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Le Mensonge; ?tude de Psycho-Sociologie Pathologique et Normale.

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presented at once. The following classification is given: There are three kinds of combinations which are fundamental in explaining the relations of consciousness to the external world; (1) elements may be inseparably connected for perception yet separately conceivable, (2) elements which can be perceived separately may be combined so as to produce an entirely new and distinct quality of sensation, (3) different qualities of sensation may be combined to form a single object. The perception of objects in groups does not fall within this classification, and is an experience of an altogether different sort. That experience is the result of analysis and not of synthesis. The process is this: (1) the perception of an undivided whole, (2) the analysis of that whole into parts — this involves temporal succession; (3) setting the parts into a correspondence with the number series for the convenience of description and fixation by association. When this has been done enough times to firmly establish the association the process is no longer necessary, and the observer may come to think he directly perceives the number.

The tendency to move in order to aid perception is attributed to the desire to restimulate the sense organs, and is not regarded as evidence of a motor element in sensation. The observer moves his muscles because he has control of them and he has not control of the stimulating object. If he had control of the latter he could accomplish the same thing by moving it. Movement has a direct effect upon sensation only in so far as it is an object of sensation.

No attempt is made to discover how many things can be perceived at once. The question is rather, what are the factors which influence the perception of number.

THE AUTHOR.

SOCIAL AND INDIVIDUAL.

Le Mensonge; Étude de Psycho-Sociologie Pathologique et Normale. G. L. DUPRAT. Paris, Alcan, 1903. Pp. 190. 18mo.

This study of lying has grown out of a lecture delivered primarily in the interests of the 'Société libre pour l'étude psychologique de l'enfant.' It includes a classification of various kinds of lying, and a study of the psychological, physiological and social causes which produce the habit of deception. The primary classification is that of positive and negative, the former including inventions, fictions, simulations, additions, distortions and exaggerations, the latter dissimulation, denial, suppression of evidence, omission, mutilation and attenu-

ation. In concrete cases, there are of course frequently both aspects of falsification. In an examination of cases undertaken by the society above named, there were found to be 42 negative, 131 positive, and about 75 mixed cases. More interesting is the study of conditions which give rise to lying. The study of pathological cases and of children leads the author to this formulation: "Lying may be due either, on the one hand, to all sorts of tendencies, appetites or repulsions, which act either as impelling forces, or as obsessions, or as principles of systematization in minds imperfectly organized as regards the coherence of their ideas, and their psychological continuity, or on the other hand, to a defect of higher intellectual or social sentiments." It is notable that in 136 cases of lying observed among children, 75 were caused by fear and 24 by pride, self-love or boasting. The conclusion from the first figures, for the parent and educator, is very evident: that if he wishes to combat successfully the lying habit in children, he must beware of appealing to fear, since this is by far the chief cause of the habit.

Lies which may be classed under the general head of boasting or more or less æsthetic modifications of bare facts are closely allied to the free use of imagination in poetry and fiction. The 'make-believe' element which is common to both is a part of the natural play-impulse of the child and is one avenue through which freedom of mental functioning finds expression. As this in general means a breaking up of the ordinary or habitual associations in favor of free invention, it is favored by complexity of experience, so that Ribot's law applies here: 'The tendency to spontaneous variation (invention) is always in inverse ratio to the simplicity of the environment.' The complicated situations of modern life tend, therefore, to supply the conditions for greater invention on the child's part and therefore for greater ability to deceive.

Among social causes for lying are mentioned especially the pressure of group or collective life in party or church or in the less organized crowd, the conventions of society, and the organization of the press, which though composed of men who individually are honest, is very deceptive in its reports of news. Contrary to frequently expressed opinions, the author finds no decided racial preeminence in either lying or truthfulness. Different races merely have different forms. Savages especially exhibit craft or cunning not so much among themselves as in dealings with the greater strength of civilized races. Whatever of truth underlies the common opinion that women are less truthful than men, is traced not to any sexual difference but rather to the necessity which woman frequently experiences

of meeting a greater physical force, or else to the artificial conditions of present civilization which tend to check her free development. In the latter case, as in the cases of members of sects and parties, above noted, the most potent cause is seen to be lack of independence. The educator or parent, therefore, who wishes successfully to combat tendencies to deception, so far as they proceed from this source, should foster independence of judgment, both intellectual and moral, in every way possible. Where, on the other hand, lying arises from egoism or cupidity, the reliance must rather be upon the cultivation of the higher sentiments which are able to inhibit the lying impulse. It is, however, noteworthy that a certain sort of lies which are very common among children spring not from egoistic tendencies but rather from the spirit of solidarity in the group, which prevents the child from betraying his companions.

The study is one which deserves the reading of both parents and teachers.

L'Ennui, Étude Psychologique. Émile Tardieu. Paris, Alcan. 1903. Pp. viii + 297.

This is a very elaborate classification and exposition of the various forms of ennui, especially those which are prevalent in modern life. The ennui of exhaustion, the ennui caused by lack of variety, by satiety, by narrowness of interests, the ennui peculiar to various ages, to woman, and to various characters, are treated in detail and illustrated from literature and life. A few brief suggestions as to remedies for ennui are added in a concluding chapter, but the author is apparently not very sanguine as to their effectiveness, for he concludes that 'ennui will go on ever increasing and opposing itself to the final triumph of the good.' If ennui is a less pressing problem to the American than to the citizen of the old world, the study is nevertheless interesting to the psychologist and the student of literature.

Essai de Classification Naturelle des Caractères. Ch. Ribéry. Paris, Alcan. 1902. Pp. xxiv + 199. 3 fr. 75.

Among the various signs — religious, psychological, metaphysical and pedagogical — of the shift in stress of attention toward the voluntary and emotional aspects of experience, may be included the studies of 'characters,' several of which have recently appeared: Perez, 'Le Caractère de l'enfant à l'homme,' 1891; Paulhan, 'Les Caractères, 1894; Fouillée, 'Temperament et caractère,' 1895; Malapert, 'Les Éléments du caractère,' 1897; not to mention incidental treatment

in works of more general type, such as Ribot's 'Psychology of Feeling.' Of the above, Perez classifies characters as quick, slow, intense, etc., using the motor organization as a basis. Fouillée and Malapert make three main classes, based on the relative dominance of feeling, intellect or will, while Paulhan distrusts the possibility of finding sufficiently constant connections between the various tendencies found in different individuals to justify any such simple scheme of classification. The present author, in a somewhat extended preface, opposes the view of Paulhan, and in the body of his work proceeds from two fundamental principles: (1) The basis for character must be sought in physical temperament; (2) intellect cannot be assigned a position among the primary characteristics. Intellect is at most of secondary importance; sensibility and will are fundamental. The function of the idea is merely to provide for the organization of the sentiments or volitions.

A classification of temperaments is first offered, based on the general tests of relative promptness and intensity of reaction in the sensitive and motor systems respectively, and to the various combinations afforded by these criteria is added a class 'Amorphous,' to include those capable neither of deep nor permanent impressions and with low capacity for motor reaction. Ranged on the basis of relative stability and unity the temperaments would then take the following order: Amorphous, sensitive (subdivided into 'reaction prompt and less intense, and reaction slow and intense'), sensitive-active, active (subdivided into choleric, with reaction prompt and intense, and phlegmatic, with reaction slow and less intense), temperate or well-balanced. The characters corresponding to these temperaments are:

Amorphous.

Sensitive { Affective. / Emotional { Unstable. / Stable.

Sensitive-Active { Affective-passionate. / Emotional-passionate.

Active { Passionate { Unstable. / Stable. / Dispassionate { Feeble. / Strong.

Well-balanced.

In the above terms, it should be noted perhaps that the author uses affective to indicate a sensitive nature which responds promptly and feebly, while an emotional nature implies a deeper seizure and slower reaction.

As regards the propriety of excluding the intelligence from the classification of characters, it would seem to be a question largely of how much one wishes to include. That some persons are so predominantly reflective and analytic in their temper as to have this properly included in a characterization, seems to me unquestionable. Such persons are placed by the author in the class of 'strong, dispassionate' natures, but this certainly does not necessarily carry with it the other implication. Many interesting literary and historical illustrations are presented by the author.

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Zur Psychologie der gebundenen und der freien Wortstellung. P. BARTH. Philosophische Studien, Bd. XIX. 1902. Pp. 22–48.

In almost all languages the order of words in a clause is strictly conventional. The order is fixed in all the Indo-Chinese languages, in the Chinese at least since Confucius, in the Ural-Altaic family of tongues, in the Bantu family, in the languages of America (both in those which, like the Iroquois, distinguish between the sentence and the word and also virtually in those of the intercalative type) in the Malay-Polynesian family, in the Semitic family and in the non-poetical Sanscrit prose. The word-order of the clause is, of course, predetermined in such languages as the Chinese, which is so lacking both in prefixes and suffixes that the grammatical relations of subject, verb and object can be indicated only by the sequence. It is more remarkable that the order should be rigidly conventionalized in languages so rich in inflection as is the Arabic and especially as is the Sanscrit. With the fixed order of the Sanscrit prose, the varied sequences of the classical Latin and Greek seem in marked contrast. Greek clauses show a greater freedom in the arrangement of words than is permitted in any other language, and the literary Latin also allows a wide variation. Nevertheless in the Latin of the common people, as we find it in Plautus or in aphorisms or legal maxims, and in the colloquial Latin of the educated classes, as we find it in Terence, there is a marked tendency toward uniformity. The order is subject, verb, object, or subject, object, verb. In language at large this is the most common order in declarative sentences. The Malay-Polynesian and Semitic languages are exceptional in their tendency to put the verb before the subject.