, 1574-84 (1991).

⁴³ Even weak entity shielding would promote marketability of shares to some extent, given that free transferability exacerbates the costs to firm creditors of assessing the personal finances of firm owners.

1. *Debtor Opportunism.* — Entity shielding invites opportunistic behavior by allowing a debtor to subordinate his creditors without their consent. The upshot may be that the availability of entity shielding increases rather than decreases the overall cost of borrowing. Suppose, for example, that our hypothetical Florentine merchant organized his three firms as partnerships providing weak entity shielding but not owner shielding. After investing assets in one partnership and causing that partnership to issue debt, the merchant could profit by shifting those same assets to another partnership and using them to attract more creditors, effectively “selling” the assets twice. Expecting such opportunistic behavior *ex post*, creditors of the first partnership might not offer better credit terms than they would in the absence of entity shielding, and indeed might increase the interest rate they charge to reflect the risk that their claims will end up subordinated. A modern merchant might employ a variation on the same theme (or scheme) by committing assets to a corporation, issuing corporate debt, and then shifting the assets to a corporate subsidiary that also borrows against them. In short, freedom to construct entities creates the potential for the same forms of opportunism toward creditors as does freedom to grant security interests, but on a much broader scale.

Owner shielding invites the reverse form of opportunism, in which an owner withdraws assets from an entity to the detriment of entity creditors. This is the principal hazard associated with limited liability, and a familiar one. As just illustrated with our hypothetical Florentine merchant, however, the incentive to remove assets from a firm opportunistically also arises in firms with entity shielding even in the absence of limited liability.

The chances that owners will be able to shift assets opportunistically either into the firm (which entity shielding encourages) or out of it (which limited liability encourages) depend on several factors, perhaps the most important of which is the number of owners. An entity's owners are unlikely to permit one another to shift assets opportunistically unless the result is mutually beneficial, suggesting that opportunistic asset-shifting of both types should decrease as the number of owners rises. But opportunistic movement of personal assets into rather than out of an entity should be particularly unlikely when the entity has numerous owners. A firm's owners are (proportionately) in the same position with respect to the firm's creditors, so that one owner's incentive to exploit firm creditors will likely be shared by the others and thus lead to an opportunistic *pro rata* distribution to all owners. That one owner has an interest in exploiting his *personal* creditors by increasing his investment in the firm, however, does not suggest that the other owners have reason to do likewise or to enable such exploitation by accepting downward readjustments of their relative ownership shares. The greater ease of using a single-owner entity than a multi-owner entity to exploit personal creditors explains why

the rise of single-owner firms presents some of the most important challenges in organizational law today.

The movement of assets across entity borders need not be malicious for entity shielding to generate costs. Although deliberate opportunism may be the bigger problem, mere confusion and uncertainty regarding the propriety of a firm's investments and distributions can occasion wasteful disputes and delay in settling creditors' claims. When the means of delineating and enforcing the distinction between firm and personal assets are weak, giving firm creditors priority in firm assets may be less efficient than creating no priorities at all.

2. *Higher Enforcement Costs.* — Rules to prevent opportunism and confusion must be credible to be effective. Establishing credibility gives rise to enforcement costs. For example, minimum capital requirements entail accounting and disclosure obligations, monitoring activity by creditors, and litigation of perceived violations.

Bright-line rules for the use of a legal entity may reduce opportunism and confusion with only modest enforcement costs, but such rules may also frequently entail high compliance costs that straitjacket owners and restrict an entity's practical applications. Consequently, modern legal systems often employ standards — such as the doctrines of veil-piercing, equitable subordination, and fraudulent conveyance — rather than rules to distinguish proper and improper asset movements across entity boundaries. But while these doctrines promote flexibility, they also invite uncertainty of litigation outcomes and require sophisticated courts capable of assessing which asset movements subvert the reliability of entities as devices for bonding contracts. It follows that entity shielding inevitably imposes costs, either in the form of ex ante rigidities or ex post judicial errors.

3. *A Sophisticated Bankruptcy System.* — Enforcement of entity shielding, and of weak entity shielding in particular, generally requires the creation of a sophisticated bankruptcy system. The typical alternative to a bankruptcy system is a first-to-file (or "first come, first served") system, which permits creditors to seize a debtor's assets based on the order in which those creditors file suit to enforce favorable judgments. Such prioritization is incompatible with weak entity shielding, which distinguishes creditors based on whether they transacted with a firm or its owners rather than on when they assert their claims.

With weak entity shielding, a personal creditor's right to enforce a claim on firm assets is contingent on whether sufficient firm assets will remain to pay firm creditors in full. To determine, then, whether a personal creditor should be permitted to seize firm assets, a court must accurately assess the ratio between firm assets and debts. Typically, this will require the court to exercise the broad powers associated with a bankruptcy system: the powers to stay division of firm assets and determine their aggregate value, simultaneously evaluate the validity and

worth of the claims of multiple creditors, and oversee ongoing firm operations during the pendency of proceedings.

Paradoxically, strong entity shielding is less dependent on the presence of a well-developed system of bankruptcy law and administration than is weak entity shielding. Because the personal creditors of an owner of a firm with strong entity shielding do not enjoy a unilateral right to levy on firm assets, the insolvency of the owner need not precipitate an assessment of firm assets and liabilities to determine the amount that personal creditors should be paid. Personal creditors in that case are usually treated as merely stepping into the shoes of the insolvent owner, receiving a net distribution of firm assets only after a majority of owners agree to liquidate.⁴⁴ Thus, at least from the standpoint of administering a bankruptcy system, strong entity shielding may entail lower costs than weak entity shielding does.

4. *De-diversification of Creditor Claims.* — Another cost of entity shielding, which arises in both its strong and weak forms, is reduced diversification of assets that back the claims of creditors. Let us return to our hypothetical Florentine merchant. To keep things simple, assume that the merchant is the only substantial investor in each of the three partnerships and has no meaningful wealth outside of them. If the three firms lack entity shielding, then a creditor of one is effectively a creditor of all, since the assets of all three are equally available as security for the debt. The amount the creditor can recover will thus depend on the total returns to the three firms in combination. If, however, the three firms are separate entities with either weak or strong entity shielding, then the creditor's recovery will depend mostly on the performance of the particular firm to which he extended credit. Unless the performance of the three separate firms is perfectly correlated, the effect will be to increase the variance of the creditor's returns.

A creditor could, of course, achieve diversification even in the presence of entity shielding by extending credit to multiple firms. Thus, the relevant cost of entity shielding is not de-diversification per se, but rather the added transaction costs necessary to achieve an efficient level of diversification.

5. *Illiquid Investments.* — The costs we have discussed to this point relate to entity shielding generally and to weak entity shielding in particular. The remaining two costs we survey, by contrast, arise only from strong entity shielding. The first such cost is investment illiquidity. An owner of a strong entity cannot unilaterally withdraw his share of firm assets for purposes of personal consumption or to pursue

⁴⁴ Moreover, if limited liability is added to strong entity shielding, insolvent firms need not assess owners' assets and liabilities, reducing even further the complications of insolvency.

higher investment returns elsewhere. This problem is particularly acute for minority owners who lack control over distribution decisions. For this reason, there is significant complementarity between strong entity shielding and tradable shares, as tradability provides owners with an alternative source of liquidity. Yet while tradable shares reduce the illiquidity costs of strong entity shielding, they usually require costly institutions to implement, such as stock markets, regulatory systems to protect investors, disclosure requirements for public companies, and so on.

6. *Exploitation by Control Persons.* — The second cost specific to strong entity shielding is exploitation by control persons. An owner's right to withdraw at will serves as an important investor-protection device: by threatening to withdraw assets and thus destroy going-concern value, an owner lacking a controlling share of firm equity can limit his exposure to expropriation by controlling owners. Strong entity shielding deprives noncontrolling owners of this protection. All else equal, strong entities are therefore likely to face greater difficulty than other entity types in attracting noncontrolling investors.⁴⁵

C. *Cost-Benefit Tradeoffs and Lessons from History*

As our survey of economic costs and benefits suggests, entity shielding is a story of tradeoffs: weak entity shielding reduces creditor information costs but requires a bankruptcy system capable of preserving the prior claims of firm creditors to firm assets, the administrative costs of which are in turn mitigated by entity shielding; tradable shares are both a cost and a benefit of strong entity shielding; and all forms of entity shielding entail enforcement costs that reduce opportunism costs. While interesting in the abstract, this inventory of costs and benefits tells us little about the development of specific legal forms. To test its value, we must turn to history. In the following sections, we trace a path through four societies that were on the cutting edge of commercial development in their respective eras: ancient Rome, medieval Italy, early modern England, and the contemporary United States.

Our principal object in these historical vignettes is to explore the extent to which economic considerations can explain the organizational forms that provided entity shielding, and to a lesser extent owner shielding, within each historical period. We do not deal here with a single historical progression, since ancient Rome is discontinuous with Western legal and economic development from the Middle Ages for-

⁴⁵ For a model illustrating the choice between the partnership and the corporate form as a simple tradeoff between exploitation by control persons and the benefits of protecting going-concern value, see Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, *supra* note 20, at 16–18.

ward. Nor do we attempt a comprehensive explanation of the level of entity shielding in any given period. As our historical narratives illustrate, many factors influence the level of entity shielding displayed by firms within a period, including the availability of alternative structures for financing businesses (such as wealthy families), the prevalence of capital-intensive enterprise, bankruptcy law, capital markets, and even deep-seated cultural norms such as aristocratic attitudes toward commerce. Economic historians conventionally argue that limited liability arose as a response to the financing needs of capital-intensive technologies, but our examination of entity shielding suggests that the factors shaping organizational law are actually much more complex and varied.

We leave to others the difficult task of assessing the relative contributions of these factors over time. Our focus here is twofold. First, we identify the factors that seem to promote entity shielding. Second, we explore how far economic considerations can go in making sense of the forms of entities and entity shielding that arise within a particular society.

Each society we analyze raises unique questions. In ancient Rome, the challenge is to explain two specialized forms of strong asset partitioning that appear in the law despite a general paucity of commercial legal entities. One such form was a species of limited liability that protected the Roman family but that may have remained unattached — anomalously from a modern perspective — to a parallel rule of entity shielding. The other was a strong entity form (the *societas publicanorum*) that Roman law made available only to commercial enterprises transacting with the state or other public entities, but not to commercial enterprises in general. By contrast, in the intensely commercial culture of medieval Italy we consider the particular form in which entity shielding first became prevalent in Western commerce, as well as the rise of specialized strong entities that are distant precursors of the modern business corporation. In early modern England, we trace the continued (if erratic) evolution of chartered and unchartered joint stock companies into the modern business corporation, and we examine the factors that encouraged the enfolding of weak entity shielding into the modern partnership form. Finally, in contemporary America we address the proliferation of strong entities, the crowding out of weak entities, and the accelerated demise of nearly all restrictions on the deployment of entity and owner shielding.

We believe that each of these societies demonstrates the importance of the institutions and practices that reduce the costs of entity shielding, at least within the frame of the period in question. At the same time, we do not wish to be understood as proposing a monocausal account of entity shielding. At most, economic cost-benefit considerations become wholly decisive only in explaining the explosive spread of asset partitioning in the legal and commercial practices of contempo-

rary America. As we argue below, however, even here the law may not yet have reached equilibrium, because it has not yet fully accommodated the more subtle costs that entity shielding can impose on creditors whose claims it impairs.

IV. ANCIENT ROME

Across its millennium of history, ancient Rome saw the rise of both sophisticated legal institutions and a vibrant economy. With the apparent exception of a class of large firms providing services to the Roman state, however, Roman commercial firms appear not to have been endowed with entity shielding.

A. *The Partnership (Societas)*

The simplest ancient Roman commercial form was the *societas*, a term often translated as “partnership” because it referred to an agreement among Roman citizens to share an enterprise’s profits and losses.⁴⁶ Beyond joint enterprise, however, the *societas* had little in common with the modern partnership form. For one thing, the *societas* lacked mutual agency; each partner had to endorse a contract to be bound by it.⁴⁷ Partners also did not stand behind one another’s obligations: the default rule of liability when they cosigned a debt was pro rata rather than joint and several.⁴⁸ More generally, Roman law made no distinction between the obligations and assets of the *societas* and those of its members,⁴⁹ precluding the rules of weak asset partitioning that characterize the modern partnership. All the more did the *societas* lack strong entity shielding: although partners could agree not to withdraw firm assets before the expiration of a term,⁵⁰ Roman law enforced such contracts through damages rather than specific performance,⁵¹ making a partner just one among many potential creditors grappling for his copartner’s assets when that copartner fell insolvent. Consistent with their lack of entity shielding, most commercial *societates* had no more than a few members.⁵²

⁴⁶ W.W. BUCKLAND, A TEXT-BOOK OF ROMAN LAW FROM AUGUSTUS TO JUSTINIAN 504–07 (1921).

⁴⁷ As Roman law developed, members of a *societas* eventually could act for each other, although for most of Roman history this innovation applied only to large banking partnerships, and may not have applied to the regular *societas* until the sixth century A.D. under the Eastern (Byzantine) Emperor Justinian. *Id.* at 507, 510; JOHN CROOK, LAW AND LIFE OF ROME 233 (1967).

⁴⁸ BUCKLAND, *supra* note 46, at 507.

⁴⁹ *Id.*

⁵⁰ *Id.* at 505.

⁵¹ A partner could be held liable if he renounced fraudulently or at an especially inopportune time for the firm. *Id.* at 508.

⁵² CROOK, *supra* note 47, at 229.

The undeveloped status of the Roman partnership — which, as we will see, contrasts starkly with the more robust form that the partnership assumed beginning in the Middle Ages — seems attributable at least in part to Rome's reliance on other forms of organization for most business activity. Chief among these alternatives were the family and the *peculium*.

B. The Family

Like the modern family, the Roman *familia* was a complete entity in our parlance: only creditors who transacted with persons dealing on behalf of the family had a claim to family assets. The Roman family was, however, much broader than today's simple nuclear family, comprising the oldest living male in the male line of descent (the *pater familias*), his children, and his slaves, as well as all of his adult male descendants and their own household members. The *pater familias* formally owned all family property, whether acquired by him or by other family members.⁵³

These attributes made the Roman family both large and, from a creditor's view, robust. The family had an indefinitely long lifespan, remaining intact over multiple generations. Moreover, those persons to whom a family member evading creditors would be most inclined to pass his assets — close relatives, and especially descendants — were themselves part of the same entity and thus also liable for the same debts.

The wealth of a single, prosperous Roman family was apparently sufficient to finance the typical commercial firm, thus reducing the need for multi-owner enterprise forms such as the partnership.⁵⁴ The vast majority of Roman commercial firms operated on a small scale. Most industrial production, such as that of ceramic lamps, ironware, lead pipes, jewelry, and clothing, occurred in small workshops or in the homes of craftsmen.⁵⁵ To be sure, large-scale production was not unknown in Roman times: industries such as brick making, bronze smelting, glass blowing, and copperware manufacturing were characterized

⁵³ Under the most common form of marriage, however, the wife's assets, including those she brought into the marriage and those subsequently acquired, were not merged with those of the *pater familias* except for the dowry; technically, they still belonged to her father's family. See BRUCE W. FRIER & THOMAS A.J. MCGINN, A CASEBOOK ON ROMAN FAMILY LAW 121-38 (2004); AARON KIRSCHENBAUM, SONS, SLAVES AND FREEDMEN IN ROMAN COMMERCE 12 (1987).

⁵⁴ CROOK, *supra* note 47, at 229; see also TENNEY FRANK, AN ECONOMIC HISTORY OF ROME 222 (1927). Wealth seems to have been concentrated in particular in families that owned large plantations. JEAN-JACQUES AUBERT, BUSINESS MANAGERS IN ANCIENT ROME: A SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STUDY OF INSTITORES, 200 B.C.-A.D. 250, at 301 (1994).

⁵⁵ See FRANK, *supra* note 54, at 220, 234-35, 240-44, 261-64; see also AUBERT, *supra* note 54, at 298-99.

by extensive factory production.⁵⁶ Yet the large industries that operated in urban factories appear to have derived their scale economies from labor specialization rather than capital intensiveness.⁵⁷ For this reason, most of the large-scale workshops in the more capital-intensive metalworking and brickmaking industries were located on the estates of landowning families that had made fortunes in agriculture and then diversified.⁵⁸

The ability of a single family to finance and manage one or more commercial pursuits, moreover, was substantially extended by the institution of the *peculium*.

C. The Peculium

Slaveholding was extensive in ancient Rome, and it was to their slaves that Roman families frequently delegated the responsibility for managing commercial activity. This arrangement was congenial to Roman social mores, under which trade was considered demeaning. Moreover, Rome's slaves often exhibited commercial talent, in part because they frequently were captured in colonial wars with societies such as Greece in which commercial activity was less discreditable.

It was common practice for a master to provide his slave (or sometimes his own son⁵⁹) with a set of assets, termed a *peculium*, for use in a business venture.⁶⁰ The *peculium*, plus any profits it generated, formally remained the property of the master. The master benefited from the arrangement either by receiving regular payments from the slave, or by offering manumission as a reward for efforts by the slave that grew the *peculium*'s assets.⁶¹

Unlike the *societas*, the *peculium* business exhibited a degree of asset partitioning. Although default on *peculium* debt enabled creditors of the *peculium* enterprise to sue the slave's master, the master's liability was capped at the value of the *peculium* (plus any distributions he had received from it) so long as he had not participated in its management.⁶² Despite this provision for limited liability, the typical *peculium* business (like the *societas*) appears not to have provided entity shielding. That is, the personal creditors of a slaveholder may have enjoyed a claim to all his assets, including those committed to *peculia*,

⁵⁶ FRANK, *supra* note 54, at 223, 226–28, 236–38. In particular, certain potteries that specialized in tableware exported their products throughout the Mediterranean. JULES TOUTAIN, *THE ECONOMIC LIFE OF THE ANCIENT WORLD* 302–03 (1930).

⁵⁷ See, e.g., FRANK, *supra* note 54, at 227.

⁵⁸ See TOUTAIN, *supra* note 56, at 301.

⁵⁹ KIRSCHENBAUM, *supra* note 53, at 37.

⁶⁰ *Id.* at 33.

⁶¹ See *id.* at 34–35.

⁶² CROOK, *supra* note 47, at 187–89; FELICIANO SERRAO, *IMPRESA E RESPONSABILITÀ A ROMA NELL'ETÀ COMMERCIALE* 61–64 (2002).

equal in priority to the claims of the *peculium* creditors. The available sources are unclear on the issue.⁶³ We only know for sure that in the *peculium castrense* — a special type of *peculium* consisting of sums earned or otherwise acquired by a son from military service — creditors of the *peculium* evidently *did* enjoy a prior claim on *peculium* assets,⁶⁴ and thus the *peculium castrense* provided weak entity shielding. But this explicit recognition of priority in the *peculium castrense* suggests that the background rule for *peculium* creditors in general was the contrary. If that inference is correct,⁶⁵ slave-managed *peculium* businesses, which were a mainstay of Roman commerce, used a highly anomalous form of asset partitioning: complete owner shielding (limited liability) but no entity shielding at all. This is a pattern we will not see again in our historical survey, and one that has not to our knowledge appeared in any other significant class of commercial organizations in the past or present. The pattern is unusual because, in general, entity shielding lays a necessary foundation for owner shielding by providing firm creditors with an affirmative claim on firm assets to offset the impairment of their claim to the firm owners' personal assets.

Absence of entity shielding in Roman *peculium* businesses may nonetheless have made sense in the Roman context, reinforcing the inference that this may well have been the rule. The fact that the typical *peculium* business had a single owner (the slaveholder) would have increased the hazard of opportunism toward creditors because a single owner need not coordinate with others the transfer of assets into and out of the entity. If the *peculium* had provided entity shielding, a *pater familias* facing bankruptcy would have been tempted to assign personal assets to *peculia* and to encourage his slaves (or sons) to borrow further against those assets and invest in speculative ventures. Success in such ventures would have redounded to the ultimate benefit of the *pater familias*, while the cost of failure would have fallen on his personal creditors.⁶⁶ The *peculium castrense* would have been less subject

⁶³ See ANDREA DI PORTO, *IMPRESA COLLETTIVA E SCHIAVO "MANAGER" IN ROMA ANTICA* 52 n.41 (1984).

⁶⁴ See 3 SIRO SOLAZZI, *IL CONCORSO DEI CREDITORI NEL DIRITTO ROMANO* 200–03 (1940). We are particularly indebted to Bruce Frier for help in researching this issue.

⁶⁵ Both di Porto and Solazzi speculate that *peculium* creditors had priority of claim in ordinary *peculia* as well as in the *peculium castrense*, evidently because they feel that result would be logical. See DI PORTO, *supra* note 63, at 52–53; SOLAZZI, *supra* note 64, at 200–03. But they do not confront the contrary logic we offer here.

⁶⁶ Roman law did provide creditors with a remedy for fraudulent conveyances, though how effective that remedy was in contexts such as the *peculium* is unclear. See SERRAO, *supra* note 62, at 26; Joshua Getzler & Mike Macnair, *The Firm as an Entity Before the Companies Acts*, available at <http://www.law.cam.ac.uk/docs/view.php?doc=2365>, in *ADVENTURES OF THE LAW: PROCEEDINGS OF THE SIXTEENTH BRITISH LEGAL HISTORY CONFERENCE*, DUBLIN 2003, at 267, 272 (Paul Brand et al. eds., 2005).

to such opportunism because it was principally comprised of the son's own earnings.

In addition, the single-owner nature of a *peculium* business would have limited the benefits that entity shielding could have offered in reducing creditor monitoring costs. As we note above, the absence of entity shielding in a multi-owner firm requires a prospective firm creditor to evaluate the personal creditworthiness of each firm owner. A prospective creditor of a slave's *peculium* business, however, needed to evaluate only the creditworthiness of the slaveholder to establish appropriate terms of credit.

Finally, the limited liability that *peculium* businesses exhibited would have provided them with de facto strong entity shielding against one another's creditors. Limited liability in one *peculium* business would have prevented the creditors of that business from levying upon assets committed to other *peculia* of the same slaveholder, effectively creating a privileged claim for those other *peculia* creditors in the assets of the particular *peculium* business with which they transacted. Such de facto entity shielding would have been only partial, since it would not have excluded creditors of businesses in which the master played an active managerial role. However, given that Romans conducted a large fraction of their business via *peculium* arrangements, the degree of de facto entity shielding may have been substantial.

The availability of slave-managed *peculium* firms with a degree of de facto entity shielding may also have made it less important to provide a rule of entity shielding to the *societas*. This is an issue to which we return below.

D. *The Tradable Limited Partnership (Societas Publicanorum)*

An apparent exception to the general lack of entity shielding in Roman commerce was a type of multi-owner firm known as the *societas publicanorum*. Dating from the third century B.C., the *societates publicanorum* consisted of groups of investors, known as *publicani*, who bid on state contracts for projects such as the construction of public works, provision of armaments, and collection of taxes.⁶⁷ The state paid a portion of the contract price upon accepting a bid, and the rest when the contract was completed. The lead investor in the group pledged his landed estates as security for performance of the con-

⁶⁷ See E. BADIAN, PUBLICANS AND SINNERS: PRIVATE ENTERPRISE IN THE SERVICE OF THE ROMAN REPUBLIC 68-69 (1983). Although the *societates publicanorum* were numerous, it seems that the actual contract of association for only one such firm has been found. See *id.* at 68; see also ALBERTO VIGHI, LA PERSONALITÀ GIURIDICA DELLE SOCIETÀ COMMERCIALI 38-46 (1900).

tract.⁶⁸ Other investors could act either as general partners, who exercised control and were fully liable on firm debts, or as limited partners, who lacked control but enjoyed limited liability.⁶⁹ By the first century B.C., the largest *societates publicanorum* appear to have resembled the modern public company in both size and structure, with “multitudes” — presumably hundreds — of limited partners who could trade their shares on a market similar to a modern stock exchange.⁷⁰ Although we lack direct evidence, the tradability of their shares strongly suggests that the *societates publicanorum* enjoyed strong entity shielding at least with respect to their limited partners. As we emphasize above, tradability of shares is difficult to sustain without strong entity shielding, while tradability in turn provides the liquidity that strong entity shielding would otherwise deny to the firm’s shareholders.⁷¹

In addition to creating liquidity problems, the liquidation protection that characterizes strong entity shielding increases the risk of opportunism by those in control. Modern societies deal with this problem through elaborate public and private mechanisms of investor protection. There is no evidence that ancient Rome developed such mechanisms. How, then, were the costs of control person opportunism kept within bounds? One answer may lie in the fact that the *societates publicanorum* evidently provided services only to the state and not to private parties. As a firm’s only customer, the state would have had a strong interest in ensuring that the firm was managed efficiently and honestly, and would also have been in a good position to notice serious malfeasance and take action against it.

⁶⁸ ULRIKE MALMENDIER, SOCIETAS PUBLICANORUM: STAATLICHE WIRTSCHAFTSAKTIVITÄTEN IN DEN HÄNDEN PRIVATER UNTERNEHMER 273–74 (2002). A short description of the *societates publicanorum* is also provided in Ulrike Malmendier, *Roman Shares, in THE ORIGINS OF VALUE: THE FINANCIAL INNOVATIONS THAT CREATED MODERN CAPITAL MARKETS* 31 (William N. Goetzmann & K. Geert Rouwenhorst eds., 2005).

⁶⁹ MALMENDIER, *supra* note 68, at 261–68.

⁷⁰ *Id.* at 249–51.

⁷¹ Further evidence of strong entity shielding in the *societates publicanorum* is that, unlike a simple *societas*, a *societas publicanorum* survived the death of any of its members except that of the lead investor whose name appeared on the contract with the state. When a member other than the lead investor died, his heir stepped into his financial rights and obligations, although the heir became a full firm member only if there had been a prior agreement to that effect. *Id.* at 243–47; see also CROOK, *supra* note 47, at 234 (discussing such limitations on the rights of heirs in the context of *societates publicanorum* formed for tax farming); P.W. DUFF, PERSONALITY IN ROMAN PRIVATE LAW 160 (1971) (same). Still further evidence for strong entity shielding is that the *societas publicanorum* appears to have been able to receive a type of legal personality that permitted a firm to own property and transact in its own name, although this privilege may have been used only by the larger firms. See BADIAN, *supra* note 67, at 69. Ulrike Malmendier argues that the *societas publicanorum* enjoyed full legal entity status by the first century B.C., although she does not specifically address the question of entity shielding. See MALMENDIER, *supra* note 68, at 252–55.

E. Some Open Questions

We have seen that there is substantial logic to the forms of asset partitioning exhibited by each of ancient Rome's best developed enterprise forms: the family, the *peculium*, and the *societas publicanorum*. Taken as a whole, however, the patterns of commercial organization in ancient Rome present a striking contrast. For business done in the private sector, Rome apparently had no forms of enterprise organization that provided weak or strong entity shielding. But for business done with the state, Romans developed and made extensive use of an organizational form that enjoyed strong entity shielding and bore a substantial resemblance to a modern publicly traded corporation.⁷²

This pattern of institutional development presents at least two significant questions. First, why did Roman law not grant weak entity shielding to the *societas*, thus offering a general-purpose commercial entity for private commerce? Second, why was the *societas publicanorum* not employed for business with the private sector as it was with the public sector?

As for the first question, we explain above that even weak entity shielding may have been inefficient for *peculium* businesses, largely because of their single-owner nature. But the same reason does not extend to the *societas*. And although the broadly conceived Roman family, supplemented with slave-managed *peculium* businesses, may have been an adequate vehicle for much of Roman commerce, it is hard to imagine that developing the *societas* into a general partnership form with weak entity shielding would not have been advantageous. The costs seemingly would have been modest. If Roman courts were capable of sorting out creditors and assets based on the distinction between a slave's *peculium* and the other affairs of the slave's master, as was required by the limited liability that came with the *peculium*, then presumably they could have done the same with the creditors and assets of a partnership and those of its various partners.

We may have to look to noncommercial aspects of Roman culture to find an answer. Perhaps Roman society was unwilling to risk the stability and status of prominent families for the sake of commerce. Hence Roman law placed all power over a family's wealth in the *pater familias*, and then made it difficult for the *pater familias* to delegate the power to put that wealth at risk. For instance, Roman law famously had no general concept of agency. The persons to whom

⁷² More accurately, the Roman *societates publicanorum* closely resemble the publicly traded limited partnerships that played a strong role in the economy of nineteenth-century France. See Naomi R. Lamoreaux & Jean-Laurent Rosenthal, *Legal Regime and Business's Organizational Choice: A Comparison of France and the United States During the Mid-Nineteenth Century* 7–10 (Nat'l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10288, 2004), available at <http://www.nber.org/papers/w10288>.

agency authority could be given — such as sons, slaves, and the managers of a *societas publicanorum* — had power to commit only the specific assets placed in their possession. The lack of mutual agency among partners is consistent with this more general pattern. Perhaps the same conservatism about committing family wealth that seems to have been reflected in ancient Rome's limits on agency authority discouraged a grant of priority to business creditors over other family creditors with respect to *any* family assets. For the Romans, the risks of commercial credit may have been more salient than its advantages, and hence they were not eager to facilitate it.

In any event, one thing is clear. It was not for lack of imagination that the Romans failed to develop general-purpose commercial entities. The Romans clearly understood the concept of entity shielding in both its weak and strong forms. As we note above, they employed weak entity shielding in the *peculium castrense*.⁷³ And they evidently employed strong entity shielding in the *societas publicanorum*. Moreover, well before the Republic ended in the first century B.C., Roman law had come to recognize noncommercial legal entities such as municipalities and nonprofit organizations.⁷⁴

This leads us to our second question: why was the *societas publicanorum* not used for private business? Perhaps the ratio of benefits to costs was too low. Unlike the state, few private parties may have needed services that only heavily capitalized firms could provide. Moreover, as we suggest above, creating publicly traded firms not con-

⁷³ Rome also had a law of secured transactions sophisticated enough to handle floating liens on commercial assets. R.W. LEAGE, *ROMAN PRIVATE LAW* 190–96 (1937). Because it generally bonds only named creditors, and not a shifting group of creditors, a security interest is a much more restrictive device than a legal entity. See Hansmann & Kraakman, *supra* note 1, at 418. But floating liens certainly signify a system of commercial law with a sophisticated approach to creditors' rights. (At the same time, we note that the availability of floating liens might have reduced somewhat the demand for weak entities, for which they can serve as something of a substitute.)

⁷⁴ Aside from the family, Roman law recognized three types of noncommercial organizations as distinct — and, in our terms, complete — legal entities. The first, the *collegium*, was employed originally for fraternal associations. See DUFF, *supra* note 71, at 152 (“[I]t is almost certain that the property of a corporate college was protected against the creditors of individual members . . .”); see also *id.* at 95–158; accord ADOLF BERGER, *ENCYCLOPEDIA OF ROMAN LAW* 395 (1953). The second distinct Roman legal entity was the municipal corporation (or *municipium*). See DUFF, *supra* note 71, at 62. Finally, Rome recognized a noncommercial type of entity that covered a mixed class of membership and charitable organizations. See *id.* at 177 (grouping these organizations together as “charitable foundations”). Like the family, all three of these were complete entities: neither members nor their creditors enjoyed a claim to entity assets. Unlike the family, however, these entities were controlled by persons who held personal property outside the entity, thus creating a hazard of asset distributions to the detriment of entity creditors. Distributions of net assets to controlling persons were formally barred, however, by virtue of the “nondistribution constraint” that remains today the defining characteristic of a nonprofit organization. See Henry B. Hansmann, *The Role of Nonprofit Enterprise*, 89 *YALE L.J.* 835, 838–40 (1980). The entities thus featured resilient organizational boundaries that contributed to their conspicuous success as asset-pooling devices.

fined to public contracting may have required costly institutions for protecting investors. Part of the answer may also lie in political considerations. When Rome transformed itself from a republic into an empire in the first century B.C., the wealth and influence of the *publicani* drew jealous attention from the emperors,⁷⁵ who ordered the state to take over much of the construction of public works. The *publicani* persisted for a time as tax collectors, but repeated clampdowns eliminated them from even this role by the end of the second century A.D.⁷⁶

V. MEDIEVAL AND RENAISSANCE ITALY

Europe's economy in the centuries after the fall of Rome provided little impetus for the formation of commercial firms with multiple owners. Southern Europe's population was reduced by a series of epidemics in the fifth and sixth centuries A.D., and then held in check by a decline in agricultural productivity caused by soil exhaustion and, possibly, climate change.⁷⁷ Among the consequences was a severe decrease in investment in commercial ventures.⁷⁸

Agricultural yields and thus population levels finally began a slow rally at the end of the tenth century A.D., in turn stimulating a revival of trade.⁷⁹ Because the decay of the great Roman roads had pushed most of the remaining long-distance commerce into the Mediterranean, by the time of trade revitalization the political center of gravity had shifted outward to Italian ports such as Amalfi, Pisa, Genoa, and Venice.⁸⁰ Unlike in ancient Rome, mercantile families comprised much of the ruling class in these new city-states, as they would later in the inland cities, such as Florence and Siena, whose own prosperity began in the thirteenth century. The result was a cluster of legal regimes highly responsive to the needs of commerce.⁸¹ The renewed importance of long-distance trade, combined with merchants' influence over lawmaking, gave rise to the *law merchant* — a set of commercial rules that exhibited substantial homogeneity across jurisdictions.⁸²

⁷⁵ During the first century B.C., the *publicani* formed a cartel to demand remission of fees paid on unprofitable tax farming contracts. Julius Caesar promised to heed their demands if he won the Roman Civil War, and he thereby gained their support. FRANK, *supra* note 54, at 182.

⁷⁶ CROOK, *supra* note 47, at 234.

⁷⁷ Robert S. Lopez, *The Trade of Medieval Europe: The South*, in 2 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE 257, 306 (M. Postan & E.E. Rich eds., 1952).

⁷⁸ ROBERT S. LOPEZ, THE COMMERCIAL REVOLUTION OF THE MIDDLE AGES: 950-1350, at 18 (1976).

⁷⁹ See *id.* at 27-34.

⁸⁰ Lopez, *supra* note 77, at 316-17.

⁸¹ See FRANCESCO GALGANO, LEX MERCATORIA 38-57 (2001); SANTARELLI, *supra* note 34, at 41-53; VIGHI, *supra* note 67, at 60-63.

⁸² The extent of their homogeneity is subject to debate. See J.H. Baker, *The Law Merchant and the Common Law Before 1700*, 38 CAMBRIDGE L.J. 295 (1979); Stephen E. Sachs, *From St.*

The most important forms of medieval trade were supported by extensive debt financing, commonly in the form of short- and long-term credit from customers and suppliers. Many of the law merchant's innovations were thus designed to make merchants more creditworthy. In particular, commercial law was heavily pro-creditor, dealing harshly with merchants who failed to pay their debts. Litigation involving merchants commonly took place in special merchant courts in which process was rapid, with disputes often decided in a matter of days.⁸³

A. Households and Partnerships

As in ancient Rome, the family — or, more accurately, the household — was the basic legal entity. There were, however, significant differences between ancient Roman and medieval Italian households. First, sons, like their fathers, had the general capacity to commit family assets.⁸⁴ Second, while adult sons sharing the father's household or participating in the family business were presumed part of the family entity, sons who did neither could be considered outside the family entity.⁸⁵ Both changes made the medieval Italian family more like a modern commercial partnership than its Roman antecedent, and reflected the fact that productive enterprise and trade were commonly conducted at the level of the household.

The medieval Italian partnership, the *compagnia*, evolved gradually out of the laws and customs governing the household, as merchants grew their businesses by adding persons unrelated to the household.⁸⁶ At first the *compagnia* differed from the Roman *societas* only in its use of joint and several — rather than pro rata — liability among partners for firm debt.⁸⁷ Over time, however, the *compagnia* also acquired mutual agency,⁸⁸ a development that would have made it more useful to

Ives to Cyberspace: The Modern Distortion of the Medieval "Law Merchant", 21 AM. UNIV. INT'L L. REV. (forthcoming 2006).

⁸³ ALESSANDRO LATTES, *IL DIRITTO COMMERCIALE NELLA LEGISLAZIONE STATUTARIA DELLE CITTA ITALIANE* 259, 298 (Milan, Hoepli 1884).

⁸⁴ See MAX WEBER, *THE HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL PARTNERSHIPS IN THE MIDDLE AGES* 86 (Lutz Kaelber trans., Rowman & Littlefield 2003) (1889).

⁸⁵ See *id.* at 109–10; see also SANTARELLI, *supra* note 34, at 129.

⁸⁶ See SANTARELLI, *supra* note 34, at 130–31; WEBER, *supra* note 84, at 106–08.

⁸⁷ LOPEZ, *supra* note 78, at 74; 2 ARMANDO SAPORI, *Le Compagnie Mercantili Toscane del Dugento e dei Primi del Trecento: La Responsabilità dei Compagni verso i Terzi*, in *STUDI DI STORIA ECONOMICA* 765, 765–66 (3d ed. 1955); 2 ARMANDO SAPORI, *Storia Interna della Compagnia Mercantile dei Peruzzi*, in *STUDI DI STORIA ECONOMICA*, *supra*, at 653, 664.

⁸⁸ See W. MITCHELL, *AN ESSAY ON THE EARLY HISTORY OF THE LAW MERCHANT* 132–33 (1904); RAYMOND DE ROOVER, *MONEY, BANKING AND CREDIT IN MEDIEVAL BRUGES* 32 (1999).

larger firms, and which in fact coincided with the increased scale of commerce that came with the High Middle Ages.⁸⁹

B. Entity Shielding and Bankruptcy

Most importantly for our purposes, the medieval law merchant was innovative with respect to entity shielding. Although the rule evidently developed gradually⁹⁰ and to different degrees in different places, medieval Italy eventually arrived at a regime whereby partnership creditors enjoyed a claim to partnership assets that was prior to the claim of the partners' personal creditors.⁹¹ This rule of weak entity shielding for partnerships was not matched by a symmetric rule of weak owner shielding: personal creditors not only lacked priority of claim on a merchant's personal assets,⁹² but their claims were also generally disadvantaged with respect to those of business creditors, reflecting the broad disposition toward facilitating trade credit.

The evolution of weak entity shielding in the Italian *compagnia* reflected not only the increasing salience of the rule's reduction of the costs of credit, but also the development of a system of bankruptcy law. As indicated in Part III, a bankruptcy regime both makes possible and benefits from a rule of weak entity shielding. Consistent with this observation, procedures for handling merchant bankruptcies had begun to develop in the Italian city-states by the early thirteenth century.⁹³ The basic rule was pro rata division of assets among creditors

⁸⁹ While the typical *compagnia* was a small firm with a fixed term of generally less than five years, JEAN FAVIER, *GOLD & SPICES: THE RISE OF COMMERCE IN THE MIDDLE AGES* 157 (1998), increases in the scale of commerce by the last half of the thirteenth century led to *compagnie* with as many as twenty (often unrelated) partners and several hundred employees. EDWIN S. HUNT & JAMES M. MURRAY, *A HISTORY OF BUSINESS IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 1200-1550*, at 62 (1999). For example, in 1312 only eight of the seventeen partners of the large Florentine Peruzzi *compagnia* were members of the Peruzzi family, and by 1331 the family had only a minority interest in the firm. See RAYMOND DE ROOVER, *THE RISE AND DECLINE OF THE MEDICI BANK 1397-1494*, at 77-78 (1963); see also HUNT & MURRAY, *supra*, at 105-09; Raymond de Roover, *The Organization of Trade*, in 3 *THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE* 42, 76-79 (M.M. Postan et al. eds., 1965). Typically, the largest of these *compagnie* originated as traders of grain or textiles in central Italy and grew by establishing new branches in foreign cities. See HUNT & MURRAY, *supra*, at 102-05; de Roover, *supra*, at 70-89. Once these partnerships established a network of international branches, they were well placed to trade in international currencies as well. Consequently, they soon also became Europe's dominant international bankers. 3 ARMANDO SAPORI, *Dalla "Compagnia" alla "Holding,"* in *STUDI DI STORIA ECONOMICA*, *supra* note 87, at 87, 127, 132-33.

⁹⁰ VIGHI, *supra* note 67, at 50, 57-60.

⁹¹ GALGANO, *supra* note 81, at 45.

⁹² There were some forms of personal assets that were unavailable to a merchant's business creditors in a bankruptcy proceeding, including his wife's dowry, family real estate, and some personal possessions. But these assets were evidently unavailable to personal creditors as well. LATTES, *supra* note 83, at 339 & nn.11-12; SANTARELLI, *supra* note 35, at 242-43.

⁹³ See SANTARELLI, *supra* note 35, at 33-39; Francesco Galgano, *L'iniziativa del debitore nel fallimento delle società personali*, 5 *RIVISTA DI DIRITTO CIVILE* 289, 304 & n.74 (1959) (It.).

based on the relative value of their claims. This regime constituted a deviation from the Roman rule of priority for earlier-arising debts — a deviation presumably adopted because of the speed and simplicity it offered in handling the claims of commercial creditors.⁹⁴

Only an individual merchant, not a *compagnia*, could be the formal subject of bankruptcy.⁹⁵ As the partnership developed, however, rules evolved that in effect provided for firms to go bankrupt. If a member of a partnership fell bankrupt in connection with a debt of the partnership, then all other partners of that firm would also be declared bankrupt regardless of whether they were in fact insolvent.⁹⁶ The result was that all creditors of the partnership were able to seize a portion of each partner's assets, including assets held by the partnership, when a partnership failed to pay its debts. Moreover, the creditors would first have to exhaust partnership assets before taking the partners' personal assets.⁹⁷

In addition to bankruptcy proceedings, another likely contributor to the rise of entity shielding in the Middle Ages was the medieval revolution in bookkeeping methods. Recordkeeping became cheaper with the introduction of inexpensive paper in Italy in the thirteenth century, and arithmetic became easier with the displacement of Roman numerals by Hindu-Arabic digits in the late fourteenth century. Double-entry accounting, which provided the first workable method for tracking a firm's net value, also appeared in the fourteenth century and spread thereafter.⁹⁸ These innovations made it easier for owners and creditors to assess the value of firm assets and distinguish permissible from impermissible distributions. This increase in the reliability of financial reports made creditors more likely to accept a firm's business assets, rather than the personal assets of its owners, as the principal bond for the firm's obligations.

Medieval weak entity shielding differed from the analogous modern rule for partnerships in two important respects. First, it applied not just to partnerships, but to businesses owned by individual merchants as well. Formation of a sole proprietorship today, in contrast, does not

⁹⁴ SANTARELLI, *supra* note 35, at 264.

⁹⁵ See *id.* at 187; Galgano, *supra* note 93, at 300–05, 310.

⁹⁶ See SANTARELLI, *supra* note 35, at 187; Galgano, *supra* note 93, at 300–05, 310. If a merchant was a partner in two different *compagnie*, *A* and *B*, and committed an act of bankruptcy in connection with *A*, then the partners of *B* would not be thrown into bankruptcy, although *B* would be subject to dissolution.

⁹⁷ See VIGHI, *supra* note 67, at 134–35; Galgano, *supra* note 93, at 327 n.141.

⁹⁸ ALFRED W. CROSBY, *THE MEASURE OF REALITY: QUANTIFICATION AND WESTERN SOCIETY, 1250–1600*, at 206 (1997); RAYMOND DE ROOVER, *The Commercial Revolution of the Thirteenth Century*, in *ENTERPRISE AND SECULAR CHANGE* 80, 81 (Frederic C. Lane & Jelle C. Riemersma eds., 1953). The spread of new commercial practices would have been aided significantly by the development of movable type in the mid-fifteenth century.

in itself bring entity shielding: there is no distinction between an owner's personal assets and creditors and those of the owner's business. Today an individual can obtain entity shielding for a wholly owned business only by forming a business corporation or limited liability company of which the owner is the sole shareholder. Moreover, the single-shareholder corporation has been slow to win acceptance in modern law.⁹⁹

Why did medieval law, in contrast to modern law, endow sole proprietorships with entity shielding? Several possible reasons come to mind. To begin with, the lack of any form of owner shielding meant that entity shielding had only benefits and no costs for business creditors. Thus, it unequivocally increased a merchant's creditworthiness while aggravating only slightly the burdens faced by personal creditors, who already operated under strong limitations.¹⁰⁰ Moreover, given that the law considered other male members of a merchant's household his partners, the contrary rule would have made creditors' rights depend rather arbitrarily on whether a merchant currently had other male family members in his household. Finally, guild rules, which constrained closely the forms and methods of merchant activity, made the nature of a merchant's business activities difficult to obfuscate and hence inhibited opportunistic use of entity shielding to avoid personal — or other business — creditors.

The second difference between medieval and modern entity shielding is that the medieval form was heavily locational in its operation. If a merchant was engaged in businesses at different locations, or operated branches of the same business at different locations, creditors at one location enjoyed priority of claim to the assets held there.¹⁰¹ The consequence was that each branch of a merchant's business was effectively a distinct entity. This location-based entity shielding is in contrast to the contemporary rule of firm-based entity shielding, whereby all creditors of a partnership enjoy equal priority to all the partnership assets wherever they are located.

⁹⁹ See, e.g., PAUL L. DAVIES, GOWER AND DAVIES' PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW 4-5 (7th ed. 2003) (noting that U.K. law did not formally allow a one-person private company until 1989); CALLY JORDAN, INTERNATIONAL SURVEY OF CORPORATE LAW IN ASIA, EUROPE, NORTH AMERICA AND THE COMMONWEALTH 62 (1997) (noting that although the French closely held company form — the SARL — requires at least two shareholders, there is now a "more generalized trend toward the acceptance of one-person corporations" among the member states of the European Union).

¹⁰⁰ So far as personal credit was concerned, medieval law, like Roman law generally, favored debtors over creditors — for example, by forcing unpaid creditors to accept compromises and substantial extensions of time to pay. LATTES, *supra* note 83, at 310 (noting that, from a creditor's viewpoint, insolvent nonmerchant debtors (*debitori civili*) were treated more indulgently than commercial debtors).

¹⁰¹ GALGANO, *supra* note 81, at 63 n.36 (collecting sources).

Location-based entity shielding was presumably an adaptation to the highly fragmented nature of the political jurisdictions of the time and the difficulties that this fragmentation created for the effective administration of bankruptcy law. Because the geographic reach of trade was far wider than the jurisdictional reach of the courts in the small city-states of medieval Italy, merchants had a strong incentive to flee to another jurisdiction in order to avoid their creditors — an incentive frequently acted upon.¹⁰² In fact, “merchant in flight” was the term generally used to refer to a bankrupt merchant.¹⁰³ The temptation to flee was heightened by the fact that the largest firms of the time engaged primarily in trading and banking, and thus held non-fixed assets — such as marketable goods, coin, and financial claims — that were easy to make off with. Furthermore, the courts’ limited jurisdiction meant that a single court often could not reach, or even discover, assets held in other jurisdictions.¹⁰⁴

In light of these jurisdictional limitations, there was probably little to be gained by establishing a bankruptcy process that sought to assemble all of a firm’s business assets wherever held, and all debts wherever owed, and then divide the assets ratably among the creditors. Not only would such an effort likely fail, but the time it required would increase the opportunity for firm owners to abscond with assets. More logical was a faster procedure whereby all of a bankrupt firm’s creditors with claims arising locally could immediately seek satisfaction out of the firm’s local assets.¹⁰⁵

While the resulting system of location-based asset partitioning would have been relatively easy to administer, it came at the cost of depriving merchants of the option of setting up a different system of partitioning if they preferred. A creditor could be given a first priority claim only to the assets of the local branch with which he dealt. The

¹⁰² LATTES, *supra* note 83, at 334 n.16; ROBERT S. LOPEZ & IRVING W. RAYMOND, *MEDIEVAL TRADE IN THE MEDITERRANEAN WORLD* 290 (1978); *see also* SANTARELLI, *supra* note 35, at 34–39.

¹⁰³ SANTARELLI, *supra* note 35, at 48–60.

¹⁰⁴ This is not to say that there was no means of reaching assets that a merchant held in another jurisdiction. From the twelfth through the early fourteenth centuries, if a merchant from one jurisdiction failed to pay a debt owed in another, the latter jurisdiction would often threaten or undertake group reprisal by seizing the goods of, or barring from trade, *all* merchants from the offending merchant’s home city. The result, in effect, was to make all merchants from a given city sureties for each other when in a foreign jurisdiction. *See* Avner Greif, *Institutions and Impersonal Exchange: From Communal to Individual Responsibility*, 158 *J. INST. & THEORETICAL ECON.* 168, 188–89 (2002); Avner Greif, Paul Milgrom, & Barry R. Weingast, *Coordination, Commitment and Enforcement: The Case of the Merchant Guild*, 102 *J. POL. ECON.* 745, 753–58 (1994).

¹⁰⁵ While we have little direct evidence, one suspects that the system was administered with more speed than precision and that the division of assets among creditors was relatively crude. *See, e.g.*, LATTES, *supra* note 83, at 330.

system did not permit the owners of a multi-city firm to give all of the firm's creditors an equal priority claim to all of the firm's assets wherever located.

There is some evidence that, at least in the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries, the entity shielding granted to partnerships by the law was weaker than merchants would have wished. Members of a medieval *compagnia* often promised in their partnership agreement to refrain from joining other partnerships,¹⁰⁶ and under some early statutes this commitment was imposed as a matter of law.¹⁰⁷ The commitment may have been intended, at least in part, to prevent partners from diverting firm opportunities to themselves. But it probably also served, and was intended to serve, to insulate the firm from the spillover effect when another firm with an overlapping partner became insolvent. As such, this rule provided the kind of protection offered by *strong* entity shielding, in that it protected not just firm creditors' priority of claim but also a firm's going-concern value.

A legal rule of strong entity shielding would have been superior to such contractual commitments in two ways. First, it would have provided insulation from the spillover effect without barring merchants from becoming members of more than one firm. Second, it would have insulated firms more effectively because it would have been enforceable against non-firm creditors without their consent, whereas a mere contract among partners presumably would not have bound the creditors of outside firms that a partner had joined in violation of the agreement. On the other hand, the simple promise not to invest in other partnerships had the advantage, relative to strong entity shielding, of not requiring partners to weaken their control over firm affairs by giving up their personal withdrawal rights.

The organizational structure of the largest international Italian firms in the late fourteenth and fifteenth centuries arguably reflects, at least in part, an effort to reinforce the rule of locational entity shielding that seems to have been achieving broader use at the time. Until the mid-fourteenth century, each of the great international Italian firms was organized as a single large partnership with branch offices located throughout Europe. In the early 1340s, the largest of these firms — then all headquartered in Florence — collapsed suddenly, evidently as a consequence of macroeconomic factors.¹⁰⁸ When new international

¹⁰⁶ Armando Sapori cites for this and other "standard" clauses in partnership agreements the 1310 contract of the Tolomei partnership. See 3 SAPORI, *supra* note 89, at 124–25; see also FAVIER, *supra* note 89, at 164; LOPEZ & RAYMOND, *supra* note 102, at 198–99.

¹⁰⁷ See, e.g., Il Constituto del Comune di Siena dell'Anno 1262, II, 123; II, 82, cited in A. Arcangeli, *Gli istituti del diritto commerciale nel costituito senese del 1310*, 4 RIVISTA DI DIRITTO COMMERCIALE 243, 348 (1906) (It.).

¹⁰⁸ 2 SAPORI, *Storia Interna della Compagnia Mercantile dei Peruzzi*, *supra* note 87, at 686–88.

firms arose later in the fourteenth century, they were organized not as single partnerships but rather on a hub-and-spoke system with branch offices formed as separate partnerships, and with a central partnership (or individual) that held a controlling interest in each subpartnership and exercised company-wide executive authority. The Medici bank was a prominent example of this new organizational structure.¹⁰⁹ This organizational shift is commonly explained as an effort to avoid the sudden systemic bankruptcies of the past by making each branch of a firm to some degree independent of the others.¹¹⁰ This explanation is not, however, entirely satisfying because it is not obvious that the new arrangement was less vulnerable to company-wide collapse. Given that each partnership within the structure lacked limited liability or any other form of owner shielding, and that each partnership also benefited from only weak entity shielding, unpaid creditors of any one branch office would have been able to levy against assets held in the other branches, leading to failure of all of the branches whenever the assets of the whole company and its owners were inadequate to cover the company's aggregate debts — which is the same condition under which a single integrated partnership would fail.

An advantage that the hub-and-spoke system does seem to have offered, however, was that creditors of each branch office had more control over the losses they might incur from such a domino-effect bankruptcy. With each office organized as a separate partnership, the creditors of each office would have had a clearer first claim to the assets of that particular office, and hence less exposure to claims arising from other branches. In short, the hub-and-spoke system may have served as a formal reinforcement of the locational asset partitioning that had become customary practice. It is difficult to assess just how important this consideration might have been.¹¹¹ There would have been other reasons for adopting the new arrangement, such as provid-

¹⁰⁹ See DE ROOVER, *supra* note 89, at 77–86.

¹¹⁰ See, e.g., *id.* at 77–78; I FEDERIGO MELIS, ASPETTI DELLA VITA ECONOMICA MEDIEVALE (STUDI NELL'ARCHIVIO DATINI DI PRATO) 130–31 (1962).

¹¹¹ A 1495 lawsuit involving two Medici partnerships raises some doubt about the rigor with which courts observed entity shielding between branches of a firm operating in different locations, even when the branches were organized as separate partnerships under the subpartnership system. The lawsuit was brought against a firm in Naples that was ninety-five percent owned by the Medici branch in Rome and five percent by its Neapolitan manager. The plaintiff was the holder of a bill of exchange drawn in Rome and payable in Naples. The courts held that, for purposes of the litigation, the two firms could be treated as one — and hence, apparently, it was not important to decide which firm was directly liable for the debt. See DE ROOVER, *supra* note 89, at 139–40, 260–61. With weak entity shielding, of course, this would not have been the case: if the Rome partnership was the only firm directly liable for the debt, then the holder of the bill was only a subordinated creditor of the Naples firm — an important difference, given that the Rome partnership was evidently insolvent and the Naples subpartnership was also in financial difficulty.

ing stronger incentives to local managers (who were generally made partners only in the local subpartnership) and insulating those local managers from personal liability for debts that arose in other branches of the company (a benefit that the subpartnership structure would have provided even in the absence of weak entity shielding).¹¹²

C. Limited Partnerships

Like their Roman forebears, medieval Italians developed a stronger form of asset partitioning through firms organized, in effect, as limited partnerships.

The earliest such form was the *commenda*, which arose during the tenth and eleventh centuries as a device for financing maritime trade. The prototypical *commenda* had two partners: a passive investor who provided capital, and a traveling trader (often the ship captain) who contributed labor and initiative.¹¹³ A *commenda* lasted only a single, round-trip voyage, at the end of which the merchandise obtained in foreign ports was sold and the profits divided between the active and passive partners according to pre-specified proportions.¹¹⁴

Scholarly interest in the *commenda* has derived primarily from the fact that the passive partner usually enjoyed limited liability.¹¹⁵ Given the passive partner's lack of control over firm matters, limited liability made sense as a way of shielding him from imprudent borrowing by the active partner. At the same time, the passive partner's lack of control disabled him from causing the firm to make opportunistic distributions to him at the expense of firm creditors. And the active (or general) partner, personally liable for any shortfall in firm assets, would have had no incentive to make distributions to the passive partner that might compromise firm solvency. In all of these respects, the *commenda* reflected the tradeoffs among control, incentives, and liability typical of limited partnerships in general. The reason that this tradeoff of limited liability for lack of control first appears in seagoing ven-

¹¹² A case decided in Bruges in 1455 suggests the effectiveness of this strategy. In that case, a Milanese merchant named Ruffini sued the Medici's Bruges branch for the defective packing of wool bales that he had purchased from the Medici's London branch. The court rejected Ruffini's argument that, since the Medici family controlled both firms, he should be able to recover from one for the debts of the other. The court instead accepted the defendant's reasoning that the case against the Bruges branch should be dismissed because, given that the two branches were distinct partnerships, Ruffini was required to bring his action against the London branch with which he had dealt. *See id.* at 83-84.

¹¹³ HAROLD J. BERMAN, *LAW AND REVOLUTION: THE FORMATION OF THE WESTERN LEGAL TRADITION* 352-53 (1983); LOPEZ & RAYMOND, *supra* note 102, at 175; de Roover, *supra* note 89, at 49-50.

¹¹⁴ LOPEZ, *supra* note 78, at 76-77; LOPEZ & RAYMOND, *supra* note 102, at 175; de Roover, *supra* note 89, at 49-50.

¹¹⁵ *See* MURAT CIZAKCA, *A COMPARATIVE EVOLUTION OF BUSINESS PARTNERSHIPS* 14 (1996); *see also* WEBER, *supra* note 84, at 81.

tures is presumably that the passive partner's renunciation of control was made particularly credible by the fact that the firm's assets were at sea or in foreign ports for the life of the venture.

While the partial limited liability of the *commenda* was important historically, an equally significant feature of the arrangement was a rule whereby the *commenda* had *strong* entity shielding with respect to the passive partner.¹¹⁶ This arrangement was likely acceptable to the passive partner because in the *commenda*, unlike the typical *compagnia*, the firm's assets were sequestered in the hull of the ship or in foreign ports, so that anything the active partner wished to expropriate would still have to come back with him. Once the ship arrived at its home port, and windows of opportunism thereby opened to the active partner, the contract dissolved and the passive partner was immediately owed his due. The hull of the ship thus acted as a resilient boundary for the firm that reduced the costs of both limited liability and liquidation protection, making the *commenda* particularly well suited to realize the benefits of strong asset partitioning in the medieval period.

A version of the *commenda* was later developed for terrestrial use. In its typical employment it resembled its maritime progenitor: a passive investor financed a traveling merchant on a trading expedition, and the firm was dissolved upon the merchant's return.¹¹⁷ Subsequently, by the fifteenth century there evolved a more general form of nonmaritime limited partnership termed the *società in accomandita*.¹¹⁸ Passive partners in the *accomandita* enjoyed limited liability so long as they refrained from lending their name to the firm and from participating in its management.¹¹⁹ Like the *commenda*, the *accomandita* was evidently used principally for short terms during which firm assets were remote from the limited partners. The Medici bank, for example, used the *accomandita* when creating new branches in foreign cities. The local branch manager would serve as the general partner, and the central Medici bank in Florence (a general partnership) served as the limited partner. The motive was to limit exposure of Medici family wealth to the conduct of the untried manager. If the local manager proved his reliability within the prescribed period (typically two years),

¹¹⁶ WEBER, *supra* note 84, at 76–77. This rule may not have been universal. Like the *compagnia*, the *commenda* also would have had weak entity shielding with respect to the active partner.

¹¹⁷ See LOPEZ & RAYMOND, *supra* note 102, at 188–89.

¹¹⁸ The form was well developed at least by 1408, when it was adopted by statute in Florence. de ROOVER, *supra* note 89, at 75.

¹¹⁹ DE ROOVER, *supra* note 89, at 89, 284, 325.

the firm was reformed as a general partnership (*compagnia*) in which the Medici family accepted unlimited liability.¹²⁰

Why was the use of limited partnerships confined to short-term arrangements involving investments at a distance? One evident reason was that — as the arrangements of the Medici bank indicate — limited liability was generally unworkable for the trading and banking firms of the time. The fluid and fungible nature of these firms' assets made those assets a weak basis for firm credit, with the consequence that personal liability was important for creditworthiness. Further evidence of the need for personal liability can be found in an ill-fated experiment by Siena — then the dominant center of European banking — which in 1310 adopted a statute providing that partners in *compagnie* bore only pro rata personal liability for firm debts rather than the joint and several liability that had previously prevailed and continued to prevail elsewhere. The result was that Siennese firms were so handicapped in attracting credit that, by the time joint and several liability was reinstated in 1342, Florence had permanently displaced Siena as the center of European banking.¹²¹ Clearly, if pro rata liability was an insufficient basis for credit, full limited liability would have been even less workable.

This is not to say that long-lived firms with the stronger forms of asset partitioning were entirely absent from medieval and Renaissance Europe. Their most conspicuous development took place later, however, and not in Italy but in England.

VI. EARLY MODERN ENGLAND

In contrast to the vibrant city-states that dotted the medieval Italian peninsula, the English realm of the Middle Ages can be fairly called an economic backwater.¹²² Native industry was inconsiderable, and the nation's international trade, based almost entirely on export of raw materials such as wool, was mostly in the hands of foreign merchants living in enclaves such as London's Lombard Street.¹²³ The consequence was that English merchant law during that period lagged behind Italy's innovative practices.

With the Atlantic eclipsing the Mediterranean during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries as the source of new avenues of trade, eco-

¹²⁰ See, e.g., *id.* at 63, 311–12.

¹²¹ See WILLIAM M. BOWSKY, *A MEDIEVAL ITALIAN COMMUNE: SIENA UNDER THE NINE*, 1287–1355, at 254–57 (1981); EDWARD D. ENGLISH, *ENTERPRISE AND LIABILITY IN SIENESE BANKING*, 1230–1350, at 99–100 (1988); 2 SAPORI, *Le Compagnie Mercantili Toscane del Dugento e dei Primi del Trecento: La Responsabilità dei Compagni verso i Terzi*, *supra* note 87, at 804–05.

¹²² See, e.g., 5 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, *A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW* 67 (3d ed. 1982).

¹²³ *Id.*

conomic fortunes shifted northward, first toward the Low Countries and then in England's direction. The development of entity shielding proceeded apace.¹²⁴ By the end of the seventeenth century, England had become the commercial leader. It enjoyed a natural advantage in endowments of coal, which helped boost it to the van of the Industrial Revolution in the eighteenth century. Although institutional conservatism prevented English law from developing in lockstep with commerce, economic expansion eventually brought sufficient pressure to bear, and by the mid-nineteenth century the country had produced

¹²⁴ Although we do not pursue here the further evolution of law and commerce on the European Continent, we note that by the end of the sixteenth century, the City of Antwerp had enacted statutes that established entity shielding for partnerships. In relevant part, one of these statutes reads roughly as follows:

Concerning the Partnership and Jointly Held Property

1. Each member of a commercial partnership is jointly and severally liable for the debts of the partnership, but can seek indemnification from the partnership.
2. Each member of a partnership may, for the term of the partnership, incur debts and dispose of assets on its behalf.
3. Likewise, whenever merchants have different commercial partnerships in different places, one partnership and its assets are not liable for the debts of the other partnership.
4. Also, the creditors of one partnership, establishment, or shop have a prior claim on its assets over the creditors of another partnership, establishment, or shop.
5. The assets of a partnership may not be seized, executed upon, or subjected to liens to satisfy the personal obligations of its individual members.
6. But a personal creditor may lay claim to, and seize, a merchant's interest in a partnership that remains after all of the company's debts are discharged.

Impressae, Titel LII (1582), reprinted in 2 G. DE LONGÉ, COUTUMES DU PAYS ET DUCHÉ DE BRABANT: QUARTIER D'ANVERS 392, 392-95 (Brussels, Ministère de la Justice 1871).

A second statute, in relevant part, reads:

Concerning the Partnership and Jointly Held Assets

.....

25. So if one of the partners is indebted in his own name, even with regard to the dowry of his wife or similar privileged debts, the assets of the partnership are not liable, and may not be seized, paid out, or pawned, nor can they be paid out as compensation.
26. Similarly, when merchants have different partnerships, establishments, or shops in different locations, each partnership, establishment, or shop is not liable for the others' debts. Partnerships, establishments, or shops may not compensate or cross-subsidize one another.
27. But when the creditors of a partnership, establishment, or shop have been paid, if there is anything left over, those who are owed debts by individual partners or by their other partnerships, establishments, or shops may make their claim, whether this is by way of compensation or by the seizure and paying out of the assets, and each is to be paid according to the occasion, preference, or advantage of his debt.

Compilatae, Titel IX, § 2 (1609), reprinted in 4 G. DE LONGÉ, COUTUMES DU PAYS ET DUCHÉ DE BRABANT: QUARTIER D'ANVERS 173, 182-85 (Brussels, Ministère de la Justice 1874). Although it is not entirely clear, the reference in the statute to "partnership, establishment, or shop" (our translation of "compagnie, negotiatie, comptoor oft winckele") appears to establish location-based entity shielding of the form, described *supra* pp. 1368-69, found in medieval Italy. Preliminary research suggests that entity shielding of this form, created by municipal or local statutes, was common throughout Middle Europe at that time. We are grateful to Andreas Fleckner for his enterprising research into medieval and early modern municipal and local statutes on the Continent, and to Lisenka Van Holewinckel and Emily Kadens for help with translation of the statutes reproduced here.

useful, general-purpose commercial entities offering both weak and strong versions of entity shielding.

A. *The Early Joint Stock Companies*

England's most celebrated commercial enterprises at the beginning of the modern period were its joint stock companies, which led the nation's charge overseas for conquest and profit during the Age of Exploration. England was not, in fact, the joint stock company's creator — that distinction belonging to Genoa, which starting in the fourteenth century sold shares in state-backed monopolies engaged in a variety of ventures, including the mining of salt, the importation of coral, alum, and mercury, and, most spectacularly, the conquest of two Mediterranean islands.¹²⁵ Though innovative, these Genoese enterprises were relatively small affairs by modern standards, and indeed managed to operate under a rule whereby every owner had to consent to any sale of a firm's shares¹²⁶ — an arrangement that is feasible only if owners are not numerous. By contrast, the trade opportunities that opened during the sixteenth century to European nations with ocean access required fleets of deep-water ships and large overseas posts — and thus organizational forms capable of amalgamating capital pools of unprecedented scale.¹²⁷ While Portugal and Spain responded by organizing and funding intercontinental trade through the state,¹²⁸ the Dutch and especially the English followed the Genoese example of combining private investment with state-granted monopoly privileges. Guilds of traders, often operating through *commenda*-like arrangements, were issued charters that included exclusive privileges to trade in particular regions of the world.¹²⁹ Although these chartered companies at first divided the cargo among the investors at the end of each voyage,¹³⁰ the inefficiency of such frequent asset liquidations led the Dutch Estates General in 1623 to grant the Dutch East India Company perpetual existence.¹³¹ While shareholders lost their power to withdraw at will, they were compensated with a new right to sell their

¹²⁵ CIZAKCA, *supra* note 115, at 29–30; MITCHELL, *supra* note 88, at 138–39.

¹²⁶ CIZAKCA, *supra* note 115, at 31.

¹²⁷ See generally Barry Supple, *The Nature of Enterprise*, in 5 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE 393, 416–23 (E.E. Rich & C.H. Wilson eds., 1977) (discussing new challenges of scale in financing faced by merchants engaged in international trade at the close of the Middle Ages).

¹²⁸ E.L.J. Coornaert, *European Economic Institutions and the New World: The Chartered Companies*, in 4 THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF EUROPE 220, 228–29 (E.E. Rich & C.H. Wilson eds., 1967).

¹²⁹ 8 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 199–202 (2d ed. 1982); Samuel Williston, *History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800* (pt. 1), 2 HARV. L. REV. 105, 109 (1888).

¹³⁰ 8 HOLDSWORTH, *supra* note 129, at 193–94; Williston, *supra* note 129, at 110.

¹³¹ See CIZAKCA, *supra* note 115, at 46; Coornaert, *supra* note 128, at 258.

shares without the consent of other owners,¹³² a compromise that reconciled a company's need for fixed capital with a shareholder's need for liquidity. The success of this arrangement prompted imitation in England's own East India Company, as well as in several other joint stock enterprises chartered by the English Crown or Parliament in the seventeenth century.¹³³

The best evidence indicates that the English and Dutch chartered joint stock companies featured strong entity shielding, which would have equipped the companies to amalgamate large volumes of capital from many owners. These companies enjoyed liquidation protection against shareholders, who, as we indicate above, were required to surrender their withdrawal rights. And while direct evidence on the point is lacking, circumstances and logic suggest that these firms enjoyed liquidation protection against shareholders' personal creditors as well. The strongest evidence that these companies enjoyed liquidation protection against personal creditors, and thus strong entity shielding, is the fact that their shares were tradable. In the absence of liquidation protection against personal creditors, excessive borrowing by any owner would have threatened a firm's going-concern value, and thus given owners a collective interest in restricting membership in the firm. Fully tradable shares, by contrast, are consistent with a lack of concern about any given shareholder's personal borrowing habits, and thus with liquidation protection against personal creditors.¹³⁴ And the fact that shares could be seized and then sold by personal creditors would have provided a means to pay off the claims of the personal creditors of a bankrupt owner without forcing a payout from the firm itself. Similar logic explains why the death of a shareholder did not dissolve an English joint stock company¹³⁵ — the shares instead devolving to heirs¹³⁶ — even though the demise of a partner did dissolve an English partnership.¹³⁷

¹³² Coornaert, *supra* note 128, at 257–58.

¹³³ See 8 HOLDSWORTH, *supra* note 129, at 209; Williston, *supra* note 129, at 110.

¹³⁴ Another factor suggestive of strong entity shielding in the joint stock companies is that legal sources referred to those companies as “corporate” bodies. See, e.g., An Act for Better Securing Certain Powers and Privileges Intended To Be Granted by His Majesty by Two Charters for Assurance of Ships and Merchandizes at Sea, 6 Geo., c. 18, § 18 (1719) (Eng.). The terminology of incorporation then (as today) implied both perpetual existence and that the entity rather than its members owned the joint property. 3 WILLIAM HOLDSWORTH, A HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW 483–84, 489 (5th ed. 1982).

¹³⁵ See 8 HOLDSWORTH, *supra* note 129, at 202.

¹³⁶ Samuel Williston, *History of the Law of Business Corporations Before 1800* (pt. 2), 2 HARV. L. REV. 149, 163 (1888).

¹³⁷ ANDREW BISSET, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP INCLUDING THE LAW RELATING TO RAILWAY AND OTHER JOINT STOCK COMPANIES 83 (London, V & R Stevens 1847).

A notable common feature of these Genoese, Dutch, and English firms is that they typically enjoyed monopoly privileges, which was likely due to the perceived national importance of the activities in which they engaged. An interesting and open question is whether there is also a relationship between their monopoly privileges and the fact that these firms were among the first in Europe to feature strong entity shielding. It is possible that the scale of enterprise resulting from monopoly would have deepened the market for a firm's shares, thus increasing the attractiveness of share transferability relative to withdrawal as a source of liquidity. Another (and potentially complementary) hypothesis is that the state had an independent reason to endow these firms with liquidation protection because the firms as going concerns provided significant public benefits. The prospect of monopolistic revenues would then have been a device for attracting investors otherwise leery of control-person opportunism that could not be disciplined through shareholder withdrawal threats.

Owner shielding — in the form of full limited liability — was also available in the joint stock companies, a trait that carried over from their origins in the *commenda*. Importantly, however, full limited liability was not universal, at least in the English companies. Rather, the charters of English companies specified whether and when shareholders could be called upon to make additional capital contributions, a mechanism by which the degree of owner shielding could be varied to suit business necessity.¹³⁸ Not all chartered joint stock companies opted for full limited liability, an early illustration that limited liability is not a prerequisite of tradable shares.

An important implication of the English and Dutch chartered joint stock companies is that commercial firms had been established by the early seventeenth century with all of the elements of the modern business corporation: strong entity shielding, limited liability, and tradable shares. As we emphasize above, these elements are complementary, and it is thus unsurprising that they arose as a package. And this package proved popular, setting off a surge in applications for company charters.¹³⁹ The English Parliament was, however, restrained in its response, issuing only a few corporate charters in the first half of the eighteenth century, and only gradually picking up the pace thereafter.¹⁴⁰ Indeed, it would not be until the nineteenth century that English enterprises enjoyed a general right to the company form. Part of the explanation for this delay lies with interest-group politics, wherein

¹³⁸ See Williston, *supra* note 136, at 160; see also 8 HOLDSWORTH, *supra* note 129, at 204.

¹³⁹ Williston, *supra* note 129, at 111–12.

¹⁴⁰ *Id.*

incumbent firms sought protection against well-financed upstarts.¹⁴¹ But the types of charter that were granted suggest that Parliament also wished to protect creditors and small shareholders against the opportunism that rules of strong asset partitioning invite. Charters were most often awarded to firms that invested in large fixed assets, such as canals, that could not easily be opportunistically dissipated or diverted by control persons at the expense of owners or firm creditors. Meanwhile, in manufacturing, the sector most strongly associated with the Industrial Revolution, applications for corporate charters were usually rejected.¹⁴²

Parliament's grudging policy on charters likely caused merchants to seek other entity forms suited to the financial demands of England's commercial expansion. By the end of the seventeenth century, two such entities had been developed. One was the general partnership, reformed by common law courts to provide weak entity shielding. The other was the unincorporated joint stock company, constituted as a strong entity by grafting the trust form onto the partnership. The entity shielding provided by both of these forms would have made them useful for combining investment capital from multiple owners, thus increasing their attractiveness as the scale of enterprise expanded during the seventeenth, eighteenth, and nineteenth centuries. We address these entity forms in turn.

B. *Bankruptcy and Partnership in England*

As the theory we set forth in Part III suggests, and the commercial history of medieval Italy corroborates, a bankruptcy system is a precursor to the rule of weak entity shielding that characterizes the traditional partnership. But while the merchant class that controlled Italian city-states began constructing sophisticated bankruptcy systems in the thirteenth century, England's courts, less under the sway of the local commercial interest,¹⁴³ relied during the Middle Ages on more primitive methods for coaxing assets out of debtors. Throughout the medieval period, England more than most parts of Europe relied on imprisonment to pressure defaulting debtors into making good on obli-

¹⁴¹ See RON HARRIS, *INDUSTRIALIZING ENGLISH LAW: ENTREPRENEURSHIP AND BUSINESS ORGANIZATION, 1720-1844*, at 60-61 (2000) (discussing an incumbent firm's reaction to smaller "bubble" firms).

¹⁴² See BISHOP C. HUNT, *THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE BUSINESS CORPORATION IN ENGLAND 1800-1867*, at 16 (1936). Manufacturing, service, and financial firms that received charters were often, in effect if not in name, mutual companies or cooperatives owned principally or exclusively by suppliers or customers, who also would have been the firms' principal creditors. The identity of owners and creditors eliminated the hazard that one group might exploit the other. See, e.g., HENRY HANSMANN, *THE OWNERSHIP OF ENTERPRISE* 246-86 (1996) (discussing the historical development and role of banking and mutual insurance companies).

¹⁴³ 5 HOLDSWORTH, *supra* note 122, at 119.

gations.¹⁴⁴ And an insolvent debtor's assets went to the creditor who sued to attach them first, a procedure resulting in what a sixteenth-century Londoner described as a "first come, first served" system that conferred windfalls on whichever creditors were best positioned to learn of a merchant's misfortunes.¹⁴⁵ It is thus unsurprising that England — unlike Italy — appears not to have developed rules of weak entity shielding during the Middle Ages.¹⁴⁶

The prosperity of the sixteenth century brought heightened demand for reception of Southern Europe's more sophisticated rules of commercial law, including its rules of bankruptcy.¹⁴⁷ As with company charters, however, bankruptcy reform issued from Parliament sluggishly. A 1542 statute provided for the basic elements of a pro rata bankruptcy system,¹⁴⁸ and an act in 1571 empowered Chancery to appoint commissions, constituted in part of creditors, for valuing debtor estates, approving creditor claims, and apportioning assets.¹⁴⁹ Severe limitations, however, led to the system's infrequent use during the sixteenth century. For example, the system applied only to "traders" — a classification that did not include farmers, innkeepers, or mere shareholders of joint stock companies.¹⁵⁰ And the commissions could not discharge a debtor's remaining unpaid obligations upon distributing an estate, and thus provided little incentive to debtors to invoke them voluntarily.¹⁵¹ The system gradually improved, and thus experienced wider use, during the seventeenth century: statutes enacted in 1604 and 1623 enhanced the power of commissions to compel testimony and avoid pre-insolvency conveyances,¹⁵² and Chancery became active during the latter half of the century in reviewing commission rul-

¹⁴⁴ 8 HOLDSWORTH, *supra* note 129, at 231; *see also* 2 EDWARD CHRISTIAN, *THE ORIGIN, PROGRESS, AND PRESENT PRACTICE OF THE BANKRUPT LAW BOTH IN ENGLAND AND IRELAND* 8–9 (London, W. Clarke & Sons, 2d ed. 1818) (discussing broad powers of commissioners in sanctioning debtors and presenting cases in which the arrest of a debtor was sought).

¹⁴⁵ 8 HOLDSWORTH, *supra* note 129, at 231.

¹⁴⁶ *See* GERARD MALYNES, *CONSUETUDO, VEL LEX MERCATORIA OR THE ANCIENT LAW-MERCHANT* 160–61 (photo. reprint 1997) (1622) (suggesting that the rules of asset partitioning under the medieval law merchant were confined to the European continent).

¹⁴⁷ *See* 5 HOLDSWORTH, *supra* note 122, at 129.

¹⁴⁸ An Acte Againste Suche Persones as Doo Make Bankrupte, 34 & 35 Hen. 8, c. 4 (1542) (Eng.).

¹⁴⁹ An Acte Touchyng Orders for Banckruptes, 13 Eliz., c. 7 (1571) (Eng.).

¹⁵⁰ 8 HOLDSWORTH, *supra* note 129, at 237 n.4.

¹⁵¹ *Id.* at 240. The additional powers of commissions to imprison, pillory, and cut the ears off debtors also probably limited the frequency of their voluntary invocation. *Id.* at 238–39.

¹⁵² An Acte for the Discripcion of a Banckrupt and Reliefe of Credytors, 21 Jac., c. 19 (1623) (Eng.); An Act for the Better Reliefe of the Creditors Againste Suche as Shall Become Bankrupts, 1 Jac., c. 15 (1604) (Eng.); *see also* 1 EDWARD CHRISTIAN, *THE ORIGIN, PROGRESS, AND PRESENT PRACTICE OF THE BANKRUPT LAW* 27–30, 43 n.4 (London, W. Clarke & Sons 1812).

ings.¹⁵³ This last development led to the articulation of rules that increased the predictability of bankruptcy outcomes.

The most important such rule for our purposes was weak entity shielding for partnerships, which Chancery formalized in the 1683 case *Craven v. Knight*¹⁵⁴ by ruling that the assets of a bankrupt partnership must be applied first to the claims of partnership creditors, and that only the excess, if any, could be made available to the partners' personal creditors.¹⁵⁵ The *Craven* result was paired with a rule of weak owner shielding in 1715, when Chancery held in *Ex parte Crowder*¹⁵⁶ that a partner's personal creditors enjoyed first claim to the partner's personal assets, and that only those personal assets remaining after the personal creditors had been paid in full could be given over to creditors of the partnership.¹⁵⁷ The regime created by the combined holdings of *Craven* and *Crowder* is known as the "jingle rule," ostensibly because its symmetrical treatment of partnership and personal creditors makes it easy to remember. It remains in effect in England today, and was in force in the United States until 1978.¹⁵⁸

The rule of weak entity shielding established by *Craven* is taken for granted by modern scholars, and the case itself is all but forgotten.¹⁵⁹ But the change in the law was conspicuous to contemporaries. Early bankruptcy treatises make much of *Craven* and the subsequent decisions that reaffirmed its rule of entity shielding.¹⁶⁰ These treatises do not, however, provide a clear explanation for the result in *Craven*, nor for that matter the result in *Crowder*, and neither do the recorded opinions in those cases.

We believe that the *Craven* and *Crowder* decisions are best explained as complements to the English bankruptcy system, which by the late seventeenth century had reached an advanced stage of development. As we have indicated, rules of weak asset partitioning are inconsistent with a "first come, first served" method for distributing debtor assets because asset partitioning prioritizes creditors according

¹⁵³ See 8 HOLDSWORTH, *supra* note 129, at 244.

¹⁵⁴ (1683) 21 Eng. Rep. 664 (Ch.).

¹⁵⁵ *Id.* at 664.

¹⁵⁶ (1715) 23 Eng. Rep. 1064 (Ch.).

¹⁵⁷ *Id.* at 1064.

¹⁵⁸ See *supra* p. 1339.

¹⁵⁹ Notable exceptions are Joshua Getzler and Mike Macnair, who in a recent paper examine the case law development of the jingle rule in detail, and — using our terminology of asset partitioning — explore the sharp doctrinal struggles within the Court of Chancery over the rule. See Getzler & Macnair, *supra* note 66.

¹⁶⁰ See 1 CHRISTIAN, *supra* note 152, at 297; ARCHIBALD CULLEN, PRINCIPLES OF THE BANKRUPT LAW 459–73 (London, T. Cadell & W. Davies 1800); SOAME WHITTAKER, THE LAW OF BANKRUPTS, THEIR CREDITORS, AND ASSIGNEES: FROM THE ISSUING THE COMMISSION TO THE ALLOWANCE OF THE CERTIFICATE BY THE LORD CHANCELLOR 67 (London, J. Stratford 1801).

to the nature of their claims rather than when they assert them. England's adoption of weak asset partitioning thus probably could not have preceded the development of an effective bankruptcy system during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries. And the formalization of these rules was not possible before judicial review of bankruptcy commission rulings became common in the late seventeenth century.¹⁶¹ Once, in turn, an effective pro rata bankruptcy system was established, rules of weak asset partitioning would have reduced the costs of administering that system, increasing their likelihood of adoption. Indeed, the jingle rule made the procedures used in the seventeenth century for the bankruptcy of an English partnership particularly easy to administer. Under those procedures, the simultaneous bankruptcy of a partnership and its partners resulted in the appointment of a joint commission for the partnership and a separate commission for each individual partner. Creditors were required to choose only one commission — separate or joint — before which to press their claims.¹⁶² The jingle rule enabled each commission to distribute the assets under its purview independently of the decisions made by other commissions appointed upon the bankruptcy of the same partnership.

Further developments during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries permitted the English partnership to add a degree of liquidation protection to the priority rule recognized in *Craven*, and thus to transition from weak to strong entity shielding. Specifically, liquidation protection in the partnership arose through judicial enforcement of agreements among partners not to withdraw before the expiration of a specified term. Such agreements give rise to a so-called term partnership, as contrasted with the default rule of partnership at will, under which any partner could leave the partnership and withdraw his share of firm assets at any time. Term partnership agreements can be enforced in various ways,¹⁶³ but at least by the late nineteenth century England had settled on the particularly strict rule whereby a partner could neither withdraw any portion of firm assets nor renounce liabil-

¹⁶¹ Commission members included merchants, many of whom would have been familiar with Italian commercial practices. 5 HOLDSWORTH, *supra* note 122, at 129–35, 150; 8 HOLDSWORTH, *supra* note 129, at 207. There is therefore a possibility that commissions had been applying rules of weak asset partitioning on an ad hoc basis before Chancery formalized such a rule in its *Craven* decision.

¹⁶² See CULLEN, *supra* note 160, at 451–59.

¹⁶³ Enforcement regimes less severe than the one in effect in England by the late nineteenth century include allowing a partner who withdraws early to receive his share of net firm assets subject to an offset for breach of the partnership agreement, and allowing the partner to renounce liability for future but not past firm debts. In contrast with the English regime, American partnership law during the nineteenth century took an ambiguous position among these milder alternatives. See *infra* section VII.A, pp. 1388–94.

ity for future firm obligations before the specified term had expired.¹⁶⁴ This rule allowed English partners to opt for a significant degree of liquidation protection among themselves, at least for the duration of their agreement. A measure of liquidation protection against personal creditors appears to have been possible as well, by use of a clause in a partnership agreement specifying that a bankrupt partner's share would be paid out only through disbursements of partnership income made in the normal course of business. The best evidence suggests that courts would have allowed partnerships to modify the default rule, under which the bankruptcy of a partner dissolved even a term partnership and empowered the bankruptcy trustee to liquidate the partnership assets. Indeed, American courts later reached a similar conclusion, as we describe in the next section.¹⁶⁵

We defer our analysis of the likely reasons for the strengthening of the partnership to our discussion of the United States, where the partnership form underwent a similar transformation during the nineteenth century. For present purposes, it suffices to note that the addition of entity shielding to the partnership in England may at least partially explain why the partnership form was able to give the joint stock company such a long run for its money, remaining the dominant form of jointly owned enterprise until the twentieth century.¹⁶⁶

C. England's Proto-Corporation: The Unincorporated Joint Stock Company

The so-called unincorporated — meaning unchartered — joint stock company was a business form improvised to mimic the chartered company during a time when parliamentary obduracy and demand for the company form had combined to create a charter shortage. The attribute of the chartered company most coveted by investors appears to have been share tradability, which was reproduced with some success in the unincorporated companies through a union of the trust form and the partnership. The result was a partnership-like form whose assets were held in trust for the partners by trustees whom the partners had themselves selected.

¹⁶⁴ Only when the partnership was no longer viable and the withdrawing partner was not acting opportunistically would courts order early dissolution. See *Moss v. Elphick*, (1910) All E.R. Rep. Ext. 1202-03 (K.B.) (noting the rule's codification by the Partnership Act, 53 & 54 Vict., c. 39, § 32 (1890) (Eng.)); NATHANIEL LINDLEY, *A TREATISE ON THE LAW OF PARTNERSHIP* 646-50 (London, W. Maxwell & Son 1888) (describing the pre-1890 common law rule).

¹⁶⁵ Unfortunately, it seems that few English courts have ruled on this precise issue. We note, moreover, that the lack of clear authority would have made such liquidation protection against personal creditors less dependable than the liquidation protection offered by the corporation.

¹⁶⁶ Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, *supra* note 20, at 6.

The use of the trust form to achieve tradable shares is normally explained in terms of ease of litigation.¹⁶⁷ During the eighteenth century, an English partnership typically could initiate and answer lawsuits only through use of the names of all partners, which was a problem if share tradability kept the roster of partners in constant flux. The trust permitted suit in the names of the trustees, who remained the same even while shares changed hands.

While the trust certainly would have been useful in the litigation context, we believe that it may have enabled tradability of shares more directly by providing the unincorporated companies with strong entity shielding. As we note above, strong entity shielding facilitates share tradability because it, by dint of liquidation protection, allows shareholders to be unconcerned if shares fall into the hands of an insolvent investor. During the seventeenth century it likely became settled doctrine that a trustee's personal creditors could not levy on trust assets, even though the trustee held those assets in his own name.¹⁶⁸ English trust law also seems to have arrived by the seventeenth century at the modern rule for multi-beneficiary trusts whereby neither a beneficiary nor his creditors can force liquidation of trust assets,¹⁶⁹ such creditors instead enjoying at most a right to seize the beneficiary's share of the trust's periodic income distributions. In short, the trust by the late seventeenth century offered full liquidation protection, a trait that would have caught the eye of businessmen looking for a way to convert their partnerships into strong entities. For these reasons, we believe it to be no coincidence that the unincorporated joint stock companies first appeared in the 1680s, and proliferated thereafter.

Strong entity shielding was not, however, accompanied in the unincorporated companies by limited liability. The unincorporated companies would have enjoyed weak owner shielding no later than the *Crowder* decision of 1715 due to their utilization of the partnership form. But the mere addition of the common law trust probably was not a reliable means for raising the level of owner shielding to full limited liability, as indeed it would not be today.¹⁷⁰ Many unincorporated

¹⁶⁷ See HARRIS, *supra* note 141, at 147.

¹⁶⁸ In contrast to the English trust, the Islamic analogue, the *waqf*, was a highly rigid device that permitted little innovation and did not draw a bright line between the personal assets of the trustee and the assets of the trust. Timur Kuran has argued that these limitations prevented the *waqf* from evolving into a proto-business entity. See Timur Kuran, *The Provision of Public Goods Under Islamic Law: Origins, Impact, and Limitations of the Waqf System*, 35 LAW & SOC'Y REV. 841, 861-69 (2001).

¹⁶⁹ See, e.g., FREDERIC W. MAITLAND, *Trust and Corporation*, in SELECTED ESSAYS 141, 196-97 (H.D. Hazeltine et al. eds., 1936) (discussing the rights of creditors against members of a society built on a trust settlement).

¹⁷⁰ See Henry Hansmann & Ugo Mattei, *The Functions of Trust Law: A Comparative Legal and Economic Analysis*, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 434, 459-63 (1998).

companies therefore sought limited liability contractually, such as through clauses in agreements with firm and personal creditors, by specifying limited liability in the partnership agreement and on firm letterhead, and by including "limited" in the firm's name.¹⁷¹ But courts did not definitively endorse these measures until well into the nineteenth century, leaving a rule of limited liability for the unincorporated companies in doubt during most of the period in which they were important.¹⁷²

In addition to strong entity shielding, contemporaneous developments in financial markets would likely have catalyzed the trade in unincorporated company shares. Shares in the chartered companies were changing hands vigorously by the 1690s, largely due to an undertaking by the Bank of England and the East India Company to finance the rapidly expanding national debt through stock offerings.¹⁷³ The chartered South Sea Company, having abandoned overseas trade, attempted the same in 1713.¹⁷⁴ Each of these schemes was quickly followed by spikes in the number of unincorporated companies,¹⁷⁵ which likely were able to piggyback their share distributions on the stock market infrastructure that had arisen to support trade in the chartered firms. As with the chartered companies, robust trade in the shares of the unincorporated companies would also have reduced the cost of liquidation protection by making tradable shares a more effective alternative to withdrawal as a source of liquidity.

To be sure, only the largest chartered companies of the eighteenth century, and evidently very few of the unchartered variety, saw a level of trade in their shares that would be considered active by modern standards.¹⁷⁶ But liquidity is relative, and the benchmark here was the typical partnership interest, which in early modern England would have been largely illiquid due to its personal nature.

¹⁷¹ PAUL L. DAVIES, *GOWER'S PRINCIPLES OF MODERN COMPANY LAW* 32 n.65 (6th ed. 1997); HARRIS, *supra* note 141, at 140, 143; HUNT, *supra* note 142, at 100-01. The success of unchartered joint stock companies in achieving tradable shares despite the doubtful nature of their limited liability further illustrates that limited liability is not necessary for making shares tradable.

¹⁷² The larger unincorporated joint stock companies probably did enjoy a substantial degree of limited liability as a practical matter. As Gower puts it, personal shareholder liability was "largely illusory" because litigating against a large and shifting pool of investors was very costly under the partnership law of the time. DAVIES, *supra* note 171, at 32; see also RONALD RALPH FORMOY, *THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN COMPANY LAW* 36 (1923). In addition, wealthy shareholders with liability concerns could protect their personal assets by investing through intermediaries (known as stags) or neglecting to sign the company's deed of settlement. See DAVIES, *supra* note 171, at 32.

¹⁷³ See HARRIS, *supra* note 141, at 53-57.

¹⁷⁴ *Id.* at 56.

¹⁷⁵ See *id.* at 57-63.

¹⁷⁶ See *id.* at 118-27.

A famous effort to suppress the unincorporated companies took place in 1720 with the passage of the South Sea Company Act,¹⁷⁷ better known as the Bubble Act. That statute forbade unincorporated companies from selling shares and chartered companies from selling their charters or engaging in lines of business that their charters did not authorize.¹⁷⁸ While the Act remained on the books until 1825, there was only one effort to enforce it — in 1722 — during the entire eighteenth century.¹⁷⁹ The upshot is that the unincorporated companies continued to flourish despite their doubtful legality, to the point that nearly one thousand were operating in England at the beginning of the nineteenth century,¹⁸⁰ some with thousands of shareholder-partners. The success of these firms was an embarrassment to the paternalistic arguments of the Bubble Act's defenders, and thus set the stage for Parliament's accession to the modern corporate form.

D. General Incorporation Acts in the United Kingdom

More than a century's worth of pressure for a company form featuring both free availability and unclouded legitimacy finally induced Parliament in 1844 to enact a statute permitting incorporation as a matter of right.¹⁸¹ The statute also sought to remove the unincorporated companies from the margins of legality by requiring all partnerships with transferable shares or more than twenty-five members to register as public corporations and follow uniform disclosure rules.¹⁸²

The 1844 statute did not explicitly provide for strong entity shielding, apparently because by the nineteenth century that attribute was understood to be inherent in the company form. For example, an 1837 statute¹⁸³ empowering the Crown to grant unincorporated companies any of the privileges normally conferred in a charter of incorporation made strong entity shielding explicit,¹⁸⁴ presumably to make clear that such companies, though not fully incorporated, would nonetheless en-

¹⁷⁷ 6 Geo., c. 18 (1719).

¹⁷⁸ HARRIS, *supra* note 141, at 118–27.

¹⁷⁹ *Id.* at 78–79.

¹⁸⁰ See HUNT, *supra* note 142, at 87.

¹⁸¹ See *id.* at 94.

¹⁸² *Id.* at 94–98.

¹⁸³ An Act for Better Enabling Her Majesty To Confer Certain Powers and Immunities on Trading and Other Companies, 1 Vict., c. 73 (1837) (Eng.).

¹⁸⁴ Section 25 of the Act provides:

And be it enacted, That the Bankruptcy, Insolvency, or stopping Payment of any Officer or Member of such Company or Body in his individual Capacity shall not be construed to be the Bankruptcy, Insolvency, or stopping Payment of such Company or Body; and that the Property and Effects of such Company or Body, and the Persons, Property, and Effects of the individual Members or other individual Members thereof (as the Case may be), shall, notwithstanding such Bankruptcy, Insolvency, or stopping Payment, be liable to Execution or Diligence in the same Manner as if such Bankruptcy, Insolvency, or stopping Payment had not taken place.

joy the company form's standard rules of asset partitioning. Also, the 1844 statute reinforced entity shielding by imposing strong legal capital rules that were designed to prevent the draining of firm assets to the detriment of firm creditors. In particular, a company's paid-in capital could not be used for redemption of shares unless new shares were issued for the same amount, and a net reduction of capital was prohibited unless all objecting creditors were first paid off.¹⁸⁵ Although such legal capital rules would also have facilitated limited liability, the 1844 statute did not in fact permit that attribute. Only in 1855 was the statute amended to endorse limited liability, and even then it was optional.¹⁸⁶

Although Parliament had finally provided for incorporation as a matter of right, the partnership nonetheless remained the dominant form for enterprise for another half century or so. Only during the twentieth century did the corporate form become commonplace among even small- and medium-sized firms. The steps by which this change occurred, and the economic developments that likely impelled it, are most easily seen in the United States.

VII. THE MODERN PERIOD IN THE UNITED STATES

Notwithstanding the development of both weak and strong commercial entity forms by the mid-nineteenth century, the choices available to business owners remained limited. Although almost any jointly owned commercial firm could be (and by default usually was) a partnership, limitations on that form — such as a lack of complete liquidation protection and limited liability, shares that were not easily transferable, and the presumption that every owner was a firm agent — made it unsuitable for many businesses. The only other important option was the corporation, and while that form generally lacked the limitations of the partnership, it was burdened with other restrictions that hampered its use by small-scale enterprises.

At the end of the twentieth century, by contrast, commercial actors in many Western countries could fashion entities with almost any combination of key structural attributes. The intervening period was one of rapid transformation, in which legal systems both increased freedom of contract for internal firm affairs and broadened the supply of entity forms. The jurisdiction that best illustrates this transformation is the United States, both because the period corresponds with the nation's emergence as the world's leading commercial power, and because America ultimately experienced the greatest proliferation of commercial entity forms.

¹⁸⁵ See BISSET, *supra* note 137, at 188.

¹⁸⁶ HUNT, *supra* note 142, at 133-34.

A. *The Strengthening of the American Partnership*

Initially a weak entity on the model of *Craven* and *Crowder*, the American partnership had developed by the end of the twentieth century to the point where owners could opt both for strong entity shielding over a defined period and for limited liability.¹⁸⁷ Even where partners chose to retain their unilateral withdrawal right, American law provided the partnership a high degree of liquidation protection against personal creditors, thereby frequently preserving the firm's going-concern value upon a partner's insolvency. The growth of the partnership into a modern commercial entity offering both strong entity shielding and complete owner shielding corresponds with developments, such as superior accounting and valuation techniques and greater commercial sophistication among courts, that protected owners and creditors alike.

By the early nineteenth century, most American states had followed England in adopting the jingle rule for the division of partnership assets, thus lending the American partnership weak degrees of both entity and owner shielding.¹⁸⁸ Pursuant to this regime, courts initially held that personal judgment creditors of a partner could demand immediate liquidation of partnership assets and reduction of the partner's share to cash, even if the partnership was for a defined term that had yet to expire or the partners had otherwise agreed among themselves to restrict liquidation.¹⁸⁹ To reconcile a personal creditor's right to demand liquidation with the partnership creditors' prior claim to partnership assets, courts as a matter of course appointed a receiver and assumed oversight of partnership assets when a partner became insolvent.¹⁹⁰

Courts were aware, however, that forced liquidation could entail significant destruction of going-concern value,¹⁹¹ and thus by the mid-nineteenth century began seeking alternative devices for accommodating the claims of personal creditors. A personal creditor's primary

¹⁸⁷ As we observe above, *see supra* note 45, Lamoreaux and Rosenthal explain the choice between the partnership and corporate forms in the late-nineteenth-century and early-twentieth-century United States as a tradeoff between the protection from minority oppression offered by the partnership and the ability to lock in capital offered by the corporation, both consequences of the absence of a withdrawal right (liquidation protection against owners) in the corporation as opposed to the partnership. Though that is a reasonable rough view, liquidation protection in the partnership was, as we discuss here, in fact a more complicated matter. So, too, was minority protection via the withdrawal right in the corporation, as we note in our references to appraisal rights and oppression remedies. *See infra* note 241 and accompanying text.

¹⁸⁸ *See, e.g.,* *Pierce v. Jackson*, 6 Mass. (5 Tyng) 242, 243 (1810).

¹⁸⁹ *See, e.g.,* *Renton v. Chaplain*, 9 N.J. Eq. 62, 64 (Ch. 1852); *Marquand v. President of the N.Y. Mfg. Co.*, 17 Johns. 525, 528-29 (N.Y. 1820).

¹⁹⁰ *See* *Randall v. Morrell*, 17 N.J. Eq. 343, 346 (Ch. 1866).

¹⁹¹ *See, e.g.,* *Renton*, 9 N.J. Eq. at 64.

form of redress became sale of the partner's interest; forcing the partnership to reduce that interest to cash required the additional and sometimes lengthy step of a suit for an accounting.¹⁹² State legislatures, in turn, empowered courts with equitable devices, such as garnishment and constructive seizure, to substitute for liquidation.¹⁹³ This culminated in the late nineteenth century in the creation of the judicial charging order, under which a defaulting partner's management and control rights were preserved but his income stream was diverted to a personal creditor until the unpaid claim was satisfied.¹⁹⁴ Although a creditor with a charging order could compel liquidation of the partnership after foreclosing on the partner's share,¹⁹⁵ foreclosure required judicial approval, which normally was denied unless the income stream was unlikely to suffice in a reasonable time.¹⁹⁶ Moreover, under the Uniform Partnership Act¹⁹⁷ (UPA) — promulgated in 1914 and thereafter adopted by almost every state — a creditor who foreclosed upon a share could not force liquidation of a partnership for a term until the term had expired.¹⁹⁸ Some courts applying UPA have recently demonstrated a reluctance to allow foreclosure even upon a partnership at will unless the remaining partners have consented or the court determines that a forced sale will not “unduly interfere with the partnership business.”¹⁹⁹

While UPA did provide for dissolution of the partnership upon the formal bankruptcy of a partner,²⁰⁰ this seems to have been intended more to protect the remaining partners and the partnership creditors than to make assets available to personal creditors. UPA did not explicitly allow a bankrupt partner's trustee to force liquidation, although it did empower him to petition a court for a liquidation order.²⁰¹ Some bankruptcy courts have recently been reluctant to grant

¹⁹² Cf. *Deal v. Bogue*, 20 Pa. 228, 234 (1853) (holding that a judgment creditor of one partner may not seize and sell partnership property before the partnership is dissolved).

¹⁹³ A. MECHELE DICKERSON, RICHARD B. HAGEDORN & FRANK W. SMITH, JR., *THE LAW OF DEBTORS AND CREDITORS* § 6.86, at 6-258 (2005).

¹⁹⁴ J. Dennis Hynes, *The Charging Order: Conflicts Between Partners and Creditors*, 25 PAC. L.J. 1, 3-4 (1993).

¹⁹⁵ *Id.* at 4-5.

¹⁹⁶ See *infra* notes 201-02 and accompanying text.

¹⁹⁷ 6 U.L.A. 275 (2001).

¹⁹⁸ UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 32(2)(a), 6 U.L.A. 404; HAROLD GILL REUSCHLEIN & WILLIAM A. GREGORY, *THE LAW OF AGENCY AND PARTNERSHIP* 516, 526 (2d ed. 1990).

¹⁹⁹ *Hellman v. Anderson*, 284 Cal. Rptr. 830, 838 (Ct. App. 1991); see also *Centurion Corp. v. Crocker Nat'l Bank*, 255 Cal. Rptr. 794, 797 (Ct. App. 1989) (permitting a sale when the remaining partner consented); *FDIC v. Birchwood Builders, Inc.*, 573 A.2d 182, 185 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1990) (holding that courts should be “circumspect” in ordering foreclosure pursuant to a charging order).

²⁰⁰ UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 31(5), 6 U.L.A. 370.

²⁰¹ See *id.* § 37, 6 U.L.A. at 470 (stating that any partner's legal representative or assignee, “upon cause shown, may obtain winding up by the court”).

such petitions, however, emphasizing that typically a trustee can instead convert the partner's interest to cash by selling it.²⁰² And when a partner undergoes Chapter 11 reorganization rather than Chapter 7 liquidation, most courts have held that state laws adopting UPA's automatic-dissolution provision conflict with the purposes of the federal bankruptcy code and thus are unenforceable.²⁰³

An interesting aspect of these developments is the possibility of partnerships exhibiting a degree of liquidation protection against partners' personal creditors that is even stronger than the degree exhibited against the partners themselves. The question whether partners enjoy a withdrawal right is primarily one of contractual interpretation, and courts normally would have little reason to override an agreement among partners to permit dissolution at will. But a personal creditor's right to force dissolution of a partnership is ultimately a question of property law, giving courts (and legislatures) greater latitude to fashion remedies that both protect the interests of personal creditors and preserve a firm's going-concern value. This allows for the possibility of liquidation protection against personal creditors even when such protection against partners themselves is, by their own choice, lacking. In this way, American law treats liquidation protection against personal creditors not as a mere backstop to liquidation protection among owners, but rather as a valuable device in its own right, providing additional protection to the going-concern value of a business.

As American law moved away from automatic payout of an insolvent partner's share, it also became more tolerant of alternatives to liquidation for fixing the value of that share. Courts had traditionally viewed conversion of all assets to cash through public auction as the most accurate way to ascertain a firm's value.²⁰⁴ Accordingly, UPA provided for full liquidation in most instances when a partner left a

²⁰² See, e.g., *Cutler v. Cutler (In re Cutler)*, 165 B.R. 275, 280-82 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1994); see also *Manning v. Nuthatch Hill Assocs.*, 831 F.2d 205, 210 n.10 (10th Cir. 1987) (raising the question whether the Bankruptcy Code preempts Colorado's provision that bankruptcy of a partner dissolves the partnership). But see *Turner v. Cent. Nat'l Bank*, 468 F.2d 590, 591 (7th Cir. 1972) (per curiam) (commenting that the trustee of a partner may demand payout of the partnership interest after an accounting and the payment of partnership debts).

²⁰³ See *Siegal v. Siegal (In re Siegal)*, 190 B.R. 639, 646 (Bankr. D. Ariz. 1996); *LeRoux v. Summit Inv. & Dev. Corp. (In re LeRoux)*, 167 B.R. 318, 320-22 (Bankr. D. Mass. 1994); *Nizny v. Nizny (In re Nizny)*, 175 B.R. 934, 939 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1994); *In re Cardinal Indus., Inc.*, 116 B.R. 964, 982 (Bankr. S.D. Ohio 1990); *In re Corky Foods Corp.*, 85 B.R. 903, 904 (Bankr. S.D. Fla. 1988); *In re Rittenhouse Carpet, Inc.*, 56 B.R. 131, 133 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1985). But see *Catron v. Catron (In re Catron)*, 158 B.R. 624, 628-29 (Bankr. E.D. Va. 1992); *Harms v. Harms (In re Harms)*, 10 B.R. 817, 821 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1981); *Durham v. Sw. Developers Joint Venture*, 996 P.2d 911, 917 (N.M. Ct. App. 1999).

²⁰⁴ See *Creel v. Lilly*, 729 A.2d 385, 392 (Md. 1999) (discussing the traditional preference for liquidation); accord *Davis v. Davis*, 366 P.2d 857, 859 (Colo. 1961).

firm.²⁰⁵ During the twentieth century, however, courts began permitting less costly valuation methods, such as division of assets in kind or buyout of the departing partner's share according to a formula.²⁰⁶ Courts initially endorsed such alternatives only when the partnership lacked outstanding debt,²⁰⁷ but in the late twentieth century even this qualification was relaxed.²⁰⁸ Consistent with this development, the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 1994 (RUPA) provides for buyout of a partner's share — by either the partnership or a third party — rather than liquidation in many instances where the partner dissociates but the partnership continues.²⁰⁹

With liquidation no longer viewed as the only or even best way to accommodate the interests of personal creditors, the conceptual path was clear for full enforcement, against partners as well as third parties, of agreements among partners to waive their withdrawal rights and thereby imbue a partnership with strong entity shielding. Partners had long been able to create a significant degree of liquidation protection among themselves, largely because they could deduct damages from the cash payout owed a partner who withdrew early from a partnership for a term.²¹⁰ But UPA codified an even better remedy by recognizing a term partnership's ability, with leave of court, to dispatch a prematurely exiting partner with a bond rather than cash.²¹¹ And RUPA goes even further by shifting the burden to the partner who disassociates "wrongfully" (that is, early) to prove that immediate buyout will not cause "undue hardship to the business"; otherwise, the partner gets nothing until completion of the specified term or undertaking.²¹² RUPA also states that dissociation because of a partner's personal bankruptcy is wrongful,²¹³ and thus makes clear that the trustee of a bankrupt partner in a defined-term partnership has no right to immediate payout of the partner's share. The upshot is that partners now may opt for strong entity shielding, including liquidation protection against both themselves and their personal creditors, at least for the duration of a specified term or undertaking.

²⁰⁵ UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 38(1), 6 U.L.A. 487; *see also* Dreifuert v. Dreifuert, 280 N.W.2d 335, 337 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979).

²⁰⁶ For an early example, *see Dow v. Beals*, 268 N.Y.S. 425, 427 (Sup. Ct. 1933).

²⁰⁷ *See Logoluso v. Logoluso*, 43 Cal. Rptr. 678, 682 (Dist. Ct. App. 1965); *Rinke v. Rinke*, 48 N.W.2d 201, 207 (Mich. 1951); *Nicholes v. Hunt*, 541 P.2d 820, 827-28 (Or. 1975).

²⁰⁸ *See Manning v. Nuthatch Hill Assocs.*, 37 B.R. 755, 760 (Bankr. D. Colo. 1984), *modified*, 831 F.2d 205 (10th Cir. 1987); *Arnold v. Burgess*, 747 P.2d 1315, 1322 (Idaho Ct. App. 1987).

²⁰⁹ *See* REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 701 (1996).

²¹⁰ *See* Ribstein, *supra* note 19, at 194.

²¹¹ UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 38(2)(b), 6 U.L.A. 487 (2001).

²¹² REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 701(h).

²¹³ *Id.* § 602(b)(2)(iii).

Besides continuing to enhance the power of partners to achieve strong entity shielding, American law in the late twentieth century also provided a new option with respect to owner shielding. Although states had made the limited partnership available since the nineteenth century, that form provided limited liability only to the passive partners. During the 1990s, however, every state enacted a Limited Liability Partnership (LLP) statute that empowered active partners to opt for limited liability as well.²¹⁴ LLP statutes otherwise largely incorporate RUPA, including its provisions for entity shielding.²¹⁵ Interestingly, the introduction of the LLP came shortly after federal law had eliminated even weak owner shielding for partnerships.²¹⁶ These movements of federal and state law, pushing the degree of owner shielding in the partnership in seemingly opposite directions, are reconcilable when understood as pursuing the common goal of increasing options for business owners. When the partnership was the only option for small firms, weak owner shielding provided a reasonable tradeoff: it inhibited opportunism toward firm creditors by making partners personally liable for firm debts, and it also facilitated personal borrowing by granting a partner's creditors first claim to his personal assets. But changes in the corporate form during the twentieth century made that form more useful to small-business owners. Because the corporation provides limited liability, these changes allowed federal lawmakers to refashion the partnership for dedicated use by owners who wish to maximize firm creditworthiness through full pledges of their personal assets in support of firm debts. By enacting the LLP statutes, the states then provided owners the further option of combining complete owner shielding with the other attributes of a partnership.

American partnership law thus now offers strong entity shielding for a defined term as well as complete owner shielding. These attributes come à la carte: partners may opt for either, neither, or both. And even if partners do not opt for liquidation protection among themselves, the law — by use of the charging order and other innovations

²¹⁴ ALAN R. BROMBERG & LARRY E. RIBSTEIN, BROMBERG AND RIBSTEIN ON LIMITED LIABILITY PARTNERSHIPS, THE REVISED UNIFORM PARTNERSHIP ACT, AND THE UNIFORM LIMITED PARTNERSHIP ACT (2001), at § 1.01(e), at 15 (2005). The LLP form is also available to limited partnerships, giving rise to the Limited Liability Limited Partnership (LLL), in which both general and limited partners enjoy owner shielding. *Id.* §§ 5, 5.02, at 191, 195–96.

²¹⁵ *Id.* § 1.01(e), at 15 & app. B. Four states — California, Nevada, New York, and Oregon — allow the LLP form to be used only by professional firms, such as those of lawyers or accountants. CAL. CORP. CODE § 16101(8)(A) (West Supp. 2006); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 87.020(8) (LexisNexis 2004); N.Y. P'SHIP LAW § 12-1500(a) (McKinney Supp. 2006); OR. REV. STAT. § 67.500(a) (2003).

²¹⁶ See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 723, 92 Stat. 2549, 2606–07 (codified at 11 U.S.C. § 723 (2000)).

— affords partnerships a high degree of liquidation protection against partners' personal creditors.

Several contemporaneous developments appear to have contributed to the strengthening of the American partnership over the last two centuries. One theme running through the history is increased reliance upon sophisticated accounting techniques and other methods for valuing a business. For example, in the early twentieth century, courts and legislatures generally countenanced valuations based only on book value or other methods that excluded "good-will,"²¹⁷ and were thus, because they omitted going-concern value, no better than a liquidation sale. By contrast, RUPA's buyout provision explicitly requires consideration of going-concern value,²¹⁸ thus authorizing a potentially more accurate approach. Increases in the accuracy and reliability of valuation methods may also explain RUPA's greater reliance on buyout rather than liquidation for paying out a departing partner's share. Similarly, more accurate valuation methods would tend to decrease the implied discount rate applied to a business's future income stream, thus making courts more willing to rely upon the charging order to satisfy claims of personal creditors. For the same reason, a partner's share should now fetch a higher price if sold, increasing the attractiveness of sale relative to withdrawal as a device for providing liquidity to the claims of an owner or his personal creditors.

A related trend is an increase in the effectiveness and thus usefulness of courts as arbitrators of internal partnership disputes. Both UPA and RUPA enable judges to order dissolution on "equitable" grounds, including for conduct by a partner that makes continuing the business impracticable.²¹⁹ Courts equipped with superior valuation techniques should be better able — and thus more willing — to undertake an assessment of whether a partner's conduct as a firm manager should be enjoined as contrary to the interests of his copartners. The availability of such judicial review would, in turn, make partners more willing to forgo the right of unilateral withdrawal as a means for policing exploitative conduct.

Better valuation techniques, combined with the power of courts to order liquidation for cause, would reduce the costs of strong entity shielding among owners. Increased confidence among American courts in their ability to value partnership interests and arbitrate internal firm disputes would also increase their willingness to deny attempts by personal creditors to force liquidation of even a partnership at will — that is, to impose a rule of liquidation protection against per-

²¹⁷ UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 38(2)(c)(II), 6 U.L.A. 487–88 (2001); *see also, e.g.*, *Dow v. Beals*, 268 N.Y.S. 425, 427 (Sup. Ct. 1933).

²¹⁸ REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 701(b) (1996).

²¹⁹ UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 32(1)(d), 6 U.L.A. 404; REVISED UNIF. P'SHIP ACT § 801(5)(ii).

sonal creditors even in the absence of a rule of liquidation protection against owners. American courts seem to view themselves as competent to make an independent assessment of whether devices such as the charging order are sufficient to protect the interests of personal creditors and thereby render liquidation unnecessary.

American law has not yet taken the seemingly ultimate step of permitting partnerships that feature strong entity shielding in perpetuity rather than for just a specified term or undertaking. One possible reason is that perpetual existence may seem inappropriate in a form in which the identity of the individual owners is critical because each is a presumptive firm agent. But whatever the cause, the inconvenience to commercial actors may be slight. By the late twentieth century, American law had developed alternatives to the partnership that were useful to small firms and that combined strong degrees of asset partitioning with the possibility of perpetual existence. We turn to those alternatives now.

B. The Company Form in the United States

As with the partnership, the history of the company form in the United States is a story of widening choices for owners and thus of greater power for firms of all sizes to opt for strong forms of owner and entity shielding. Although at first useful primarily to large and capital-intensive firms, the American company form evolved into a preferred means of legal organization for even small and closely held businesses.

In the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, state legislatures granted charters primarily to the same kinds of firms that Parliament had typically allowed to incorporate: those that built and ran canals, bridges, and turnpikes.²²⁰ But American states were less stingy than Parliament in granting charters, and they were also quicker to enact general incorporation statutes. New York led the way in 1811, and other states quickly followed.²²¹

These statutes imposed restrictions on the corporate form designed to compensate for the loss of the withdrawal right that attends strong entity shielding. Firms were not permitted to restrict alienation of shares,²²² thereby guaranteeing shareholders an alternative source of liquidity. And prohibitions on allocating control and income sepa-

²²⁰ See EDWIN MERRICK DODD, *AMERICAN BUSINESS CORPORATIONS UNTIL 1860*, at 11 (1954). See generally JOSEPH STANCLIFFE DAVIS, *ESSAYS IN THE EARLIER HISTORY OF AMERICAN CORPORATIONS* (1917).

²²¹ DODD, *supra* note 220, at 64. Also, Massachusetts in 1809 had enacted a statute that facilitated incorporation by textile mills. Blair, *supra* note 22, at 419 n.108.

²²² See, e.g., *Sargent v. Franklin Ins. Co.*, 25 Mass. 90, 96-97 (1829); *Chouteau Spring Co. v. Harris*, 20 Mo. 382, 388 (1855); *Brightwell v. Mallory*, 18 Tenn. (10 Yer.) 196, 198 (1836).

rately from shareholdings (such as statutory provisions restricting the issuance of preferred stock),²²³ and on one corporation's owning the shares of another,²²⁴ sought to impede blocs of shareholders from seizing or abusing control to the disadvantage of noncontrolling shareholders. Such forms of investor protection help explain why firms in capital-intensive industries sought incorporation in the nineteenth century notwithstanding the significant degree of liquidation protection offered by the term partnership at that time.²²⁵

While formal rigidities in the corporate form may have helped larger firms raise equity capital, they also made incorporation unattractive to smaller firms. Flexibility in allocating ownership, control, and income rights is important in small firms, as is the ability to restrict alienation of shares given that the identity of individual shareholders can be important for firm governance. The greater risk that a small firm will be commandeered, or incapacitated by deadlock if two or more owners have equal holdings, also makes loss of the withdrawal right more costly, as does the fact that an efficient market in a small firm's shares is less likely to form. Finally, the benefits of strong entity shielding tend to be lower when owners are fewer and thus better able to monitor one another's patterns of personal borrowing. In these ways, capital intensiveness, diffuse ownership, and strong entity shielding are mutually reinforcing. Consequently, relatively few small firms incorporated during the nineteenth century, leaving the partnership as the dominant commercial entity of the period.²²⁶

²²³ Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, and Pennsylvania all imposed restrictions on the issuance of preferred stock between 1870 and 1900. These restrictions chiefly consisted of requirements of supermajority approval by shareholders of issuances of preferred stock (three-quarters in Massachusetts; two-thirds in New Jersey) and limitations on the proportion of stock that could be special or preferred. See Act of May 9, 1870, ch. 224, § 25, 1870 Mass. Acts 154, 160-61; Act of Apr. 7, 1875, §§ 25, 33, N.J. REV. STAT. (1875); Act of May 18, 1892, ch. 688, § 47, 1892 N.Y. Laws 1824, 1837; Act of Apr. 3, 1872, No. 28, § 1, 1872 Pa. Laws 37.

²²⁴ See *De La Vergne Refrigerating Mach. Co. v. German Sav. Inst.*, 175 U.S. 40, 54-55 (1899) (noting that New York statutory law then prohibited a corporation from owning the shares of another, and that purchases of stock in other firms generally were considered beyond the power of a corporation absent a specific statutory grant); *accord Hazelhurst v. Savannah, Griffin & N. Ala. R.R. Co.*, 43 Ga. 13, 57-58 (1871); *People ex rel. Peabody v. Chi. Gas Trust Co.*, 22 N.E. 798, 799 (Ill. 1889); *Robotham v. Prudential Ins. Co. of Am.*, 53 A. 842, 846 (N.J. Ch. 1903).

²²⁵ Another reason for preferring incorporation would have been its default rule of limited liability, which would in turn have facilitated share tradability.

²²⁶ See Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, *supra* note 20, at 6 (noting that partnerships remained the dominant business form in the nineteenth century even in manufacturing, and that partnerships tended to be much smaller than corporations). Partnership then, as today, would also have been a better option for owners who wished to pledge their personal assets in support of firm debt.

Another company-like entity — the limited partnership — was available in most states in the nineteenth century.²²⁷ Like the corporation and its medieval forebear, the *accomandita*, the American limited partnership allows for the separation of management from ownership, as limited partners are not firm agents and may not participate in management.²²⁸ Indeed, limited partners originally could not vote on partnership matters, making them even weaker than corporate shareholders.²²⁹ Disabling limited partners was seen as necessary to their limited liability at a time when creditors expected that those engaged in a firm's operations could be called to account for firm debts. As we described in our discussion of premodern limited partnerships, however, passivity also made limited partners particularly vulnerable to exploitation by general partners. Perhaps to compensate for this vulnerability, limited partners usually enjoyed a circumscribed statutory withdrawal right, such as payout after six months' notice as long as the firm clearly retained enough capital to pay its debts.²³⁰ But such attempts to balance protection of passive investors with maintenance of going-concern value — resulting in a semi-strong form of entity shielding — were apparently insufficient, as the limited partnership was not widely adopted in America in the nineteenth century.

The transformation of the American company form began in the late nineteenth century with an easing of the corporation's formal rigidities, such as restrictions on the free alienability of shares.²³¹ This made the form more attractive to small and closely held firms, whose rates of incorporation rose accordingly. The transformation continued during the twentieth century, by the middle of which a closely held business corporation could be structured with great flexibility.²³²

During the second half of the twentieth century, repeated cuts to the top personal income tax rate ultimately brought it well below the

²²⁷ New York again came first, enacting a limited partnership statute in 1822. Most other states enacted similar statutes over the next thirty years. See UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT explanatory note, at 3 (1916).

²²⁸ See, e.g., CAL. CORP. CODE § 15632 (West 1991 & Supp. 2006); N.Y. P'SHIP LAW § 121-303 (McKinney Supp. 2006).

²²⁹ FRANCIS J. TROUBAT, THE LAW OF COMMANDATARY AND LIMITED PARTNERSHIP IN THE UNITED STATES 281-82, 294-95 (Phila., James Kay, Jun. & Bro. 1853).

²³⁰ See UNIF. LTD. P'SHIP ACT § 16.

²³¹ See, e.g., *Johnston v. Laffin*, 103 U.S. 800, 803-04 (1880) (noting the power of firms to place reasonable restrictions on the transfer of shares); *Bloomington v. Bloomington*, 177 N.Y.S. 873, 878 (Sup. Ct. 1919) (upholding a right of first refusal in current shareholders for proposed stock sales).

²³² See, e.g., *Searles v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co.*, 145 A. 391, 393 (Me. 1929) (holding that bylaws restricting alienation of stock, accepted with knowledge thereof, will be upheld, particularly when the restraint is for a limited period); *State ex rel. Manlin v. Druggists' Addressing Co.*, 113 S.W.2d 1061, 1063 (Mo. Ct. App. 1938) (permitting "reasonable" restrictions on a shareholder's right to transfer stock).

corporate tax rate. The result was to make incorporation of small firms much less attractive, and hence to create demand among small businesses for entity forms that provided the strong entity and owner shielding of the corporation without being taxed like one. One response was the introduction by state legislatures of new strong entity forms, such as the limited liability company (LLC)²³³ and the statutory business trust. Another was to graft limited liability onto the existing partnership forms, resulting in the limited liability partnership (LLP) and the limited liability limited partnership (LLLLP).²³⁴ Among these new forms, the LLC has proven far more popular than the LLP and the LLLL for general enterprise, evidently in part because it provides a stronger degree of entity shielding.²³⁵

The LLC in its current form in fact imposes even fewer formalities on a firm than does the corporation. But the most flexible entity of all is the statutory business trust, which Delaware introduced in mature form in 1988.²³⁶ While it explicitly provides for both strong entity shielding and full limited liability,²³⁷ the business trust leaves owners free to specify all other matters of organizational design, including control rights, allocation of earnings, and even fiduciary duties.²³⁸ In fact, the Delaware business trust statute does not even offer default terms for most of these basic structural elements. The business trust effectively represents the minimum required of law in creating a strong entity — asset partitioning and, in particular, strong entity shielding — and leaves the rest to be determined by contract.²³⁹ The business trust can thus be seen as the final step in the historical evolution of commercial entities.

²³³ See, e.g., ALA. CODE §§ 10-12-1 to -61 (1999 & Supp. 2005); CAL. CORP. CODE §§ 17000-17700 (West Supp. 2006); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 156C (2004).

²³⁴ See, e.g., DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, §§ 17-101 to -1111 (1999 & Supp. 2004); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 14-9-100 to -1204, 14-9A-1 to -130 (2003); N.Y. P'SHIP LAW § 226 (McKinney Supp. 2006).

²³⁵ The LLC, for example, allows a firm to adopt strong entity shielding in perpetuity. See BROMBERG & RIBSTEIN, *supra* note 214, § 1.04(c), at 24.

²³⁶ 66 Del. Laws 514 (1988).

²³⁷ DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 12, § 3803(a)-(b) (2001) (providing for limited liability for beneficial owners and no personal liability to third parties for trustees); *id.* § 3805(b) ("No creditor of the beneficial owner shall have any right to obtain possession of, or otherwise exercise legal or equitable remedies with respect to, the property of the statutory trust."); *id.* § 3805(g) (same for trustees); *id.* § 3808(b) ("[T]he death, incapacity, dissolution, termination or bankruptcy of a beneficial owner shall not result in the termination or dissolution of a business trust.").

²³⁸ Most provisions in Delaware's Statutory Trust Act (formerly the Business Trust Act), including those pertaining to ownership and management structure, fiduciary duties, and the allocation of trust property, contain the qualification "[e]xcept to the extent otherwise provided in the governing instrument of the statutory trust," or words to similar effect. See, e.g., *id.* §§ 3805(a), 3806(a), 3808(a).

²³⁹ The Delaware Statutory Trust Act specifies that its policy is "to give maximum effect to the principle of freedom of contract and to the enforceability of governing instruments." *Id.* § 3825(b).

The formal restrictions on the traditional corporate form were designed to protect noncontrolling shareholders from the hazards of strong entity shielding and firm creditors from the hazards of limited liability. The easing of these restrictions, and consequent wider use of the company form, reflects the development of effective alternatives for protecting both groups. As with the transformation of the partnership, the new sources of protection appear to have been better information about firms, superior accounting and valuation methods, and greater sophistication of courts in arbitrating internal firm disputes. The improvement in information about firms resulted from multiple factors, including federal income tax reporting (following adoption of the corporate income tax in 1913), mandated disclosure under stock exchange rules and government regulation, and broader use of credit rating agencies. Such information, when combined with the superior valuation techniques that resulted from improvements in financial theory and analysis, deepened equity markets and increased the effectiveness of transferability of shares as a liquidity substitute for withdrawal in smaller firms. Better information and valuation also impeded controlling shareholders from siphoning off firm assets through self-dealing and fraud. For the same reasons, courts were better equipped to rule on petitions by noncontrolling shareholders for relief from exploitation.²⁴⁰ In particular, the twentieth century saw an expansion of judicial and statutory devices for protecting equity investors, such as the recognition of fiduciary duties flowing from majority to minority owners; appraisal (that is, buyout) rights when a firm undergoes a significant transaction, with shares valued by accounting

²⁴⁰ Contrary to the analysis we offer here, Lamoreaux and Rosenthal suggest that judicial enforcement of fiduciary duties of controlling shareholders and corporate managers became weaker over the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. See Lamoreaux & Rosenthal, *supra* note 20, at 21–28. They argue that the shift from the partnership to the corporate form occurred despite this change principally because of an increase in profitable opportunities for firms capable of locking in capital. *Id.* at 28–29. The primary support they offer for this increasing legal laxity is a claim that all transactions by corporate directors and officers involving a conflict of interest were automatically voidable in the early nineteenth century, while courts by the late nineteenth century had become willing to investigate the merits of such transactions before ruling on their validity. See *id.* at 23–28. This doctrinal shift, if it in fact occurred, seems best explained not as an increase in laxity, but rather — consistent with our thesis here — as the replacement of a rigid rule with a more sophisticated standard for preventing abuse by control persons. Indeed, Lamoreaux and Rosenthal note that substantive judicial investigations into conflicted transactions included comparisons of amounts paid by corporations to market prices, *id.* at 27, a fact suggesting greater judicial comfort with financial analysis. We are, moreover, skeptical that early fiduciary duty doctrine was as rigid as they suggest. See, e.g., Norwood P. Beveridge, Jr., *The Corporate Director's Fiduciary Duty of Loyalty: Understanding the Self-Interested Director Transaction*, 41 DEPAUL L. REV. 655, 659–660 (1992) (quoting an 1843 treatise that expressly sanctioned self-dealing by corporate managers and directors). We note, finally, that our own view regarding the evolution of legal oversight of corporate affairs is more consistent with Lamoreaux and Rosenthal's basic theory, which focuses on a subset of the factors we consider here.

rather than liquidation sale; and “shareholder oppression” remedies — including forced dissolution — for noncontrolling shareholders of closely held corporations.²⁴¹

In general, the various factors that increased protection for noncontrolling shareholders — especially better information and valuation techniques — have redounded to the benefit of noncontrolling owners and firm creditors alike. Noncontrolling owners are in important respects more vulnerable than creditors to control-person opportunism, as the value of their residual claim on assets depends more on accounting and reporting practices by firm managers than does the value of the prior and fixed claims of creditors. A firm able to attract equity investors notwithstanding liquidation protection thus a fortiori should be able to attract creditors notwithstanding limited liability. This helps explain why the new strong entity forms such as the LLC and the statutory business trust, with the virtually unrestricted freedom they allow in structuring ownership rights, can offer limited liability as their default rule.

Success in protecting entity creditors and investors, however, has exacerbated another entity-related problem: the costs that profligate entity shielding can impose on an owner’s personal creditors. These costs, and the ways courts and legislatures respond to them, will likely shape the next chapter in the evolution of legal entities.

VIII. CONCLUSION: THE UNRESOLVED PROBLEMS OF ENTITY SHIELDING

The nearly unlimited plasticity of strong entities made possible by contemporary U.S. business law is the inverse of Roman law’s insistence on the flesh-and-blood individual, and especially the *pater familias*, as the only legitimate holder of assets and obligor on debts. A confluence of legal, accounting, and valuation developments, as well as the widespread availability of low-cost credit information, have made the costs of protecting creditors and owners manageable even for the smallest American LLCs and closely held corporations. This confluence of factors has made contemporary America qualitatively different in many ways from previous societies, as exemplified by the severing of the traditional link between a business owner’s enjoyment of limited liability and his passivity — a link strong enough to persist from Roman times to well into the modern era. Although Rome obviously

²⁴¹ For thorough documentation of the rise of such devices for protecting shareholders, see Robert B. Thompson, *The Shareholder’s Cause of Action for Oppression*, 48 BUS. LAW. 699 (1993). Other useful sources include Edward B. Rock & Michael L. Wachter, *Waiting for the Omelet to Set: Match-Specific Assets and Minority Oppression in Close Corporations*, 24 J. CORP. L. 913 (1999); and Robert B. Thompson, *Corporate Dissolution and Share-Holders’ Reasonable Expectations*, 66 WASH. U. L.Q. 193 (1988).

lacked many of modern America's tools for protecting investors in an enterprise, the widespread Roman institution of the *peculium* indicates that Rome's courts were capable of distinguishing the assets of slave-managed firms from the personal assets of the *pater familias*. Nevertheless, Roman law used entity shielding sparingly, apparently restricting it mostly to the specialized *societas publicanorum*. Whether this reluctance to deploy entity shielding reflected a deep anticommmercial cultural norm, a low demand for legal entities, or something else remains an important unanswered question.

Unlike ancient Rome, medieval Italy — an intensely commercial society with a strong demand for credit — readily embraced weak entity shielding. Yet even the Italian city-states were unwilling to go further and adopt strong entity shielding for general-purpose commercial firms, suggesting strongly that cost factors were binding constraints on the supply of entity shielding. Even weak entity shielding was locational rather than firm-based in medieval Italy, evidently because the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts and the monitoring abilities of merchants were necessarily local. Similarly, strong entity shielding was facilitated during the Middle Ages by the single-voyage nature of merchant ventures and the clear boundaries on firm assets provided by the hulls of merchant ships. The relationship between strong entity shielding and monopoly also manifested itself in the special medieval Genoese companies and formed a bridge to the joint stock companies of the early modern period. This is a relationship that is persistent but whose specific, cost-side mechanics demand further historical inquiry.

In England, the expanding jurisdiction of nationwide courts during the seventeenth century dramatically reduced the cost of introducing firm-wide weak entity shielding into partnership law, and may even have forced this innovation as a means of reducing the costs of administering bankruptcies. Similarly, the development of markets in the shares of chartered joint stock companies, as well as the development of partnership and trust law, allowed entrepreneurs to create home-made strong entities in the form of unchartered joint stock companies. Thus, the role of declining costs is clear in the rise of entity shielding under English law, even if an account of complex interest group politics is necessary to explain the delayed appearance of general incorporation statutes more than a century after the passage of the Bubble Act in 1720.

It thus appears that cost factors have played a prominent role in the development of entity shielding in every society we have investigated, although in each period — and in ancient Rome in particular — they must share the stage with other factors. A point worth noting, however, is that in every period except that of ancient Rome, we have been concerned chiefly with the costs and benefits of entity shielding either to the owners and creditors of firms or to the courts. We have focused on these particular costs and benefits because they have the

greatest capacity to explain the rise of entity shielding in the West over the last millennium. But the case of the Roman *peculium*, which may not have had entity shielding, is a reminder that entity shielding affects not only a firm's creditors, but also the personal creditors of the firm's owners. Moreover, it is the costs that entity shielding imposes on personal creditors that provide a point of intersection between the Roman *peculium* and the flexible rules of entity formation found in the contemporary United States.

These particular costs arise because entity shielding subordinates the claims to entity assets of an individual's personal creditors without obtaining their consent or even, indeed, giving them specific notice. This feature of entity shielding is why it requires organizational law rather than just contract, and why it is so effective in solving the transaction cost and moral hazard problems that would otherwise attend the creation of the pattern of creditors' rights seen in contemporary business forms. But the ability to impair the interests of personal creditors without their consent is also why entity shielding presents a greater opportunism hazard than does owner shielding, including limited liability in particular. It is relatively easy to ensure that creditors know in advance that they are dealing with a limited liability entity, thereby enabling them to adjust the interest rate they charge and to impose contractual limitations on the entity's structure and conduct. The experience of the past two centuries has established the effectiveness of legal rules that assist entity creditors in forming and protecting their expectations regarding firm assets. But the subordination of personal creditors without notice presents different and perhaps thornier problems. These problems have not been central to the evolution of organizational law in the past, since they are strongly constrained in firms with multiple owners and relatively rigid structures. However, the increasing freedom in entity creation has brought them to the fore.

Two important manifestations of these problems are already apparent: the rise of elaborate group structures with tangles of entities that mar the transparency of business enterprises, and the increasing use of entity forms by wealthy individuals to thwart the legitimate claims of personal creditors. Consider the first of these — the increasing occurrence of unitary enterprises subpartitioned into hundreds or even thousands of separate asset pools, each protected by some degree of entity shielding. As the recent bankruptcies of Enron and WorldCom demonstrate, this subpartitioning of assets and liabilities into entities controlled by the firm but often absent from the firm's balance sheet greatly diminishes investors' ability to evaluate the firm's financial condition. An elevated risk of fraud is one cost of such profligate asset partitioning. A second, equally important cost is that unsecured lenders to parent companies face increased difficulty in monitoring the assets that bond their claims. A third cost is the heightened complexity of bankruptcy proceedings, in which courts must reconcile the compet-

ing claims of the parent company's creditors and the creditors of hundreds of subsidiaries.

One response to these costs is the unsettled doctrine of substantive consolidation, by which a bankruptcy court sets aside part or all of the subsidiary structure of a corporate group, and thus in effect scales back or entirely cancels asset partitioning within the overall asset pool.²⁴² Another response with a similar effect is to override the subsidiary structure of a corporate group by making security in all of a group's subsidiaries available for debtor-in-possession financing, a measure that benefits the enterprise as a whole at the expense of those creditors who relied upon the entity status of individual subsidiaries.²⁴³ Just as the administrative costs of bankruptcy played a critical role in the emergence of strong entity shielding three centuries ago, bankruptcy law is likely to set limits on entity shielding and entity proliferation within today's corporate groups. It is critical, however, that when bankruptcy courts apply entity-trimming doctrines such as substantive consolidation, they do so with a healthy appreciation for the history and economic functions of entity shielding.

The second manifestation of the notice problem implicates a somewhat different set of costs — the costs of debtor opportunism vis-à-vis individual creditors. Recall from Part IV that Roman law may have withheld entity shielding from the *peculium*, an institution that limited the liability of the *pater familias* for the debts of a slave-managed business. As we argue above, the presumptive reason why entity shielding might have been withheld was to guard against the risk that a failing Roman patriarch would stuff his personal assets into the businesses of his sons and slaves to the detriment of his personal creditors. But precisely this maneuver has today become increasingly easy for well-heeled and legally sophisticated American burghers. States now compete in offering to households “asset protection trusts,” mechanisms designed to make entity shielding available to frustrate personal creditors.²⁴⁴ The availability of such vehicles raises the question whether, in the twenty-first-century world of easy entities, the venerable safeguards against fraudulent transfers go far enough to protect personal creditors. Again, the response to this kind of opportunistic use of entity shielding may have to come through federal bank-

²⁴² See, e.g., *In re Owens Corning*, 316 B.R. 168 (Bankr. D. Del. 2004), *rev'd*, 419 F.3d 195 (3d Cir. 2005) (invoking the substantive consolidation doctrine to void subsidiary cross-guarantees of parent debt benefiting bank creditors at the expense of tort creditors).

²⁴³ See, e.g., *In re Babcock & Wilcox Co.*, 250 F.3d 955 (5th Cir. 2001) (extending debtor-in-possession (DIP) financing to an entire group, although particular subsidiaries may not require financing, with the use of the group's assets as collateral for superpriority DIP financing).

²⁴⁴ See Larry E. Ribstein, *Reverse Limited Liability and the Design of Business Associations*, 30 DEL. J. CORP. L. 199 (2005); Robert H. Sitkoff & Max Schanzenbach, *Jurisdictional Competition for Trust Funds: An Empirical Analysis of Perpetuities and Taxes*, 115 YALE L.J. 356 (2005).

ruptcy law, although the most recent amendments to the Bankruptcy Act are not heartening in this respect.²⁴⁵

These observations imply that although the law has successfully addressed one constraint on the formation of strong entities — the need to protect entity creditors and investors — it is just beginning the task of sorting through a second constraint: the need to protect third-party creditors unaffiliated with the entity itself. This task may ultimately require a rich and subtle jurisprudence, both inside and outside of bankruptcy. We expect these problems of entity shielding to play a dominant role in the next phase of the evolution of organizational law.

²⁴⁵ The Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-8, 119 Stat. 23 (amending scattered sections of 11 U.S.C.), generally strengthens the position of creditors at the expense of consumer debtors, in large part by shifting individual cases from Chapter 7 to Chapter 13. Despite the crackdown on consumer debtors, however, nothing in the 2005 Act affects the limits of asset protection trusts, except the extension of the Bankruptcy Code's fraudulent conveyance "reachback" provision from one to two years. *See id.* § 1402, 119 Stat. at 214-15.